The world of ancient magic

Papers from the Norwegian Institute at Athens 4

The world of ancient magic

Papers from the first International Samson Eitrem Seminar
at the Norwegian Institute at Athens, 4–8 May 1997

Edited by

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

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Foreword

TO HONOUR THE MEMORY of Samson Eitrem on the 125th anniversary of his birth in 1872, an international conference on *Magic in the ancient world* was held 4–8 May 1997, at the Norwegian Institute at Athens. An important partner in the organization of this conference was the Faculty of Arts at the University of Oslo, Professor Eitrem's *alma mater*. The choice of theme will not come as a surprise to those familiar with the work of Samson Eitrem. As is well known, a substantial part of his scholarly life was devoted to the study of ancient magic and divination.

The organizing committee consisted of Professor Erik Østby, director of the Norwegian Institute at Athens, and, from the University of Oslo, Professors Siri Sande and Hugo Montgomery. David Jordan was included as an associate on account of his familiarity with the field and his contacts with other scholars working on problems connected with ancient magic.

The chief aim of the conference was to provide a forum for a wide range of contemporary approaches to the study of magic in the ancient world. We also thought it fitting to have a personal glimpse of Samson Eitrem, and for this we turned to Professor Knut Kleve, who belongs to the last generation of Norwegian scholars to come into contact with him as an academic teacher. Further, Samson Eitrem's interpretations of magical practice in a well-known passage from Virgil was the theme of Professor Egil Kraggerud's contribution.

In the spirit of Eitrem, the conference gave room for several approaches to the theme, ranging from the general and theoretical to the documentary and specific, from curse tablets to divination, and from classical Greece to Viking Scandinavia.

Samson Eitrem was Norway's greatest classical scholar. The papers in this volume show the continuing vitality of a field of study whose foundations he himself helped lay.

The editors are grateful to Dr. Ingunn Lunde, who gave important technical assistance and advice during the production of this volume. The Eitrem Fund, as well as the Faculty of Arts at the University of Oslo, have provided financial support.

David Jordan *Hugo Montgomery* *Einar Thomassen*

Abbreviations

AAA. *Ἀρχαιολογικά ἀνάλεκτα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν*
ABSA. *Annual. British School at Athens*
ADAW. *Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*
AE. *L'année épigraphique*
AGP. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*
AHB. *The Ancient History Bulletin*
AJA. *American Journal of Archaeology*
AJPh. *American Journal of Philology*
ANRW. H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin 1972ff.)
AOF. *Altorientalische Forschungen*
APF. *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete*
A&R. *Atene e Roma*
ARW. *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*
BAB. *Bulletin de l'Académie royale de Belgique: Classe de Lettres*
BASP. *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists*
BCH. *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*
BFLL. *Bibliothèque de la Faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège*
BICS. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* (Univ. London)
BIFAO. *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale*
BLR. *The Bodleian Library Record*
BRM. A.T. Clay, *Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpoint Morgan* I–IV (New York 1912–23)
BullÉp. *Bulletin épigraphique* (annually in *REG* 1888ff.)
ByzZ. *Byzantinistische Zeitschrift*
CAAG. M. Berthelot and C.-É. Ruelle, *Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs* (Paris 1887)
CAF. T. Kock, *Comicorum atticorum fragmenta* (Leipzig 1880–8)
CCAG. F. Cumont et al., *Catalogus codicum astrologorum graecorum* I–XII (Brussels 1898–1936)
CE. *Chronique d'Égypte*
CIL. *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin 1863ff.)
CIS. *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum* (1881ff.)
CJ. *Classical Journal*
ClA. *Classical Antiquity*
C&M. *Classica et Medievalia*
CMAG. J. Bidez et al., *Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques grecs* (Brussels 1924–32)
CPh. *Classical Philology*
CRAI. *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres.*
CQ. *Classical Quarterly*
CR. *Classical Review*
CW. *The Classical World*
DAGR. C.V. Daremberg and E. Saglio (eds.), *Dictionnaire des antiquités greques et romaines* (Paris 1877–1919)

DDD. K. Van der Toorn, B. Becking, and P.W. van der Horst (eds.), *Dictionary of deities and demons in the Bible* (Leiden 1995)
DK. H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* I–III ([17]Berlin 1974)
DTAud. A. Audollent, *Defixionum tabellae quotquot innotuerunt tam in graecis orientis quam in totius occidentis partibus praeter Atticas in* Corpore Inscriptionum Atticarum *editas* (Paris 1904, rpt. Frankfurt-am-Main 1967)
DTWü. R. Wünsch, *Defixionum tabellae in Attica regione repertae* (*IG* III.3, Berlin 1897)
EA. *'Αρχαιολογικὴ 'Εφημερίς / 'Εφημερὶς 'Αρχαιολογική*
EBGR. *Epigraphic Bulletin for Greek Religion, 1987ff., in Kernos 4 (1991) ff.*
FHG. C. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (Paris 1841–70)
FGrHist. F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin/Leiden 1923–58)
GB. *Grazer Beiträge: Zeitschrift für die klassische Altertumswissenschaft*
GDI. H. Collwitz and F. Bechtel, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften* (Göttingen 1884–1915)
GGR. M.P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I. *Die Religion Griechenlands bis auf die griechische Weltherrschaft* (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft* 5.2.1, [2]Munich 1955, rpt. with a supplement as 3rd ed., 1967)
GMA. R. Kotansky, *Greek magical amulets: The inscribed gold, silver, copper, and bronze lamellae*, I. *Published texts of known Provenance* (*PapColon* 22.1; Opladen 1994)
GMPT. H.D. Betz (ed.), *The Greek magical papyri in translation, including the demotic spells*, I. *Texts* (Chicago/London 1985)
G&R. *Greece and Rome*
GRBM. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Monographs*
GRBS. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HSCPh. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
HThR. *Harvard Theological Review*
ICS. *Illinois Classical Studies*
IDélos. *Inscriptions de Délos* (Paris 1926–72)
IG. *Inscriptiones Graecae*
IGAS. R. Arena, *Iscrizioni greche arcaiche di Siciliae Magna Grecia* (Milan 1989)
IGDS. L. Dubois, *Inscriptions grecques dialectales de Sicile: Contribution à l'étude du vocabulaire grec colonial* (*Collection de l'École française de Rome* 119; Rome 1989)
IKnidos. W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Knidos* I (Bonn 1992)
IKyzikos. E. Schwertheim, *Die Inschriften von Kyzikos und Umgebung*, I. *Grabtexte* (*Inscriften Griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 18; Bonn 1980)
ILS. H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones latinae selectae* (1892–1916)
JbAC. *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum*
JBL. *Journal of Biblical Literature*
JEA. *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JHS. *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES. *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JÖAI. *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts in Wien*
JÖByz. *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*
JRS. *Journal of Roman Studies*
JWI. *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*
KAR. E. Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiösen Inhalts* (*Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft* 28.1–4, 34.1–5; Leipzig 1915, 1923)
KLNM. *Kulturhistorisk leksikon for nordisk middelalder fra vikingtid til reformasjonstid* (Oslo 1956–78)
LIMC. *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae* (Zürich 1981ff.)
LS. C.T. Lewis and C. Short, *A Latin dictionary* (Oxford 1879)
LSJ. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H.S. Jones, *A Greek-English lexicon* ([9]Oxford 1940)
MAMA. *Monumenta Asiae Minoris antiqua* (Manchester 1928ff.)

MD. Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici
MDAI(A). Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung
MemPontAcc. Atti della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia: Memorie
MH. Museum Helveticum
ML. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century* BC (Oxford 1969)
NAWG. Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen: Philologisch-historische Klasse
NHC. Nag Hammadi codices
NHLE. J. Robinson (gen. ed.), *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* ([3]Leiden/San Francisco, 1988)
NIYR. Olsen, M. et al. (eds.), *Norges innskrifter med de yngre runer*, 1ff. (Oslo 1941ff.)
NJA. Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik
OLD. P.W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1968–76)
PAAH. Πρακτικά τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας
PapColon. Abhandlungen der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (from vol. 22 *Abhandlungen der Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*), *Sonderreihe Papyrologica Coloniensia*
PBSR. Papers of the British School at Rome
PCG. R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae comici graeci* (Berlin/New York 1983ff.)
PCPhS. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
PG. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus, series Graeca*
PLLS. Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar
PLRE. A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale and J. Morris, *The prosopography of the later Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1971)
RAC. Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (Stuttgart 1950ff.)
RE. G. Wissowa *et al.* (ed.), *Paulys Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft: Neue Bearbeitung* (Stuttgart 1894–1980)
REG. Revue des études grecques
RendPontAcc. Atti della Pontifica Accademia Romana di Archeologia: Rendiconti
RFIC. Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica
RGVV. Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten
RhM. Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
RPh. Revue de philologie
RSA. Rivista storica dell'antichità
RSO. Rivista degli studi orientali
RSR. Recherches de science religieuse
SB. Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten (Berlin 1926ff.)
SCI. Scripta classica Israelica
SDAW. Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Philol.-hist. Kl.
SEG. Supplementum epigraphicum graecum (Leiden 1923ff., Alphen aan den Rijn, Amsterdam 1979ff.)
SGD. D.R. Jordan, 'A survey of Greek defixiones not included in the special corpora,' *GRBS* 26 (1985) 151–97
SO. Symbolae osloenses
SupplMag. R. W. Daniel and F. Maltomini, *Supplementum magicum* (*PapColon* 16:1–2; Opladen 1990–92)
TAPhA. Transactions of the American Philological Association
TDSG. M. del Amor Lopez Jimeno, *Las tabellas defixionis de la Sicilia griega* (Amsterdam 1991)
TGF. A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* ([2]Leipzig 1889)
TLL. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Leipzig 1900ff.)
TrGF. B. Snell, R. Kannicht and S. Radt (eds.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Göttingen 1971–85)

TSMB. R.S.O. Tomlin, 'The curse tablets,' in B. Cunliffe (ed.), *The temple of Sulis Minerva at Bath*, 2: *The finds from the sacred spring* (*Oxford University Committe for Archaeology Monographs* 16; Oxford 1988):59–277

WJA. Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft

WKPh. Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie

ZDMG. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

ZPE. Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Samson Eitrem 1872–1966.
'Jeg står bare på terskelen til antikken ...'

Samson Eitrem—on the threshold of antiquity[1]

Knut Kleve

HUMAN LIFE, says Schopenhauer, is mostly miserable and short. The relatively happy are so only apparently, or they are, like the longlived, rare exceptions, for whom there also had to be a possibility—as enticement.[2] Eitrem may be regarded as such an enticement, in the double meaning. He became nearly 94 years old, and study was his great joy to his last evening. When he went to sleep not to awake again, his contribution (1968) to the Kerényi Festschrift lay finished on his desk.

It is now 125 years since Samson Eitrem, or Sam or Sammi, as he liked to be called, was born.[3] As I am the only classicist in Oslo old enough to remember him, I have been asked to give this lecture.

Eitrem is Norway's greatest classicist, and his name also ranks among the first internationally. Watching British television I once heard a commentator wonder how men like Ibsen or Munch could have come from such a cultural backwater as Kristiania (later Oslo). Eitrem is no less a mystery. In his youth classical studies had reached a bottom level in his homeland.

Leiv Amundsen's 'Eitrem-Bibliography' (1968) lists some three hundred titles, among which are several substantial books; 250 articles in newspapers and popular periodicals are not included. Emil Smith,[4] Eitrem's younger colleague and critic, wrote an amusing newspaper article on his 80th birthday, where he calls him 'frankly speaking a typical workaholic' (1952). Scholars abroad often begin to speak about Eitrem when they realize that I am a Norwegian. In Naples Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli[5] told me about an antiquarian catch of his: one of Eitrem's

1 I thank Professor Knut Bergsland and Eitrem's daughters Meta and Anine for answering my questions about Eitrem, University Librarian Gunn Haaland for tracing Smith's article and other hard-to-find literature, and Gerd Legaard for typing.

2 A. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, II 655.

3 Samson (Sam, Sammi) Eitrem, 1872–1966, Professor of Classics, Oslo.

4 Emil Smith, 1887–1957, Professor of Greek Language and Culture, Oslo.

5 Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, Professor of Greek History, Rome, President of the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi, Naples.

books with a dedication in the author's own handwriting. In London Eric Turner,[6] when he heard I had been a pupil of Eitrem, said: 'Then you are well off,' and immediately showed me his papyrological treasures. And in Berlin, Uvo Hölscher[7] told me, with some pride, that he had had private conversations with Eitrem. I did not tell him that I already knew, because Eitrem had told me. One evening during the German occupation a soldier in uniform rang his bell. The soldier was Hölscher. Eitrem let him in, but asked him to call again in civilian clothes if he returned. Hölscher returned in 'civvies,' which must have been rather difficult to accomplish and even punishable for a German soldier. To be sure, Hölscher was always a stern anti-Nazi.

Eitrem's work covers more or less the whole field of classics, but it was his study of ancient religion that made him famous. Smith (1952) describes how Eitrem started with Ovid and mythology, 'the driest of all sciences ... which is to the history of religion as the shell to the nut' (cf. Eitrem 1899, 1900). In the late 1940s, when I began to study classics, the same Smith, by then my teacher of Greek, said to me (before I knew Eitrem): 'Curious chap this Eitrem, so downright stupid as a young man. He is improving with the years!' A malicious rumor had it that Smith, then Docent and more a journalist than a scholar, felt passed over when Eitrem preferred the Swede Gunnar Rudberg[8] as a new professor. But after he eventually became a professor himself, Smith turned into a warm admirer of Eitrem, not least to be seen from the newspaper article mentioned above: 'He performs his work with respect for nothing but the truth and a scientific knowledge, and every word from his mouth or line from his hand ... is accepted with reverence by all engaged in classical culture, and perhaps with some anxiety by people with dogmatic scruples.'

Eitrem moved from mythology to religion and eventually cracked the nut. His voluminous *Opferritus und Voropfer der Griechen und Römer* (1915) was, according to Smith, regarded by several university colleagues 'as a monstrosity of learned pedantry with no demonstrable benefit,' but, he truthfully adds, 'it has in effect proved a basis for a new and truer understanding of essential problems within the history of ancient religion.'

His next great leap took Eitrem to magic. I would have liked to call him 'der Magus in Norden,' had not that title already been given to another.[9] As the result of the purchase and study of Greek papyri for many years together with Leiv Amund-

6 Eric Turner, 1911–83, Professor of Papyrology, London.

7 Uvo Hölscher, 1916–96, Professor of Classics, Berlin and Munich.

8 Gunnar Rudberg, 1880–1945, Professor of Classics, Oslo (1919–33), Uppsala (1933–45).

9 Johann Georg Hamann, 1730–88.

sen,[10] who later became Eitrem's successor in the professorship, the *Papyri Osloenses* appeared in three volumes (Eitrem and Amundsen 1933–45). Volume I contains the first magical papyri ever commented upon. Eitrem had realized the impact of magic on ancient religion. 'The scholar,' he says, 'has to wander through the whole inferno of magic and sorcery.... This may be deplored, but there is after all no other way' (Amundsen 1967a:74, 1967b:431). Smith again: 'With his enormous learning and matter-of-fact attitude he spread light in the dark labyrinth of superstition, drawing connecting lines to the highest religious concepts and experiences.' We may add: drawing lines right up to the last and triumphant religion of antiquity, Christianity.

It has, of course, been duly observed that Eitrem did not completely avoid the prejudices of his time. Thus he was of the opinion that the origin of religion lay in the cult of the dead. This idea even seems to have inspired him when he wrote *Opferritus und Voropfer.* He believed he was at the very roots of religion. Eitrem also paid at least lip-service to the view that religion and magic differ fundamentally. Eiliv Skard,[11] a former pupil of Eitrem and my teacher of Greek philosophy, showed enthusiastically how the great Festugière,[12] invited to Oslo by Eitrem, had demonstrated the difference by just two gestures—folded hands for religion: '*Thy* will be done;' grasping hands for magic: 'Let *me* have it!'

Such views, however, did not interfere with Eitrem's actual research. He was first and foremost a philologist eminently embodying Nietzsche's positivist ideal of philology as 'the art of reading well—or being able to read a fact without falsifying it by interpretation, without losing caution, patience, subtlety in the desire for understanding.'[13] This, together with Eitrem's editorial exactness and acute awareness of the importance of chronology, emphasized by Festugière, makes his results timeless.[14]

Eitrem had been in retirement for several years when I began to study classics, but now and then he still gave courses in Roman religion and papyrology. Thus I had the luck of becoming his pupil literally *extra ordinem.*

Leiv Amundsen, by then my teacher of Cicero, urged me to attend the course in Roman religion. When I entered the classroom for the first time, I had never met Eitrem before. He sat at the end of the seminar table: a bald, elderly, friendly-looking gentleman, well dressed (which could not be said of Smith), wearing thick

10 Leiv Amundsen, 1898–1987, Professor of Classics, Oslo.

11 Eiliv Skard, 1889–1978, Professor of Ancient History of Ideas, Oslo.

12 A.J. Festugière, O.P., 1898–1982, Directeur d'études at the École pratique des hautes études, Paris.

13 F. Nietzsche, *Der Antichrist*: 52, tr. Hollingdale: 165.

14 Smith 1952, Calderini 1965, Festugière 1966, Van Groningen 1966f., Amundsen 1967b:430, Graf 1991.

glasses, and maybe a little shy at meeting new students. Before him on the table was a pile of incredibly stained and yellowing papers (not unlike my own lecture notes, I must say, when I myself packed up fifty years later). Eitrem did not actually read the notes, he only now and then took a brief look at them, holding them close to his glasses, not to lose the thread of his lecture.

He told us about the oldest Roman gods. Coming directly from Plato and Cicero's philosophical works I found the theme, the superstitious faith of a primitive peasant people, utterly disgusting. But Eitrem said superstition is not far from anybody, even highly educated people, especially when placed in extreme situations, and he gave Cicero as an example. According to Plutarch, Cicero, on the run from Antony's henchmen, 'made up his mind to enter the house of Octavian and slay himself upon his hearth, and so to fasten an avenging demon upon him. But he dropped the plan as a flock of crows flew against him with loud clamour...' (*Cic.* 47.3–6, transl. Perrin). Eitrem's lecture left the first crack in my glossy picture of antiquity.

Professor Mørland,[15] also a former pupil of Eitrem, thought it might be 'good for my health' to visit the meetings in the Classical Society where Eitrem was in the chair for several years. And living quite near to Eitrem, I also happened to meet him fairly often on the street and have a chat with him. His natural friendliness, humour and urbane ease reminded me strongly of my deceased father. The thought struck me more than once that Eitrem was the only quite normal classicist in Oslo.

At the end of my student days I also took part in Eitrem's papyrology course, again at the instigation of Professor Amundsen. It was very different from Amundsen's course, which I also attended. Both courses took place in the Papyrus Collection of the University Library, within immediate reach of the papyri themselves. But, whereas Amundsen gave a strictly systematic and pedagogic introduction, Eitrem just snatched the papyrus which happened to interest him at the moment and expected the audience to join in the interpretation then and there. Eitrem held Amundsen in high esteem and regarded him a better papyrologist than himself. He could repeatedly be heard muttering to himself: 'Amundsen is always right against me.'

The audience consisted of Dr Jansen,[16] also a former pupil of Eitrem, and myself. Jansen was at that time Docent of theology and later became Professor of the history of religions. He and Eitrem were rather different personalities. Eitrem was a positivist while Jansen also had a religious concern, mysticism as presented by

15 Knud Henning Mørland, 1903–85, Professor of Classics, Oslo.

16 Herman Ludin Jansen, 1905–86, Professor of the history of religions, Oslo.

Plotinus or al-Ghazali. Eitrem could sometimes take a teasing but still absolutely friendly attitude to Jansen: 'And then what would Docent Jansen like to say?'

Eitrem's somewhat sloppy lecturing irritated Jansen. When he was a student, Jansen told me, it happened that Eitrem went unprepared to his lectures and had to look up words in the choral lyrics of Greek tragedies. To forget was a mortal sin with Jansen. Another colleague of his did not even remember when Moses Maimonides was born!

One day Eitrem suddenly asked if I could imagine continuing working with the papyri with the prospect of taking over responsibility for the collection. (I have afterwards realized that this must have been at the time when Amundsen, Eitrem's 'faithful famulus,' as Smith amiably calls him, had to withdraw from papyrology to write the history of the Norwegian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 'dwelling,' as Amundsen later expressed himself, 'in the land of the heathen for many years.') I was quite taken aback and not ready to abandon philosophy (and told Eitrem so), at any rate not in order to study dry taxation documents and amulets from ancient Egypt (which I did not tell him). Eitrem answered nothing. He continued to stare nearsightedly at the papyrus of the day through his thick spectacles and a magnifying glass. But then he exclaimed: 'I really am in love with this stuff!' This scene has haunted me ever since. Eitrem never mentioned it again.

After the lesson Jansen supported me, saying: 'It was quite right of you to refuse. Philosophy is what we all would like to study if we could,' possibly thinking of Plotinus' 'flight of the alone to the alone' (*Enn.* 6.9.11, transl. Mead). I was still too young to realize, with Socrates (*Phaedo* 77e), that philosophy is just another form of incantation.

Eitrem's 80th birthday dawned with Smith's newspaper homage (1952) and did not pass without some drama. The King had awarded Eitrem a high order, unaware that Eitrem was against orders. The presentation had to be cancelled at the last minute.

When I arrived at the reception, Eitrem stood in the doorway: 'Oh boy, eighty years!' Everybody was there, his lovely family, university and other dignitaries, colleagues, pupils, friends, above all Halvdan Koht, the retired professor of history, who had been Norway's foreign minister when the Germans attacked us in 1940. He told about his and Eitrem's more than sixty-year-old friendship.[17] As his achievements were duly extolled, I heard Eitrem, standing close to him, mutter to himself: 'Yes, yes.'

When I moved to Bergen in western Norway in the early 1960s, I tried to make it a habit to pay Eitrem a visit whenever I came to Oslo. Over a cup of tea we chat-

17 Halvdan Koht, 1873–1965, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor of History, Oslo. For his and Eitrem's friendship cf. Amundsen 1967a:68.

tered about everything: Hölscher's visits during the war, our eccentric colleagues, how Eitrem once had to smuggle papyri out of Egypt in his shoes and stockings, etc. I took also the opportunity to discuss my own scholarly problems, at that time within Epicureanism, as Eitrem was well informed on all topics. I have in my possession Hermann Diels' edition of one of the Herculaneum papyri with a personal dedication to Eitrem. The pages are filled with Eitrem's pencilled comments. I remember we had a lengthly discussion on how the Epicurean gods, being atomic compounds, could still be regarded as eternal, a problem on the scale of the quadrature of the circle. But Eitrem never got tired; he followed the conversation with a boyish fervour, a *nonagenarius* who had forgotten to grow old.

In his *Notes on the demonology in the New Testament* (1966) and elsewhere, Eitrem has demonstrated how the gospels picture Christ against a completely magical background. Jesus walks on the sea, makes the fig tree wither away, turns water into wine, raises the dead, expels demons, threatens spirits who go into swine, etc. Amundsen, who had assisted Eitrem, seems somehow resentful of this presentation of Our Lord as an exorcist and miracle-monger. He assures us that 'Eitrem had, himself undogmatic, a deep respect for all true religiosity' (Amundsen 1967a:430). Amundsen may here have confused respect and politeness. Eitrem was a polite man. He could call Smith to his face 'an irregular Greek verb' (Smith 1952), but that was because Smith was a hard nut and even felt flattered by it. But I can hardly imagine Eitrem telling the pious Father Festugière that magic and religion are basically the same (but oh, so interesting) nonsense. To be sure, I never asked Eitrem about his belief, either because it never occurred to me, or because I still seemed *à la* Jansen to hear the sound of the wind and did not want to be told that it actually was calm. What kind of faith could I expect from a scholar who believed religion had an origin?

I visited Eitrem for the last time in 1965, the year before he died. Standing in the doorway when I was about to leave, he said, and they were actually his last words to me: 'I have the feeling that I am standing only on the threshold of antiquity, and now I am going to die,' again reminding me of Nietzsche, who also had realized that 'only late does it dawn on one what we can have from the Greeks, only after we have learnt much and pondered much.'[18]

After the death of Eitrem things have happened that I would like very much to tell him about. Perhaps I might use magic? Eitrem has himself left us the beautiful *Papyrus Osloensis* number 1 with a recipe that 'works for everything,' 'works even with kings,' 'there is none better.' If only it could work also for me!

What Sammi ought to know is that we now have found again the two hundred papyri he stored away in cigar boxes before he left. They have been taken care of.

18 F. Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente* (*Sämtliche Werke*, 8, Berlin/New York 1980):25.

But most of all I need to tell him that I became a papyrologist after all and that I could never have worked with the Herculaneum papyri without his and Amundsen's papyrology lessons.

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Magic: Reconsidering the Grand Dichotomy

Jens Braarvig

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of the Grand Dichotomy, as J. Goody with an over-all concept styles the dichotomies that have diffused science from the evolutionists of the nineteenth century up to Lévi-Strauss,[1] also the category of 'magic' has suffered greatly. But still, the *study* of magic seems to prosper as ever. In the latest collective treatment of our theme, *Magika hiera* (Faraone and Obbink 1991), a splendid exposition of the state of the art, many aspects of magic are treated, but the category 'magic' itself is mainly devoured by the category of *religion*, a category which admittedly is almost as ill-defined as magic. This is, as stated in the introduction, also the programme of the book: 'to ask *whether the traditional dichotomy between magic and religion helped in any way to conceptualize the objective features of the evidence examined*' (vi–vii). The question might also be asked if it still *helps*, not only whether it *helped*, because—in fact—in *Magika hiera* the arguments are still based on the selfsame dichotomy. And again: 'All these practices border ostensibly on the sphere of *religion* (perhaps of a personal or familiar sort) insofar as they document attempts on the part of the individuals to influence factors in their environment that are beyond their immediate control. In many cases these private, "magical" rites have clear parallels with well-known forms of corporate and civic cult. Yet the relationship between magic and religion with respect to such practices has historically been, and continues to be, a very problematic one' (vi).

Indeed the relationship between magic and religion, in both practice and theory, is problematic, but this still seems to be the dynamics of the study: unproblematic categories are seldom studied. The quotation also has implicit definitions of magic, which are very much in the tradition, over a century old, of studying

1 Goody (1977:146f.) gives lists of such dichotomies both of the evolutionists and Lévi-Strauss, (*cf.* also *ibid.*:4–8), scientific/mythical, scientific/magical being among the items. He (3) also refers to the Grand Dichotomy as the Great Divide, that of the ethnocentric 'we' and 'they,' which 'pushes us once again into the use of binary categories and while it introduces developmental perspective, it attempts to look for a single breaking point, a Great Divide, though whether this jump occured in Western Europe in the sixteenth century, or in Greece in the fifth century BC, or in Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium, is never very clear.'

magic as a phenomenon, to the discussion of which we shall return. It is also contended in the same paragraph that many now study magical practices as 'nondichotomous variations in ritual procedure' and that 'the antithesis between magic and religion arbitrarily separates a continuous spectrum of interlocking religious phenomena.' If such arbitrariness is characteristically exercised by the religious themselves in establishing the demarcation-line between religion and magic, or even truth and magic, or true and false ritual, there is every reason not to give up the understanding of this dichotomy—on the contrary, such conflicts are very important objects of study. If, which is rather the intent of the quotation, the arbitrariness is on the part of the students of magic, there is of course reason for attention, for, as is stated *ibidem*: 'Many continue to cling, consciously or not, to the standard dichotomy.' The unconsciousness and the clinging are of course not worth saving, but one may contend that the conscious use of dichotomies in the study of magic, as well as in a whole range of other religious and anthropological phenomena, is very fruitful, if not basically necessary in any science, because it is built, as we all know, on the principle that things different cannot be the same. This is of course a long discussion which we will not enter into here, but personally I would rather stick, if not exactly cling, to a conscious set of dichotomies and oppositions by means of which we may try to explain the phenomenon of magic—if there *is* such a phenomenon. In fact, the authors or the *Magika hiera* suggest that this last is to be doubted, for they seem rather to describe non-magic, or the nonexistence of magic—but negative descriptions, fortunately, establish phenomena often as well as do positive descriptions.[2] Religion/magic is not the only dichotomy into which to place our topic: both in the material on magic and in its interpretation magic is often dichotomously placed with science, and in some cases also with other opposites. To see magic, then, in the perspective of 'the Grand Dichotomy refined' (Goody 1977:147) seems to me a fruitful starting point, and, notwithstanding the abuses by Darwin's imitators, such dichotomies are inevitable in describing human existence both diachronically and synchronically: change involves differences, as do societies and human psychology. In the words of G.E.R. Lloyd—referring to the terms 'primitive,' 'civilized,' and to 'prelogical,' 'prescientific' and their opposites—'the manifest unacceptability of the terms in which some aspects of the problem were debated in the nineteeth and early twentieth centuries does not

2 Arguments for the dichotomous nature of magic have recently been produced also by H.S. Versnel (1991:177): 'rejection of the term "magic" will soon turn out to be unworkable' (this should even be expressed in the present tense, since in fact most students of magic use the category and the dichotomy), and 'it would be utterly unpractical to completely eliminate religion as one of the obvious models of contrast.' He gives further examples of the attempts to discard the dichotomous, derogatory, and allegedly culturally dependent category of magic, with bibliography on the later discussion on the problem.

mean either that there was no problem or that its resolution has now been agreed' (1979:1).

Goody, however, in denying the well-known but 'bad' dichotomies of the 19th century, is still wrestling with the dichotomies as if he wishes to atone for past imperialist cruelties: his refinement consists in launching literacy/nonliteracy as the basic dichotomy to replace the dichotomies of historical and anthropological research from the evolutionists up to Lévi-Strauss' lists of binaries, to replace 'R. Horton's characterization of the difference between the "open" and the "closed" situations' which 'might be better explained in terms of the potentialities of literacy' (Goody 1977:147).[3] Indeed I do respect both these great writers for contributing their fruitful dichotomies to anthropological and religious studies, but I cannot agree that the one pair of dichotomies should have a more universal validity than the other. Dichotomies should be coined to represent a certain context: they should be formulated in the process of working with a certain material where they explain certain aspects of the phenomena we have chosen to study. Thus I find no reason for dispensing with either the dichotomy magic/religion or magic/science, correlated with other dichotomies where desirable, if only because these words are deeply rooted in most modern and many ancient languages. Thus I have, with a small change, chosen as the title of this paper that of Chapter 8, 'The Grand Dichotomy reconsidered,' of Goody's book—being basic to human understanding and the production of opinions and statements, both the Grand and the small dichotomies, it seems, are still in need of reconsideration.

After Goody's (1977) and Lloyd's (1979) books, we have had a another strong wave of what a historian of religion might even term monistic philosophy, *viz.* the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and all the followers of the deconstructist fashion, in many respects a reaction against the Grand Dichotomist himself, Claude Lévi-Strauss. Though even Lévi-Strauss did not necessarily project magic only onto far away tribes: where there is religion there is magic and *vice versa*—he states in the binary way. And, 'there is no need to invoke the exercise of vanished faculties or the employment of some supernatural sensibility to understand the penetration which so-called primitives show in their observation and interpretations of natural phenomena', he says (1966:220f.) on the topic of *The savage mind*, the title of his book (1962, 1966). Thus he seems well aware that the category of magic too often has been used to describe 'outside' and inferior thought when compared to our scientific thought and as such subjective and open to any meaning we might wish to give it—even though also the Lévi-Straussian exercises may seem unnecessarily re-

3 Robin Horton (1967), who, 'applying Popper' (Goody 1977:2), contrasts the open systems of thought—where hypotheses are proved or disproved—with the closed systems, where the results are only tested against the culturally accepted world view, criticizes and develops Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's concepts of the prelogical, prescientific and mythopoetic worldviews.

ductionist and ontologically unfounded today. It is of course very true that magic is usually described, throughout history, as something belonging essentially to the Other. The various allegorists of the Grand Dichotomy, such as E.B. Tylor and James G. Frazer with their ingenious but somewhat mechanistic theories, placed magic very much with the Others, *viz.*, the primitives in far-away colonies never visited. But as for Greece, she is generally regarded as Ourselves, especially when one is discussing the beginning of logic, philosophy, science, etc.; and Dodds' 'irrational,' even Eitrem's, which has been shown to be an organic part of Greek culture, has often been deemed a disturbing element in classical culture and has had to be explained away. But after the two Great Wars in our century, we are, however, more willing to accept the Others among ourselves, and we even study classical Greece as the Others, or 'them,' as L. Bruit Zaidman and P. Schmitt Pantel have done systematically in their recent book on Greek religion (1992).[4] The solution of the riddle of Ourselves and the Others does not lie in projecting the unpleasant (or idealized) parts of Ourselves onto the Others, and this has also been gradually more difficult in recent decades, especially after such books as E.W. Said's work on Orientalism (1978), on how Western Science has set the agenda and has defined the Others. Thus, when the Others speak and even write themselves, they are no longer that easy to define by means of any opportune and arbitrary category. The awareness of this difficulty has long ago come to characterize social anthropology and most humanistic studies.

Studying the Others is sometimes a projection of a phenomenon in one's own society or culture onto another medium: this has been taken up in the analysis of Margaret Mead's work (Freeman 1983; *cf.* Orans 1996), and there is another somewhat provoking example, Gananath Obeyesekere's contention (1992) that cannibalism as a phenomenon mostly is a projection of the English sailor's fear of eating his fellow sailor when shipwrecked and without food and water. Now this has been shown not to be true—indeed cannibalism is documented—but cannibalism is usually cultic, and as such something 'Other' even in these cultures themselves. Thus studying the Other may in certain respects be studying Ourselves, or, rather the darker side of Ourselves, unless the Other is idealized: even then it is very much a projection of our own needs and wishes. At the time magic became a fashionable word, there were many movements that included activities of which some quite correctly could be called magical; the most influential was the Theosophical Society, the leaders of which often posed as thaumaturges and magicians, especially the founder Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–91), who as a member also of the spiritualist movement persuaded, or perhaps seduced, masses of people to join an or-

4 *Cf.* the balanced remark of H.S. Versnel (1991:188): 'Ancient Greece was a non-Western culture. Ancient Greece was the first Western culture. Both statements can be defended.'

ganization that also has played an important role for popular religious and pseudo-scientific activity throughout the 20th century; there was also her esoteric predecessor Eliphas Lévy (1810–75) with his neo-cabbalistic ritual magic. From the turn of the century on there were also many others who aptly could be called, and did call themselves magicians; suffice it to mention the hero of the present-day satanists Aleister Crowley (1875–1947), and the popular magical writer Dion Fortune, all of them, with Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925) and his Anthroposophical Society, contemporaries of James Frazer and precursors of the present-day 'New Age,' the beliefs of which in many respects could be styled magical. My point is that such persons and movements, frequently magical even by self-definition and reasonably called thus by historians of religion, were very much present in the time of the great discoveries of science of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus the dichotomies which we are discussing were present in Western culture itself, only it was much easier and more convenient to project such views onto peoples of other cultures and other epochs. It is remarkable that only today is one beginning to write the histories of Theosophy and related very influential movements, not to mention Freemasonry with its huge and influential following throughout the last two and a half centuries. Thus Dodds and others have demonstrated to us that Greek antiquity admitted room for the irrational; we should acknowledge, which indeed recent research freely does, that there is also room for it in Western culture.

Now Lévi-Strauss was not in favour of the Grand Dichotomy when concerned with magic, and even his precursor Lucien Lévy-Bruhl—notwithstanding his famous, or rather infamous, grandly dichotomous *mentalité primitive*—contributed, in his old age, to bring the Other home: 'In every human mind, whatever its intellectual development, there subsists an irradicable fund of primitive mentality.... It is not likely that it will ever disappear.... For with it would disappear, perhaps, poetry, art, metaphysics, and scientific invention—almost everything, in short, that makes for the beauty and grandeur of human life.' It 'represents something fundamental and indestructible in the nature of man' (Lévy-Bruhl 1949, quoted at Tambiah 1990:92f.). Also Ludwig Wittgenstein would bring the projections of James Frazer back into our own backyard; in his somewhat oracular but witty criticisms of Frazer he concludes that Frazer is more primitive than the primitives he studies: 'Frazer is more savage than most of his savages, for they would not be so far removed from the understanding of a spiritual matter as an Englishman of the twentieth century' (quoted *ib.* 62). 'Frazer can imagine no priest who is not basically an English parson of our time, with all his stupidity and dullness' (60). Wittgenstein also attacks the view of Frazer and others that magic necessarily is an *error*; it is not part of human *opinions*, and therefore not erroneous or true: it is rather, as part of symbolism and language, an expression of a wish: 'I believe that the characteristic of primitive man is that he does not act on *opinions* (in opposi-

tion to Frazer)' (56). Thus Wittgenstein makes a strong dichotomy between Frazer and the 'primitives,' which indeed Frazer did himself (*cf.* Frazer's legendary 'God forbid' when he was asked if he wanted to visit his objects of study), but Wittgenstein is much more sympathetic to understanding magic as part of our own, even Frazer's experience: 'Yes. Frazer's explanations would not be explanations at all if they did not appeal ultimately to a certain tendency in ourselves' (60). 'But why does Frazer use the word "ghost?" Therefore, he very probably understands this superstition, since he explains it to us with a superstitious word which is easy to him. Or better, he would have been able to see from it that something in us speaks for those modes of actions of the savages' (61). 'Nothing shows our relationship with the former savages better than that Frazer has at hand a word that is familiar to him and to us, such as "ghost" or "shade," to describe the views of these people. ... Yes, this peculiarity is related not only to the expressions "ghost" and "shade" and we have made too little fuss over the fact that we count the word "soul," "spirit" as part of our own educated vocabulary' (63). Wittgenstein is also willing to accommodate magic within everyday life even our own time: 'When I am angry about something, I sometimes hit with my stick on the ground or a tree, etc. But certainly I don't believe that it is the fault of the ground or that hitting can help. "I can release my anger." And all rites are of this kind' (56). 'Religious actions, or the religious life of the Priest King, is of no other sort than any genuinely religious action today, perhaps a confession of sins. This can also be "explained" and cannot be explained' (56). These rather commonsensical reflections on magic, represent quite another kind of treatment than Frazer's complex schemes of Theoretical Magic and Practical Magic, and of Homoeopathic Magic and Contagious Magic as subsets of Sympathetic Magic (Frazer 1911–5:1.1 52ff., 111ff.). Frazer does not reflect on in whose minds these theories of magic are found, but of course the scheme is in Frazer's mind, not in the savage's. Following Wittgenstein, we may agree that Frazer builds a kind of magical metaphysics which suits both his time, one of economic and industrial growth, empire, and the 'great conquering races of the world' (*ib.* 218), and the Grand Dichotomy, but scarcely involves the metaphysical thinking that was connected to magic in antiquity, *i.e.* neo-Platonic συμπάθεια, a concept Frazer took over without understanding its philosophical background. While Frazer puts magic with the primitives, Wittgenstein makes room for it in his own life in stating that 'I can release my anger.' That many magical rituals may act as a channel for a release of anger is, if one would like to interpret magic psychologically, easy to document: in *Magika hiera* or the present book there are many examples of magical acts that may surely have had that therapeutic effect for those who performed them. Usually it is the losers, the weak, who resort to magic, people who are angered, but do not have means and power to take revenge or have satisfaction in an ordinary way. The therapeutic value of symbolically representing one's anger is

also very much exploited in modern group psychology, where one ritually kills all 'enemies' ('I hate my father, I hate my mother, I hate my husband,' etc.), to free oneself from traumatic experiences in childhood and elsewhere, and the concealed aggression accompanying them. I would assert that the psychological effect of such practices might be close to the effect of the magic we study in antiquity and elsewhere among the Others.

Wittgenstein, then, makes three important points that are relevant to a methodical approach to magic: Frazer is far from understanding magic when he explains it on the basis of metaphysical concepts for which we do not even have satisfactory explanations and definitions ourselves; when we explain a phenomenon such as magic it would not mean anything to us if it did not correspond to something in ourselves; the phenomenon of magic may well be explained by our everyday experience. Seen in this way the dichotomies, grand or trifling, are as much part of our society and our own time as of history; in Tambiah's words (1990:60): 'Wittgenstein is claiming that "civilized" man has within him the same symbolizing and ritualizing tendencies as the "primitive."' Roland Barthes (1957) has given us an understanding of phenomena which in our culture may be termed mythological; the same kind of study of *magical* structures in Western society would surely also be very rewarding.

As I have tried to exemplify, we make dichotomies in our arguments and writings to suit our strategies of policy, research, and thinking, generally. But, there are also arguments that dichotomies basically belong to our apparatus of concepts, that concepts provide meanings only in oppositions. Thus the challenge of a meaningful scientific set of concepts should be to define them as in tension with oppositions and not to dismiss them. In this way one may say that the Grand Dichotomy is something belonging also very much to our interpretative faculties, and as such should be investigated also in terms of basic epistemology, not only in the perspective of cultural sciences. Indeed our interpretative faculties contribute great numbers of dichotomous interpretative concepts and categories, but these dichotomies must be analyzed and established as a meaningful set of opposites. What is of paramount importance, though, is to differentiate between the dichotomies in the material studied itself, and the dichotomies created in the name of science. The last ones should be discussed and defined so that we do not 'continue to cling, consciously or not, to the standard dichotomy,' in the words, quoted above, of the editors of *Magika hiera*. If discarded as meaningless they may easily be taken up and filled arbitrarily with any meaning, because, as it seems, many wish to discuss and use the concepts still. This is true both of magic and myth, both being sometimes mentioned in the same contexts as certain kinds of *Weltanschauungen*. The challenge, then, would be to put the category of magic into a meaningful and communicative set of opposites, and not to discard it.

Another reason why one should keep magic as a research category, especially if one's concern is antiquity, is the fact that this word is coined within the context of antiquity itself, as Fritz Graf has made a point of discussing (1994:27–9) in his splendid overview of our topic, *La magie dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine*. Its connotations in antiquity are, however, somewhat undefined, and there is reason to put this 'emic' concept into a broader discussion when we wish to use it as an 'etic' concept, as we know the concept also acquired new meanings throughout the history of Western thought, and, to be able to use it for other cultures also, we are still in need of reflections on definition.

So, after these arguments for keeping magic as a category, there remains the unpleasant question of how it is to be defined. I am afraid that I do not have a complete answer, nor a new definition. I would, however, contend that much of the research done on magic implicitly defines it, and, that much which is tentatively classed as non-magic in the discussion in *Magika hiera* still must be classed as magic or closely related to magic. In trying to give 'magic' a specific meaning we face at least three problems: firstly, the fact that 'magic' is a polemical category in the guise of being scientific; secondly, that the meaning of the word has changed greatly throughout its history; and thirdly, that the word is used in such an inaccurate way in common language. Thus, when we treat the history of the word, it denotes quite diverse phenomena—when we treat it in the perspective of *Begriffsgeschichte*, we have difficulties in deciding what phenomena we should subsume under the category.

Magic, then, and I would like to include myth, are rhetorical and polemical concepts in common and even scientific language. Such categories are not in need of definitions; in fact definitions are detrimental to their effect, for their intent is persuasion and it is their rhetorical force that causes them to be accepted as true. As such they even approach the phenomenon of magic itself. To bring them from their monological into a dialectical context should be the goal of any academic treatment and use of the concepts.

