Edith Foster

Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism

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In this book, Edith Foster compares Thucydides' descriptions of the Peloponnesian War in books one and two of the *History* with the arguments about warfare and war materials offered by the Athenian statesman Pericles in those same books. Thucydides' narratives emphasize the passions that motivate aggressive warfare and show that it is frequently unproductive or counterproductive. By contrast, Pericles' speeches demonstrate that he shared with many other figures in the *History* a mistaken confidence in the power, glory, and reliability of warfare and the instruments of force.

Foster analyses Thucydides' presentation of the events that led up to the war, and his presentation of Pericles' character in book one, before studying the evidence from Pericles' speeches. The contrast between the historian and his subject shows that Pericles does not speak for Thucydides, and that Thucydides should not be associated with Pericles' intransigent imperialism. On the contrary, books one and two of the *History* lead the reader to an analytical view of the complicated history, character, and effect of a man who was entirely dedicated to Athens' imperial potential.

Edith Foster is assistant professor of history at Ashland University in Ohio. She has contributed articles to the *American Journal of Philology*, *Humanitas*, and *Academe*, and has published book reviews in *Classical Philology, Bryn Mawr Classical Reviews*, and *Gnomon*. She is the co-editor, together with Donald Lateiner, of *Thucydides and Herodotus: Connections, Divergences, and Reception*.

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EDITH FOSTER

Ashland University, Ohio

For My Father

Contents

Acknowledgments

Moral support is of course also crucial. For this I would like to thank in the first place my husband, David Foster. As for my father, to whom this book is dedicated, no support could be of longer duration, or more loyal.

List of Abbreviations

CT	*A Commentary on Thucydides,* Simon Hornblower. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1991–2008.
HCT	*A Historical Commentary of Thucydides,* Arnold Wycombe Gomme, Antony Andrewes, and Kenneth James Dover. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1959–1981.
OCRST	Oxford Classical Reading Series: *Thucydides.* Jeffrey Rusten, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
Poppo	*Thucydidis De bello peloponnesiaco, libri octo.* Ernestus Fridericus Poppo. Leipzig: Teubner. 1875–1886.
TAI	*Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism.* Jacqueline de Romilly; translated by Philip Thody. Oxford: Blackwell. 1963.

Introduction

This book compares Thucydides' presentation of warfare and war materials in the narrative portions of his *History* to Pericles' statements about Athenian warfare and war materials in the *History*. It argues that Pericles is an historical character in Thucydides' *History*, and that Thucydides does not share his views, but composed Pericles' speeches to display Pericles' character and views to the reader; moreover, it argues that Thucydides carefully introduced and surrounded Pericles' speeches with contrasting narrative illustrations.

One important reason to review the relationship between the two is that Thucydides is frequently identified with Pericles' intransigent imperialism. Many scholars hold that Pericles speaks for Thucydides, or that Thucydides was dependent on Periclean ideas.[1] Many hold that after Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides rewrote his *History* to

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[1] *TAI* 119: "[Thucydides'] work appears as totally dominated by Pericles' ideas" (cf. 110–155 passim). Finley (1942) had argued previously to de Romilly that Pericles spoke for Thucydides, especially in the Funeral Oration. Their view was typical of their age. Bayer (1948) 57 writes of "…the historian's self-immersion in the eternal validity of the Periclean accomplishment…" (…das Sich-Versenken des Historikers in die ewige Gültigkeit des perikleischen Werkes…), and Chambers (1957) lists a large number of similar views. These ideas were taken up (to give some examples) in Westlake (1968) 23–42, Edmunds (1975a) e.g. 41, Pouncey (1980) e.g. 36, Connor (1984) e.g. 50, Kallet-Marx (1993) e.g. 116–117, Dewald in *OCRST* 114–147, Balot (2001) e.g. 172–178, Wohl (2002) e.g. 31, 70–71, and Sonnabend (2004), and are represented in *CT* and *HCT*. The tone of scholarship has changed little. Wade-Gery in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1948 edition p. 904, 1970 edition p. 1069): Thucydides "had for Pericles a regard comparable to Plato's for Socrates, and an equal regard for Pericles' Athens." Sonnabend (2004) 76: "Perikles is painted in an idealising way similar to that used by the great historian, Theodore Mommsen, to paint Julius Caesar" (Der Perikles ist ähnlich idealisierend verzeichnet, wie es später der große Historiker Theodore Mommsen mit Iulius Caesar gemacht hat). Scholars have also argued the other side, however. Cf. e.g. Strasburger in *OCRST*, Flashar (1989), Rood (1998) 205–208, Pelling (2000) 90–105, Stahl (2003).

justify Pericles' policies.[2] Others argue that the first part of the *History* displays devotion to Periclean imperialism, but that the latter part of the book shows disappointment with this ideal.[3] All of these arguments condemn Thucydides to a longer or shorter association with Pericles' fundamental chauvinism: an attitude that Athens deserved to rule whatever lands and peoples she had won through acquisitive warfare. The ethical implications of this association have not gone unnoticed, and Thucydides has been associated not only with Pericles' imperialism, but also with his materialism.[4] Well-known scholars argue that Thucydides' monetary interests in Thrace made him a partisan of Periclean politics, or more broadly, that Thucydides was a defender of Athenian greed.[5]

[2] The view that Thucydides rewrote the *History* to defend Pericles is defended in *TAI* and many other standard sources. Cf. e.g. Westlake (1968) 23–42, Pouncey (1980) 80–82, or Kallet-Marx (1993) 204. For an overview of the origin and development of this argument, and a concise description of its effect on the scholarship, cf. Stahl (2003) 18–23. The idea originated with and has a long history in the German scholarship. It began with Ullrich (1846), was continued in Nissen (1889), Schwartz (1919), Vogt in *OCRST*, and most recently strenuously argued in Will (2003). This view has also had strong detractors. Cf. Strasburger in *OCRST*, Busolt [1902] (1967), or Stahl himself.

[3] Connor (1984) 27 wrote that the Archaeology argues for "the significance of … naval might and financial reserves in military matters, and of imperialism as a source of power and greatness" (cf. 28, 34, 47, 49), but that Thucydides shows a failure of imperialism and imperial materialism both at the end of the Archaeology and in the books on the Sicilian expedition (cf. 63, 74–75, 103, 161). This compromise position has stood since then. Cf. e.g. Kallet (2001) 3: "Earlier in the History, especially in books 1 and 2, the historian sets out to demonstrate the essential role of money in the creation of naval *arche*, to foster a positive reading of the notion of expense (*dapane*), and to imply the unprecedented success under Pericles of combining *periousia chrematon*, 'financial surplus,' *gnome*, 'acute judgment,' and leadership; in the last three books he systematically shows the dismantling or unraveling of this process" (cf. 24–25). Balot (2001) e.g. 166 and Wohl (2002) e.g. 71 see a similar division.

[4] The view that Thucydides is to be associated with immoral imperialism is expressed in a typically pithy way by Momigliano (1960) 59–60, who shares the view that Pericles speaks for Thucydides. "…the implicit conclusion of Pericles (Thucydides) is that the immorality of the Athenian empire is to be accepted and defended because it is related to the glory of sea-power" (cf. 66). For a comprehensive overview of the scholarship on Thucydides and Periclean imperialism, cf. W. Nicolai (1996).

[5] Will (2003) 224: "According to his ancestry Thucydides belongs among Pericles' enemies, namely among those who represented an oligarchical and conservative view. His interests in the northern border regions of the Athenian empire will have brought about his change of opinion and his approval for Athens' imperial politics…" (Seiner Herkunft nach gehört Thukydides ins Lager der Feinde des Perikles, in dasjenige der Vertreter einer oligarchish-konservativen Richtung. Thukydides' Interessen in den nördlichen Grenzregionen der attischen Arche werden seinen Kurswechsel und die Billigung der imperialen Politik Athens bewirkt haben…). Cf. also Balot (2001) 176: "Thucydides regretted Athens' increasing lack of prudence, but he also admired the products of its well managed imperialism. His *History* is in some sense a memorial to the glorious edifice whose foundations were Athenian greed."

A closely related point of view argues that Thucydides' attachment to Pericles made him incapable of assessing Athenian materialism.[6]

I argue that it is possible to separate Thucydides' views from Pericles' views, and that Thucydides wrote the *History* partly in order to show the price of Periclean materialism and imperialism. An analysis of the contrasting meaning of warfare and war materials for Thucydides and Pericles offers one way to capture the difference between the historian and the character he created. The contrast is easiest to understand in respect to weapons. In Thucydides' presentation, weapons have no intrinsic glory but are evaluated in each successive situation. Their use and the consequences of their deployment can be positive (e.g. the Greek navy fends off Xerxes). However, Thucydides emphasizes stories in which the aggressive deployment of armed force is unproductive or even counterproductive.[7] By contrast, in writing up Pericles' speeches, Thucydides showed that he shared with many other actors in the *History* a mistaken confidence in the power, significance, and glory of the instruments of force.

The present study therefore elucidates the contrast between Pericles' hopes for Athenian warfare and Thucydides' analysis of warfare. Thus, for instance, the introduction to Thucydides' *History* (commonly called "the Archaeology") shows that improving weapons make the human drive to expansion increasingly powerful and destructive. Hopes for profit and empire ensure that the greater destructiveness of warfare does nothing to discourage armed conflict; on the contrary, the Pentekontaetia, that is, Thucydides' account of the approximately fifty years between the defeat of the Persian invasion and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, shows that Athenian warfare against both Greeks and non-Greeks vastly accelerated once Athens had proved the power of her navy in the Persian Wars.

Athens thus found herself in an historical situation that was new to her, but not to the history of Greece as Thucydides tells it in the

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6 Hornblower (1987) 174: "Personal prejudice – the spell of Pericles and the nostalgia for Pericles induced by the experience of his less stylish successors – stood between Thucydides and a correct assessment of the moment at which *pleonexia*, which had been there from the Periclean period, and indeed from 479 and the beginning of the empire, began to have effects which would be fatal."

7 In the first sections of the *History*, we find, for example, the stories of the conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, the Athenian siege of Potideia, and of the Theban and Spartan attacks on Plataea, all stories in which substantial resources were invested to little or no gain for the aggressor, and in general Thucydides' account of the stalemated first years of the war; in the latter sections of the *History*, we read most famously the story of the Athenian expedition to Sicily.

Archaeology: an acme of wealth and weapons increased both Athens'
power and also her defensive capacity, and caused the aggressive pur-
suit of further acquisition. In response to this aggression, fear, hatred,
anger, and a desire to resist dominated Athens' enemies. The progress
toward the Peloponnesian War (as we call it) is tragic and its result is
destructive, a fact Thucydides vividly and repeatedly records.

Pericles shares, supports, and creates the passions that led to the war.
I shall therefore argue that however great Pericles' political insights may
have been, and Thucydides was the last person to deny Pericles' talents
and the first to record and praise them, Thucydides was not an expo-
nent of Pericles' materialistic imperialism. Rather, Thucydides' speak-
ers, Pericles included, illuminate Thucydides' narrative explanations
by demonstrating the responses of characters imbedded in the action.
Here we see human beings fully under the power of the passions their
situation has produced. In the speeches, more and less impassioned
speakers boast about their navy (Corcyra), suppress mention of their
navy (Corinthians), fearfully list the ships, money, and resources of the
Athenians (Archidamus), disqualify those same resources (Sthenelaidas,
Corinthians at 1.121–122), or list, explain, and glorify Athens' war mate-
rials (Pericles). The reader is called upon to understand and assess their
words in the context of the narrative of events. Since the narrative con-
sistently shows that the fate of weapons and armies deployed in warfare
is unpredictable, and that the deployment of armed force generates
opposing unpredictable deployments, we are entitled to ask how this
lesson reflects on those speakers in the *History* who advertise aggressive
warfare as the means to greatness.

Thus the relation of speech and narrative is at the core of the analysis
offered here. As was stated above, this book analyzes Thucydides' narra-
tive treatment of warfare and war materials, and Thucydides' Pericles'
treatment of these same topics in his speeches, so that the two can be
compared.

In order to achieve the closest possible description of the juxtaposi-
tion between the author and his Pericles, this volume offers a reading of
books one and two of Thucydides, up to and including book two, chap-
ter 65, which contains Thucydides' famous assessment of Pericles' lead-
ership. The decision to proceed in this way originates with the intention
to argue against the widely accepted view that the initial sections of the
History differ from the post-Periclean sections in that they show greater
approval for imperialism (cf. note 4). Moreover, Thucydides' presentation
of imperial materialism in the latter parts of the *History* is less

controversial, and in my view better understood. I cannot think of a scholar who would not accept the view that the Athenians succumbed to the temptations of imperialism for the sake of profit when they attacked Sicily. My aim is to describe Thucydides' portrait of the exemplar of this human weakness: an intelligent, devoted, and self-controlled leader who succumbed to a belief in the historical significance of Athens' empire and the armed force that made it possible.

The use of narratology in this reading follows the limited practice now customary among readers of the ancient historians.[8] Perhaps more important to explain, in reference to the present study, is the habit of reading references to material objects and elements of nature for their connections to the themes and plot of the narrative. In the following study, Thucydides' references to materials will be considered to have four main functions. First, and easiest, they characterize actors, as a material epithet might characterize the statue of a god. We might think of the linen robes and golden cicadas of the Athenian elders in 1.6.3. Second, and a bit more difficult, materials give clues to the nature of actions. In 2.2.1, Thucydides says that about three hundred Thebans entered Plataea at night "with weapons." The information provided in Thucydides' references to the weapons and the time of day allows us to conclude that this is an invasion, that is, to make inferences about the nature of the action in progress.

Third, references to materials respond to the reader. A very brief comparison to Herodotus is perhaps useful for understanding this point. The breadth of Herodotus' references to materials corresponds to the breadth of his account, and the objects he names and describes frequently respond to the reader's interest in religion and mythology, for instance, as well as in events. By contrast, Thucydides meets the reader's knowledge and interests by supplying illustrations that are drawn from a familiar and limited set of material references he repeatedly employs, and which corresponds in its limitations and thematic intensity to his focus on a single war. Despite the demands of this focus, Thucydides appeals to a humble and attentive reader.[9] An assumption that he shares a Periclean disdain

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[8] On the promise and problems of applying narratological methods to reading ancient history, and Thucydides in particular, see Hornblower (1994) 131–166, Rood (1998) 294–297, and Scardino (2007) 126–154.

[9] Thucydides' conscious strategies for creating a relationship with the reader have received important attention in recent scholarship. Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 63 (on the Archaeology): "…particularly worthy of mention is the creation of a relationship between the author and his readers that arises when the reader, as the author intends,

for the ordinary, the agricultural, the improvised, the traditional, or other such categories blinds us to the values of a narrative that repeatedly illustrates how the "modern" weapons characteristic of the Greeks' post-Persian War acme of wealth destroy both themselves and the stable values of Greek life.[10] Fourth, and as is implied in the main topic of this book, both the narrator's and the speakers' references to materials reveal their priorities, and these will be compared throughout the analysis.

One last point on reading references to materials: a crucial discipline for reading these references adequately is respect for the limitations imposed by the narrative context. As an example of the difficulty that ignoring the narrative context can cause, I provide the following description of the war materials referenced in the Archaeology: "En effet, la *flotte* permet le commerce. Le commerce apporte des *revenus.* Les revenues donnent naissance à un *trésor.* Le trésor, d'autre part, est lie à la *stabilité*, laquelle entraine l'éxistence des *remparts.* Et ces trois termes, flotte – trésor – remparts, permettent alors à un état d'en *grouper* d'autres, plus nombreux, sous sa domination, et d'acquérir la *force*" (1956A 261–262; her italics). (Thus the *fleet* enables commerce, and commerce brings in *revenue.* Revenue gives birth to a *standing reserve.* The standing reserve, for its own part, is related to *stability* such as implies the existence of *walls.* And these three terms, "fleet – standing reserve – walls," make it possible for a state to *gather* other more numerous states under its domination, and to acquire *force.*)

In this analysis, part of an important and much larger argument, de Romilly abstracts references to materials from their narrative context and builds a description of Thucydides' argument based on these abstracted references. Her description is vivid, but constructs a reliability of material resources that is ultimately unthucydidean (and therefore seems to agree with Pericles). For instance, a look at the Archaeology shows the stagnation in a continuous competitive struggle for survival of all naval powers except for Athens, whose failure, despite initial success, is the

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makes the results and methods of the author's investigation his own" ("…besonders ist die Herstellung einer Beziehung zwischen dem Autor und seiner Lesergemeinschaft zu erwähnen, die durch die erstrebte Aneignung der Forschungsergebnisse und der Methodologie des Autors durch den Leser entsteht"). Cf. Dewald (2005) 15–16.

[10] I have supplied no definition of war materials in Thucydides, nor is one possible. In Thucydides, any material can become a war material e.g. mud (e.g. 4.4.2), or sacred objects (e.g. 2.13.4–5). Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 42: "Under the concept παρασκευή Thucydides subsumes all material resources that can be useful in the framework of a war" ("Thukydides subsumiert unter den Begriff παρασκευή all materiellen Mittel, die im Rahmen eines Krieges von Nutzen sein können"). Cf. Allison (1989) 28–44.

subject of the *History*, and the survival of Sparta, which has no walls or navy and little money: the materials de Romilly mixed into a recipe for power are interrogated in Thucydides' historical analysis and found to be consistently destructive of long-term stability.[11] Close observation of the narrative context is therefore essential for reading and assessing Thucydides' references to materials. This is perhaps particularly true of references to war materials, which carried great emotional resonance for Thucydides' original readers, so that Thucydides was able to deploy his references to maximum rhetorical effect. The eternal reader (cf. 1.24.2) can recover this effect through close attention to the plot and consequences of Thucydides' narratives.

A final remark: this book is not an argument about Greek history per se, but about Thucydides' thought and writing. An important consequence of this is that the argument deals with Thucydides' Pericles, not the historical Pericles. Therefore it does not refer to sources such as later historians or epigraphical remains. On the other hand, since Herodotus was influential for the formation of Thucydides' view of the meaning of war materials and style of employing them in his narrative, references to Herodotus will be frequent; references to Homer constitute more tentative suggestions.

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[11] Continuous references throughout the book will provide evidence of how much I have otherwise relied on de Romilly's insights, so that this example should not be taken to represent an entire argument, the importance of which could scarcely be overestimated.

1

War Materials and Their Glory in the Archaeology

The argument of Thucydides' Archaeology has often been cited as evidence that Thucydides and his Pericles shared a positive evaluation of imperialistic warfare.[1] It is certainly true that the Archaeology and Pericles' speeches treat many similar topics, warfare and imperialism among them. But is it equally true that Thucydides and Pericles agreed about these topics? Does the Archaeology, like Pericles in his speeches, display approval for imperial warfare and confidence in the value of imperialistic acquisition? In our approach to this question, we will pay

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[1] Readings of the Archaeology often come dangerously close to enforcing an association between Pericles and Thucydides. Edmunds (1975a) 41 emphasizes the view that Thucydides and Pericles display a common materialism: "...here again in the case of *chremata* we see that Pericles' thought fits into an historical pattern already adumbrated by Thucydides himself. In the Archaeology, Thucydides traced the development of wealth and power from the earliest times in Hellas ... sailing was the source of wealth and power ... and the Athenian empire was based on *chremata* and the fleet ... Thus Thucydides presents Pericles as the statesman whose policy and military strategy follow from historical insight." (For a brief discussion of this quotation, see Chapter 6.) Other authors find much broader agreement between the historian and the statesman. *TAI* 119: "...does not the whole theory attributed to Pericles form the basis of Thucydides' own analysis? Is it not the same which inspires the Archaeology?" For further expressions of the view that the Archaeology and Pericles substantiate each other, cf. Connor (1984) esp. 47–49 and 160, Flashar (1989) 437, or CT 229 or 232. The implications of this view for our understanding of the *History* had long since been drawn. Bizer (1968) 41 (with 46–47) and Pouncey (1980) 49–50 both argued that the *purpose* of the Archaeology was to justify Periclean power politics. Enmeshed in this conclusion, Crane (1998) 7 argued that Thucydides' effort to write history ultimately failed when the insights won from the synthesis of the archaeology and Pericles' speeches could not explain events: "...I think it as at least as possible [i.e. as dying] that Thucydides simply stopped [writing] because events diverged from both the vision of history that he articulates in the Archaeology – according to which, Athens, with its sea power, financial reserves, and clear-eyed ruthlessness, should logically destroy its atavistic foes – and the synthesis between public and private interest that Perikles develops in all three of his speeches."

close attention to the role of Thucydides' references to the tools of imperialism and warfare in the Archaeology.

At the same time, we will remain mindful that war materials are not the Archaeology's exclusive focus. Swords, money, ships, walls, and other materials necessary for warfare are prominent in the Archaeology, which is a history of continuous conflict. However, they are by no means the only material illustrations of Thucydides' analysis. This chapter will also attend to the evidence Thucydides brought forward to characterize the successive peoples of Greek history. This evidence is various, copious, and striking, ranging from loin clothes and golden hair brooches to the graves of Carian pirates and the (imagined) future ruins of Athens and Sparta.[2]

The Archaeology is therefore a text rich in narrated materials. Furthermore, it offers guidance for assessing their role. The first and most important standard for judging the role of narrated materials in the Archaeology is offered by the lessons learned from Thucydides' account of ancient events. Thucydides' stories of Greek warfare, for instance, display the usefulness or uselessness of war materials in each successive case. Second, in chapter 10, Thucydides offers overt guidance for the interpretation of material remains and their humble or glamorous appearances, and this advice can help to guide our analysis. Finally, Thucydides' arguments about glory are very revealing of his evaluation of war materials.

This last standard may at first seem surprising. As we shall discuss, however, in the Archaeology, Thucydides shows that the materials of warfare and imperialism are a frequent focus of admiration and glory. He shows that earlier men glorified the iron swords of pirates, that later men (and their poets) admired Agamemnon's fleet, and that men of his own time, and of all times, overestimate Athens' power because of her imperial buildings. In the first two cases, Thucydides demonstrates that the weapons men admired were destructive of societal stability both for

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[2] While I do not pretend to have an adequate interpretation of every physical element and/or artifact in the Archaeology, no materials will be spurned and no passages will be considered digressions. The history of treating puzzling passages in the Archaeology as "digressions" begins (for us) with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who famously considered the characterization of the Spartans and Athenians in 1.6, with its information on hair brooches and loin clothes, to be a useless digression (Dion. Hal. *De Thuc.* 16). Against this view, see Erbse (1970) 52–54 and Luraghi (2000) 232–233: "…these sparse details that disturbed Dionysius can only be understood as a part of the communication between Thucydides and his audience…" Cf. Hornblower (2004) 308, who argues against accepting the disqualification implied in the term "excursus."

those attacked and also for those wielding the weapons. By showing the disparity between the glorification of iron swords or Agamemnon's fleet and their actual destructive effect on society, Thucydides confutes the delusion that these weapons are glorious. As for Athens' imperial buildings, as the cause of an eternal error about the power of Athens, they are symbolic of the persistence of the human addiction to glory. I shall argue that Thucydides' analysis of our admiration for these buildings is a sign that he himself took a cautiously distant attitude to Periclean beauty and its effects.

Thus there is a generous amount of direct and implied discussion of war materials in the Archaeology. In fact, Thucydides' discussion and assessment of the materials of Greek warfare begins in the first sentence of the *History*. After announcing that he has composed a report about the war between the Spartans and Athenians, Thucydides observes that at the beginning of the war both Sparta and Athens "had reached an acme in respect to their entire preparation for this war,"[3] and that the rest of Greece was gathering to support one side or the other (1.1.1). These two factors, the acme of materials and the movement (κίνησις) of all Greece, even of mankind, are defining features of the greatness of the war.[4] It will be one of the aims of this book to follow Thucydides' presentation of this acme in the initial narratives of the *History*, and to show that this presentation is more important for the structure of book one than we have usually thought.

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[3] This statement conflicts with oratorical descriptions of Sparta's poverty later in the *History* and has been questioned. Cf. Poppo, ad loc. 1.1.1: "The assertion seems controversial because of the things that Archidamus says at 1.80.3–4, but Krüger warns justly that the matter is rhetorically enlarged in Archidamus' speech" ("Res propter ea quae dicit Archidamus 1.80.3–4 controversa videtur, sed ibi oratorie rem in maius augeri recte monet Krüg"). Poppo seems to be saying that although Archidamus argues at 1.80 that Sparta has essentially no material acme, Archidamus is exaggerating, since his aim is to prevent Sparta from going to war with Athens. He might also have argued that Pericles' assertions about Spartan poverty in his first speech are equally rhetorical (cf. 1.141.3–5, 1.142.1, discussed in Chapter 4). Cf. 1.10.2, 1.18.1–2, and 1.19 for descriptions of Sparta's power from Thucydides' point of view.

[4] Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 30–31 and 42: "…the Archaeology is a study of the two interconnected phenomena that make up the concept of κίνησις [disturbance]. Thucydides explores the possibilities of the ξύστασις [gathering together] into a large war party, and the origination of a large and various collection of military resources (παρασκευή) in the previous history of Greece" (…die Archäologie [ist] eine Studie über die beiden unter dem Begriff κίνησις zusammengefügten Phänomene … Thukydides erforscht die Möglichleiten der ξύστασις zu einer großen Kriegspartei und des Zustandekommens einer umfangreichen παρασκευή in der bisherigen Geschichte Griechenlands]. Cf. Monoson (1998) 291.

The Greek acme of war materials is also central for the plot of the Archaeology, which begins its explanations with a description of the poverty of earliest Greece, and progresses through time and a series of weaker acmes before it arrives at a restatement and explanation of the culminating pre-Peloponnesian War acme in chapter 19:

> καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἡγοῦντο, κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν.

> And the Spartans led their allies without payments of tribute, seeing to it only that the allies managed their political affairs in a way that was useful to their own oligarchy. But the Athenians [led their allies], in time both taking ships from the cities, except the Chians and Lesbians, and also requiring all to pay money. And their individual resources for this war [i.e. the Peloponnesian War] were greater than their greatest strength when they flourished in an unimpaired alliance. (1.19)

Thus statements that Athens and Sparta had reached an acme of war strength frame the historical explanations of the Archaeology: the first sentence remarks that the Athenians and Spartans had achieved an unprecedented material acme, and chapter 19, which follows Thucydides' description of Greece's difficult ascent to prosperity, shows that this acme came about through the imposition of power in ways characteristic of the two great powers. The Spartan acme arose through enforcing political integration. The resources of the allies are available to the Spartans through decisions to prosecute interests common to the oligarchies. By contrast, the Athenians are said to lead by "taking ships" and "requiring payments." The disparity between the Spartan and Athenian acmes is clear: Athens deliberately takes resources from the allies; Sparta, by contrast, has a policy of not doing so. Thucydides reports both procedures, but does not argue that one is better than the other, stating only that each side has amassed greater resources than ever before.

In the sentence immediately preceding chapter 19, Thucydides explains how it was that each side came to be so strong at this particular time: continuous warfare since the Persian Wars had produced both war materials and military experience:

> καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ξυνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους … ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὰ μὲν σπενδόμενοι, τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἢ ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχοις

ἀφισταμένοις εὖ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μελέτας ποιούμενοι.

And the [Persian War] alliance held together for a short time, but once they had quarreled, the Spartans and the Athenians warred against one another with their allies … And thus since from the Persian Wars continuously until this war they were both inscribed in treaties, and also warring with one another or with their own revolted allies, they were well equipped and became more experienced in warfare, since they were practicing in dangerous conditions. (1.18.3)

The continuous internecine warfare of the pre-Peloponnesian War years contributed to the acme of power and military experience both cities achieved. As we have seen, readers have often concluded that Thucydides shared Pericles' admiration for this buildup and the applications of force for which it was used. However, it is important to ask in what way the acme contributes to the greatness of a war that is ultimately described as great not because of any achievement, but because of the length and intensity of its sufferings (1.23.1–3).[5] Is this acme of wealth and war materials significant for the achievement it represents, or for some further achievement it makes possible? Or does the conclusion of the Archaeology, with its emphasis on suffering, suggest that the acme is most significant for a negative reason, namely, its powers of destruction? The following analysis pays careful attention not only to the increasing size, but also to the character of the successive acmes of Greek history in the Archaeology.

The Rich Soil Paradox

Thucydides' account of the slow accumulation of Greek wealth begins with material deficits and builds to the acme of power that characterizes the age of the Peloponnesian War in 1.1 and 1.19. Thus the earliest peoples who lived in "the place now called Greece" are described according to the things they do not have. Beginning with the contention that the ancient peoples had no markets, Thucydides says that "each group domesticated its own holdings sufficiently to sustain life" and had no surplus of property or money (1.2.2). The early peoples did not plant trees or vines on the land, they lacked walls, and "they were not strong in respect to the size of their cities, or in any other preparation" (1.2.2). No markets, no secure communications, no surpluses, no long-lived

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[5] Cf. Connor (1984) 32.

plantings, no walls: sufficient food is the single material achievement of the early peoples.