Like myth, however, magic has in periods also had very positive connotations. The word '*mythos*' was given superbly positive connotations during the so-called German romanticism, from Herder on, a tradition which has had great importance for the discipline of religious studies through Walter Otto, who made *mythos* into the holistic expression of truth—in opposition to *logos* which only expressed the contextual truth—and Mircea Eliade, to mention only two. This has not happened to the same extent in more modern times with 'magic,' a word that had its zenith in the Renaissance with all its admiration for antiquity, Neoplatonism and Theurgy. Now Proclean Theurgy (see below) also had great influence on the very influential church father pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, but the principles of heavenly hierarchies, the mystery language, and the divine names, bearing clearly

the marks of Theurgy, were integrated into Christianity, which after its triumph soon turned its back on its old friends and termed such practices, now well integrated into its main stream, magic in the negative sense. Thus in the Middle Ages, dichotomizing Christianity, with its intention of monopolizing ritual, could make the magic arts inherited from Theurgy into something diabolic and in the name of Christ could define them out of the true Christian faith (see now Flint 1991). With the Renaissance, and such personalities as Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, *Magia*, *Cabbala* and *Astrologia* were again part of essential *Scientia*; Paracelsus reintroduced alchemy; and Marsilio Ficino, translator and heir of Proclus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, made magic again very influential with his *magia naturalis*, using the very word positively. Paracelsus is of course regarded as one of the fathers of modern chemistry, which so to say was extracted from the alchymistical speculations, and the speculations themselves slowly died out during the Enlightenment. Ficino was careful not to involve any demoniacal powers in his system of magic, which was a complex system of correspondences where the astrological and planetary influences were present in all the elements in the world. With his *vis imaginativa* the magician could to some extent manipulate these powers, and express them through visual arts as well as talismans, in oratory and poetry as well as incantations, in music as well as proportion and number, which themselves express the spherical harmonies by *sympathetic* magic (in the neo-Platonic sense, not the Frazerian), and in the elements with their occult qualities. Thus he could produce effects both on his own psyche and other's, as well as on the inanimate objects, with his imaginative power—in all of this, though, he carefully confined himself to the material universe, thus keeping the whole Christian angelic hierarchy out of his magical system (see Walker 1958:36ff., Yates 1964). That the Great Magician lived on for some time as a very popular figure is easily documented by Shakespeare's Prospero (Yates 1973:85–107, *passim*) and Marlowe's Doctor Faustus (Peuckert 1956, index *s.v.* Faust). Within the disciplines of social anthropology and religious studies one does not use 'magic' in this positive sense, although several writers in the history of ideas do, such as F.A. Yates and D.P. Walker.

In the modern common use of our word, these positive connotations have been somehow retained: we easily talk about the magic of poetry and there is a *genre* of modern South American fiction called magical realism. Thus the word has been retained with positive connotations within the esthetic arts, indeed part of the agenda of Ficino. As for astrology with its teachings of correspondences it is very much alive in so called New Age religions, with all their cures and practices aptly called magical, practices inherited possibly from Ficino and other renaissance magicians through the medium of Theosophy, etc. Other modern usages are of course the 'magic' of the entertainer whose smart tricks shock his audience, and the 'magic' of the exceptionally successful sports star, etc.

We have mentioned the pair 'emic' and 'etic,' which is an important distinction for humanistic and anthropological studies. Clifford Geertz (1983:56f.) has introduced another pair that is very close in meaning, *experience-near* and *experience-distant*. The distinction is very important for the study of magic: as we have seen in the material of Frazer, the category of magic is very much of the 'etic' or the 'experience-distant' type, and instances of practitioners of magic (whatever their language) calling *themselves* magicians or the like are extremely scanty. The category of magic of Frazer and the evolutionists is also somewhat polemical in nature, and this is also very much the character of the word in much of our material; usually the magicians are among the 'Others'—be they, as we have seen, in the lands of the savages or in a sect or religious movement close in place and time. Thus, in connection with the concept of magic emics and etics, experience near or distant is of great importance, also because magic is to that extent a polemical category.

This has led me to reflect on a *threefold* interpretative scheme, and I would like to suggest the triad of intra-textual, inter-textual, and extra-textual levels of understanding of, *in casu*, magic: The first kind, intra-textual, should denote the magic which is acknowledged as such by the individual(s) practicing it; the second, the inter-textual, is the context where someone, often in a polemical way, is *said* or *declared* to practice it or is *accused of* doing so, and the magic described accordingly, and where the magic may be a topic of discussion or polemical contest. In the third, extra-textual, context, then, magic would be described disinterestedly, analytically and in a historical perspective.[5] Thus, there exist magic and magicians by (1) self-definition, by (2) polemical definition, and by (3) scientific/historical definition. And then there is the use of the word 'magic' where a phenomenon, or activity, is called magic from the outside as a descriptive practice or merely as an *analogy* or *allegory*, which is strictly not magic at all, but which still may have an extra-textual, even inter-textual, flavour to it and contain views on magic, and as such be important information on the phenomenon itself as experienced at the time. The use of the word in the sciences of anthropology and history should belong to the extra-textual level, but as it describes the two other uses one should develop a dialectic relation between this extra-textual level and the intra- and inter-textual level. If such a definition of magic is to be produced, it certainly must take into consideration the historical meanings as well as the modern usage—if the category is to have meaning in the modern world—and the vocabulary of the material itself must be considered.

5 The concept 'inter-textual' was coined by Julia Kristeva in 1966 in connection with her reading of Mikhail Bakhtin (*vide* Kristeva 1986:37). Since then it has been an important concept for the study of literature used in various contexts. For the development of the concept with the prefixes *intra-* and *extra-* in the context of magic I am responsible myself.

Now, hopefully, the distinctions between the categories suggested are fairly sharp from a theoretical point of view, but the actual borders within the material to be subsumed under them may not be that sharp. In the following I would like to examine a few examples which from one or another viewpoint is called magic, where there may be some reason for doubt if something should be called magic or not, *i.e.* to what extent it can or should be called magic as such in the context of anthropology and history, and whether it is possible to subsume this material under the categories we have suggested.

Some case histories

(a) Empedocles

In his recent book on Empedocles Peter Kingsley (1995), by placing him in a broader cultural and literary context, and, not the least, in a *magical* context (esp. 215ff.), rescues him from the readings—the tentacles, we may say—of the doxographic tradition that began with Aristotle. So, what are our reasons for calling Empedocles a magician? Kingsley centers on the much-debated passage (DK 31 B 111) where our philosopher-magician—if that is what to call him—shows his nearest pupils remedies (φάρμακα) for suffering and old age and explains how to stop destructive winds from destroying the fields, how to unleash them for revenge, and then, for the good of agriculture, how to manipulate the rains. Last but not least he tells his students how to bring back or invoke (ἄγειν) the dead man's soul (μένος) from Hades.

So already in Empedocles we encounter, in its full force, the figure of the learned magician, and the apparent paradox of a prominent early philosopher with a somewhat magical tinge requires an explanation: the passage may be explained away as spurious, as does B.A. van Groningen (1956, *cf.* Kingsley 1995:219) or Ava Chitwood (1986), 'simply by making it [the fragment] disappear,' (Kingsley 1995:227ff.)[6], and Diels himself, who is not quite willing to accept the conjunction of magic and science and explains the disturbing fragment allegorically: as a whole it 'suggests nothing more than what science promises to give its adepts today: information about the laws of nature which will enable one to become their master' (quoted *ib.* 219). Thus the modern reception of Empedocles, apart from Kingsley's fresh contribution, is characterized by careful denial of the magical aspects of

6 In fact Chitwood (1986:181–3) treats the fragment, but she is not prone to see it as an expression of magic, *cf.* also: 'The importance of Empedocles lies in his philosophy, taken as philosophy and not as biography.' (191)

Empedocles' personality, but still he fully presents us with the dichotomy philosophy/magic in our interpretation of him.[7]

Now Empedocles was perceived also by his immediate successors as a magician: Gorgias, reported to have been Empedocles' pupil, is even quoted as claiming 'to have been present while Empedocles was performing his invocations' (D.L. 8.59 = DK 82 A 3: λέγειν ὡς αὐτὸς παρείη τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι; *cf.* Kingsley 1995:220, n.9). Those who, like the mythical Telchines, who were able to control the weather, rain, clouds, hailstorms, and snow, were properly called γόητες and even μάγοι, as Diodorus Siculus says (5.55.3), and, as having this ability, Empedocles too would deserve these designations and would be what we might call a full-fledged magician in this capacity.[8] But this understanding of the magician-philosopher seems not to be unequivocal even in antiquity: Timaeus of Tauromenium (356–260 BC), in his usual sober style, gives quite another explanation (D.L. 8.60 = DK 31 A 1 = *FHG* 566.30; *cf.* Suid. *s.v.* Ἐμπεδοκλῆς), rationalizing completely the fact that Empedocles was called κωλυσανέμας, 'wind-obstructor:' Empedocles, to wit, arranged that asses should be flayed so that their skins might be stretched out on the hills as protection against the annual storms that destroyed the crops—not very magical, but perhaps an early rationalizing attempt to purify Empedocles from irrational beliefs?[9]

Perhaps significantly, immediately after his description of Empedocles' preoccupation with wind, Diogenes Laertius tells us of the episode of ἡ ἄπνους 'the *breathless* woman' or rather 'the woman in trance.' For thirty days Empedocles had observed her, evidently as part of medical and at the same time shamanistic research, and was called 'not merely physician (ἰητρός) because of this, but also a diviner (μάντις)' (D.L. 8.61 = DK 31 A 1).[10] He is also reported to have written an epigram to his lover and pupil, the physician Pausanias, in which the latter is depicted as 'bringing back many men pained with dreadful toils from the innermost shrine of Persephone' (D.L. 8.61 = DK 31 A 156 ['unechtes']?)[11]—clearly 'Orphic.' This information, seen in conjunction with the last line of fragment 111, clearly

7 *Cf.* G.E.R. Lloyd's view on Empedocles, *infra* p. 39.

8 Λέγονται δ' οὗτοι καὶ γόητες γεγονέναι καὶ παράγειν ἅτε βούλοιντο νέφη τε καὶ ὄμβρους καὶ χαλάζας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χιόνα ἐφέλκεσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ καθάπερ καὶ τοὺς μάγους ποιεῖν ἱστοροῦσιν. ἀλλάττεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας μορφάς, καὶ εἶναι φθονεροὺς ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν τεχνῶν (Kingsley 1995:225).

9 Further ancient interpretations of Empedocles' epithet κωλυσανέμας, both rationalistic and magical: DK 31 A 14. Kingsley does not report these counterarguments against his case.

10 Empedocles' 'shamanistic' features: Kingsley 1995:225f. Rather than 'shamanism' in Empedocles' case I opt for the emic term 'Orphism,' now accepted after the finds at Olbia and Derveni. An important part of Orphism was evidently the practice of travelling to the other world, symbolically, or experienced as an actual fact.

11 ὃς πολλοὺς μογεροῖσι μαραινομένους καμάτοισι φῶτας ἀπέστρεψεν Φερσεφόνης ἀδύτων.

points to some kind of practice of communicating with the other world, and here it seems that it is the dead man's soul that one is to bring back—to communicate with it for magical purposes? To ask about the future? To heal it, even? All these are possible and are also connected with what may be called magical from one or another viewpoint. Pausanias' bringing back the tormented souls from Hades may, however, rather be a kind of therapeutic practice—the men were still alive, but their souls had gone to Hades temporarily—especially as this is reported in a context in which both Pausanias and Empedocles are called physicians, and which includes the account of the woman in the trance.

One of the great themes in, or even premisses for, 'science' in Empedocles' and the Pythagoreans' milieu was the doctrine of the microcosmos-macrocosmos correspondences between the individual and the 'all,' the 'kinship of all nature.' The universe, *i.e.* the universal soul, is 'breath,' the first act of the Unlimited in the creation of the cosmos is to breathe; the Unlimited is thus called πνεῦμα (Arist. *Ph.* 213b22 = DK 58 B 30;[12] *cf.* Guthrie 1962:277–8). This wind or breath is also apparently the uniting principle of the whole cosmos for the Pythagoreans and for Empedocles: 'The followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles, and most of the Italian philosophers, say that there is a certain community uniting us not only with each other and with the gods but even with brute creation. There is in fact one breath pervading the whole cosmos-like soul and uniting us with them' (S.E. 9.127 = DK 31 B 136).[13] The nature of the human soul is also described by several philosophers as air or wind.[14] The words denoting soul, spirit, etc. are also often etymologically related to 'wind' and 'breath.'[15] Thus it was very natural to talk about the souls of the dead, the women in trance, and the travels to the underworld, in terms of wind and breath, and in being able to control the winds, one was able to control the soul, and vice versa. This of course prefigures the Theurgic and neo-Platonic views on

12 Εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἀναπνέοντι καὶ τὸ κενόν, 'the Pythagoreans also said that the void exists, and that it enters the universe from infinite breath, the universe being supposed to breathe in the actual void ...' (transl. Guthrie).

13 Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τὸν Ἰταλῶν πλῆθός φασι μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τ' ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων. ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα (transl. Guthrie 1962:278; *cf.* also 200 n.2).

14 So Anaximenes, DK 13 B 2: Οἷον ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει, 'as our soul, which is air, is controlling us, thus the whole world is kept together by wind (~ spirit) and air;' *cf.* Guthrie 1962:128: 'In making his air selection, an air in perpetual motion, Anaximenes also was respecting an age-old and still flourishing popular belief which associated, and in fact identified, breath and life' and Guthrie 1959:135ff.

15 Πνεῦμα, ψυχή, *spiritus, animus*, etc., also in Semitic languages. Further in Onians 1951.

συμπάθεια which became the ontological explanation of why Theurgic magic worked. It also, however, prefigures the kind of correspondence-thinking which in fact also is basic in natural science, be it mathematical or experimental.

So, is Empedocles a magician? Kingsley argues strongly for his being one in the intra-textual sense, *i.e.* that he understands himself to be one. And certainly he was not a modest man in his claims: 'I come to you as an immortal god, no longer mortal, honoured by all' (D.L. 8.62 = DK 31 B 112),[16] but does this make him a magician? Not necessarily, for he may have perceived himself chiefly as the Great Sage, as such also believing himself capable of what we ourselves would call magical feats—but for him these powers would only be part of his ability to cure sickness and control the breath and merely a corollary of his world view: as we have seen, in controlling the microcosmos one also controls the macrocosmos, the winds, the weather etc., as well as the breath-souls of men. Also, Empedocles' work as a whole—the doctrine of the elements, which he was credited with inventing, his general 'mytho-philosophical' cosmology, and rhetoric, another of his 'inventions' (D.L. 8.57 = DK 31 A 1)[17]—is not mainly magical. He seems then to have looked upon himself as a Great Sage—and in fact we may 'read' him as an expression of early scientific optimism. Indeed Empedocles' age flowered with all kinds of explanations for both *physis* and for what later philosophy would call the spiritual part of man. Empedocles even thinks himself divine.

Notwithstanding all the good qualities of his book, Kingsley seems too categorical in insisting on Empedocles' perception of himself as a magician.[18] Although parts of the material on him may, in certain contexts, be described and understood as magical, this aspect must have been at most only part of his self-perception. But Empedocles *was* reported to have practiced γοητεία with Gorgias as the witness—here, however, we are moving into inter-textual interpretations—and the statement of Gorgias, Empedocles' pupil, just may refer to the fact that the teacher

16 Ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητὸς πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος. *Cf.* Kingsley 1995:223.

17 Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ φησι πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικὴν εὑρεῖν, Ζήνωνα δὲ διαλεκτικήν. Further references to Empedocles as the first rhetor, *vide* DK 31 A 19.

18 *Cf.* Kingsley 1995:228 on the views of Ava Chitwood on Empedocles: 'We do not have to be told that Diogenes Laertius 'says that Satyrus believed that Empedocles laid claim to the powers mentioned in fragment 111;' we know that Empedocles laid claim to the powers in question from the fragment itself.' And (249): 'This is the historical reality of Empedocles as a magician—not just any magician but a magician who claimed to be able to use his magical powers to descend to the underworld.' As for the secrecy of his message of magic to his pupil (DK 31 B 111, Kingsley 1995:221 n.12), it does not, however, make the message exclusiely magic: secrecy was of course a part not only of the mysteries but even of the sciences: *cf.* Timaeus' report (D.L. 8.54) that Empedocles was convicted of stealing discourses from Pythagoras, and was excluded from taking part in the discussions after this.

made speeches 'like an enchanter,' a case of 'magic' that I shall discuss below. Other inter-textual material on Empedocles, that of Timaeus *apud* Diogenes Laertius (*cf. supra* p.32), would speak against his being perceived as a magician, although he is admired by Heraclides Ponticus as 'not merely a physician, but also a diviner' (D.L. 8.61; *cf. infra* n.34)[19] As for the extra-textual interpretation of Empedocles, much of his activity would indeed today qualify as 'magic' in a dichotomy magic/science: he may have been an important thinker for 'proto-science,' but his claims in matters of cosmology, healing, or psychology would scarcely be accepted by science. As such his world view might aptly be classed, with Marett, as 'magico-religious' or even 'magico-mythical.' But like Paracelsus, Ficino, and the Renaissance magicians, Empedocles appears to us a paradox: both scientific and magical, both logical and mythical. He is thus quite an important figure for the study of magic, since he indeed presents a border case.

(b) Gorgias

My next case will be the great sophist and orator Gorgias, himself a pupil of Empedocles. Gorgias, as we have seen, was reported as claiming 'to have been present while Empedocles was performing his invocations.' Since, however, Gorgias himself used the language and imagery of magic to describe the able speaker and orator, it is possible that this statement of his refers to Empedocles as a 'speaker of magical dimensions,' in the same way as we also may use this image: Empedocles is in fact credited with being the inventor of the 'enchanting' art of persuasion. This somehow weakens Gorgias' testimony that his teacher was as a full-fledged magician: Gorgias would have heard Empedocles speaking as a 'magician'—in quotation marks.[20] This brings us to a case of magical language which in fact is *not* necessarily magic *per se*, 'magic' used to describe another phenomenon, namely rhetoric. Magic and rhetoric may have certain features in common, but one would be wrong to identify the two. But Gorgias' use of the magical imagery, however, shows that he was well acquainted with magic, especially since his use of the imagery of magic is so complete—most of the basic terms of magic in the technical sense are present in his description of rhetoric; thus we may presume that magic as an activity and as a phenomenon was well known in his milieu and his time. As

19 Then comes Empedocles' statement (DK 31 B 112) that he is immortal. Another important 'Presocratic' close to Empedocles' milieu and reported to practice magic (Tertullian, *An.* 28.5) was Pherecydes.

20 *Cf.* even Kingsley 1995:220: 'It is very possible that by Empedocles' "magic" Gorgias himself had been referring primarily to his teacher's uncanny rhetorical powers and mastery of the spoken word, ...'; also 220 n.10, 248 n.53.

such Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*[21] is important as a witness to the magical terminology of 5th-century Greece and as inter-textual material for a definition of its magic, even though the analogical or allegorical use of magical terminology really should qualify it as extra-textual. But Gorgias' statement almost *defines* what magic is in a classical Greek setting, enumerating its main constituents and their workings and showing that belief in magic certainly was enough part of the horizon of his audience for him to use its imagery to describe the art of rhetoric. Thus we find in his description (10ff.), in addition to μαγεία itself, also γοητεία ('witchcraft,' 'sorcery,' 'magical practices') (ἐπ)αγωγή ('invocation,' 'manipulation'), ἐπῳδή ('incantation,' 'enchantment,' 'charm'), and θέλγειν ('to bewitch,' 'to charm')—only the term κατάδεσμος seems to be missing. 'When the power of enchantments mingles with the concepts of our soul, it charms us, persuades us, and changes us by means of its witchcraft. The double craft of sorcery and magic has been invented for the sake of deceiving our soul and cheat our views' (10).[22] Here μαγεία has nothing of its connotations of 'wisdom of the East' (as *e.g.* in Plato *Alc.* 1, 122a) it refers exclusively to the *manipulative* art of magic. Speeches, then, are like the φάρμακον, the magical means, or the drugs, since they infatuate and bewitch by means of persuasion (14).[23] Indirectly Gorgias also compares *poetry* with magic, much like Ficino (who, however, might contend that poetry *is* magic and part of magical discipline), in stating that poetry is only metrical speech (23),[24] rhetorical speech being then compared with magical incantation.

Gorgias does not say that rhetoric *is* magic: it is rather *like* magic, speeches are *magical*, in the way one might say of a cunning speaker even today, who influences and manipulates like a powerful master (8).[25] The aims of the orator and the magician are close: both wish to manipulate others by means of trickery and symbols, the one through persuasion, the other through rituals and other magical means. Gorgias presents us with an early example of this *allegorical* use of 'magic,' al-

21 Ἑλένης Ἐγκώμιον; references are to the text of Immisch 1927. For a full treatment of magic and rhetoric as based on this work see Romilly 1975.

22 Συγγιγνομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν γοητείᾳ. γοητείας δὲ καὶ μαγείας δισσαὶ τέχναι εὕρηνται, αἵ εἰσι ψυχῆς ἁμαρτήματα (ὁρμήματα Immisch) καὶ δόξης ἀπατήματα.

23 (Immisch §10b): Οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτησαν. 'Some (speeches) intoxicate and bewitch the soul with an evil kind of persuasion.'

24 Τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον.

25 Λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν. The *allegorical* character of Gorgias' description is clear from §14 (Immisch §10b): *ὥσπερ* γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων ... *οὕτω* καὶ τῶν λόγων.... Demosthenes also uses the image of the γόης and his activity in describing the cunning and seducing speaker: 19.102, 109; 18.276: Δεινὸν καὶ γόητα καὶ σοφιστὴν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ὀνομάζων; 19.32: Εἴ τις ἂν ὑμῖν ἢ ῥήτωρ ἢ σοφιστὴς ἢ γόης οὕτω θαυμάσιος δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ λέγειν δεινός....

though he also, indirectly, provides us with rich information on the beliefs in magic in his ambience, and especially its terminology.[26]

(c) *On the sacred disease*

With the treatise *On the sacred disease*,[27] written in the full bloom of the classical period, at the end of the 5th or in the beginning of the 4th century, we are back into the discussion of 'real magic,' with no talk of poetical imagery and allegories. The text is pivotal in describing nascent critical science in antiquity, and is as such employed by G.E.R. Lloyd (1979:15–58) as his main evidence for how critical, rational, and cause-oriented natural science departed from magic—the text systematizes in a very explicit way the dichotomy magic/science in the classical period. But, since its main object is to show that the 'the sacred disease,' epilepsy, is in no way more sacred than any other disease but is to be explained by natural causes (*Morb.sacr.* 1.2f.),[28] the text also treats the dichotomy science/religion, and thus also strongly dichotomizes magic/religion, in order to show that the deceivers, soothsayers, and rouges, who claim to deal with the sickness in fact practice what the author of the text inter-textually describes as deceptive magic, etc., and are in opposition not only to true science but also to true religion. And the causes of illnesses are not some unclear godly figure with a faint symbolic relation to the ailment, such as the Mother of the gods if the patient cries like a goat or a lion, or Poseidon if he makes a shrill sound, etc. (1.32ff.). The author is very polemical specifically against 'magicians, purifiers, vagabonds, and impostors, who pretend to be especially religious (θεοσεβής) and to know more than others,' since such cheaters are the ones 'first to make the ailment into something sacred,' just to hide their helplessness in actually curing people, so that they can go on with their ma-

26 Although there are views presented in the dialogues of Plato which take magic literally deadly serious, describing it dichotomously with religion in a complete set of magical terminology (*Laws* 10.909a–c, 11.932e–933e, *Republic* 364b–c), there are many instances of his use of magical imagery as allegories, *e.g.* Socrates is allegorically—and positively—referred to as a magician being an admirable teacher and dialectician (*Phaedo* 77e–78a, *Meno* 79e–80b), Callicles likens—negatively—to magic the conventions and traditional views that destroy the independent and good young people with the incantations of traditional thinking (*Gorgias* 483e–484a).

27 Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου, *De morbo sacro*; references are to the text of Grensemann 1968. The date: Lloyd 1979:15 n.32. Reference to the dichotomous terminology of the text: Versnel 1991:191.

28 Οὐδέν τί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱερωτέρη, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ νοσήματα ὅθεν γίνεται, φύσιν δὲ αὕτη καὶ πρόφασιν. 'I do not believe that the sacred disease is any more divine or sacred than any other disease but, on the contrary, just as other diseases have a nature from which they arise, so this one has a nature and a definite cause' (transl. Lloyd 1976:16). Grensemann thinks the sentence possibly should be deleted, because it appears in a very similar form at 2.1f. Anyway this is the very clear message of the text.

gical purifications (καθαρμοί) and enchantments (ἐπαοιδαί) (1.10–2),[29] without really taking any real responsibility for the patient (1.23): 'and I do not think that even those who try to treat those ailments in that way think the ailments are particularly sacred or divine. ... With such utterances and methods, they pose as having some kind of superior knowledge, and they deceive people proposing to them all kinds of purifications and cleanliness, though most of their talk is [not on medicine, but] on the divine and the spiritual' (1.24–7).[30] This is not science, and this is not religion: the author of our text is sympathetic to religious sentiments, but he does not at all wish to grant the magicians he is attacking a genuinely religious attitude: 'at least I mean that their talk is not on religion, as they themselves may believe, but rather on the non-religious and on the inexistence of the gods—their religion and their kind of divinity is rather non-religious and blasphemous, at least as I teach it' (1.28).[31] 'If a man practices magic and offerings to take down the moon, obscure the sun or making winter or summer, I do not believe anything of that to be divine—it is rather human indeed, if the power of the divine can be dominated and enslaved by some human knowledge.' Our author here clearly distinguishes between the submissive and the coercive attitude towards the divine, prefiguring the dichotomy echoing through the whole modern discussion of ma-

29 Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα ἱρώσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι μάγοι τε καὶ καθαρταὶ καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεξόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀμηχανίης τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσι καὶ ὡς μὴ κατάδηλοι ἔωσιν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι ἱερὸν ἐνόμισαν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι, καὶ λόγους ἐπιλέξαντες ἐπιτηδείους τὴν ἴησιν κατεστήσαντο ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς σφίσιν αὐτοῖσι καθαρμοὺς προσφέροντες καὶ ἐπαοιδάς, λουτρῶν τε ἀπέσχεσθαι κελεύοντες καὶ ἐδεσμάτων πολλῶν καὶ ἀνεπιτηδείων ἀνθρώποισι νοσέουσιν ἐσθίειν. 'It is my opinion that those who first called this disease 'sacred' were the sort of people we now call mages, purifiers, vagabonds and charlatans. These are exactly the people who pretend to be very pious and to be particulary wise. By invoking a divine element they were able to screen their own failures to give suitable treatment and so called this a 'sacred' malady to conceal their ignorance of its nature. By picking their phrases carefully, prescribing purifications and incantations along with abstinence from baths and from many foods unsuitable for the sick, they ensured that their therapeutic measures were safe for themselves' (transl. after Lloyd 1972:16).

30 Οὕτως οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκέουσιν οἵτινες τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ ἐγχειρέουσιν ἰᾶσθαι ταῦτα τὰ νοσήματα, οὔτε ἱερὰ νομίζειν εἶναι οὔτε θεία. ... τοιαῦτα λέγοντες καὶ μηχανώμενοι προσποιέονται πλέον τι εἰδέναι καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶσι προστιθέμενοι αὐτοῖς ἁγνείας τε καὶ καθαρότητας, ὅ τε πολὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ λόγου ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἀφήκει καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον.

31 Καίτοι ἔμοιγε οὐ περὶ εὐσεβείης τοὺς λόγους δοκέουσι ποιεῖσθαι, ὡς οἴονται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀσεβείης μᾶλλον καὶ ὡς θεοὶ οὐκ εἰσί, τὸ δὲ εὐσεβὲς αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβές ἐστι καὶ ἀνόσιον, ὡς ἐγὼ διδάξω.

gic (1.31):[32] in his dichotomy the verbs κρατῶ 'dominate' and δουλεύω 'be enslaved' are even stronger than in Plato, where the same dichotomy is expressed through πείθειν, 'persuading' the gods.[33] Our author is as uncompromising when it comes to magical rites: they are different from religious offerings and prayers (1.41), just as the mentality of those practicing magic is different from that of the truly religious.

One would presume that those described as magicians in *On the sacred disease* would not like to be characterized as such: their intra-textual description would presumably be different. Those earning money from their tricks might be an exception, though. This leads us to the question: who were the persons so polemically criticized in the text as magicians and mystery mongers? What were their milieus? Or, in the terms that I have proposed above, what is the intra-textual description of those so deprecated by this inter-textual description? Lloyd (1972:37ff.; *cf. supra* pp. 31f.) tries to free Empedocles of the charge of magic—but the latter's claim to control the weather and the episode with 'the woman in the trance' places him squarely among of our author's opponents. Indeed Empedocles seems to have had an interest in 'other states of mind,' which is something clearly related to epilepsy and possibly linked to the belief that one can get knowledge of other worlds in epileptic trance. The author of *On the sacred disease* does not seem attack any particular persons; rather he argues against mentalities and with attitudes towards medical cures other than his own—a stance not of course infrequent in the use of 'magic' to describe the sinister activities of 'them' and 'the Others.' If he had individual offenders in mind, it would have been easy enough to name them. Several of the views of Empedocles, and of the Pythagoreans and Orphics, are much like those under attack. Now science, if we may call it thus, developed greatly in the hundred or so years between Empedocles and *On the sacred disease*. Our author seems to criticize not so much the past as the present; it is therefore likelier that he is attacking the intellectual heirs of Empedocles and Pythagoras around 400 BC rather than opponents living a hundred years before. From our other descriptions of magic in his period, we know that there were such groups, and some of them might easily have sailed under the banners of Orphic and Pythagorean 'mysteries'—in fact the τελεταί are often part of magical terminology, and there are also indications that 'Pythagoreanism' and 'Orphism,' after a hundred years, were de-

32 Εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μαγεύων τε καὶ θύων σελήνην καθαιρήσει καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανιεῖ καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ εὐδίην ποιήσει, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγ' ἔτι θεῖον νομίσαιμι τούτων εἶναι οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινον, εἰ δὴ τοῦ θείου ἡ δύναμις ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου γνώμης κρατεῖται καὶ δεδούλωται. Added to this list of tricks are 'making rain and drought, making sea and land impassable' in 1.29.

33 *Laws* 10.909b, *Rep.* 2.364c: θεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν. The difference between persuading and manipulating the gods became a theological problem with the Theurgists in their efforts to distance their soteriological teachings from magic, *cf. infra*.

signations attached to activities and mentalities not at all as sophisticated as those of the earlier Pythagoreanism.[34]

The text distinguishes magical fraud from religion and also from science, for the defrauders have no real understanding of the causes of illness: its polemical and inter-textual description of magic clearly establishes the three possible dichotomies between science, magic, and religion, and uses the main terminology of magic. But what about the extra-textual description of the points of view in the text? From the view-points of the modern humanistic and anthropological sciences one has no trouble in agreeing that what the author describes as magic is exactly that, even if there may be some disagreement about his view of religion. Even though the text ends with the proud claim (18.6) of having no recourse to 'purifications or magic or any such craft (ἄνευ καθαρμῶν καὶ μαγίης καὶ πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης βαναυσίης)' and shows a fairly rational understanding of causes, still, an extra-textual comparison with modern science would reveal a strong magical tinge in its doctrines of the temperaments (14.5f.), the wind (17.9), and the dependence of epilepsy on weather conditions (18.1). Also the recommended cures seem much like those of the kind of healers which the text itself is criticizing, and even to be related to the microcosmos-macrocosmos speculations referred to above.[35]

Still the *Sacred disease* gives us a well-established understanding of magic, science, and religion and makes distinctions among them that should also be taken into account in our extra-textual definitions. The treatise is also very interesting inter-textually, as it illustrates how the accusation of magic is relative to the views of those who describe it, and reminds us that we should be aware of which positions we take in describing the phenomenon also in a modern context.

(d) Apuleius

Next we shall try the case of Apuleius (2nd century AD): was he a magician? He was acquitted in court, in his own lifetime—but posterity has never dissociated him from the phenomenon. Thus his writings are today important evidence for magic in antiquity and were even read as such in his own time. The charge of magic against him lived on in Augustine's writings from an inter-textual position: from his Christian viewpoint he attacked Apuleius as the *typus* of the magician.[36] So, in

34 As another of the type, however admittedly more philosophically minded, we may again mention Heraclides of the 4th century, a great admirer of Empedocles and interested in trance, winds, bringing back souls, etc., and thus probably in the states of epilepsy, *cf.* pp.32f.

35 The author even states (17.9) that thinking comes from the air: ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τῆς φρονήσιος τοῦ ἠέρος πρῶτος αἰσθάνεται ...

36 Augustine evidently had good friends in Madaura, Apuleius' birthplace, and he even writes them letters, one of which is preserved (*Ep.* 232); they might easily have given him opportune advice on the matter.

the *City of God* there is no room for magicians: in his polemical and inter-textual Christian position against magicians and those dealing with demons Augustine is intransigent. Augustine at length (*Civ.D.* 8.14–22) denounces Apuleius' positive view of demons as exposed in *De Deo Socratis*, declaring that 'all men, or nearly all, have a horror of the name of demons ...' (8.14),[37] producing arguments that men, as rational beings, are superior to the demons. The demons, says Augustine, describing Apuleius views, 'are also the source of the miracles performed by magicians' (8.16).[38] It is absurd that in order to communicate with the gods upright men should make use of such beings, which 'cherish the magicians' thousand injurious arts in their sorceries, which innocence detests;' beings concerned with the 'criminal acts of magic,' from which the Christians stay aloof (8.18).[39] Thus Augustine warns against these beings, but at the same time he calls them 'poetic fictions and theatrical entertainments' (8.18)[40] and shows the same attitude towards magic as we met in *On the sacred disease*: at the same time seriously warning against the destructive power of magic and calling it childish foolishness—the doubleness is characteristic of the polemical inter-textual approach to magic. Augustine is averse to any use of magic, and as he says, the *artes magicae* are not only denounced by the Christians: by common people, and by Virgil as well, and by Cicero, quoting the Twelve Tables, the old laws of Rome.[41] Now, although Apuleius' judges acquitted him in the trial,[42] Augustine still treats him as guilty and says he should have abided by his faith and not have been so cowardly as to deny it—if he had been executed, his demons would have richly rewarded him in the next world for his loyalty to them, just as the Christian martyrs have been rewarded (8.19).

So in the eyes of Augustine Apuleius was a magician, and his accusers in the trial, from which his wonderful speech of defence is preserved, wanted him intensely

37 *Omnes vel paene omnes daemonum nomen exhorrent.*

38 *Ab his quoque esse miracula magorum.* Apuleius, however, refers to Plato as the authority (*D.Socr.* 6): *per hos [daemonas] eosdem, ut Plato in Symposio autumat, cuncta denuntiata et magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagiorum species reguntur*; certain of Plato's doctrines are respected by Augustine as well.

39 Quoting Verg. *Aen.* 7.338: *amant in maleficiis magorum mille nocendi artes, quas non amat innocentia*; ... *(ab) artium magicarum sceleribus (alienus).*

40 *Non est quod iste poetica figmenta et theatrica ludibria iustificare conetur.* At the end of 8.22 Augustine treats the demons as real but fraudulent; *cf.* also 18.18, where he refers to the *Asinus aureus*, as he calls it, and discusses whether the change of humans into animals for a period is possible or not: He has heard of more instances as well and is sceptical but does not quite deny the phenomenon.

41 Cicero is not known to have referred to the Twelve Tables, although Pliny, *HN* 28.4.17f., quotes them in his treatment of magic: *Non et legum ipsarum in duodecim tabulis verba sunt: qui fruges excantassit, et alibi: qui malum carmen incantassit?*

42 *Cf.* Valette 1924:xxii: 'Eut-il au moins gain de cause devant la justice? On ne saurait en douter; la suit de sa carrière le montre.'

to be one. He had married Pudentilla, the widowed mother of a friend of his at Oea; she was considerably older than he, and her near relatives resented the remarriage as probably lessening their chances of inheriting her money. So what was better than an accusation of magic, a crime to be punished under the Cornelian law *de sicariis et veneficis*? Certainly he could not have won the lady by *honest* means! The accusation, an important part of which was that he had dissected fishes for their use in magical rites and love magic against the widow, shows that magic was very much part of the society, and that the accusers were aware of the art (Abt 1908:67, index *s.v.* 'Fische'). 'My accusers Aemilianus and Rufinus should state in which interest, even if I had been the greatest of all magicians, would I force Pudentilla into marriage by means of incantations and potions' (*Apol.* 90).[43] Magic seems to have been, to judge from Apuleius' *Apology*, one of the standard accusations of the petty bourgeoisie of a provincial Roman town in the 2nd century against any intruder into their small community, but such an accusation evidently was credible enough to make its way to court. Even then, though, magic had no proper definition, with the result that it must have been very difficult to convict someone of the crime. Thus Apuleius brilliantly humbles his accusers in his speech, portraying himself not at all as a magician but as a Platonist and a philosopher, and to impress the judge and the audience quotes an array of philosophers; 'I congratulate myself on being numbered among such persons' (27),[44] he says, having referred to the fact that according to vulgar misunderstanding the old philosophers sometimes were designated by the word *magus*. 'Such are the anecdotes [about magic], among others, and about boys [involved in magical operations as described above] which I have read in a number of authors, but I am doubtful if I should say such things are possible or not. But I do believe, just as Plato, that there are certain divine powers placed between man and the gods when concerned both their nature and their location, and that these govern every divination and magical miracle' (43).[45] Apuleius does not fail to mention too that 'I have also participated in several initiations in Greece'—mystery cults being somehow related to magic, but still accepted generally. He also shows his *interest* in magical phenomena, and dichotomously ascribes to the simple or childish soul the ability to forget the present under the influence of incantations and vapours and to tell the future

43 *Venio nunc ad ipsum stirpem accusationis, ad ipsam causam maleficii. Respondeat Aemilianus et Rufinus, ob quod emolumentum, etsi maxime magus forem, Pudentillam carminibus et venenis ad matrimonium pellexissem.*

44 *Gratulor igitur mihi, cum et ego tot ac tantis viris adnumeror.*

45 *Haec et alia apud plerosque de magiis et pueris lego equidem, sed dubius sententiae sum dicamne fieri posse an negem; quamquam Platoni credam inter deos atque hominum natura et loco medias quasdam divorum potestates intersitas, easque divinitationes cunctas et magorum miracula gubernare.* This is the subject of his *De deo Socratis*; *cf. supra*.

(55).[46] And of course Apuleius explained the business with the fishes, so pivotal in the accusation, as a part of natural investigation, which it possibly was.

Now, the *accusers'* inter-textual point of view is quite clear, Apuleius is a magician. But Apuleius himself is denying the charge, his intra-textual statement is negative. Apuleius *did* declare himself a believer in the demons, as beneficent beings between gods and humans, and he cited the Platonic tradition in their support. He strongly reiterated, though, that he was *not* a magician—but no wonder, since he wanted to avoid the death penalty. Certainly he was interested in magic: in his delightful *Metamorphoses* he describes so many kinds of magic, that the book itself might even have had him convicted.[47] Its descriptions of magic must rather be interpreted as an allegorical autobiography—in youth he had no doubt been fascinated by magic as a phenomenon—and their humorous style does not suggest the serious magician wishing to practice the *ars magica* in earnest; it is more an innocent mockery of making fun of the whole magical business. There are, then, quite good reasons to believe that Apuleius was the victim of provincial narrow-mindedness, as he himself asserts in his *Apology*, notwithstanding 'que les explications d'Apulée ne sont pas toujours entièrement convaincantes, et que d'autre part le philosophe tel qu'il le conçoit est presque nécessairement doublé d'un magicien' (Vallette 1924:xxii n.2).[48] Apuleius' being a magician, then, again was probably only a rumour but was seen as a possibility and a threat in his time and milieu. To see how widespread the practice was, we need only consult the Greek and Latin magical papyri.

(e) Bhavya

G.E.R. Lloyd once called for Chinese comparanda for the Great Dichotomies (1979:8 n.28) and later (1996) he contributed such himself. This procedure is very helpful, for although the Chinese may be the Others, they are not so wholly Others as some unknown African, Melanesian, or Australian tribe, onto which we may and do freely and arbitrarily project, positively or negatively, our own cultural dichotomies. After all, Chinese thinking, being the product of a complex society and system of administration, treats problems intellectually in a way more like the

46 *Sacrorum pleraque initia in Gaecia participavi ....;* and 43: *quin et illud mecum reputo posse animum humanum praesertim puerilem et simplicem, seu carminum avocamento sive odorum delenimento soporari ....*

47 There is, however, every reason to presume that the book was written *after* the trial, especially because it would have been part of the accusations as evidence, as well as of the defence, if it was written before.

48 The problem of *Metamorphoses* as source for the biography of Apuleius: Valette 1924:vi. The date relative to the Apology: xiv sq.; *cf.* also Valette 1908.

Greeks than the Azande or whatever.[49] For the purpose of exploring how one party sees as magic and irrelevant nonsense what another sees as rational, I shall adduce an *Indian* example—Indian culture being also a complex culture with a long tradition of intellectual history. But Indian religions, and even what we may call science or 'science,' are full of incantations and *mantras* of all kinds: for personal salvation, for killing enemies and cursing rivals, for protection against wild animals and spirits, for the inducement of sexual desire, for getting children, for putting them to sleep, for producing the right weather, for healing and thaumaturgy, and most of all, for producing concentration and states of mind conducive to the development of man, for his escape from suffering and human existence. Thus some *mantras* have a more religious and 'rational' use, others clearly magical uses.

More or less the same dichotomies as in our examples from Western antiquity are also present in our Indian example. The Mādhyamaka Buddhist philosopher and apologist for the Mahāyāna faith Bhavya, who worked in the 6th century AD as an historian and systematizer of his religion, was to defend its sacred scriptures, the Mahāyāna Sūtras, which are full of the so-called *dhāraṇī*—or *dhāraṇīmantras* (Braarvig 1997). These strings of partly linguistically and semantically unexplained gibberish, interspersed with a choice of technical terms from Buddhist philosophy and ethics, originated probably as aids to memory as containing technical terms of Buddhist teachings (the meaning of the word *dhāraṇī* is 'supporting,' 'containing' *i.e.* the teachings). Indian sciences of grammar, music, philosophy etc., have a long tradition of using short symbols as annotation and mnemonic devices. Since, however, they embraced the complete teachings of Buddhism in symbolic form, the *dhāraṇī* soon became a matter for chanting—and enchanting—for by chanting or murmering them one could ultimately cure all suffering and sickness. The mnemonic syllables soon came to be chanted not only as aids to concentration and meditation, which above all is the means of salvation in Buddhism, but also for their magical effect—cure, protection, success, even the destruction of enemies.[50]

Bhavya, then, tried to defend a part of the Mahāyāna texts which was only reluctantly accepted by the intellectual elite of his time, for whom it was difficult to reconcile the great intellectual achievements of the Mahāyāna with the belief in mantras and magical rituals. Confronted as he was with religiously authoritative texts claiming the mantras to be the Words of the Buddha, Bhavya's main solution to the problem was to try to save the mantras as *foci of concentration*, which, of

49 This is not to say, of course, that magical phenomena of very simple societies are irrelevant; they are, however, not treated intellectually or philosophically to that extent in societies with simpler cultures.

50 There is also an argument that if one concentrates on the meaninglessness of the syllables in the mantras, one will also realize the meaninglessness and emptiness of existence as a whole, this being a basic tenet in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

course, was very much in accord with the different traditions of yoga. Thus, in doing this, he tried to take out the irrational part of his religion and stressed that the magical use of mantras was not on the Mahāyāna agenda. So while his opponents, adherents of the traditional non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, which were called *śrāvakas* by the Mahāyānists, attacked him by denying that such outlandish talk was in any way conducive to salvation and freedom from the everlasting round of rebirth, Bhavya set out to give the magical syllables a rationale.

Both Bhavya and his opponents, the *śrāvakas*, established their dichotomous positions towards magic: Bhavya accepted the mantras as a means to salvation but denounced their magical use, thus rejecting their 'darker' side. The *śrāvakas* contended that such mostly meaningless syllables, even if indeed in foreign languages, do not at all help for anything and reject the whole business of mantras, including the use which Bhavya favours—what is conducive for human development is only the moral and ascetic practices described in the 'true' Buddhist scriptures, *i.e.* those scriptures accepted as such by the *śrāvaka* party.

Where the dividing line between magic and religion is placed *is* arbitrary, both in the present and even in 6th-century India, but the dynamics of the study of magic, be it from a scientific descriptive view or from some kind of apologetic endeavour, is closely related to the dichotomous situation in which magic as a phenomenon always seems to present itself. As such, again, the dichotomy should not be given up but discussed and refined: the whole phenomenon of magic, with its derivatives, is suffused with otherness and dichotomies, not only from an extra-textual position, where research often too soon has labeled a phenomenon magic, but also inter-textually, which the Bhavya-*śrāvaka* controversy exemplifies, and intra-textually, in the way that Bhavya himself makes a sharp dichotomy between the soteriological and magical use of mantras. The idea (*cf.* Versnel 1991:180 n.8 for bibliography) that dichotomies should be a product of Western culture must be discarded as nothing but another popular myth of social anthropology: among other related dichotomies, that aptly called magic/religion is also present in Buddhist and Hindu traditions—space limits us to this one example.

(f) Theurgy

This takes us back to Theurgy, which will be our last example of the problem of the applicability of the category magic.[51] A few remarks on the dichotomous nature of this important and very complex movement in late antiquity will however have to suffice. Now Theurgy presented the scholarly world, the evolutionists as well as the Philhellenes, with a great paradox: how can pure Platonism develop or, rather, degenerate into such a confused mass of magic, with even Plotinus venerated as one of the fathers of the philosophy which is its basis—Plotinus, who was the pure contemplative mystic, and, as he has been looked upon, a lone rationalist in a superstitious age? And indeed at the end of the period Proclus practiced Theurgic rituals and had visions of Hecate (Marin., *Proc.* 26) even though, it must be admitted, he was an admirable systematizer of neo-Platonic philosophy. Today these questions are not that relevant anymore, thanks to great advances in Theurgic studies: Samson Eitrem and E.R. Dodds have contributed to the gradual freeing of Theurgy from the grasp of magic, although both of them were still prone to subsume it under that category. I quote Eitrem (1941:49): 'L'evolution de la philosophie grecque dans sa derniere phase est caractérisée par l'influence toujours croissante de la magie.' Then F.V.M. Cumont, Hans Lewy, Jean Trouillard, Andrew Smith, and recently Gregory Shaw and others have continued this work to resolve the enigma of Theurgy.[52] The work of the distinguished classicist Dodds, 'Theurgy and its relationship to Neoplatonism' (1947 = 1951:283–311) has become standard and has apparently the greatest influence on the study of Theurgy, even though it is quite a short and incomplete treatment. Dodds deals with mainly two phenomena, the mediumistic trances of Theurgy, and its magical animation of statues. Dodds' views on Theurgy was clearly formed in his own milieu: he was a life-long member of Britain's Society for Psychical Research and attended many mediumistic séances personally. In fact he commendably acknowledge his interest in such phenomena in his own times, and, unlike Frazer, also the existence of the Others

51 For the comparison of Tantrism and Theurgy, *cf.* 'Instead of the popular religion being spiritualized by the contemplative ideal, there is a tendency for the highest religion to be invaded and contaminated by the subrational force of the pagan underworld, as in Tantric Buddhism and some forms of sectarian Hinduism' (Dawson 1948:192f., quoted at Dodds 1951:302 n.35, on Porphyry). Bhavya's views on mantras is generally that of the Tantric religion, the most important religious practice of Tibet, with mantras playing a key role in all kinds of ritual activity. Theurgy, as intertwined with neo-Platonism, may superficially be categorized as magic in the same way as Tantrism, as both religious systems are concerned with invocations of 'powers.' Both systems, however, have mainly a soteriological purpose, but still the Juliani, the introducers of the *Chaldean Oracles,* were credited with great thaumaturgical powers, just like the Tantric 'Fathers.'

52 For a problem-oriented history of reseach, as well as of the controversies in antiquity about Theurgy, see the valuable overview and biblographical at Shaw 1985, esp. 'ii. The Theurgical debate,' 2–13.

in his own society. He was, however, as also might be expected, a sceptic: 'This branch of theurgy is especially interesting because of the evident analogy with modern spiritualism: if we were better informed about it, we might hope by a comparison to throw light on the psychological and physiological basis of both superstitions.'

We have mentioned some of the 'magoi' of the late 19th and the 20th century, like Aleister Crowley. Here are the words of another of them, Israel Regardie (in his *The tree of life*, quoted at Shaw 1985:4 n.12): 'I hope to show that the technique of Magic is in closest accord with the traditions of highest antiquity, and that it possesses the sanction, expressed or implicitly, of the best authorities. Iamblichus, the divine Theurgist, has much to say in his various writings about magic ....' But Dodds (1951:288) ranked Theurgy as only a lower kind of magical religiosity: 'As vulgar magic is commonly the last resort of the personally desperate, of those whom man and God have alike failed, so theurgy became a refuge of a despairing intelligentsia which already felt *la fascination de l'abîme*.' Writing about antiquity but rather referring to his own time, he described Theurgy as a strategy to manipulate the gods in a magical way. 'The creator of theurgy was a magician, not a Neoplatonist. And the creator of Neoplatonism was neither a magician nor—*pace* certain modern writers—a theurgist' (285). Thus Dodds still placed Theurgy safely on the magic side of the dichotomy, and Plotinus' 'rational mysticism' on the other, from which Theurgy had degenerated (288; *cf.* Shaw 1985:5).[53] With his monolithic mystical ideal, Plotinus was, of course, totally unsparing towards the *artes magicae* and any sort of γοητεία.[54] Some of the more recent writers mentioned above have put Theurgy, however, also into other dichotomies, as if defending it against the charge of magic. Jean Trouillard argues that Theurgy is a development, not a degeneration, of neo-Platonism: it was a discipline to bring the practitioner further than mere reflection and intellectual activity could bring him—thus Theurgy is a development of the negative theology of neo-Platonism, leading from moral practices and contemplation into Theurgy, the fruit of which was the *unio mystica*. Thus Trouillard (1972; 1973) describes Theurgy in terms of negative theology in a

53 F.V.M. Cumont (1949:374) is more lenient: 'la magie se flattait d'obtenir des effets semblables, mais la théurgie se présente comme l'antithèse de cet art réprouve;' and (362): 'mais le point essentiel est que la théurgie était une forme honorable de la magie, une sorcellerie clarifiée, et elle ne se donnait pas pour autre chose.' On the 'forme honorable de la magie' *cf.* Augustine as quoted *infra* n.58.

54 In Πρὸς τοὺς γνωστικούς, *Enn.* 2.9.14, he describes, full of contempt, magicians, who, among other things, try to treat illnesses with their fake means, using the usual magical terminology. At *Enn.* 4.4.40, however, he uses magic in a neutral and also allegorical way (Plotinus often use mythological allegories to explain his philosophical truths), *cf. infra* n.62. Dodds (1951:285) quotes Wilhelm Kroll's apparent view of an heroic attitude of Plotinus, who 'raised himself by a strong intellectual effort above the fog-ridden atmosphere which sourrounded him.'

dichotomy with positive theology and theoretical philosophy, but to be sure also as a non-manipulative discipline as different form magic. Andrew Smith, following Laurence Rosan, introduces a dichotomy *within* Theurgy to account for ritual activity, which he regards, like Dodds, as inferior to Plotinian θεωρία: he contends that there is a higher Theurgy, and a lower variant for the simple with rites 'sinister' and 'regrettable' (Shaw 1985:7–9). Shaw, then building on Trouillard, also stresses a similar, but inverted, inner dichotomy of Theurgy, that of pious ritual performance to achieve unity with the highest reality, in tension with theoretical philosophy, which is organically the theoretical side of the ritual which are the work of the Gods, and which make man divine, 'he takes on the shape of the god,' and thus the soul *becomes* the ritual. This interpretation is built also on Iamblichus' own viewpoints on the matter (26, *passim*).[55]

So far we have presented a number of extra-textual, modern scientific interpretations of Theurgy.[56] There were, however, ancient forerunners. Thus even within the fold of neo-Platonism we have Damascius' statement in his commentary on the *Phaedo* (§172 Westerink): 'Now Plotinus, Porphyry and many others honour philosophy more highly, while Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and the other Theurgists give more honour to the hieratic art'[57] (*cf.* Shaw 1985:2). Porphyry would contend that only the lower part of the soul was purified by rites, a position taken by Andrew Smith in his interpretation of Theurgy. But these divergences do not at all compare to the clearly polemical inter-textual positions of some of the Christian apologists. Augustine (*Civ.D.* 10.9.10f.) condemned the Theurgists in the same spirit as he condemned Apuleius: 'that which they call magic, or with a more detestable word sorcery, or a more honourable word Theurgy.'[58] And Eusebius—now

55 He quotes Iamb. *Myst.* 184.8 des Places: ὃ δὴ δύναται εἰκότως καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν σχῆμα περιτίθεται.

56 One may, however, even say that Dodds' interpretation is tinged with inter-textual perspectives, since he in fact is polemizing against a phenomenon in his own time, in which he had a lifelong interest. And Trouillard's standpoint may be read as an apology for Theurgy, indeed he as been critizised, both positively and negatively, since his sholarship is similar to Neoplatonism itself (see Shaw 1985:6 and n.30), and as such he is really writing from an intra-textual perspective. It may also be true that a completely extra-textual standpoint is a construct, since one is always influenced by the material on which one works, having some sort of *Vorverständnis*. This is of course the classical hermeneutical problem, which we will not discuss further here, but the categories of the humanistic and anthropological sciences should indeed be extra-textual, though they are of course built up in dialogue with the tradition of research in which they should be used, as well as the material treated by them, so as to be able to explicate it.

57 Ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν προτιμῶσιν, ὡς Πορφύριος καὶ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικήν, ὡς Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ ἱερατικοὶ πάντες. Quoted also by Dodds 1951:301n.25 to substantiate his dichotomy between Plotinus and the Theurgists, *cf. supra* p.46.

58 *Quam vel magian vel detestabiliore nomine goetian vel honorabiliore theurgian vocant.*

an important source for Theurgic oracles—made Theurgy one of his main objects of attack in his Christian crusade against demonology and magical practices (*PE* 3.14–5.30), and 'he quotes the ritual injunctions with a view to demonstrating the absurdity of magical polytheism' (Lewy 1978:65).[59] On the other hand, by irony of history, the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, with all his influence on both ritual and mysticism in the Christian churches, might almost be called a Theurgist himself: even from his inter-textual position as a Christian, he would, to judge from his writings, be very sympathetic to Theurgy: he may even have seen the practice of the Christian sacraments as Theurgy—the word θεουργία appears 47 times in his extant writings (Saffrey 1982:72)—and he was clearly influenced by Proclus and other Theurgists. Thus Theurgy was not at all base magic to the great church father, though he clothed it in a Christian garb.[60]

And how did the Theurgists understand themselves? Not at all as magicians: Iamblichus, as its spokesman, stated that Theurgy had nothing to do with either sorcerers (γόης) or their wonderworking (θαυματουργία): it was a ritual discipline that started where theoretical philosophy ended, and had the soteriological aim of attaining Theurgical union with the ineffable and the divine, both of them immanent in its rituals. Through these last, the soul is lifted up into immortality, leaving this world (Iamb. *Myst.* 161.10–6, 175.13ff., 96.13–97.9, 270.14–9).[61] Thus it would seem, as argued by Trouillard and Shaw, that Theurgy is best understood by its inner, *i.e.* intra-textual, dichotomies philosophy/ritual—or rational theorizing contrasted with ritual action—rather than the dichotomy rationalism/magic.

Theurgy, though, is often called magic both in antiquity and in modern times. Christian apologists were of course prone to call magic everything that was not Christian, but still, Theurgy, because despite its soteriological aims it had its set of magical terms (Eitrem 1941, Lewy 1978:56f., 440f.), was careful to defend itself against the accusation of magic. And even though modern interpretors would absolve Theurgy of the charge, the general late-antique interest in magic would as-

59 *Cf.* also Lewy 1978:246 and references in n.67 for Hippolytus' criticism of magic.

60 The classic on Dionysios' relation to Proclus and the other Neoplatonists is Koch 1900; further in Saffrey (1982) with references, who also (72) concludes that Dionysios was trained under Proclus, in his school; on the ritual continuity between Theurgy and Christianity *cf.* Shaw 1985:11, Trouillard 1968–73:582.

61 *Cf.* Lewy 1978:275, *passim*, for the use of the the novel English word 'goët,' as the opposite of the Theurgic practicioner; the resultant dichotomy is broadly equivalent to magic/religion—with Theurgy on the religion side; *cf.* also Dodds somewhat unfair review of Lewy (Dodds 1961, reproduced in Lewy 1978:693–701), in which he makes fun of Lewy's 'highly idiosyncratic English' (694) containing the word *goët*. That Lewy's book is 'an extraordinarily difficult book to use' (so Blumenthal 1993:1n.1) may be true, but it is very rewarding, being the first systematic attempt to show that Theurgy is a consistent religio-philosophical system; *cf.* now Majercik 1989:1–46, on the problem of magic, Theurgy and Christian sacramentalism 22–25, with further references.

sure the popularity of any religious message related to magic, if only in form. But there is more to it than mere language: the practice, even the theoretical basis, of the ritual has a relation to magic. Proclus would explain that by the serial manifestation of the divine, divine power was present in the kind of material, plant, animal, soul, or spirit of which it was the cause: thus the soul might be elevated by Theurgic ritual to the divine because of the divine presence in everything (*Theol.* 145; *cf.* Dodds 1963 *ad loc.*). This doctrine is related to the Plotinian συμπάθεια,[62] but Proclus stresses that the sympathy is between the soul, etc., and the *divine*, not the 'horizontal' sympathy between different material and psychical things, which would be the principle of magic as performed by a human magician (*cf.* Shaw 1985:22). This is the basis of Theurgic rituals: they lead the soul from the material world upwards to the divine through the divine 'vertical' *series*, and thus different objects, like stones etc., especially in amulets and talismans, may symbolize the divine, as do also the verbal 'symbols'[63]—which was close to magic in appearance though not in self-declared theory and intention. The central position of Hecate in Theurgy as the universal feminine power or cosmic soul also is reminiscent of magic, in whose operations she was, after all, a main helper.[64] The neo-Platonic Theurgical writers are careful to stress that it is not the practitioner but the god, being the ritual itself, who performs the ritual (Shaw 1985:28). Iamblichus denies that the spells of Theurgy are coercive: the gods show themselves by their own will, αὐτοφανής, κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν βούλησιν.[65] Thus there is no question of manipulating or *coercing*, and man's union with the divine in the ritual must be most of all total *submission* to the divine nature. Since Theurgy thus is explicitly *non-magic*, we are evidently compelled to subsume it under 'religion' in the magic/religion dichotomy. But still Theurgy is made clear to us through its opposite both historically and doctrinally, and our extra-textual description profits greatly by seeing it in

62 *Cf. Enn.* 4.4.40, where Plotinus explains that magic works because of natural accord between the similar and enmity between the dissimilar, but, apart from using general magic terminology, he stresses that 'the true magic is the attraction and enmity in the whole universe' (ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὖ), using 'magic' universally and allegorically rather than in its strict sense. This is evidently the source of Frazer's version of 'sympathetic magic'.

63 *Cf.* Lewy 1978:471: 'The theurgist who utters the "symbols" (*i.e.* the magical names) of the gods, causes the invoked gods link themselves with him through the "chain" of the demons attached to each of them, who draw him upward to the desired goal.' On the magical names as the 'verbal statues' of Theurgy, *vide* Saffrey 1982:67ff.

64 *Cf.* Lewy 1978:52: 'We may conclude form the similarity of the literary form that the Chaldaeans imitated the style of the normal type of Hecatean oracles. Thus this relationship reflects the competition between Theurgy and the lower forms of magic.' Hecate as the cosmic soul: *ib.* 47.

65 As says Iamblichus in *De mysteriis Aegyptiorum*; *cf.* Lewy 1978:467–71, Excursus v, on the Theurgic discussion on invocation as decided not by the practitioner , but by divine will: the ritual is the 'call' of the godhead; and Majercik 1989:23.

the dialectical perspective of the dichotomy religion/magic—that also enables us to understand the origin and popularity of the phenomenon sociologically.

Conclusion

Many of the examples we have presented are connected not to magic, but rather the accusation or rumor of it, and its use as an allegorical term. It *is* difficult to get intra-textual material on magic, as we have seen in most of our excerpts from the more sophisticated antique literature. Magic is usually the activity of the Others, and whoever practices it is not prone to admit it, since it in fact concerns a private, not easily acknowledged or even recognized, darker side of the personality.[66] We *are* lucky, then, to have the lead curse tablets and the magical papyri as studied in *Magica hiera* and in the present volume, for most of them give evidence of what I would contend magic really *is*, and present it in an intra-textual way, with no theoretical reflections or any metaphysics of the Frazerian or even Theurgical and Ficinian type. Magic, among most serious writers, is something the Others do, but the lead tablets and papyri of antiquity clearly prove that the Others were among the Greeks themselves.[67] The message that they transmit—hate, lovesickness, jealousy, the spirit of having lost the game, greed, pettiness and stinginess—is related to a part of human nature that we are not ready to admit in ourselves, and we are not prone to admit it for a culture we admire as much as the classical Greek. But still it is there, ready to be understood, as I argue, through a set of dichotomies that establish such activity as a phenomenon most aptly called *magic*—because the phenomenon is there in the material when interpreted, because the word and its cognates are found in the literature in antiquity, and because the phenomenon is also found in many other cultures both as a rumour and a self-defining reality.

Thus Frazer's dichotomies may still be fundamental to the study of magic: 'By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life. ... It is true that magic often deals with spirits, which are personal agents of the kind assumed by religion; but whenever it does so in its proper form, it treats them exactly in the same fashion as it treats inanimate agents, that is, it constrains or coerces instead of conciliating or propitiating them as religion would do' (Frazer 1911–15:I 222, 225). But, even though such dichotomies exist in human existence it-

66 Although the self-defining magician of Theurgy and Renaissance magic later, the Grand Magus, may be excluded from this picture as being prestigious in the positive sense. (In antiquity the word *praestigiae* had no positive connotations, it only meant deceptions, jugglers' tricks, illusions, and secret strategems, but has undergone the same change as the word magic.)

67 We all maybe are even our own Others, though we never admit it in public.

self and thus in all cultures, it is important to deduce these dichotomies within these cultures themselves, where they belong—be it within our own, within Greek culture, or within any other—and not to build a dichotomy 'us'/'them:' thus we keep ourselves in an extra-textual position, outside the dichotomy. We can very well do if we eschew Frazer's pride in the British Empire or his emotional view of the hostility between the 'priest' and the 'magician,' of 'the haughty self-sufficiency of the magician, his arrogant demeanour towards the higher powers,' and of the priest 'with his awful sense of the divine majesty, and his humble prostration in presence of it' (226). Thus we may refine (in Goody's sense) the dichotomizing tools of science—when the intra-textual and inter-textual descriptions of magic are suffused with dichotomies, there is no reasons why not to employ these last in our extra-textual descriptions of the phenomenon, and build our understanding and definitions on them.

Thus we are left with many of the classical dichotomies in the study of material classed as magical, even as extracted from the material treated above: In contrasting *religion* and *magic* there is (*a*) the attitude of a *submissive* vs. *coercive* mentality (*cf.* Versnel 1991:178§2) where the religious submits himself to *divine will* through the ritual and acts as a suppliant, while the magician demands the that demonic or divine forces shall perform the *magician's will*, which is manifested in ritual actions, verbal, physical or mental. One might say that this points to a basic dichotomy in human life: feeling subordinate to other powers *vs.* being in control oneself. This attitude also entails (*b*) different goals or intentions in the two, the religious would have a longer-term or *collective* aim, or, in the religions where salvation, especially in the other life, is the principle aim, a collective or personal *soteriological* aim, while the practitioner of magic would have mostly a *personal* and pragmatic, this-worldly aim (*ib.* 178§1). The social correlative to these intentions and attitudes is that (*c*) religion is *morally and collectively accepted* by society as a common expression of all, while magic is not prone to be admitted by even the ones practicing it, being strongly condemned as *immoral, subversive and destructive* by society at large, being socially marginal and as such often ascribed to strangers and despised groups (179§3). This marginality, however, may result in not only condemnation, but also an admiration for the strange and exciting: thus the imagery of magic is used allegorically in poetry and art, and generally in depictions of the extraordinary in general. The magical imagery of language and expression is, however, only distantly related to magic in the strict sense. The positive use of magic in the Renaissance, defining itself (intra-textually) as such, with its admiration for the Great Magician, would not quite suit this dichotomy, and would have to be treated as a special case.

In relation to science, the fundamental dichotomy is that magic is based in the belief that magical actions and the willpower of the magician work by its own force

to bring about the desired result, while science would empirically and systematically search in nature for causes of the events that it would control. Thus the dichotomies magic/science and magic/religion share the dichotomy (*d*) *untruth/truth*: magic is content with persuading those seeking its services that it works, be it by deceit and fraud, while science would seek a true description of nature, and while religion would contend that its scriptures are true, the magician would be content if his texts and rituals could impress and produce a certain result even by fraud: the enchantments and rituals would not be effective through their meaning, but through their alleged power to invoke spirits for a specific often harmful purpose, or by their alleged direct influence.

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Is magic a subclass of ritual?

Einar Thomassen

IN THIS AGE of deconstruction, 'magic' is one of those traditional terms which it has become fashionable to dismantle and discard as being no longer useful for scholarship—a word expressing the prejudices of the one who uses it rather than conveying an understanding of what it purports to designate. These days there is hardly a new publication dealing with magic which does not avow that the term itself is deeply problematical. Thus, for instance, the recent book *Ancient Christian Magic* by Marvin Meyer and Richard Smith (1994)—an admirable publication in many respects—carries the subtitle *Coptic Texts of Ritual Power.* And in their introduction to the volume the two editors admit that 'the subtitle is more precise and crucially important' (1). Indeed, going on they maintain that 'the more closely these texts are actually read, the harder it is to maintain any distinction between piety and sorcery' (2). In a similar vein, Hans-Dieter Betz, in his introduction to *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation,* asserts that in antiquity,

> The religious beliefs and practices of most people were identical with some form of magic, and the neat distinctions we make today between approved and disapproved forms of religion—calling the former 'religion' and 'church' and the latter 'magic' and 'cult'—did not exist in antiquity except among a few intellectuals. (*GMPT*: xli)

It would seem, then, that a general agreement has emerged that the phenomenon of 'magic' cannot truthfully or usefully be distinguished from 'ritual,' or from 'religion' in general. It may be questioned, however, how useful such a position is for purposes of theoretical analysis. After all, the word 'magic' continues to be used, even by those who deny its validity in principle, and the prospect of doing without it in our descriptive work as historians of religion does not really seem inviting.[1] There still is, it appears, something we want to call 'magic,' although we no longer think we have a clear idea of what it is. For this reason it seems that after

1 As H.S. Versnel (1991:181) succinctly puts it: 'One problem is that you cannot talk about magic without using the term magic.' For the extensive literature concerning the nature of magic I refer to Versnel's article, which contains excellent bibliographical references.

deconstruction has had its say, some work of reconstruction may now be called for. As you will already have suspected, this is going to be a theoretical paper—actually rather a speculative one—more than an historical and empirical study. My chief concern will not be with the various manifestations of ancient magic as such, but with the problems of classification and taxonomy currently posed by the term 'magic' in my own discipline, the history of religion.

Reflecting, for that purpose, on the history of the discipline, it can no doubt be said that magic has been treated as the stepchild, or, if you like, the black sheep, in the family of the discipline's theoretical concepts. One of the first things our founding fathers did was to separate magic from religion. According to the most influential classification scheme, which goes back to E.B. Tylor and, above all, to Sir James Frazer, magic differs from religion with respect to the *action type* of the magical act. Magic, it is thought, is the performance of instrumental acts. The intention of the magical act is to cause an effect, and is based on the belief in the existence of invariable mechanisms which automatically link the effect to the cause. Religion, on the other hand, addresses the powers which govern us as autonomous personalities, and religious acts are therefore not instrumental, but *communicative* in their essence. Consequently, while magic intends to coerce the powers operating in the world, religion proposes to negotiate with the powers as deities.

The second classical approach to the phenomenon of magic was to explain it primarily in social categories. The chief proponents of this approach, Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, also assumed that there is a difference in principle between religion and magic. The difference is not, however, basically one of action type, but has to do with social context and function. In Durkheim's famous phrase, the magician has a clientele, not a church.[2] For him, religion is the communal cult and beliefs of a group, the expression of collective identity. Magic, on the other hand, is an individual practice—a private, often secret matter; it is thus posited off centre in relation to what serves to confirm group identity, and is even a potential threat to it.[3]

In both of these classical theories magic is defined out of religion—in the first theory because it rests on notions of automatic efficacy, which are deemed to be alien to genuine religion, in the second because it lacks the social functionality of

2 Durkheim 1994:62. For Mauss' description of the diffeence between magic and religion cf. in particular Mauss 1997:13–16.

3 Thus Mauss stresses 'l'irréligiosité du rite magique; il est et on veut qu'il soit anti-religieux' (1997:15). It is true that in Mauss' analysis, magic too, just as religion, is an articulation of social forces. By consequence, however, he ended up with 'une difficulté grave' and 'un dilemme' with regard to his initial distinction between religion and magic: How can magic be anti-religious and anti-social, and at the same time a collectively underpinned activity involving a notion of the sacred, and thus itself a social and religious phenomenon? (*cf. ib.* 139–140).

affirming collective identity, which in the Durkheimian perspective is the essence of religion. Now I am not going to say that this is all wrong. On the contrary, I would hold that these two perspectives on magic together encompass widespread intuitions regarding the nature of 'magic.' An attempt to combine them might prove quite interesting.

Let us look at the sociological viewpoint first—that magic consists in practices outside the religious cult thought to be central to a society. There is much to be said for this view. The roles of magician, witch or sorcerer are found in a wide variety of societies, and are generally attributed to marginal persons, who are feared, despised and frequently persecuted (*cf. e.g.* Mauss 1997:19–24). This was largely true in antiquity as well. Magic was something associated above all with out-groups. The word *mageia* itself is of Iranian origin, and other barbarian peoples too, such as the Jews, the Chaldaeans or the Egyptians, were believed to be great practitioners of magic, a reputation they shared with the notorious Thessalians, despised by all decent and civilized Greeks. Much ethnographic material can be adduced which parallels this view of magic in the Graeco-Roman world. Magic is associated above all with 'the others'—other peoples, immigrants, and, very frequently, with aboriginal populations living as remnant minorities among a powerful majority of more recent colonizers. The Scandinavian example is of course the Saami, who used to be feared by the local Scandinavian and Finnish populations, and still are, for their powers as sorcerers.

The category of the marginal applies in this context both to the 'others' in the sense of the foreign and exotic, and to deviant behaviour and people who are 'different' within—and thus on the margins of—a community. Naturally, we need to distinguish between how people see themselves and how they are classified by others. Obviously many more people have been accused of witchcraft and sorcery in the history of mankind than there have been actual practitioners of these arts. A famous case from the ancient world, known to all, is that of Apuleius, who was accused of having employed love magic to capture the heart of the wealthy widow Pudentilla. In this case it is clear that the accusations against Apuleius, though motivated by the pecuniary interests of Pudentilla's relatives, was made more efficient, as Fritz Graf has pointed out (1996:64), by the suspicion already lying upon Apuleius by the fact that he was a social upstart, a stranger and a so-called 'philosopher'—all qualities which bestowed upon Apuleius the odium of marginality.

On the other hand, the evidence from literature, curse tablets and the magical papyri leaves no doubt that there actually existed in all periods of antiquity individuals who saw themselves as practising what society at large called *mageia, goeteia,* etc. The category of magic is not merely the expression of an ideological prejudice against 'the other'; it was also a profession and a practice understood by its practitioners as being something different from the official cult of the gods.

Thus Marcel Mauss' contention that the role of sorcerer is basically something which is ascribed to a person by public opinion[4] is only partly true. There has of course to be a pre-existing slot in the collective consciousness into which the magic practitioner's self-image will fit, but it is nonetheless the case that being a *magos* or a *goes* is also an acquired status, one which often requires long periods of apprenticeship and initiation.

Thus we have to beware of not throwing out the baby with the washwater. On the one hand we have 'magic' as a denunciatory term used to describe what is weird, what does not conform to the shared social norms of a community, specifically in its dealings with the suprahuman, and which therefore is perceived as a potential threat to the community. This perception of magic is a reality, in the sense of a social fact. It is noteworthy that in antiquity the initiation rites of various mysteries were also associated with the practice of magic in this way (especially if such rites were performed by women).[5] Already Heraclitus, if we are to believe Clement of Alexandria (*Prot.* 22 = DK 22 B 14), threw the *magoi* into the same bag as the bakchoi, the maenads and the mystai. What magic and the mysteries have in common, of course, is the private, secret, uncontrolled and therefore potentially anti-social, nature of their practice.

On the other hand, however, the fact that the category of 'magic' was a social construction, does not mean that it did not exist as a specific activity pursued by people who knew that that was what they were practising. The *goês* and the *magos* did actually exist. We now need to look into the question of the action type of the magical practice.

Is it true that magical action is instrumental whereas religious action is communicative? This too is a question which cannot be answered, as far as I can see, simply by yes or no. The distinction between instrumental and communicative action seems like a neat one. We might invoke, for instance, the authority of the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, who has argued for categorizing instrumental and communicative action as two irreducible basic forms of human action (*e.g.* 1981:I 384ff.). However, in the area of religion, and especially in the analysis of ritual, things are not as clear-cut as we might like them to be. Instrumental action is at bottom a physical thing, involving the use of the body. Communicative action, on the other hand, is the transmission of information and presupposes a personal interlocutor able to decode the message. The transmitted information is itself essentially incorporeal; the physical only plays a part as the

4 'C'est donc l'opinion qui crée le magicien et les influences qu'il dégage,' Mauss 1997:32; *cf.* also 19–33 *passim*; this is accepted by Graf 1996:58. Mauss' views are, to be sure, more nuanced than this (*cf.* 33–37); however, the logical status of the negative vs. the positive characteristics of the magician with regard to the definition of magic remains unclear throughout Mauss' essay.

5 *Cf.* Graf 1996:25–29, 57, 89–107, 197.

medium through which the information is conveyed. This dichotomy breaks down, however, when we consider ritual acts, because it belongs to the nature of ritual to involve the body. Ritual, it is conventionally said, consists in symbolic acts. But too often the accent has been on the symbolical aspect, ritual as language and communication, and too rarely has its act-quality as such been taken into account as an indispensible feature of ritual.

The traditional distinction of magic and ritual on the basis of a dichotomy between instrumental and communicative acts fails, I think, to take the problem of ritual seriously. Rereading older works in the history of religions—most of them written by liberal Protestants—one cannot help noticing that in addition to the excision of magic from the domain of religion, frequently also another sentiment can be found: that of a contempt of 'ritualism' and of the notion of *opere operato*. Typically, the phenomena referred to by these terms are compared to magic and contrasted with 'cult,' which is considered the more authentic ritual expression of religion. Thus the attempt in this period of scholarship to exorcize—if the word may be allowed here—magic from religion was rather unsuccessful in so far as it required a further distinction within religion itself, where what was exorcized seems to have reappeared in new guise.

This situation suggests that the distinction between religion and magic might derive from a failure to take proper account of the nature of ritual. It reveals too, perhaps, a prejudice about the nature of religion which gives religious belief a privileged status as opposed to religious action, reflecting, on an even more deep-seated level, a privileging of mind, or spirit, over body and matter.

If, then, we are to review the relationship of magic and religion, we need to do so in the context of considerations on the problem of ritual. Elements of the problem which then present themselves are the relationship of the symbolic and the physical aspects of ritual, the relationship of words and action and the criteria we use for classifying various types of ritual. To pick up the last thread first, it is usual to distinguish two main classes of religious rituals: rituals of maintenance and rituals of transformation.[6] The first class of rituals are fixed according to a calendar, and are most typically collective; they serve to maintain a situation, in terms of their social function they serve to maintain the coherence of a group of people. Transformation rituals, on the other hand, are concerned with the individual person, and effect a change in the status and identity of that individual. The various kinds of rites of passage naturally belong to this category. To these two broad categories a third may be added, crisis rituals, which are performed by individuals or

6 *Cf. e.g.* Zuesse 1987:414ff. (Zuesse uses the terminology 'confirmatory rituals' and 'transformatory rituals'); also, Honko 1979.

collectivities as an improvised response to situations of perceived threat (*cf.* Honko 1979).

Where does magic fit into this picture? Can magic ritual be subsumed under one of these classes, or is it to be considered a class of its own alongside the others? It might seem that magical rituals have a certain affinity with crisis rituals. Many of the situations in which magic is used may in fact be interpreted as individual crisis situations: sickness, love, crime, lawsuits, business competition, sport games. However, we would probably be wrong to stress the element of psychological urgency in all such cases. Graf points out in his recent book that the magic rituals more often than not were performed by professionals (1996:132f.). And the great mass of curse tablets by which people tried to influence the outcome of horse-races during the later empire, has made A.A. Barb wonder 'whether the engraving and burying of these charms may not have been almost as popular as the filling in and posting of football-pools is today' (1964:120). Though an element of crisis can be sensed in many cases, it does not seem plausible to make this a general criterion of magic.

So is magic, then, perhaps a separate, fourth class of religious ritual? But what criteria should we apply in that case to define its common genus with the other three classes as well as its own *differentia specifica*? We need in any case some kind of general notion about ritual. Now, an aspect of ritual which has attracted attention in recent years is its performative quality.[7] Rituals are performances. As such, they are doing things. It is essential to note, however, that rituals are doing things not only with words, but by means of bodily gestures and manipulations of matter as well. Unless this physical characteristic of rituals is given due attention, the inspiration offered by speech acts theory risks being deceptive. Ritual acts normally include both words and action. This is a feature which is shared by magical rituals and those rituals which are commonly called religious. An interesting thing about a performance perspective on ritual, however, is not only that the ritual words may be analysed as a form of action, but also that the non-verbal part of the ritual is highly laden with symbolism. Ritual is not only doing things with words, but just as much saying things with acts.

This dialectic of signifying and doing in ritual is quite fascinating. In everyday life too, of course, both are present and, indeed, inevitable. We cannot communicate without at the same time performing an act, and our acts normally signify something. In a ritual situation, however, both of these aspects are enhanced: we speak with heightened physical presence, and our acts are replete with meanings. Ritual in a sense operates on the principle of reversal, a bit like the use of italics in

7 This was inspired by the well-known books by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). The most influential applications of the theory are probably Tambiah 1968 and 1973.

printing.[8] Speaking emphatically turns speech all the more into an act, while acting with intense deliberation increases the significative content of the act. There is a double reversal, then, it would seem, which essentially consists in upsetting the normal relationship between saying and doing by undertaking to turn the one into the other. A magical transmutation indeed!

The function of performing bodily gestures and specific acts together with the pronunciation of words is, it would seem, to enhance the action character of the utterance. It is not enough to promise mutual fidelity with words in a wedding ceremony, the act of promise is given additional emphasis through the solemn exchange of rings. In a similar way, if in antiquity you wanted to curse someone really seriously, you wrote 'I bind NN, etc.' on a tablet, pierced it through with holes and hid it in some secret or inaccessible place, in order to endow the fleeting spoken words with permanent efficacy. This seems to be the way the combination of words and acts works in all rituals. The Christian baptismal words 'I baptise you …' are accompanied by the imposition of hands, water immersion and anointment, whereby the baptizand is 'sealed'—not only is the act-nature of the initiation emphasized and intensified by physical means, but the act leaves a permanent imprint as well.

The performative quality of the ritual words themselves are enhanced by ways of attracting attention to their physical, phonic and acoustic, dimensions, not only by forms of diction and modulations of voice, but also by the use of non-normal languages. Languages such as Hebrew, Egyptian and Latin have played this role in various historical contexts. The speaking of the sounds is what matters, more than their meanings. Normal comprehensibility even seems to detract from the efficacy of the utterance. However, this form of performative use of language seems to be most efficient when it is used in combination with speech which actually conveys a message. Whereas much of what is being said is more readily comprehensible, going into sublimely unintelligible speech marks the climaxes in a liturgy. Thus we have a dialectic between signifying and doing on the level itself of the words used in a ritual. A similar dialectic can be said to be present on the level of the acts performed, but there the diametrically opposite seems to apply: the highlights of the sequence of gestures are not the ones which most resemble normal activities, but the ones which are especially rich in symbolism, *e.g.* the sacramental parts of the mass.

All of this suggests that an essential purpose of ritual is in fact the fusion of saying and doing, of signifying and effecting. From an analytical point of view we can study the dialectics of these two components, and come to the conclusion that their fusion is never actually sucessful, they invariably fall apart in the very attempt

8 The simile is borrowed from Smith 1987:108.

to merge them. This must be so, because the signified content of a sign is by definition incorporeal and repeatable, whereas an act, considered just as an act, is an empirical event taking place under conditions of time and space. This dichotomy of the intelligible and the sensible, which as a general theme of course has a long history in western philosophy, is made into a particularly acute problem in ritual. By attempting to effect things with signs but at the same time turning acts into symbols, rituals both affirm and at the same time deny this dichotomy.

I shall resist the temptation to continue pondering over this paradox, and try to stick to my theme. Is there a difference in principle between a religious class of rituals and magical ones? Well, in terms of this general characteristic of the attempted fusion of signs and acts there seems to be no difference in principle. What we have said about rituals in general seems to apply to magical rituals as well. In particular, we see that the instrumental-communicative dichotomy does not offer a clear criterion for differentiation, since it does not sufficiently account for the fact that *all* rituals are emphatic ways of doing things with the aim of causing an effect, at the same time as they insistently communicate meanings. Thus we do not seem to be able to make progress along this line of deliberations.

The other traditional approach seems more promising. The rituals which we intuitively label magical seem to be characterized by their quality of being unofficial and private. However, this is, I believe, a rather superficial way of looking at the matter. One reason is that there actually do exist private forms of ritual devotion which we normally do not want to classify as magic, such as prayer, or mystical exercises. Therefore we need to go one step further and ask how the collective and the private as such are constituted within ritual generally and magic in particular.

The main types of religious ritual which were mentioned earlier can all of them be seen as ways of negotiating a relationship between individuals and a community. Rituals of maintenance serve to reaffirm periodically a social contract between the members of a community. Transformation rituals serve to integrate individuals into a group by conferring upon them a socially recognized and desirable status and identity. Crisis rituals reestablish a *nomos* in situations of *anomie*, and most often have the form of mutual reassurance shared by the members of a group. Compared to the social qualities of these rituals, magical rituals appear not only to be private and unsocial, but actually anti-social. Perhaps we can work with this latter notion. Could it be that the magical ritual is an inversion of what these other kinds of rituals are doing—not merely different from them with respect to social ramifications, but their necessary dialectical negative side, the dark side of ritual, the explicit expression of a tension existing even within ritual's positive side?

Further, the dialectics of act and symbol, performance and communication, physicality and intelligibility, can be related to those of the individual and the collective. The emphatic performance of acts in ritual has the effect of asserting the

individual performer, who in this way is endowed with a surplus of power. On the other hand, however, the symbolic qualities of the performed acts serve to de-individualize the performer. The power invested in him by the ritual does not belong to himself as an individual, but rather to the role he is performing. The duality of physicality and symbolism in the ritual has a socially integrating effect, mediating the individual and the collective, since it focuses attention on the individual by means which highlight his personal bodily and sensual presence; at the same time as he is submitting to a common code of significations.

This integrating mechanism which ritual is, has the effect of not only making the individual significant, by making him perform acts which focus attention on his unique body, but also of making this significance into something which is collectively shared and approved. Thus the power accorded to the ritual performer is diffused in, and controlled by, what is the common concern of the collectivity. The collective performance of the ritual is therefore often essential, as can be seen most clearly in those ritual modes which we call ceremonies. And in any case, the ritual performer must conform with a standard role.

Ritual therefore has to do with striking a balance between the granting of power to the performing body of the individual, and the control of this power for the common good. If we adopt this perspective on ritual it should also be possible to describe situations where this balance is skewed. Magic seems to be such a situation. The magical ritual act is, typically, an act where the power of the ritual performer is not allowed to be absorbed by the collective, but is assumed by, or arrogated by, the individual himself only. This anti-social, or potentially anti-social, attitude seems to be expressed in various ways by the characteristic forms of the magical ritual.

On the one hand, the performative and physical dimension of ritual, which endows the performer with power, is maintained in magic, and very frequently emphasized even more intensely than in normal rituals. The element of performative self-assertion is very strong in the magical ritual.

On the other hand, this self-assertion is not controlled by the forms of a collectively sanctioned symbolism. The circumstance that the ritual is typically performed in solitude, and not in a collective situation, is only one aspect of this. Equally significant is the fact that magical ritual deliberately negates the conventional and recognized symbolic content of normal rituals. One form of this is the employment of obscure formulae, magical words. This occurs, as we have remarked, in normal ritual too. The crucial difference is, I think, that in normal rituals the use of such formulae is restricted to ritual actors possessing clearly defined roles accorded to them by common consent. Thus the excess of assertive power wielded by the person enunciating such formulae is all the more strongly controlled by a community, by virtue of the fact that he is performing them not as

an individual person, but as the actor in a special liturgical role granted to him by the group on whose behalf he acts. The use of such formulae by unlicensed people is another matter, and becomes magic, not primarily because of the enunciation act itself, but because of who performs it.

It must be noted, too, that the formulae employed by the magician are however as a rule not simply identical with the ones used in normal liturgies, but includes secret words known only to the few. The *difference* from the normal is essential. Magical ritual does not intend to communicate, in the way that normal rituals communicate by means of a code of significations shared by a community. With respect to the verbal features of the magical ritual this is shown, then, both by the extensive use of *voces magicae* and by the fact that the formulae used are distinct from the ones sanctioned in communal rituals.

We can go further than this, however, and observe that not only does the magical ritual disobey the demands of intersubjective transparency posed by the existence of a fixed symbolic code in ritual, but it very often revolts against these demands too. This is expressed in the phenomenon of inversion: the magical acts are deliberate inversions of the ones performed in normal rituals—the sacrifice of a black animal instead of a white one, at midnight instead of during daylight, holding objects upside down, walking backwards, etc. In this way, the magician actively refuses to submit to a common code, and the power generated in the ritual is not shared by a community. Instead, the ritual power is retained by and concentrated in the magician himself.

This ego-centric concentration of power in the magician, and his refusal to be intersubjectively communicative, is the foundation for the forms of discourse employed—spells, curses, commanding invocations. This also accounts for the character of the physical acts performed: they are not as much instrumental acts, properly speaking (which would make magic insdistinguishable from primitive science, or technology); rather, they are imperative commands expressed in acts—not just doing things, but saying things with acts in the imperative mode.

Moreover, the unsocial appropriation of ritual power by a single person in the magical ritual also makes it possible to employ the power for deliberately anti-social purposes, to harm other people or to manipulate them. Such destructive use of the magical ritual is not in itself the basis of the practice of magic, but the individualistic form of ritualization which constitutes the magical ritual as such opens up the possibility of using it for such blacker purposes.

Finally, to wind up a couple of loose ends: We made the observation that there also exist other forms of individual rituals which are not generally considered to be magic. It is noteworthy that the most generally approved form of individual ritual is prayer. Why is prayer acceptable, and not considered to be magic? Presumably it is because the element of performative self-assertion is very weak in prayer.