Thucydides depicts this early society as unstable and violent. He states from the outset that the early peoples feared each other on land and sea (οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης) and argues that successive groups of attackers regularly overran every establishment (1.2.2). The violence was encouraged by easy success, since the anonymous peoples left their land easily (1.2.1, 1.2.2) and were replaced by successively larger groups.[6]

Thucydides lays most of the blame for the weakness of early Greece upon these constant migrations (cf. 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and 1.2.6). As he reports the situation, however, the migrating peoples themselves would not have shared his view that their situation was problematic. The reason they were easily unseated, he reports, was that "they believed they could win their necessary daily sustenance anywhere" (τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο 1.2.2).

The migratory peoples thought that they could change where they lived at any time, since nature would take care of their essential needs. Thucydides, on the other hand, provides evidence that this idea was mistaken and harmful. The violent behavior of the early peoples shows that in fact the "necessary daily sustenance" was not available just "anywhere," but rather only on rich land, where a group of people could grow or raise sufficient food for immediate consumption. Rich land was therefore the focus of the widespread warfare of early times. Thucydides argues that two central problems caused this warfare. Inside of a given group, some people who already possessed rich land became more powerful, and this caused internal strife or *stasis*. Second, those on the better land were more likely to be attacked from the outside by other tribes (1.2.4).

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[6] Indefinite pronouns (τις) prevail in 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and 1.2.4. They allow for no identification of any group. Thucydides' compressed presentation shows that numbers were the most important factor determining survival. Given that all were equally unarmed, numbers made for force, and force for possession, which could then be challenged by the next larger group on the horizon (1.2.1). Population was therefore simultaneously the most important offensive and defensive weapon of any group (cf. Poppo ad loc.). Nevertheless, the description is not biologically impersonal. Luginbill (1999) 38 is witty on this chapter: "Like so many colonies of bacteria, these proto-Greek groups follow the unseen, unconscious drive to expand." However, Thucydides seems to illustrate that the actions of the early peoples were not unconscious, but mistaken.

Thucydides' examples show that in his view the apparently easy-going attitude of the nomadic peoples ignored natural and political necessities. The cost of their error was enormous. Far from being effortless, the migratory lifestyle required the regular use of force. Only by forcibly removing or preventing others from inhabiting rich land could the more powerful or more numerous parties hope to get their daily subsistence easily. The continuous result of this attitude, and the violence it engenders, is the "soil paradox," according to which rich land results in warfare and poverty from warfare, not the expected easy living.[7]

Poor land, on the other hand, an apparent disadvantage, is in Thucydides' account a source of durable power. Although he does not say so, relatively infertile land presumably enforced long-term cultivation and steady cooperation in order to avert starvation. Attica is Thucydides' example of a society that benefited from acquiring the virtues enforced by poverty. Attica managed to escape weakness and achieve stability over many generations in early times. Attica was "without stasis because of the poor soil" (τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί 1.2.5). Attica also benefited from the instability of the rest of Greece. Because of its stability, rich exiles from strife in other cities made Athens their refuge and swelled the population with citizens (πολῖται 1.2.6).

In Thucydides' explanation of earliest Greece, poor land encourages behavior that causes stability, whereas rich soil encourages competition for an easier life and produces warfare, poverty, and (in comparison to Attica) stagnation.[8] We note that from the beginning of the Archaeology the materials of the world that appear attractive and might, if they were properly managed, help to furnish power actually promote instability and violence. This violence destroys the advantages that might come from rich land, so that the migrants who attack others for the sake of an easier living are poorer than those who never possess good land. Thus Thucydides' initial description of the relationship between the first development of peoples and the material conditions of life is an illustration not of the benefits, but of the prevalence and cost of acquisitive warfare.

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[7] Marshall (1975) 26–40 offers a detailed explanation of the "soil paradox," which useful phrase Marshall seems to have coined. As for the deleterious effect of rich soil on the human character, Herodotus' similar view should be brought to mind. For instance, he ends his history (cf. 9.122) with statements that would support the views Thucydides seems to be marking out here.

[8] Cf. CT ad loc. 1.2.4.

Minos

The first descriptions of the Archaeology depict humanity on land, and show that taking other people's land is an unreliable road to prosperity. Subsequent descriptions depict humanity at sea (cf. 1.3.4). After arguing the lengthy weakness and disunity of the Greeks in chapter 3, Thucydides begins a section (chapters 4, 5, 7, and 8) on piracy and its repressor, Minos, who made possible the first consolidation of Greek power. Piracy is the next development of the power to take other people's property by force, since it allows some people to take the produce of others without having to fight for land and afterward produce food. Nevertheless, the pirates, as we shall see, are comparative failures, reduced to poverty and strife by their chaotic plundering of every resource. Like the migrating peoples of chapter 2, their endless warring makes them poor. However, we must also be open to the possibility that these chapters contain a positive presentation of exploitative behavior, since in these chapters the drive to take the things of others characterizes everyone, including Minos of Crete who is by no means as great a failure as the pirates he expels. Does Minos provide a positive paradigm by which we can measure Thucydides' view of Athenian acquisitiveness, and perhaps Athenian naval power?[9]

Minos possessed the first navy.[10] He conquered, says Thucydides, the Hellenic Sea and was the first "founder" (οἰκιστὴς πρῶτος) of many Aegean islands, leaving his children to rule them (1.4). During this process, Minos chased the pirates, "as much as he could," from the seas, in order to monopolize the proceeds of the region for himself (1.4). Thucydides identifies his rewards as the more reliable income (πρόσοδος 1.4), whereas the rewards of piracy are profit (κέρδος 1.5.1).

How is it that Minos manages to prevail over the pirates? The pirates had emerged as a result of a single technological advance: the incipient use of boats, which could be deployed against the still unwalled cities of the early peoples:[11]

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[9] Minos is often thought of as the paradigm for Athenian sea power. Cf. e.g. *TAI* 67–68: "…it looks as if the form assumed by Athenian imperialism had brought the character of Minos to life simply because he could be seen as a forerunner." Cf. Finley (1967) 141: "Accordingly, when Pericles maintained and even extended the naval policies of Themistocles, he was, so to speak, reapplying the ancient secret of power which Minos and Agamemnon had used before him." Cf. Hornblower (2004) 316: Minos was "a mythical paradigm or prototype of the fifth century rulers of the sea."

[10] Cf. Hdt. 3.122.

[11] Although there is no distinction in Greek, I shall use the word "boat" to describe the early less developed seacraft, which Thucydides distinguishes from the later ships and triremes (cf. 1.10.4, 1.13. 2, 1.14. 3).

οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἵ τε ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ
παραθαλάσσιοι καὶ ὅσοι νήσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον
περαιοῦσθαι ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων
ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς
ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας
οἰκουμέναις ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο.

For in ancient times the Greeks and the barbarians who lived beside the
sea on the continent, and also those who possessed islands, when they
began to cross over to one another more commonly in boats, turned to
piracy. The most powerful men led them, both for the sake of their own
profit and also for the sustenance of the weak, and falling on cities that
were unwalled and inhabited in groups of villages, they plundered them
and got most of their living from this source. (1.5.1)

The unwalled cities easily fell to invaders with swift transportation.
This passage provides an example of Thucydidean irony: for the sake
of "nourishing the weak" the pirates fall upon unwalled villages.[12] The
defenseless are sacrificed for the weak, and the reader is left with the
strong impression that the generous aspects of piracy are less impor-
tant than the selfish ones. This conclusion is confirmed throughout
Thucydides' presentation of the piratical lifestyle, which is character-
ized with verbs that refer to violence and plundering. We note "they
plundered" (ἥρπαζον 1.5.1), and especially "they robbed one another"
(ἐλήιζοντο … ἀλλήλους 1.5.3) and "they plundered one another"
(ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους 1.7), which specify the reciprocity of banditry
among the pirates themselves.

The continuous disorganization these habits created is opposed to
Thucydides' presentation of Minos's ability to organize: in the short
term, Minos forms a navy, and in the long term, he founds a dynastic
hegemony. It is relevant to note that Minos and the pirates have essen-
tially the same boats to use. Technical improvements in boats and naval
warfare come much later in time (cf. note 11). Thucydides therefore
attributes Minos's preeminence to a superiority of organization, not
materials. His advantage is not that he has boats, since the pirates have
these as well, but that he is able to gather and organize these boats to
act in unison as a navy. They are therefore much more useful for the
warfare Minos wages for the sake of the profit to himself and his fam-
ily. Thucydides devotes some narrative attention to Minos's intelligent
and successful project, which was prosecuted in a chaotic world. Does

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[12] An example of the juxtaposition of precise references (*akribeia*) to produce a rhetorical
effect.

Thucydides' interest in Minos extend to admiration for his more orga-nized exploitation of others? This is our question.

Let us work toward answering this question by showing that Thucydides cannot be identified with those who admire piratical violence. After this, we will address the question of Thucydides' attitude to Minos.

Thucydides makes it clear that piratical taking was admired by many. As we saw, he writes that the pirates fell on the unwalled villages and got most of their living that way. He concludes this sentence by saying that the deed did "not hold any disgrace, but even carried some glory" (οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον 1.5.1).[13]

The sentence is phrased to indicate that the reader might be surprised to find out that piracy found so much approval.[14] Indeed, Thucydides writes as if we might not find this claim of piracy's glory credible, since in the next sentences he offers three successive proofs that piracy was considered glorious. First of all, he argues, in his own time there were still people who were pirates and proud of it (1.5.2). Second, he pro-vides a story about the ancient poets. He relates that they used to ask "everywhere in the same way" whether those sailing in were pirates, and asserts that the pirates were in no way embarrassed to tell about their deeds.[15] On the contrary, they thought it was a poet's business to know about such affairs (1.5.2). Finally, Thucydides also offers the remark that the descendants of some pirates had continued the habit of wearing iron swords (1.5.3). The symbol of piracy was thus a welcome sign of piratical descent for those generations who no longer practiced piracy, but wanted to remember that their ancestors had done so.

The pirates' poets and descendants memorialize piratical glory. And, just as he had previously shown that the attitudes of the migratory peo-ples were dangerously mistaken, Thucydides now gives evidence that an

[13] Cf. Herodotus' description of the Thracians at 5.6. They consider the most honorable life, he says, to be a life of plunder and warfare.

[14] Thus, for instance, the first clause of this antithetical statement suggests a criticism of piracy (it is shameful), and the second clause answers this criticism (definitely not to the pirates' contemporaries). Cf. Rusten (1989) 24–25 for a fuller taxonomy and useful discussion of Thucydidean antitheses.

[15] Note the parody of the unintelligent uniformity of the poets' interest in piracy at 1.5.2: καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν… (And the ancient poets inquiring in same way of those sailing in everywhere whether they were pirates…), which perhaps reflects Thucydides' view of the limitations of Minoan (i.e. Homeric) society, in which the very practices that kept it poor were most admired. Cf. Marchant (1891) ad loc.

heroic view of piracy imagines a glory that never was. He depicts the reality of life with iron swords: all Greeks had carried swords in those days, he argues, just like barbarians, because of the dangerous conditions (1.6.1). There was nothing glamorous about this; on the contrary, piratical violence had created a state of permanent insecurity. The pirates, like the earlier nomadic peoples, suffered from "indefensible homes" (ἀφάρκτους οἰκήσεις) and "dangerous access to one another" (οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους) (1.6.1). In short, the violent practices enabled by boats and iron swords caused a lifestyle of continuous fear and isolation.

According to this analysis, when the pirates' descendants wear swords, they are indulging in a poetic daydream. Thucydides himself can hardly be identified with the delusion he has just exposed, and in the Archaeology the piratical daydream is shared only by the pirates' poets and descendents, and not by those who stand outside of the piratical culture and see it from the point of view of organized states. Thucydides reports that during the Peloponnesian War the Athenians purified the island of Delos by digging up all the graves. They found a majority of Carian burials "recognizable by the equipment of arms that was buried with them and by the manner in which they are still buried today" (1.8.1).[16] Those who interred the pirates presumably gave them the funerals they themselves wanted: the pirates buried each other with the swords and armor that were the signs of their glory. But neither Thucydides' Athenians, whom he writes up as reporting about these graves only the relevant anthropological facts, nor Thucydides himself, who in the next sentence calls the pirates common criminals (κακοῦργοι 1.8.2), see any glory in the graves at Delos. The Athenians have inherited Minos's task of policing the Aegean, and for them pirates are an inglorious nuisance.[17]

In sum, Thucydides shows that the pirates' claims to glory were mistaken in the first place. Their plundering was not a glorious achievement, but rather both the cause and the result of sordid poverty. Subsequently, their claims to glory were forgotten or ignored. The pirates fulfill a

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[16] Herodotus also portrays the Carians and related Phoenicians as pirates, cf. Hdt. 1.1.4, 2.54.1, 2.152.4, and Erbse (1970) 54.

[17] In the *History*, the Athenians and Spartans do police the Aegean somewhat, despite the war. Cf. e.g. 2.32 (the Athenians fortify the island of Atalanta in order to prevent pirates from plundering Euboia), 3.51 (the Athenian general Nicias fortifies Minoa, at Megara, partly to prevent piracy), and 4.53.3 (the Spartans defend Laconia from pirates who set out from the island of Cythera).

monitory role in the Archaeology: their hopes that the violent exploitation of others would lead to long-term significance were not fulfilled.

Thus Thucydides admires neither the pirates – whom he, in a rare explicit judgment, classifies with petty criminals – nor those who glorified their violent ways. Perhaps, however, he assesses Minos's more organized exploitation differently. Minos, as we have seen, was as greedy as the pirates. On the other hand, his longer view and better organization were beneficial for Greece. Since he founded cities as well as taking people's money, his expulsion of the pirates enabled better communications and more security:

κατασταντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλωιμώτερα ἐγένετο παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους (οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατῴκιζε), καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾤκουν, καί τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι· ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις.

Once Minos had established his navy, conditions were such that sailing to one another's lands was easier, for he made the evil doers leave the islands at the same time as he colonized many of them. And the people living by the sea, since they possessed more money, dwelled more securely, and some of them also built walls around themselves as they became richer. For the weaker peoples, because they desired profits, submitted to enslavement by the stronger, and the more powerful peoples, since they had surpluses, made the lesser cities subservient to themselves. (1.8.2–3)

Minos's navy creates the security that allows for communications and trade, and thus first shows the power of a navy to create order in the chaotic world of the Aegean islands. The result is a significant advance in material prosperity, as men become richer and amass capital.

However, the advance in security is simultaneously an advance in insecurity. Walls are the sign of this new situation. Thucydides had introduced the section of text we are analyzing with a statement that stressed their role and importance: "Such cities as were founded most recently and at a time when the people were already sailing more, [these cities] more frequently had surpluses of money, and so they were built right on the beaches, with walls, and each group blocked off the isthmuses both for the sake of the markets and for strength against their neighbors" (1.7.1).[18] Walls served simultaneously as aggressive instruments for the

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[18] τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα ᾠκίσθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωιμωτέρων ὄντων, περιουσίας μᾶλλον ἔχουσαι χρημάτων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τοὺς ἰσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανον ἐμπορίας τε ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προσοίκους ἕκαστοι ἰσχύος…

monopolization of trade and as defensive strongholds. They were not only a sign of prosperity, but also a defense against the more powerful and better-organized warfare of the Minoan era.

This warfare arose because each power used Minos's achievements as a basis for the acquisition of further profit.[19] The description of the Minoan age at 1.8.3 shows that the drive to acquisition required the forcible exploitation of others. Thucydides' language of slavery and domination is frank: the new wealth made some cities the masters of other cities, who were willing slaves because of the hope that they would someday themselves rise to a dominant position.

Arguments can be made that Thucydides' critical view of such arrangements is not difficult to detect. Let us begin with the weakest arguments: first, an argument *ex silentio*, on the issue of describing the Greeks as tolerant for mutual enslavement; and second, an argument that contrasts Thucydides' presentation of the Minoans to the Athenian popular view, as represented in the Theseus cycle. We shall build to the stronger arguments: an argument that explores the contrast between this state of enslavement to profit with Thucydides' description of Sparta and Athens and an argument, finally, that Thucydides' account of the Trojan expedition shows the self-destruction of the Minoan profit cycles.

First, the argument *ex silentio*. Thucydides' description of the Minoan period names no power but Minos. By this means, Thucydides avoids humiliating any particular Greek city: both Greek cities that enslaved others for the sake of profit and Greek cities formerly enslaved for the sake of profit remain unnamed. In the fifth-century world, such intercity relations as Thucydides describes in 1.8.3 were normally called alliances.[20] Thucydides' description rejects this euphemism, while at the same time leaving the particular political myths of each city untouched.

Despite this avoidance of naming, Thucydides' description of Minos's hegemony in the Aegean bears a strong resemblance to his description of the Athenian empire in chapter 19. Like Minos, the Athenians subordinated island powers in the Aegean and took money from these subordinates. The belief that Thucydides approved of the Athenian

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[19] On the unchanging psychology of the profit seekers of the Archaeology, cf. Stahl (2003) 24–25.

[20] Cf. the discussion of 1.96 in Chapter 3. As Athens falls back into this old-fashioned mode of alliance, Thucydides argues explicitly that Athenian enforcement of tribute payments, and the rebellions against this enforcement, began the "enslavement" of Athens' allies (1.98.4). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 66.

empire has therefore been important for our view of Minos in the Archaeology: if Thucydides approved of the similar Athenian empire (and he must have done so, since Pericles approves of the empire), he must have approved of Minos, so proceeds the chain of associations.[21] It is the aim of this chapter to avoid these circular arguments. I would like to suggest another possible reason for the similarities Thucydides constructs between Minos's hegemony and the Athenian empire. I suggest that Thucydides' description of Minos's achievements was intended to provoke reflection on the long-term consequences of the forceful exploitation of other states, rather than to build approval for Athens' empire.

In 1984, W. Robert Connor pointed out that Athenian memories of Minos's exploitation of Athens, immortalized in the Theseus mythology, were particularly dark.[22] In 1997, Sophie Mills gathered the evidence for Minos's reputation at Athens as "violent, cruel, unjust, and uneducated" (224; cf. Plato, *Minos* 318d–321a). The popularity of the subject would be hard to overestimate: for instance, plays on Cretan themes were written by all three iconic tragedians and Aristophanes.[23] Athens' subordination to Crete was a bitter memory, and as the early Platonic dialogue reveals, it was not hidden from every Athenian that this memory was determining his reputation at Athens. To quote Mills once again (224–225):

> In the Platonic *Minos*, Socrates himself seems to connect the characterization of Minos in tragedy with the Athenian image of Minos, judging it to be a distortion of the truth about the Cretan king which was designed merely to please mass opinion, since he asserts that tragedy is δημοτερπέστατον ("most enjoyable for the people"): "and in it we get Minos on the rack of verse and avenge ourselves for the tribute he made us pay." (*Min.* 321a)

Conveniently for public poets, Socrates implies, the Athenian People detests Minos, whose negative public image at Athens makes the positive

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[21] Cf. note 9.

[22] Cf. Connor (1984) 24.

[23] Mills (1997) 224–225. Relevant to our argument here is also the following remark: "The story of Theseus' triumph over the proto-tyrant of the Aegean ... must acquire a special relevance after the Persian Wars. In the fifth century, Crete lay outside mainstream Greek politics and culture, and it took no part in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.169–170), which were so important to shaping a common Greek identity and especially Athens' role as the leader of Greece. As the oldest enemy of Athens in myth, it can fittingly be portrayed as a place which represents what is foreign, different, and antithetical to the virtues which were held to be pre-eminently Athenian" (224). Cf. Rusten (1989) 142.

role Thucydides assigns to him all the more interesting. In chapters 4 through 8 of the Archaeology, Thucydides makes a strong argument that Minos benefited coastal Greece, Athens necessarily included. Thucydides' argument asks Athenian readers to agree that Minos's exploitation of Athens was the better way, since Minos offered Athens and the other cities the basic conditions under which they could begin to flourish. In other words, the Athenians should be grateful to Minos. Instead of remembering any kind of contribution, however, they remember his cruelty, and it seems possible that they were meant to apply this logic to themselves. Athenians able to compare Thucydides' account of Minos's accomplishments to their own lengthy resentment of Minos might realize that those who exploit others are hated for as long as their memory lasts, regardless of their organizational achievements.[24] As for readers other than the Athenians, they have had the opportunity over the course of the history to observe whether the allies were grateful for Athens' control of the Aegean.

Further support for the contention that Thucydides was not a partisan of the Minoan system of exploitation is provided by Thucydides' contrasting story of the growth of Sparta and Athens, and even more by his story of the Trojan expedition. These arguments are provided in the next two sections of this chapter. It is well to remember, however, that even in the chapters we have reviewed, Thucydides' account gives us no direct evidence for arguing that he admired Minos's acquisitive practices. He shows straightforwardly that his organizational accomplishments were great: Minos organized a navy, and through expelling the pirates and establishing longer-lasting political arrangements, created the security that enabled communications and trade in the Aegean. These were important accomplishments. But the profit motive that dominates the psychology of all parties in the Minoan Age also produced much less desirable results. Minos's victory affords protection against the pirates, but does not defend the walled powers of the Aegean against each other.[25] Even at this point in the argument, it is possible to predict that competitive warfare will overwhelm the minimal security Minos was able to provide.

In summation: we have argued that Thucydides cannot be identified with those who admired piratical taking. Nor have we found any

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[24] It is worth noting proleptically that Minos's notoriety at Athens contrasts to the claims of Pericles' last speech, in which Pericles argues that hatreds are ephemeral, but glory is eternal (cf. 2.64.5).

[25] Cf. Crane (1998) 140–141.

evidence that Thucydides admired Minos's exploitation of others, as such.[26] On the contrary, Thucydides makes it possible for us to accept that Minos was better than chaos, without inspiring us, at the same time, to admire the focus on acquisition that compelled his world to remain so violent. For as Thucydides' explications of the Trojan expedition, the acme of the Minoan Age, will also show, the world of competitive acquisition, in which all are enslaved to profit, is not only unattractive, but inherently unstable and self-destructive.

Athens and Sparta

Before discussing the fate of Thucydides' Minoan profit seekers, it will be well to turn to the descriptions of Athens and Sparta that Thucydides inserted into his discussion of the pirates and Minos.[27]

Thucydides discusses the Athenians first. Once again, we find that characterizing materials describe the new situation. The Athenians were the first to put down "the iron" of the pirates, writes Thucydides (1.6.3).[28] This symbolic turn away from rapaciousness is illustrated not with images of decent poverty, as we might expect from Thucydides' introduction to Athens at 1.2.6, but with a description that emphasizes a display of wealth, leisure, longevity, and Athenian pride. Evidently, the stable Athenian life in Attica (cf. 1.2.5–6) has achieved for Athens what all the generations of plunder could not achieve for the pirates.

The iron swords had symbolized the power to kill. As a contrast, Thucydides shows long-lived Athenians who wear golden cicadas in their ornately coiffured hair, and complete their habit with the linen robes of decorous leisure:

[26] A standard analysis of the Archaeology argues that the Archaeology justifies the use of violent power. Cf. e.g. Pouncey (1980) 49–50: "Historical change [in the Archaeology] takes place along a continuum of aggression, beginning with the first bandit, and rising to the concerted and organized violence of an empire. By extension, therefore, we seem to have sketched out in advance the outlines of a justification of the Athenian empire, and so far there seems to be nothing defensive or ambivalent about it: concentrations of power, after all, constitute the 'greatness' of the historian's theme." The implication of this analysis is that Thucydides identifies the exercise of force with greatness.

[27] Chapters 4 through 8 of the Archaeology discuss Minos and piracy, and in between these chapters, chapter 6 describes Athens and Sparta. The chapter has therefore often been thought of as an excursus. But cf. note 2 and the explanations of Erbse (1970) 52–53.

[28] Thucydides' thematic of iron, iron swords, and violence is restricted to social psychology. In Herodotus, iron swords could symbolize the divine. Cf. Herodotus' description of the Scythians' sacrifice of defeated enemies to an iron sword (thought to symbolize Ares) at 4.62.1–4.

ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν· ἀφ' οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἐπὶ πολὺ αὕτη ἡ σκευὴ κατέσχεν.

Meanwhile the Athenians first put down the iron and turned to a more luxurious lifestyle. And the wealthy elders among them, because of their luxuriousness, not long ago ceased to wear linen tunics and to bind a knot of the hair on their heads with a fastening of golden cicadas: from which [custom] this same costume prevailed among the elders of the Ionians for a long time, since they are related. (1.6.3)

By contrast to the poverty and insecurity of the piratical cultures, the Athenian elderly are not only safe and healthy, but actually spoiled. Moreover, Thucydides' picture of the early Athenians is antithetical not only to the violence of the piratical cultures, but also to their migratoriness. The golden cicadas, signs of Athenian autochthony, represent a claim to a stability of habitation so reliable that it is conceived of as organic.[29] We will note proleptically that the fertility of the land suggested by the cicada symbol (which advertises the power of the soil to produce even human beings) is sharply opposed to the barren and hostile natural world with which the Archaeology ends (1.23.3–4).

The golden cicadas and long linen robes also display that the Athenians are members of the aristocratic Mediterranean elite, among whom strict class differences were the norm.[30] Their wealth does not come from farming Attica, but from international trade with the old established powers of the Mediterranean. Not they, but the Spartans, are the first Greeks to show moderation. Inside their city, the Spartans abjure displays of wealth and turn to a display of equality:

μετρίᾳ δ' αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν.

[29] This Athenian view is not Thucydides' view. At 1.2.5–6, Thucydides had explained that Attica's poor soil was the root cause of Athens' stability, thus exposing the claim of autochthony to explanatory demystification. The cicada *mythos* referenced here is another fact of social psychology: it shows that the positive state of affairs at Athens has made the Athenians aspire to a mythical connection to their land. Cf. Thucydides' history of Attica at 2.14–17. On cicadas as symbols of autochthony (cicadas were supposed to originate from the soil, and thus were used as symbols for the Athenians' claim to have sprung from the earth of Attica), and generally, cf. M. Davies and Kathirithamby (1986) 113–133.

[30] On the gold, linen, and luxury of this passage, and its meaning in the context of fifth-century aristocracy, cf. Kurke (1992).

> The Spartans first turned to a moderate way of dressing such as we prac-
> tice now, and in respect to other things those who had acquired more
> established a way of life approximately equal to that of the many. (1.6.4)

The Spartans are therefore the first people who consciously sepa-
rated themselves from the appearances that accompany the acquisitive
ethos.[31] In addition, Thucydides tells us that the Spartans were the first
to exercise naked in public and to be oiled up after their contests (1.6.5).
Consistent with their rejection of the display of wealth, Thucydides'
Spartans practice sports, in which honor is attached to winning a com-
petition of skill rather than a competition for things. Furthermore, by
practicing sports naked, they display an unprecedented allowance of
equality with and trust toward others.[32]

It seems unlikely that Thucydides' readers would think it unpleasant
to exercise and clean up afterward. The exercises of active and naked
young Spartans contrast to the passive and elaborate decorousness of
the elderly Athenians, but both parties are attractive. Taken together as
an image of the human life span, the active youth of the Spartans and
the leisured old age of the Athenians constitute an ideal archaic life.
We might remark that not only the human life span but also the human
body is conspicuous in these sentences of chapter 6. If we were to make
a statue of each of the images presented here, the Athenians would
look archaic (eastern influence and all), but the Spartans would look
like a fifth-century Harmodious. These observations accord with the
characterization of both sides. In the pre-Homeric world, the Athenians
rejected the iron swords of the pirates, but they were still practicing old-
fashioned aristocratic ἁβροσυνή. By contrast, Thucydides emphasizes
the Spartans' ability to innovate at this stage (see πρῶτοι in 1.6.4 and
1.6.5) and writes that their moderate ways are closest to reflecting the
habits of modern Greece. As we have seen, the early Spartans are more

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[31] Costumes of acquisitive cultures in the Archaeology: the iron swords of the pirates,
with the armor in the Carian graves, the linen robes, and golden decorations of the
Athenians and their Ionian relatives, the scepter of Agamemnon (1.9.4). Cf. Pausanias'
adoption of Persian dress at 1.130.1. All of these contrast to the Spartan decision. The
very expensive buildings of Athens and the humble buildings of Sparta (1.10.2) might
be considered the equivalent costumes of the cities, especially as Thucydides explicitly
argues about their appearances (1.10.3). On clothes as expressions of about social and
political commitments, cf. Geddes (1987).