The discourse of prayer is explicitly submissive in character, and uses either very plain language or formulae with a high degree of official sanction. As soon as the degree of performativity increases, for instance, when prayer turns into invocation, we need a communal setting for the ritual to be acceptable. There is a decisive distinction in attitude between saying 'I invoke …,' and 'we invoke ….'

Another point concerns the official use of magic, which exists in many societies. Here, the observation can be extended which was made before about the use of powerful unintelligible formulae in liturgies. The use of magic in such situations is characterized by being restricted to very special people such as kings and priests. It is acceptable precisely because these people act on behalf of a community. They act in *roles* which at the same time make them represent a collectivity and set them apart from the ordinary community members. They thus represent the diametrical opposite of the magician who assumes the power of magic for his own person.

To conclude: Magic is the appropriation of ritual power for personal ends, offsetting the balance between the individual and the collective which forms the sanctioned norm of ritual practice in societies. Magic depends on normal ritual and relates dialectically to it, by combining features which are the same as the ones performed in normal rituals—hymns, prayers, invocations, sacrifices, etc.—with features which are deliberately different from it. A kind of intertextuality thus operates between magic and the official religious ritual forms. This suggests that the most fruitful approach is neither to make an absolute distinction between religious ritual and magical practices, nor to pretend there is no difference. Historically, religious rites and magic have always existed side by side—there is never the one without the other. Theoretically, too, the mutual relationship and interdependence of the two should be more basically interesting than religion and magic studied separately.

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Magic in the oracular tablets from Dodona

Anastasios-Ph. Christidis, †Sotiris Dakaris, †Ioulia Vokotopoulou

AS IS WELL known, the bulk of the oracular tablets (πινάκια, μολύβδια, μολυβδᾶ πέταλα in the ancient terminology) from the Oracle at Dodona remains unpublished. Approximately 1400, however, from the excavations of D. Evangelidis there (1928–35), are nearly ready to appear in print. From them this paper presents a selection related to the practice of magic.[1]

H.W. Parke (1967) provides an excellent—and in many respects still valid—introduction to all aspects of oracular practice at Dodona and detailed information on the Oracle and its history. For the purposes of this presentation a few points may be mentioned:

a. The lead oracular tablets are, in their vast majority, palimpsest, *i.e.* they contain more than one inscription, very often incised over earlier ones.

b. They range in date from the 6th to the 3rd century BC.

c. The enquirers are men, women, men and women (couples, as a rule), free citizens, and slaves, as well as groups of people.

d. Most of the corpus consists of questions; there are a very few answers clearly identifiable as such.

e. Most of the texts are in Northwest Greek (of varying degrees of 'purity,' especially as one progresses in time). Others are in *e.g.* Thessalian, Boiotian, Sicilian West Greek, and Attic-Ionic. That the enquirer seems to be using his 'mother' dialect and, as Parke notes (1967:101), that 'the questions were written in the most miscellaneous forms of handwriting, in different varieties of the Greek alphabet and

1 On the original excavations see Carapanos 1878. On recent work see Dakaris 1963, the excavation reports by D. Evangelidis and S. Dakaris in *Ἐπειρωτικά Χρονικά* and *PAAH*, and also Christidis, Dakaris, and Vokotopoulou 1993. Since 1975, a team consisting of Sotiris Dakaris, Ephor of Antiquities at Ioannina and excavator of Dodona (†1996), Ioulia Vokotopoulou, Ephor of Antiquities at Ioannina and later Director of the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki (†1995), and Anastasios-Ph. Christidis have been working on the publication of this material. The datings are in all cases those of Dr Vokotopoulou. Thanks are due to David Jordan for improving the English of this paper, for the reference to *PGM* XXXVI in the discussion of no. 2, and for other valuable comments and suggestions.

with all the variations of spelling and grammar which the individual might give to his enquiry' lead one to conclude 'that the lead tablets were written on by the private enquirer himself, in most, if not all instances....' It should be noted that the 'variations in spelling and grammar' that Parke refers to very often take the form of omissions, repetitions and even genuine 'slips of the tongue' (or, rather, 'slips of the pen'), which betray a hurried, anxious mode of writing that cannot be attributed to anyone other than the enquirer himself.

f. The typical but not exclusive format of the question was: 'Θεός· Τύχα Ἀγαθά. *X* (without patronymic, sometimes with ethnic, *e.g.* Ἀρχίας Μεταποντῖνος) enquires (*e.g.* ἐρωτᾶι, ἐπερωτᾶι, κοινῆται, ἐπικοινῆται, αἰτεῖ καὶ δεῖται, ἀνερωτῆ, συμβουλεύει, χρᾶται, ἐρᾶται) of Zeus Naios (Δία τὸν Ναῖον) and Diona (Διώναν)[2] whether (πότερον, πότερα) it would be better (λώϊον καὶ ἄμεινον, λώϊον καὶ βέλτιον/βέντιον, λώϊον καὶ ἄρειον) ....' The tablet was folded or rolled up and handed over to the priest. On the outside, one usually finds a summary (abbreviated or full) of the subject of the enquiry, or the name of the enquirer, usually abbreviated (Parke 1967:102, 109), and sometimes alphabetic numerals, which apparently serve as a sort of reference system.

1

Inv. M257 — H. 0.023, W. 0.042, Th. 0.0009, L.H. 0.0025 m — very early IV[a]

Inscription A3, one of four on the tablet. The date: *cf.* Trumpf 1958, Beil. 71f. = SGD 9 (lead curse tablet, Athenian Kerameikos), Johnston 1978:225, fig. 2 (graffito on Attic terracotta pot).

1 Ἐπήνεικε φάρμακον
2 ἐπὶ τὰγ γενεὰν τὰν ἐ<μ->
3 ὰν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰγ γυναῖκα [ἢ ἐ-]
4 π' ἐμὲ παρὰ Λύσωνος;

3 τάγ· τατ tab.



Did he (she?) apply a *pharmakon* to my children or to my wife or to me, from Lyson?

In line 2, the space after the final ε is uninscribed. The choices are to read, with the text, ἐάν, psilotic Doric-Thessalian for 'his,' or to assume an inadvertent omission (perhaps influenced by the ending of γενεάν?) and to understand ἐ<μ>/άν 'my.'

2 Occasionally other deities are addressed, *e.g.* Herakles, Themis, Aphrodite, Dionysos.

The latter would square better with the 1st-person pronoun in line 4. I assume a *constructio praegnans*, the thought being both 'did s/he get a *pharmakon* from Lyson?' and 'did s/he apply it to us?' Other interpretations of the grammar are possibly, however. One should also note the absence, as in no. 4 *infra*, of the usual interrogative particle ἦ before the verb.

Does *pharmakon* here mean 'poison?' 'witchcraft?'

2

Inv. M269 max.pr.H. 0.025, max.pr.W. 0.028 2nd quarter v[a]
Th. 0.0005, L.H. 0.004 m

The tablet contains three partly legible inscriptions and illegible traces of others. The date: *cf.* Roehl 1882, nos. 372–432 (inscribed lead tablets from Styra). Beneath a lacunous inscription on Side B



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 [- - - - - - -]ας πὲρ [- - - - - -]
2 [θεῶν τίν]ι εὐχό[μενος - -]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

is a drawing. The enquirer—his name probably to be found in the fragmentary]ας—uses the common formula to ask, in regard (πέρ) to some concern of his, to which god he should pray (and/or sacrifice) in order to succeed.

It is not clear whether the drawing is related to the inscription. Drawings of any kind are very uncommon in our corpus, and one is inclined to assume that they represent enquiries on the part of illiterates. (The existence of a few abecedaria in the corpus seems also to suggest this.) Here, a different hypothesis may be tentatively proposed. The drawing is very similar to the 'clé sur la matrice' found on the later Graeco-Egyptian magical intaglios (Delatte and Derchain 1964:244–57), which show the womb together with 'une clé symbolique destinée à fermer l'organe féminin par excellence aux influences mauvaises' (245). What does the drawing on the lead tablet mean? Here the key seems to be in the opening, not the locking, position. If the enquiry concerned offspring, a theme persistent among the oracular tablets from Dodona, and if the drawing is related to it (neither is obviously true), is the key a pictorial reference to, or perhaps a magical 'reinforcement' of, the verbal enquiry itself and here intended not to seal the womb but to open it? We may compare the admittedly much later spell called φυσικλείδιον 'key to the vagina' (*hapax*) at *PGM* XXXVI 283–94, for opening the womb for impregnation.

3

Inv. M186 | H. 0.036, W. 0.067 Th. 0.001, L.H. 0.002 m | mid-IV^{a}

The tablet contains four enquiries, one of them relevant to our topic:

1 Ἐπικοινῆται Σώσανδρος [πὲρ]
2 τᾶς ἐπαράσιος τᾶς Ἀλε[max. 4]
3 ἦ τυγχάνοι`μι´ κα δικαζόμ[ενος;]

3 τυγχάνοιμι: τ has two verticals



Sosandros enquires about the curse of Alex[—]: should I succeed if I went to court?

A possibility in line 2 is Ἀλε[ξία], genitive of the name *Alexias*. The writer, belatedly realizing that the answer to a 3rd-person enquiry (τυγχάνοι;) would be ambiguous (if it is 'he would,' is 'he' Sosandros? Ale[—]?), has corrected the verb to the 1st person by inserting -μι. The verb ἐπαράομαι 'curse' is well attested; its noun, ἐπάρασις, is apparently new.

4

Inv. M433 | H. 0.017, W. 0.036 Th. 0.0015, L.H. 0.002 m | *c.* 340–320^{a}

Ed. pr.: Evangelidis 1929:126, no. 5, fig. 15. The date: *cf.* Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1903 (the Timotheos papyrus), Johnston 1985, fig. 58 (inscribed terracotta sherd from Athenian Kerameikos).

1 Κατεφάρμαξε
2 Τιμώι Ἀριστο-
3 βούλαν;

2 Τίμων (?) *ed. pr.*



Did Timo bewitch/poison Aristoboula?

Again, we note the absence of the interrogative particle ἦ before the verb, as in no. 1 *supra*.

5

Inv. M166	H. 0.008, max.pr.W. 0.193 Th. 0.0015, L.H. 0.002	c. 420–410[a]

Ed.pr.: Evangelidis 1935:257, no. 23.[3] The date: *cf.* Carapanos 1878, nos. 4, 5, pl. 34. The text, which consists of one line, seems to be in the same hand as M1070 (unpublished).



[- - - Διὶ] τῶι Νάωι καὶ τᾶι Διώναι· ἦ μὴ χρηῦνται Δωρίωι τῶ[ι] ψυχαγωγῶι;

[... enquire of Zeus] Naios and of Diona: should they really use Dorios the necromancer?

The necromancer's name, Dorios, is apparently new. On the outer side of the tablet it recurs in an abbreviated form, Δώρι(—), evidently an indication of the subject of the enquiry. The enquiry is made by a group of persons—therefore by (representatives of) a community? The use of the particle μή, which shows that they expect a negative answer, may mean that they consider it extraordinary to employ a necromancer.

3 Of the tablet five joining fragments are preserved. Evangelidis assumed that the first was complete at the left, but clearly there must have been more at the beginning, with the identification of the enquirers.

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Euphemistic names for the powers of the nether world

Emmanuel Voutiras

DEATH, the inevitable end, is incomprehensible to man; divinities and other supernatural powers associated with the realm of the dead he therefore perceives as dangerous, menacing and implacable. For the Greeks, at least since Homer, the domain of the dead was the nether world, located below earth and generally visualised as a gloomy and unpleasant place. The divinities controlling this domain are called gods of the earth, χθόνιοι θεοί. The cult they receive differs fundamentally from that of the gods of Olympos, whose realm is in heaven above, and who are therefore called οὐράνιοι θεοί.[1] The χθόνιοι are fearsome gods; they are not easily invoked and the rites associated with them are mainly expiatory.[2] Their names are only reluctantly proffered by people who would rather avoid any contact with them.[3] But this picture of the nether world and its gods, clear and consistent

1 The strict distinction between the cult of the οὐράνιοι θεοί and that of the χθόνιοι θεοί which Plato, *Leg.* 828c6ff., introduces in his city of the Magnetes typifies Greek views in this matter. This distinction is instrumental for our understanding of Greek religion; see Burkert 1985:199–203.

2 The fundamental work on Greek beliefs about the nether world and the cult of the chthonian gods is still Rohde 1898. R. Schlesier (1991f., 1994) has recently argued that the distinction between 'Olympian' and 'chthonian' is a modern construct. The claim is (rightly, I think) rejected by S. Scullion (1994).

3 In the second part of an elaborate rhetorical sentence, Isocrates manages to avoid even calling the fearsome gods of the nether world 'chthonians' and defines them only by opposition to those of Olympos (*Philippus* 117): τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμῖν ὄντας Ὀλυμπίους προσαγορευομένους, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις τεταγμένους δυσχερεστέρας τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχοντας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ νεὼς καὶ βωμοὺς ἱδρυμένους, τοὺς δ' οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις τιμωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀποπομπὰς αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ποιουμένους. 'In the case of the gods we invoke as the "Heavenly ones" those who bless us with good things, while to those who are agents of calamities and punishments we apply more hateful epithets; in honour of the former, both private persons and states erect temples and altars, whereas we honour the latter neither in our prayers nor in our sacrifices, but practice rites to drive away their evil presence' (tr. G. Norlin); cf. Henrichs 1991:162 n.2. The assertion that these gods did not receive prayers or sacrifices (*cf. Schol. ad Hom. Iliad.* 9.158: no sanctuaries of Hades) is probably a rhetorical exaggeration. Pausanias (6.25.3) mentions a cult of Hades in Elis as the only exception known to him and gives an appropriate mythological explanation; *cf.* Ballabriga 1986:30f., 34f.; Yalouris 1988:388; Henrichs 1991:195 n.2. Strabo (8.3.14, 344C) also mentions a cult of Hades in Triphyllia, and Philostratus (*Apoll.* 5.4) asserts that Hades was worshipped at Gadeira, in the south of Spain.

though it may appear, is in fact partial and incomplete. For we know that the chthonic divinities had a positive side as well: being powers of the earth, they were naturally considered bringers of fertility and therefore wealth. This aspect is reflected in myth: Demeter, the giver of corn, is the mother of Persephone, the queen of the nether world; Hades, Persephone's husband and lord of the dead, is the same as Plouton, the god of wealth. The ambivalent nature of the powers of the nether world, which is amply attested in Greek literature, was given due consideration by Erwin Rohde in his broad and pioneering treatment of the subject a century ago (1898:II 362–96); more recently (1991) Albert Henrichs dedicated an illuminating study to this aspect based on the analysis of passages from tragedy and comedy.[4] In order to understand this ambivalence it is helpful to keep in mind that the nether world itself could be perceived in two very different ways: as a dark and gloomy place of no return and as a country where goods were abundant and cheap. Callimachus offers a humourous description of this inconsistency in a witty (perhaps real) funerary epigram,[5] in which the deceased answers the questions of a curious visitor and provides him with first-hand information about the nether world (*AP* 7.524; XIII Pfeiffer):

> Ἦ ῥ' ὑπὸ σοὶ Χαρίδας ἀναπαύεται; – Ἐι τὸν Ἀρίμμα
> τοῦ Κυρηναίου παῖδα λέγεις, ὑπ' ἐμοί. –
> Ὦ Χαρίδα τί τὰ νέρθε; – Πολὺ σκότος. – Αἱ δ' ἄνοδοι τί; –
> Ψεῦδος. – Ὁ δὲ Πλούτων; – Μῦθος. – Ἀπωλόμεθα. –
> Οὗτος ἐμὸς λόγος ὔμμιν ἀληθινός, εἰ δὲ τὸν ἡδὺν
> βούλει, Πελλαίου βοῦς μέγας εἰν Ἀΐδῃ.

'Does Charidas rest beneath you?' 'If it is the son of Arimmas of Kyrene that you mean, he does.'

'What is it like below, Chairidas?' 'Very dark.' 'And what about return?' 'All lies.' 'And Plouton?' 'A myth.' 'I am done for.'

'This is the truth that I tell you, but if you want something agreeable, a large ox in Hades costs a shilling.' (tr. after W.R. Paton)

The short poem consists of three elegiac distichs: an enquiry of a passer-by concerning the identity of the deceased, which is promptly answered; a brief dialogue between the deceased and the passer-by, who, like most, is curious about the nether world and learns to his dismay that it is a gloomy place of no return; an attempt by the deceased to console his disappointed friend by mentioning a pleasanter as-

4 For a general discussion of the ambivalent nature of chthonian gods see 162–9; especially important are the closing remarks, 200f., on the significance of the names for the gods of the nether world.

5 *Cf.* Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1924:I 176f.: '13 verhöhnt den Glauben an das Jenseits des gemeinsamen Glaubens ganz grob, was sogar auf dem Grab stehen konnte, wenn es im Sinne des Toten war.'

pect of the nether world, the popular belief that everything is extremely cheap there.[6]

This ambivalence is also characteristic of the lesser powers populating the nether world, the heroes and especially the *daimones* (*cf.* Kern 1933), who are often identified with the souls of the dead, particularly those who had perished untimely or in an unusual way, or had met a violent death (Nock 1950, ter Vrugt-Lentz 1960:43–51; *cf.* Waszink 1954, ter Vrugt-Lentz 1976; Zintzen 1976). In antiquity (as well as in more recent times) such powers play an important rôle in the enactment of spells and the various ritual performances used to constrain an opponent or inflict punishment, which we usually designate with the generic term 'magic.'[7] Like the gods of the nether world, in whose realm they belong and by whom they are controlled, they are often invoked or mentioned in binding spells engraved on lead tablets (*defixiones*)[8] and more regularly in magical recipes written on papyri (where they are usually called νεκυδαίμονες). The fact that the tablets containing written curses as well as other remnants of magical performances, such as puppets pierced by nails, are mainly found in graves (or in wells, whose underground water was seen a means of communication with the nether world: Ninck 1921:1–46, Gruppe and Pfister 1924–37:57–70, Vikela 1994:114) points to the conclusion that a direct connection was thought to exist between magic and the powers of the nether world.

To perform an act of magic usually meant to establish contact with or to summon up one of the chthonian gods (ἐπαγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι) or the souls of the dead or both. Any such encounter was, however, felt as a potentially dangerous experience. Isocrates (*supra* n.3) reminds us that people try to keep away from gods associated with calamity and punishment (ἀποπομπὰς αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ποιουμένους); he also stresses that their very names are unpleasant to pronounce (δυσχερεστέρας τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχοντας). This remark explains why, in common usage,

6 The last verse has been much discussed. As Jacobs already saw, Πελλαίου must be taken as a genitive of price denoting a small coin; see Pfeiffer's critical apparatus and the discussion in Gow and Page 1965:II 189. The cheapness of things in the nether world was legendary; Callimachus himself refers to it in almost identical terms in a choliambic poem which he puts into the mouth of Hipponax (fr. 191.1f. Pfeiffer):

> ἀκούσαθ' Ἱππώνακτος· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἥκω
> ἐκ τῶν ὅκου βοῦν κολλύβου πιπρήσκουσι.
>
> 'Listen to Hipponax, for indeed I have come
> from the place where they sell an ox for a penny' (tr. C.A. Trypanis).

7 Considerations of the essence of magic and its relationship to religion are outside the scope of this short communication. On this complex subject see recently Versnel 1991a; Graf 1996:14–21.

8 The gods named in the defixiones are invariably connected to the nether world: see *DTAud*, index: 461–4; Kagarow 1929:59–61; Preisendanz 1972:6–9; Versnel 1991b:64f. For the invocation of *daimones* or 'special dead' in the *defixiones* see *DTWü* pp. VII, XXIII; Henrichs 1976:257f.

the gods of the nether world (if they are named at all) are often referred to by euphemistic appellations and epithets exalting their mildness and good temper (Εὐβουλεύς, Εὐμενίδες, Μειλίχιος; further examples: Henrichs 1991:163f.; *cf.* Stiglitz 1967:41–3 with n.108). This must have posed a problem in the case of magical operations, for here it was their ability to constrain and to punish that was requested. It is therefore not surprising to find in the *defixiones* special names and epithets exalting the power of the gods and the *daimones* of the nether world. A case in point are two lead tablets in the National Museum of Athens, possibly from Arkadia,[9] which are written by the same hand and contain two almost identically formulated judicial curses; they are eviently the work of a professional sorcerer acting on behalf of two different 'clients.' I give a new edition of these texts, based on a reexamination of the tablets by D.R. Jordan and myself. I have discussed earlier readings and conjectures elsewhere (Voutiras 1998:64–67).

DTAud 43

1 Ὅταν σύ, ὦ Πασιάναξ, τὰ γράμμα-
2 τα ταῦτα ἀναγνῷς – ἀλλὰ οὔτε
3 ποτὲ σύ, ὦ Πασιάναξ, τὰ γράμμα-
4 τα ταῦτα ἀναγνώσει οὔτε
5 ποτὲ Νεοφάνης Ἀγασιβώλω
6 δίκαν ἐποίσει· ἀλ' ὥσπερ σύ, ὦ
7 Πασιάναξ, ἐνθαῦτα ἀλίθι[ος]
8 κε[ῖ]σοι, αὖτ[ι] καὶ Νε[ο]φά[ν]εα
9 ἀλίθιον καὶ μηδὲ[ν] γενέσθαι.

DTAud 44

1 Ὅταν σύ, ὦ Πασιάναξ, τὰ γράμμα-
2 τα ταῦτα ἀν{αν}αγνῷς – ἀλλ' οὔ[τε] πο-
3 τὲ σὺ ταῦτα ἀναγνώσει οὔτε πο-
4 τὲ Ἀκέστωρ ἐπὶ Ἐρατ[ο]μέ-
5 νεα δίκα<ν> ἐποίσει [ο]ὐδὲ Τι-
6 μανδρίδας· ἀλ' ὥσπερ σὺ ἐν-
7 θαῦτα ἀλίθιος κεῖ[?]οι[10] καὶ οὐ-
8 δέν, οὕτως καὶ Ἀκέστωρ
9 καὶ Τιμανδρίδας ἀλίθιος εἴη
10 καὶ οὐδέ[ν].

9 In the museum inventory the tablets appear next to objects from Megara. But some dialect features (especially κε[ῖ]σοι for κε[ῖ]σαι) point to Arkadia; see recently Dubois 1986:II 319–22.

10 It is unclear whether there is enough space for one letter in the break. If nothing is missing, we have a case of elision of the intervocalic σ, a phenomenon known from the Laconian and Argive dialects.

Both curses begin with an invocation of Pasianax. The context makes it quite clear that he is not a god or hero, but the dead person lying in the grave in which the curse tablets were deposited.[11] It is a very rare name, found only once elsewhere, as an epithet of Zeus in a Delphic oracle quoted by Phlegon of Tralleis (*FGrH* 257 F 1.28). Its meaning, 'lord of all,'[12] along with the fact that it is not otherwise attested as a personal name,[13] shows that it should rather be considered an invocation.[14] R.Wünsch (1900:67f.) interpreted it as an epithet of the lord of the nether world, which has been transferred to the soul of a dead person in the assumption that the power to harm the enemies of the *defigens* will be transferred with it.[15] This interpretation is not entirely satisfactory, since it is not supported by the context. Audollent, who did not reject Wünsch's view in principle, pointed out, *ad loc.*, that in what follows the magician, far from considering Pasianax as a powerful ally, treats him as if a lifeless corpse, unable to move or to react (*cf.* Graf *supra* n.11).[16] What we have here is in fact an instance of sympathetic magic, according to the well-known principle of *similia similibus*, which is difficult to reconcile with the concept of a powerful *daimon* assisting the sorcerer. According to Audollent the thought of the stiff corpse spontaneously came to the magician's mind as he was writing the curse: 'vix autem ea scripsit cogitat de frigido cadavere in sepulcro iacente, quod neque legere quidquam, neque se movere potest, sed pro nihilo potius reputatur.' In my opinion this is an unlikely assumption.[17] Ancient magicians, like their more

11 As Fritz Graf points out (1996:118), the role of Pasianax is that of an intermediary bringing the text to the nether world: 'Es ist ein bemerkenswerter Text, der eine erstaunliche und grausame Ironie gegenüber dem Toten, Pasianax, an den Tag legt und in dem ausnahmsweise der Name des Toten, der als Vermittler der Botschaft dient, überhaupt genannt ist.'

12 The meaning is suggested first of all by the etymology of the word. F. Bechtel (1917:362) remarks that when the first component πασι- is interchangeable with παν-/παντ-, it is related to πᾶσι, not πάσασθαι. In our case the existence of the compound παντάναξ illustrates the point. Further confirmation is provided by the use of Pasianax as an epithet of Zeus, the most powerful god, in the oracle quoted by Phlegon.

13 It is true that Bechtel (*supra* n.12), apparently unaware of these curse tablets, thought that the name Pasis attested at Miletos could be a shortened form of Pasianax. One cannot rule out that Pasianax was the actual name of the deceased (*supra* n.11); it may even have been one of the reasons that the led the magician to deposit the curse tablets in Pasianax' grave. But in view of the rarity of the name, its transparent etymology, and the parallel (Abrasarx) discussed below, this possibility appears rather unlikely.

14 This is the view accepted by most: see *LSJ s.v.*; F. Graf (1996:118, *supra* n.11) seems to think that Pasianax is the actual name of the deceased.

15 'Dieser Name ist dann, wie häufig, eine Bezeichnung des Gottes dem Diener gegeben ... vom Tode auf den Todten übertragen worden: der Verstorbene hat dieselbe Macht dem Feinde zu schaden wie Pluto selbst'; *cf.* *DTAud* p. 79: 'Πασιάνακτα autem cognomen fuisse patet eius qui dominatur in inferis.'

16 Invocations of the real names of the deceased, though uncommon, are attested in the *defixiones*: see Rohde 1898:II 424f. Examples: *SEG* 43.434 (Pella, 4th cent. BC), *SupplMag* 37, introd.

17 It may have been suggested by the abrupt *asyndeton*.

recent counterparts, operated according to specific recipes, a number of which have survived in the magical papyri. We must therefore conclude that their spells were composed on the basis of well-established formulas.[18] The fact that our two texts contain almost identical expressions is a clear indication of their formulaic nature. This conclusion is further reinforced by a recently discovered curse tablet of late antique date from Savaria (modern Szombathely) in Hungary (Gáspár 1990, *SEG* 40.919; *cf.* Graf 1996:241 n.44).[19]

1 Ἀβρασαρξ, παρατίθεμαί
2 σοι Ἄδιεκτον, ὃν ἔτεκεν
3 Κουπεῖτα, ἵνα ὅσον χρόνον
4 ᾧδε κεῖται, μηδὲν πράσσοι,
5 ἀλλὰ ὧς σὺ νεκρὸς εἶ, οὕτως κάκῖ-
6 νος μετὰ σοῦ εἰς ὁπόσον χρόνον ζῇ.

Abrasarx, I entrust you with Adjectus, whom Cupita bore; may he, for as long as he lies here, not have any success, but just as you are dead, so may he also be with you (*i.e.* as if dead)[20] for as long as he lives.'

This new *defixio* is clear evidence that the basic recipe according to which our two curse tablets were composed had wide circulation in antiquity and remained in use for many centuries. The name by which the dead man is invoked in this case is, as the first editor rightly recognised, a slightly (perhaps intentionally) altered form of Abrasax, the well-known *epiklesis* of the all-powerful god of the Gnostics, who is often invoked in late antique magic (Dieterich 1891, Le Glay 1981; *cf.* Graf 1996:118).[21]

If one follows Wünsch's interpretation of *DTAud* 43–4, which is based on the assumption of an intimate relationship between the souls of the dead and the gods of the nether world (see above), the reference to universal power contained in the names Pasianax and Abrasarx (*sic*), both of them suitable *epikleseis* of powerful gods, in the *defixiones* we have examined, appears to be ironical, since the dead persons they designate are invariably treated as corpses incapable of action. One may doubt whether this irony (Graf, *supra* n.11) would be likely from a magician.

18 Such formulas could be transmitted over long periods of time; see the contribution of M. Dickie in this volume.

19 In line 6 I have adopted the more natural punctuation and construction proposed by M. Sève, *BullÉp* 1991:144.

20 The construction suggests that we should supply νεκρός (sc. ἔστω) at this point to complete the sentence. The adjective νεκρός is occasionally found in the meaning 'close to death;' for this colloquial use *cf.* Men. *Kolax* 50, with the commentary of Gomme and Sandbach *ad loc.*

21 If the letters of the name ΑΒΡΑΣΑΞ are taken as numerals and added, they give a total of 365, the number of the days of the year. Abrasax therefore represents time.

I think that there is a more plausible explanation. According to an established Greek belief, which we find expressed already in the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*, the dead inhabit the nether world as powerless shadows (νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα, 10.521, 536, 11.29, 46); they need to drink the blood of a sacrificed animal in order to become able to act. This same image is presented with greater force in a recently published fragment of Aeschylus' *Psychagogoi* (*TrGF* 3 F 273a), which has been convincingly interpreted by Albert Henrichs (1991:187–92) as a dramatised version of the Homeric *Nekyia*. In these anapaestic verses the chorus gives directions to a stranger—most probably Odysseus—on how to summon up the souls of the dead from the nether world: first he has to go to the shore of the 'terrible lake' and pour the blood of an immolated animal into the water among the weeds for the lifeless (ἄψυχοι) to drink; then, after invoking Gaia (Χθὼν Ὠγυγία) and Hermes Psychagogos, he should ask the lord of the nether world, Zeus Chthonios, to let 'the crowd of the nightly wanderers' (νυκτιπόλων ἑσμόν) come up, crossing the mouth of the river from which the water of Styx originates. The 'nightly wanderers' are, as Henrichs explains (188), the powerful souls into which the lifeless dead have been transformed as a result of the ritual described above. Once again, the twofold nature of the inhabitants of the nether world becomes evident: though normally powerless, they can be transformed into fearsome powers through certain operations.

I would therefore propose to interpret the names Pasianax and Abrasarx in the three *defixiones* on the basis of this double aspect of the souls of the dead: although they treat them as lifeless corpses for the purposes of sympathetic magic that will render the *defixi* powerless, the operants must have felt that the souls of these same dead could become powerful and are potentially dangerous *daimones* of the nether world.[22] This would explain the use of euphemistic names as if they were mighty divinities. One should note that in both cases the actual names of the dead were avoided. It is not very likely that they were unknown to the magicians who wrote the curses, for we have to assume that the graves into which they deposited the tablets had been carefully chosen: we know from the recipes of the magical papyri that such curses could only become effective through the mediation of special categories of dead such as the *ahoroi* and the *biaiothanatoi* (Graf 1996:136f.). The identity of the dead person with which a curse was associated was clearly not indifferent. There are in fact *defixiones* where the dead are called by their actual names (*supra* n.16). The euphemistic appellations Pasianax and Abrasarx may, therefore, have a

22 It was commonly believed that the dead (or at least a number of them) could harm indiscriminately mortals that came into contact with them; they were therefore sometimes designated collectively as οἱ κρείττονες. See Schol. Ar. *Aves* 1490; Photios, *Lex. s.v.* κρείττονες· οἱ ἥρωες· δοκοῦσι δὲ κακωτικοί τινες εἶναι· δι' ὃ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἡρῷα παριόντες σιωπῶσιν. *Cf.* Rohde 1898:I 228, 246.

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Songs for the ghosts: Magical solutions to deadly problems[1]

Sarah Iles Johnston

IN HIS fourth *Georgic*, Virgil tells the story of Orpheus, which climaxes with the singer's journey to the Underworld in order to retrieve the soul of his wife, Eurydice:

> And entering into that dark and terrible grove,
> Orpheus approached the ghosts and their formidable king,
> hard hearts no human prayer can hope to soften.
> But moved by his music, from the furthest depths
> of Erebus rose feeble shades, and
> phantoms long deprived of light, as many as the birds
> that hide themselves by thousands in the leaves,
> when evening or a wintry shower drives them
> down from the mountains. Ghosts of mothers and men;
> and images of great-hearted heroes lacking life;
> boys and unmarried girls and youths,
> laid on the pyre before their parents' gaze.
> All of these the river Cocytus encircled,
> with her black shores, ugly reeds
> and sluggish, hateful pools; and the river
> Styx, as well, imprisoned them with her nine-fold strength.
>
> — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
>
> But at last, having escaped from every hazard
> Orpheus was returning, and Eurydice,
> restored to him, was following behind,
> journeying back to the breezes of the world above.
>
> (lines 468–86)

Of course, we all know how this story ends. Orpheus, having used his musical talents to persuade the rulers of the Underworld to release Eurydice's soul, disobeys

1 This paper is a highly condensed and refocused version of the three first chapters of my book, Johnston 1999.

the command not to look at her until they have reached the upper world. Her soul is claimed by Hades a second time, this time forever. It is a bittersweet story, well suited to become the stuff of operas, as indeed it did. But in sources older than Virgil, we glimpse versions of the story in which Orpheus may have succeeded. And in fact, the tragic ending that Virgil helped to popularise tends to distract us from what would have been an important point for earlier audiences: Orpheus knew how to win back a soul from the land of the dead.

Orpheus' journey is an appropriate starting point for this essay because he is in many ways a mythic crystallisation of the ritual expert on whom it will focus, the *goês*. We often translate '*goês*' as 'magician,' but here I will offer an interpretation of the *goês* that simultaneously endeavors to broaden the range of pursuits to which this term could refer and yet to define more precisely what lay at the heart of *goêteia*, the *goês*' art. I will suggest that the *goês*, like Orpheus, combined within a single person the talents of magic, music, mystery religions, and—most importantly—the ability to interact with the souls of the dead. But because my discussion of the *goês* depends on understanding Greek ideas about the possibility of interaction between the living and the dead, I will spend the first part of this paper on that topic. In particular, I will sketch the ways in which I think that those ideas *changed* during the archaic and classical periods, between the approximate time that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were taking on their final forms and the time that Plato was writing his dialogues.

Let us start with the questions of whether dead souls were believed to return to the upper world, and if so, which ones? In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, there are two types of souls that can do this: those whose bodies have not yet received funeral rites and those who died prematurely, before being married, for example.[2] Thus, we know that from fairly early times, the Greeks believed that the *abnormal* dead might interact with the living when they wished to do so. We do not find evidence for anything more complicated than this belief, however, and most importantly, we do not find evidence for the belief that the living could *cause* souls to interact with them, until the early 5th century. At that point the idea begins to experience rather a vogue: we have the scenes in Aeschylus' *Persians*, in which Darius' soul is called up, and in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, in which Electra, Orestes and the Chorus of Mycenaean women implore the soul of Agamemnon to return and to help them punish his murderers.[3] We also know that Aeschylus wrote a play entitled *Psy-*

2 Lacking burial rites: Patroclus at *Il.* 23.65–74, Elpenor at *Od.* 11.71–78, and Hector at *Il.* 22.355; for discussion, Bremmer 1983:89–94. Premature deaths: the unmarried women and men or newly married women who greet Odysseus at the border of the Underworld at *Od.* 11.42–43 and the Pandareides, *ib.* 20.61–8; see Bremmer 1983:103, Johnston 1994, Johnston 1999, ch. 6–7.

3 Aesch. *Pers.* 618–80, *Ch.* 489–509; *cf.* 456 (Orestes) 'Be with those you love, father,' 130 (Electra) 'I call upon my father.'

chagôgos, 'The Leader of Souls.' This play dealt with Odysseus' interview of Teiresias, which is portrayed in *Odyssey* 11 as having taken place at the border between the upper world and the Underworld, but as the title is a term used in later 5th-century sources for technical specialists in the invocation of souls to the upper world, it seems likely that Aeschylus presented Odysseus not as journeying to meet the dead at the entrance to Hades but as calling them up into his presence.[4] At about the same time, Empedocles is promising to teach his students how to 'lead souls out of Hades' and is rumoured by some of them to have actually revived a dead woman.[5] The concept of leading souls up from the Underworld seems to have been familiar enough by the 470s for Simonides to use it metaphorically, to describe how the valour displayed by dead soldiers would keep their memory alive, would 'lead them up from Hades.'[6] His verb, *anagô* 'lead up,' is frequently used of the invocation of souls in the classical and later periods.

At about the same time as these literary references begin to multiply, curse tablets begin to show up in the archaeological record.[7] It is my opinion that, from the very beginning, these curses depended on the dead for their enactment. Because this is a matter of some controversy, however, I will pause here and discuss the reasons why I hold this view.

First of all, the great majority of tablets inscribed during the early periods were deposited in or near graves, suggesting that the dead had some rôle to play in the enactment of their curses (Gager 1992:18f., Graf 1994:148.). But what? Without further information it would seem safest to assume that the dead are imagined as messengers between this world and the next, carrying the words of the tablets to deities in the underworld. This has a broad parallel in Mesopotamian practice, and I would agree that the Greek dead were often imagined in this rôle.[8] But I also

4 Aesch. fr.273–8 Radt; *cf.* Eur. *Alc.* 1127f. A very early 4th-century oracular tablet from Dodona (Evangelidis 1935:257, no. 23; cf. *supra* p. 71) has a mention of a professional *psychagôgos* (I am grateful to A.-Ph. Christidis for bringing this tablet to my attention). See also Radt's comments on the *Psychagôgos* in the edition of Aeschylus' fragments, *ad loc.*

5 Diog.Laert. 8.54, Emped. 31 B 111 DK (= fr. 101 Wright, 12 Bollack), line 9, ἄξεις δ' ἐξ 'Αΐδαο καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός. Diogenes, *loc.cit.*, quotes Empedocles' student Gorgias as describing him practicing *goêteia*, and continues with Heracleides Ponticus' account of Empedocles curing a woman who had been *apnous* for many days. The *Suda* (*s.v.* ἄπνους) includes the relevant lines from Empedocles as well and also calls him a *goês* in connection with his revival of an apparently dead woman.

6 *Anth.Pal.* 7.251.4 (Simonides), ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ 'Αΐδεω.

7 A good overview of our information concerning curse tablets can be found in Gager 1992, ch. 1. His notes will lead the reader to more detailed discussions of particular tablets. Also important are Graf 1994, ch. 5, and Faraone 1991a.

8 In Mesopotamian rituals, the dead were sometimes offered meals in order that they might rise to accept them and then carry back to the Underworld another, troublesome ghost, making them messengers of a sort. See Bottéro 1980:39f., Cooper 1992:28f., Scurlock 1988, 1995a:188f., 1995b, Scurlock, forthcoming.

would argue that the dead usually were envisaged as doing even more—not on the basis of the few tablets from the classical period that actually state this, although I will return to them shortly below, but for another reason. By far, the deities most frequently mentioned on tablets of the classical period are Hecate, Hermes and Persephone.[9] It is 'in their presence' (*pros*) that the dead are bound or registered (*e.g. katadein, katagraphein*). Such phrases, as others have pointed out, have a legalistic ring and suggest that these deities were expected to take note of the registration and then set in motion the proper chain of events to effect the curse. But *what* are they expected to do exactly, and why are they the deities chosen to do it? Let us begin with Hecate. Her only connection to the Underworld during this period is as the mistress of the restless dead. Euripides' Helen and Menelaus talk of her sending forth ghosts, for example, and in a fragment of 5th-century tragedy she is protrayed as leading packs of dead souls through the night.[10] Other than this, she has no other rôle with reference to the dead or to the Underworld. Nor does she have any rôle as a goddess who punishes individuals—either before or after death—at this time. The *only* way to understand the tablets' constant requests that Hecate should witness their curses is to assume that she is to ensure their activation by commanding those whom she rules—the dead—to do the dirty work. Centuries later, the more loquacious magical papyri make this point explicit: Hecate is described as 'rousing the *aôroi*' to do what the practitioner asks.[11] A similar interpretation should be adduced for Hermes, who as early as Aeschylus' *Persians* (629f.; *cf. Ch.* 124ff.) is portrayed as having the ability to help rouse the souls of the dead into action, which is a natural outgrowth of his rôle as the one who leads them into Hades after death, and who, like Hecate, has no other connection with the dead or the Underworld at this time. Persephone, the queen of the dead, could release souls when she wished to and thus fits the scenario too; she is in fact implored by Electra in the *Choephoroi* (490) to help guarantee Agamemnon's aid. Notably, entities whom we could more easily imagine as inflicting the damage described in the curses, such as the Erinyes, almost never appear in the tablets, which tends to support the idea that deities are chosen *not* on the assumption that they will work the curse but rather that they will mobilize others to do so.

It is important to remember, in judging this thesis that I am offering, that most of it aligns perfectly well with what we already know of beliefs during the classical

9 On the frequency with which different gods are mentioned, see Gager 1992:12. In some areas, a few other, usually chthonic gods join the list, including Demeter in Sicily (on which see Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993:125–31).

10 *Tr. Inc.* fr. 375 Nauck; Eur. *Hel.* 569–70; Hippocr. *Morb.sacr.* 4.362. More examples and discussion: Johnston 1999, ch. 6.

11 *E.g. PGM* IV 2726–39, 2943–66; *cf.* 1459–95, 1416–31, where Hecate is asked to force an Erinys to rouse the *aôroi*.

period. The dead are already imagined to be capable in themselves of causing trouble for the living, and certain gods—most notably Hecate and Hermes—are known to have special control over them. The only novelty presented by these early tablets, as I interpret them, is the fact that they are a new way in which a practitioner could *ask* a god to *make* the dead do something.

As I noted, on a few tablets from the classical period, we do find the dead themselves mentioned. In the earliest examples that I know of, two tablets from early 4th-century Attica, the victim simultaneously is bound in the presence of Hecate *and* the 'incomplete' (*atelestoi*) dead, which implies that Hecate and the dead are understood to be functionally equivalent in this case.[12] In another 4th-century tablet, found in the Athenian Agora, the victim is bound in the presence of those below—*hoi katô*. As the gods mentioned in tablets are almost always carefully specified, and as *hoi katô* is a term commonly used of the dead, particularly in Attic tragedy (*e.g.* Soph. *Aj.* 865, *Ant.* 75, Eur. *Alc.* 851), we have to assume that the writer was using this phrase to refer to the dead.[13] These references show that it was possible to imagine the dead playing the same rôle as Hecate and Hermes, and, more importantly, indicate that the dead were on the minds of those who wrote the tablets; thus these tablets help to confirm my earlier hypothesis that the dead were important to the activation of the tablets' curses. But as far as the exact function accorded to the dead in these examples is concerned, I would suggest that there has been a kind of slippage: their writers registered their victims in the presence of the dead as well as the deity who would command them, thus moving the dead into a magisterial rôle that they did not normally play.

If my analysis concerning the rôle that the dead played in the activation of curses is correct, then the tablets provide evidence from the early classical period for three important ideas. First, certain gods were taking on a new or at least increased importance in their rôles as controllers of the dead, most prominently Hermes and Hecate. In neither case does this rôle contradict any aspect of our earlier picture of the god—it can be understood as a development of Hermes' rôle as *psychopompos* and of certain aspects of Hecate's *persona* that bring her into association with dead

12 The Greek words in question are *atelês and atelestoi*, which literally mean 'incomplete' but often also mean, more specifically, 'uninitiated' (*e.g.* Pl. *Phd.* 69c); *cf.* F. Graf (1994:153), who understands, with J. Gager (1992:90f.) the word to mean 'unmarried;' although this meaning is otherwise unattested for either word, there may be some some support in that the tablet is intended to prevent a woman from seducing a man. Audollent (*DTAud ad loc.*) assumed a meaning 'uninitiated.'

13 Attic tablets deposited in the presence of *atelestoi*: *DTAud* 68, 69, on which *cf.* Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993:130. Agora tablet: Young 1951:222f. (SGD 20), Curbera and Jordan 1998. *Cf.* also the curse tablet *SEG* 37.673 (Olbia, 4th/3rd cent. BCE; see now Bravo 1987, Jordan 1997), which directly addresses a dead person and promises a reward for his help, and *DTAud* 52 (= Gager 1992:164f.), a 3rd-century tablet from Attica.

souls—but their specific rôles as gods who might help the practitioner by facilitating his access to the souls of the dead are definitely new. This makes sense: before the advent of the curse tablets and other means of invoking the dead against other people, there was no real need for such a divine rôle. Second, the living could call for aid upon even the dead to whom they did not have a familial relationship. Indeed, in some tablets the practitioner indicates that he has no idea in whose grave he is burying the tablet by using such as phrases as 'you buried here, whoever you are,' and in only one tablet (*SupplMag* 47, Middle Egypt?, 2nd/3rd cent. CE?), to my knowledge, is the dead person addressed by his own name, as E. Voutiras argues elsewhere in this volume. The apparent distaste of the dead for serving the living in this capacity, evinced in several tablets, suggests moreover that one would not wish this rôle upon a departed loved one.[14] Third, the dead were beginning to be understood as all-purpose factotums of the living. They could be asked not only to help take vengeance upon their former persecutors or to defend the surviving members of their family, as Electra and Orestes hope Agamemnon will do in the *Oresteia*, but also to assist in a wide variety of tasks in which they were unlikely to have any personal interest—the hobbling of orators' tongues, for example. The dead, then, were no longer only threats in their own right, but also tools to be used against one's opponents; to the long-standing, generalized fear of random attacks by the envious or vengeful dead now was added the fear that the dead might be used against one by a competitior (correlatively, the dead, particularly those who had died under unfortunate circumstances, had more to fear than just the usual dreariness or punishments of the Underworld; they might be shanghaied into servitude). The curse tablets, then, confirm that in the 5th century we have entered into an era of belief different from that of the Homeric poems. We have passed from a situation in which the dead scarcely interacted with the living, and then only at their own discretion and under very specific circumstances, when their bodies were unburied for example, to one in which the living, at their pleasure and for many reasons, could activate the dead. Neither belief system is unique—we find examples of both in the ancient Mediterranean. And yet, the switch from one to the other within a single culture and a comparatively short time can scarcely have been by chance. We need to seek the reasons for this change.

We can begin by pausing on the observation that there were other Mediterranean cultures that believed that the dead interacted with the living to a greater extent than did the Greeks of Homer's day. Two of them, Mesopotamia and Egypt, were cultures with which the Greeks had frequent contact during the so-called 'orientalising period,' which shortly preceded the changes we are discussing. As others have demonstrated, the Greeks borrowed many artistic, religious and lite-

14 *E.g.* the tablet from Olbia (*supra* n.13), which bribes the ghost to secure his help, and *PGM* IV 385.

rary ideas from these cultures;[15] it would not be surprising, therefore, if they borrowed beliefs and practices regarding use of the dead as well. The likelihood of this is increased by Walter Burkert's demonstration (1992:65–87) that the Greeks borrowed from Eastern cultures methods of *solving* problems caused by the dead, for it would have been natural to adopt solutions to problems from the same place as one adopted the means of causing them. Close comparisons of evidence from the various cultures allows us to go even further and pinpoint some specific practices that are likely to have been borrowed, although I will not go into details here. The use of figurines to represent and thus to control ghosts and the invocation of souls specifically for necromancy, for example, probably were borrowed by the Greeks from Mesopotamia.[16]

Exposure to other cultures is an important part of the reason why we see a change in Greek beliefs about the dead and their capability to interact with the living during the later archaic period, but it is not the whole explanation. Cultures do not borrow from one another randomly. We will not fully understand why the Greeks adopted a new outlook towards the dead, or the impact of that adoption, until we consider how the new outlook either validated or challenged existing Greek cultural values. What would have prepared the ground for the Greeks to accept belief in the more active dead, who could be manipulated by a person with the right knowledge and skills, during the later archaic or early classical age?

Part of the answer may lie in the fact that, during these periods, there was an increasing tendency to *separate* the world of the dead from that of the living, as manifested in a number of phenomena. For example, in the 7th century, cemeteries began to be located outside a settlement's boundaries, in contrast to the earlier practice of burying both inside and outside city walls.[17] Such extramural burial

15 To mention just a few of the best-known works on this topic, West 1971, 1978, Burkert 1992, S.Morris 1992, Faraone 1992.

16 For the relationship between Greek and Mesopotamian uses of the dead (as well as that between Greek and Egyptian) see Johnston 1999, ch. 2. My comment here on the Mesopotamian use of figurines is based on information provided by Richard Beal of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago and by JoAnn Scurlock of Chicago and on their knowledge of the primary texts. Scurlock will discuss the question in more depth in a forthcoming book. Brief discussions are now available at Abusch 1989, Scurlock 1991, 1995a:1889–92. Scurlock 1988, in two volumes, includes examples throughout; particularly helpful are the footnotes to volume 1. Mesopotamian necromancy: I know of no single monograph, but see Scurlock 1988:103–12, 1995a:1889, 1995b:106, Scurlock, forthcoming:10. Although it is not the main focus of B. Schmidt's works, he discusses it often (1994., esp.121–43, 241–5, 1995, esp.115–20) in the context of tracing the development of Israeli necromancy and offers good analysis of how it is likely to have affected the beliefs of many ancient Mediterranean cultures, including Greece. The Greek use of figurines to control the dead: Faraone 1991b, 1992, ch. 4f.; Gager 1992:16–18; Graf 1994:ch. 5.

17 Most importantly, Sourvinou-Inwood 1995:413–44 (a concise and helpful résumé of her 1981 and 1983 work on this topic, plus further arguments in response to the critiques of I. Morris 1987, 1989), Seaford 1994:79–84.

symbolically distanced the dead from the living and particularly when combined with various late archaic and classical laws that limited the number of people who could participate in a funeral, made death and the dead increasingly unfamiliar for many people.[18] The dead were no longer, we might say, as much a part of everyday life as they had been before.

There were also changes in the way that the process of dying itself was imagined to take place. For example, during the later archaic period, representations of the ways in which souls crossed from the land of the living to the land of the dead were elaborated. In the Homeric poems, most transitions to the Underworld are presented as simple and direct; the soul is described as simply 'flying' to Hades, without any further ado.[19] It is only in one of the youngest portions of the Homeric poems—Book 24 of the *Odyssey*—that we first hear about Hermes *guiding* the souls across the boundary into the Underworld, and it is only in later epic poetry that another famous *psychopompos,* Charon, makes his debut and begins ferrying souls across a river that divides the land of the living from the land of the dead. The addition of these *psychopompoi* emphasizes the fact that the dead were spatially separated from the living.[20]

Already, based even on these few observations, we can begin to see that during the later archaic period, there was a change from the outlook that Philippe Ariès has called 'Tamed Death'—a situation in which death is viewed as a familiar part of life, disliked but not particularly frightening or difficult—to an outlook in which both the process of death and the afterlife itself were cloaked in mystery and complexity and were awaited with anxiety and fear. According to the 'Tamed Death' paradigm, the living feel little discomfort around the dead; they may even prefer to keep them nearby for the purpose of validating ancestral rights or expediting the periodic delivery of funeral offerings. When fear of death arises, however, the dead are likely to be exiled both because they are unpleasant reminders of what is to come and because they are frightening in their unfamiliarity. It is important to realize that this defamiliarization of death would have a spiraling effect: as death and the dead became less familiar, they would become more frightening; as they became more frightening, they would be further distanced and, thus, would become even less a part of everyday life. All of this is likely to have led to the assumption that the dead were powerful, for as cultural anthropology has demonstrated again and again (*cf.* recently Graf 1997), it is common to attribute fantastic

18 Funerary laws: The most important ancient texts are conveniently provided by Seaford 1994:74–8; interpretative discussion: Gernet and Boulanger 1970:137f., Alexiou 1974:15–20, Sourvinou-Inwood 1983 (*cf.* 1995:440f.), Garland 1989, Holst-Warhaft 1992:102f. and 114–26, Seaford 1994, ch. 3–5.

19 *E.g. Il.* 16.856, 23.362, *Od.* 11.222; *cf.* Sourvinou-Inwood 1995:5659.

20 Minyas fr.1 Davies (= Paus. 10.28.1); *cf.* Sourvinou-Inwood 1995:94–106, 303–61.

powers to those who are unfamiliar—to those who lurk outside of normal life. In sum, the less familiar the dead became, and the more uncertain people became about their nature, the more people were likely to begin wondering about the ways in which the dead might affect the living.

Given the change in attitudes towards the dead that I have just sketched, the Greeks would have been open, first, to the belief that souls of all types could become active forces within the world of the living, and even be manipulated by the living, but also, second, to the belief that it required a well-trained expert to contact the dead and direct their power towards any given goal. All of these new ideas and influences supported one another in various criss-crossing ways, of course. For example, expectation that the dead might be invoked to return would lead to further thought about the boundaries between the upper and lower worlds and their permeability or lack thereof. Both the ideas about boundaries and theories about how they were to be crossed would be elaborated, therefore. Psychopompic figures, who started out as guides *into* the Underworld, would be likely to assume the additional rôle of leading souls *out* again when a practitioner asked them to; as I mentioned, Hermes does become associated with returning souls as early as Aeschylus. The addition of Hecate to the pantheon and her appointment as mistress of the dead is too complex a topic to cover fully here, but its development, too, falls within the late archaic and early classical periods, the time during which the changes in attitudes regarding the dead were occurring.[21]

In these periods also Greek lamentation for the dead, my final topic in this discussion, shows changes similar to those that we have just observed. In the Homeric poems, there were two ways of expressing grief after the death of an individual: *thrênos* and *goös*. *Thrênos* was a more controlled and orderly expression of grief. Already in Homer it consisted of composed songs, sometimes sung by professional mourners, and was the type of lament most often associated with men. *Goös*, in contrast, was spontaneous and emotionally powerful—sometimes excessively so. It was performed primarily by women, especially those related to the deceased. The songs these women sang to the dead emphasized their pain as survivors and sometimes reproached the deceased for having left his family unprotected. In the *Iliad*, for example, Andromache complains to the dead Hector that Astyanax now will have to beg for food. Somewhat later, *gooi* began to carry the additional purpose of rousing living listeners to revenge; the singers did this by focusing not only on their own pain but also on the injustice of the death suffered by the deceased. In this way, the *gooi* of women, sung in the presence of male survivors, could drive a cycle of murder and counter-murder.[22]

21 Fuller discussion: Johnston 1999, ch. 6.

22 *Thrênos* and *goös* and their development: Alexiou 1974, esp. 11–5; Holst-Warhaft 1992; Seaford 1994 *passim* (see index *s.v.* 'lamentation'). Andromache's lament: *Il.* 22.477–515.

In the late archaic and classical periods, both *goös* and *thrênos* were restricted in many places by laws governing funerary practices. The *goös* was weakened by limiting the number of women permitted to participate as well as by truncating its length and frequency and restricting the places where it could be performed. Moreover, subsequent interaction between living and dead was restricted in some cities: under new laws, visits to the grave were allowed only on designated days and only by designated people who were particularly close to the deceased (*supra* n.17). At the same time as the *goös* was being restricted in these ways, the *thrênos* was moving towards a more artificial existence as a poetic form, which focused increasingly on the accomplishments of the deceased and said little about the pain of the survivors. Often, it was composed long after the death of the individual. In sum, new laws and customs sharply curtailed the opportunities that the living had for speaking to the dead. In doing so, the laws not only accomplished the specific aims that the legislators may have had, such as discouraging the vendettas that women's *gooi* were able to stir up, but also contributed to the growing distance between the living and the dead. 'Conversation' between deceased and survivor could no longer be easy and frequent (*supra* n.21).

And yet, it was at about the same time that these traditional means of talking to the dead were being restricted that, as I noted earlier, the Greeks seem to have begun adopting new techniques for communicating with them and compelling them to serve the living. The art of controlling the dead, in other words, arose at about the same time as lament—the everyday practice of conversing with them—was being restricted; communication with the dead was changing from an activity in which anyone might participate to a degree into a profession with special techniques and aims.

And here we finally return to the focus of this essay, the figure of the *goês*, for analysis suggests that the name was the precise term for a professional communicator with the dead. The most obvious evidence for this is linguistic: '*goês*' is derived from the same root as '*goös*,' a point to which I will return later. But the ancients saw the connection as well. As is so often the case, late sources such as the *Suda* are the most explicit, and bluntly define *goêteia* as the invocation of the dead.[23] But the same idea lurks behind earlier sources as well. Plato said that those who practice *goêteia* claim that their sacrifices, prayers and chants can do two things: lead up souls (*psychagôgein*) and persuade the gods. I interpret the latter part of this, persuading the gods, with reference to what I proposed earlier about the curse tablets: to get control of a soul of the dead one first had to convince a god such as Hecate to cooperate. Thus, the two apparently separate halves of the goetic

23 Suda *s.v.* γοητεία (ἀνάγειν νεκρὸν δι' ἐπικλήσεως); Cosmas = *PG* 38, 491 (ἐπίκλησις δαιμονίων κακοποιῶν περὶ τοὺς τάφους εἰλουμένων); Clem.Alex. *Strom.* 1.8.39.5.

art, as we glimpse it here, really make up one whole. Elsewhere, Plato uses the word '*goês*' in ways that are clearly metaphorical but that play with the essential link between *goêteia* and the dead. In the *Sophist,* for example, the Stranger describes sophists as using *goêteia* to bring to light 'verbal ghosts'—*eidôla legomena*—with their words.[24]

Empedocles seems to have earned his reputation as a *goês* explicitly from his ability to revive the dead. In the 3rd century BCE, Satyrus reported that Gorgias had described Empedocles as working *goêteia.* Diogenes Laertius, quoting Satyrus, adds that Empedocles' own poetry gives evidence of this and other things as well (8.59 = DK 31 B 111). He then goes on to quote lines in which Empedocles claims to do two things: raise the dead and alter the weather. As the fragment of poetry is directly followed by a quotation of Timaeus' remark that Empedocles' *weather* magic earned him the title of *kôlysanemas,* 'wind-stopper,' Empedocles' reputation as a *goês* is surely meant to be exemplified by his claim to lead souls out of Hades (8.60). Certainly, this is how the compiler of the *Suda* understood the situation when he offered the rationalized account of Empedocles' miracle that was popular in later antiquity: there he stated that Empedocles was called a *goês* because he revived a woman whom others had thought was dead (*supra* n.5). The use of binding spells—and thereby the use of the dead—may also lie behind the 5th-century historian Pherecydes' use of the term '*goês.*' There are, he said, two types of Dactyls: 'those to the left' who are *goêtes*; and 'those to the right' who in contrast are 'releasers'—*analyontes* (Pherec. *FGrHist* 3 F 47). By at least the 4th century, as shown for example in an Attic curse tablet (Wilhelm 1904:121, SGD 18), one of the specialized meanings of the verb *analyô* is 'to release from a binding spell,' and so we can guess that the opposition implied is between those Dactyls who were experts in the sort of binding techniques that the tablets employ and those who released the victims of those techniques. Although I am not saying that the term *goês* was never used more broadly to mean something such as 'wonder-worker,' or that the *goês* was never viewed with scorn as a faker, these sources and others suggest that control of the dead was the very essence of *goêteia.* Notably, not until much later, and even

24 Pl. *Leg.* 909b3 (*cf.* 933a5ff.), *Soph.* 234c5f., *Resp.* 584a9f.; *cf. Plt.* 303c1–5, *Menex.* 235a1f., Eur. *Hipp.* 1038–40. Elsewhere in the dialogues, the ability of the *goês* to persuade the living soul shades into something less respectable, for Plato begins the long-lived practice of using the term '*goês*' disparagingly, to refer to anyone who deceives or deludes others; for him, *goêteia* is quintessentially the art of making you believe in things that are not really there (*Resp.* 602d1; *cf. Soph.* 241b5, *Phlb.* 44c8, *Hp. mi.* 371a1, Eur. *Bacch.* 233–7). Plato also refers to *goêtes* as delusive shape-shifters or as mimics (*Euthphr.* 288b8, *Resp.* 380d1, 383a3, *Soph.* 235a1, 8, *Plt.* 291c3, 303c4). Although Plato clearly intends these remarks as slurs, they may have had some basis in real beliefs of the time, for Herodotus uses '*goêtes*' to refer to the Neuri, whose most distinctive feature is the ability to become wolves once a year (4.105). Perhaps this reputation for self-metamorphosis grew out of the *goêtes*' reputation for producing other remarkable sights, notably ghosts.

then only infrequently, do we find *goêteia* specifically connected with any other particular branch of magic, such as *rhizotomia*.

Before continuing with these thoughts, we need to consider some other ideas that cluster around the word *goêteia*. Tradition persistently connects it with two other things. The first is mystery initiations that guaranteed a better afterlife. In the same breath in which he calls them *goêtes*, Diodorus Siculus tells us that the Dactyls were experts in 'initiations and mysteries.' In the next sentence, he adds that their student was Orpheus, and that Orpheus was the first to introduce those initiations and mysteries into Greece. Orpheus was himself simultaneously called a *goês* and founder of mystery rites by Diodorus' contemporary, Strabo. Of course, there are many earlier sources connecting Orpheus with mysteries as well, and Diodorus' source for the Dactyls and mysteries is an Orphic poem that goes back at least to the early Hellenistic period. Even earlier, in Euripides' *Bacchae*, Pentheus had called the disguised Dionysus—who had come to Thebes in order to introduce new mystery cults—a 'spell-chanting *goês*,' and Plato, in his *Republic*, had connected the door-to-door marketing of curse tablets and 'sendings' of ghosts with on-the-spot initiations into mysteries, implying that the same practitioners offered both services. To back up their claims, Plato continued, the practitioners produced books by Orpheus and Musaeus.[25] Empedocles also combined a reputation for *goêteia* with that as a teacher of doctrines about the soul, its post-mortem experiences, and what should be done to prepare it for life after death.

This combination of *goêteia* and mysteries is not at all illogical: the expert who knows enough about the afterlife to control the souls of the dead should also know how to ensure that a soul would get a good deal once it was down there and especially how to protect a soul against the sort of postmortem intrusions it would otherwise suffer at the hands of the *goêtes* themselves. In particular, both undertakings would require that the practitioner have a special relationship with the gods of the Underworld, who could support his control of souls by forcing them to do his bidding and to support his initiations by promising his clients a better deal in the afterlife.

The man who could both invoke souls and guarantee their protection in the afterlife naturally would also know how to keep dangerous souls at bay. What Plato says in the *Phaedrus* about experts in purifications and initiations being able to release those who have become sick or crazy due to 'ancient wraths' seems relevant

25 Diod.Sic. 5.64.4 = Orph. fr. test. 42 Kern, Str. 7.330 fr. 18 = Orph. fr. test. 40 Kern, Luc. *Astr.* 10, Eur. *Bacch.* 233–7, Pl. *Resp.* 364b5–5a3. The words that I have translated as 'invocations of the dead' are *epagôgai* and *katadesmoi*—literally 'leadings upon,' which refers to sending a soul against another person, and 'bindings,' which refers to the curse tablets. On Musaeus as the founder of mysteries, Graf 1974:8–22, 94–126 and on Orpheus as the founder of mysteries, Graf 1974 *passim*.

in this context, for the word used for wraths—*mênimata*—typically refers to the anger of the dead. Thus, the passage suggests that a professional initiator could also protect the living from the illness and madness caused by the angry dead. There is also evidence in various ancient sources that dangerous souls were imagined to cause problems during the mysteries themselves.[26] This point brings the vocation of the *goês* and that of the initiator closer together still, as the practitioner who would initiate the living soul must also be one who could avert the dangerous souls of the dead. In short, although we surely cannot go so far as to call everyone who performed mystery initiations a '*goês*' or presume that every *goês* was also an initiator, the frequent coexistence of the two rôles helps us to recognise that each was essentially an expert in the care and control of the disembodied soul, and that it would not be remarkable for these rôles to be performed by the same man.

This same practitioner also might protect an entire city-state from dangerous souls, not by calling them up but by sending them away. A scholiast describes the 5th-century *psychagôgoi* who appeased Pausanias' ghost and drew it away from the Spartan temple it was haunting as *goêtes* who knew how to use purifications (*katharmoi*) and *goêteia* that could either 'send ghosts out against others' (*epagousi*) or 'send them away' (*exagousin*). Something similar probably lay behind the Orchomenians' control of Actaeon's ghost. Epimenides' 'purification' of the Athenians after the Cylonian affair in the late 7th or early 6th century, which like the Spartan ritual was ordered by the Delphic Oracle, probably also involved the control and exorcism of ghosts.[27] Incidentally, the fact that these rites to purify cities were apparently carried out in full view—indeed the Delphic Oracle ordered them and the city states paid for them—implies that the *goês* was anything but an outcast, feared and detested by the average Greek of the classical period. An early 4th-century oracular tablet from Dodona (*supra* p.71), which asks the oracle 'Should we hire Dorius the *psychagôgos* or not?' also points to the open use of such a practitioner by a city or another group, as do the remarks of Plato at *Republic* 364e5, according to which whole cities might hire the specialists he described as using the arts we associate with *goêteia*.

26 Pl. *Phdr.* 244d. On details of the dead causing problems for initiates, Burkert 1987:96f. n.36 and Johnston 1999, ch. 4. The earliest allusion to this belief is Empousa's appearance at Ar. *Ran.* 285, as I show in Johnston 1999, ch. 4; on this passage see also Brown 1991.

27 The ghost of Pausanias, Thuc. 1.134f., Plut. *De sera* 560e–f, *Mor.* fr.126 Sandbach = schol. Eur. *Alc.* 1128 (that Plutarch also discussed the ghost story in his *Lectures on Homer*); *cf.* Plut. *Letters of Themistocles* 5.15, apparently referring to the same event. The Spartan Pausanias himself, interestingly, was at least in later times said to have had a run-in with the ghost of a girl he had murdered. He tried to rid himself of this problem by being purified and seeking the advice of Phigalian *psychagôgoi* (Paus. 3.17.7–9); see also Burkert 1962:48f., Faraone 1991. The ghost of Actaeon: Paus. 9.38.5. Epimenides: Plut. *Sol.* 12, Johnston 1999, ch. 7.

I mentioned that *goêteia* was connected with two other phenomena in antiquity. The first, which I have just discussed, was mystery religions. The second was singing and more broadly music of all kinds. The compiler of the *Suda* and Cosmas defined *goêteia* as an act of 'calling upon' (*epiklêsis*) the dead; earlier sources repeatedly connected *goêteia* with the *epôidê*, or chanted song. The Dactyls were credited both with the invention of various forms of music and with the composition of *epôidai*. Their student Orpheus, of course, was the most famous singer of all—by classical times we find him using his lyre and his voice to convince the gods of the dead to release the soul of his wife, and by Varro's day he was known as the author of a book called the *Lyre*, in which he taught others how to invoke souls through music as well.[28] The crediting of such a book to Orpheus verifies that in ancient eyes what Orpheus did with his music was not really very different from the way that others used *epôidê* or the incantations written on curse tablets to call up souls, even if their writers had very different reasons for invoking them. Broadly, all of these connections between the invocation of souls and song are part of a belief in the ability of all kinds of sound to enchant the individual soul.[29]

But there is an even clearer attestation of the fundamental association between *goêteia* and music or chant within the very term *goês* itself. As I have already noted—and as various ancient lexicographers noted long before me (see Burkert 1962 esp. 43)—'*goês*' is built from the same root as the older word *goös* and all its cognates. This makes sense: the *goês*, like the lamenter, wishes to communicate with the realm of the dead. There is more to be learned from this linguistic connection between *goês* and *goös*, however. Further consideration will help to confirm what I suggested earlier: that ritualized manipulation of the dead was adopted by the Greeks from foreign cultures during the late archaic or early classical age.

To begin with, the word *goês* does not appear in our sources until the late 7th or early 6th century, in a fragment of the poet Phoronis (fr. 2, schol. Ap.Rhod. 1.1129), who, like Pherecydes, uses it to describe the Dactyls. This late appearance of the word and the lack of any synonym in earlier Greek must make us wonder whether it was only after their own language was well developed that the Greeks

28 The Orphic *Lyre* is known only from a scholium to Verg. *Aen.* 6.119, discussed at West 1983:29–31. According to the scholiast, 'Varro says there was an Orphic book about summoning the soul (*de vocanda anima*) called the *Lyre*' (tr. West).

29 *Goêteia* and *epôidê*: *e.g.* Eur. *Hipp.* 1038–40, *Bacch.* 233–7, Pl. *Grg.* 483e6, *Menex.* 80a2 and b6, *Leg.* 933a5. The story of Orpheus using his voice to win a soul from Hades was known as early as Eur. *Alc.* 357–62. Orpheus as *goês*: Strabo 7.330 fr. 18 = Orph. test.fr.40 Kern. The Dactyls as *goêtes* using *epaôidai* and as teachers of Orpheus: Diod.Sic. 5.64.4 = Orph. test.fr.42 Kern. When *goêteia* is not connected with *epôidê per se*, it nonetheless is often associated with other forms of song or speech: Pl. *Soph.* 234c5, *Menex.* 235a2, *Hp.mi.* 371a1, *Resp.* 413c1. The psychagogic powers of the sonorous *iynx:* Johnston 1995. Generally, the strong connection in Greece between sound and the sort of magic that affects the soul: Frankfurter 1994, de Romilly 1975.

encountered the phenomenon it described. Notably, the other words that the Greeks eventually came to use for approximately the same sort of practitioner are either formed from other, previously existing words, such as *psych/agôgos,* or were borrowed from other languages, such as *magos.*

Nor was the *go-* root itself a perfect fit. As I noted earlier, the *goös* was stereotypically performed by women, not by men, who ideally were associated instead with the *thrênos.* So far as I have been able to discover, however, using the dead to work one's will was associated exclusively with men in archaic and classical times.[30] Notably, for example, Queen Atossa does not invoke Darius in the *Persians* herself. She pours libations and grieves, as a good wife should, but she asks the chorus of *male* Persian elders to sing the special songs that will bring Darius back into the light. It is not until the Imperial period that we meet women who invoke the dead; even Medea stops short of this until she falls into Seneca's hands. Although there is no doubt that, in real life, women as well as men commissioned curse tablets, we have no evidence that women made or deposited them. In the later classical period one, or possibly two, real women, named Ninos and Theoris, were brought to trial for mixing potions and singing incantations, but these were secondary charges, added to the far more serious accusation of introducing foreign cults. At any rate, we do not hear of either of them invoking the dead.[31] One of the fables in the Aesopean corpus (112 Halm) mentions a female *magos* (*gynê magos*) who similarly is charged with both introducing new religious practices and selling incantations to appease the wrath of the gods but this, again, shows no connection to invocation of the dead. The development of a term for a practitioner who is male from words linked to a stereotypically female pursuit not only argues for the perceived similarity between what the *goês* and the lamenting women did, but also suggests that the art of *goêteia* was not practiced by Greeks before the later archaic period. Otherwise, the language is likely to have developed a more gender-appropriate term.

In following these discussions of, first, the connection between *goêteia* and mystery religions and, second, the connection between *goêteia* and song, the alert reader will probably have inferred yet a third connection, which deserves some attention before we leave these topics: a connection between mystery religions and song. The legendary founders of ancient mysteries are sometimes musicians themselves, Orpheus being the most famous example, and the Dactyls and Musaeus two others. Another founder of mysteries, Eumolpos, is not known in our sources as a musician *per se,* but was reputed to have composed poems about the mysteries,

30 So, R. Gordon (1987:64, 65, 74), who develops the idea somewhat differently, however.

31 Sen. *Med.* 740ff. Ninos: Dem. 19.281, schol. *ad loc.*, Jos. *Ap.* 2.37. Theoris: Dem. 25.79, Philoch. *ap.* Harpocr. *s.v.* Θεωρίς; discussion at Versnel 1990:116–8, with emphasis that the charges of magic (if they were made at all in the case of Ninos) were secondary to the other charges brought against these women.

and the difference between composition and performance, of course, scarcely existed in antiquity. His name, moreover, would attest to his rôle as a singer even if nothing else did.

There are two ways of understanding this connection between music and mysteries. The first is to remember that many types of information—including the sacred teachings that underlay mystery religions—were conveyed through oral poetry. We still have, indeed, remains of some of the sacred poems ascribed to Orpheus. In this respect, the singer is essential to mystery religions because of his rôle as a teacher. But the second way is to remember the rôle that music played in communicating with the Underworld: since mystery religions depended upon knowledge of and privilege within the Underworld, the highly talented musician could also become an excellent mystagogue. This point can be inferred from the fact that, from very early times, Orpheus was credited with a poem in which he narrated his descent to Hades,[32] but in later antiquity it is also made very nicely by Orpheus himself, in the opening lines of his *Argonautica* (40–2), when he claims that everything he has sung to mortals about the Underworld was learned when he descended to Hades, 'trusting in my cithaera, driven by love for my wife.' Orpheus knew what he did because he had special connections to the powers of the Underworld, and he was able to make those connections because he was a good singer; now, as a good singer, he would pass his knowledge on. There is a fluid triangularity between music, mysteries and *goêteia*. Some mythic figures or religious *milieux* emphasize two of the sides in preference to the third—we never hear of Eumolpus interacting with the dead, for example—but the structure as a whole hangs together, and at least once is crystallized into a single figure, Orpheus.

Let me pause here and review what I have suggested. The Greeks encountered the idea that the living might be able to manipulate and control the dead through special techniques among foreign cultures with whom they had contact during the later archaic age, a time when they were primed to accept it because of various changes in attitudes towards the dead that had arisen in their own culture. Because this new idea of manipulating the dead required communication with the Underworld, the Greek term to describe the expert in this field was built on the root of an older word for funerary lament—*goös*. So important was this element of communication to the act of invoking the dead that even the long-standing association between *goös* and women did not impede the development of the masculine noun *goês*. This new expert, the *goês*, also was understood to have the ability to initiate souls into mystery religions, or, in other words, to ensure through his superior knowledge of the Underworld and how to communicate with its denizens that the souls under his care would receive preferential treatment after death. The real *goês*

32 Orphic *katabasis*: Diod. Sic. 1.96.2; *cf.* Graf 1974:142.

of the classical period, in sum, might be defined as a man who could negotiate a variety of relationships between the living and the dead through virtue of his ability as a communicator.

Incidentally, my hypothesis that both the concept and techniques for invoking the dead were foreign in origin is supported by the Greeks' own statements. Already in its earliest uses, '*goês*' and its cognates have a strongly foreign flavor that *goös* never had. The association of *goêteia* with the Dactyls, who were connected with Crete and Phrygia, deliberately situates the *goês* outside of central Greece. Orpheus is said to be from Thrace. Pentheus' description of Dionysus as a *goês* occurs in the middle of a passage in which he is called a Lydian stranger and derogated for his foreign habits of dress and behavior. Herodotus uses the term '*goêtes*' only of distant Libyans and Neuri.[33] In part, this association between *goêtes* and foreign races reflects the universal tendency to attribute to foreign lands anything outside what are considered 'normal' abilities, but we must remember that sometimes claims of foreign origin reflect reality: myth said that Phoenician Cadmus brought the alphabet to Greece, and the Greek alphabet really is a development of the Phoenician. In the case of *goêteia*, there are other good reasons to suppose that it entered Greece from elsewhere and we should accept what the Greeks said about it not only as an expression of its *conceptual* foreignness but also as a valid reflection of its origins.[34]

Now that we know the *goês* a little better, let us return, in closing, to Orpheus. If, as Diodorus, Strabo and others tell us, Orpheus was a *goês*, an initiator, a singer and an expert in matters of the soul, then why, in the version of his story that survived, did Orpheus fail in the very task on which all goetic art is based? Part of the answer is of course dramatic: tragic endings make for better stories. But the story itself, interestingly, provides another reason that makes perfect sense within Orpheus' rôle as a *goês*. He turned his gaze upon the soul whom he had invoked. Many a Greek text warns against looking at or interacting with the spirits of the dead whom one has invoked—most famously, Heracles warns Admetus not to converse with Alcestis, newly returned from Hades, for three days, after which she will once again be counted among the living. Nor is this only a literary motif—the

33 On Orpheus and Thrace: Eur. *Bacch.* 233–7, Hdt. 2.33, 4.105; *cf.* Graf 1987, esp. 99–101.

34 Here my conclusions differ from those of H.S. Versnel (1990:14–8) and of R. Gordon (1987:72–9), both of whom assume that the association of magic with foreign cults largely reflects the desire to marginalize each phenomenon further. *Cf.* the insights of F. Graf (1987:100), who notes that the Greeks were free either to emphasize or to forget the foreign origin of gods they had adopted from other cultures; retention of the 'foreignness' suggests that they viewed the interests of that god—however well incorporated into Greek culture they might become—as intrinsically 'un-Greek.'

new *lex sacra* from Selinous tells the individual who summons a ghost to 'turn himself around' before the ghost arrives.[35]

Orpheus' failure, then, lay not in being a *goês* but in forgetting the rules of *goêteia*. This best-known version of the myth belongs alongside others such as that of Icarus, which suggest that the limits of human accomplishment are set not by our lack of skill, but by our human desires and weaknesses. Orpheus was a divine singer, perhaps, but only a mortal practitioner of his craft; he was able, like the real *goêtes*, to invoke the soul of his beloved, but not to resist the very human temptation to glimpse her once she had risen.

35 Eur. *Alc.* 1144–6; *lex sacra* from Selinous Col. B line 5 with commentary *ad loc.* by Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993.

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Samson Eitrem and the death of Dido: A literary reappraisal of a magical scene

Egil Kraggerud

AT LINE 450 of Book IV of Virgil's *Aeneid* Dido asks for death,[1] at 475 her decision to die is final, at 705, where the book ends, she draws her last breath. Meanwhile she has been preparing and staging her suicide whereby magical procedures play an important part, seemingly to give the sister a hope and to prevent her interference with her own plans. One has often asked: Why does she not kill herself right away, as Deianira did in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles (thus Heinze 1914:141 n.1)?[2] This would at least have meant a simpler and less circumstantial account.

Among the numerous contributions to this part of the *Aeneid* Eitrem's 'Das Ende Didos in Virgils Aeneis' (1933) broke new ground in its time. It is a pity that it was published in a Festschrift hard to come by for the average classicist. Even so it has been discussed by some prominent scholars dealing with Dido's death, among them Arthur Stanley Pease (1935), Roland Austin (1955), Anne-Marie Tupet (1970, 1976), and Sergio Ingallina (1987, with copious bibliography). After finding some aspects of Eitrem's more technical approach and some of his conclusions out of tune with high tragedy Austin (1955:150, on 498) arrives at more or less the same overall view of the passage as Eitrem himself: '[Virgil] confronts us with ... the dark mystery of human behaviour in the shadow of madness, in which details are of no individual significance and it is the sum of them alone that matters—and in his depicting of that sum Virgil shows a firm and masterly control of his material.'[3] The

1 Before this she signalled to Aeneas that she would die if she were left alone with her hostile surroundings (322 *cui me moribundam deseris hospes?*) and as a consequence she would pursue him as an *umbra* with vengeance (385–7).

2 Verbal parallels between both queens' manners of death is noted by A. Martina (1988:920). However, Sophocles' Ajax is presumably closer to Virgil's mind, as has been shown especially by Rosa Lamacchia (1979:431–62): Tecmessa is being misled as to the intentions of Ajax in a way reminiscent of Anna.

3 Not dissimilarly, though after criticizing many details, Eitrem writes (1933:38): 'die Magie, mit fein berechneter, stetiger Hervorhebung des sepulchralen Elementes, ist nur ein düsteres Akkompagnement der immer tiefer gehenden Charakteristik der Verzweifelnden.'

difference between Eitrem's and Austin's positions is mainly that Austin cares less about the details, it is the whole that matters, whereas Eitrem holds that a literary account like Virgil's should, on one level at least, be scrutinized and assessed like any other magical recipe. Eitrem's points, though controversial, are still thought-provoking. Part of my own paper will take issue with some of his points.

One of Eitrem's concerns[4] is to elaborate the naïve question I started with: Why did not Dido kill herself without further ado? Why does she make use of magic at all when so little comes of it? Eitrem adduces evidence to show the irrelevance of Dido's arrangements. Moreover, she admits herself that she is a novice and even stresses her strong reluctance to use magic (493). According to Eitrem she is an agnostic, even disloyal, and in reality spoiling the whole ritual. Eitrem (1933:32) describes the procedure as a 'pseudo-magische Praxis,' but evidently launched with all the apparatus belonging to the art. Its basis, however, turns out to be both shaky and faulty. And so Eitrem doubts whether her magic was ever meant to succeed. And perhaps rightly so, we might add, for had Virgil made it more successful it would hardly have been palatable to his more enlightened readers who had a negative attitude towards love magic.[5] Eitrem (18) calls the magical practice in Book IV a torso, one of his main objections to it being its half-hearted character: The ritual is discontinued before it reaches its natural and expected climax, which was to light the pyre, he maintains. Consequently the reader is much at a loss about the purpose of it all. From the viewpoint of Dido herself this can perhaps be accepted, as her main intention seems to be to deceive those surrounding her (*i.e.* her sister) about her planned suicide. And in this she is successful; nobody suspects her real intentions before she is already dying. However, from a more realistic point of view and in accordance with Eitrem's stern analysis, there is a real difficulty about the professional aid Dido was all but totally dependent upon, owing to her own ignorance of the art. Her Massylian expert seems tacitly to give Dido's behaviour and attitude her approval. *Qui tacet consentire videtur* in such serious matters. In short: according to Eitrem neither in sum nor in detail does Virgil's account add up. How are we for instance to understand Virgil's way of partly focussing on the magical expert and partly ignoring her? And are we to sweep ritual nonchalance and contradictions under the carpet? That is to say, if we put our faith in Eitrem's analysis. Eitrem can give no better explanation of the awkward character of Virgil's account than by pointing to the scene's literary effectiveness (*supra* n.3).

4 The following paragraph is a free summary of Eitrem's paper in so far as I highlight points with important implications.

5 One cannot help thinking of Horace who let magic and its despicable practitioners have it in his *Epode* 5 and *Satire* 1.8; *cf.* Ingallina 1974.

It is time to turn the magic table so to speak. I am grateful to my Norwegian forerunner for having pinpointed magical elements which the literary analysis must try to come to grips with.

In the first place, both Eitrem's article and more recent investigations do not focus enough on the importance of the original legend for assessing the function of magic in Virgil's version. The most pivotal difference between Virgil and his sources, as far as we know them,[6] is, of course, that Virgil has added a lover and a romance to his account. It goes without saying that the traditional story of Dido's death had to be attuned to this changed background. Nevertheless the poet has been able to keep the most conspicuous elements in the traditional story. Virgil too connects Dido's suicide with a huge pyre. In Eitrem's analysis this very conservatism is the poet's weak spot as he seems to use magic for no other reason than to keep the traditional pyre built by Dido, the real purpose of which had of course to be concealed from her surroundings. But the parallelism does not stop with the pyre. I believe that Virgil has been at pains to preserve more from the original legend, however much he had revolutionized it with the introduction of the Trojan hero and a love story. As for magic—the new element added to the account of her death—it was obviously more than a casual means of motivating the building of a pyre within the new framework. It had in addition some obvious advantages of its own in comparison with the traditional account.

The first version we know of stems from the Sicilian historian Timaeus, but what remains of it is a meager summary only (*FGrHist* [82] III B p. 624). His version emphasizes the exposed position of the Phoenician queen at the edge of civilization. When Dido had successfully established her colony, the king of the Libyans wished to marry her. She refused, but when pressure was put on her from her own citizens, she pretended that she had to perform a religious ceremony before the new marriage could take place: She wanted to free herself from the oath to her first husband whereupon she had a huge pyre (πυρὰν μεγίστην) built next to her palace. When it was lit as part of the ceremonies she threw herself upon it from the palace. This summary can be supplemented from the later account found in the 3rd-century historian Justin (18.4–6, 6.5–7). Justin in his turn built on the Augustan world historian Pompeius Trogus, who in his *Historiae Philippicae* had dealt with the history of Carthage. Justin tells us explicitly that the ceremony was (deceitfully) staged to placate the late husband's *manes*. To offer him a sacrifice would be taken as a reasonable precaution on Dido's part before marrying a new husband. Dido had therefore many sacrificial animals slaughtered. The only important difference between Justin and Timaeus is that in Justin Dido seized a sword on

6 Our ignorance about how Naevius treated the romance, if he treated it all, is of course a reservation underlying all studies concerning Dido and Aeneas.

entering the pyre and threw herself upon it instead of throwing herself directly into the fire. This motive seems to be a contamination of the old account with Virgil's version which by the 3rd century was surely dominant in the Latin West, representing Dido as stabbing herself on the unlit pyre by using the sword Aeneas had left behind as a gift (646f. with 507). The Greek account of her death is obviously the older one genetically as well.

The radically new element Virgil had added to the story, the lover Aeneas, stands in marked and intended contrast to the potential marriage partner in the previous tradition. In Timaeus he is the local loathsome king trying to force an unwilling foreign queen into marriage, whereas in Virgil he is a refugee arousing the queen's deepest passion through his heroic qualities. In both cases, however, in spite of the strikingly different emotional background, suicide allows Dido to keep her dignity and freedom and not least restore her loyalty to her first and only husband. Virgil's version, then, is primarily a reinterpretation of Dido's death based on real love, a factor outside the horizon of the traditional myth. Nonetheless the local king has not disappeared, but plays an important part in Virgil's version as well. Iarbas, the rejected suitor, is a jealous rival keeping a close watch on Dido (198–218). And his fervent complaint to Jupiter triggers the divine intervention which compels Aeneas to set sail, whereupon Dido's tragedy runs its course. Both in the traditional story and in Virgil's version the ceremonies leading up to the suicide distract people's attention from grasping the real intentions of the queen.[7] In Timaeus these ceremonies are meant as pious preparations for a new marriage, in Virgil the corresponding magical scene seems at first to aim at the recovery of the lover. In accordance with his love story version Virgil supplanted one sort of religious ceremony (though insincere) with magic (equally malfunctional in Dido's case), not primarily as a deception-scene, or to satisfy an exotic interest in a part of religion on the fringe of society, but to have a ceremony which was intimately connected with real eros. This is well in accord with his main narrative line depicting a relationship of love that has reached a crisis and where the female party is unable to accept a final rupture.

The religious ceremony included in the traditional legend was seen by Dido's people as the proper way to deal with the situation, but it was apparent that it signified submission and defeat. Similarly the magic of the Fourth Book will be seen by Dido's sister to be the right and proper answer to the imminent crisis at hand, but not as signifying submission and defeat, but rather as defiant measures with a good chance for success. From the Roman reader's point of view magic may well have seemed to be consonant with Dido's bewildered and desperate state of mind

7 That Virgil has played down the deception motive in his own context is obvious from a comparison with the legend in Timaeus and Justin.

whether they believed in such rituals or not.[8] While Aeneas was still there on the African coast the use of magic might be expected as something that should at least be tried after Anna's failure as a zealous, almost desperate go-between during the crisis (412–49). According to Dido herself in her address to her sister magic represented an ultimate means to bring Aeneas back (*reddat eum ...* [*amantem*], 479)—or, in case of failure, to have her emotional ties to Aeneas severed in the professional way (*eo me solvat amantem*).[9] This is repeated a few lines later in reverse order as part of the credentials of the Massylian priestess (487f.): *haec se carminibus promittit solvere mentes / quas velit, ast aliis duras immittere curas.* Dido's first words to Anna, then, mark two different functions of magic (more on this below).