[32] Thucydides contrasts the Spartan adoption of nudity to the prolonged inability of the
barbarians to adopt the same habit (1.6.5); Greeks outside of Sparta and Athens seem
very similar to barbarians (cf. 1.5.1–2, 1.6.1–2, 1.6.6), not because of any particular
Greek or barbarian origin, but because of similar behavior.

egalitarian than the early Athenians. Their wrestling reflects this, indicating friendly associations between people, a type of behavior that is new to the narrative, and one that is particularly opposed to the reciprocal violence of the piratical cultures.[33]

The complementary descriptions of the Spartans and the Athenians contrast sharply to the framing description of the pirates and Minoans in chapters 4, 5, 7, and 8. The world outside of Sparta and Athens is relentlessly violent and monotonous. It contains every danger and no life worth living. The materials of piratical Greece – the vulnerable cities, iron swords, raiding ships, and so on – all furthered the theme of violence and death. By contrast, the materials of Sparta and Athens signal not only relief from the threat of violence, but even certain positive values – dignified leisure, or sports, for instance, available only when stability and prosperity have been achieved. In chapter 6, characteristic objects and behavior from the daily life of Sparta and Athens represent the extraordinary achievement of stable peace and characteristic civic culture. Thucydides' presentation of leisure and sports in the two cities also shows that their achievement provides for certain elements of private human happiness, something no other groups in the Archaeology are able to claim.

Agamemnon and Troy

By contrast to his presentation of Sparta and Athens, Thucydides' account of the Trojan expedition shows that it belonged to Minoan culture.[34] I quote again the last sentence of chapter 8:

> ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὄντες ὕστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν. Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι.

> For the weaker peoples, because they desired profits, submitted to enslavement by the stronger, and the more powerful peoples, since they had

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[33] On the Spartans in the Archaeology, see Orwin (1994) 31: "One was a Spartan first, rich or poor only secondarily." Cf. also his warning on page 84 that in retrospect, that is, after reading more of Thucydides' *History*, one may come to see these Spartan innovations as a response to the Helot threat. Allison (1989) 15–21 remarks on the parity of Spartans and Athenians in the Archaeology despite the disparity between their material armaments.

[34] Cf. Erbse (1970) 51–52, Tsakmakis (1995) 36. Thucydides announces the Trojan expedition at 1.3.4 as an early collective achievement of the Greeks once they had become

surpluses, made the lesser cities subservient to themselves. And accordingly, when they were well established in this manner of living, at a later time they made the expedition to Troy. And Agamemnon, I think, leading the expedition because he excelled his contemporaries in power, and not so much because the suitors of Helen were bound by the oaths of Tyndareus, gathered it together. (1.8.3–9.1)

What will happen, in the Minoan situation, when one city finally achieves the competitive advantage for which all are struggling? The answer seems to be that this city, accustomed to making power and profit its entire aim, will reach out for an even greater prize. Thucydides, like Herodotus, thinks it unlikely that the Trojan campaign was fought for the sake of Helen of Troy.[35] The Trojan expedition was less a matter of fulfilling an oath, and more a matter of the usual material calculus: Agamemnon, the leader of the richest coastal power (Mycenae), saw a chance to plunder Troy and could compel others to help him.[36] Consistent with his presentation of the Minoans, Thucydides will refuse to glorify the Trojan expedition, but rather in chapters 9 through 12 of the Archaeology shows a mismanaged and piratical expedition that brought political and economic chaos to Greece.

In chapter 9, Thucydides shows how Agamemnon came to the fabulous inheritance of money, territory, and naval power that are the

accustomed to seafaring. Subsequent announcements also emphasize the fact that the Trojan expedition represented its historical context. Cf. 1.8.3 and 1.9.4: "it was necessary for this expedition to resemble the sorts of things that preceded it." At 1.10.3, Thucydides argues that we should accept that the Trojan expedition was "the greatest expedition up to that time, but was left behind by those of today." At 1.11.2, we find yet another similar statement: "although it is the most famous of past events, it is shown by its deeds to be something less than the reputation and tradition that has prevailed about it because of the poets." Perhaps in order to stress his view of the limited nature of the real event, Thucydides never calls the Trojan affair a war, but only an expedition (στόλος). Nevertheless, as the paradigmatic ancient event, the Trojan expedition is central to the Archaeology. Thucydides spends more than three chapters of the Archaeology on the Trojan expedition, more narrative space than he gives to any other single account. On the central position of the Trojan story in the organization of the Archaeology, cf. Ellis (1991) and Hammond (1952).

[35] Cf. Hdt. 2.112–113, and 2.115–220.

[36] Agamemnon's greed was a well-established Homeric theme, so that Thucydides' argument is closer to the tradition than it seems to be. Cf. Neville (1977) on Herodotus on the Trojan wars, and his p. 11 note 13 on Homer's portrayal of Agamemnon's motives for going to Troy: "Of seventeen references to Helen by name in the Iliad as the 'cause' of the war, nine refer to Helen alone (2.161, 177, 356, 590; 3.154; 4.174; 9.339; 11.125; 19.325), eight mention treasure as well as Helen (3.70, 91, 282, 285, 458; 7.350, 401; 22.114)."

foundations of the power with which he dominated his allies.[37] He describes Agamemnon's inheritance in detail, confirming the story with evidence from Homer, and concludes as follows: "Inheriting these things [that is, inheriting the combined wealth of Atreus and Eurystheus, and the monarchy over Mycenae and its subject territories], and since he was much stronger than others in respect to his navy, [Agamemnon] made the expedition, gathering it together less with good will than with fear" (1.9.3). Agamemnon's wealth and navy are the reason he can compel other states to join the expedition to Troy.

Thus the starting point of Thucydides' account of the Trojan expedition seems relatively straightforward: chapter 9 argues that Agamemnon was wealthy and powerful. By contrast, and as we shall discuss, the closing sections of Thucydides' account in chapters 11 and 12 argue that the Trojan expedition was poor and mismanaged, and ultimately destabilized Greece. We must first discuss the middle section of the argument in chapter 10. Because of its cautious character (Thucydides is operating in reaction against a most authoritative background), this passage requires a tenacious analysis.

Initially, chapter 10 seems to be devoted to showing that the Trojan expedition was large. At the beginning of chapter 10, Thucydides warns us not to make a mistake about the size of the Trojan expedition. We should not conclude, he argues, that the Trojan expedition was weak just because the ruins of Mycenae are unimpressive. If we imagine the ruins of Sparta and Athens, we will easily perceive that ruins do not reveal the actual power of a city, since (for instance) Sparta's humble ruins might easily mislead uninformed viewers to underestimate her power in the future (1.10.1–2). We must discuss Thucydides' warning not to be misled by appearances in a subsequent part of this chapter. Here, we will focus on his argument that the Trojan expedition was larger than Thucydides' contemporaries might think. The argument and the evidence are both famously complicated, partly because Thucydides bases his analysis on close reasoning about the Homeric Catalogue of Ships, a suspect source produced by an author who, "being a poet, likely adorned the expedition to

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[37] Cf. Stahl (2003) 25 and Kallet-Marx (1993) 29 on the importance of Pelops' money for this inheritance story. Through money, the Asian Pelops established himself, and thus ultimately Agamemnon, in the Peloponnesus.

make it greater" (ἢν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι 1.10.3, cf. 1.21.1).

Thucydides therefore advertises his mistrust of Homer. At first reading, his analysis of the Homeric evidence seems equally untrustworthy, however, since it exposes contradictions: Thucydides' analysis seems to argue that the *Iliad* reveals a very large, if primitive (1.10.5), expedition, but at the same time a small one:

> πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου πεντήκοντα, δηλῶν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας· ἄλλων γοῦν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ οὐκ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτερέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμοι πάντες, ἐν ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδήλωκεν· τοξότας γὰρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσκώπους. περίνεως δὲ οὐκ εἰκὸς πολλοὺς ξυμπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὰ πλοῖα κατάφαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ληστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα. πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐλαχίστας ναῦς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ πεμπόμενοι.

> For of the 1,200 boats he [Homer] portrayed those of the Boeotians with 120 men and those of Philoctetes with fifty, showing, as I think, the most numerous and least numerous. Or at least nothing else is recorded concerning the size of the boats in the Catalogue of Ships. But that they were all both rowers and fighters was shown in [the depiction of] the boats of Philoctetes, for he portrayed all the rowers as archers. And it is not likely that many sailed who were not rowing, except for the kings and the most powerful men, especially since they were planning to cross the sea with the equipment of war, and the boats did not yet have covered decks, but were outfitted piratically according to the old-fashioned mode. Thus someone looking to the mean in respect to the most and least numerous boats [would conclude that] not many went, since they had been sent as a common force from all of Greece. (1.10.4–5)

Thucydides concludes that the expedition was not so big after all, even though his announced intention (1.10.1) was to show that the expedition was stronger than we might assume. Let us review the argument. First, in a famous warning against drawing conclusions from appearances, Thucydides encourages us to believe in the size of the Trojan expedition, in spite of the unimpressive remains of Mycenae. He then makes a careful and rational argument about the Homeric evidence, which shows the size of the expedition in terms of the numbers of people who went to Troy. These numbers would presumably show Agamemnon's substantial power, whereas the deceptively slight ruins of Mycenae did not.

In detailing his argument about Homer's numbers, Thucydides offers his calculations (i.e. 1,200 ships multiplied by perhaps eighty or ninety people in each ship), but omits to mention the result of his calculations, an impressive number that would presumably prove definitively that the Trojan expedition was large, since the sum is about a hundred thousand people.[38] Having omitted or suppressed this number, Thucydides ultimately concludes, apparently contrary to both his own argument and his calculations, that we should think that "not many people went, when you consider that they were sent from all of Greece" (1.10.5).

Thus Thucydides calculates in order to show the size of the expedition, but then hides this size, and although he sets out to prove that the expedition was large, he concludes that it was small. Thucydides' complicated presentation of Agamemnon's navy is important for the consideration of the materials of warfare in the Archaeology, and therefore we must briefly persist in attempting to disentangle this passage.[39] One fact emerges clearly: no matter how many ships Agamemnon had, they were "piratical," that is, relatively primitive, from Thucydides' point of view (1.10.4).

As for Thucydides' enumeration of the number of men who went on the expedition, we might consider Thucydides' calculation first from the perspective of its importance for Thucydides' claims about Mycenae. The large number of men who went on the Trojan expedition proves Agamemnon's power at home in Greece, and demonstrates that Mycenae really was stronger than it looks from its ruins, at least as Thucydides represents their appearance.[40]

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[38] Taking the mean of 120 and 50 as 85 people per ship, the sum is 102,000. Cf. *HCT* ad loc. 1.10.5 (which also argues that this "excursus, like most of the others, has not been fully thought out"), and Luraghi (2000) 230.

[39] Luraghi (2000) argues that "Thucydides simply expected his audience to be impressed by his argument, and not to reckon precisely how many people would have taken part in the expedition according to his own calculation" (230, cf. 238). However, it seems to me that after calling so much attention to his use of Homer's numbers, Thucydides' suppression of the sum of his calculation is a literary device. The entire paragraph is after all an explanation and justification of his calculation. It seems likely that readers could be expected to calculate the sum that was being so carefully supported with evidence and argument. The passage therefore exposes an extrasophisticated example of the rhetorical deployment of numerals. This strategy (namely suppression of the total of an equation carefully constructed in the narrative) is deployed again at 5.68.3. On the rhetorical deployment of numerals in Thucydides, cf. Rubincam (1979, 2003, and forthcoming).

[40] Just as, for instance, the numbers of Xerxes' troops display the power of the Persian King to muster men from all corners of the empire. Cf. the catalogue of Xerxes' infantry and cavalry from the regions of the empire at Hdt. 7.61–88.

We might, however, also consider Thucydides' numbers from the point of view of his statement about the weakness of early Greece. At the same time as showing the relative power of Mycenae, the number of men who sailed to Troy exposes the continuous weakness of early times, since Agamemnon could enforce a muster over large areas (1.9.4), but still only found a hundred thousand people to go with him.[41] For Thucydides' compressed argument, then, the same number shows both the power of Mycenae and also the underpopulation of early Greece upon which Thucydides insists (cf. 1.11.1). The total number of men who went to Troy confirms that Mycenae was a strong power in a weak civilization. Thucydides' complex presentation induces the reader to think this through.

Of course, Agamemnon's naval expedition was nevertheless very large. As we read further into Thucydides' explanation of the Trojan expedition, we discover that this impressive number has at least one more purpose, since it forms the basis for a demonstration of Agamemnon's mismanagement of his large numbers of troops.

How does Thucydides show Agamemnon's mismanagement? The argument seems surprising at first, but then very familiar. In chapter 11 of the Archaeology, Thucydides argues that the reason so few people went to Troy was "not so much underpopulation as lack of money" (αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηματία 1.11.1).[42] I understand this remark to indicate that underpopulation was a problem, but that poverty was an even greater problem for the Trojan expedition. This assertion is astonishing, since, as we saw, Thucydides spent most of chapter 9 describing and emphasizing Agamemnon's vast wealth. How could the expedition now be poor?

[41] By the standards of Thucydides' day, this was a weak showing. As Crane (1998) 132–133 explains at length, Athens' fleet of three hundred fully modern triremes relied on a crew of sixty thousand from a single city. Thucydides is also able to show that monarchs of his day can raise larger forces than Agamemnon's relatively easily. At 2.98.3, for instance, Thucydides shows that the Thracian Sitalces' acquisition of an army of a hundred and fifty thousand was almost accidental: "And many of the independent Thracians followed along for the sake of booty without having been summoned, so that it is said that the whole crowd numbered no less than 150,000" (2.98.3). All of this is to say nothing of Herodotus' numbers, which presumably help to shape Thucydides' readers concepts of "large" and "small." For Herodotus' elaborate calculations about the size of Xerxes' expedition as a whole, for instance (5,283,220 men), cf. Hdt. 7.184–186.

[42] I have translated ἀχρηματία simply as "lack of money." Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 28–30 on the meaning of χρήματα and ἀχρηματία in the Archaeology. are "usable wealth: in particular in 1.11 as in 1.8.3, Thucydides' discussion necessitates the idea of expenditure…" (30; cf. 33–34).

But the answer is not that far to seek. As in our previous examples of failed warfare, the problem is the piratical mindset. Agamemnon "led an army that was smaller because he hoped to get his sustenance by warring on the spot" (τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν… 1.11.1). Like the migratory peoples of chapter 2, Agamemnon thinks he can get his daily sustenance anywhere, or at least that his soldiers can.[43]

Thucydides' previous portraits of the nomadic and piratical lifestyles have already demonstrated the futility of this belief, as far as he is concerned. Consistent with this, in Thucydides' explanation, Agamemnon's lack of planning proves to be decisive for the wretched fate of the Trojan expedition. As before, plundering proves unreliable, and Agamemnon's hopes of an easy living are disappointed. The nourishment of the army proves to be a basic problem, and the splintering of forces that results from the necessity to provide food at the same time as fighting causes the destructive length of the war. Thucydides argues that the lack of supplies caused the Greeks to split up into groups and to practice both farming and piracy (1.11.1 and 1.11.2). After the very first battle, therefore, the war was never contested by the whole army:

> περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἀθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἷλον, οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἀθρόοι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ' ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐν ἐλάσσονί τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον.

> But if they had come possessing a supply of food, and staying grouped together without turning to piracy and farming had prosecuted the war continuously, they might have taken [Troy] easily by winning a battle, since they held out although they were not gathered together, but rather [fought] with the contingent that was available each time: if they had sat down to a siege they would have taken Troy in less time and with less labor. (1.11.2)[44]

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[43] Herodotus' story of Xerxes' expedition to Greece offers a paradigm for Thucydides' depiction of Agamemnon. In fact, the relevance to the Archaeology of Herodotus' vivid depiction of the defeat of larger and stronger armaments by smaller forces is everywhere evident. As Thucydides' stories show, taking other people's land and resources is not as easy as one hopes, and even with vast resources Xerxes failed. Furthermore, Xerxes' failings as military planner bear comparison to those of Thucydides' Agamemnon. In Herodotus, Xerxes too, despite being warned (Hdt. 7.47), counts on improvised exploitation of subject populations and good weather in order to survive, and must lose large parts of his forces not only to defeat, but also to panic, storms, and starvation. (Storms: cf. e.g. 7.42.2, 7.188–192, 8.12–13, 8.118; starvation and disease: cf. e.g. 8.115.)

[44] On the translation of this somewhat contentious sentence, see A. Parry (1989) 36–38.

If Agamemnon had been able to abandon piratical habits and had invested enough money and planning in the expedition to make it work, he might have taken home a big prize quite easily, or at least "in less time and with less labor." As it was, a foreseeable problem, namely, finding food for a hundred thousand people, made the expedition much longer and more difficult than it might have been. The end of our passage seems almost sarcastic, since Thucydides suggests that even siege warfare, a notoriously difficult business, would have been more intelligent and economical than what the Greeks actually did.[45]

In the Archaeology, the earliest migratory peoples of Greece, the pirates, and Agamemnon exhibit the same behavior in regard to the basic human necessities. That is, they frequently turn to violent seizure of others' property, rather than planning, to fulfill their needs. This ethos is consistently accompanied by poverty. We remember that warfare, and not poor land, was the cause of the destitution of the early Greeks. After this, the rapacious and shortsighted use of a new technology, boats, made the pirates poor. Agamemnon is an example of the same problem. Though very rich, his improvident warfare causes the poverty of the Trojan expedition. In each case, the material conditions offer promising opportunities, but the predatory warfare that follows their introduction causes poverty.[46]

Worse than the shortsighted Trojan expedition itself, however, are its effects. As a result of the ten-year length of the Trojan War, Greece is destabilized, and reverts to a migratory stage similar to that endured by the nomads of chapter 2. The cycle of development begins again as the late homecomings of the kings cause migrations, *stasis* in the cities, and banishments (1.12.1–2). Agamemnon has all but undone the groundwork laid by Minos's foundations. "With difficulty and after a long time Greece settled down securely..." Thucydides argues (1.12.4).[47]

In the end, therefore, the most famous deed of Thucydides' Minoan period caused destruction at Troy and regression at home. Although Agamemnon gathered the largest ever Greek naval expedition, Thucydides denies that this poorly planned invasion achieved anything but harm. Despite the expedition's size, all sense that Agamemnon's or the

[45] Contra *CT* ad loc.
[46] The improvidence of these parties is opposed to the *pronoia* typical of men (e.g. Themistocles at 1.138.3 or Pericles at 2.65.6) whom Thucydides will praise.
[47] Greece's recovery and slow advance is mysterious, but it seems that basic technological advances, at least, are not forgotten, so that the advantages (and disadvantages) of possessing them persist even when political order disintegrates. Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) note 31.

expedition's actions deserve glory evaporates. The Trojan expedition did, in Thucydides' report, "resemble the events that preceded it" (1.9.4).

Materials and the Reader

We have seen that Thucydides illustrates the Archaeology with material indices. Rich and poor land, iron swords or none, golden cicadas and linen cloaks, barbarian men with and Spartan men without loincloths, olive oil, or Agamemnon's islands or his scepter are a sampling of the attributes that characterize people and their situations. Given that Thucydides chooses vivid material examples in order to illustrate his argument, it is not surprising that the explanations of chapter 10, which are folded into Thucydides' description of the Trojan expedition, focus on how to think about materials.[48]

As we saw, Thucydides began chapter 10 by arguing that we should not underestimate the size of the Trojan expedition because the ruins of Mycenae appear unimpressive.[49] He makes the question more relevant to his readers by extending his argument to the appearance of the future ruins of Sparta and Athens. He argues that the ruins of Sparta, which display no impressive buildings, will cause many future observers to believe that the Spartans were weak. As a result of being unimpressed by Spartan ruins, they will mistrust the Spartans' glory (κλέος), that is, they will think that the Spartans cannot have done the deeds history attributes to them (1.10.2).[50] They will be wrong, he shows, for the Spartans are in fact powerful, and will be just as wrong about Athens when they conclude, on the basis of seeing her impressive ruins, that she was twice as powerful as she really is:

> καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται, τῆς τε ξυμπάσης
> ἡγοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἔξω ξυμμάχων πολλῶν· ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης

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[48] The story of the Trojan expedition frames the passage at 1.10.1–3 in the same way as the previous chapters about the pirates and coastal cities (4, 5, 7, and 8) had framed the chapter on the *tropoi* of the early Athenians and Spartans.

[49] Perhaps this observation is in itself a warning about the fate of previously great cities. Cf. Hdt. 1.5.4: τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ σμικρὰ αὐτῶν γέγονε: τὰ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὦν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῷ μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως (For anciently some places were large, and many of them have become small, and places that were large in my time were previously small. And so, understanding that human happiness never remains in the same place, I will mention all equally).

[50] Thus the one time in the Archaeology that glory might correctly be attributed, the narrator describes us as not doing it.

πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα, Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανερᾶς ὄψεως τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἔστιν. οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός, οὐδὲ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν πόλεων μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις…

Even though the Spartans occupy two fifths of the Peloponnesus and lead all of it and possess many allies beyond it, since their city was neither united nor furnished with temples and lavish buildings, but rather inhabited in villages in the old-fashioned manner of Greece, it would appear inferior [i.e. to the capacity for such power], but if the Athenians suffered this same thing [i.e. observation once their city was long ruined] their power would be guessed at twice what it is on the basis of the exposed appearance of the city. It is not, therefore, reasonable to disregard [appearances], but also not [reasonable] to consider the appearances of the cities rather than their power… (1.10.2–3)[51]

This argument about assessing material evidence is important for our view of Thucydides. The argument confirms that Thucydides does not believe that glamorous appearances reveal power. In fact, humble appearances (as at Sparta) may conceal power, and the appearance of greatness (at Athens, and as we also saw with Agamemnon's large fleet) may be deceptive. At the same time, the argument reveals that Thucydides believes that many people will be deceived by appearances. They will thereby be prevented from forming an accurate assessment of important realities.[52]

Thucydides' readers will be in good company when they make this error. In particular, our analysis of the Archaeology has shown that Thucydides' historical agents frequently see glory where Thucydides sees none. Those who were mistaken about the pirates gloried in their iron swords, for instance, and readers who have been misled by the poets admire Agamemnon's expedition to Troy. In the same way, men of the future will fail to recognize Sparta's strength, and believe too much in Athens' power.

[51] My interpretation differs from that found (for instance) in Hendrick (1993) 27 and Crane (1998) 151. Both accept a reading of 1.10 that emphasizes a negation of the importance of materials for understanding power. But it seems implausible that Thucydides would spend a chapter discussing the ruins (see also 1.10.1–2) and then deny that anything at all can be learned from them. Cf. Kallet (2001) 56–57, who both translates and explains the passage in a way close to the interpretation offered here, and Sonnabend (2004) 68.

[52] Nevertheless, Thucydides seems to have realized that written history would make a difference to the future reputations of Sparta and Athens. Homer's poetry had certainly made a difference for Mycenae, as he also remarks (1.11.2). In 1.10.2, Thucydides rescues Spartan *kleos* from our errors.

Thucydides' contrasting argument in this chapter is supported by the presentation of Athens and Sparta in the Archaeology so far. In chapter 10, Sparta has no expensive temples or establishments but is "inhabited village-wise, according to the old fashioned way of Greece" (1.10.2). The humble ruins that will result from this lack of grand building are consistent with Sparta's rejection of display at 1.6.4. Likewise, Athens' impressive appearance is consistent with the emphasis on increasing wealth in Thucydides' presentation of Athens at 1.2.5–6 and 1.6.3. Thus the presentation of Athens and Sparta in chapter 10 is familiar.

However, at 1.10.2–3 Thucydides uses the present tense.[53] The implication is that when drawing conclusions about the power of Sparta and Athens the future viewer will consult the ruins of Thucydides' day. While Sparta is permanently devoid of large structures, the most prominent buildings of Thucydides' Athens were Themistocles' walls and Pericles' beautiful and expensive buildings on the Acropolis, the material culture of imperial Athens.[54]

Thucydides' readers will be able to assess Athens' power accurately if they heed his warning and do not allow themselves to be deceived by the appearance of these impressive constructions. By Thucydides' calculation, the impression they leave is twice too grand. We note that his analysis treats the impressive appearances of Athenian buildings as detriments to a realistic assessment of Athens' power, not as an expression of Athens' power. Thucydides himself, then, was not prone to believing in their glory, but rather took an analytical approach to their effect on human sensibilities.

The Modern World

So far, our investigation has covered the first twelve chapters of the Archaeology. In the first part of the Archaeology, the stories of mismanagement and failure (i.e. the nomads, the pirates, and Agamemnon) are balanced by the stories of successful dynasts (Hellen, Minos, Pelops, Atreus) and by the description of Athens and Sparta.[55] Both the dynasts

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[53] Cf. Poppo's important analysis of these sentences, ad loc. No detailed modern study analyzes the persistent anachrony of the Archaeology.

[54] Cf. Chapter 4 on Thucydides' description of the building and nature of the Themistoclean walls at 1.90–93. Thucydides also remarks on the expense of Pericles' Propylaea on the Acropolis in the narrator interventions found in Pericles' speech in indirect discourse at 2.13. Cf. Chapter 5.

[55] Remarks on the dynasts are compressed. Hellen and his family came to widespread power in the cities (and thus gave their name to the Greeks) through helping

and the peoples without named leaders operate on the principle that men take whatever they can. Athens and Sparta seem, so far, to be an exception to this, although the Athenians are less of an exception than the Spartans. The continuing Archaeology describes further cycles of behavior based on the desire for power and profit, and shows on the final example of the Peloponnesian War that these cycles have a necessary end.

The story of the reestablishment of Greece after the disturbances caused by the Trojan expedition begins with the Corinthians, the coastal power par excellence. The Corinthians follow exactly the formula laid down in chapter 7: they block off an isthmus and monopolize trade. Like Minos, once they have ships, they suppress the pirates and get even richer (1.13.5). Also similarly to Minos, they focus on profit. Corinth is in fact the richest city of the Archaeology. As the poets attest, Corinthian money is both old and continuous (1.13.5). New is that the Corinthians undertake the improvement of Greek navies and become inventors. They build the first Greek triremes, initiating technical improvements that greatly increase the physical force of Greek navies (1.13.2). Of all cities, the Corinthians demonstrate the earliest ability to create the instruments Pericles identifies as essential to Greek warfare: money and ships.[56]

Despite Corinthian wealth and innovations and the widespread adoption of seafaring (1.13.6), Greek navies in the several hundred years before the Persian Wars were from the fifth-century point of view technically deficient (1.41.1, 1.14.3), and were mostly used for local warfare: 260 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians had already quarreled with the Corcyraeans in western Greece (1.13.4). Later (in the seventh century), the Ionians for a while dominated "their local sea," before the Persians become too strong. In the sixth century,

others (1.3.2) (just as, for instance, Corinth "helps" Epidamnus, and Athens "helps" Corcyra when they claim these cities for their alliances before the Peloponnesian War). Pelops brought wealth from Asia, and the disparity between Pelops and the poorer Greeks was important for establishing his family as the leading family of the Peloponnese, which was named after him (1.9.2). (Thus these two stories are aetiological. On all such stories of family and origin in the Archaeology, cf. Howie [1984].) Atreus, finally, manages to establish himself with the Mycenaeans as king after the death of Eurystheus, who had designated his cousin Atreus as his heir. Fear of foreign enemies, which causes the Mycenaeans to desire a leader who seems strong, and his own flattery of the People are important additional factors in Atreus' success (1.9.2).

[56] Kallet-Marx (1993) 31–32.

the pious Polycrates (who came closest to achieving Minoan stature) dominated the islands around Samos; the Phocaeans had a far-flung possession in Marseille, and even defeated the Carthaginians in a sea battle: "For these were the most powerful navies" (1.14.1).

It was not until the reign of Darius of Persia that Greek powers (the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans) acquired trireme navies of any size (1.14.2). The Athenians and the Aeginetans were at that time less well developed than these powers, and had "bits and pieces, and most of these were Pentekonters" (Αἰγινῆται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι, βραχέα ἐκέκτηντο, καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντόρους 1.14.3). Shortly before the Persian Wars, Themistocles convinced the Athenians to build "the very triremes with which they fought" (1.14.3).

Even these triremes were fairly primitive in their design by fifth-century standards (e.g. they do not have fully covered decks); they still resemble Homeric boats, therefore, in certain fundamental ways (cf. 1.10.4). Moreover, the aims of these smaller powers and their navies in the period between the Homeric and Persian Wars are uniform with the aims of earlier periods. At 1.15.1, Thucydides summarizes the activities of these relatively small and equal Greek navies:

> τὰ μὲν οὖν ναυτικὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοιαῦτα ἦν, τά τε παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ὕστερον γενόμενα. ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποιήσαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσσχόντες αὐτοῖς χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ· ἐπιπλέοντες γὰρ τὰς νήσους κατεστρέφοντο, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσοι μὴ διαρκῆ εἶχον χώραν.

> Now these were the sorts of navies the Greeks had, both the older ones and the ones that came about later. And nevertheless [i.e. even though the navies were small and technically deficient], those peoples contrived the greatest strength for themselves who concentrated on these things [i.e. navies] because of both the profit of money and the rule of others. For sailing against the islands they defeated them, especially the ones that did not have sufficient land. (1.15.1)

The story of navies in the time after the introduction of the trireme shows that nothing has fundamentally changed since Minoan times.[57] The competing powers are attempting to expand, and naval conquest followed by exploitation of the conquered is still most useful for the

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[57] Cf. Stahl (2003) 23: "Let us admit that Thucydides sees a development of civilization from the beginning of Greek history … that he also sees the greatest concentration of power up to his own time in the Athenian naval empire … We should still not be deceived into thinking that the tendency to amass greater power brings with it any change in principle…"

acquisition of power. Islands were particularly vulnerable to these actions, especially small ones.

Thucydides does not praise this wafare. His remark that islands of insufficient size to defend themselves were a particularly attractive mark reminds us of proportions we have seen before, since these defense-less islands are the equivalent of the unwalled cities of piratical times. Neither they nor the unwalled cities are important acquisitions, but simply easy targets: with such a remark Thucydides goes out of his way to show that the gains of this perennial naval raiding were often inglorious and militarily insignificant.[58]

Warfare on land shows the same character as warfare at sea. Fighting is Greek on Greek: the cities do not unite, and warfare is limited to campaigns against each city's particular neighbors (cf. ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις ... ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες 1.15.2). The largest action of the period was a war between the Chalcidians and Eretrians that caused the rest of Greece to divide according to their alliance with either side (1.15.3), an early indication that this could happen, regardless of the otherwise loose connections between the poleis.

Thucydides classes the warfare he has described in these chapters among the hindrances to Greek growth and consolidation (1.16.1).[59] Moreover, at this very moment, many of the wealthier cities are ruled by tyrants who live in fear of their lives for the sake of the greater profits now available (cf. 1.13.1, 1.17). These do "nothing worth mentioning," but like the other cities, fight wars of their own against those who live close to them (1.17).[60] The incessantly quarreling Greeks would have seemed to any observer to be entirely vulnerable to the Persia's westward advancing power.

The Spartans, the Athenians, and the Persian Wars

It will fall to Sparta and Athens, who are so far not among the wealthy Greek powers, to lead the defense against Persia. Thucydides' Spartan

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[58] The cruelty of such conquests, on the other hand, is well illustrated by his depiction of Athens' conquest of Melos at (5.116.3–4).

[59] Cf. 1.16.1: "And there were also hindrances from others elsewhere that prevented them from adding to their power" (ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι). This sentence classes the land and naval warfare listed in chapter 15 as a hindrance, and states that other problems also existed.

[60] Thucydides' description of the tyrants is yet another example of the cost of a false focus on materials. The tyrants live miserable lives for the sake of profit – exactly the opposite behavior of the Spartans of chapter 6.

story, like his story of early Attica, argues that not only characteristic civic culture, but also durable power arises from political stability:

> ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἀφ᾽ οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν.

> For it is about 400 years and somewhat more, reckoning to the end of [the Peloponnesian] War, that the Spartans maintained the same constitution, and because of this they became powerful and settled affairs in the other cities. (1.18.1)

Sparta has no walls (1.10.2), no ships, and no money (1.19). Sparta has a long-standing political order (which was never a tyranny) and "good law" (1.18.1). If it were true that materials of warfare such as money, walls, and ships produce power, we would expect the Corinthians to take the first rank among Greek cities. Instead, and despite continuous civil strife (1.18.1), Sparta has achieved the greatest stability and therefore the greatest power (Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες 1.18.2). The Spartans use their power to relieve Greek cities, including Athens (1.18.1), of their tyrants, and, by the time of the Persian Wars, lead the Greeks.

Athens' story is different. Having begun as a stable landed power, Athens was not originally dependent on the exploitation of others. Room emerged for a somewhat less frantic devotion to acquisition, and although Athens engages in the activities typical of the other coastal powers (Athens' war on the small island of Aegina is mentioned at 1.14.3), Thucydides' description of Athenian actions during the Persian Wars seems to confirm that Athens could also risk present prosperity for the sake of long-term aims.[61]

Thucydides agrees with Herodotus that the Persians aimed to enslave Greece (1.16.1, 1.18.2). His account of the Persian Wars stresses Spartan leadership in a time of danger (1.18.2), and especially the extraordinary nature of the Athenian decision to fight the Persians at sea. Confronted with the approaching Persians, the Athenians take thought and make a decision about what to do (διανοηθέντες 1.18.2). This is unprecedented in the Archaeology. As a result of their deliberations (i.e. not as a result

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[61] Cf. Rawlings (1981) 69: "It is Athens which best exhibits Thucydides' course of progress from barbarity to civilization. Her history reveals most clearly the successive benefits of stability, increase in population, walls, ships, commerce, income, reserves, which eventually lead to thalassocrassy, the apex of civilized power." Rawlings emphasizes the connectedness of Athens' wealth and her long stability, though, once again, to my mind there is not much evidence that Thucydides believed thalassocrassy was necessarily civilized.

of fear or the desire for profit) they take apart their own city, abandon it, "and embarking into their boats, they became nautical" (1.18.2, cf. 1.73.4, 1.91.5). This application of thought and daring, together with Greeks' ability briefly to maintain an intercity alliance, is rewarded with victory over the Persians (1.18.2).

Thucydides identifies the Athenians with their war materials in this passage, showing that their progress toward becoming a seafaring people has suddenly been realized. This identification is repeated in Thucydides' assessment of the main strength of the two sides. The Spartans were strong, he says, "on land"; the Athenians, "with ships" (1.18.2). He could have written that the Athenians were strong at sea, but the language he uses is well suited to indicating that the Spartan situation is unchanged, whereas the Athenian situation, which involves dependence on technology, is new.

Thucydides' stories of Sparta, Athens, and the Persian Wars emphasize that, of the Greeks, only the Athenians and Spartans demonstrated the capacity to develop their civic culture beyond the piratical. The resulting stability of their cities led them to ever greater power. During a period when great danger threatened Greece, they united, and together with their allies defended Greece against a much larger enemy.

When this danger receded, however, the two parties fell back into the usual Greek quarrels. Our opening examination of chapters 18 and 19 showed, however, that these post-Persian War quarrels had a different status than previous quarrels: just at the time when these leading cities were becoming most prosperous, they gained continuous military experience fighting one another. As Thucydides says in chapter 19, by the end of this period, each side had more war materials than the two united had possessed at its start.

The Peloponnesian War

This fact has crucial consequences. The much greater size of the powers (cf. 1.1.1) that collide in the Peloponnesian War causes the price of warfare to become intolerably high. Thucydides argues that the Persian Wars were the greatest events previous to the Peloponnesian Wars (1.23.1). But they were comprised of short individual battles that did not have the destructive results a long war must cause (cf. the effect of the length of the Trojan War). The Peloponnesian War, on the other hand, exceeded anything the Greeks had previously experienced. Its

length and continuous sufferings (1.23.1) caused a fundamental disintegration of society, and even of society in nature.[62]

Thus, for instance, the Peloponnesian War caused a regression to conditions harsher than those associated with the migratory peoples of chapter 2. Cities were hardest hit. Their destruction caused desertions, migrations, banishments, and death (1.23.2). Worse even than this, nature herself became hostile and unpredictable. Earthquakes and eclipses were more frequent, and the most basic material prerequisites of human life – water (cf. αὐχμοί; droughts), food (cf. λιμός, famine), and human health (cf. ἡ νόσος, the plague) – were threatened (1.23.3). Chapter 23, with its plagues, earthquakes, and eclipses, puts in symbolic doubt the prospect that a cycle of development, such as we saw beginning in chapters 2 and 12, could begin again. Scholars have argued that chapter 23 is artistic and does not require a logical justification.[63] In my view, however, chapter 23 has a strong connection to the narrative. In the Peloponnesian War, the states that seemed to be escaping from the piratical cycles of shortsighted acquisitive warfare became the most destructive ones. The force they can exert against each other is the result both of their long stability and also of the acme of wealth, war materials, and allies each side has amassed since the Greek victory over the Persians. For Thucydides, the movement of these forces was the greatest disturbance (κίνησις … μεγίστη 1.1.2) in history: these acmes were destructive to an extent that bore no comparison to the (already destructive) acmes that preceded them, and they disturbed human life at its foundations.[64]

The story of Greece's long progress to the catastrophe of the Peloponnesian War is therefore hardly a glorification of war materials

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[62] Like Herodotus, who argues at 6.98.2 that under Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes Greece experienced more suffering than in the preceding twenty generations, Thucydides argues that his war was important on account of its sufferings. Thucydides, however, has moved his statement of this fact to a prominent position in his narrative, right at the close of the Archaeology and just preceding his statement of the cause of the war. Cf. Erbse (1970) 67–68.

[63] Tsakmakis (1995) 59: "23.3 is consciously deployed as a rhetorical *amplificatio,* and does not claim a function founded in logic" ("23.3 wird bewusst als eine rhetorische *amplificatio* angeführt, ohne Anspruch auf eine logisch begrundbare Funktion"). I agree that 1.23.3 is rhetorical amplification (overstatement is common enough in Thucydides, cf. e.g. 1.1.2 or 7.87.5), but argue nevertheless that the passage has a logical connection to the Archaeology's analysis of the Greeks' continuously destructive actions against one another. Cf. Hornblower's essay in *CT* ad loc. for a contextualized discussion of this passage, with literature.

[64] Cf. Connor (1984) 31.

or acquisitive warfare. The Archaeology in fact shows that each successive phase of Greek history wrecks itself on warfare and the attempt to exploit others and showcases the psychologies (the love of gain and glory, the desire to be free of labor, the fear of domination) that motivate the continuous appearance of the imperialistic drive.

When comparing the Archaeology to Pericles' speeches, we ought to remember these findings. The Archaeology is very far from endorsing imperialism, but rather documents the destructiveness of the drive to acquisition Pericles encourages, shows an anti-Periclean awareness of the cost of this behavior for the happiness of the individual, and reveals, as characteristic of the stability that alone brings cities to civilized growth, the daily life that Pericles scorns.[65]

Furthermore, the Archaeology warns us against adopting glory as the standard for our actions. In the Archaeology, the desire for glory normally leads us to admire the weapons of force and their short-term winnings, but to undervalue the restraint that produces stable growth. By contrast, Pericles argues that it is glorious to fight others for their property and to die for the sake of imperial acquisition.[66]

Finally, the Archaeology never encourages trust or confidence in materials themselves, as Pericles does (e.g. 1.143.5, 2.13), and carefully separates both size and glamorous appearances from actual power, warning us against Pericles' own buildings in this regard. While acknowledging Thucydides' high praise of Pericles' leadership, we should therefore reexamine the view that Thucydides shared Pericles' attitude toward the materials of warfare and the acquisition of empire.

[65] On Pericles' encouragement of acquisition, cf. e.g. Balot (2001) 173, and Chapters 4 through 6 of the present study. On Pericles' scorn for the ordinary and especially agriculture, cf. e.g. 1.143.5 and 2.62.3.
[66] Cf. especially 2.64.5 and 2.43.2–3, but also 2.41.4 and 2.64.3.

2

Arms and Passion

Corinth and Corcyra at War

Chapters 2 and 3 of this analysis study the role of war materials in selected sections of book one of the *History*. Chapter 3 discusses the war materials referenced in the speeches made at the Spartan Congress and in the Pentekontaetia. Overall, it argues that one goal of Thucydides' depiction of this prewar period was to show the size, character, and influence upon events of Athens' acme of wealth and war materials. The present chapter offers a detailed study of Thucydides' account of the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth.

Thucydides' story of this struggle constitutes not only a detailed presentation of the kind of naval conflict – that is, between coastal powers fighting over defenseless properties – he had introduced in the Archaeology, but also an introduction to the Greeks of this wealthiest period of Greek history. His characterization of the Modern Age is at first unexpected: throughout this initial episode of the *History*, Thucydides typifies the Corcyraeans and Corinthians as rich, angry, and incompetent. However, it becomes clear that their wealth and weapons support and even partially create these character traits, since they give the combatants the means to fulfill their passions quickly and impressively with warfare.

Thucydides' account of their warfare vividly depicts the wasteful fighting that results. His story of the intensifying passions and growing accumulation of weapons that lead to the murderous battle of Sybota once again confutes the glorification of an acme of war materials by displaying the reality of its deployment, and in this way, as well as in many others, introduces us to the world of the Peloponnesian War.

Epidamnus, Corinth, and Corcyra

Epidamnus was a small city on the northwest coast of Greece and was founded by Corcyra, which was itself a colony of Corinth. Thus though many of Epidamnus' settlers came from Corcyra, Epidamnus' οἰκιστής ("founding father") was from Corinth.[1] This Corinthian οἰκιστής, a descendent of Heracles himself (1.24.2), incarnated some of the oldest and most authoritative Greek traditions.[2] Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamnus were therefore linked by a prestigious line of descent, beginning with the greatest pan-Hellenic hero. Unfortunately for Epidamnus, even such illustrious antecedents as these were a weak bulwark against the interests of much larger powers.[3]

Epidamnus' history is paradigmatic, and prefigures the story of Corcyra herself.[4] She became powerful and populous (ἡ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος 1.24.3), and then succumbed to long-lasting *stasis*. At some time previous to 435 BCE, the democratic faction had achieved the advantage in this civil strife, and in 435 possessed the city; the oligarchic faction, which had allied with the non-Greek population of the vicinity, was attacking the city from outside in an effort to regain control.

The detailed depiction of events begins as the representatives of the Epidamnian *demos* supplicate the Corcyraean mother city for help to stop the oligarchs' war against their city:

οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντες Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἐπιέζοντο, πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις ὡς μητρόπολιν οὖσαν, δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τούς τε φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν

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[1] On Corcyra as the mother city of Epidamnus, cf. Graham (1983) 31. In Thucydides' narrative, Delphi (1.25.1) and Sparta (1.28.1) both demonstrate their recognition of Corcyra's status as the metropolis of Epidamnus. The religious connection between Epidamnus and Corcyra (as distinct from the religious connection to the Corinthian founder) is shown most clearly by the passage at 1.26.3, in which the Epidamnian oligarchs supplicate the Corcyraeans, demonstrating their συγγένεια by showing family tombs at Corcyra. Cf. Graham (1983) 149; on the religious connections binding the three cities, cf. Malkin (1987).

[2] Cf. Hall (1997) 56–65 on the complex story of the Heraclid foundation of Corinth, and on the close relations between Heraclids and Dorians. The fame and centrality of this connection could hardly be overestimated (59). Heracles was descended from Zeus, and the Kings of Sparta, for instance, were held to be descended directly from Heracles, a fact known, e.g. to Xerxes, King of Persia (Hdt. 7.208.1).

[3] Cf. Bowie (1993) 145.

[4] Cf. ibid. 142.

βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι. ταῦτα δὲ ἱκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν ἱκετείαν οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν.

The Epidamnians in the city, when they were hard pressed, sent messengers to Corcyra, since it was the metropolis. These asked [the Corcyraeans] not to disregard that they were being destroyed, but to reconcile them with the fugitives and to put a stop to the barbarian attacks. They were asking these things seated as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcyraeans would not accept their supplication, but rather sent them away unsuccessful. (1.24.6–7)

The "fugitives" with whom the Epidamnian *demos* asks to be reconciled are their own aristocrats, who are plundering them by land and sea (1.24.5). In their desperation, they suggest that they are willing to put their quarrels behind them, if Corcyra will only help them to survive. They are not therefore asking Corcyra to become the tool of their side in the war, but to restore their city as a whole, and they appear in a positive light.[5]

Thucydides does not fail to show that the Epidamnians seat themselves in the Temple of Hera in their attempt to activate the Corcyraeans' sense that their requests are sacred.[6] Corcyra, however, is unmoved.[7] Although the Corcyraeans will later in the story fiercely maintain their claim to Epidamnus, at this time they refuse to recognize the Epidamnians' claim to help from their mother city, and send them away to likely extinction. Note the emphatic repetition of the Corcyraeans' refusal contained in the last two clauses of 1.24.7. The first clause would have completed the thought, but Thucydides pauses on the consequences for

[5] Cf. Herodotus' story of a successful request that a third party reconcile two factions in stasis is found at 5.28–29.

[6] The universality and importance of the religious connections between colonies and founding cities is the main theme of Malkin (1987). As for the temple, it is the famous future site of Thucydides' rhetorically charged descriptions of gruesome bloodshed (and perverted supplication) during the Corcyraean revolution. Cf. 3.75.5, 3.79.1, and 3.81.2. The inhumanity shown to the Epidamnians in our present passage is the seed of the events that will lead to this revolution, since the events depicted here culminate in the Battle of Sybota, at which the Corinthians capture the 250 Corcyraean prisoners who later help to foment the revolution at Corcyra (1.55.1).

[7] This refusal to help would likely make a negative impression on an Athenian reader. Cf. Bernek (2004) and Gould (1993) on the much fuller representation of supplication in the Athenian tragedies. In Athenian supplication tragedies, the refusal of supplication is the mark of a barbarian power, while the granting of supplication is above all typical of Athens, which enjoys praise as the most Greek, and therefore also the most compassionate, power. Cf. Crane (1998) 120.

the Epidamnians: the Corcyraeans refused the Epidamnians' supplication, which means that they sent them away empty-handed.[8]

To whom shall the Epidamnian *demos* now turn for protection? The answer lies with the Corinthian οἰκιστής, and the established line of connection to Corinth. If the Corcyraeans will not help, perhaps the Corinthians will. The Epidamnians take great care with this second application for help, and before they go to the Corinthians, they ask permission of the god at Delphi to turn themselves over to Corinth (1.25.1). The god (Apollo) grants his permission, and the Epidamnians take his answer to Corinth.[9] Showing the Corinthians both that their founder was Corinthian and that the oracle had instructed them to ask for help at Corinth, they repeat the formulas of supplication. They ask the Corinthians "not to overlook their destruction, but to defend them" (1.25.2), and by contrast to the Corcyraeans, the Corinthians accept their supplication. "The Corinthians," Thucydides says, "undertook to help the Epidamnians according to justice [κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον], since they believed that the colony belonged to themselves no less than to the Corcyraeans" (1.25.3).[10] Thus both Apollo and the Corinthians themselves recognize the Epidamnians'

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[8] 1.24.6–7 engage our sympathy for Epidamnus. The formulaic language of their supplication (repeated nearly verbatim at 1.25.2), the reasonableness of their request for reconciliation and aid, and the depiction of their situation in the temple are cut off by the Corcyraeans' refusal and finally by the sharp alliteration of ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν.

[9] Note the character of this story, in which the god (not the oracle or the Pythia) is represented as if conversing with the Epidamnians. 1.25.1: καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς καὶ τιμωρίαν τινὰ πειρῷντ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀνεῖλε παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι (And having sent [ambassadors] to Delphi they asked the god if they should hand over their city to the Corinthians, since they were their founders, and should try to receive some help from them. And he answered that they should hand over [the city] and make [the Corinthians] their leaders). The god's definitive answer constitutes a critique of Corcyra; moreover, Epidamnian acceptance of the god's advice seems inevitable and necessary; no sense that they have deserted Corcyra colors the story. For another such conversation, cf. 1.118.3.

[10] Translations of κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον vary widely. Cf. Salmon 1984, 282: "because they thought it legitimate to do so" or *CT* ad loc., "to vindicate their rights." Thomas Hobbes' translation (of 1629) is very interesting, since it implies that the "justice" the Corinthians are thinking of is really their own interest in Corcyra: "And the Corinthians undertook their defense not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyraeans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyraeans…" (Hobbes [1989] 16). I prefer a direct transmission of the Corinthians' reference to justice. Justice will be the stated theme and first word of the Corcyraean speech at 1.32.1, and the Corinthians' first statement in response (1.37.1) is to deny the Corcyraean charge of injustice, so that the word itself has some symbolic status in the story. Cf. the final result of these quarrels at 1.86.2, where Sthenelaidas presses

claim to Corinth's help, although Thucydides couches the Corinthians' views in explicitly ethical terms: in his account, the Corinthians say that helping Epidamnus is a matter of justice, not religion.

The reader rightly suspects that the Corinthians' high claim is specious: although they are themselves oligarchs, the Corinthians treat the Epidamnian *demos* as entirely sufficient representatives of Epidamnus. In other words, they have conveniently seen justice in the claims of one side of a factional struggle. We are therefore not surprised to learn that the Corinthians have a second reason for extending help to the Epidamnians, namely, "at the same time" (ἅμα) as they are considering questions of justice, they also feel "hatred of the Corcyraeans" (μίσει τῶν Κερκυραίων 1.25.3). In the next sentences, Thucydides explains in detail why the Corinthians hated their Corcyraean colonists.

Thucydides begins his remarks by saying that the Corinthians hated the Corcyraeans because although they were colonists, the Corcyraeans "treated them with contempt" (1.25.3). He then gives the following account of their behavior:

> οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὄντες κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁμοῖα τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προύχειν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς Κερκύρας κλέος ἐχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς (ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύοντο τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀδύνατοι· τριήρεις γὰρ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ὑπῆρχον αὐτοῖς ὅτε ἤρχοντο πολεμεῖν).

> For in the common assemblies, the [Corcyraeans] did not offer the customary prerogatives, nor extend precedence at sacrifice to a Corinthian like the other colonists, but contemned the [Corinthians], since they were both as rich as the richest Greeks of that time, and also more powerful [i.e. than Corinth] in their resources for warfare. And lifted up [or perhaps: excited] both because they were far superior in respect to their navy, and sometimes also because the Phaeacians, who had glory in naval matters, had lived on Corcyra before them, they had fitted out their navy all the more, and were powerful. For they had 120 triremes when they began to make war. (1.25.4)

The Corcyraeans refused to treat the Corinthians with the customary special consideration at intercity gatherings. This behavior is caused by the Corcyraeans' certainty that they are richer and militarily more

justice as an imperative of political responsibility to which the Spartans ought to respond: καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους (And we will not, if we are prudent, overlook the injustice done to our allies).

powerful than the metropolis that requires their respect. Thucydides' description of Corcyra's behavior toward Corinth complements his portrayal of the Corcyraeans' treatment of the Epidamnian suppliants: the Corcyraeans have ignored their responsibilities to the Epidamnians and insulted Corinth, apparently without fear of the consequences.[11]

Thucydides' explanation of this behavior emphasizes the role of Corcyra's money and large navy, and describes the progress of Corcyra's navy to its present size. Two factors – their initial naval superiority to Corinth, and second, the fact that they claim association to the Phaeacians – have caused the Corcyraeans to continue to apply themselves to their navy. The result is a navy of 120 triremes, second only to Athens' own.

Corcyra's accumulation of wealth and war materials in such large amounts is having a deep psychological effect, and has caused the Corcyraeans to put aside the relationships recognized by other Greeks. Instead, an awareness of their independent capacity for naval warfare is determining not only how they treat other states, but also how they think about themselves, since the navy that founds their confidence also realizes their similarity to the Phaeacians and their claim to be continuing the Phaeacian tradition.[12] The large navy is the sign of a prestigious inheritance that is independent of the Corinthian founding of Corcyra.[13] Corcyra's abundant war materials are the basis for the reinterpretation of her history, and therefore identity, as a state.

The Phaeacians are not the only Homeric forces at work here: like Achilles, the Corcyraeans threaten the Corinthians in public assemblies,

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[11] Cf. Fischer (2000). The fact that the verb ὑβρίζειν does not appear in this story should not cause us to doubt that Thucydides is here depicting a display of hubris. Fischer shows convincingly that Thucydides more often depicts than names hubris.

[12] Crane (1998) 101: "Material and symbolic power are symbiotic and reinforce each other." The Phaeacians are a problematic source of glory in nearly every way, however. On the nature of the Phaeacians in Homer, cf. Rose (1969). It is no hindrance to Corcyraean claims that the Phaeacians may or may not have been extirpated by Poseidon in the *Odyssey* (cf. Bassett [1933] and Rusten [forthcoming]). As Thucydides points out, not the Phaeacians themselves but their προενοίκησιν, their previous residence, on Corcyra is important for the Corcyraeans: the Phaeacians lived on Corcyra and created their nautical κλέος there, and now the Corcyraeans dwell in this same place. On Phaeacian κλέος as seafarers and the potential significance of the sanctuary of Alkinoos at Corcyra (3.70.4), cf. Mackie 1996, 103–104.

[13] Cf. Howie (1989) 27–28 and Crane (1998) 104. Corcyra's rejection of Corinth was a result of old history as well as new wealth. Herodotus had detailed various incidents of the cruel and continuous struggle between Corinth and Corcyra (Hdt. 3.48–53, cf. 7.168). Salmon (1984) 272–279 provides a detailed description of the contest for preeminence in northwestern Greece. Corcyraean behavior and their claim to the Phaeacian inheritance can be seen as defensive of the navy itself: to admit Corinth's leadership of Corcyra would be to place Corcyraean war materials at Corinth's service.

and the Corcyraeans' emphasis on and identification with their war materials is also recognizably Achillean.[14] At the same time, Thucydides' Corinth, a deeply established power (1.13.2–5) that, despite its antiquity and dignity, cannot forbear to hate the upstart Corcyraeans and fear their power, seems to reflect a psychological constitution familiar from the figure of Agamemnon.[15] Whether or not we think these Homeric paradigms are at work here, the story that follows is entirely predictable in terms of the old Homeric ethos: unpunished Corcyraean hubris would entail an unbearable threat and loss of status for the Corinthians. The Corinthians will therefore now go to war to stop these demonstrations and restore their own safety and honor.[16]

Thucydides has therefore written up the story to show that Corcyra's hubris – a response to the possession of copious materials of warfare – has set in motion the old cycle of insult, anger, and revenge. The belligerents seem to be entirely unaware of the trap they are entering. The Corinthians happily (ἄσμενοι 1.26.1) take the opportunity to respond to Corcyraean provocations, sending soldiers and settlers to occupy and fortify Epidamnus (1.26.1). The first armed deployment in Thucydides' story of the Peloponnesian War therefore results not from reasoned calculation, but from the Corinthians' passionate response to Corcyraean insults.

Passions also rule the reponse to Corinth's actions. When the Corcyraeans perceive that the Corinthians have occupied Epidamnus, they become angry (ἐχαλέπαινον 1.26.3). They now pick sides in the Epidamnian quarrel, harshly (κατ' ἐπήρειαν 1.26.3) requiring the exiled aristocracy of Epidamnus (the only side left to choose, as the *demos* is inside Epidamnus with their Corinthian supporters) to accept them as their patrons. They man forty ships and take the Epidamnian oligarchs with them to Epidamnus. They offer the Epidamnians and Corinthians inside Epidamnus a chance to leave, and, when they do not do this, besiege the city (1.26.4–5). The ironic situation would have been very evident to ancient readers: the oligarchic Corinthians are besieged with the Epidamnian *demos*, while the Corcyraean democrats outside the city are supporting the Epidamnian oligarchy.

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[14] Like the Phaeacians' ships, incidentally, Achilles' armor was magical, including the original armor (i.e. the suit Hector strips from Patroclus before Hephaestus creates the famous armor of book 18). Cf. *Iliad* 18.82–87. The Corcyraeans' identification of their real navy with the Phaeacians' magical navy is surely just as unrealistic as if any individual identified his armor with Achilles' armor.

[15] Cf. Bowie (1993) 144.

[16] Cf. Lendon (2000) 14–15.

In summation of the events so far, Corcyra's weapons have emboldened public displays of contempt for Corinth, and Corinth has responded with armed force. Now the two powers are settled in and around the hostage city of Epidamnus and are on the cusp of one of their habitual wars. Nothing restrains the passions of the combatants; on the contrary, in this story, social institutions such as supplication or the meetings of the Corinthians and their allies have on each occasion been the instruments of inflaming rather than settling the conflict.[17] Furthermore, and as we shall see, negotiations persistently fail. Thucydides' story emphasizes the hatred and anger that overwhelm religious and political ties, and shows the origins of these passions in the dangerous arrogance caused by the possession of wealth and weapons.[18]

As the conflict grows ever larger and more serious, Thucydides will relate two accumulations of force and two battles. He will provide a short account of a battle fought previous to Athenian participation (which modern historians call the Battle of Leukimme), and a much more detailed account of a battle that takes place after the Athenians have become involved (called by historians the Battle of Sybota).

The First Battle between Corinth and Corcyra

In response to the Corcyraean siege of occupied Epidamnus, the Corinthians institute a second subscription for colonists, and begin to raise forces at home as well as among their allies and colonies.[19] Thucydides introduces the allies as substantial contributors to the accumulations of war materials the Corinthians raise for each battle. For this first battle, the Corinthians create a large military force of seventy ships and ten thousand hoplites: thirty of these ships and three thousand of the hoplites are their own, while forty ships and seven thousand hoplites are contributed by eight Peloponnesian allies and two of Corinth's

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[17] Note the similar progress of the Harmodious and Aristogeiton story, which proceeds from insult to action, and in which religious rituals play a role in humiliating key principals (6.54–59).