As mentioned above, many traditional elements have been integrated into Virgil's reinterpretation. The role of Sychaeus is a case in point. The way Virgil takes account of Dido's deceased husband in connection with her death follows naturally from the way he had emphasized his position in Dido's earlier life right from the beginning of her story (1.343ff.) and not least at the opening of Book IV (15–7, 20–9). By yielding to her feelings for the new guest Dido had, according to her own conscience, committed a kind of adultery.[10] Her dead husband is in the sequel evidently never far from her thoughts as a kind of moral superego. All the time she had paid respect to his memory in a chapel in her own palace (457–9). When Aeneas breaks with her she thinks in her frenzied state of mind that Sychaeus calls for her at night. In the monologue where she is reviewing the choices still left her she explicitly rejects either marrying one of the Libyan suitors or following Aeneas to Italy, either with or without her own people (534ff.); to her this would mean both humiliation and personal insult (*cf. irrisa* 534, *supplex* 535 and *ratibusque superbis / invisam* 540f.). It goes without saying that the only option left, suicide, is in accord with her emotional state of mind. To return to her husband corresponds to an inner impulse towards a *status quo ante* (*cf.* 28f., 460f.). Thus, and only thus, she will be able to assert her true self after the aberration that her relationship with Aeneas had been. At 547 she considers her own death as deserved (*quin morere ut merita es*). With regard to her late husband, Virgil's account of Dido's death shows an interesting correspondence with elements of the traditional myths as for instance can be seen in Justin's version where her exit line, with its double-entendre, is that she is going away to join her husband (*Ituram se ad virum, sicut praeceperint dixit vitamque gladio finivit.* 18.4). Tradition had depicted her as an exemplary *univira*, the woman of one husband in life as well as in death. Reminiscent of the sacrificial ceremony in Timaeus are Dido's last orders to her absent sister to bring the

8 Servius (on 493) seems to voice the official view: ... *Romani ... semper magica damnarunt.*

9 On the ambiguity of *amantem* going both with *eum* and with *me* see Quinn 1968:334 n.1.

10 See especially 4.24–7 and 552, with the comments of Hardie 1986:269ff.

victims necessary for the expiatory rites, as ordered by the priestess of magic (636). It is clear that Anna will not find her alive any more. These orders at least have little to do with trickery and camouflage.[11] Although this sacrifice had from the beginning been planned as part of the magical ceremonies, from Dido's point of view it will rightly and properly belong to her own funeral. In the end the ceremonies become what they were in the old tradition, *i.e. piacula* to placate her one and only husband and to ease her return to him: σκηψαμένη τελετήν τινα πρὸς ἀνάλυσιν ὅρκων ἐπιτελέσειν 'pretending that she would perform some rite with a view to being released from (her) oaths' (Timaeus *loc.cit.*).[12] Dido had much to atone for in her own eyes. She had been deeply conscious of her *culpa* (19), she had offended holy *Pudor* (27). From a narrative point of view Virgil's allusion (635ff.) to the traditional religious motive seems *prima facie* to be a loose end. There is not a word either that Anna really brought the sacrificial victims or that they were actually sacrificed. It is clear that they could not have been so in accordance with the original magical plans as Dido's suicide rendered all that invalid. That the fire was lit immediately after Dido's death can be inferred from her own anticipation of it at 661 and from the narrative at the beginning of Book v, where Aeneas can see the funeral fire from his ship (3f.). The pyre has become a truly funeral one, to which sacrifices by the nearest relatives are appropriate. However much this motive has been transformed to something new in Virgil's version, the reader will feel, both from its function in the old legend and from its new design, that the aspect of *piacula* (*cf.* 636) towards Sychaeus is still a relevant perspective.

We have next to look closer at the magical scene itself (474–521). Magic had a long literary tradition by Virgil's time. As to love magic, one possible model for its prominence in the Dido tragedy is the Sophoclean *Trachiniae*. Queen Deianira, fearing to lose her husband's love, sent him a costume prepared with a *pharmakon* which she believed would bring him back to her. Instead it brought him an excruciating death. Learning about her mistake she takes her own life on their common bed with his sword (Clausen 1987:54).

Another possible model was Medea, the most renowned enchantress of all. In the *Argonautica* of Apollonius she has powerful drugs at her disposal (3.528–33).[13] But every reader of the Euripidean *Medea* knew that even she was unable to keep her husband's love, and the only use she made of her *pharmakon* was to destroy her

11 Anna's *fraus* 675 refers to Dido's whole concealment of her intentions to commit suicide.

12 Virgil seems to imitate this traditional motive twice. On the one hand his magical scene corresponds to the rite (τελετήν τινα) described by Timaeus; both in Timaeus and in Virgil the pretended aim is a release (ἀνάλυσις, *solvere* 479) in relation to a beloved person (dead husband, lover). On the other hand the motive is taken up again in order to show its potential as part of Dido's funeral.

13 On Apollonius 4.1396ff. as a source for *Aen.* 4.483ff. see Hügi 1952:65f.

rival and Jason's father-in-law. Another drama of Euripides, *Hippolytus*, provided Virgil with what to me seems an instructive parallel in the crucial passage where Phaedra's Nurse twice mentions that she could use love magic to cure her mistress if necessary (478f., 509–15). Phaedra is going through a terrible agony because of her passion. Indeed the Nurse fears for her life and is ready to do anything to save her. 'Accept your love', she urges (476), 'it is a god's will; and if you are ill with it, then find a good way to subdue your illness. Charms (ἐπῳδαί) there are, and spells that beguile (λόγοι θελκτήριοι); we shall find some remedy for this illness of yours (τι τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου).'[14] Euripides refers to what many must have regarded as a possible means of saving a lovesick woman on the point of dying from unrequited love. When Phaedra rejects what is suggested to her with indignation, the Nurse seems tactfully to accept her refusal. But a little later she is back on the magical track (509–15): 'I have in the house a love-charm (φίλτρα) that is a spell for love (θελκτήρια / ἔρωτος)—it has this moment come into my mind .... But we need to get some token from him for whom you long, a lock of hair, or from his clothes, and to join the two to get one happy issue' (tr. Barrett). Her words, as Barrett has demonstrated, are callously ambiguous, but it may scarcely be doubted that Phaedra with all her suspicion and misgiving takes the love-charm referred to at 509 as a charm to cure her *own* love, *i.e.* as a medicine to release her from her own sickness.[15] The conclusion is that one who advocates the use of love magic should be prepared to apply both kinds of drugs for the benefit of one's client. And so the Nurse first suggests the use of *epodai* and *pharmaka*, incantations and drugs, to arouse love in the beloved. As Phaedra stubbornly refuses assistance of that sort, the Nurse drops casually that she has *philtra* in her possession to cure the queen's illness, *i.e* to cure Phaedra *from* her love. In fact the Nurse does not intend to use anything of the sort, she is a practical and worldly woman and approaches Hippolytus in order to cure Phaedra the direct way. Magic, however, plays no part in the playwright's investigations into the pathology of love except for these references.

Accordingly there is a literary precedent from high tragedy for the combination of two mutually exclusive magical *praxeis* as alternative measures.[16] If the better al-

14 W.S. Barrett (1964:247) finds the imprecise nature of the terms well motivated in the context, but stresses that 'no-one could think of any magic but one to prevail on Hippolytus.'

15 Immediately (516) she asks whether the *pharmakon* is an ointment or a brew. This does not make sense unless one thinks of an antaphrodisiac effect. The Nurse, however, is thinking of a 'charm' to cure the illness of her mistress by procuring Hippolytus himself to consummate her love (Barrett, *op.cit.* 252).

16 Eitrem shows that the alternatives here are well established in popular love magic as respectively the binding of the beloved and the loosening of the emotional ties. As to the combination of both alternatives in literature he himself points to Theocritus' *Pharmakeutria*: *philtra* to bind the indifferent man in love (2.1–3) as against *pharmaka* to kill him (161), the alternatives being emphasized in 159, νῦν μὲν τοῖς φίλτροις καταδήσομαι, αἰ δ' ἔτι .... In addition to the passage in the *Hippolytus* discussed above I would like also to recall a close parallel in Tibullus 1.2.41–64. Here a *saga* promises that she is able to remove the poet's love for Delia (59f. ... *haec eadem se dixit amores / cantibus aut herbis solvere posse meos*); she has already started the relevant ceremonies when the poet stops her and urges her instead to make Delia love him (63f.).

ternative fails, recourse should instead be had to the one that could extinguish love from the lovesick person.

It is not unreasonable in the *Aeneid* either to think in terms of antaphrodisiac therapy as the probable final stage on the magic agenda. As words and persuasion have failed so signally it must be reassuring for Dido's sister to hear not only that there was a supernatural means of bringing Aeneas back, but also and in particular of putting an end to Dido's passion, the more so as she had herself been responsible for encouraging Dido to surrender to that same passion (31–53). It is interesting to see how Virgil develops the alternatives of 479, *quae mihi reddat eum vel eo me solvat amantem*. By mentioning both of them in the same breath he signals that if the binding fails, then the alternative is the only hope. Eitrem, however, seems to think that both kinds are mixed together with little or no discernment on Dido's or Virgil's part.[17] I cannot see that he has proved his point. On the contrary, the passages in the *Hippolytus* just referred to (478–515) and more explicitly in Tibullus 1.2 (*supra* n.16) hint at binding and loosening as alternative means to cope with a desperate situation of unilateral love. Virgil, like Tibullus, brings real magic into play, but paradoxically without making us believe in its power a whit more than Euripides. In Virgil fruitless persuasion preceded magic, the kind of persuasion Phaedra's Nurse was about to launch.

To start with the kind of magic aiming at binding the beloved person, those who can see a little deeper will find it of little relevance for Dido any longer. Not only had she decided to take her own life. She had in the previous passage humiliated herself by approaching Aeneas a last time through Anna. She had hoped to move him to a short respite so that she could learn to live with her affliction (433f.). She had achieved nothing, however, and at that point her tragedy is irrevocable just as in Phaedra's case. Her love is turning into hatred. Thus the attempt at getting Aeneas back cannot be wholly sincere on her part though the poet is not explicit on that score. Magic, then, is above all meant to sooth Anna. It is also in accordance with its *raison d'être* that magic to inflame passion in Aeneas should take place before Aeneas sails off. The preparations for the ceremony are such that if this kind of magic fails, then the other type can run its course. The central element is the pyre, but we are not expected to see it lit during the first part. Dido expressly says in her first address to Anna, that its function, according to the priestess, is to get rid of all that reminds her of the abominable person. That being so, it will be associated with the alternative stage. Accordingly Eitrem's grievance against the nonuse of the rather obtrusive pyre requisite does not quite hit the mark. Virgil has in mind fire as a means of destruction, not a homoeopathic fire of love magic.

17 Eitrem 1933:34: 'Es bedeutet ... eine Schwäche der Zauberhandlung, dass der Dichter uns darüber im Zweifel lässt, inwiefern Liebeszauber oder Schadenzauber beabsichtigt wird. ... Dido stellt beides in Aussicht.'

The passage 509–21 contains certain elements of real magic. Eitrem is not right, however, as Pease pointed out in his commentary, in claiming that something is amiss with the lines 513–6 in their context: the verbs *quaeruntur* and *quaeritur* do not point to an interruption to collect lacking items, potent herbs and the *hippomanes* charm. These are already available during the ceremonies from a casket at hand (Pease 1935:425).[18] Another problem is what seems to be a doublet in the preparation of the pyre. At 494–7 Dido orders Anna to have it erected whereas at 504–8 Dido is in charge herself. The two versions may, however, supplement each other. In the last resort Dido takes charge of the pyre, with the funeral branches, the sword of Aeneas, the effigy of him, all of which makes sense in a ceremony of destruction. But the rest of the passage belongs properly to the first phase (the *katadesmos*[19] rite in Eitrem's terminology).

Therefore I cannot accept Eitrem's view of 520, that it suggests how Dido counteracts the magical ceremony. The context implies Dido's cooperation. The presence of the magical priestess and the ritual she is professionally responsible for seem to speak against any counteracting activity from other participants, let alone from the person having ordered the ceremony and whom it is all meant to benefit. Whereas the *maga* invokes the whole mass of competent deities at 509–11, Dido's special prayer (*cf. tum* 520) is that one of that number should have care for those who love *non aequo foedere*, that is whose love is not reciprocated, and she hopes for a just and provident god to strike a balance in the relationship (520f. ... *tum, si quod non aequo foedere amantis / curae numen habet iustumque memorque, precatur*). Those who are taking the ceremony deadly seriously, such as Anna, must hope for the competent god to drive Aeneas back into Dido's arms, but those with a fuller insight into Dido's real situation will see that the line reflects her actual state of mind bent on avenging the iniquity she has suffered.

The passage starting with 584 brings the moment of truth. The ceremony had so far been of no avail as one could well guess: at the new dawn Aeneas is leaving Carthage with his fleet. It is obvious for Anna as well that one must very soon take recourse to the other form of love magic in order to help Dido sever the ties impairing her happiness and wellbeing. At this stage we have Dido's bitter monologue (534–52). She is no longer concerned with further steps on the magical agenda. She is instead staging her own kind of *diakopos*,[20] which should not be mistaken for being a magical scene in an enhanced form. She has left the domain defined by the

18 Tupet (1976:251) misses a feature of narrative economy when she asserts: 'les plantes et l'hippomane sont simplement apportés *mais non pas utilisés*' (my italics).

19 On κατάδεσμος (and ἀγωγή) see Gow on Theocritus 2.3.

20 This is Eitrem's term for the *Schadenzauber*-type of magic behind 479b (*quae*) ... *eo me solvat amantem*.

Massylian expert. At this stage she hurls bitter curses against the unfaithful lover. And they soon transcend the lover's own life and encompass the whole future history of his nation. They contain obvious historical truth for a Roman ear. Dido's state of mind with its thoughts of vengeance corresponds to the long and bitter struggles between the two nations in later history. One should not, however, understand Dido's slighted love and her imprecations as being the cause of this antagonism any more than the slighted goddess Juno is the real cause of the war breaking out in Latium in Book VII. The same holds good for the magical rites proper. As they cannot in their more positive form alter Dido's relation to Aeneas and bring him back to her, it is mistaken to regard their sequel, be it the kind of magical *solutio* alluded to at 479 and 487 or even its actual realization in suicide, as the determining factors behind the course of history.[21] It is only on the face of it that Dido seems to consummate the magical procedures by adding her own life blood to the expected climax of the magical practice which were to blot out every memory of the abominable man by means of fire (494–8, 640).

The second ceremony (635 ff.) which Anna expected becomes irrelevant when Dido puts an end to her unhappy love (*curae* 639) by stabbing herself. The ambiguity of 639 is shown by 652. The magical pyre, then, is, as I mentioned, transmuted into a funeral pyre for Dido where it converges with the pyre in the Dido legend of the Greek historian Timaeus.

So the use of magic in Book IV of the *Aeneid* has obviously many aspects which are hard to tabulate, but with this *caveat* I would like to emphasize the following points, in no systematic order: (1) Magic replaces the religious ceremonies originally staged to give Dido the freedom of a grand and theatrical suicide. Virgil has deepened her traditional virtue as an *univira* and her wish to return to her first husband with a tragic heroine conscious of her *culpa* against her husband because of her affair with Aeneas. (2) In Virgil's version love is a power as strong and potentially destructive as in the Euripidean *Hippolytus*. In this perspective the use of magic is logic enough within the context of myth and more popular mentality as a possible way to mend a crisis in a love affair—not for Dido's sake but for Anna's. No form of magic is of any avail to Dido in the process; only death by her own hand

21 This is most explicitly implied in Tupet's analysis of Dido's death: 'Or, les plaintes et les cris de colère d'une femme abandonnée, même appuyés par un suicide, n'avaient pas un pouvoir suffisant pour amener la Ville au bord de sa perte; seule la magie toute-puissante pouvait oser s'opposer aux destins. En la mettant en œuvre, Virgile trouvait le moyen d'expliquer, et de justifier, les défaites les plus humiliantes de sa patrie. Les vaincus de Cannes et de Trasimène auraient été victimes, non de leur faiblesse ou de la supériorité ennemie, mais de la sorcellerie la plus noire.' (1970:255f.; *cf.* 1976:263f.). I for one feel inclined to emphasize almost the opposite: Dido's death (because of her slighted love) and her bitter enmity against Aeneas and his nation are facts of history. In that regard they have a historical as well as a typological dimension, but not *qua* magical elements accompanying them.

will bring her freedom, as was clear to her from the outset. (3) Magic accompanies and visualizes the transition Dido is passing through from a wrecked love to rancour and hatred.

Virgil has indeed enhanced the emotional perspective with a detailed account of Dido's growing hatred towards Aeneas and the Trojans, feelings bordering on fury. What was in the tradition mainly a rational and calculated suicide arising from a proud and unyielding character becomes in Virgil a powerful substitute for the planned second and climactic magical scene. Dido is all the time looking beyond what she disclosed initially to her sister, which was, if necessary, to blot out the memory of Aeneas with all his belongings. To lend substance to her curses against Aeneas and his people she arranges her suicide as a kind of *devotio*. Her ardent wish is that Aeneas will suffer utter deprivation and early death (615–20). To satisfy her hatred she tries to arouse future wars with his nation as the climax of her imprecations (622–9). My interpretation of Dido's suicide can embrace some of the tenets of Anne-Marie Tupet's thorough discussions, but I cannot agree with her conclusion that Virgil with his account aims at explaining the course of history, not only the hardships of Aeneas himself, but above all the bloodstained enmity between Carthage and Rome. If this view is accepted, then one implication would be that Aeneas by yielding to the tempation in the cave was personally to blame for the most bitter warfare in Rome's history. That Dido believes in her own imprecations is natural enough. But for Virgil and the enlightened part of his audience neither magic nor *devotio* could determine the course of history.

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Three curse tablets[1]

David R. Jordan

in memory of Sara B. Aleshire

HERE I offer, in memory of a scholar whose premature death, on May 2, 1997, is a loss both to her personal friends and to classical studies, editions from autopsy of three Greek texts, each showing an aspect of magic discussed in the seminar.

1

Of the greatest help to our understanding of Greek and Latin curse tablets is H.S. Versnel's demonstration (1991) that while many curses express aggressive malice on the part of the curser, certain others, which Versnel calls 'prayers for justice,' are written in the hope of obtaining vengeance for wrongs suffered. Examples of these last, their targets being those who have committed theft, poisoning/witchcraft, and the like, are generally, he notes, directed against 'whoever/if anyone' (εἴ τις, *siquis*) perpetrated the crime rather than against named persons; the aggressively malicious curses, on the other hand, name the intended victim, sometimes even twisting the name or employing other 'magical' techniques.

Versnel's distinction of the two basic types of curse tablets would have been of far less use, however, had he not been careful to explain that many examples fall somewhere between, in a kind of 'borderland.' The first tablet presented here has such a 'borderland' prayer, perhaps the earliest yet known, for its spelling suggests very early IV[a]. The tablet is opisthographic: on one side the operant seeks vengeance by putting a reciprocal binding spell (ἀντικαταδεσμεύω) on 'whoever put a binding spell on me' (εἴ τις ἐμὲ κατέδησεν), while on the other he turns to ag-

1 Although I gave no formal paper in the seminar, my fellow editors have invited me to contribute an article to the proceedings. For facilitating my examination of tablets 1 and 2 and of 3 I must record my gratitude to Michael Vickers, Reader in Archaeology at the Ashmolean Museum, and to Anastasios Christidis and Eleni Trakosopoulou-Salakidou, respectively; for suggestions about the personal names of tablets 1 and 3, to Jaime B. Curbera; and, for a possible solution to one of the problems of 3, to Anna Panayotou.

gressive magic and binds (καταδεσμεύω) two men, whom he names, calling one an ἀντίδικος. I have found one instance of the verb καταδεσμεύω in this sense on an unpublished lead curse tablet (IV[a]?) from Makedonia; *LSJ* record no instance in any sense before the Septuagint; ἀντικαταδεσμεύω is new.

The text of Side A is structured largely on alternatives—'woman or man or slave or free' etc., 'before Hermes *eriounios* or *katochos* or *dolios*'—a technique of listing discussed by Richard Gordon in this volume. The prepositional phrase πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμῆν, with his epithets, finds a parallel, for example, on another 4th-century Attic curse tablet, Strÿd 1903, καταδῶ τούτος ἅπαντας πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμῆν τὸν {τὸν} χθόνιον καὶ τὸν ἐριούνιον καὶ οὐκ ἀναλύσω. So far, I have not found these particular epithets on any curse tablet from outside Attica. Unique to this tablet is ἢ ἄλλοθί που (line A 11); it confirms what we might already have suspected, that the prepositional phrase with πρός plus names or titles of chthonians, fairly common in 4th-century Attic curses (see Curbera and Jordan 1998:215f.), refers to the place of deposit, either a grave or a chthonic sanctuary.

I have not made full sense of Side B, which was quite difficult to transcribe. Its intended victims are two men, Dion and Granikos. The first name is banal, the second apparently new as an anthroponym. It was no doubt derived from the name of the river in northwest Asia Minor: names of other rivers in that region occur as personal names, *e.g.* Αἴσηπος (*Il.* 6.21, Hes. *Th.* 342, Q.S. 2.590; Lehmann 1917, no. 1, Kyzikos, IV[a]; *cf.* Robert 1978:456), Ἔμβειλος (*IKyzikos* 164; *cf.* 182 Ἔνβιλα Ἄβας), Ῥύνδακος (*SEG* 35.134.22, a slave Ῥυνδα( ), Athenian Kerameikos, IV[a]; *IG* II[2] 9096, Αἰσχύλος Ῥυνδάκου Κυζικηνός, IV[a]). Our Granikos, then, may well have been from Asia Minor. An inscription from near Eleusis (*SEG* 24.233, IV[a] or III[a]) records a dedication by a θίασος composed of men with such names as Μίδας and Λυδός; evidently they were foreigners resident in Attica. Among them was a priest named Ῥύνδαξ. Perhaps Granikos as well was a metic. Or a slave or former slave?

The tablet was discovered in 1913 in a drawer in the Keeper's Room in the Ashmolean Museum, along with three others, among them our no. 2, which is known be Attic (*infra* p. 5); the prepositional phrase with the epithets of Hermes suggests that this tablet is Attic as well.

As for the date, except in line 3, with its η's in three successive words, we find ε where we might have expected η. This would point to a period when there was still uncertainty about the use of the new Ionic alphabet, *i.e.* sometime before *c.* 370[a], as L.L. Threatte (1980:159) would propose. In general, the mistakes that the writer makes and then corrects seem mostly to be phonetic and may imply an awareness of certain sub-standard features in his or her own pronunciation: the writer evidently began to write γκυνη for γυνή (A 2) and corrected οἰκεῖος from οἰν- (A 4); he or she inserts σ's in πρὸ`ς´ τόν (A 9) and ἀντι/καταδε`σ´μεύω (A 11), where the

first spelling suggests that the sound was smothered; the 'correction' in ἀσ/`σ´τος (A 3f.) is no doubt an overcompensation. Simplification and such a smothering would explain the form ἐ̣λ̣ά[<τ>τον]ο<ς> (B 3) if indeed the restoration is correct.

I regret that for technical reasons I have not been able to provide an illustration, for such might have enabled the reader to get more from Side B and would of course have been useful to the student of Attic letter forms.

Ashmolean Museum — H. 0.07, W. 0.055 m — Attica
Inv. G.514.3 — Very early IV[a]

Side A

1 Εἴ τις ἐμὲ κατέδεσεν
2 ἒ γυνὴ ἢ <ἀ>νὴρ ἒ δ<ο>ῦλος ἒ ἐ-
3 λεύθερος ἒ ξένος ἒ ἀσ-
4 `σ´τος ἒ οἰκεῖος ἒ ἀλλώτ-
5 ρτος ἒ ἐπὶ φθόνον τὸν
6 ἐμε̑ι ἐργασίαι ἒ ἔργοις,
7 εἴ τις ἐμὲ κατέδεσ-
8 εν πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμε̑ν τὸ-
9 ν ἐρ̣ιόνιον ἒ πρὸ`ς´ τὸν
10 κάτοχον ἒ πρὸς τὸν δό-
11 λιον ἒ ἄλλοθί πο, ἀντι-
12 καταδε`σ´μεύω τὸς ἐχ`ρ´θ̣-
13 ὸς ἅπαντας.

Side B

1 Καταδεσμεύω ἀτίδικον Δί-
2 ωνα καὶ Γράνικον μὲ ΑΠ̣[.]Δ̣?Ε-
3 ΣΤΑΙ αὐτ̣ὸν τοῦ ἐ̣λ̣ά[τον]ο (?) μέ-
4 ρος πλείονος ἒ ἐγὼ ἀνεδόμεν.

A 1 ἐμέ: central horizontal of 2nd e missing 2 γυνή: υ corr. from κ 3 ἐλεύθερος: ς corr. from γ *vel sim.* 4 οἰκεῖος: κ corr. from ν 4/5 ἀλλώτ/ρτος for -ότ/ριος 12 καταδεμ regularly spaced, small σ crowded between ε and μ, higher than normal ἐχ`ρ´θ̣/ός for ἐχθρός B 1 ἀτίδικον for ἀντί- 2 μέ, *i.e.* μή 2/3 ΑΠ̣[ ]Δ̣?Ε/ΣΤΑΙ: Π with two cross-bars, one slightly sloping to the right; conceivably NT crowded together; N or T corr. from the other? 3 αὐτ̣ὸν: ο̣ or κ̣ ἐ̣λ̣ά[τον]ο (ε̣ or γ; λ̣ or α̣) for ἐλάττονος?

A. Whoever put a binding spell on me, whether woman or man or slave or free or foreigner or citizen or domestic (?) or alien, whether for spite towards my work or my deeds, whoever put a curse on me before Hermes *eriounios* or *katochos* or *dolios* or anywhere else, I put a reciprocal bindingspell on all my enemies.

2

That the living should be affected by the conditions of the dead with whom curse tablets are deposited is a common idea in Greek magic. In the present curse, the victim is to have the use of speech only when the dead are able to read the text of the tablet. This last, that the dead should read, is a well-known ἀδύνατον, which we find in two curse tablets, *DTAud* 43 and 44, discussed by Emmanuel Voutiras elsewhere in this volume. The first begins:

1 Ὅταν σύ, ὦ Πασιάναξ, τὰ γράμμα-
2 τα ταῦτα ἀναγνῷς – ἀλλὰ οὔτε
3 ποτὲ σύ, ὦ Πασιάναξ, τὰ γράμμα-
4 τα ταῦτα ἀναγνώσει ....

Whenever you, O Pasianax, read these letters—but you'll never!

Like that of *DTAud* 43 and 44, the 'magic' of the present tablet, unique in being addressed to deceased ἠΐθεοι (unmarried young men), is analogical. It has an element, though, that I have not seen elsewhere and was not apparent in the earlier transcriptions, the conceit that it is Hermes himself who will read the text, as if somehow to enforce the analogical operation while the intended victims are still alive.

The curse is in two parts, divided by a horizontal at the left, much like a *paragraphos*, between lines 9 and 10. The first is directed against four persons, Kerkis, Blastos, Nikandros, and Glykera, who are listed at the top of the tablet, in much larger letters than the rest of the text. Kerkis is evidently the principal target, for Kerkis is the only one of the four to appear in the curse proper. As a name, Κέρκις, discussed by L. Robert (1963:187–90), is rare and may be of either gender (masc. at Segre 1944f.:85.37, Kalymnos, c. 200[a]; fem. at *IG* XI [2] 161B.119, Delos, 279[a]). The only other possible Attic attestation on record is Κέρκ[ις, a female slave freed in the 320's (*IG* II^2 1576.77); the restoration, though, is not inevitable, Κερκώπη, for which there is space, being attested three times in 4th-century Attica (*IG* II^2 11833; *SEG* 26.289.1; Philetaerus fr. 9 *PCG*). What the relations of the four intended victims were is unknown. If Κέρκ[ις is rightly restored at *IG* II^2 1576.77, however, it is tempting to note that a Nikandros (*IG* II^2 1567.19) and a Glykera (*SEG* 18.368.241) were also manumitted in the 320's, a date compatible with the script and spelling of the curse; but it should be stressed that Νίκανδρος and Γλυκέρα are both common Attic names. Of the name Βλάστος we have no other attestation in Attica before Roman times.

The second part of the curse is directed against one Theon and his παιδίσκαι. Wünsch suggested that they were prostitutes, Theon their owner or pimp. We may compare another 4th-century curse tablet, Peek 1957:207, from the Athenian Kerameikos, on which an οἰκέτης is referred to as a πορνοβοσκός.

W. Judeich was able to learn the possible provenance, Menidhi in Attica, from the owner late in the last century.

Previous editions: Ziebarth 1899:20 (from a quick transcription made at Athens by Judeich, and with suggestions by G. Kaibel), Wünsch 1900:20 (after Ziebarth), *DTAud* 52 (after Ziebarth).

Again, I regret that I cannot illustrate the tablet; I do not consider the readings in doubt, in any case.

Ashmolean Museum Inv. G.514.1	H. 0.12, W. 0.09 m	Menedhi (?), Attica Later IV^{a}

1 Κέρκις
2 Βλάστος
3 Νίκανδρος
4 Γλυκέρα
5 Κέρκιν καταδῶ καὶ λόγους καὶ
6 ἔργα τὰ Κέρκιδος καὶ τὴν γλῶσ-
7 σαν παρὰ τοῖς ἠϊθέοις καὶ ὁπότα-
8 ν οὗτοι ταῦτα ἀναγνῶσιν, τότε
9 Κέρκιδ̣ι̣ καὶ τὸ φθένξασθαι.

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10 Θέωνα καταδῶ, αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς
11 παιδίσκας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν τέχνη-
12 ν καὶ τὴν ἀφο̣ρ̣μὴν καὶ τὴν
13 ἐργασίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ λόγους καὶ
14 ἔργα αὐτοῦ. Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε, ταῦτα
15 σὺ κάτεχε καὶ ἀνάγγ̣ω̣θ̣ι̣
16 ταῦτα τέως ἂν οὗτοι ζῶσιν.

9 φθένξασθαι [—] edd., φθ. [πρὸς] conj. Kaibel, but the area at the right of the verb is blank. 9/10 [κατὰ τ]/ὸ(ν ἀ)γῶνα conj. Bravo 1987:210 10 ογονα edd.; Θέωνα conj. Kaibel 15/16 συ̣ ο̣ ατε̣χχκ̣οκλιπ/ανατεω̣ανουτοις Judeich; κάτεχε καὶ [ὁπόταν] ἀνα<γν>ῶς, {αν} οὑτοῖς ὠσὶν [μόνον] conj. Kaibel; σὺ ... [κ]άτεχε καὶ π .... / ανατε<ί>, ὡς ἂν οὑτοῖς ὠσίν ... conj. Ziebarth; οὕ[τω κ]άτε̣χ[ε] κ̣[ατ]ὰ π/άντα ἕως ἀνό[η]τοι {σ} ὦσιν conj. Wünsch.

Kerkis. Blastos. Nikandros. Glykera. I bind down Kerkis and the words and deeds of Kerkis and his/her tongue before the young men, and whenever they read these (*sc.* words), then shall it be Kerkis' to speak.

I bind down Theon, him and his girls and his art and activity and work and his words and deeds. Hermes Chthonios, control these things and read these (*sc.* words) while they (*sc.* the intended victims) are alive.

3

Eleni Trakosopoulou-Salakidou, at a conference held at Thessaloniki in April 1993, put scholars into her debt by making public four lead curse tablets that her excavations had brought to light at Akanthos in Makedonia. Here I discuss, on the basis of autopsy, the most fully preserved (1997:160–4, no. 4), an interesting opisthographic example. Although it is hardly a mere accident that it came to light in the vicinity of graves, the tablet, being a surface find, has no chronologically useful excavation stratigraphy. Because of its mixture of four-barred and lunate sigmas, Dr Trakosopoulou-Salakidou assigned it to late IV^{a} or early III^{a}. The variant treatments of μήτε (B3 μήτε, A4, B2 μήτι, A5 μήτηι) suggest that for the writer ε, ι, and ηι represented approximately the same sound; phonetics, then, confirms a date of very late IV^{a} or afterwards.

It is difficult to know which side was meant to be read first. On what, following the *editio princeps*, I call Side A, one Pausanias contrives to make a woman do his will and 'embrace' (ἐ̣ν̣σχη̣) him: until she does this she is to be unable to participate in sacrifices to Athena or to enjoy the pleasures of Aphrodite. The first stipulation looks like an early precursor of certain 'prayers for justice' that put their victims beyond the pale of the divine (Versnel 1985). The second reminds us of the aggressively erotic spells known chiefly from Roman Imperial times and discussed by Christopher Faraone elsewhere in this volume. I have never seen the two stipulations together in one curse, nor in fact either one separately at such an early date. On Side B the same Pausanias puts a curse on a person whose name, Αἶνις, may be of either gender (masc. at *SEG* 9.45.28, Kyrene, V^{a}; fem. at *IG* II^{2} 9536, Αἶνις Μηλιάς, IV^{a}): Ainis also is not to participate in sacrifices (no divinity is named) or to 'get possessed of any other good' until s/he 'is gracious to' (ἱλάσηται) Pausanias. It may be worth noting that while on Side A two female deities are named and there is the implication that to embrace Pausanias will put an end to the intended victim's sexual deprivation, there is none of this on Side B.

On each side the curse includes a clause that is printed in the *editio princeps* ταῦτα δὲ μηδεὶς ἀναλύσαι ἀλλ' ἢ Παυσανίας, *i.e.* 'and let no one undo (ἀναλύσαι, optative) these things.' After ΔΕ on Side A, however, there is a vertical, *i.e.* I, and after the same letters on Side B, there is space for a thin letter, but the surface is too worn to show whether anything was inscribed there. The inevitable transcriptions are ΔΕΙ (A) and, based on this, ΔΕ[Ι] (B). Below, I have assumed an informal misspelling of δέ. One may also think of a misspelling of δή (as Anna Panayotou suggests per *epistt.*) or of a less attractive possibility, a unique (?) use of

δεῖ with a personal subject (μηδείς) and an infinitive (ἀναλῦσαι). The technical sense of ἀναλύειν, 'to undo a *katadesmos*,' is also to be found also in the 4th-century Attic curse quoted in connection with tablet 1 (Strÿd 1903:5, *supra* p. 112) and in the description of an amulet at *PGM* IV 2177, καταδέσμους ἀναλύσεις.

The top line of Side B, Μελίσσης Ἀπολλωνίδος, is written in rather larger letters than the rest of the text, and its four-barred sigmas are in contrast to the lunate sigmas elsewhere. I very tentatively assume that the line is in a different hand and comes from an earlier use of the tablet, perhaps as a label of some kind. Dr Tracosopoulou-Salakidou assumed in the line the signature of a magician, with her metronymic; here I am agnostic, unable to cite any comparable example of a magician's signature. A third possibility, despite the different letter forms in the line, is that it is syntactically connected with the text of Side B. We may note that on Side A, the writer, having left no room for the last phrase (line 7), inserted it, in rather smaller letters, between lines 1 and 2. Could the writer, having run out of space at the bottom of Side B, have inscribed the last line of the text, Pausanias' civic identification, at the top of the text? Metronymy, as the editor reminds us, was indeed an available alternative in Makedonia, for both men and women (Tataki 1993).

Whichever of the three possibilities is right, I assume, following a suggestion by Jaime Curbera, that because there is no article τῆς after the Μελίσσης of B 1, Ἀπολλωνίδος is an ethnic rather than a metronym (contrast Σίμην τὴν Ἀν/φιτρίτου at A 1/2); Melissa will no doubt have been from Apollonia in the Chalkidike (Papazoglou 1988:421–3), a city with which Akanthos had military alliances in the 380's (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11f.). To be sure, the attested masculine ethnic for that city, Ἀπολλωνιάτης (5.2.13), implies a feminine Ἀπολλωνιᾶτις, a form found on Attic gravestones (*IG* II^2 8532, III^a; 8353, II^a; *cf.* Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Ἀπολλωνία on this feminine ethnic for the Illyrian city Apollonia), but variation on a city's ethnic is easy to parallel, *e.g.* Ἀλεξανδρῖτις (many exx. at Dittenberger 1906:181) *vs* Ἀλεξανδρίς (*IG* XII [1] 393, Rhodes, Hell.) and Ἀλεξανδρηΐς ([3] 67, Telos, Hell.); *cf.* the ethnic Σινωπίς (II^2 10359, IV^a) and the fluctuation between that (Str. 12.3.40) and Σινωπῖτις (Str. 12.3.12) as adjectival forms. The name Ἀμφίτριτος of the father of the intended victim of Side A is apparently a *hapax*, its second element presumably being that found (Krahe 1955:65) in the Illyrian names *Tritus, Ettritus, Tritanerus*, Τριτύμαλλος.

Thessaloniki Museum Inv. I.160.79/1987 — H. 0.02, W. 0.045 m — Akanthos
A, B 2–6: late IV[a] or afterwards
B 1: somewhat earlier?

Side A

1 Παυσανίας Σίμην τὴν Ἀν-
7 Ταῦτα δεὶ μηδεὶς ἀναλύσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Παυσανίας.
2 φιτρίτου καταδεῖ, μέχρι ἂν Παυ-
3 σανίαι ποήσῃ ὅσα Παυσανίας βούλεται.
4 Καὶ μήτι ἱερείου Ἀθηναίας ἅψασθαι
5 δύναιτο, μήτηι Ἀφροδίτη ἱλέως αὐτῇ
6 εἴη, πρὶν ἂν Παυσανίαν ἐ̣ν̣σχῇ Σίμη.

Side B

i. Earlier text (?)

1 Μελίσσης Ἀπολλωνίδος.

ii. Curse

2 Παυσανίας καταδεῖ Αἶνιν. Μήτι ἱερ-
3 είου ἅψασθαι δύναιτο μήτε ἄλλου ἀγα-
4 θοῦ ἐπήβολος δύναιτο γενέσθαι, πιρὶν
5 ἂν Παυσανίαν ἱλάσηται Αἶνις. *vacat*
6 Ταῦτα δε[ὶ] μηδεὶς ἀναλύσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Παυσανίας.

A 1/2 Ἀν/φιτρίτου for Ἀμφ- 3 ποήσῃ for ποιήσῃ βούλεται (ε corr. from η): βούληται T.-S. 4 μήτι for μήτε: μή τι T.-S. Ἀθηναίας: Ἀθηνᾶς T.-S. 5 μήτηι for μήτε: μή τῆι T.-S. ἱλέως αὐτῇ: ἡδέως αὕτῃ T.-S. 6 ἐ̣ν̣σχῇ: σχῇ T.-S. 7 δεί for δέ: δέ T.-S. B 2 μήτι for μήτε: μή τι T.-S. 2/3 ἱερ/είου: ἱερε[ί]/ου T.-S. 4 πιρὶν for πρὶν 6 δε[ί] for δέ: δέ T.-S.

A. Pausanias puts a binding spell on Sime, daughter of Amphitritos, until she does for Pausanias whatever Pausanias wants. And neither may she be able to touch a victim sacrificed to Athena nor may Aphrodite be gracious for her, before Sime embraces Pausanias. And may no one other than Pausanias undo these things.

B. *i* [Earlier text?]: Of Melissa from Apollonia. *ii* [Curse]: Pausanias puts a binding spell on Ainis. May s/he neither be able to touch a victim nor be able to get possessed of any other good, before Ainis is gracious to Pausanias. And may no one other than Pausanias undo these things.

Side A

Side B

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Κόλασαι τοὺς ἡμᾶς τοιούτους ἡδέως βλέποντες 'Punish those who rejoice in our misery': On curse texts and *Schadenfreude*[1]

Hendrik S. Versnel

Beware God's anger and men's gossip.
Theognis 1298

1. *Two defixiones concerning derision*

ONE OF THE most fascinating and instructive texts in the whole dossier of *defixiones* is a curse copied from an opisthographic lead tablet found in 1899 near Arkesine on Amorgos but now lost.[2] It has been assigned to the 2nd century of our era by Th. Homolle, to the 1st by F. Bömer, and to *c.* 200 BC by J. Zingerle. The curse is prompted by the evil practices of 'a certain Epaphroditos,'[3] who is accused of having incited the slaves of the writer to flee. Here is the translation of the text:

> A: Lady Demeter, Queen, as your supplicant, your slave, I fall at your feet (Κυρία Δημήτηρ, βασίλισσα, ἱκέτης σου, προσπίπτω δὲ ὁ δοῦλός σου). He has taken off my slaves, has led them into evil ways, indoctrinated them, advised them, misled them, he

1 As is apparent from this title I shall quote Greek inscriptions in their own spelling, despite their orthographic or grammatical oddities, unless this seriously affects their intelligibility. I am grateful to David Jordan for his corrections of my English and many other helpful comments. Thanks also to Alice van Harten who, in an earlier stage, scrutinized the text for flaws and errors.

2 Homolle 1901:412–30, *IG* XII (7) p.1, SGD 60; *cf.* Wünsch 1905:1081, Latte 1920:81 n.54, Zingerle 1926, Björck 1938:129–31, Versnel 1981b:32, Pleket 1981:189–92, Versnel 1985.

3 In a letter David Jordan suggests to me that perhaps *epaphroditos* should not be capitalized but rather interpreted as 'a certain charming fellow.' This may well be true. Names of thieves and the like are mentioned if known, but the curse is usually the specific refuge for those who do *not* know their opponents, which might explain the indefinite pronoun τις. On the other hand, the target seems to be perfectly familiar to the author. Moreover, Epaphroditos is one of the most current Greek names in inscriptions of the Roman period, and is especially at home in Crete, the Cyclades and not least on Amorgos, where the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* I (1987) mentions five persons of that name, including one from Arkesine, where the tablet was found.

rejoiced (in my misery) (κατέχαρε), he has them wandering round the market place, he persuaded them to run away. This is what a certain Epaphroditos has done. The same man has bewitched my handmaid so that he could take her as his wife against my wishes. And for this reason he had her flee together with the others. Lady Demeter, this is what I have been through. Being bereft I seek refuge in you. Be merciful to me and grant me my rights (ἐγὼ ὡ ταῦτα παθὼν ἔρημος ἐὼν ἐπί σε καταφεύγω σοῦ εὐγιλάτου τυχεῖν καὶ ποῖσαί με τοῦ δικαίου τυχεῖν). Grant that the man who has treated me thus shall have satisfaction neither in rest nor in motion, neither in body nor in soul; that he may not be served by slave or by handmaid, by the great or the small. If he undertakes something, may he be unable to complete it. May his house be stricken by the curse for ever. May no child cry (to him), may he never lay a joyful table; may no dog bark and no cock crow; may he sow but not reap; ... (?); may neither earth nor sea bear him any fruit; may he know no blessed joy; may he come to an evil end together with all that belongs to him.

B: Lady Demeter, I supplicate you because I have suffered injustice: hear me, goddess, and pass a just sentence (λἱτανεύω σε παθὼν ἄδικα, ἐπάκουσον, θεά, καὶ κρῖναι τὸ δίκαιον). For those who have cherished such thoughts against us and who have joyfully prepared sorrows (τοὺς τοιαῦτα ἐνθυμούμενους καὶ καταχαίροντε(ς) καὶ λύπας ἐπιθε(ῖ)ναι) for my wife Epiktesis and me, and who hate us (μισοῦσιν ἡμᾶς), prepare the worst and most painful horrors. O Queen, hear us who suffer and punish those who rejoice in our misery (ἐπάκουσον ἡμῖν παθοῦσι, κόλασαι τοὺς ἡμᾶς τοιούτους ἡδέως βλέποντες).