[18] Cf. Crane (1998) 99, who sees parallels between the breakdown of social institutions here and during the revolution at Corcyra.

[19] The project to resettle Epidamnus – in other words, to replace the Corcyraean colony at Epidamnus with a Corinthian one – is popular at Corinth: it is evident that the oligarchy is enjoying the support of the people in its endeavor to punish Corcyra and gain Epidamnus (1.27.1). The first call for colonists had involved Corinth's allies, Ambracia and Leucas (1.26.1); the second call (1.27.1) seems to be directed toward Corinthian citizens, and is more formal. Equality of terms is promised to those who will go; interested parties who cannot leave immediately are able to secure a share in

northwestern colonies, Leucas and Ambracia.[20] Thucydides lists the contributors city by city, including in his list even cities that can contribute only one ship:

> ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κωλύοιντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν· οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλῆς Κεφαλλήνων τέσσαρσιν. καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐδεήθησαν, οἳ παρέσχον πέντε, Ἑρμιονῆς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζήνιοι δύο, Λευκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ὀκτώ. Θηβαίους δὲ χρήματα ᾔτησαν καὶ Φλειασίους, Ἠλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς καὶ χρήματα.

> And the [Corinthians] asked the Megarians to join in escorting them with ships, in case they should be prevented from sailing by the Corcyraeans. And these prepared to accompany them with eight ships, and with four of Pale of the Kephalanians. And they asked the Epidaurians, who supplied five [ships], and Hermione [supplied] one, and Troizen two; the Leucadians [supplied] ten, and the Ambracians eight. They asked the Thebans and the Phliasians for money, and the Elians for empty ships and money. (1.27.2)

The Corinthian allies are introduced as sources of ships, men, and money. Their contributions are characterized through a stripped-down version of the quantified list standard since the Homeric Catalogue of Ships and Trojan Allies (*Il.* 2.484–877).[21] Before the narration of the Battle of Sybota, Thucydides will employ another list in this style, which refuses individualization of the allies, and characterizes them only by the relative size of their contribution.[22] The isolation of this unqualified statistic makes it instantly evident to the reader that each ally is very small in comparison to Corinth, and certainly in comparison to Corcyraean power. Allies will therefore of necessity obey the larger states whose power to punish them is so great.[23] At the same time, and despite the small size of each ally, the value of their collective contribution is

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the colony with a payment of fifty drachmas. Here, as in the Athenian expedition to Sicily, individual citizens can hope to profit (cf. 6.24.3).

[20] These two cities also have men inside the besieged city, since they were involved in the original expedition. Thus their participation is understandable. It is also ultimately tragic. Except for the Corinthians, all foreigners inside Epidamnus will be sold into slavery when Corcyra wins the sea battle (1.29.5).

[21] The verbs of this list, as Gomme points out (*HCT* ad loc.), are all aorists: "they asked, and they received." Thucydides' list is frank: it does not show the allies as volunteers, but rather as responding to Corinth's request, where the consequences of refusal were well known.

[22] Cf. 1.46.1. Individualization through ethnographic description was characteristic of Herodotean lists of allies, most famously at Hdt. 7.61–99.

[23] On the "imperial intentions" of Corinth's colonial hegemony, cf. Graham (1983) 151, and Salmon (1984) 279.

instantly evident: where the Corcyraeans must fight on their own, and furnish all of their own resources, over half of the Corinthian expedition comes from allied cities and colonies.

Upon learning about the expedition, Corcyraean emissaries go to Corinth with Spartan and Sicyonian ambassadors in an attempt to negotiate a settlement (1.28.1).[24] The Corcyraeans offer to refer the matter either to arbitrators or to Delphi (1.28.2), and threaten to find "allies other than the present ones" (1.28.3) if the Corinthians should force a war upon them.[25] They also propose a truce for the length of the negotiations (1.28.5).[26] But neither threats nor promises interest the Corinthians, who "obeyed none of [the Corcyraean proposals]" (1.29.1). On the contrary, as soon as their ships are manned, they send a herald to declare war and sail north toward Epidamnus with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, in order to make war on the Corcyraeans (1.29.1).[27] The Corinthians have spurned the opportunity for negotiations, and are trusting to their own and allied military force to enforce their supremacy at Epidamnus.

The Corcyraeans, however, do not allow the Corinthians to pass Corcyra, much less approach Epidamnus, but send a herald to the Corinthians when they reach the temple of Apollo at Actium (which is about seventy nautical miles southeast of the nearest part of the island of Corcyra).[28] At the same time, they man their fleet, "yoking [i.e. reinforcing with cables] the old ships so that they would sail, and outfitting the others" (1.29.3).[29] Although forty of the Corcyraeans' ships are

[24] On Sparta's failure to control this widening conflict, cf. Wilson (1987) 29.

[25] This is an interesting way of speaking, since the Corcyraeans are not officially allied to anyone. Their words are a threat to turn to Athens, since although they were not allied, their dependence on Corinth aligned them with the Peloponnesians. Cf. *HCT* ad loc. The Corinthians deploy this same threat against the Spartans at 1.71.4–5.

[26] Salmon (1984) 284: "There was no reasonable grounds for rejecting the final suggestion: that both sides should remain as they were under truce until the arbitration had been completed … since [Corinth could negotiate] without even putting herself into a position in which she would have to accept the decision of the arbitrators, whatever it was." Cf. Stahl (2006) 305. However, Wilson (1987) 34 argues the following: "…all [Corcyraean proposals] … tacitly ceded at least some rights of intervention and negotiation to Corcyra, something the Corinthians could not allow…" In other words, the reason that Corinth will not negotiate is not that the terms are unreasonable, but that she will not treat Corcyra as an equal.

[27] On the differing numbers of ships at each stage of this account, cf. *HCT* ad loc.

[28] For approximate measurements of nautical distance in this area of Greece, see J. S. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000) 62–79.

[29] A large variety of tasks accomplished with ropes is called "yoking" in the prose of this period. Cf. *CT* ad loc.

besieging Epidamnus, the Corcyraeans manage to put together the rest of their navy (eighty ships) in time to meet the Corinthians. One might suspect that a navy put together in this improvised way would not win a sea battle. However, the Corcyraeans defeat the Corinthians "by far" (1.29.5), destroying fifteen Corinthian ships.[30]

In addition to insults, the Corinthians have now suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of their colonists.[31] Thucydides once again attributes the ensuing accumulation of weapons to passion:

> τὸν δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ὕστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῇ φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυπηγοῦντο καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεῶν στόλον.

> For the whole year after the sea battle, and for the next year, the Corinthians, furious over the war with the Corcyraeans, were building ships and very energetically preparing a naval expedition. (1.31.1)

Just as the Corcyraean navy was at the basis of the initial conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, this new Corinthian buildup will be the catalyst for the next stage of the conflict. Before going on to describe this buildup and its consequences, however, Thucydides records Corcyra's reaction to the victory at Leukimme. His depiction focuses on Corcyra's treatment of those who now fall within the reach of her power. Epidamnus falls to the Corcyraeans on the same day as the Corinthians lose the sea battle. The Corcyraeans hold the Corinthians in the city as prisoners, whereas the other foreigners (ἐπήλυδας) are sold (1.29.5). The results of the sea battle are similar, but more drastic for Corinth's allies: the Corcyraeans keep the Corinthians captive, but kill the allied prisoners (1.30.1).[32]

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[30] Much later, the Corinthians will turn such improvisation against the Athenians themselves, and also win (7.36.2). In Thucydides, "ordinary" (φαῦλος) and/or improvised weapons can be an actual advantage to their possessors: weapons do not need to look good in order to do the job. As we learned from the Archaeology, people are vulnerable to appearances, so that beautiful weapons, like an accumulation of weapons the possessor considers to be large, can cause unwarranted overconfidence. Weapons considered ordinary do not have this effect, but are just as useful in battle. φαῦλος with war materials in Thucydides: 4.9.1, 4.115.1, 6.21.1, 6.31.3. An important illustration of the effect of beautiful weapons can also be found at 6.31.

[31] This defeat was not unpredictable: in fear of Corcyraean sea power, the Corinthians had walked from Corinth to Apollonia (several hundred kilometers) when they first occupied Epidamnus (1.26.2), and before this battle had asked the Megarians to accompany them "in case the Corcyraeans would prevent them from sailing" (1.27.2). Thus, although they knew that the Corcyraeans were a strong sea power, they rushed to attack them. Salmon (1984) 283 emphasizes that Corinthian confidence that an enemy this large would be easy to defeat was poorly founded from the beginning.

[32] Wilson (1987) 31 (contra *HCT* ad loc) argues that no formal reasons existed why the Corcyraeans would kill these prisoners. He refers to 1.53.3 to support his view that

During the next summer, the Corcyraeans "rule the whole sea in that area" (1.30.2). They use their power to take violent revenge on the coastal cities, ravaging Leucadian land, and sacking the harbor of Elis "because they supplied ships and money to the Corinthians" (1.30.2). They also sail against any other Corinthian allies they can reach (1.30.3), showing no sympathy for the fact that the Corinthian colonies and allies were compelled to contribute to a party they themselves are fighting a war to escape.[33]

Thucydides' account of the fate of the smaller cities and their citizens brings the problem of force into sharp focus. Epidamnus is a hostage to the power interests of the mother cities. Corinth's allies are compelled to fight Corinth's imprudent wars, and harshly abused by Corcyra when Corinth loses. To make matters worse, their lands are destroyed when Corcyra decides to send a message about the price of aiding Corinth. The allies can escape neither Corinth nor Corcyra.[34] Their predicament vividly demonstrates why cities struggle to accumulate the men, money, and weapons they hope will secure for them the independence the Corcyraeans now claim.[35]

Corinth and Corcyra at Athens

Corcyraean independence is now threatened, however. When the proportions of the second, much larger Corinthian naval buildup become evident, the Corcyraeans take belated fright (ἐφοβοῦντο 1.31.2). Although they themselves provoked Corinth's hatred, they must now fear the consequences. They had long since threatened to go to Athens for help in this situation (cf. 1.28.3).

The Corinthians also go to Athens "in order to prevent that the [Athenian] navy, coming in addition to the Corcyraean navy, would

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the action displays the Corcyraeans as "bloodthirsty" (31). Perhaps, however, they are simply determined to instill terror in Corinth's smaller allies.

[33] The Corcyraean treatment of these smaller powers is consistent with her original impolitic treatment of Epidamnus: despite the opportunity, the Corcyraeans trust to their own power, and make no attempt to attach these cities to themselves.

[34] Cf. Corinth's argument (1.38.5) that the allies should yield to the Corinthians even when they make mistakes, and her argument at 1.40.5 that it is every established power's right to punish their allies. The Corinthians also claim that their allies love them (1.38.3).

[35] The Corcyraeans are not exceptional in their behavior toward smaller powers, but are merely passing along to others what the Corinthians did to them. On past Corinthian cruelty to the Corcyraeans, cf. Hdt. 3.48–53.

become a hindrance to managing the war in the way they wanted" (1.31.3). Thus the Corcyraeans will compete to include and the Corinthians to exclude the Athenian navy from entering the coming struggle: neither side seems to consider that the Athenians might use the situation to achieve their own aims.

The speeches at Athens contrast to the explanatory narrative context Thucydides has provided in one important way, namely in that the Corinthians never mention their naval buildup, although it is the reason why the Corcyraeans, a strong naval power, must make a request for help.[36] As we shall see, despite Corinth's motivated silence, the Corinthian naval effort is a dominant issue and has a marked effect on the Athenians' response to Corcyra's request and Corinth's argument.[37]

The Corcyraeans speak first. They begin their speech by arguing that it is only just for them to show that fulfilling their request will be expedient, or at least not harmful, for Athens (1.32.1; cf.1.35.5).[38] The substance of this expedience turns out to be their navy, for as even the Corcyraeans are unable to conceal, what they bring otherwise is mostly enemies.[39] They repeatedly emphasize, however, that the enemies they bring are really Athens' enemies already (1.33.3, 1.35.4 and 5, 1.36.1). Moreover, they promise that they themselves will be the most faithful of allies; they will remember it forever, they claim, if the Athenians now preserve them from the Corinthian attack (1.33.1). They thus claim the standpoint of an abused smaller city that seeks protection with a larger power (1.32.5, 1.33.1, 1.35.3–4).

This plea bears an ironic similarity to the plea the Epidamnian factions made to them. However, there is an important difference between Corcyra's plea to Athens and Epidamnus' plea to Corcyra, namely, Corcyra's expectation that Athens will recognize the value of Corcyra's navy.[40] Corcyra has no previous treaty, alliance, or relationship of any kind to Athens (1.31.2). Rather, the similarity in the military forces and,

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[36] On the relation of speech and narrative, particularly at the beginning of the history, cf. Dewald in *OCRST* 139: "…the way that the initial narratives are constructed in Thucydides sets up a fissured consciousness, split absolutely between the viewpoint of the Thucydides' narrator, who understands the full range of the factors involved in events, and those of the various speakers whose partial and highly engaged albeit intelligent arguments he allows the speeches to focalize." Cf. Stahl (2006) 310.

[37] Cf. Legon (1973) 162.

[38] Cf. Crane (1998) 106–108 on justice and expedience in both speeches.

[39] Cf. Stahl (2006) 307.

[40] Cf. the apt summary of the Corcyraean speech in Kitto (1966) 293–294: "War is coming for certain. We Corcyraeans are in danger from Corinth; if you help us now you

in fact, of the military materials of the two cities is the basis for Corcyra's argument that Athens should do for Corcyra what Corcyra did not do for the Epidamnians.

In order to make their argument, the Corcyraeans stress the size of their navy, introducing it as an element of power early on in their speech, when they remind the Athenians that in the recent sea battle they defeated the Corinthians by themselves (1.32.5). Their tone is materialistic: they treat the size of their navy as the power of their navy, and stress that Athens is lucky to be offered such a valuable navy as a gift. They imply that the Athenians would sooner or later have made efforts to acquire this navy; by good fortune, however, the Corcyraeans have themselves arrived at Athens and will spare the Athenians from expending resources to harness Corcyra's power:

> …ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ' ὑμῖν πλεῖστον. [2] καὶ σκέψασθε· τίς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἢ τίς τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἂν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσγενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν, καὶ προσέτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετήν, οἷς δὲ ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν, ὑμῖν δ' αὐτοῖς ἰσχύν· ἃ ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον οὐχ ἧσσον διδόντες ἢ ληψόμενοι παραγίγνονται.

> …and we have acquired the biggest navy except for yours. Only consider: what good luck is more unusual, or more painful to your enemies, than if that power which you would have valued over much money and good will to be added to you comes by itself, self-announced, giving itself without danger and expense, and bringing in addition courage to the many, joy to those whom you defend, and strength to yourselves. And in all of time, all of these things at the same time have been available for few men, and few who ask for an alliance arrive among those to whom they appeal giving safety and honor no less than taking it. (1.33.1–2)

Corcyraean rhetoric in this passage is classicizing and sublime. Responding tricolon constructions emphasize the courage, joy, and strength Athens will receive without any effort, since the big navy comes by itself, self-announced, giving itself without danger and expense. Likewise, a triple dose of absolute claims (cf. all of time, all of these things, at the same time) emphasizes the uniqueness of the opportunity.[41]

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will win our everlasting gratitude; you will also have on your side the second biggest navy in Greece."

[41] Note also the parallel comparatives σπανιωτέρα and λυπηροτέρα of the Corcyraeans' first statement, emphasizing that rare good luck for Athens corresponds to a rare

In this passage, the Corcyraeans willingly identify their entire power as their navy, which they lay at the Athenians' feet as a gift unique in history. In the Corcyraean presentation, the possession of a sizable navy is an unparalleled advantage, and they argue that the Athenians are incomparably lucky to be offered such a gift: the Corcyraean navy, which brings advantages (security, courage, joy, safety, and honor) for which the Athenians might otherwise supplicate the gods, is a nearly divine thing.

Thucydides' presentation of Corcyra's defeat at Sybota will constitute the most vivid possible repudiation of the claims made here. By contrast, in the previous passage, the Corcyraeans take victory for granted, and see themselves and the Athenians as sharing "safety and honor" when they combine their naval forces. Thus Corcyraean rhetoric shares with Periclean rhetoric the tendency to describe navies as reliable guarantors of security. But Pericles was never compelled to make such claims to a larger power, as the Corcyraeans must do here: Corcyra's claims are corrected not only by their refutation in Thucydides' description of the Battle of Sybota, but also by their immediate reception at Athens. Thucydides sets up this correction in an ironic way, giving to the Corcyraeans words suggestive of the plan the Athenians ultimately adopted.[42]

According to the Corcyraeans, the possession of a large navy sets its possessors far above those who have no navy, or only a smaller one. This advantage is to be guarded by any means, they argue, and they go so far as to state that Athens should aim at either the exclusive possession of all significant Greek navies, or the elimination of all navies besides their own:

> καὶ ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἠπειρώτιδος τῆς ξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἄλλον ἐᾶν κεκτῆσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅστις ἐχυρώτατος, τοῦτον φίλον ἔχειν.

> And since we offer a naval rather than a land alliance, the alienation of our forces would be a more important problem [i.e. more important than the alienation of a land power], but rather [i.e. rather than endure the alienation of a naval power], it would be best, if you are able, to allow no one else to possess ships, but if you do not do this, to have the strongest [naval] powers as your allies. (1.35.5)

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chance to cause Athens' enemies (Corinth, for instance) pain and frustration, and the emphatic repetition of ὀλίγοι in the final clauses.

[42] Cf. Stadter (1983) 134.

In dense and elusive language, a contrast to the beautiful order and noble terms of the passage just reviewed, the Corcyraeans argue that the Athenians should seek to monopolize naval power. The best course of action would be for Athens to eliminate other navies. Failing this, they should absorb them. It follows from their argument that Athens' securest course of action would be to crush Corcyra, with absorption (which is Corcyra's whole policy, seen from the Athenian point of view) being only the second-best plan.

The Corcyraeans seem to take for granted that the Athenians will not try to realize this recommendation at their expense. They likely believe that their navy is too attractive, since they see it as power that can be instantly added to Athens' power, for the Athenians to think of destroying it. Their fascination with their own power has misled them, therefore, into suggesting to the bold Athenians the plan they will ultimately attempt to realize, not only against the Corcyraeans, but simultaneously against Corinth. As Thucydides' narration of the battle of Sybota will reveal, the Athenians are far less impressed with Corcyra's power than the Corcyraeans themselves. They have contempt for Corcyra's old-fashioned navy (cf. 1.49.1–4), and Corcyraean delusions of power and greatness in this speech may well have struck them as ludicrous.[43]

The Corcyraeans, however, believe that they are making the Athenians an offer of present power that will be almost impossible to refuse. The conclusion of the Corcyraean speech states their view as frankly as possible:

> βραχυτάτῳ δ᾽ ἂν κεφαλαίῳ, τοῖς τε ξύμπασι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τῷδ᾽ ἂν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μάθοιτε· τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἕλλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων· τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἅμα ναυμαχήσετε, δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἕξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναυσὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

43　While fewer members of the Athenian assembly of 433 BCE may have been familiar with Herodotus, many would have been aware of Corcyraean nonparticipation at Salamis. Herodotus reports that the Corcyraeans already had a sizable fleet of sixty triremes in 480 BCE, when they were called upon to join the Greeks at the Battle of Salamis (7.168.2). However, because they were expecting that the Persians would be victorious, they did not send these ships to the battle. According to Herodotus, the Corcyraeans expected to claim their nonparticipation in the battle as a deliberate favor to Xerxes. He provides a short account of the speech they had planned to speak to the victorious Persian king: "'O King [they think of saying] we, although the Greeks were inviting us to participate in this war, since we have no small power, nor supply the smallest number of ships, but rather, the most [ships] next to the Athenians, did not wish to oppose you or to displease you in any way.' By saying these things they

To sum up the whole and the individual points in the shortest way, learn why you should not cast us aside. There are three navies worth mentioning in Greece: yours, ours, and the Corinthian navy. If you disregard that two of these become one, and the Corinthians take us before you do, you will fight the Corcyraeans and the Peloponnesians at the same time. But if you accept us, you will be able to fight them with more ships, namely ours. (1.36.3)

Here are words the dullest member of the Athenian assembly could be expected to understand. Our navy, the Corcyraeans argue, is a threat if the Corinthians gain it, but an advantage if you absorb it now. The conclusion to the Corcyraean speech enshrines the view that war with the Peloponnesian League is inevitable, and treats navies as weapons in which size is equivalent to power. Since the Corcyraean navy is large, they argue, it would obviously be a benefit to Athens in the coming war, and its alienation would be an obvious disadvantage. Before comparing these contentions to Thucydides' explanations of Athens' decision, we are invited to compare the Corcyraean view to the Corinthians' opposing speech.

In Thucydides, every Corinthian speech, including even the shortest one (1.53.2), begins with blame or praise of someone. In this first speech, the Corinthians begin by condemning Corcyraean materialism and greed.[44] They mention what the narrative has already shown, namely that wealth has led the Corcyraeans to behavior that the Corinthians think is brazenly hubristic (1.38.2–5, cf. 1.25.3–4). Moreover, they argue that Corcyraean wealth is ill-gotten and that the Corcyraeans' general isolation from other Greeks is the result of their desire to have privacy in which to pursue criminal activities (1.37.2–4).[45] Corinthian jealousy of Corcyraean wealth seems evident in this opening attempt at character assassination, but the Corinthians also make more substantial points, arguing, for instance, that if the Corcyraeans had wanted to offer the Athenians a share of their power, they should have come forward when that power was not compromised by involvement in a war with a

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hoped to get something more than the others" (Hdt. 7.168.3). Herodotus imputes to his Corcyraeans materialistic priorities similar to those we find in Thucydides. Furthermore, like Thucydides' Corcyraeans, Herodotus' Corcyraeans present their navy as valuable because of its number of ships, and also boast that it is second in size to the Athenian navy.

[44] Corcyraean πλεονεξία in this speech: 1.37.4; hubris and too much money: 1.38.5; violent πλεονεξία: 1.40.1.

[45] The Corinthians are essentially accusing the Corcyraeans of piracy. The difference between the extortion practiced by powers such as Corinth and Athens, and outright robbery, such as the Corinthians are here suggesting is practiced by the Corcyraeans,

better-established power whom they have insulted, but rather when it was available to use without dragging Athens into enmities with other major powers (1.39.3).

This is a strong argument. The Corinthians argue further that the Athenians should consider the political context of the choice that lies before them. They maintain that Athens' advantage lies in not making mistakes (1.42.2); war with the Peloponnesians could be forestalled or prevented with good decisions, such as the decision to support Corinth in the matter of punishing (1.43.1) Corcyra. The Athenians:

> …μηδ' ὅτι ναυτικοῦ ξυμμαχίαν μεγάλην διδόασι, τούτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ τῳ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν.

> …should not be dragged along by this, [namely] that [the Corcyraeans] offer the great alliance of a navy. For not wronging similar [states] is a securer power than to have more (πλέον ἔχειν), [taking it] because you are excited by that which is presently visible, despite the risks. (1.42.4)

If the Athenians decide for Corcyra, they will be displaying that they can be "dragged along" (ἐφέλκεσθαι) by a bribe, namely, Corcyra's navy, and that like children, they forget prudent policy toward similar powers (as the Corinthians claim to be) because they become excited when someone dangles a prize in front of them. These contemptuous suggestions are supported by a verbal trick that displays the Corinthians' scorn for Corcyra: the Corinthians transfer the epithet "great" from the word "navy" to the word "alliance," producing the phrase "great alliance of a navy." The phrase points out that the entire substance of the Corcyraeans' alliance is their navy, since they have nothing else to offer. According to the Corinthians, the Athenians should resist the temptation to absorb this navy. "That which is presently visible," the 120 Corcyraean ships, are a bribe the Corcyraeans are offering to entice the Athenians to break the pan-Hellenic agreements. They seem to the Corinthians a less reliable guarantor of safety than an invisible concord within the traditional political context of the Greek *poleis* (cf. "…the laws of the Greeks" 1.41.1: κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους).

The Corinthian speech would be more convincing to the reader if the narrative had shown that the Corinthians themselves trust the *nomoi* of

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is important in the minds of Greek powers that practice extortion (cf. 1.77.3–4). However, Thucydides seems to question whether the distinction is justified (cf. the explanations of 1.8.3 and 1.98.4–99.1, which both speak of the enslavement of those from whom income is extorted).

the Greeks. Instead, Thucydides has shown that the Corinthians rely on armed force. They rushed to apply force at Epidamnus, and then refused arbitration before the Battle of Leukimme. As they speak, they are angrily engaged in building up the largest possible fleet in order to correct their initial defeat. Corinthian condemnations of Corcyraean and Athenian materialism are therefore not matched by an equally frank explanation of their own behavior, since the Corinthians' massive buildup of men and materials goes entirely unmentioned in their speech. While the Corinthians argue that it is their right to punish Corcyra (1.40.5, 1.43.1), their self-serving silence is meaningful to the reader, who, along with the Athenians, will suspect that their emphasis on preserving the status quo has an ulterior motive. For as the Corcyraeans have already made plain (1.36.3), if the Corinthians defeat Corcyra, they themselves will acquire the navy they are advising the Athenians to reject.[46]

Thucydides reports that the Athenians held two assembly meetings after the Corinthians and Corcyraeans spoke. In the first assembly, they tended more toward the Corinthian argument. But in the second meeting, they decided to close a defensive alliance (ἐπιμαχία) with Corcyra (1.44.1).

Just as neither Corinth nor Corcyra had the interests of Epidamnus in mind when they sponsored one side or the other in the Epidamnian struggle, so the Athenians have no thought of benefiting Corcyra with this alliance. On the contrary, they intend that the Corcyraeans will continue to suffer from Corinthian aggression for as long as possible, since the continued fighting will wear down both sides:

> ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὣς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν, ἤν τι δέῃ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. ἅμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κεῖσθαι.

> For they thought it likely that there would be a war with the Peloponnesians, and they did not want to throw away Corcyra to the Corinthians when she possessed such a big navy, but as much as possible to wear them down

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[46] Cf. 1.68.4, where the Corinthians advertise to the Spartans that when the Athenians "took Corcyra by fraud," they captured the power "that supplied the most ships to the Peloponnesians." They are chastising the Spartans for losing control of the Corcyraean war materials they advised the Athenians to ignore, and it seems most likely that they recognized their potential value all along.

upon each other, so that both the Corinthians and also the other powers possessing navies would be weaker, if it could be done, when they began the war. And at the same time, the island seemed to lie conveniently for the crossing to Italy and Sicily. (1.44.2–3)

The Athenians have responded not so much to the speeches as to the coming war and the material preparations of each side.[47] They do not particularly value the Corcyraean navy, which they are prepared to see destroyed, but do not want to see the Corinthians strengthened by the addition of this navy to their own. Thus they will support the Corcyraeans against the Corinthians because they believe it is in their own interest to weaken the navies of both sides as much as possible.[48] The ἐπιμαχία allows Athens to accomplish this aim without breaking the letter of the thirty-year treaties by which the Spartan and Athenian alliances were at that time governing their affairs.

Athens' policy seems "fiendishly clever,"[49] but it shares some principles with the much less clever Corcyraean argument: Athenian policy in this matter, be it ever so subtle, is founded on the idea that weakening the naval power of Corinth and Corcyra will make the Peloponnesians less dangerous adversaries in the coming war. As we shall see, events will prove that this assumption is less valid than the Athenians believe.[50]

The Athenians' similar attitudes toward war materials constitute one aspect of their similarity to the Corcyraeans; others are not far to seek. The Athenian view that war with Sparta is inevitable is not a result of the Corcyraean speech. Nevertheless, the Athenians have concluded that war is on its way. Clearly, they believe that they can win this war, since their decision shows that they feel sufficient to provoking Corinth, an important Peloponnesian ally, to this extent. This attitude is strongly reminiscent of Corcyraean over-confidence; moreover, Thucydides tells us that for the Athenians "the [Corcyraean] island seemed to lie conveniently for the crossing to Italy and Sicily." Their plan for Corcyra reflects long-term,

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[47] Cf. Crane (1998) 123: "They neither value Corinth's services in the past, nor seek future *charis* from either Corinth or Corcyra."

[48] Hornblower (1994) following Badian (1993), argues that "Thucydides systematically understated Athenian aggressiveness in the run up to the war." I agree with Stahl (2006) 331 that this is not the case. Athens' motivations in this matter are clearly delineated by the narrator.

[49] Stahl (2006) 314; "Machiavellian": Stadter (1983) 131. On the opposing idea (i.e. that the ἐπιμαχία was a moderate Periclean policy designed to encounter Corinthian aggression) cf. Bloedow (1991) 193–196, with note 21.

[50] Thus, if it is correct that this policy was Periclean, the reader may recognize even here a reference to Periclean materialism going awry. Cf. e.g. Salmon (1984) 288 or

post victoriam imperial ambitions. These imperial ambitions depend on Athens' navy. The Athenians may therefore see through Corcyra's delusions of naval grandeur when they formulate their ἐπιμαχία, but their own similar dreams of naval glory persist unabated.[51]

νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη (Biggest in its Multitude of Ships): The Naval Battle between Corinth and Corcyra

Two hundred and sixty triremes fight at the Battle of Sybota. One hundred are disabled or destroyed; seventy of these are Corcyraean ships. Athenian policy, which was founded on material considerations, backfires; as a result of the battle, Corinth is inflamed against Athens, and her navy is barely weakened. This slight weakness is unimportant for Corinth's ability to raise the larger war against Athens: her true power, which she will now energetically use, lies in her influence with Sparta and Sparta's allies. At the same time, the Corcyraeans' violent improvidence costs them their navy. They become weak Athenian dependents, and the Corinthian capture of important Corcyraean prisoners (1.55.1) begins Corcyra's slide into self-annihilation.

Thus if any victor emerges from this battle, it is Corinth, but the victory is gained at the immediate cost of the inhuman murder of Corinthian allies, and a deeper commitment to the hatreds that cause Corinth to become the most energetic proponent of the destructive war with Athens. The consequences of the Battle of Sybota are therefore catastrophic for every party; moreover, Thucydides frames his account of the battle itself in a tragic mode that stresses the blindness of the combatants and the waste of lives their actions cause.

Thucydides' presentation of the sea battle that was "biggest in its multitude of ships" of any Greek-on-Greek naval battle to that date (1.50.2) begins with an explanation of the numbers of these ships. He first describes the small Athenian force and its mission (1.45), and next provides a breakdown of the huge Corinthian navy, which he follows out to the coast of western Greece (1.46). A description of the Corcyraean forces and the supporting infantry of both sides precedes the relation of the battle itself (1.47). Thucydides' account of the number and position

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Badian (1993) 160 and note 62. However, the notion that the policy is Periclean relies on Plutarch (*Per.* 29.1–2). Cf. Stadter (1983) 135 note 7 and Will (2003) 171 on the weakness of Plutarch's attribution of this policy to Pericles.

[51] Cf. Connor (1984) 35–36 on the foreshadowing of the Sicilian disaster in this passage.

of the ships each city is sending to the battle shows how the combatants fulfilled the policies and passions described in the preceding narrative; it also closes his depiction of the decisions over which the combatants had some control. At the same time, the passage naturally provides information necessary for understanding the battle. To view such sections of the text as simply informational, however, passes over their important function as transitions between the narrative of relations between states and the narrative of the physical contest between armed forces (i.e. battle narrative).[52]

The Athenians are sending ten triremes (1.45.1). Athenian numbers reflect their chosen policy of provoking the two parties to further debilitating warfare while appearing not to attack Corinth or break the treaties (1.44.2).[53] In order not to break the treaty, the captains of the ten triremes have been commanded not to attack the Corinthians unless they disembark on Corcyra or her properties (1.45.1–3). The small Athenian numbers also reflect Athenian confidence (which is revealed to be overconfidence, cf. 1.50.5) that ten Athenian ships will be able to defend themselves and potentially also the Corcyraeans in a very large battle.

Corinthian numbers, by contrast, are apparently limited only by necessity. The Corinthians are sending a huge force of 150 ships to Corcyra (1.46.1). The size of Athens' meager addition to the Corcyraean cause is quickly set in the context of the Corinthian allies' contributions: Athens is sending as many ships to Corcyra as very small cities such as Elis and Leucas bring to Corinth.[54] "…and the Corinthians, when everything was ready, sailed to Corcyra with 150 ships. There were ten of the Elians, twelve of the Megarians, and ten of the Leucadians, twenty-seven of Ambracians and one of the Anactorians…" (1.46.1). Allied contributions have grown substantially since the muster for Leukimme; however, Corinth herself has made the supreme effort, and has built up a fleet of ninety ships (1.46.1).[55] Corinth's numbers expose a determination

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[52] Cf. de Romilly's extensive treatment of the organization of Thucydidean battle narrative in *OCRST* 359–380.

[53] Cf. Wilson (1987) 52–53.

[54] The small size of the Athenian contingent contrasts sharply to Corcyraean pride in the grand size (as they see it) of their own navy. If numbers are glorious, then the Athenian contribution is inglorious.

[55] This huge increase in Corinthian forces was accomplished in a short time. Cf. Legon (1973) 162: in two years, the fifteen Corinthian triremes that survived Leukimme became ninety. The allied increases listed here are tragic, since the allies will endure the disastrous Corinthian murders recorded at 1.50.1–2.

to outdo Corcyraean numbers by a large margin, and by doing this to ensure the victory that escaped them at Leukimme.

We expect, at this point in the narrative, to hear about the numbers and divisions of the Corcyraean navy. Instead, Thucydides interrupts his description of the competing navies to bring the Corinthians to the west coast. A description of the topography of Chimerium, the site at which the Corinthians lay anchor and make camp, follows:

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν ἠπείρῳ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πλέοντες, ὁρμίζονται ἐς Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος γῆς. ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἐφύρη. ἐξίησι δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ἐς θάλασσαν· διὰ δὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐσβάλλει ἐς αὐτήν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ Θύαμις ποταμός, ὁρίζων τὴν Θεσπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὧν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κορίνθιοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὁρμίζονταί τε καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο.

> And when, sailing from Leucas, the [Corinthians] had reached the continent across from Corcyra, they anchored at Thesprotian Chimerium. It is a harbor, and a city lies above it away from the sea, namely, Ephyre, in Thesprotian Elaiatis. Through this harbor the Acherusian marsh empties into the sea. The Acheron River empties into [this marsh] as it flows through Thesprotis, which is how the marsh gets its name. The Thyamis River also flows there, bordering Thesprotis and Kestrine, between which [rivers] the Chimerium promontory rises. And so the Corinthians anchored in this part of the continent, and made camp (1.46.3–5).

This description, which is dense with names and details, is something of a mystery, particularly as the area described plays no role in the battle.[56] The description shows a promontory of land rising amid marshes and rivers in the Greek northwest.[57] This highland is close to the coast, and likely windy enough. This perhaps accounts for the name Χειμέριον, which means "stormy or wintery." The implications of this are bad enough, considering that the Corinthians are present with such

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[56] If the Corcyraean attack on the Corinthian camp (1.49.5) was an attack on Chimerium, Thucydides does not say so. Contra Wilson (1987) 46–47.

[57] Poppo (ad loc.) calls this passage (beginning with ἔστι δὲ λιμήν) *ekphrasis*. The description is fully elaborated. It has a complete narrative frame, i.e. the statements at the beginning and the end that the Corinthians laid anchor. Three successive sentences begin with verbs (ἔστι, ἐξίησι, ῥεῖ) and each sentence provides new natural or topographical information; the description is therefore very dense. The announcement of the name of the city Ephyra is delayed by hyperbaton; by contrast, the names of physical features (the Acherusian marsh, Acheron River, and Thuamis River) are conjoined. Cf. Rusten (forthcoming), who mentions *Iliad* 6.152. The passage is not mentioned by Funke and Haake (2006), who are unnecessarily disappointed in Thucydides' geographical descriptions.

a large navy, but worse is that the Corinthians are parked in waters from the Acherusian marsh, which is fed by the Acheron River. Notice that Thucydides anchors his reference to the Acherusian marsh with an explanation of the name that allows for no mistakes: this really is the water of the Acheron, flowing out to sea. Thucydides and his readers might have been very unfamiliar with the topography of the Greek northwest.[58] But he could certainly count on readers to recognize the name of the Acheron River, whose waters flowed from Hades.[59] The strong suggestion of ill omen seems to be the purpose of this description.

Thucydides tells us that once the Corinthians make camp, the Corcyraeans perceive that they have arrived and man a fleet of 110 ships (1.47.1). Corcyra's numbers have sunk somewhat, but not much, since the beginning of the conflict with Corinth, when she had 120 ships (1.25.4). One hundred and ten ships is an enormous number for any one city to bring to sea. Nevertheless, one might have expected the Corcyraeans to have built up their forces in response to the Corinthian threat. Had they been counting on more Athenian support?[60] Counting the ten ships of the Athenians – but these have been ordered not to attack unless the Corinthians threaten to disembark on Corcyra (1.45.3) – the Corcyraeans again have 120 ships. They make their battle camp across from the Corinthians on "one of the islands called Sybota" (1.47.1).[61]

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[58] Certainly, this description is so inaccurate as to be mostly unrecognizable to scholars. Cf. Wilson (1987) 37–39. *HCT* ad loc. claims that the description of Chimerium is "the chief error in Thucydides."

[59] Better-educated ancient readers might also have been familiar with some of the following facts: the only *necromanteion* (oracle of the dead) in Greece was nearby. On this oracle and its practices, cf. Luck (2006) 11–13. In Herodotus (5.92.2), the Corinthian tyrant Periander, that arch-foe of the Corcyraeans, had consulted this oracle of the dead. Furthermore, a (non-Homeric) tradition is recorded that the Phaeacians, whose inheritors the Corcyraeans claimed to be, had been ferrymen of the dead (cf. Howie [1989] 29). According to Pausanias' description (10.28.1–29.1) Polygnotus' painting, the *Nekuia*, situated in the Cnidian lounge at Delphi, gave the river Acheron central prominence. The area was thus associated with the threshold of death and contact with Hades.

[60] Or did they never suspect that the Corinthian navy could grow so large in so short a time? Whatever the reason may be, the Corcyraeans have not translated their wealth into defensive capacity. Contrast the Athenians under Themistocles (1.14.3, Hdt. 7.144). Expecting an attack, as the Corcyraeans do here, they turned available wealth into ships.

[61] On the places called Sybota, another potentially symbolic element of the topographical information offered for this battle, cf. note 78. As for infantry forces at the competing camps, the Corcyraeans are supported by one thousand Zakynthian hoplites stationed on Point Leukimme on Corcyra island. Allied infantry forces on

Thus Thucydides has set up his combatants. The Corinthians, with their huge home force and many allies, are opposed to the Corcyraeans, who are large, but perhaps not large enough. The Corcyraeans are helped only by the Athenians, who, as we know, and the Corcyraeans must surely at this point suspect, are neither sufficient nor aiming to help them.

The Battle: Navies Deployed

The Corinthians put out from Chimerium by night.[62] At dawn, the two parties see each other on the open water and take up positions that represent plans and strategies.[63] Once the battle begins, however, these positions all but disappear from the reader's mind, since Thucydides does not begin his account with a tale of events, but rather describes the nature of the fighting, assimilating the Corinthians and Corcyraeans to one character: seen from the Athenian point of view, the belligerents have the same equipment, the same deficiencies and difficulties, and the same experience of the "huge din and confusion" of the battle.

ξυμμείξαντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα ἑκατέροις ἤρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστάς, τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι. ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀπελύοντο ὑπό τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὁπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἳ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν νεῶν· διέκπλοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἦσαν, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ. πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία…

And they met, once the standards had been raised for each side, and both sides were fighting at sea with many hoplites on their decks, and many archers and javelin throwers, since they were still equipped in a more

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the continent support the Corinthians: these are non-Greeks, who have come to help "since they have always been friendly to the Corinthians" (1.47.3).

[62] The narrator marks the progressing time of day carefully: on the first night the Corinthians rest in the waters of the Acheron; they leave Chimerium while it is still night (1.48.1); the combatants see each other at dawn (1.48.2); it is late afternoon when they see the Athenian reinforcements approaching (1.50.5); then it is dark (1.51.3), and finally it is night once again (1.51.5).

[63] The Corcyraeans place their boats in three groups, apparently one behind the other, and place the ten Athenian ships on the extreme right (1.48.3). The Corinthians adopt a crescent formation. They place their own (i.e. strongest) forces opposite the Athenians, and position their strongest allies against the Corcyraeans' left (1.48.4).

inexperienced old-fashioned way. And it was a fierce sea battle, but not similarly strong in terms of skill, since it was more like an infantry battle. For whenever they would ram one another, they could not easily get free because of the number and crowding of the ships, so that trusting rather more to the hoplites on the deck [i.e. than to naval maneuvers] for victory, once they had established themselves, they fought from stationary ships. And there were no *diekploi*, but rather they fought more with spirit and energy than understanding. And so the sea battle was a huge din and confusion on every side... (1.49.1–4)

All of the sentences in this paragraph deploy comparisons, and all of the comparisons indicate deficiencies in the combatants. Besides accumulating these comparisons, the passage accumulates repetitions that emphasize important details. The large numbers of variously armed *epibatai* are emphasized by anaphora (πολλοὺς μὲν, πολλοὺς δὲ, τε καὶ). The negative reason for the presence of these hoplites, archers, and throwers is stated in two ways (τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον). Vivid noun doublings characterize the crowding, noise, and confusion (cf. πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου, θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ, πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης).

Thucydides' elaborate first paragraph of battle narrative seeks to demonstrate the counterintuitive fact that the Corcyraeans and the Corinthians, by his own account the oldest sea powers in Greece (cf. 1.13.4), are incompetent to fight a sea battle. For all their courage and spirit, from the Athenian point of view, they lack the skill to handle their navies.[64] Instead, in their inexperience, the combatants are fighting an old-fashioned infantry battle from the decks of their ships.[65] Neither are their ships the impressive weapons that the Corcyraean speech, in particular, has led us to expect. In fact, they are hardly weapons at all. Since the combatants are unable to use their ships as weapons (cf. the remark on *diekploi*), the ships rest (ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν

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[64] The Athenian point of view is evident in the mention of the *diekplous*, the unusually dense employment of judgments, and the descriptions of inadequate naval techniques. The *diekplous* was a complicated naval maneuver, which required the attacking party to cross enemy lines and outflank an enemy ship by maneuvering it into a position where it could be rammed in the side. It required speed and great skill, and was a signature move of the Athenian navy at its height. Cf. Warry (1995) 40–53. On the disadvantages of unskilled numbers of boats as opposed to the possession of skill, cf. Phormio's speech at 2.89.

[65] Thucydides' emphasis on the combatants' incompetence might also be seen as a reminder that neither of these parties was accustomed to fighting the more advanced navies of the Aegean. If they had fought at the Battle of Salamis, things might be different. Note that not only the Corcyraean contribution to this battle is in question (cf. Hdt. 7.168). On the Corinthians, cf. Hdt. 8.94.

νεῶν) and become floating platforms for the hoplites who do the actual fighting.[66] It is astonishing to think through what Thucydides is claiming here, since he is saying that these states paid for, built, and manned about 260 triremes, and then brought them out to an important battle without learning how to exploit their potential. The furious haste that impels the Corinthians therefore wastes the weapons upon which they rely for their victory. Moreover, the Corcyraeans cannot handle the navy upon which they have pinned their entire identity.

The result was a chaotic melee of ships. In the next section of the battle narrative, Thucydides separates the combatants back out and devotes a story to showing how passions exacerbate the already overwhelming difficulties of each side, simultaneously following the Athenians as they become entangled in events.

The Athenians are particularly vulnerable to actions taken by their new allies, the Corcyraeans. During the initial phases of naval action, they manage to stay more or less disengaged: obedient to their commands not to attack, they confine their activities to feints toward the Corinthians (1.49.4). However, the Corcyraeans soon prove to be as imprudent as any warring party could possibly be. Despite their disadvantage in numbers, twenty of the Corcyraean ships manage to turn the forces on the right (i.e. allied) side of the Corinthian line. Instead of continuing the battle, these Corcyraean ships sail to the Corinthian camp, where they disembark, burn the deserted tents, and plunder the Corinthians' property:

> μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει· οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώξαντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν.

> Especially the right flank of the Corinthians was in trouble. For the Corcyraeans, having turned the [Corinthian] line with twenty ships and chased the ships to land in small groups, sailed to their camp and disembarked, and [then] burned the empty tents and plundered their property. (1.49.5)

The Corcyraeans have achieved an advantage in the battle – but they sacrifice that advantage for the sake of petty revenge or theft. Once these ships are gone, their colleagues out on the water, who had fewer

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[66] By contrast, the magical ships of the Phaeacians from whom the Corcyraeans claim inherited naval glory sail "swifter than a falcon flies." *Od.* 13.84–89.

ships to start with and are now, as Thucydides says, lacking twenty from this smaller number (τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώξεως οὐ παρουσῶν 1.49.6), are soundly defeated by the Corinthians.

The defection of these twenty ships shows an astonishing lack of discipline (or a reckless overconfidence) among the Corcyraeans, who are forgetting that their island will be defenseless if their navy fails (cf. 1.50.4). Corcyra's "great alliance of a navy" thus fragments and fails for the slightest of causes, and rather than bringing victory to Athens has now caused a situation in which the Athenians are compelled to defend it, and therefore to fight the Corinthians:

> οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπροφασίστως ἐπεκούρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὥστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν τινί· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγίγνετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἴχετο ἤδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους.

> Since the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans were hard pressed, accordingly they helped them with less hesitation, at first restraining themselves from ramming anyone. But once all could see that the Corcyraean line had been turned and the Corinthians were pressing forward, then all went to work and there was no distinguishing anyone any longer, but rather it came to this (i.e. this familiar, or this expected, or this inevitable?) point of necessity that the Corinthians and Athenians fought one another. (1.49.7)

Thus avoidable Corcyraean imprudence drags the Athenians into the battle, and in order to prevent a Corcyraean defeat and their own likely destruction, the Athenians must fight the Corinthians. Driven by necessity, they cross a threshold from which there will be no return.

The Corcyraean navy is now disappearing into the waters of the northwestern sea, its much advertised glory and Phaeacian legacy crumbling into the shipwrecks that will become a prominent feature of the concluding portions of Thucydides' narrative. Moreover, had the Corinthians handled themselves well in the next phase of the battle, the Athenians might have paid on the spot for their cynical policy of encouraging warfare among neighboring states. However, the Corinthians deny themselves the clear victory in which they have invested such massive resources. Thucydides relates that on the side of the battle where the Corinthians themselves were fighting, they were winning "by far," and

set the Corcyraeans to flight (1.49.6, 1.50.1). Once they have turned the Corcyraean line, however, they forget long-term necessities. Instead of dragging off the valuable hulls of the ships they have defeated, "sailing across enemy lines they turned toward the men, to murder them, rather than to take them alive" (1.50.1).[67] Neither side in this battle can sustain a battle plan: just at the point when they should prosecute their victory, the Corcyraeans allow themselves to turn to plunder and the Corinthians are overwhelmed by hatred.[68]

The Corinthians' revenge goes horribly wrong when they mistakenly kill some of their own allies:[69]

τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὐχ εἷλκον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἃς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν, τούς τε αὑτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ᾐσθημένοι ὅτι ἥσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ, ἀγνοοῦντες ἔκτεινον. πολλῶν γὰρ νεῶν οὐσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχουσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτουν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο· ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς γεγένηται.

When they had routed their enemy, the Corinthians did not tow away the hulls of the ships they had sunk, binding them [to their own ships], but sailing across enemy lines they turned toward the men, to murder them, rather than to take them alive, and their own allies, since the Corinthians had not perceived that those [allies] on the right side of the line had been defeated: not recognizing them, they killed them. For since both sides had

[67] They are far from home and need these hulls, as will become evident later on, when they must fear for their ability to accomplish the voyage back to Corinth because they have nothing with which to repair their ships (1.52.2). On tying up captured vessels: 2.90.6, 4.14.1.

[68] In each case, it is interesting to note, Thucydides shows a characteristic response to available materials: the Corcyraeans grasp at the first plunder that comes within their reach, whereas the Corinthians forget material advantages (i.e. the hulls of the defeated ships) in favor of achieving violent revenge. These responses are consistent with the attitudes the combatants had expressed in their speeches: Corcyra's reverence for wealth and naval power was opposed by Corinth's (perhaps disingenuous) contempt for materialism.

[69] The murder of friends and allies, whether by mistake or not, causes pollution. Cf. Parker (1996) 104–143. In respect to pollution, it is appropriate to be slightly wary of Parker (1996) 13: "The noun *miasma*, ubiquitous in the tragedians, does not occur at all in Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon." The verb certainly occurs, e.g. 2.102.5, and concerns of purity are important: cf. e.g. in the plague story (pollution of temples and other buildings at 2.52.2–3); the story of Alcmeon at 2.102.5, the accusations and counteraccusations surrounding the Athenian occupation of the Boeotian temple at Delium (4.97.1–99.1); the purification of Delos (1.8.1, 3.104); and many references in the latter part of book one (1.126–138), in which the Spartans and Athenians challenge each other to purify their cities of curses.

many ships stretching over a large expanse of the sea, when they met one another it was not easy to tell who was winning or losing. For this naval battle of Greeks against Greeks was the biggest so far in terms of the number of ships. (1.50.1–2)

Thucydides begins the first sentence of this passage by mentioning the prudent thing the Corinthians might have done (i.e. tow away the hulls), had their heads been clear: this is not history, but an imaginary ethical example that sets off the contrasting passionate behavior the Corinthians did in fact display. Next, in the phrase "to murder them, rather than to take them alive," the words "to murder them" would have been sufficient, since whoever is going to murder someone does not intend to take him alive. But again, the extra clause reveals the Corinthians' alternatives, had they been less passionate: they could have taken the men alive. Finally, Thucydides provides a double statement of the human limitations that cause the Corinthians' physical blindness: the Corinthians did not perceive (οὐκ ᾐσθημένοι) that their right wing was being defeated; they did not recognize (ἀγνοοῦντες) their allies on the other side of the line. In fact, no one could easily recognize anyone (οὐ ῥᾳδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο) in such a mass of boats (1.50.1–2). The Corinthians kill as much from confusion and ignorance as from passion. The number of ships on the water, once again depicted as a disadvantage (cf.1.49.1–4), overwhelms human capacities of discrimination.

Thus hatred and confusion blind the Corinthians, who unwittingly kill their allies. It is at this point in the narrative, when he has described the lack of skill characteristic of the main parties, the chaotic battle that ensues, Athenian entanglement, Corcyraean plundering, and Corinthian murder, that Thucydides states that this is the biggest Greek naval battle so far in terms of the number of ships. His presentation leaves no room for calling these navies or this battle glorious because of its size.[70] On the contrary, his description of the battle has emphasized its incompetence, confusion, errors, and crimes.

Blindness and Death in the Waters of Acheron

Thucydides provides this battle narrative with a long and remarkable coda that emphasizes both this battle's destruction of lives and also the

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[70] At the same time, this statement puts the battle in pan-Hellenic context, and helps to define the size of pan-Hellenic affairs in proportion to the presentation of the Athenian acme of materials. Even Corinth's mightiest efforts and the deployment of

blindness and uncertainty of the combatants as night falls on their day
of combat. His statement that the battle was the largest Greek naval
encounter to that date in fact signaled the end of the fighting. However,
neither the reader nor the combatants realize this yet. In the next sen-
tence (1.50.3), we hear that the Corinthians chase the Corcyraeans to
land, and turn to pick up their shipwrecks and corpses. They get "most
of them," and bring them over to an uninhabited harbor on the main-
land, which, like the island upon which the Corcyraeans have their base,
is called Sybota. Here, the Corinthians and their allies regroup and sail
back out (1.50.3). The Corcyraeans, fearing that the Corinthians intend
to land on Corcyra, come out to meet them with "as many of their ships
as could still sail, together with the Attic boats" (1.50.4).

It therefore looks as if the battle will continue, but at the last minute,
just as the Corinthians are about to begin their second attack, events
inexplicable to the belligerents begin to take place. Thucydides identi-
fies to the reader the Athenian reinforcements that unexpectedly appear,
and which the combatants cannot recognize. The reader is thus able to
observe all sides as they react to the unexpected close of the battle:

> ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ καὶ ἐπεπαιάνιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι
> ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο κατιδόντες εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων
> προσπλεούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι,
> δείσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι
> δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσιν.

> It was already late and the paean to attack had been sung, but the Corinthians
> suddenly began backing water, because they saw twenty Athenian ships sail-
> ing toward them, which the Athenians had sent out later to help the ten ships
> they had sent in assistance, since they [i.e. the Athenians] had come to fear
> exactly what happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be defeated,
> and that their ten ships would be few to defend them. (1.50.5)[71]

The Athenians have sent twenty belated ships to reinforce the origi-
nal ten. At first it seems that the Corinthians know who and what they
are looking at, just as the reader knows. In the next sentences, how-
ever, Thucydides shows at length that neither combatant is able to rec-
ognize reliably whose ships these are or how many ships are coming.[72]

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her massed allies have achieved a naval force that is half the size of Athens' navy (cf.
2.13.8) before she calls on any allies.

[71] Note the unnecessary repetition of the number ten. The small size of the Athenian
contribution is focalized through both the narrator and the Athenians.

[72] The delayed deployment of discrepant awareness (the author apparently grants, but
then denies, reliable knowledge to the Corinthians) supports the narration of the
sudden and unexpected reversal of events.

First, the Corinthians cannot recognize them; then, the Corcyraeans have the same experience. This uncertainty leads to a quick cessation of hostilities:

> ταύτας οὖν προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑποτοπήσαντες ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν εἶναι οὐχ ὅσας ἑώρων ἀλλὰ πλείους ὑπανεχώρουν. τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις ἐπέπλεον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς οὐχ ἑωρῶντο, καὶ ἐθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορινθίους πρύμναν κρουομένους, πρίν τινες ἰδόντες εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσιν. τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν· ξυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἤδη, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐποιήσαντο. οὕτω μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡ ναυμαχία ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα.

> Seeing these ships ahead of them, and suspecting that they were from Athens, and that there were more of them than they could see, the Corinthians retreated. As for the Corcyraeans, they did not see the ships, which were sailing toward them from a less visible quarter, and they were astonished that the Corinthians were backing water, until some who saw them reported that the ships were sailing toward them. And then the Corcyraeans also withdrew. For it was already getting dark, and the Corinthians had made an end of the battle by turning away. Thus they were separated from one another, and the sea battle ended at night. (1.51.1–3)

Thucydides lavishes words on the perplexities of each side, and the narrated light fades to black. He is not quite finished with his story, however, but shows the final arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, and the consequences of the battle. Corpses and wrecks floating in the water greet the late arriving Athenian newcomers:

> αἱ εἴκοσι νῆες αἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὗται, … διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἢ ὤφθησαν. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι (ἦν γὰρ νύξ) ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ πολέμιαι ὦσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔγνωσαν· καὶ ὡρμίσαντο.

> These same twenty ships from Athens … carried forward through the corpses and the shipwrecks, sailed into the Corcyraean camp [at Leukimme] not much later than they were seen. And the Corcyraeans (for it was night) were afraid that they were hostile, but then they recognized them, and [the Athenians] laid anchor. (1.51.4–5)

The Athenians are drawn forward (προσκομισθεῖσαι) by waters polluted with Corcyraean corpses no one could rescue during the day.[73] In this situation of death, defeat, and darkness, Thucydides extends the Corcyraeans' suspense for as long as possible; they fear the incoming

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[73] Cf. προσκομίσαι at 1.50.3 and προσκομίσασθαι at 1.54.2, the verb the Corinthians use to describe their carrying of corpses to land, and ὅπῃ κομισθήσονται at 1.52.3: the Corinthians do not know how they can be carried across, i.e. away from the waters in which they are trapped.

ships in the dark until the last minute, but then are relieved of their fears when they finally recognize them.[74] Thus their lack of control over the events of this disastrous day is extended to the very end. The Corcyraeans have suffered severely in the battle; as shall be confirmed in Thucydides' final tabulations (1.54.2), the corpses and wrecks through which the Athenians sail are those lost from seventy Corcyraean vessels. At a low estimate, between seven and ten thousand corpses are in the water.

From the modern point of view, the historical imperative for writing the passages we have just reviewed seems slight. Thucydides could have told us that the battle cost many lives and ended when the Athenian reinforcements appeared in the evening. From the beginning of this battle narrative, however, Thucydides has emphasized that the experience of the battle overwhelmed the physical capacities of human beings: it was clear from his initial description that any individual trapped in the confusion of helpless ships stuck fast to one another in a raging battle would be trusting his survival to chance. Thucydides' subsequent account of events sustained the sense that human capacities were overpowered, foregrounding, for instance, the unpredictable events that led to Athens' confrontation with Corinth, and the uncertainties of visibility and identification that had earlier in the day confused the Corinthians, with the result that they killed their own allies. At the conclusion of the battle, the unexpected arrival of the Athenians, the dark, and the distances over the water once again thwart the combatants' powers of recognition. Thus natural conditions, such as darkness and distance, or battle conditions, such as noise and confusion, had overwhelmed human capacities throughout the day. Equally dangerous, however, were the passions that brought the combatants to the battle and determined their behavior at the moment when they had an advantage, and therefore, freedom of movement. These passions had derailed any possibility of planning or reliable action.