Defixiones are generally defined as thin lead sheets inscribed with maledictions intended to negatively influence the actions or welfare of persons (or animals). Whenever a motive is mentioned it generally refers to competition especially in the fields of sports and (amphi)theatre, litigation, love, and commerce. Practically without exception these texts are anonymous and lack argumentation or references to a deserved punishment of the cursed person(s). In contradistinction, the present text presents a humble supplication from a submissive mortal ('your slave') to a sovereign goddess ('Queen'), who is asked to show her 'mercy' and to 'hear' the suppliant by avenging him and by punishing the culprit. Although the suggested punishments are phrased in the form of curses, these curses are not of the type that we normally encounter in the *defixio*, but they belong to a large category of well-known conditional self-curses and, more especially, of imprecations against potential grave desecrators.[4] In general, the punishment serves as satisfaction for the sense of justice of the injured person. For these and other reasons, I have proposed to distinguish this genre, comprising a considerable number of

4 Among the many curses of this type collected at Kakridis 1929, Parrot 1939, Robert 1978, Strubbe 1991, 1997, the closest parallel that I know of is a sepulchral execration from Salamis in Cyprus (I^p^–II^p^), *SEG* 6.802; see Watson 1991:111ff., 30–8, on standardization of curse formulas in general.

curses, from the *defixio* in the usual sense of that term and to label it 'prayer for justice' or 'judicial/vindictive prayer.'[5]

With respect to the issue that I wish to discuss in the present paper another remarkable aspect requires our attention. Although it is true that the target must be persecuted primarily for his evil deeds, this is by no means the sole cause of the author's rage. An important additional motif—if it may be called additional—is his suspicion that people rejoice in his misery. In fact, this concern seems to be so dominant that it recurs no fewer than three times, once on side A and twice on side B. Quite some emphasis indeed on an aspect that, compared to the loss of a number of slaves, including a handmaid, might be rated as being of minor importance. At any rate in the eyes of a Dutch observer.

Before attacking this problem by investigating whether there are more expressions of this suspicion, it may be expedient to point out a few further peculiarities of the prayer under discussion. First, while on side A the charge is levelled at one person mentioned by name and including an enumeration of detailed offences, the other side is definitely less definite. First, it gives the impression that Epaphrodeitos' action is the result of a conspiration by a number of anonymous enemies. The final line, on the other hand, presents a picture of gloating and chuckling onlookers who are not actively involved in the evil action. Incidentally, probably the whole text of side B has been literally copied from a model, as the peculiar curse formula of side A certainly was. We shall see that these variations on the theme of *Schadenfreude* also prevail in other texts that I shall present. For here we encounter the subject of this paper: the occurrence of *Schadenfreude* or malicious laughter in, and more especially its meaning and relevance for, *defixiones* and other curse texts.

Once more returning to our text I would like to draw attention to the specific nature of the complaint, which to my knowledge is unique in the whole dossier of *defixiones*. The escape of slaves does not occur in any other of the curse texts known to us,[6] although it was a current concern in ancient sources[7] and we do find instructions to prevent or retrieve the damage in the magical papyri.[8] In order to appreciate the special nature of our present text we must realize that being deserted by one's slaves is—especially in the context of a face-to-face society—both a very

5 Versnel 1991, pointing out its similarity with petitions of the Egyptian ἔντευξις type. At Versnel 1985 I discuss the expression 'may he never lay a joyful table.'

6 Interestingly, we do have a parallel case. On the accusation of Demosthenes, Theoris from Lemnos was sentenced to death on the charge of practising magic and *teaching slaves how to deceive their masters* (Plut. *Dem.* 14, Dem. *Aristog.* 1, 79; Philochoros *ap.* Harpokration *s.v.* Θεωρίς).

7 Bellen 1971, Bradley 1989:1–45, 53–5, 71–3, 1994:107–31, Daube 1952.

8 *SupplMag* 56, introd., n.6 has a survey of prayers and charms to force a fugitive slave to return. Interestingly, there exists also a charm to cause a slave to run away: Delatte 1927:615.13–6; *cf.* also *supra* n.6.

public (in the sense of conspicuous) event and a grievous attack on the victim's dignity. Presumably so too (or worse) is the downright rebellion of a slave maid against her master's preference concerning the choice of a husband. All this suggests a rather peculiar social position and a perhaps even more peculiar weakness of character or status of the author. How else should we explain that his slaves could 'walk around the marketplace' while their master obviously is unable to force them to return back home?[9] Altogether the impression forces itself upon us that the tragic protagonist of this text indeed had quite some reason to fear the malicious laughter of both the offender and those who may have instigated him to his action or at least derived delight from the spectacle. This may put us on the track when we now pursue our investigation.

A remarkable though among students of Graeco-Roman antiquity largely ignored curse text offers both a summary and a further substantiation of what we have just seen in the Amorgos text. Written in the Punic language[10] on a lead tablet found in a necropolis not far from Carthage it can be dated to the 3rd century BC It has drawn considerable attention among the specialists in Punic/Phoenician culture, especially for its linguistic aspects.[11] The text is not without difficulties but can be translated roughly as follows:

> Lady Hawwat Elat (or: goddess). This is an operation of melting. I, Maslih, I make Emashtart melt, the place where he lives (or: and Amrit) and all his belongings, because he has (or they have) rejoiced at my expense about the money that I have completely lost. May[12] everyone who rejoices at my expense about the loss of my money, become like this lead which is now being melted.

The most remarkable aspect of this text is that it does *not* curse either the thieves or 'those who may have found the money but do not want to give it back,' formulas which occur in large numbers and great variety in Greek and Roman judicial prayers of later periods. Instead, the curse is exclusively focused on the person or persons who rejoice in the misery of the author. Incidentally, there is an interesting mixture of a prayer for justice to an avenging goddess[13] on the one hand, and what

9 David Bain reminds me of an interesting parallel to the walking slaves. In his *De agricultura* Cato twice warns against ambulant slaves. At 5.2 he prescribes *vilicus ne sit ambulator* and likewise at 143 requires of the bailiff's wife *ne sit ambulatrix*. Most illuminating for our text is Bain 1986:131: 'In these examples we have *ambulatio* applied to a slave's deserting his or her task and putting his own interests before those of his or her master.'

10 *CIS* I 6068, best available as Donner and Röllig 1968, no. 89.

11 Levi della Vida 1933, Ferron 1967. I have based my discussion on Ribichini 1976.

12 For reasons not comprehensible to me Ribichini here suggests the addition: '(That the goddess may make?).'

13 The nature of the goddess is debated since she is known from only one other inscription. Ribichini's argument for a chthonic nature, though not impossible, is not compelling.

is generally called sympathetic magic in the action of melting on the other. Melting wax or metal especially in the context of oath-taking or execration are typical of Near Eastern ritual. Aramaic, Hittite and Assyro-Babylonian texts, especially the well-known Maqlû (lit.: 'burning') incantations[14] provide close analogies to our Carthaginian *defixio*. Here is one example from these Maqlû texts, which are predominantly concerned with counter-magic: 'Just as these figurines melt, run and flow away, so may sorcerer and sorceress melt, run and flow away' (Maqlû 2.146–57). But the practice is also attested in Greek ritual.[15] To our topic, however, the text is relevant above all for its emphatic and *exclusive* plea for punishment of one or more persons who have mocked the author in his misery.

To the best of my knowledge these two texts exhaust the number of prayers for revenge that explicitly refer to derision on lead tablets, but we shall find more evidence if we turn to other types of inscriptions. Also, there are more types of reference to derision or *Schadenfreude* in curse texts besides requests for revenge. I shall discuss these other expressions later and shall now first cast a glance at the plea for justice in a different type of epigraphical curses.

2. *Two funerary curses concerning unholy glee*

The Amorgos text presented two expressions for (malicious) joy over the misery of another person: ἡδέως βλέποντες (once) and καταχαίρω (twice). It is this verb χαίρω, twice in its more adequate form ἐπιχαίρω, that we find more often in another type of curse texts, which can with equal right be labelled *prayers for revenge*. I have in mind those funerary inscriptions which implore a god to punish (or which simply call down a curse upon) the villain who has caused the death of the deceased or has inflicted any kind of injury during his lifetime. Best known are the ones marked by a stereotyped couple of features—the Sun as avenger and the symbol of the raised hands—which F. Cumont took as standard characteristics for his collections of 1923 and 1933, adopted and supplemented by G. Björck in 1938.[16] Many new testimonia have come to light since.[17]

14 Meier 1937 (text and translation), Reiner 1958, Bottéro 1985:163–219, Abusch 1974:251–62, 1987:13–41.

15 Faraone 1993:62–5; *cf.* 1989a. On a very interesting recent inscription from Ephesos, containing a melting ritual against a sorcerer, see Graf 1992.

16 The main collections and discussions are: Cumont 1923, 1926f., 1933, Björck 1938:24ff.; *cf.* also Sanders 1960:264ff., Bömer 1963:201–5. On the symbol of the raised hands see Strubbe 1991:42.

17 *BullÉp* 1965:335, 1968:535, Pippidi 1976f., Jordan 1979. But these do not exhaust the list, *e.g.* recently Ricl 1994.

Most telling for our purpose is a funerary inscription from Alexandria (II^p, *SB* 1323; Cumont 1923, no.22; Björck 1938, no.11):

> Θεῷ ὑψίστῳ καὶ πάντων ἐπόπτῃ καὶ Ἡλίῳ καὶ Νεμέσεσι αἴρει Ἀρσινόη ἄωρος τὰς χεῖρας. Εἴ τις αὐτῇ φάρμακα ἐποίησε ἢ καὶ ἐπέχαρέ τις αὐτῆς τῷ θανάτῳ ἢ ἐπιχαρεῖ, μετέλθετε αὐτούς.
>
> To God Most High and to the Sun and the Nemeseis Arsinoe, who died before her time, raises her hands. If anybody poisoned/bewitched her or if anybody rejoiced in her death or will rejoice, do persecute them.

Just as in the Amorgos curse, there is a double focus. First on the person who is supposed to have intentionally caused her death by poison (or black magic) and secondly also on the one who gloats over her death or may do so in the future. Nor is this all. Just as in the Amorgos texts there are two possibilities: the one who is rejoicing in her death may be the murderer himself, but the reference to the future in the subsequent enunciation clearly suggests another person or persons. So once more it appears that both first-hand and subsidiary involvement may be implied in the notion of *Schadenfreude*. And again influence from formulaic models should be taken into account.[18] We have a closely related formula in another funerary inscription from Amisos (Dain 1933, no. 34).

> εἰ δέ τις ἠδίκησε αὐτὸν ἢ ἐπεχάρη, ἤτε γυνὴ ἤτε ἀνήρ, χείρονα πάθοιτο αὐτοῦ.
>
> If anyone has injured him or rejoiced in the event, either woman or man, may he suffer worse inflictions than the deceased.

Again we observe two by now well-known causes for revenge: the damage itself and the *Schadenfreude*, here phrased in an optional disjunctive expression.[19]

3. *Dolos: an excursus on poison, black magic, slander, gossip and mocking*

Two *defixiones*, two funerary curses, the former presenting everyday tragedies of loss and bereavement, the latter the great tragedy of life and death—*unnatural* death. All four are marked by the suspicion (or the awareness) either that the act

18 Björck notes that the two texts share the thematic 2nd aorist of χαίρω, but, of course, they are not alone in this.

19 Although I would surmise that there exist many more of these curses they are not easy to find, *e.g.* Bernand 1992: no. 98 (a reference, which, like so many others, I owe to one of the invaluable surveys by A. Chaniotis, *EBGR* 1992, *Kernos* 9 [1996] no. 12) is a funerary curse with the wish that the sky will punish those who rejoice over the death of the deceased (ὁ περειέχων μετελεύσεται τοὺς ἐπειχάραντές σοι), which once more underlines the formulaic nature of these curses. M. Maas (1903) has argued, not very compellingly, that this was a 'jüdisches Rachegebet.'

may have been committed by a person who gloats over the misery he inflicted, or that others may be watching the misfortune with gleeful satisfaction.[20] That, by the way, the latter category is not necessarily restricted to people who are familiar with the deceased or belong to the same group or community is illustrated by Plutarch in his essay Περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης (*De curiositate*), in which he censures people who want to know everything that is concealed, unpleasant or depraved. More especially those who take delight in reading inscriptions on tombs are accused of ἐπιχαιρεκακία 'malice, *Schadenfreude*,' or ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς 'joy at another's misfortune' (Plut. *Mor.* 518C; *cf.* Helttula 1995:146). Even so, *Schadenfreude* flourishes best in the context of personal relationships, good or bad, sharing this preference with an extended conglomerate of malicious affections or expressions. We shall now first cast a glance into this shady realm of surreptitious malice, where gossip, slander, derision, magic and poison also belong. It is a realm of secrecy.

The Sun, considered the most qualified avenger,[21] and other superior and all-seeing gods[22] such as Hypsistos Theos ('the Highest God') are specifically invoked in funerary texts in cases of uncertainty about the cause of death or disease. As noted earlier, these texts are frequently concerned with abnormal and hence puzzling death,[23] the deceased being referred to as an ἄωρος or βιαιοθάνατος, *i.e.* someone who has died 'before his fated time.' As is typical in traditional, premodern societies, the inexplicable death, for example by a lingering illness, is frequently attributed to the evil practices of unknown enemies (Meuli 1975:439–44). Both the suspicion and the uncertainty concerning the precise cause of the adversity are expressed in typically 'conditional' or 'optional' formulas. Here are a few examples.

Δόλος, often more specifically δόλος πονηρός (see Robert 1977:49), is the most comprehensive and a very common term for the entire complex of undefinable causes of death. For instance, in two sepulchral stelae, εἰ δὲ δόλος με [δάμασσε], θεῖον φάος ἔκδικον ἔστω 'if a cunning scheme killed me, may the divine light avenge me' (Cumont 1923, no. 15, Björck 1938, no. 2) and εἰ μὲν ἰδίᾳ μοίρῃ, ὤφειλεν, εἰ δὲ χερσὶ δολοποιοῖς, Ἥλιε, βλέπε 'if by my own fate, it had to be so, but if by cunning hands, Sun, keep watch' (Cumont 1923, no. 12, Björck 1938, no. 3). Greek δόλος has its pendant in the Latin term *dolus* or *dolus malus*, a common

20 If the laughter of one's enemies is worse than death (Eur. *HF* 285f.), worst of all is the fear of such mockery *after* one's death: Halliwell 1991b:286, with testimonia in n.22.

21 Dölger 1919:90ff. Cumont 1922:133ff., Bidez 1932, Pettazzoni 1949, Fauth 1995:189–202.

22 In the collection at Björck 1938:24–45: Serapis (no. 1), Theos Hypsistos (11, 12), Hosios Dikaios (13), Hagne Thea (14), *Manes vel Di Caelestes* (16), οἱ θεοί (17); *cf. IKyzikos* 522 for Δίκη καὶ Ζεῦ Πανεπόψιε.

23 For instance, of the 22 pagan Greek and Latin texts collected by Björck all but three request revenge for manslaughter.

legal expression.[24] Occasionally it can be found in prayers for justice as well, for instance one found at Uley, written by a certain Dicilinus (Hassall and Tomlin 1989:329) against persons *qui pecori meo dolum malum intulerunt* 'who cunningly inflicted evil harm on my cattle.' 'The harm done is not specified but was presumably an ailment blamed on persons known to bear Dicilinus a grudge whether it was thought to be due to poison or to witchcraft': thus the comment of its editor, R.S.O. Tomlin. This assessment is directly relevant to our issue in several respects. First, there is the question concerning the identity of the offender; it is by no means easy,[25] as the following funerary inscription from Pessinous (Lambrechts and Bogaert 1969, *BullÉp* 1968:535, 1970:600) may show: ὅς ἂν ἐνεχίρησε Μηνοδώρῳ χωρὶς θεοῦ βίας, Ἥλι Κύρι, μή σ' ἀρέσι 'whoever may have laid violent hands on Menodoros, unless it was performed by the power of a god, must be displeasing to you, Helios Kyrios.' The problem is that it is by definition impossible to decide whether it is god, fate or human malice that should be blamed, as Greek archaic poetry and tragedy were well aware. Of course, firm characters may take the risk: ... *manus lebo contra deum qui me innocentem sustulit* 'I raise my hands against the god who, innocent as I am, took me away' (*CIL* VI 25075, Cumont 1923:II 5). But wavering ones—a majority—have to make do with vague or dubitative expressions such as ὁ ἐπίβουλος (Björck 1938, no. 5); *quisquis ei laesit aut nocuit* (whoever hurt or injured him, (*loc.cit.* no. 10) and a lavish variety of terms with the stem ἀδικ- and the like:[26] τὶς αὐτὸν ἠδίκησε τῷ ἦ αἷμ[α] 'whoever wronged him: blood over him!' (Rosanova 1955:174–6); τὶς δὲ τούτους ἠδίκησε, ἐνκεχαρισμένος ἤτω εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ νέκυεια 'whoever wronged him, may he be welcome to the dead' (*MAMA* 7.402); τὶς [ποτε? τοῦτ]ον ἀδίκησεν, ἔστα[ι αὐ]τῷ πρὸς [τὸ]ν Θεό[ν] (7.360.5–9); τὶς κακῶς ἐ]ποίησεν, ἔσται αὐτῷ [π]ρὸς τὸν Θεόν (7.276c.2–4)

24 *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae* (1933) *s.v. dolus.*

25 Of course, the perpetrator is not always anonymous. In cases of violent death, for instance, he may have been observed *in flagranti*. Kajanto 1968:185f.: 'In many an epitaph the cause of death was stated in terms which nowadays would amount to libel,' with the evidence. More examples: Veyne 1983. However, it is striking to read (*CIL* VI 2.12649, Björck 1938, no.20, Rome) that a father, mourning his daughter who passed away after a lingering illness, adds: *Atimeto liberto, cuius dolo filiam amisi, restem et clavom unde sibi collum alliget* 'For Atimetus the freedman, whose evil schemes made me lose my daughter, rope and nail, in order that he may hang himself.' He seems to be sure of both cause (no doubt poison or magic) and identity of the culprit. The same in *CIL* VI 20905 (Björck 1938, no.21, Rome), a curse against *Acte libertae, venerariae et perfidae, dolosae, duri pectoris* 'Upon Acte the freedwoman, treacherous poison monger, crafty and cruel.' *DTAud* 1, quoted *infra* p.134, gives a good insight into the background of these suspicions; it squares nicely with *DTAud* 4, a case of suspicion of poisoning, where I suggest that in 'the curse against the one who has written against me or who gave the instruction' refers to an accusation on a lead tablet like the ones that have come down to us at Knidos. See below.

26 I am indebted to my colleague Johan Strubbe for allowing me to inspect, before its publication, his recent book on funerary curses (1997).

'whoever wronged him, he will render account to God;' εἴ τις ἠ[δίκη]σεν αὐτῄ, [ἔ]ξι <π>ρὸ<ς> τὸν Θεὸ̣ν̣ [ὅσ]τις κρείνι δ[ικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους] 'if anybody wronged her, he will render account to the God who judges the righteous and the unrighteous' (*ib.* 6–10). Apparently, in the context of death the notions 'mysterious' and 'malicious' are near equivalents, as are 'uncertainty' and 'suspicion.'

Nor is this the only dilemma. Sixty years ago Louis Robert wrote: 'Poison and magic played an important part both in reality and in the imagination. It might be interesting to trace its attestations in the Greek epitaphs.'[27] He mentioned a few examples to which, indeed, many more could be added. But, as Tomlin, quoted above, implied, the expression 'poison *and* magic,' might be better replaced by 'poison *or* magic' or, better still, 'poison, *in other words* magic,' since Greeks and Romans did not make a clear distinction between the two.[28] Suffice it to illustrate this well-known ambivalence with the fact that *venenum* in Roman law may imply both forms of *dolus*, just as Greek *pharmakon* does.[29]

In sum, uncertainty in various degrees and in different respects appears to be a central characteristic of these pleas for justice and revenge. By way of illustration I quote two texts that exemplarily display the rich vocabulary of doubt and suspicion. The first is one of the the best-known funerary pleas for justice, voicing the charge of φαρμακεύειν and professing desperate doubts about both motive and identity of the offender. Preserved in two identical inscriptions from Rheneia the formulas display overt Old Testament reminiscences and are generally ascribed to a Jewish or Samaritan ambience.[30] In Gager's translation:

27 My translation of Robert 1936:55f.: 'Poison et magie jouaient un grand rôle et en fait et dans les imaginations. Il serait intéressant d'en relever les traces dans les épitaphes grecques;' *cf.* also Zingerle 1926:18f., Latte 1920:68 n.18.

28 Sometimes the intended meaning is beyond doubt, *e.g. nutritus veneno* (*CIL* IX 3030). Less unequivocal, but probably referring to poison is SGD p.158: 'whoever gave a φάρμακον to Hyakinthos;' Solin 1981:105f.: *L. Al(l)ius C.f. an(n)orum natus xxv mortu(u)s est vevene (= veneno) quia suas iniurias defendebat. Alias C.f. fecerunt.* But what exactly does φάρμακα δηλητήρια mean in the oldest formulas of the Dirae Teiae? Nilsson, *GGR* I 803: '... worunter Zaubermittel zu verstehen sind; denn ein ganzes Volk vergiftet man nicht.' Unfortunately, attempts of this kind have been made, or at least feared: the Athenians believed that the Spartans φάρμακα ἐσβεβλήκοιεν ἐς τὰ φρέατα 'had thrown poison into the wells' and thus caused the plague (Thuc. 2.48).

29 Particularly interesting is Plato, *Leg.* 11.933, with its distinction between two techniques. One concerns 'injuries done by bodies to bodies according to nature's laws' (referring to poison). The other is the type that causes injuries through μαγγανείαις τέ τισι καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι 'certain magical tricks, charms, and curses,' *i.e.* magic. Significantly, both are listed under the heading *pharmakeiai*. For a full discussion I may refer to Graf 1994:31–73, ch. 2, 'Vocabulaire et réflexions des anciens'; *cf.* Graf 1992:276f. on the double meaning of φάρμακον in an oracle inscription from Ephesos, and also Latte 1920:68 n.18, Zingerle 1926:18f. Anthropology informs us that often there is uncertainty about the precise ways of witchcraft attacks. Sometimes they are imagined as missiles coming from without, other times the harm comes from within: Evans-Pritchard 1937:38, Malinowski 1950 (= 1922):242.

30 Cumont 1923, 19–20, Gager 1992:185–7, no.87, with bibliography. Their cultural setting: White 1987.

> I call upon and beseech the highest god, Lord of the spirits and of all flesh, against those who by deceit murdered or bewitched/poisoned (ἐπὶ τοὺς δόλωι φονεύσαντας ἢ φαρμακεύσαντας) miserable Heraklea, untimely dead, causing her to spill her innocent blood in unjust fashion (ἀδίκως). Let the same happen to those who murdered or bewitched/poisoned her and also to their children. Lord, who oversees all things and angels of God, before whom on this day every soul humbles itself, may you avenge this innocent blood and seek (justice) speedily (ἵνα ἐγδικήσῃς τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἀναίτιον ζητήσεις καὶ τὴν ταχίστην).

The second is a self-execration found at Knidos (*DTAud* 1, discussed *infra)*, in which the author denies under oath any malice or evil intent against another named person. Again an alleged manipulation of a φάρμακον plays a central role:

> ... εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ φάρμακον Ἀσκλ[α]πιάδαι ἢ ἔδ[ω]κα ἢ ἐνεθυμήθ[η]ν κατὰ ψ[υ]χὴν κακόν τι [α]ὐτῷ ποῖσαι, ἢ ἐκάλεσα γυναῖκα ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τρία ἡμιμναῖα διδοῦσα ἵνα αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ζώντων ἄρῃ .....
>
> ... if I have given a *pharmakon* to Asklepiadas or contrived in my soul to do him harm in any way, or if I summoned a (wise) woman to the temple paying her three half mina's in order that she remove him from the realm of the living ...

Together these two texts provide a most instructive insight into the idiom of suspicion. In the first the death may have been caused by murder, more particularly a deceitful, mysterious form of murder: δόλος. This expression cannot, however, be sharply distinguished from the subsequent verb: φαρμακεύειν, and this term, in its turn, may harbour two intertwined meanings: poison, especially through a *philtron*, and black magic, which may—but need not—be contrived by material means. Finally, the whole complex is summarized in the term ἀδίκως, thus paving the way for the logical request for retaliation: ἐγδικήσῃς, ζητήσεις.[31] The second text presents a similar spectrum, varying from administering poison (or practicing magic?), via nourishing negative feelings against the target, to commissioning manslaughter to a wise woman (who no doubt is expected to apply the same surreptitious techniques as detailed earlier in the curse).[32]

Curiously, it is as if the mere nourishing of evil thoughts against a person suffices to automatically produce miserable effects. The Amorgos text, for instance, requires punishment 'for those who have nourished such thoughts against us (τοὺς τοιαῦτα ἐνθυμούμενους) and who have joyfully prepared sorrows (καὶ καταχαίροντε(ς) καὶ λύπας ἐπιθε(ῖ)ναι),' and other texts provide a rich variety of similar suggestions. It is in fact exactly the same surreptitious manner in which envy, as-

31 The two terms are current in biblical language but are also in use in pagan inscriptions: Versnel 1991:65–79.

32 Note that expressions comparable to ἐκ τῶν ζώντων ἄρῃ occur in another *defixio* (SGD 131, Wünsch 1909:41–5) as well as in literature (*e.g.* Mt. 24:39, Jn. 19:15).

sisted by her henchmen gossip and slander, and often reified or personified as the evil eye, is supposed to work.[33] The semantic field of βασκανία/βασκαινεῖν, for instance, unites a seamless range of denotations such as: bewitch (with the evil eye)—malign, slander—envy, grudge.[34]

'No family can stand to see another prosper without feeling envy and wishing the other harm,' writes the anthropologist E.G. Banfield on a modern community in South Italy.[35] Hence the extreme mistrust and secretiveness of the family in its eternal competion against other families and groups, all permanently engaged in attempting to discredit one another, so as to rise, if only temporarily, in the social scale (so Du Boulay 1976:389–406). The practical effects of these envious thoughts can be represented in two different manners, remarkably analogous to the ambivalence of the concept of *pharmakon*. Banfield records several stories in which poison is the most natural and self-evident instrument used by the envious person, and of course there are other instrumental courses of action. On the other hand, mere (fear of) envy[36] or gossip may suffice to make its target sick. The same ambivalence between an instrumental and a direct, immaterial working of envy and hate can again be observed in the modern discussion on the function and effects of ancient satire and libel. Some scholars claim to have discovered 'evidence of Greek opinion that the imprecations of Archilochus and Hipponax were not merely scurrilous malediction, but were conceived of as carrying a certain supernatural potency to harm, analogous to the ancient curses of tragedy.'[37] According to this view, ancient satire is comparable to the magical curse poetry of ancient Ireland, which was assumed to be capable of killing animals and men, more precisely: rats and kings (so *e.g.* Elliot 1972). However, other scholars argue for a clear distinction between the alleged independent, direct effects of magical satire, working like a spell, and the social effects of grief and shame, which can lead to death for a victim who can no longer face a society which is aware of the dishonourable ridicule to

33 The dark and silent workings of malicious talk and envy and their cooperation in ancient literature: Hubbard 1990:348. The close connections of scornful or insulting laughter with envy and *Schadenfreude*: Halliwell 1991b:289.

34 *Cf.* the well-known accusations against βασκανία and φθόνος in funerary inscriptions: Aalders 1979:4–6. On the expression τὶς ἂν προσοίσει χεῖρα τὴν βαρύφθονον 'une main à la lourde envie:' Robert 1978:259ff. Generally: Schlesier 1994.

35 Banfield 1958:115. Consequently, Greeks, ancient and modern, are 'caught in a system in which lying, quarreling, gossiping, envy, jealousy, and hatred seem to a large extent to be inevitable,' according to Du Boulay 1974:173.

36 Envy and the evil eye in the modern Mediterranean: *e.g.* Arnaud 1912:385ff., Schmidt 1913, Dionysopoulos-Mass 1976, Herzfeld 1980b, Galt 1982. Generally: Dundes 1981. Ancient Greece: the literature cited *infra* n.41.

37 Hendrickson 1925:117. The relationship of libelling and cursing: Radermacher 1908; *cf.* also Speyer 1969:1214f.

which he has been subjected.[38] Notorious is the case of Archilochus and the Lycambids, at least according to later Greek authors. However, caution is called for. Exactly the same discussion developed concerning the 'genuine' or 'correct' meaning of the *(malum) carmen* that was censured by the Laws of the Twelve Tables: injurious verse or magical spell?[39] Here, too, the dispute is far from being settled, and, in my view, cannot be settled because the dilemma is posed in the wrong terms.

It seems to me that here as well as with respect to the other concepts just mentioned, modern attempts to draw sharp boundaries betray a serious misunderstanding of the way Greeks and Romans understood (and sometimes still understand) the mechanisms of envy, evil-eye, gossip, mockery and magic. It appears that word and action are widely regarded as either parallel or subsequent, but always inseparable and often intertwined forms of expression. To put it differently, cause and effect cannot always be clearly distinguished.[40] Hate *involves* harmful effects, envy *implies* injury, very much like the Irish Athirne's satires addressed at Lady Luaine, who had rejected his advances, spontaneously generated three blemishes 'Reproach, (Bad) Repute, and Disgrace' on her face, and thus provoked her death of shame. For antiquity this suggestion is confirmed by a massive evidence on envy and its effects, collected in well-known works by Walcot and others.[41] Significantly, Aristotle, *EN* 1131a9 and *Pol.* 1262a27, includes defamation and abuse in a list of acts of violence, together with assault, murder and robbery. This is a clear corroboration of the fact that ridicule can function as an act of aggression and can be identified with inflicting physical injury.[42]

Envy breeds gossip. Exemplarily Pindar *Pyth.* 11.28ff. relates κακολόγοι πολῖται 'slanderous citizens' directly with ἴσχει γὰρ ὄλβος οὐ μείονα φθόνον 'for good fortune raises equal envy' (see Hubbard 1990). Gossip, in its turn, generates evil fame. Hesiod, *Catalogue of Women* fr.67, puts it very bluntly: 'And Aphrodite felt jealous (ἠγάσθη) when she looked on the daughters of Tyndareus and cast

38 H.D. Rankin (1974:11) forcefully defends the second option in the case of Lycambes' supposed death as a result of Archilochus' scurrilous verses: 'This was because of the injury that their honour suffered from the diffusion of his ridicule throughout an honour-orientated or 'shame' society rather than because they were placed under a spell by magical words;' *cf.* Rankin 1977:50–6. Latin invective and its consequences: *e.g.* Koster 1980, Veyne 1983.

39 Verse: Cicero *ap.* Aug. *CD* 2.9, Cic. *Rep.* 4.12. Spell: Plin. *NH* 28.17. Modern discussion: Marmorale 1950:53ff., Tupet 1976:166–8.

40 For an exemplary demonstration of similar intertwining of external and internal causes of injury in archaic and classical Greece I refer to Padel 1992, 1995. Especially in the context of sorcery this double focus is well-known in anthropological literature: *supra* n.29.

41 Jahn 1855, Kötting 1954, Moreau 1976f., Walcot 1978, Dickie 1987, 1992, Yatromanolakis 1988, Schlesier 1994.

42 As seen by Halliwell 1991b:287f., who adds much interesting evidence.

them into evil report (κακῇ δέ σφ' ἔμβαλε φήμῃ),'[43] which brings us back to the two notions more directly relevant to our issue: gossip and its corollary mockery. Evidence of their social functions and mutual interconnectedness in Greek society, ancient and modern, abounds. I am fully aware of recent mistrust (esp. Herzfeld 1980a, 1987) concerning both the rationale of '*the* Mediterranean' as an all-embracing and coherent concept and its relevance to the conceptual framework of ancient Greek culture. For brevity's sake I refer to the sensible reply by David Cohen (1991:38–41), which I fully endorse. Despite many differences, he argues, there are typical patterns of social practices that characterise a wide range of Mediterranean communities, and which display a considerable similarity in the underlying normative structure. Asked why we should select the Mediterranean as an exemplary model (not, to be sure, as a case of proved historical continuity), he answers: 'The main reason is that there is no other group of well-documented societies which manifest the same patterns of social practices.' So back to our issue now.

> The fear of gossip and ridicule is closely related to the two concepts of self-regard and shame. The prestige of an individual, or family, is constantly being evaluated and reevaluated in the community through gossip (...). To be gossiped about is in most cases to be criticized adversely, and since people enjoy this recreation they laugh and they ridicule the object of their discussion. The knowledge, or the imagining, of this ridicule and laughter is an important element in a man's feelings of shame. For if the outside world judges him to be a failure he has also failed to live up to his own ideal image of himself which depends on success.

Thus a perfect summary of the issue at stake by J.K. Campbell in his ground-breaking work on the Sarakatsani (1964:312). It may serve as a most illuminating diagnosis of the frame of mind of the author of the Amorgos tablet: failure or mishap provokes gossip and unholy glee, followed by ridicule. The effect on the target is shame, entailing loss of self-regard and social prestige. In the next section, dealing with the role of malicious laughter in ancient Greek literature, we shall encounter similar sequences of action, reaction and effect. The emphasis on imagination, expectation and suspicion, central in the above curse texts *and* in Campbell's description also prevails in the literary evidence. For, indeed, the favourite ambush of gossip and mockery is located behind the target's back.[44]

43 The same poet in his 'Counsels of Wisdom' in *Erga* 760ff., is exemplary in his advice: 'Do as I say and try to avoid being the object of men's evil rumour (φήμη). Rumour is a dangerous thing.'

44 The connection of gossip and hatred/hostility (μῖσος, the same word as used in the Amorgos text): Du Boulay 1974:201–29, ch. 9 on gossip, esp. 209. The social functions of gossip: Gluckman 1963, Paine 1967, Handelman 1974, Bleek 1976, Spacks 1985, Brisson 1992. Two excellent recent studies on ancient Greece, especially Athens: Cohen 1991 (see index *s.v.*) and Hunter 1990:299–315 (revised as 1994:96–118). Privileged targets of gossip: Winkler 1990:58–64.

The modern Greek expression 'the world laughs' (ὁ κόσμος γελάει) accurately reflects such ancient expressions as: δι' ἄστεος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γέλως 'all over the city everybody laughs' (Semonides 7.74 W.); νῦν δὲ δὴ πολὺς ἀστοῖσι φαίνεαι γέλως 'now you will be the laughing-stock of your fellow townsmen' (Archil. *Ep.* 172); γεί]τοσι χάρμ' ἔσομαι 'I will make myself a joke to my neighbours' (169a); οἱ δὲ γείτονες χαίρουσ' ὁρῶντες καὶ τόν, ὡς ἁμαρτάνει 'and the neighbours will rejoice seeing him, how he fails (Semonides 7.110f.); μὴ γείτοσι χάρματα γήμῃς 'in order that your marriage will not be a joke to the neighbours' (Hesiod. *Erga* 701). Incidentally, all these quotations pertain to women who make their husbands laughing-stocks. Now, as M.L. West *ad loc.* laconically comments: 'The idea of being laughed at or of giving unsympathetic persons cause for rejoicing is abominable to the Greek.'[45] Not only to the Greek. Horace *Epod.* 11.7 gladly imitates Archilochos' Neoboule epode (see Henrichs 1980:17): *heu me per urbem .... fabula quanta fui* 'Oh, what a story I was all over town.' Revealing to the close connection of gossip and ridicule are also Hor. *Epist.* 1.13.9f., *paternum cognomen vertas in risum et fabulas fias* 'that you do not turn your father's cognomen into a laughing-stock and so become the talk of the town,' and Prop. 3.25.1, *risus eram positis inter convivia mensis et de me poterat quilibet esse loquax* 'I was the joke of the dining room and whoever wanted could talk about me.'

These examples from the ancient world anticipate the observation of Du Boulay (1974:201) that 'gossip is both the means of mockery and the mockery itself, although it is not only these.' The close interrelation, if not equation, of these two expressions of malicious intent is also in agreement with a statement by Campbell (1964:313) that 'the ridicule which a man suffers or imagines he is suffering is seldom crudely inflicted to his face.'[46] The target will sense or suspect a change in looks and behaviour of his social environment. Accordingly, nicknames, which are usually ironic, if not insulting, are used mainly to refer to a person not present. People are not meant to be aware of their own nicknames, and use of the nickname in direct address is a form of affront (Campbell 1964:315, McDowell 1981, Stewart 1991:57). Likewise, satirical songs are as a rule not sung into the victim's face, but he will learn of it, and be bitterly ashamed (Campbell 1964:314). Of course, there are again noticeable exceptions: downright vilification (λοιδορία) and public name-calling was permitted and lavishly applied in the courts of ancient Athens.[47]

45 'In such a society, anything, which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose face," is felt as unbearable' (Dodds 1951:18); *cf.* also Gouldner 1965:81–6, Dover 1974:236–42.

46 Du Boulay 1974:202: 'Because gossip is against the interests of those talked about, it naturally takes place behind their backs;' *cf.* Hubbard 1990:348.

47 Hunter 1994:101. So were vilification and mockery in the streets and markets of Athens: Halliwell 1991b:286f. The public aspects of the court: Chaniotis 1992.

However, for reasons of space I cannot expand on the public function of ancient satire and curse poetry beyond the few observations given above.

Altogether we may conclude that gossip and mockery have a twofold effect, an internalized and an outward one: they generate feelings of shame in the target and loss of face before the outer world. In other words, they affect both his self-respect and his reputation. Especially the latter involves an emphasis on public aspects. P.M. Spacks (1985:4), for instance, lists as purposes of gossip to damage competitors or enemies, to gratify envy and rage by diminishing another, to generate an immediately satisfying sense of power. 'Private as its subject may appear, gossip requires a public setting to be effective. For gossip is about reputation. While asserting the common values of the group, it holds up to criticism, ridicule, or abuse those who flout society's or the community's accepted rules,' thus Hunter 1994:96, on ancient Athens, also adding (116): 'Yet this is the very aim and effect of gossip itself, to submit its target to public mockery.' In Athens gossip played an important part in political competition, for instance in the *dokimasiai rhetoron* exactly because the speakers 'featured players in the public spotlight—star performers on the political stage' (Winkler 1990:59). Accordingly, Aeschines writes (1.127): 'Attaching itself to men's life and conduct, talk travels unerringly and spontaneously throughout the city, like a messenger proclaiming to the public at large details of men's private behaviour' (further testimonia: Hunter 1994:99). In a society that values honour and shame as perhaps the most fundamental elements of its cultural identity and hence as primary incentives to social action, this is indeed the worst thing that can happen. And this is the way our wronged slave-owner of Amorgos must have felt it.

The main objectives of this section were, first, to present a brief gamut of the secret weapons of maliciousness serving as a mental background to our own issue. Secondly, it provides an impression of the characteristic gnawing uncertainty concerning the evil motives and the identity of persons who are suspected of hostile feelings. Thirdly and more especially, it focused the attention on the roles of gossip and mockery in this context. In his recent book on magic Fritz Graf has rightly emphasized the element of crisis as an important incentive to the application of *defixiones*. We shall keep this in mind when we pursue our enquiry in the role of malicious delight or *Schadenfreude*. But before casting a glance into the relevant ancient Greek literature, I will now briefly discuss a few sometimes rather obscure expressions in curses that have not been satisfactorily understood so far and may perhaps find a niche if viewed from the common perspective evoked by our discussion.

4. New light on some obscure expressions in curse texts

In *Papyrus Upsaliensis* 8 (the one that inspired Björck to make a collection of funerary pleas for revenge) a certain Sabinus curses two persons (including his daughter) for having wronged him. He refers to them as τῶν καλυψάντων τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰδῶ. Björck rather reluctantly suggests that it must mean something like: 'those who have covered (that is effaced) my honour.'[48] In view of the above bouquet of malice I have no doubt that this is the correct interpretation. The author of the papyrus has been brought into a shameful position. In this connection it is remarkable how often the authors of judicial prayers refer to their own desolated positions with terms like 'poor,' 'bereft:' ἔρημος in the Amorgos tablet; ΔΑΓΙΝΑΓΑΡΙΜΕ φίλων πάντων καὶ ἐρήμα in a new curse from Macedonia,[49] where, not without hesitation, I have proposed to read ταπ(ε)ινὰ γάρ ιμε [= εἶμαι?];[50] miserable (ταλαίπωρος) is especially frequent in Coptic curses, where it may be an Oriental heritage.

Furthermore, various references to different kinds of injury may be elucidated in the light of what we have so far discovered. For instance, a Coptic prayer for revenge (Björck 1938, no. 28) mentions that people καταφρονεῖν 'despise' the author, while the female writer of a tablet from Nabataea (no. 17) prays that οἱ θεοὶ ἐκδικήσειαν ὑπὸ τῶν κακολογούντων αὐτήν 'the gods may exact vengeance from those who speak ill of/abuse/curse[51] her.' The verb δείρω in no. 18 (Cumont 1926f., no. 10b, from Philippopolis) ἐκ τῶν δειράντων με ἐκδίκησον (from those who 'skinned' me, exact vengeance) may be explained as a 'catch-all term,' referring to similar acts of abuse. A curse from Claudiopolis,[52] though clearly forensic, may have elements that belong in a similar context: πάντες οὗτοι ἔ[στ]ωσαν κατα[δε]δεμένοι μὴ ἀντιλέγοντες [μ]ὴ λαλοῦντες μὴ ἐνβλέποντες. Cormack translates: 'let them not speak against, let them not utter a word, let them not spy

48 Björck 1938:72: 'Jedoch ruht, was ich mir nicht verhehle, die Erklärung dieses ganzen wichtigen Passus auf unsicherem Grunde.'

49 The text has now been published with a circumstantial commentary by Emmanuel Voutiras (1998), to whom I am indebted for having sent me a draft of his forthcoming book. See also Dubois 1995 and Voutiras' reaction: 1996: 678–82.

50 In a letter of September 16, 1991, as acknowledged by Voutiras *op.cit.* (previous note), whose objections I share but do not consider insurmountable. I am gratified to see that, independently, Dubois now proposes the same conjecture. He also points out that the combination of ταπεινός and ἔρημος is well documented in Greek literature, *e.g.* Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.23, as is the expression φίλων ἔρημος (more instances in Voutiras 681 n.14). David Jordan suggests to me *exempli gratia* another possibility, ἀλγ(ε)ινά.

51 Λοιδορέομαι, κακῶς λέγω, and *maledico* can all mean 'curse' as well as 'abuse:' Watson 1991:46; *cf.* Hunter 1994:221 n.14. Κακηγορεῖν: esp. Halliwell 1991a:49-54.

52 Cormack 1951, SGD 169, Gager 1992:137, no. 47.

on Capetolinus.' The first word seems to belong to the ambience of the court. The second term, λαλεῖν, is a normal word for 'speaking' but may have a connotation of 'chattering,' 'being talkative.' Finally, ἐνβλέπειν is simply 'to look (at).' But the jargon considerably differs from the usual language of forensic curses and may well imply aspects of sneaky ways of talking and looking. A very interesting inscription from Delos contains an accusation by Theogenes against a woman who has cheated him concerning a deposit. Now he prays that she will not escape the power of the goddess (Ἁγνὴ θεά, the Dea Syria) and demands all *therapeutai* (no doubt the group of those devoted to the goddess, including the sacred personnel of the temple) to slander/calumniate (βλασφημεῖν) her καθ' ὥραν.[53] The term βλασφημεῖν again belongs to the idiom of gossip and malignity, more especially to its public employment well known from the Athenian court (Hunter 1994:102, 221 n.14). Finally, in an unpublished tablet from the sanctuary of Demeter at Corinth,[54] a woman commits another woman to the Moirai Praxidikai and asks them to avenge her for τὰς ὕβρ{ι}εις. If, later in the curse, she also asks them καρπίσαι με (to make me fertile), a tragedy seems to surface. In view of the extremely common equation of derision and ὕβρις,[55] I guess that the author has been insulted or derided by another woman on account of her barrenness and now resorts to the application of an old proverb ἀδικούμενος διαλάσσου· ὑβριζόμενος τιμωροῦ 'if wronged reciprocate, if injured avenge yourself' (Chilon *ap.* Stob. 3.118.1–2H).