Thucydides therefore displays some primordial facts about naval battles and human limitations in his depiction of the Battle of Sybota. Nor was the situation resolved by the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, but rather events threaten to rekindle anew the next morning, as everyone embarks into their ships and returns to the high water (1.52.1). Thucydides endows the already lengthy conclusion of this story with a further and complex messenger scene, which ensues when the

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[74] For another description of the role of focalization in this battle narrative, cf. J. V. Morrison (2006) 39–41.

exhausted and shaken (1.52.1–2) Corinthians, who no longer wish to fight, test whether the Athenians will allow them to pass unmolested back down the coast.[75] As their test, they send out messengers without a herald's wand, to see if the Athenians and Corcyraeans will kill them. The Corcyraeans want to do this (1.53.3), but the Athenians, attempting in vain to preserve the appearances of peace, send the messengers back to the Corinthians and allow them to head home (1.53.4).

With this, the battle is officially over, and the Corcyraeans are free to "take up the shipwrecks and corpses that had been carried in their direction by the current and the wind, since [the wind] that had come up during the night had dispersed them in every direction, and they set up a trophy of victory on the island of Sybota" (οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐξενεχθέντα ὑπό τε τοῦ ῥοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου, ὃς γενόμενος τῆς νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχῇ, καὶ τροπαῖον ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Συβότοις ὡς νενικηκότες 1.54.1). The current and the wind, the two natural characteristics of Chimerium, had begun to disperse the remainders of the proud Corcyraean navy into nature.[76] The Corcyraeans are able to reclaim whatever corpses have drifted over to their own coastline; they gather up these dead, and then, as the Corinthians had also done, set up a trophy of victory.

Thucydides therefore pairs his description of the Corcyraeans' partial success at rescuing their dispersing corpses with the news that the Corcyraeans will also erect a victory trophy. This ironic juxtaposition of the facts of defeat with a contrived claim of victory is supported by his persistent emphasis on death and corpses in this story, and by the perhaps historical but nevertheless striking report that the two sides set their trophies in places with the same name.[77] He ends the story of the Battle of Sybota by outlining each party's assertions of victory (1.54).

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[75] The Corinthians perceive that the Athenians have fresh ships, but that "for themselves there are many problems": the sudden Athenian reinforcements, the previous day's unexpected events, the prisoners they must guard on board, and the lack of supplies to repair their ships in the uninhabited harbor (1.52.1–2). They had, we remember, neglected to carry off the hulls of the Corcyraean vessels.

[76] Cf. notes 57, 59, and 77 on the mythological frame of this battle story. The adverbial πανταχῇ emphasizes that the corpses have dispersed everywhere, and therefore contrasts with the restriction in κατὰ σφᾶς. The Corcyraeans have picked up whatever corpses they could find on the coast of the island of Corcyra, and perhaps on surrounding islands. Cf. the repetition of κατὰ σφᾶς at 1.54.2. Unburied corpses in Thucydides: e.g. 2.52.2 (the plague at Athens), 7.87.2 (the quarries at Syracuse), and cf. Lateiner 1977. On "tragic akribeia" as used here, cf. Hornblower 1994, 138.

[77] As for the two Sybotas, the doubling of names, along with the similar behaviors of each side, deserves some mention. The combatants, who are related, do the same

Since any claims to victory the Corcyraeans can put forward depend on the Athenian intervention, it becomes evident that the Athenians prevented a clear Corinthian victory in this battle, a fact that will have devastating consequences for Greece.

In the story of the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, Thucydides shows that the mere possession of a navy moves human beings to irrational recklessness, the consequences of which quickly escape their control. The story shows that the Corcyraeans had invested their sense of glory and their very identity in their navy, and that because of it, they felt confident to insult and neglect other states. This navy is now destroyed; moreover, the stance of the Athenian narrator, for whom the Corcyraean navy seemed old-fashioned and inefficient, had even before the outcome of the battle shown that Corcyra's hubristic attitude was misplaced. However, not even the best navy would have sufficed to make Corcyraean warfare glorious. Once the Corcyraeans are fighting, their lack of skill and restraint wastes their resources and leads to their defeat.

For their part, the Corinthians hasten into a battle over an issue that might twice have been resolved through negotiation. However, their hatred is too strong, and motivates not only their two attacks on Corcyra, but also the errors they make during the Battle of Sybota. They will now turn this hatred against the Athenians, who have prevented them from winning the demonstrative victory they crave. Thus the immediate result of the battle between Corinth and Corcyra, in Thucydides' description, is the transformation of Corcyra's naval acme into wrecks and corpses in the water. The long-term result is more warfare, from which the Athenian meddlers will ultimately suffer defeat.

The pace of the events leading to this war immediately (1.56.1) picks up as Athens and Corinth subsequently compete over another small hostage city, Potideia. This conflict is a further demonstration of the Archaeology's analysis of the stagnation, in continuous unproductive and competitive warfare, of the coastal powers, but this time Athens is directly involved. Suddenly, Athens is compelled to defend her interests against determined adversaries, and everything changes. Gone are the oversubtle calculations of the Corcyra episode; instead, Athens sends army after army to Potideia, each one responding to a challenge to her

thing in two places with the same name. The doubling creates the sense of an inescapable sameness. Cf. the discussion in this chapter of the opening section of the battle narrative.

power.[78] Consistent with this, the price for Athens of the conflict over Potideia is of an altogether different order from the price of interference at Sybota. At Sybota, the Athenians lost no men. At Potideia, more than 150 Athenians die in an initial battle for control of the city (1.63.3); having failed to achieve this control, a large Athenian force besieges and blockades the small city, at great expense to the state, for two years.[79] Furthermore, for the first time, an individual enemy leader emerges who is able to generate enthusiasm for resistance to Athens. Aristeus' popularity and efficiency is a new factor; his is the first "commander narrative" of the *History,* and through this narrative we learn that one brave individual with useful plans can be a crucial factor in thwarting imperial ambitions.[80]

Thucydides vividly portrays the costs in human life and Athenian resources of the conflict over Potideia. Athens' disproportionate investment in this sudden campaign to secure the Thraceward region is unsettling; Corinth's ability to provoke this response from Athens, which had believed itself strong enough to play diplomatic games with Corinth's strongest passions, is also unsettling. Thus the narrator leaves us with some questions. Is Athens really so superior to Corinth as she believes, and is her empire actually secure? Or does the Athenians' rush to impose themselves at Potideia reveal the fragility of the empire Athens will now fight a war to defend?

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[78] Thucydides catalogues the gradual accumulation of Athenian resources at Potideia. The first fleet of thirty ships and one thousand hoplites is sent at 1.57.6; at 1.61.1 the Athenians send forty additional ships and two thousand hoplites; at 1.64.2 they send 1,600 more hoplites under Phormio in an unknown number of ships to assist with besieging the city.

[79] Cf. 1.64, 2.13.3 (on the cost; cf. the argument of Chapter 5), and 2.70.

[80] Cf. Vogt in *OCRST* 236, who argues that Pericles' war plan did not foresee the appearance of Brasidas. If this is true, then this would be a surprising weakness in Pericles' plan, since the Spartans and other city-states regularly had good generals. Furthermore, it was certainly available to Pericles to remember that the Persians did not anticipate the appearance of (for instance) Miltiades. Aristeus' sudden appearance in this narrative, after such a dense depiction of Corinthian weakness, is as if a standing warning never to underestimate an opposing power.

3

The Athenian Acme in Book One of Thucydides

The Spartan War Congress and the Pentekontaetia

In Chapter 2, we saw that Corcyra's acme of wealth and war materials was a root cause of the war between Corcyra and Corinth. This chapter continues to discuss the narrative setting of the war, and will focus on the representation of Athens' corresponding acme of wealth and war materials in Thucydides' accounts of the Spartan War Congress (1.68–88) and the Pentekontaetia (1.89–118), Thucydides' history of the fifty years between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars.

Thucydides records four of the speeches held at the Spartan War Congress in 432: the speeches of the Corinthians, Athenians, and of two named Spartan speakers, Archidamus, King of Sparta, and Sthenelaidas, a Spartan *ephor*. For each of these speeches, the Athenian acme is an important topic.

For example, both the Corinthians and the Athenians argue that human beings are subject to the desire for rule and the drive to acquisition that produce accumulations of wealth and war materials. The Corinthians once again suppress mention of their own imperial practices and try to limit this trait to the Athenians, arguing that it is an aspect of the Athenian character. By contrast, the Athenians argue that the drive to empire is characteristic of all human beings, who necessarily seek their own advantage (1.76.2). Their speech aims to deter a Spartan attack, and they do not hide but rather advertise their war materials and military power.

Archidamus, King of Sparta, does not directly comment on the Athenian view that acquisitive behavior is inevitable. Instead, he focuses on the threat the existing Athenian acme represents for Sparta.[1] Archidamus aims to slow the impetus to war, and his argument that

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[1] Cf. Adcock (1951) 7.

Sparta is unprepared to face Athens' imperial resources is at the center of his contention that Sparta should delay an attack. His view seems to dovetail nicely with the Athenian presentation that preceded it, but his policy does not represent the only possible Spartan view of the Athenian acme. On the contrary, in the final speech Thucydides records, Sthenelaidas argues that Athens' money, ships, and horses should be ignored in favor of punishing Athens' injustices (1.86.3–5). Sthenelaidas rejects both the view that Athens' aggressive behavior is inevitable and also the view that Athens' acme of wealth and war materials should be allowed to exercise a strong deterrent effect on Spartan behavior.

The second half of the chapter discusses the role of warfare and war materials in the Pentekontaetia. The argument focuses most closely on the opening narratives (1.89–1.97), in which Thucydides describes the Themistoclean foundations of Athenian power and Athens' imposition of tribute payments on the allies. It then briefly discusses Thucydides' concluding catalogue of Athens' subsequent campaigns. As a whole, the Pentekontaetia shows the establishment of Athens' imperial capacities, and after this Athens' continuously aggressive behavior, once a basis of prosperity had been established through the assessment of tribute on the allies. Its placement after the speeches held at the Spartan Congress allows us to assess the speakers' claims about Athens' acme and behavior.

The deeper cause of the war is Spartan fear of Athens' size and imperial expansion (1.23.6, 1.88, 1.118.2). While material considerations are far from being Thucydides' sole focus, in the sections of the text under consideration he expends careful attention on the acme of wealth and weapons that undergirds the brief Athenian acme of imperial power. In so doing, he exposes an important element of the history that produced Pericles and the Periclean age. I argue that his aim in clarifying this history is not to extol the Athenian acme of materials, but rather to reproduce for the reader its existence and to show the effect of the acme on Athens and her allies, on the Spartans and their alliance, and ultimately on individuals such as Pericles.[2] As a whole, the presentation helps us to understand not only how the Athenians frightened the Spartans into the war, but also how Pericles could have come to believe that this acme was exceptional, lasting, and more historically significant

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[2] Contra de Romilly in *TAI* 32, who argues concerning the speeches held at the Spartan Congress that "All this long analysis of the rival forces is intended to explain and emphasize the plan put forward by Pericles…" Cf. Raubitschek (1973), Connor (1984) 50–51. For a contrasting view, cf. Stahl (2003) 41–56.

than any other. At the same time, it guides the reader to understand that this acme resembled the acmes that preceded it, and to see Pericles' assessment of the Athenian acme in this context.

The Corinthians Correct Athens and Sparta

The speech the Corinthians hold at the Spartan Congress is famous for its opposing characterizations of the Spartans and Athenians. The Corinthians' Athenians are dominated by a restless drive to acquisition. Their Spartans show just the opposite quality. Although Athens' growth has set all of Greece in turmoil, the Spartans are asleep:

> ἡσυχάζετε γάρ, μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν διπλασιουμένην δὲ καταλύοντες.

> For you alone of the Greeks are inactive, O Lacedaimonians, not avenging any [event] with power, but rather with delay, and you alone do not destroy the nascent, but the redoubling increase of the enemy. (1.69.4)

The Spartans, complain the Corinthians, take revenge by not doing anything, and wait until their enemies have grown powerful before they attack them. At present, Athens' "redoubling increase" is compelling all powers to act, but the hesitant, old-fashioned Spartans are quiescent (1.68.1, 1.71.2). Ignorant of the foreign affairs (1.68.1) and clinging to ways that are not relevant in an advancing world (1.71.2–3), the Spartans are immobilized by the fear of losing what they have (1.70.4). Nevertheless, it is they who claim the reputation for maintaining Greek freedom. They should, the Corinthians argue, finally act to free those Greeks already enslaved by the Athenians and to prevent the enslavement of the rest (1.69.1). Thus the Corinthians urgently exhort the Spartans to emergency action against Athens.

They do not, however, suggest a specific plan. Though they themselves possess a large navy, suitable for attacking some part of Athens' empire, the Corinthian tirade lacks practical suggestions beyond the conventional demand that Sparta waste Attica (1.71.4).[3] Instead, they challenge the Spartans to take a page from Athens' book and to exchange their obsolete and unchanging laws for most unspartan ἐπιτεχνήσις (counter-inventiveness 1.71.3).

Thus the Corinthians leave their own navy out of the picture, and instead require the Spartans to become more like the Athenians they so

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[3] Cf. Legon (1973) 161, Crane (1992a) 227.

obviously resent.[4] The Corinthians damn the Spartans for not practicing imperialism – the Spartans are naïve enough to believe that they can keep their power "without harming others" (1.71.1) – while they simultaneously excoriate the Athenians for taking whatever they can, whenever they can. Thus neither great power can satisfy the Corinthians; but the Athenians endure their most intense criticisms. The Corinthians' famous characterization of Athens' addiction to acquisition is close to a caricature, and could not be plausible to an audience that did not have reason to believe it. To quote from the end of a long paragraph:[5]

> καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ᾽ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν· μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

> …and if the Athenians do not go out after that which they have thought of, they believe themselves robbed of their own, but whatever things they have acquired, once they have pursued them, they count them as unimportant in comparison to what they will get in the future. And if they fail of some attempt, they fill out their lack by hoping for other things. For they alone equally possess and expect whatever they have thought up, because they so swiftly take in hand to do what they have thought of. And they wear themselves away for all these things, suffering toil and danger for their entire lives, and because they are always acquiring, have the least enjoyment of the things that are available to them; they think it is a festival to do the necessary and that inactive leisure is more of a disaster than constant laborious business. So that if someone would conclude that they are by nature such as to have no rest themselves nor to allow it to other men, he would speak correctly. (1.70.7–9)

The Corinthians argue that the Athenians live only to acquire, and will endure any amount of toil and suffering in order to procure an advantage for their city (cf. also 1.70.5–6). They thus are born to make life miserable for others. The Corinthian description of the Athenian character argues that their devotion to acquisition is an innate characteristic, not a series of discreet policy decisions concerning which one

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4 Cf. Orwin (1994) 42.
5 On the misathenian audience of these speeches, cf. Debnar (2001) 30–58.

might negotiate. The implication is that the Athenians are irredeemable, and must be constrained by force (cf. 1.70.1, 1.71.4).

Just as in their dealings with Corcyra, therefore, the Corinthians implicitly reject rational negotiations with an opponent they characterize as opportunistic and materialistic by nature (cf. 1.37.2–5). The Corinthians also create themselves as critics of Athens in the same way as they had created their superiority to Corcyra, namely by suppressing information that would expose their similarity to the object of their criticism. In their initial peroration on the ills of Spartan quiescence, the Corinthians had mentioned the objects of the Athenians' acquisitive drive, Corcyra and Potideia (1.68.4), for example.[6] Throughout their critique of the Athenian character, however, they mention neither specific Athenian crimes, nor the objects of Athens' grasping behavior. The territories, ships, and money that will become the center of Archidamus' vivid description of Athens' material advantages are entirely absent from the Corinthians' generalized description of Athenian ambition and greed.[7]

Of course, the Corinthians can count on their audience to have heard many specific examples of Athenian wrongdoing in the preceding speeches, and we might presume that a repetition of these crimes would be redundant. On the other hand, the reader is already accustomed to Corinthian habits in respect to accusing others.[8] As we saw, at Athens the Corinthians accused the Corcyraeans of greed and materialism (1.37.2–5, 1.40.1), while never mentioning the massive buildup of naval power with which they hoped to take Corcyra. They had spoken as if they had no material benefit to gain from conquering Corcyra, but rather were interested only in punishing Corcyra's wrongdoing. At Sparta they repeat this practice, suppressing mention not only of their own navy and empire, but also of Athens' all too similar possessions. In fact, Corinthian practices, such as building up very large navies to subordinate wealthy and rebellious allies to their own interests, are similar, if not identical, to the Athenian practices the Corinthians want the Spartans to punish. It is little wonder, therefore, if they do not describe Athens' specific crimes.

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[6] In this section of the speech, they stress the military value of Corcyra's navy and the strategic value of Epidamnus, which is now lost to the Peloponnesians, as examples of the price of Sparta's inactivity.

[7] Note, for instance, that in 1.70.7–9, the Athenians' possessions are referenced with demonstrative adjectives and pronouns only.

[8] On the Corinthian habit of suppressing inconvenient information, cf. Stahl (2006) 309–310.

For fear of being associated with that which they are urging the Spartans to destroy, therefore, the Corinthians blame the Athenians in general psychological terms. At the same time, they deploy their unmentioned naval power to huge effect in this speech: Corinth's threat to leave the alliance (1.71.4) is a threat to deprive Sparta of her main naval resources unless she decides for war.[9]

In their speeches at Athens and Sparta, the Corinthians cloak their own naval forces, which become visible only through their effect on others. At the same time, both speeches aim at the destruction of another party's competing naval power. The main arguments of Corinth's speeches – that it is necessary to punish (e.g. 1.40.5) or to free (e.g. 1.124.3) other Greek powers – are therefore accompanied by a continuous material motivation that reflects Corinth's desire to possess the power she believes should accrue to her diginity. Overall, Corinth's descriptions of Athenian acquisitiveness reflect not fear of conquest, but fear that Athens' power will allow the Athenians too easily to compete for properties the Corinthians claim for themselves. The Corinthians therefore demonstrate a competitive stance toward the Athenian acme that contrasts to the Spartan attitude.

The Athenian Response

The Athenians who respond to the Corinthian speech have no difficulty mentioning their navy directly, since this in fact suits their intended self-presentation as much as it would have harmed the Corinthians' disguise. Thucydides introduces the Athenians by saying that the Athenian emissaries intended to respond to the speeches against Athens by showing the power of their city (τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημῆναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν 1.72.1). They believed, Thucydides says, that in this way they would turn the Spartans to quiescence rather than war (νομίζοντες μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχάζειν τραπέσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν 1.72.1). Their main contentions are that they deserve their empire (1.73.1 and 1.75.1), so that the Spartans should not be angry with them for possessing it, and that they are very powerful: angry or not, the Spartans should think long before attacking Athens.

The Athenians begin their speech with a recital of their performance in the Persian Wars. They rehearse the history of their successes on land and sea, stressing especially the role of their navy in saving all of Greece

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[9] This threat is usually read as a threat to ally with Argos, not Athens; cf. *HCT* and *CT*, ad loc.

at the Battle of Salamis. They emphasize throughout their presentation that they accomplished everything unaided and by their own decision, and declare to their audience that their demonstration will show "with what sort of city you will contend, if you do not plan well" (1.73.3).

The Athenian history lesson is therefore a boast of Athens' independent power, but also at the same time a boast of her generosity, since Athens placed her power at the service of Greece in the hour of crisis.[10] In the Athenian description, Athens' success at the Battle of Salamis was her finest hour, a moment when an acme of virtue was realized through the intelligent deployment of the most powerful war materials. The Athenians restate what everyone knows:

τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην· ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, ὃς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων.

We brought the three most useful things to this battle: the greatest number of ships, the most intelligent general, and the most unhesitating courage. For [we brought] perhaps somewhat fewer than two thirds of the four hundred ships, and Themistocles as general, who was most responsible that the sea battle was held in the narrow waters, which thing very clearly saved the day; because of this, you honored him most of any foreigner who came to you. (1.74.1)

The Athenians' tripartite claim – they supplied many ships in a situation where many were needed and useful, as well as the intelligence and courage to get the job done – is diametrically opposed to Thucydides' story of the battle between Corcyra and Corinth, in which planning was impossible, war materials were both redundant and ultimately wasted, and courage, although in abundant evidence, was corrupted by hatred.[11] While the story as the Athenians tell it at Sparta is obviously tailored to achieve the Athenians' rhetorical purposes, it is nevertheless an effective reminder of a past and lost potential: for all of Greek history that

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[10] This has led some scholars to identify the speech with Pericles' Funeral Oration. Cf. most notably Raubitschek (1973), who argues that Pericles sent the emissaries (33), that the speech reflects Periclean views (36) and therefore also Thucydides' views (43), and is a statement of the glory of Periclean Athens (48).

[11] In respect to the contrast between the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Sybota, note that the Athenians' description stresses their determination not to become angry (ὀργισθῆναι) with the Peloponnesians for not helping them (1.74.2). In other words, by their own account, the Athenians exercised the self-control the Corinthians and Corcyraeans could not discover at the Battle of Sybota.

these Athenians and their listeners knew of, the Battle of Salamis provided the most important example of the potential of Greek navies to be used for, rather than against, the common good of the Greeks.[12]

At the same time, however, the Athenian speakers deploy this story of independence and generosity to advertise Athens' superiority to the land-based Peloponnesians. Their story emphasizes Peloponnesian defenselessness. According to the Athenians, although the Peloponnesians had cities and the Athenians had no city, the Peloponnesians were in fact the defenseless party, since only a navy could stop the Persians "from sailing into the Peloponnesus to sack the cities one by one, since you were unable to defend each other against many ships" (1.73.4):

> εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μήδῳ δείσαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἢ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὕστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς διεφθαρμένοι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ἔτι ὑμᾶς μὴ ἔχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς ναυμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἂν αὐτῷ προυχώρησε τὰ πράγματα ᾗ ἐβούλετο.

> And if we, like others, had come to an agreement with the Persian before he arrived because we feared for our land, or had not dared later on to embark into our ships, giving up because we had [already] been sacked, it would have been no use for you to fight the Persians at sea, since you did not have sufficient ships, but rather matters would have advanced for [the King] at his own leisure and in whatever way he wished. (1.74.4)

The Athenians mold the history of the Persian Wars to support the thesis that no amount of infantry can compensate for the lack of a powerful navy. Because they "did not have sufficient ships," the Peloponnesians were in the power of the King. The Athenian speech claims the Battle of Salamis as the decisive battle in which the Persians were defeated. It was after this battle, they stress, that the Persian King left Greece "with a large part of his army, since his power was no longer equal [i.e. to Greek power]" (1.73.5).[13] Thus the results of the Battle of Salamis show that "the affairs [πράγματα] of the Greeks are in their ships" (1.74.1).[14]

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[12] Herodotus argues that the Athenian decision to fight saved Greece (7.139, cf. note 15), although he gives the first prize for courage at the Battle of Salamis to Aegina, and the second prize to Athens (8.93.1); his depiction of Themistocles' role at the battle of Salamis confirms the Athenian description here (8.56–63). For Herodotus' description of the Spartans' treatment of Themistocles, cf. 8.124.

[13] Contrast Herodotus at 8.113.2–3: Mardonius' army was very large (Herodotus sets the number at three hundred thousand), and above all, he kept the most effective part of Xerxes' infantry forces with him, allowing the rest to accompany Xerxes to Greece.

[14] Poppo ad loc. translates: in navibus fortunas Graecorum sitas esse (The fate of the Greeks was in their ships). *Fortuna* is perhaps a bit subjective for πράγματα; on the

In fact, infantry power was necessary for the defeat of the Persians.[15] The Athenians do not mention the Battle of Plataea in the year following Salamis (479 BCE), in which battle the Spartans led the combined Greek infantry to victory over the Persian army that was occupying Greece.[16] Had Mardonius won, the Persians might well have conquered Greece, regardless of the victory at Salamis.

Like the Corcyraeans, then, the Athenians are recasting history according to their perception of the power of their navy, and also similarly, they are using this new history to signal their independence from other powers. The Athenians' decision to ignore Sparta's leadership and achievements in the Persian wars while speaking to the Spartans and their allies in Sparta is as demonstrative of contempt as Corcyra's insults to Corinth at the meetings of the Corinthian alliance.[17]

The Athenians also resemble the Corcyraeans in their deep identification with and belief in their navy and its capacities, a belief that is here strengthened through the memory of the kind of victory the Corcyraeans can only dream of, and is therefore that much more

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other hand, "affairs" is too neutral. On Thucydides' sometimes frustrating use of abstract nouns, cf. A. Parry (1989).

[15] In arguing that the Athenians (and the gods, 7.139.5) saved Greece, Herodotus also stresses the importance of sea power. He argues that Athens' naval opposition to Xerxes was the centerpiece of Greek opposition to the king, since the Spartan wall at the Isthmus of Corinth would not have defended Greece, and that if the Athenians had not been able to hold off the Persian navy, the allies would have fallen one by one to Persian sea power, leaving the Spartans isolated and unable, finally, to defend even themselves (7.139.2–3). However, Herodotus does not, therefore, underestimate the importance of the Greek defeat of Mardonius' infantry expedition, but rather devotes much of the latter part of book eight and the first eighty-five chapters of book nine of his history to the Battle of Plataea. At 9.64.1, Herodotus praises Pausanias' victory at Plataea as the finest victory known to people of his time.

[16] Thus, incidentally, diminishing the role of their own infantry, as well as that of the Spartans and the other allied forces. They do mention the Battle of Marathon (1.73.4), but only to stress that they alone (μόνοι) fended off the Persians' initial attack, another unrestrained claim of unique significance. On the Athenian contribution to the infantry battle at Plataea, cf. Hdt. 9.60–61. On the role of the Plataeans at Marathon (μόνοι is an ungrateful exaggeration), cf. Hdt. 6.108.1 and 6.111.1–2.

[17] Even verbs such as ξυνναυμαχῆσαι (1.73.4) and ξυνεσώσαμεν (1.74.3), which seem to indicate common action, actually stress that Athens came to help everyone else although her own situation was so terrible, and thus in fact stress Sparta's hesitations (as contrasted to Athens' ability to do the right thing even in such precarious circumstances). Contrast Thucydides' affirmation of Spartan leadership at 1.18.2. On Sparta's ability to ignore such insults, as well as the Corinthian critique, cf. Archidamus at 1.84.2. On the ubiquity of such insults in Greek diplomatic relations of the time, cf. Grant (1965).

powerful.[18] By means of their navy, the Athenians claim the victory over the Persians as entirely their own, erasing the contributions of any other Greeks, and making themselves into the sole agents of significant events. This similarity of the Athenians' opinions to those that characterize the Corcyraeans ought to give us pause.[19] The demonstration of the "power of their city" with which these Athenians hoped to deter the Spartans from war is really a demonstration of the size and power of the Athenian navy.[20] It seems evident from what we have read so far in book one that Thucydides is exploring the dangers of identifying the power of a city with its naval power, since this produces, first, overreliance on vulnerable military resources, and second, a narrow view of the city's power that is founded on trust (or hope) in its aggressive potential. As we saw, Thucydides' narrative of the Battle of Sybota showed the complete defeat of the edifice of hope and hubris produced when Corcyra identified her power with her naval resources.

But the Athenians also differ from the Corcyraeans. They can boast not only of their navy, but also of their virtues. They argue that because they kept their nerve at the moment when everything depended on them, they deserve to enjoy the results of their bravery and intelligence (1.75.1). They remind their listeners that the Spartans withdrew from leadership of the alliance (1.75.2), in which they were hated (1.76.1, cf. 1.95.4, 1.130.2), and that the Athenians took over leadership of the alliance at allied request (1.75.2). The Athenians affirm that as leaders of the Aegean allies, the Spartans had fared no better than the Athenians are faring now, and this is not surprising, since no one wants to be ruled (1.77.5). Nevertheless, the Athenians do not disguise that they do rule, and argue that this is understandable as a process driven by human nature (twice: 1.75.3 and 1.76.2):

οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ <τριῶν> τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο.

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[18] On the effect of Athens' success at Salamis on Athens, cf. Balot (2001) 157 and Crane (1992a) 247.

[19] Cf. Balot (2001) 150 on Athens' similarities to Corcyra.

[20] Cf. Orwin (1994) 45.