5. *The theme of* Schadenfreude *in Greek literature*

In the 'Homeric' epigram generally referred to as 'The Oven' (v[a]?), preserved in Ps.-Herodotus, *Life of Homer* 32,[56] the poet promises to sing a prayer to Athena for the potters and to ask that she protect the kiln and provide a large production. The condition is that they will give him a reward. If, however, they turn shameless and

53 *IDélos* 2531; Cumont 1923, no. 8, after Hauvette-Besnault 1882:500 n.24, read καθ' ἱ[ε]ράν in the ultimate line. The reading καθ' ὥραν (Durrbach 1904:152), adopted by Roussel in *IDélos*, is no doubt correct, although its meaning 'at the right time'(?) is not entirely transparent in the context.

54 *E.g.* Stroud 1973, SGD p.66, Bookidis and Stroud 1987. I am very grateful to Ronald Stroud for granting me the opportunity to inspect these unpublished texts.

55 Literature: *infra* n.63. MacDowell 1976:20: '*hybris* and *hybrizein* are often used of a person who taunts another, laughs at him, makes a joke about him;' (21) 'it often has a sense not just of mocking but of triumphing and crowning over someone else's misfortunes.' Very to the point are Aristotle's remarks, *Rhet.* 1378b23–9, 1374a13–5: 'behaviour intended to produce dishonour or shame to others, on the part of those who derive pleasure from such behaviour,' discussed in detail at Fisher 1976.

56 *Cf.* Suidas *s.v.* Ὅμηρος, Merkelbach and West 1967:155f. Discussions: Markwald 1986:219ff., Watson 1991:69–74, Gager 1992:153f.

make false promises, the poet will summon the fearful demons that destroy the forge—probable his own comic creations—Smasher, Crasher, Unquenchable, Ill-moulder, and Spoiler. They are assisted by the witch Circe and the centaur Chiron accompanied by the other Centaurs, and instructed to 'make sad havoc of the pots and overthrow the kiln, and let the potters see the mischief and be grieved; but I shall rejoice to see their craft overtaken with disaster. And if anyone of them stoops to peer in, let all his face be burned up, that all men may learn to deal honestly.'

> γηθήσω δ' ὁρόων αὐτῶν κακοδαίμονα τέχνην
> ὃς δέ χ' ὑπερκύψῃ, πυρὶ τούτου πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον
> φλεχθείη ὡς πάντες ἐπίστωντ' αἴσιμα ῥέζειν.

Potters are a superstitious lot, no doubt due to the precarious nature of their craft (Noble 1965:72–83). One never knows if the ceramics will come out in good shape. If they don't, the blame, of course, should be diverted from the maker and either hung on harmful demons or on black magic contrived by an envious neighbour or any other malicious person. Combinations occur, as in our poem. It is very likely that this little poem is inspired by existing curses against the kiln of potters.[57] Pliny, *HN* 28.4.19, observes that 'many people believe that the products of potters' shops can be crushed by this means (*i.e.* curse tablets),' while Pollux 7.108 reports that bronze-workers used to display apotropaic amulets (βασκάνιον ἐπικάμινον) to protect themselves against envy. Together they document a double strategy. First, on a purely practical level they represent an instrument in a veritable struggle for life involving both aggressive and defensive magical techniques added to the craftmanship required. Secondly, from a more functionalistic point of view, they display an ideal device to explain—and be excused for—failure or mishap.[58]

57 As J.G. Gager (1992:153) supposes in his discussion of the magical evidence concerning potters. Although modern scholarship likes to explain the use of *defixiones* as inspired by competition and envy, so far only one curse (Attica, IV[a]), published by David Jordan elsewhere in this volume (his no. 1), has contained an explicit reference to envy.

58 The two sides were already signalized by Plato, *Leg.* 11.933, censuring the type of magic 'that convinces not only those who attempt to cause injury that they really can do so, but also their victims that they certainly are being injured by those who possess the power of bewitchment,' and referring to 'viewing another with dark suspicion if one finds magical material at his door.' On witchcraft as an explanation for otherwise unexplained calamity the groundbreaking and still fundamental study is Evans-Pritchard 1937, esp. chs. 2f. His theory has been elaborated and refined in a great number of later studies, for instance several papers in Marwick 1982, esp. Gluckman 1982:443–51, and Needham 1978:23–50. Ancient Near East: Thomsen 1987:9–14. Ancient Egypt: Borghouts 1980:1137–51. On the other hand, being too successful inevitably provokes the suspicion (and accusation) of magical practices: Pliny, *NH* 18.41–3 after Calpurnius Piso, records a process against a person who constantly reaped richer harvests than his neigbours and was accused on the grounds that he *fruges alienas perliceret veneficiis,* in agreement with the law of the Twelve Tables *neve alienam segetem pellexeris.* The socio-psychological motives involved: Graf 1994:76ff.

To our issue, however, the little poem is particularly instructive in its combination of two aspects: the picture of the punisher rejoicing over the discomfiture of his victim's work—the *Schadenfreude* we encountered in surviving *defixiones* and other curse texts—and the idea that the punishment functions as a warning for other potential offenders. The latter motif will be further explored in the next section. We shall now first pursue our enquiry into the occurrence of *Schadenfreude* in the more elevated forms of Greek literature, where the poem has taken us. For it has been noticed by many a commentator that the poet's malicious glee is mirrored in other literary genres, for instance in the Strasbourg epode (often ascribed to Hipponax, e.g. West 1971:150f., Watson 1991:56–62), which ends with the wish: ταῦτ' ἐθέλοιμ' ἂν ἰδεῖν, ὅς μ' ἠδίκησε ... 'I would love to see him in that abominable misery [detailed earlier in the epode], the one who wronged me.'

'There is nothing funny about laughter in tragedy,' thus the appropriate opening line of an article by Matthew Dillon (1991), whose finds I summarize. The nature and function of Greek laughter, especially in Homer and Herodotus,[59] has received quite some attention in recent scholarship. Whether in tragedy, epic or historiography, everywhere laughter is equally cheerless if we may believe Donald Lateiner, who entitled an article on Herodotus on laughter 'No Laughing Matter.' 'Sinister, dark connotations'—that is what M. Colakis found in Homer's descriptions of laughter and it is even worse in tragedy: in approximately 70 of the 80 extant examples from tragedy, laughter may be characterized as malevolent in the extreme, as Dillon found.

The majority of examples of laughter pertain to outright mockery, and often the relationship involved is strictly hostile, as indicated, for instance, by the prevalence of words like ἐχθρός in the immediate context. *Schadenfreude* finds its most poignant expression in the most poignant tragedy, Sophocles' *Ajax*, when Athena asks Odysseus about the sight of the crazed Ajax (79): 'Is not the sweetest laughter to laugh at enemies?'[60] Malicious laughter is the corollary of enmity. Numerous are such utterances as 'my enemies gloating with laughter,' as Electra says (Soph. *El.* 1153). Other notions often paired with derision are *hybris* and revenge, as well as brutal violence, culminating for instance in the Furies' utterance: Aesch. *Eum.* 253: 'The smell of human bloodshed makes me laugh.' Besides triumph over an enemy, it is especially conspicuous failure in general that may be a source of ridicule. Again there are numerous instances including a god's desire to see a human 'as the laughing-stock of his fellow humans' (Eur. *Ba.* 854).

59 Homer: D.B. Levine in a long series of articles, *e.g.* 1982, 1983; *cf.* also Colakis 1986, Golden 1990. Herodotus: Lateiner 1977, Flory 1978. For an excellent general discussion of laughter in Greek culture, see Halliwell 1991; *cf.* also Lateiner 1995 (index *s.v.* laughter).

60 Accordingly, it is only natural that the *Ajax*, the tragedy about loss of face, provides easily the largest number of references to laughter of all Sophocles' tragedies: Grossmann 1968.

The issue at stake in most of these cases is loss of face, fear of which is most operative amongst close relatives and the direct social environment on the one hand and enemies on the other. Unfortunately, the tragic reality of the Greek—ancient and modern—is that these two categories are not mutually exclusive, despite the truly Greek device of 'helping friends and harming enemies' (Blundell 1989). Naturally there are always two parties involved, the subject and the object of ridicule: gloating pleasure in an enemy's misfortune, especially prominent in Sophocles' *Ajax*, is taken for granted both by tormentors expressing their glee and by victims complaining of it. 'When Ajax is mad he enjoys torturing his enemies (105, 303; *cf.* 52, 114, 272); when sane he dreads their mockery (367, 382, 454),' thus too Mary Blundell (*ib.* 62).[61] In tragedy, however, the passive aspect prevails.[62] In the majority of instances the malicious laughter is not real, but anticipated, or rather dreaded. 'Its power is such that while many fear its use hypothetically, few truly employ it, and then often in contexts of *hybris* or madness.' (Dillon 1991:348)[63] While active gloating laughter does occur in Homer and Herodotus, even there it is often censured as an expression of maniacal or megalomaniacal characters such as the suitors or Cambyses.

In the curses cited above—and compare another striking instance in the next section—we have seen a similar emphasis on the suspicion of being laughed at and the ensuing loss of face. For it is loss of face that it is all about. The taints of disgrace by being ruled out by a rival or defeated by an enemy, or of simply having failed in the daily struggle for survival are all equally unbearable in the basically competitive society that was and is Greece. Malicious laughter is a marker of superiority of the subject creating a hierarchical distance to the scoffed person. 'He laughs that wins,' wrote Shakespeare, unanimously followed by modern theorists.[64] As such the gloating laugh is only surpassed by such images as the defeated enemy being literally trampled under the feet of the victor.[65]

Active ridicule, which we shall also encounter in the *defixio*, though very rare in tragedy, does occur in a uniquely challenging form in Euripides' *Bacchae*. Blind-

61 This is nicely reflected in the ambivalence of 'this search for laughter and the search to avoid being laughed at,' which modern anthropology has discovered: Du Boulay 1974:187.

62 As the examples mentioned *supra* p.138 illustrate there is a kind of gnomic substrate in the recurrent expressions, already present in Homer *Il.* 10.193 μὴ χάρμα γενώμεθα δυσμενέεσσι, an expression which is copied verbatim in magical texts: *PGM* IV 469f., 831f., 824.

63 The 'extremely common equation, in every kind of source, between derision and *hybris*:' Halliwell 1991b:287. The combination in Sophocles' *Ajax*: Fisher 1979:33ff. D.L. Cairns (1993:228–41) very correctly notes (230): 'It therefore seems likely that mockery of the disgrace of enemies is more likely to be termed *hybris* when it is the mockery of *them* against *us*....'

64 See esp. Levine 1982, on superiority and laughter in Homer.

65 Sittl 1890:106–8; many examples from magical papyri: *SupplMag* II p. 23.

ed by his own *hybris* Pentheus laughs at Teiresias and Cadmus, the Maenads, the Dionysiac rituals and even at the god himself. Thus he is preparing his own downfall by the hands of the god, who will smile in turn while hunting his human victim (1021). This cheerless altercation in malicious laughter, human and divine, forms a perfect *trait d'union* with our next section, in which we shall return to the epigraphic evidence of curse and vindictive prayer.

6. *I warn you not to trifle with the god!*

Deep concerns and beliefs that help to construct the identity of a civilization tend to be mirrored in the imagery of and the communication with the divine world. With respect to the issue under discussion we encounter a curious instance of such a projection in a unique prayer for justice written on a bronze tablet. Its provenance is unknown but probably is Asia Minor. The tablet, which has been assigned to anywhere between 100 BC and AD 200, has a round hole in the middle of the top edge presumably for attaching it to a surface for public display. I give the text and translation including a few suggestions I made in a previous study:[66]

1 ἀνατίθημι μητρὶ {ϛ} θεῶν
2 χρυσᾶ ἀπ<ώ>λεσα πάντα ὥ-
3 στε ἀναζητῆσ<α>ι αὐτ-
4 ὴν καὶ ἐς μέσον ἐνε-
5 κκεῖν πάντα καὶ τοὺς
6 ἔχοντες κολάσεσθα-
7 ι ἀξίως τῆς αὐτῆς δυνά-
8 με<ω>ς καὶ μήτε αὐτ[ὴν]
9 καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθ[αι].

I consecrate to the mother of the gods the gold pieces which I have lost, all of them, so that the goddess will track them down and bring everything to light and will punish the guilty in accordance with her power and in this way will not be made a laughing-stock.

The stolen object is consecrated or assigned to the goddess, who has to 'track it down' and punish the guilty. At first sight it betrays a similarity with the above curse from Carthage since it displays a similar concatenation of lost money and derision. However, there is a fundamental difference. This time it is not the human victim who suffers derision, but it is the goddess, who, in case of failure to retrieve the money, will herself be the laughing-stock. As I said, this is an absolutely unique formulation in this type of texts, and if I had not been able to adduce a clarifying

66 Versnel 1991:74. The *ed.pr.* is Dunant 1978; *BullÉp* 1980:45 has several suggestions that I cannot accept.

parallel I would not be so certain about the correctness of this interpretation. This parallel can be found in a clearly related genre of inscriptions that is at home in parts of Lydia and Phrygia. First of all, these inscriptions share an appeal to the miraculous power of a superior god, which we already encountered in some prayers of revenge and in the tablet from Delos cited above. Especially the notion of miracle or power (= ἀρετή) mentioned in the Delos inscription returns as a fixed characteristic in these inscriptions from Asia Minor though mostly in its variant δύναμις. It is even so pronounced in these texts that they are sometimes referred to as 'aretalogies.'[67]

I am of course referring to the Lydian and Phrygian steles, from the 2nd and 3rd century of our era, generally referred to as 'confession steles' because they contain a kind of confession of guilt.[68] A very current sequence of events recorded in the inscriptions is as follows. First there is an acclamation of the type: 'Great (is) Men' or: 'Great (is) Anaeitis,' etc. Then there may follow a confession of guilt, (ὁμολογέω or ἐξομολογέω) to which the author has been forced by the punishing intervention of the deity (κολάζω, κόλασις), often manifested by illness or accident. By his confession and eventual reparation of the wrong the culprit has appeased the god (ἱλάσκομαι or ἐξιλάσκομαι). The god therefore reveals his *dynamis* by both the punishment and the cure of the victim, and as homage to the god the story of the miracle is now written on a stele (στηλογραφέω), sometimes, but not necessarily, at the command of the god. The text often ends with a clear profession of faith: 'And from now on I praise the god' (καὶ ἀπὸ νῦν εὐλογῶ) or, especially in Phrygia, with a warning: 'I warn all mankind not to hold the gods in contempt, for they (*i.e.* mankind) will have this stele as an admonition' (παραγγέλλω πᾶσιν μηδὲν καταφρονεῖν τῶν θεῶν ἐπεὶ ἕξει τὴν στήλην ἐξενπλάριον). Note that the author of the bronze tablet just quoted obviously asks the goddess to do exactly what the confession *stelai* praise their gods for *having* done: exposing the crime, tracing and punishing the culprit, and thus manifesting their miraculous power. The wish that by doing so she will not be made a laughing-stock, then, is, in the confession texts, precisely reflected by the admonition not to hold the god in contempt.[69]

67 For this reason V. Longo (1969:158–66) included five confession texts in his collection. The term most commonly used is δύναμις or δυνάμεις. Further discussion: Versnel 1991:75–9 and literature in the following note.

68 The texts collected by Steinleiter 1913, supplemented with all the confession texts published since, have been republished with an ample commentary by Petzl 1994. The quotation here is from his no. 111.

69 There are a few examples in which a mortal did venture to hold a god in contempt, Petzl 1994, no. 59, where a person is punished because 'she had tried to conceal (περικρυβούσης) the power of the god.'

Disdaining or even deriding a god is a topic that clearly fascinated both Greek and other ancient cultures. Especially in magical papyri we find the themes exploited in the so-called ritual *diabole.*[70] In this type of 'slander spells' the author accuses his opponent of sometimes extremely abstruse ritual violations against a god, who then is expected to punish the culprit. *SupplMag* 79 ἀντίδικ[ός ἐστι] τοῦ [θ]ẹọῦ, or *PGM* IV 2341f. ἐχθρὸς τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν, or *DTAud* 155a 31f. τοῦτον τὸν δυσσεβήν,[71] are supposedly the most concise expressions of such types of alleged blasphemy. They reflect the well-known predicates of the great blasphemer Satan, who owes his Greek name Diabolos to his rôle as slanderer (*DDD s.v.* 'Devil'). The accusation that the target is ἄνομος καὶ ἀσεβής is often substantiated with detailed arguments, as for instance in *DTAud* 188: 'because he has burnt the papyrus of Osiris and eaten the flesh of sacred fishes.'[72] A 'slander spell' addressing Selene (*PGM* IV 2572–92), detailing *inter multa alia* that the target pretends that she has seen the goddess drinking (human) blood (and committing even more shameful deeds), is the most elaborate one.[73] Indeed there is no limit to the range of variations, witness the instruction: 'Of all unlawful things that she has said against the goddess detail as many as you want.' This then may result in such accusations as: 'She has slanderously brought your holy mysteries to the knowledge of men.' However, less baroque charges of derision and blasphemy,[74] which the bronze tablet quoted above tries to prevent and the confession stelai warned against, occur as well. Some are miracles of creativeness: 'Iaô does not have ribs,' or 'Adonai was violently beaten by Jacob' (*PGM* VII 605f., with Eitrem's beautiful emendation.) Finally, a very relevant example in *DTAud* 140, a so-called Sethianic curse. The author tries to win Typhon's sympathy by accusing his target of scorn against the demon: *si forte te contempserit patiatur febris, frigus .... et [si] forte te seducat per aliqua [?artifici]a et rideat de te et exsultetur tibi, vince peroccide* .... 'in case he has held you in contempt, let him suffer from fever, cold shivers ... and if

70 Generally: Eitrem 1924. It is no doubt an Egyptian heritage: Lexa 1925:56–8. Note however that both the application itself and the accusation of applying *diabole* were rife in forensic pleas in classical Athens: Halliwell 1991b:292f., Hunter 1994:102.

71 In *defixiones* slander formulas do not abound. Besides the ones cited in the text, there is *DTAud* 295 (Hadrumetum): *tibi commendo quoniam maledixit partourientem* (probably Persephone or Hekate). A *defixio* from Corsica (Solin 1981:121f.) has: ....]*ule* (probably the name of a god) *vindica te. Qui tibi male f[ecit] ... vindica te* ..

72 See Jordan 1994:123 n.22 for the English translation of a fuller, unpublished, transcription of the tablet.

73 IV 2474–90 is a brief summary of this long spell, and there it is phrased as a counter-spell: Eitrem 1924:49ff.: 'She, NN, is the one who says that I have said that ...'

74 Note that there are numerous attestations of curses, insults and threats addressed to gods: Eitrem 1924:47–9, Versnel 1981b:37–42.

perhaps he misleads you by means of some artifices and laughs at you and exults over you, defeat, kill him.'

This curse is a perfect summary of the present argument: 'holding in contempt' is clearly understood as being on a par with 'laughing at' and 'rejoicing over.' Both gods and men may fall prey to these types of debasement. Both, too, on the other hand, can make their opponents a victim of public derision as we shall now see in our final section.

7. Some inferences for the meaning of defixio

The evidence of *Schadenfreude* in magical context is significant though not overwhelming. However, we should realize that derision can go disguised in a variety of forms beyond the gloating laugh. By way of conclusion I here offer a few suggestions, which may serve to create a better insight into the functions and goals of the *defixio* or at least of some types of *defixiones*. If fear of malice and mockery, especially *Schadenfreude*, is so prominent a feature in Greek (and Roman) society as we have discovered, and accordingly plays a part in curse texts of various types, even affecting the gods, this insight may stimulate a fresh reflection on a few features in especially the *defixiones*, which so far have been too easily taken for granted.

Take for instance a *defixio* found at Rom (Poitiers) in France.[75] It is one of the few *defixiones* from the world of the theatre. It curses a mime actor, wishing that he should suffer delirium, fever, pain, and torments, all of them convenient wishes against a successful colleague. But it also includes more specified wishes, for instance that the actor may not be able to play various roles and, best of all, *loqui nequeat* 'that he may not be able to speak,' which, it should be remembered, was definitely more fatal to an ancient Roman mime than to a modern one. In this perspective, as a technical device, the curse is ingenious, but it acquires a surplus value through its side-effects on the theatrical performance. On the stage loss of speech means loss of face. This is no less true for the forensic *defixiones*,[76] which try to prevent the opponent from pleading his case or accusing the author by chilling, laming, twisting or pinning his tongue, making him voiceless, dumbstruck, unable to find or recall words, losing his memory and so on and so forth. For instance in a *defixio* from Istanbul: ποιήσατε ... ἀντιδίκους ... μήτε φροντίζειν, μήτε μνημονεύειν, καί καταψύξατε αὐτῶν τὸν νοῦν, τὴν ψυχήν 'make my opponents neither reflect nor recall, and chill their mind, their soul.'[77] Surely the primary function

75 Texts and discussion in Versnel 1985:247–69, Gager 1992:74f., no. 16.

76 This special subcategory of curses: Moraux 1960, Gager 1992:116–50, Faraone 1985, 1989.

77 Moraux 1960:12, lines 4 ff. In the 2nd century of our era Galen (XII, p.251 Kuhn), professor of medicine, scorns people who use spells such as: 'I will bind my opponents so that they will be incapable of saying anything during the trial.'

again is a purely instrumental one serving an obvious, direct and concrete goal: to win the case and prevent the opponent from doing so. But, once more, what is the very welcome excess value if it is successful? Fortunately, this is not a rhetorical question for we have picturesque descriptions of such scenes (collected and discused at Faraone 1989b), which suggest an answer to the question.

A late 3rd-century BC inscription from Delos, *IG* XI 1299 (see now Engelmann 1975) relates the miracle story of a priest of Sarapis who built a temple for his god but omitted to obtain official permission. He got involved in a lawsuit, which he won. Not, however, thanks to his superior forensic rhetoric. We are told that when a great crowd had gathered and the opponents were preparing to read their charges, their tongues were 'tied by the god'—as in the best tradition in binding magic. 'Struck by the god (θεοπλήξ) they stood dumbfounded like stone images.'[78] Convenient and effective, no doubt, but this was not the end of it: 'The whole crowd stood in amazement over this great feat (ἀρετή) of the god.' So here is an explicit reference to a concomitant, but more important, effect: the defendant, *i.e.* the god, is elated, while the plaintiffs are humiliated and degraded. The most obvious—though not the only—quality actors and advocates have in common is the fear of being struck dumb during their performance *en plein public*. The effects are fatal. According to Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 946–8 and scholia) this happened to the famous orator Thucydides, who lost his case and was ostracized. Pliny, *Ep.* 6.2.2, tells us about a lawyer who used to paint a black circle round one eye (thus creating an evil eye) in order to confuse his opponent (see Heurgon 1968), and, indeed, Cicero tells us that one of his opponents, the elder Curio, in the middle of a trial *subito totam causam oblitus est idque veneficiis et cantionibus Titiniae factum esse dicebat* 'suddenly forgot his plea and blamed this on the sorcery and charms of Titinia' (*Brut.* 217; *cf. Orat.* 129). And he adds explicitly, what in the other accounts may be implied, that Curio's sudden dumbness 'roused fits of laughter of those who scorned him' (*cachinnos inridentium commovebat*).

This should suffice as an evocation of the drastic effects of such sudden deficiencies. For the victim it is not only a matter of losing his case but also of losing his face, and one may well wonder which of the two mattered most. As there are two parties involved, there are two sides of the medal. To quote Juliet du Boulay (1974:76), 'to "make a fool of" someone is an effective way of enhancing one's own ego and of damaging that of another, a fact which creates a situation in which everyone is continually on the look-out against a possible cheat or leg-pull.'[79]

78 'What, may we ask, was the real reason for Apollonius' acquittal? We cannot be sure:' thus Engelmann 1975:54, and with the inference that the presence of numerous strangers may have intimidated the accusers. He has Euripides (*CAF* fr. 67) on his side: 'Whenever anyone stands opposite in the debate and is about to speak at a trial for homicide, fear paralyzes the mouth of men and prevents the mind from saying what it wants to say.'

79 *Cf.* 182: 'The motivation behind mockery is chiefly the desire to increase personal reputation, and a sense of self-esteem, at the expense of another's.'

Precisely this mentality, but entailing more fatal effects, finally, is the one implied in curses against venatores, gladiatores, athletes and jockeys, including their horses. Detailed lists of limbs that must be broken, sinews that must be twisted, added to a rich repertoire of stumbling, falling, being dragged, being bitten, are of course very convenient tools to secure the victory of the authors and prevent that of their opponents. But here too there is an additional effect: the flagrant humiliation of the rival before a large audience, which, like modern soccer fanatics, was yearning for loss of limbs *and* face.[80] Again *Schadenfreude* seems to be naturally involved. And I am happy to be able to substantiate these at first sight perhaps somewhat suggestive and presumptive evocations. For everything that I have been suggesting so far is expressed in a most explicit manner in a series of curses from the Agora at Athens from the mid-3rd century AD. It is a group of nine curses, published by David Jordan (1985),[81] the first five concerning wrestlers, the sixth a runner, and the remaining three—a bit out of character here—pairs of lovers. Seven of them contain (different variants of) a formula directly relevant to our issue.

No. 1: 'I deliver to you Eutychianos (names of Demons) .... destroy the wrestling that he is about to do ... And if he does wrestle, I hand it over to you (names of Demons) in order that he may fall down and disgrace himself' (ἐὰν δὲ κα[ὶ] παλαίῃ, ἵνα ἐκπέσῃ καὶ ἀσχημονήσῃ). Large parts of this curse, including ἐκπέσῃ καὶ ἀσχημονήσῃ, are formulaic since they return in nos. 2, 3, 5, and even in the erotic 'Trennungszauber' no. 7, where the male partner 'must fall and disgrace himself'—which, despite the evidence brought together by Jordan, cannot *easily* be associated with the erotic context—and no. 9, which has only 'disgrace themselves.' No. 6 against a runner presents a nice variant: 'That he may not pass the starting line and that if he does he may veer off the course and disgrace himself' (ἐὰν δὲ κὲ ἐξέρχηται, ἵνα ἀπ[ο]κάμψῃ καὶ ἀσχη[μονήσῃ]).

Here, then, we have in explicit wording what, as I have argued, may have been commonly implied as a hidden agenda behind the stereotyped wishes that rivals in the amphitheatre may fall or veer off (in the very same terms as we have just quoted). The opponent must 'make a fool of himself' and thus suffer humiliation in his sad rôle as a laughing-stock of the public. As a matter of fact, in the curses belonging to amphitheatre and circus the detailed wishes of what must happen to the targets give the impression of a prolonged panning shot[82] with a theatrical effect. The

80 For besides the 'egoistic' motive of derision, there is another, simply put by Du Boulay's informants (182): ὁ κόσμος θέλει να γελάει 'people like to amuse themselves,' especially at the expense of another.

81 Gager (1992:50f.) quotes the first (his no. 3) in translation, rendering ἀσχημονήσῃ even more emphatically as 'let him make a fool of himself.'

82 I am using here an expression introduced by Richard Gordon in his forthcoming book, *Spells of Wisdom.* See also his contribution to the present volume.

cumulation of cruel mishaps and physical inflictions staged as a delightful public display cannot but call to mind the gladiatorial shows and public executions, especially those staged as theatrical performances, so characteristic of Roman penal practice of later antiquity. The *damnatio ad bestias* is a source of undisguised *Schadenfreude*, so for instance when the martyr Satyrus in the *Passio Perpet. et Fel.* 21 bleeds profusely, it elicits the valediction commonly given in the baths, *salve lotum* 'well washed.' So intense was the desire for *Schadenfreude* that the crowd in defiance of normal procedure demanded that 'the bodies of the martyrs be brought out in the open, so that their eyes could share the killing as the sword entered their flesh.' How much ancient people savoured brutal cruelty is attested in scenes from the amphitheatre in floor mosaics (in dining rooms!) and in the literary evidence. Nor did Christians keep aloof. In the final chapter (30) of his *De spectaculis*—a candidly sadistic evocation—Tertullian pictures his future joy and exultation at the sight of pagan kings, philosophers, actors and jockeys all being burnt in one eternal fire on Judgement Day: ... *cum tanta saeculi vetustas et tot eius nativitates uno igni haurientur. Quae tunc spectaculi latitudo! Quid admirer? Quid rideam? Ubi gaudeam, ubi exultem, tot spectans reges ... in imis tenebris congemiscentes?* '... when so many nations from all the past will be consumed in one fire. What a magnificent spectacle. How shall I gape in admiration? How shall I rejoice? Where shall I enjoy myself and exult, when I see so many kings ... groaning in the place of deepest darkness.'[83]

This element of collective derision has not gone unnoticed in recent scholarship. It is generally acknowledged that public punishment had a strong function of humiliation and derogation throughout antiquity.[84] In various studies George Ville has demonstrated that condemnations to the arena and the beasts were essentially intended as a *ludibrium*, a term which Paul Veyne translates as 'sarcasme:' 'supplices infligés par une collectivité qui rit à la figure du malheureux qu'elle lynche: ils sont sarcastiques; *le sarcasme accompagne ou constitue la punition*'[85] (my italics). These punishments combine in a monstrous blow-up the two aspects distinguished by Antonie Wlosok (1980) as the domains of 'Zorn' (anger) and 'Scham' (shame) in criminal law, the first applied in punishment as revenge, the second as punishment for infringements of the common code of behaviour. The latter involved what Cicero once characterized as the sole effect of the *nota censoria*: *nihil fere damnato obfert nisi ruborem* 'the main effect on the victim is a blush of shame' (*Rep.* 4.6).

83 I owe this reference to Johan Schreiner.

84 Usener 1900, Latte 1931:155ff., with examples of shameful pillory-punishment, and Fraenkel 1961.

85 Veyne 1983:16, *cf.* 21, with references to the work of Ville. Note that just as *ludere* means both 'to play' and 'to mock,' its Greek equivalent, παίζω, means 'to play' and 'to laugh:' Halliwell 1991b:282ff.

P. Veyne (1983) has collected a mass of evidence on these types of (public) censure, invective, blame-ritual, and charivari, often used as an instrument of or a defense against *invidia*. Graffiti, *carmina, libelli, convicium* were all embedded in an old tradition: as we saw, *mala carmina* were already forbidden by the Laws of the Twelve Tables.[86] He interprets this type of punishment (1983:16) as a demonstrative, collective, and above all sarcastic act of vituperation against the one who fancied that he could 'défier la conscience publique,' 'challenge the collective conscience.' More recently, Katherine M. Coleman (1990), to whom this paragraph owes much, has analyzed the penal functions of the Roman executions staged as public performances, referred to them as 'Fatal Charades:' besides retribution, correction, prevention and deterrence, humiliation has pride of place. She emphasizes the element of mockery in these forms of public punishment,[87] claiming that one purpose of humiliation was to alienate the victim from his entire social context, so that the spectators, regardless of class, were united in a feeling of superiority as they ridiculed the miscreant.[88]

In my opinion, all this is highly relevant with respect to the reactions of the audience at the discomfiture of the losers in circus and amphitheatre and also it may help to clarify a somewhat neglected aspect of the *defixiones* discussed in the beginning of my paper. As we have seen above, curses that wish harm to an evildoer often express the wish that the author may *watch* the punishment being executed. For instance, the Strasbourg epode cited earlier ends with the wish ταῦτ' (*i.e.* in that abominable misery that I wish him) ἐθέλοιμ' ἂν ἰδεῖν, ὅς μ' ἠδίκησε. I would suggest that this is one of the motives (at any rate one of the effects) of a curious ritual at Knidos (Karia) as attested in a series of some dozen judicial prayers[89] by which thieves or other wrong-doers are subjected to divine punishment (κόλασις, τιμωρία), torments (βάσανοι), and are specifically inflicted with being πεπρημένοι 'burnt by fever.'[90] It is requested that 'the thief should return the stolen object (or that the slanderer should go up) to the temple of Demeter

86 Tupet 1976:166–8, with a discussion of how they worked.

87 As well as in permanently visible marks in the form of a tattoo: Jones 1987.

88 She aptly refers to the soldiers' mockery of Jesus as the best-known example. Synnøve des Bouvrie reminds me of the ludicrous passage in Apuleius' *Golden Ass* (2.32–3.12) where Lucius is deceived and led to think that he has killed three persons, after which he is publicly sentenced in the great theatre. It all appears to be a play of deception at the occasion of the festival for the god Risus. Yet the continuous roars of laughter of the public do evoke the realistic analogues in penal practice.

89 *DTAud* 1–13, *IKnidos* I 147–59 (II–I[a]?). Gager (1992:188–90, no. 89) quotes *DTAud* 1, 4 and 13 in translation. For an extensive discussion and interpretation of the series, see Versnel 1991, 1994.

90 For this interpretation—as against the certainly mistaken 'sold into temple slavery' as suggested by Newton and others—and its implications in the context of the Knidian curses see Versnel 1994.

ἐξαγορεύων,'[91] *i.e.* 'publicly confessing (his/her sin).' Here follows a relevant passage from *DTAud* 1 (19–28):

> ἀναβαῖ Ἀντιγόνη πὰ Δάματρα πεπρημένα ἐξομολο<γο>ῦσ[α] καὶ μ[ὴ] γένοιτο εὐειλάτ[ου] τυχεῖν Δάματρο[ς,] ἀλλὰ μεγάλας βασάνους βασανιζομένα.
>
> 'may Antigone, burnt by fire/fever, go up to Demeter and make confession, and may she not find Demeter merciful but instead suffer great torments.'

It appears that the public confession is at least as important as (probably more important than) the recuperation of the stolen object. The demand that the object be returned to the temple—not to the injured party—mirrors a closely related temple-ritual in tablets from England,[92] where it is often specified that the proprietor cedes to the deity his claims to property stolen from him. Obviously the chief desire is to see the culprit pilloried by his public confession in word and deed. This is further substantiated by the stipulation in one of the Knidian tablets (*DTAud* 4) that a slanderer must go up to the temple to confess his sin not alone but accompanied by all his relatives (μετὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἰδίων πάντων).[93]

I do not wish to question the fact that the whole ritual is also and not in the last place intended as a demonstration of the goddess's superior power, which one should not trifle with, as readers were warned in the confession *stelai*. As such it functioned as a deterrent *exemplum* and indeed was referred to in these very terms. But at the same time and through the very same procedure the sinner himself is publicly pilloried. His confession implies that he erred twice, not only by committing a crime against a fellow human but also by his lack of insight and faith in the nature of divine power. In the words of Apuleius *Met.* 11.15: *Videant irreligiosi, videant et errorem suam recognoscant* (Let the unfaithful see, let them see and admit their error). In a Greek 'translation,' this is precisely what the god Dionysos intended by leading the transvestite Pentheus through the streets of Thebes: χρήζω δέ νιν γέλωτα Θηβαίοις ὀφλεῖν 'I wish to make him the laughing-stock of the Thebans,' (Eur. *Ba.* 854). It is also precisely the humiliation that 'a certain Euphronius' was lucky enough to escape. Aelian (fr. 92i Domingo-Forasté, 89 Hercher)[94] tells us that

91 Once (in the curse quoted in the text) instead of ἐξαγορεύων we read ἐξομολο<γο>ῦσ[α] in the same sense.

92 Roger Tomlin (*TSMB*) has published 130 tablets from Bath and has collected thirty more from elsewhere in Britain (60f.). Moreover, there are about 140 unpublished curse tablets from Uley, many of them still rolled or fragmentary and likely to remain illegible, but surely of the same type. New findings continue to be published in the journal *Britannia*. Examples from Italy and Asia Minor: Versnel 1991:77–9, 83f.

93 Another interesting illustration is a judicial prayer from Bath, *TSMB* 114f., no.5, where it is wished that punishment in the form of damage to mind and eyes (*ut mentes sua(s) perd*[*at*] *et oculos su*[*o*]*s*) will occur 'in the temple' (*in fano ubi detina(t)*); *cf.* also 146f., no.31.

94 Cited at MacMullen 1997:79f.; my thanks to the author for permitting me to read the book before its publication.

this atheist was so severely ill that no physician could help. His friends took him to Asclepius, by whose advice he burned his atheistical books and applied the ashes to his chest. He was cured and 'his friends were instantly filled with great joy because he had not ended up made a fool of and dishonoured by the god' (τῷ μὴ ἐκφρησθῆναι ἐκφαυλισθέντα καὶ ἀτιμασθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτόν). Here then we recognize the same atmosphere as in the confession texts, and I have argued elsewhere that these last are precisely the type of public confessions that the injured authors of the Knidian tablets demand from their targets.[95] Incidentally, I would not be surprised if the *rubor* (blush of shame) that Cicero explained as the kernel of a certain kind of punishment may also glimmer through in πεπρημένος, the state of the culprits of the Knidian tablets when they publicly confessed their misdeed. Does 'being burned,' besides referring to a feverish ordeal inflicted by the god, also imply 'burning in shame,' a connotation which Latin *flagrare* certainly can have?[96]

The relationship of judicial prayers and confession texts is so close that elements intermingle, converging precisely in the common notion of exemplary punishment. A lead tablet, found in a well at Baelo, Spain, provides a splendid instance of judicial prayer (Bonneville, Dardaine, and LeRoux 1988, *AE* 1988:727):

1 *Isis muromem*
2 *tibi conmendo*
3 *furtu(m) meu(m) mi fac-*
4 *tu{t}o numini maes-*
5 *tati exsemplaria*
6 *ut tu evide<s>? immedi*
7 *o qui fecit autulit*
8 *aut (h)eres opertoru(m)*
9 *albu(m) nou(um) stragulu(m)*
10 *nou(um) iodices duas me<o?>*
11 *usu rogo domina*
12 *per maiestate(m) tua(m)*
13 *ut (h)oc furtu(m) repri-*
14 *ndas.*

The writer invokes the goddess Isis Myrionymos (? *Muromem*) and 'commits a theft to her' (*tibi conmendo furtum*). She is addressed as 'mistress' (*domina*) and asked *per maiestate<m> tua<m>* to pass sentence (*reprindere* for *reprehendere* 'to convict, pass judgement on') on this theft. All this is clearly in accordance with the

95 The juridical aspects: esp. Chaniotis 1997.

96 *Flagrare* in this sense: *LS flagro* II.B; *flagrans* B; *flagrantia* II; *OLD flagro* 5, *flagrantia* 3. Though *flagitium*, 'shame, disgrace, disgraceful act,' is very often associated with *flagrare* in Latin literature (see especially Usener 1900), they are not etymologically related: Walde Hofmann, *s.v.*

usual practice in judicial prayers and is closely similar to the prayer in the Amorgos curse, with which we opened this paper. However, one phrase is unique among the entire Latin evidence: *fac tuo*[97] *numini maestati exsemplaria*. It is paradoxical that the term *exemplarium* does not occur in any other Latin judicial prayer, but rather as a loanword in the Greek confession inscriptions from Asia Minor in the formula discussed above: 'I warn all not to disdain the gods, for he shall have the stele as warning (ἐξενπλάριον).' Moreover, the phrase *ut tu evide<s> immedio qui fecit autulit* 'that you publicly reveal (?) whoever did it, [whoever] stole it' recalls the phrase ἐς μέσον ἐνεκκεῖν in the text from Asia Minor that we have also discussed. This expression means 'to bring forward publicly' (*LSJ*) which fits in with the whole atmosphere of these texts, including the 'exemplary' function of the public exposure of crime and culprit. Incidentally, the term *exemplum* does occur once in a so-called Sethianic *defixio* (*DTAud* 142) which, however, is so mutilated that we do not know what the final line refers to: *ut omnes cog*[*n*]*osc*[*ant*] *exempl*[*um e*]*or*[*um*].

In sum, public exposure of a sin or misdeed by divine or human agencies naturally involves the humiliation and derision of the culprit, and sometimes this is emphasized in an explicit formulation. In one of the 4th-century epigraphical miracle stories of Epidaurian Asclepius (no. 4 Herzog) the god orders an unbeliever to sacrifice a silver sow as 'a testimony of her stupidity' (ὑπόμναμα τῆς ἀμαθίας), in another (no. 3 Herzog) a person who has mocked the ἰάματα of the god is first punished for his ἀπιστία by an illness which is only cured after his 'conversion.' However, henceforth his name will be Apistos. The notion ἀμαθία, for that matter, is a current term used to censure stupid unbelievers, nor are these the only Epidaurian inscriptions that punish sceptics with penalties that make them ridiculous.[98]

In the sphere of competition, derision plays an equally conspicuous role. The credo of a famous American base-ball coach, 'winning isn't everything, it's the *only* thing,'[99] is perhaps the most perfect translation of the famous Greek motto αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων 'always be the very best and superior to everyone else' (*Il.* 6.208, 11.784). Equally, in Greece the loser had a 'hateful homecoming, disgrace, and secrecy' (Pind. *Ol.* 8). 'He slinks in back alleys, shunning enemy eyes and nursing pain' (*Pyth.* 8). No wonder the loser is ridiculed in satirical literature, *e.g. AP* 11.82, 85.

97 The text has *tuto*, which according to P. Le Roux 'insiste sur la divinité à l'abri des maux et sur la croyance en sa perfection.' I cannot believe this is the correct interpretation, since *maiestas tua* is formulaic.

98 The material is collected at Versnel 1990:197 ff.; see also now LiDonnici 1995.

99 Vince Lombardi, as I learn from Segal 1984, where I found the other examples cited in this paragraph. However, it was not as bad as Lombardi might have it: B. Crowther (1992) gives a survey of *agones* where places other than the first were recorded and sometimes awarded prizes.

Deservedly or not, people exposed to public discomfiture and humiliation are by definition laughing-stocks. If the chief ingredient of malicious laughter is lack of respect, as Mediterranean anthropology abundantly shows, it is no less true that, according to a modern Greek expression, 'people like to laugh.' This implies that the mishap of another, especially if due to his own stupidity, is just in itself reason enough for a big laugh, quite irrespective of hidden social intentions. Demosthenes, 18.138, refers to the overt delight of Athenian juries in forensic vituperation. Numerous passages confirm that such delight was regularly expressed in outright γέλως (Halliwell 1991:293). In all we have now sketched a background against which we can get a deeper insight into the two major aspects of derogation discussed in this paper. The first represents the passive expectation expressed in the fear of being the target of derision as it was voiced in the curses that we discussed in the first part, including the appeal to gods not to tolerate that they will be made a laughing-stock themselves. The second concerns its active counterpart, namely the desire, be it inspired by lust for revenge or by motives of competition, to see another person manoeuvred into a disgraceful, hence ridiculous, position. Here the fruit of our enquiry may be that several types of *defixio*, correctly explained as basically agonistic in recent research, are even better understood if we also pay attention to the additional value of their (intended) effects. What the author of the Amorgos curse *feared* is now redirected into an additional objective of the curse: the rejoicing over the public misery of the opponent. Admittedly, in the earliest (5th- and 4th-century) Attic *defixiones,* displaying mere lists of names and simple instructions to bind the opponent, there is hardly a trace of a derisive overtone. Yet in the same period, Athenian courts roared with laughter at the discomfiture of litigants or there advocates, as we have seen. In the course of time, especially in the Roman period, the curses became more and more explicit, detailed and picturesque. And it is as if the motif of derision, implicit or explicit, increased in accordance. In the view of E.R. Dodds (1951:58; *cf.* n.45 *supra*), early Greek society valued honour and shame more than anything else; it was a society in which 'anything, which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose face," is felt as unbearable.' However, in the fifty years since the publication of his seminal study we have learned that this mentality is by no means restricted to archaic Greece, but is typical of both Greece and Rome (and other Mediterranean cultures), ancient and modern. The author of a recent book (Lendon 1997) even qualifies imperial Rome as an 'Empire of Honour.' From this perspective, then, the line of interpretation suggested in the present paper may deserve some consideration.

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