> Thus we have done nothing strange or inhuman if we accepted an empire that was given to us and did not let it go, since we were defeated by the greatest [considerations], namely honor, fear, and advantage, nor did we begin this sort of thing first, but it is established forever that the weaker is restrained by the stronger; at the same time we think we are worthy, and we seemed so to you as well until, reckoning your advantage, you began to speak of justice, but no one ever shunned an opportunity to acquire something by force, because they preferred some chance speech about justice to having more. (1.76.2)

Hewing to our theme, we will remark only on the relevance of this statement to the Athenian acme. The Athenians' explanation of the trio of motivations (fear, honor, and advantage) that compelled them to take and keep imperial power claims that irresistible advantages motivate the strong always to rule the weak.[21] Their explanation would account for any accumulation of wealth and war materials, since these resources promise to realize the rule of others and therefore both to fulfill the desire for advantages and honor, and also to provide relief from fear.

  War materials may or may not deliver on this promise, but according to the Athenians the drive to rule others is persistent: in their view, the three compulsions are common to all. If the Spartans are now making accusations of injustice, this is a sure sign that they are seeking their advantage, since talk of justice never stopped anyone from taking as much as they can. The Athenian emissaries thus disqualify even the possibility that human beings could be motivated by something other than the desire for more, and imply that the acmes this desire necessarily creates are permanent facts of human existence.

This "positive" part of their analysis seems to agree with Thucydides, although it states only half of the truth. If they had mentioned that the very forces that lead to the production of an acme also lead to its downfall, we might have seen even more common ground between the

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[21] The Athenians' argument has sometimes been seen as a strong case for Athenian imperialism. Cf. Orwin (1994) who gives the "Athenian thesis" a book-length examination, adducing much previous secondary literature. However, both Orwin (1994), e.g. 44–50, and others have questioned the strength of the Athenians' argument. Was it impressive to the Spartans? Cf. Balot (2001) 152: "If self-interest (among other things) justifies empire, then it is difficult to see what kind of activity would lie outside the realm of the justifiable." Is the Athenian argument impressive to the reader, and if so, in what way? Cf. Stahl (2003) 47, who sees in the three terms themselves reflections of the seeds of destruction: "…addiction to honor and the urge for more (audible in ὠφελία) are for Thucydides himself impulses that lead to moral decline and the destruction of peaceful relations (πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτινίαν, 3.82.8), a factor that is at least hinted at by the factor 'fear.'" From this point of view, the terms of the Athenians' argument expose to the reader that their corruption is already well advanced.

historian and his Athenians. As it is, the argument serves Athens' boast of present power, and ignores or misunderstands its own situation in the cycle of growth and destruction.

Archidamus' Argument against Going to War

The Corinthians aimed to disguise their similarity to the Athenians, but the Athenians argued that all parties are similarly acquisitive. The Athenians had also aimed to show that the Spartans should not go to war against them, since they have grown so strong. Not surprisingly, their boasts of Athenian power and description of their own acquisitive habits as human nature provoke hostility and contempt.[22] After the Athenian speech, most Spartans decide that the Athenians have committed injustice, and that they should go to war immediately (1.79.2).

In this context, Archidamus comes forward, in vain, to advise the Spartans to be more cautious. He mentions, but does not address at any length, Athens' misdeeds and the Corinthians' complaints (cf. 1.82.1, 1.82.6, 1.85.2). He focuses on Sparta. He declares that Sparta's lack of material wealth has left her at a significant disadvantage in comparison to Athens, and that Sparta cannot successfully engage the Athenians in a full-scale war until this material deficiency is addressed. In support of his argument, Archidamus produces a detailed description of Athens' material strength at the time of the Peloponnesian War:

πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιος ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκή, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οἷόν τε ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐλθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι; πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν; ἀλλ᾽ ἥσσους ἐσμέν· εἰ δὲ μελετήσομεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πλέον ἔτι τούτου ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν. τάχ᾽ ἄν τις θαρσοίη ὅτι τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὥστε τὴν γῆν δῃοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλη γῆ ἐστὶ πολλὴ ἧς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὧν δέονται ἐπάξονται. εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεήσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὖσι νησιώταις. τίς οὖν ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἢ τὰς προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ ναυτικὸν τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω.

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[22] For contempt, cf. Sthenelaidas 1.86.1 and 2.

Our [i.e. Spartan] war strength (ἀλκή) is comparable to that of the Peloponnesians and their neighbors, and we are able to attack each one swiftly. But against men who have much foreign land and are in addition very experienced with the sea and equipped as well as possible in all other things, namely with private and civic wealth and ships and horses and weapons and with a population such as exists in no other Greek place, and who in addition possess many allies who pay tribute, [against such forces] how is it possible to raise a war, and trusting to what, to attack them unequipped? [Trusting] to ships? But we have fewer. And if we will practice and build up our own fleet, we need time. Or [trusting] to money? But here our deficiency is even greater, and we have neither [money] in common [i.e. state funds], nor can we take ready funds from private men. Perhaps someone dares [to suggest] that we are superior in our infantry and in [our] number, so that going [to Attica] we can waste their land. But the [Athenians] rule much territory besides this, and they bring in what- ever they need from the sea. And if we try to make their allies revolt, since most of them are islanders, we shall need ships for this, too. What then will be our war? For if we do not defeat [the Athenians] with ships, or take away the income with which they support their navy, we shall be harmed more [than benefited, i.e. if we start the war]. (1.80.3–81.4)

Archidamus separates out the elements of Athens' acme, listing them individually until it becomes a many-headed monster, each of whose heads must be combated, he argues, with a similar head.[23] However, Sparta has no such resources. In contrast to Athenian sufficiency, Sparta's infantry is useful only for ravaging Attica, a project with limited advantages.[24] Later in the speech, in fact, Archidamus argues that even infantry forces are dependent on money, which he has already shown the Spartans do not possess. "War," Archidamus argues, "is less [i.e. not] a matter of infantry, but rather of the outlay of money through which infantry becomes useful" (1.83.2). Archidamus' opening description of Sparta's disadvantages is purely materialistic: whereas the Athenians made room for intelligence, daring, courage, and generosity in their account of the Battle of Salamis, Archidamus initially mentions no

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[23] Note the heavy use of polysyndeton in this passage (e.g. πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ ὄχλῳ...), supported by superlatives (e.g. ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται), that are intended to display the quantity and invincibility of Athens' accumulating resources. Sthenelaidas will briefly mimic Archidamian parataxis at 1.86.3.

[24] Cf. Adcock (1951) 7. Archidamus' subsequent claim that Attica is a hostage to Spartan infantry does not argue that attacking Attica is a means to victory, but that the greatest possible concessions might be won from the Athenians through exercising this threat (1.82.3–4). Archidamus warns in this later passage as well, however, that if Sparta wastes Attica without having amassed an Athenian style παρασκευή, the Spartans will only regret the action (1.82.5).

Spartan virtues or strengths but simply argues that without materials that match Athenian materials the Spartans "have no war."

His presentation seems to support the Athenian argument that Athens' material superiority is an insuperable obstacle to Spartan victory in the war, and therefore a roadblock to undertaking the war at all. According to Archidamus' evidence, the Athenians have every right to feel confident, but the Spartans must temporize (cf. 1.80.4, 1.82.1–2, 1.85.2) and build up the Athenian materials. Like the Corinthians, then, Archidamus seems to be suggesting that the Spartans should become more like Athens, since they must obtain a material acme comparable to Athens' acme before they can hope to win the war.

The price of achieving this acme would be a change in Spartan policy or even the Spartan constitution. Where the Spartans had previously withdrawn from the leadership of the allies in order to forestall the corruption of their leaders through money and power (1.95.7, 1.131.1), Archidamus is now asking the entire Spartan state to practice the very activities that had so undermined Pausanias: he advises them to take money from the Persians, raise navies, and undertake devious diplomacy (1.82.1, 1.85.2).[25] At the same time, Thucydides has shown that the value to be gained from such a transformation might be slight. Would more navies such as the Corinthians possess, and whose inadequacy the Athenian Thucydides has described to us in such detail, really be an advantage to Sparta against Athens? Even readers who know nothing of the subsequent dismal record of Peloponnesian navies during the Archidamian War might wonder whether this would be the case.

On the other hand, perhaps Archidamus believes that Sparta would govern an accumulation of wealth and weapons with the prudence described in chapter 84. Pausanias' corruption could be seen as an anomaly, and Archidamus has an answer to the Athenians' claim that their acquisitive drive is unavoidable human nature: one man, he concedes, is not so different from another, but the strongest man is educated in the most necessary things: self-restraint and discipline above all (cf. 1.84.3, 2.11, and the monitory speech at 4.17–20). Archidamus' speech initially aims to corrupt the Spartans to Athenian (and even Persian) ways, because he believes this is necessary in order to save Sparta from Athenian plots (1.82.1). In the conclusion of his speech, however, he

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[25] On Pausanias and the Spartan response to his corruption, cf. 1.94.1–96.1 and 1.128–135. On Spartan and Athenian attempts to get money from Persia and other barbarian powers, cf. 2.7.1 discussed in Chapter 5.

displays one of Sparta's important means of surviving the war. By contrast to the war materials Archidamus listed at the beginning of his speech, which can disappear over the course of a day, Sparta's tenacious prudence is no part of anyone's acme of wealth and weapons, and is nevertheless a fundamental element of her ability to outlast Athens in the war.

Sthenelaidas Argues for War

Archidamus has argued that the Spartans are not strong enough to fight Athens right now, and that they should therefore wait before doing anything. Sthenelaidas dismisses Archidamus' argument about Athens' superior strength and argues that Sparta should attack Athens immediately.

Sthenelaidas argues that the Athenians have committed injustice and must be punished (1.86.1 and 1.86.5).[26] They proved in the period of the Persian Wars that they could do good deeds: this only means that they know better than to do what they are doing now. As conscious offenders, they deserve double punishment, especially as their crimes have turned toward other Greeks. As he says, "if they were virtuous in those days against the Medes, but are now untrustworthy in their relations with us, they deserve double punishment, since they have become bad instead of good" (εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ' ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται 1.86.1).

Sthenelaidas claims that, in contrast to Athens, the Spartans themselves are unchanged (ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν 1.86.2).[27] Therefore, the Spartans still understand right and wrong in the same way as when they fought the Persian Wars, and can understand that attacks on their allies must be avenged. This imperative of justice takes priority over Archidamus' fearful counting up of Athenian resources and his uncertain hopes of getting money from Persia. Sthenelaidas briefly mimics Archidamus' manner before repeating his main point:[28]

> ἄλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρήματά ἐστι πολλὰ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι
> ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις

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[26] ἀδικία/ἀδικεῖν appears in every sentence of Sthenelaidas' speech except for sentence three. On the language and morality of this speech, cf. Allison (1984) 12.

[27] Speakers who urge the war are "unchanged," that is, they claim intransigence for their position. Cf. Pericles at 1.141, 2.61.2, Cleon 3.28.1.

[28] Cf. Allison (1984) 13.

διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει.

Others have a lot of money and ships and horses, but we have good allies, who must not be handed over to the Athenians, nor can [the complaints] be settled with arbitration and negotiations, since [the allies] are [harmed with deeds and] not with speech, but rather they must be avenged with speed and our whole strength. (1.86.3)

Sthenelaidas refuses to give primacy to Athens' accumulations of materials and to make them his reason for not going to war. He also refuses to see Sparta as weak, but instead recommends vengeance "with speed and our whole strength." Athens has, as he stresses, reached out to touch the Spartan alliance (cf. 1.118.2). Nevertheless, the ability to exert force is not at the center of his argument. Issues of principle – justice and injustice, loyalty and disloyalty – provide his standards.[29] The Athenians have transgressed against these principles, and as far as he is concerned, there is nothing left to discuss: "and let no one teach that that it is fitting for us who are being harmed to take counsel; instead, it is fitting for those who are about to do wrong to plan for a long time" (1.86.4).[30]

Despite his focus on these ethical issues, Sthenelaidas also points to the fatal practical weakness in Archidamus' plan: time is on Athens' side. If the Spartans delay their chastisement of Athenian ambition, they will only be allowing the Athenians "to become larger":

ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐᾶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας.

Vote, O Lacedaimonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta, for war, and do not allow the Athenians to become larger nor betray the allies to them, but with the gods let us attack those who are doing wrong. (1.86.5)

Sthenelaidas' words imply that the Spartans are strongest relative to Athens in the present moment, before Athens has expanded any further. This can only be correct: Athens' famous explosive speed of development contrasts sharply to Sparta's changeless economy. Dismissing the Athenians' self-justifications as excuses for criminal aggression against

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[29] Both Spartan speakers express their opinions with urgency. Sthenelaidas opposes Archidamus' superlatives (cf. note 23) with repeated gerundives (παραδοτέ, διακριτέα, τιμωρητέα).

[30] Note the disparity between this view and Archidamus' characterization of the Spartans' strength through long deliberation at 1.84.1.

others, ignoring Archidamus' far-flung plans to imitate Athens' acme, and showing that Sparta is strongest in relation to Athens at the present moment, Sthenelaidas captures both the moral and the material high ground, and after his speech the Spartans vote for war. Archidamus' strategy, which was to make Athenian materials seem as large and insuperable as possible while giving the complaints of the allies less prominence, fails when Sthenelaidas convinces the Spartans that they can best oppose both the Athenian acme and Athens' aggressive use of these resources at the present moment. The Spartans therefore vote to fight, but not for a war plan: Sthenelaidas has presented no plan at all for winning the war.[31]

The Athenian Acme and the Pentekontaetia

In Chapter 1 of this book, we discussed the repetitive accumulations of wealth and weapons in the Archaeology, accumulations driven by the desire for profit and the fear of others. Destructive of stability both in their motivation and their consequences, these accumulations (acmes) always led to more warfare and to a renewed focus on acquisition. Only Sparta and Athens had seemed to be somewhat free of these cycles, and Athenian freedom was questionable: was Athenian dependence on taking tribute from the allies (1.19) not a symptom of adherence to the bad old ways of the pirates?

Chapter 2 led us through the first sixty-nine chapters of book one of Thucydides. Our main task was to delineate the relation between warfare and war materials in the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra. The analysis emphasized Thucydides' presentation of the passions weapons arouse, the destruction they enable, and the potentially crushing cost of the determined revenge Athens provoked through her policy toward Corinth and Corcyra.

The present chapter has so far reviewed the thematic of warfare and war materials in the speeches at the Spartan Congress. The pressure the Athenian acme exerted on every party was evident. The Corinthians come to Sparta to see this acme destroyed; in response, the Athenians boast too much of their numbers of ships and right to rule. In the Greek context, their power is no delusion: Archidamus demonstrates a detailed awareness (which through him is transmitted to the reader)

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[31]   Cf. Hussey (1985) 129: "The weakness of Sthenelaidas' speech is that it cannot answer the criticism of Archidamus about the unwinnability of the war…"

of this threat to Sparta and her allies. He counsels prudent delay, perhaps hoping that the Corinthians and the Athenians, two competing sea powers, will fight it out on their own. But Sthenelaidas ended his speech by reminding the Spartans that now was the time to take on Athens. They should not allow the Athenians "to become larger" (μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐᾶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι 1.86.5). Thus, and among many other things, the speeches confirm the reality of Athens' acme, which is described from several points of view, as well as the significance of the Spartan fears that are an underlying causes of the war.[32] Upon introducing the Pentekontaetia a few paragraphs later, the narrator confirms that Athens' size – as the Spartans conceived it – was the reason for the Spartan declaration of war (cf. 1.23.6):

> ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα.

> And the Lacedaimonians voted that the treaties had been broken and that it was necessary to go to war not so much because they were persuaded by the words of their allies as because they feared that the Athenians would grow yet greater in power, since they saw that much of Greece was already subordinate to them. (1.88)

The Pentekontaetia will show how it was that Athens' size could arise and become such a crucial factor for other Greek *poleis.* The following argument follows Thucydides' account of the foundation of Athenian strength in the first section of the Pentekontaetia (1.89–99), and Athenian power in the second (1.100–118).[33]

Themistoclean Walls

Thucydides' narration of how the Athenians construct walls around their city and Peiraeus after the destruction of the Persian Wars is designed to instantiate the walls in the minds both of the eternal reader and also of Thucydides' contemporaries, for whom the evidence Thucydides adduces is a visible reminder of the Themistoclean period at Athens.

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[32] For a book-length treatment of the importance of the explanation of the causes of the war at 1.23.5–6 for the speeches of book one, cf. Hagmaier (2009).

[33] Scholars divide the Pentekontaetia differently. For a division after chapter 97, cf. *CT* ad loc. 1.98.1, Westlake (1968) 40–41, and Orwin (1994) 50. Stadter (1993) and Tsakmakis (1995) divide the Pentekontaetia as I do; fortunately, the question of the structure of the Pentekontaetia is not central to the argument made here.

When the Athenians returned to Athens after the Persian occupation of 480–479 BCE, they found their city and its wall all but destroyed (1.89.3). The Athenians naturally planned to rebuild; at the same time, the Spartans would have preferred all Greek states to be like themselves, that is, to have no city wall (1.90.1). Moreover, Athens' new navy and the display of Athenian daring during the Persian Wars had already made the other allies afraid of Athens. The allies had voiced these concerns to the Spartan leaders of the pan-Hellenic alliance, and once they perceive the Athenians' plans, the Spartans travel to Athens in an attempt to achieve their own and the allied preference that Athens not be strengthened by a wall (1.90.1).[34]

The Spartans' regular habit of ravaging Attica whenever they were called upon to do so by factions inside of Athens, or by Athens' enemies, made it most unlikely that the Athenians would agree to live without a wall.[35] The embassy of 479 BCE would have stiffened Athenian resolve to build a wall even further, however, since it confirmed that the Spartans considered northern Greece both subordinate and expendable. To the reader's astonishment, the Spartans not only suggest to the Athenians that they should not build a wall, but further, that the Athenians and Spartans should together throw down the walls of all powers outside of the Peloponnese (1.90.2). Their proposal is equivalent to suggesting that Athens and Sparta declare a joint war on northern and island Greek powers, and seems to have forseen exploiting Athens' unique naval force in order to impose Spartan ways and policies on the extra-Peloponnesian allies. Sparta's plan involves the same destruction of city walls as Athens later imposed on allies defeated after a revolt, and its ultimate consequence would be that Athens and the other northern allies would remain unwalled and vulnerable.[36]

[34] Cf. 1.69.1, where the Corinthians expressly blame the Spartans for allowing the Athenians to build the long walls down to the sea (cf. 1.107.1, 1.108.3).

[35] On factional struggles inside Athens and the resulting Spartan invasions, cf. Hdt. 5.64–91 and Thucydides 1.18.1 and 1.126.12. Thucydides shows in the Pentekontaetia how frequently the power of Spartan infantry was threatened or turned against Attica or places close to Attica in the years between the wars: 1.101.2 (the Spartans promise the Thasians to waste Attica, but are prevented from doing so by an earthquake); 1.105.4 (a Spartan land attack on Megara when Megara was still allied to Athens); 1.109.2 (the Spartans refuse to waste Attica in return for Persian money); 1.114.2 (the Spartans waste Attica up to Eleusis). Earlier in the narrative, and thus later in time, during the relation of the quarrels that directly preceded the war, the reader learned that the Spartans had promised to ravage Attica in support of Potideia (1.58.1). For a Spartan statement that Attica is in general "a hostage" to Spartan infantry, cf. Archidamus at 1.82.4.

[36] Cf. Munson (2007) 154 on Hdt. 9.106.2–4: the Spartans had previously suggested evacuating the Greeks of Asia Minor to mainland Greece, another plan the Athenians would not accept.

Thucydides tells us that the Spartans did not want the Persians to have any walled strongholds to exploit if they came back to Greece (1.90.2), and made the suggestion for this reason. However, the Spartans hid this consideration from the Athenians, and instead argued that everyone could retreat to the Peloponnesus at need, that is, that northern Greek states did not need walls because they could simply be evacuated once more if the Persians came back. Sparta's helplessly tactless words again imply that Athens and the other cities outside the Peloponnesus are expendable, as far as Sparta is concerned, and Sparta's embassy back-fires. Her words must demonstrate to the Athenians that they are on their own: they are expendable, and therefore the alliance will never be deployed for their sake, so that they can expect no help, but sooner or later certainly trouble, as of old, from Sparta.

Enter Themistocles, whose capacity for outwitting both Spartans and other opponents was well-documented in Herodotus.[37] Stadter aptly depicts "Athens' delicate position at this time, neither daring to oppose Sparta and her allies openly, nor accepting a subordinate position."[38] Perfect diplomacy was necessary, and Thucydides admiringly shows how Themistocles detains the Spartans at Sparta with lies and prevarications, while the Athenians as quickly as possible throw up their wall. The contrast between Themistocles, who sits idle in Sparta, toying with his aristocratic Spartan hosts, while all other Athenians are at home in sacked and plundered Athens heaving heavy stones at his behest, seems typical of stories about Themistocles, who tends to have his way with everyone. Once the wall is undeniably built, however, Themistocles defends it to the Spartans in a frank and challenging speech:

…καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις σφῶν τετείχισται ἤδη ὥστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σῴζειν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δέ τι βούλονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διαγιγνώσκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἰέναι τά τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά. τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι, ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἔφασαν γνόντες τολμῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα αὖ μετ' ἐκείνων βουλεύεσθαι, οὐδενὸς ὕστεροι γνώμῃ φανῆναι. δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τεῖχος ἔχειν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ ἐς τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. ἢ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

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[37] E.g. Themistocles outwits both Xerxes and his fellow Greeks (e.g. 8.75, 8.79–83, 8.109–110) at the Battle of Salamis.

[38] (1993) 44.

… and coming forward to the Spartans Themistocles then said openly that their city was now sufficiently fortified to preserve those who lived within it. If the Spartans or the allies wished to send representatives to them, they should in future arrive with the attitude that they had come to [people] who are able to discern both their own advantage and also the common interest. And he said that when it had seemed better to them to evacuate the city and embark into their ships, recognizing this without them [i.e. without the Spartans] they had dared to do it, and that in turn, in respect to those things they had planned together with them, they had been superior to everyone else in their opinion. And right now it seemed to them better for their city to have a wall, both privately for the citizens, and because it would be more helpful for all the allies. For it was not possible to plan anything in a similar or equal way for the common good without an equally strong physical foundation (παρασκευή). And he said that either it was necessary for all of the allies to be without walls, or for the truth of what he said to be admitted (1.91.4–7)

The main point of Themistocles' speech is clear.[39] The city is now defensible, and whenever the Peloponnesians come to the well-defended city, they will be compelled to treat Athenian policy with respect, that is, they will not be able to make the demands they would be able to enforce on an undefended population. Themistocles shows that the wall will protect the Athenians, and allow them to maintain the distinction between what is good for Athens (τὰ ξύμφορα) and what is good for Sparta and the other allies (τὰ κοινά). As proof that the Athenians know how to handle their own and also pan-Hellenic affairs, he relates the story of the decision to evacuate Athens and fight the battle of Salamis,[40] emphasizing Athens' independent power of decision on this occasion and her indispensible value to the alliance as counselors in the subsequent common actions.[41]

Athens' independent power of decision has now resulted in the decision to build the city wall.[42] In his final comments, Themistocles again

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[39] This speech is not entirely easy to translate (French [1971] 20 note 9 speaks of "studied ambiguity"). Some textual corruption may be evident (on this problem cf. Poppo ad loc.).

[40] For the third time, so far, in Thucydides. Cf. the narrator at 1.18.2, and the Athenians at 1.73.4.

[41] Themistocles does not mention that he himself was the chief counselor, although he was so highly honored by the Spartans in the previous year (Hdt. 8.124). Perhaps to mention this would emphasize that he was hoodwinking people who had shown him so much goodwill.

[42] Themistocles thus takes authority for Athens' physical independence from the history of her demonstrable intellectual independence. As the intellectual equal or superior to Sparta, Athens can claim to govern her own fate. Cf. Rood (1998) 146.

distinguishes between what is good for Athens and what is good for the allies: however, he claims that the wall is good for both, since it allows Athens to plan from a basis of security and authority equal to that of the other allies.[43] The final salvo is meant to display Sparta's duplicity in allowing their own Peloponnesian allies (e.g. Corinth) to possess walls, while asking Athens to go without.

Besides establishing Athens as Sparta's equal, Themistocles' speech dissects the effect of physical defensibility on the psychological and political constitution of a people. Through freeing the defended from immediate fear, the wall enables the existence of an independent foreign policy.[44] His analysis shows that the wall is necessary if the Athenians are going to exist as a city rather than as hostages, and significantly conditions our reception of Thucydides' account of Athenian behavior toward their conquered allies.[45]

Thus, when it later becomes necessary in order to discipline revolted subordinates, the Athenians will throw down their walls as Sparta has suggested here. By contrast, Athens' wall is now a fact, and the Spartans must swallow their anger and return home (1.92.1). Turning from this vivid story of Themistocles' successful trickery and the Spartans' failed diplomacy, Thucydides describes the city wall as it still appears in his time, and shows from this appearance how quickly the wall must have been built. For even now, he reminds his Athenian readers, it is clear that the construction was hasty (1.93.2).[46] In contrast to the wall around Peiraeus, which Thucydides will shortly describe, the city wall has foundations made of every kind of stone, in some places not joined together,

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[43] The scholiast exposes his limitations here, but Poppo corrects: "The scholiast gives an example of the whole thought in the following way: 'for perhaps, if enemies were attacking, we would decide not to fight, but rather to make a truce, since we have a wall, but for others it would seem best to fight.' But the sentence is more general. For it means that [those lacking a wall] are able to propose counsels neither as boldly nor as seriously as their allies. For ὁμοῖον refers more to the quality of their counsels, ἴσον more to their authority." ("Totam sententiam sic illustrat schol.: ἴσως γὰρ πολεμίων ἐλθόντων ἡμῖν μὲν δόξει μὴ μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σπένδεσθαι, ὡς ἔχουσι τεῖχος, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πολεμεῖν. Sed latius pendet sententia. Significatur enim ita eos non posse consilia pariter audacia aut gravia atque socios proponere. Nam ὁμοῖον magis ad qualitatem, ἴσον magis ad auctoritatem consiliorum videtur referri.")

[44] Which seems to have been exactly what the Spartans wanted to prevent. Cf. Stadter (1993) 43.

[45] Cf. 1.101.3, 1.108.4, 1.117.3, discussed in the final sections of this chapter, and Athens' insistence, in anticipation of a revolt, that the Potideians throw down their walls (1.57.6–1.58.1).

[46] Cf. *CT* ad loc. on this passage and the fact that excavations seem basically to confirm Thucydides' report.

but laying as the stones happen to have been brought (οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνειργασμένων ἔστιν ᾗ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστόν ποτε προσέφερον… 1.93.2). Furthermore, the Athenians laid in "many steles from tombs and other worked stones. For they extended the circuit on every side. And because of this they made haste, moving all things equally" (πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατελέγησαν. μείζων γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχῇ ἐξήχθη τῆς πόλεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ὁμοίως κινοῦντες ἠπείγοντο 1.93.2).

The city wall was an improvised and messy construction. The type and position of the stones was random; the fit of the stones was sometimes left to chance. Yet, just like the similarly messy and improvised Corcyraean navy that defeats the Corinthians at the Battle of Leukimme (1.29.3), the new wall suffices perfectly well. Thucydides' description shows that the city wall reflects an ambition to claim a larger space, commensurate with Athens' new position in the world, as well as a democratic desire for freedom from the past that caused a certain amount of further destruction to the city. Thus everything, including decorated stones and the grave markers of the wealthier members of the previous generations, gave way to the expanded plan.[47]

Of course, Themistocles had, even before the Persian Wars, anticipated the new Athens. Thucydides continues:

ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπῆρκτο δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἧς κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε) νομίζων τό τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι, λιμένας ἔχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν (τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί) καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν.

And Themistocles persuaded them also to complete the Piraeus [wall], which had been begun during his archonship, believing that the site was fine, having three natural harbors, and that it would be very advantageous to them, now that they had become nautical, for the acquisition of power

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[47] Themistocles had told them to spare neither public nor private buildings, but to throw down everything for the wall (1.90.3). Since the city was largely reduced to rubble (1.89.3), perhaps it made sense to use everything for the protective wall first, and then to rebuild the city. Nevertheless, Thucydides' remark at 1.93.2 (πάντα ὁμοίως κινοῦντες: they "moved everything equally") seems slightly ominous. The Athenians do not differentiate between steles and other stones of no historical value, but reduce everything to its immediate usefulness. If it is a crime for the Persians to destroy temples (cf. particularly the Athenian view expressed at Hdt. 8.144.2), it is surely at least problematic if the Athenians pack grave steles in a wall. Thucydides elsewhere calls disrespect for the dead disgraceful. Cf. 2.52.4. For a different interpretation of this scene, cf. Stadter (1993) 44.

(for he had first dared to argue that they should cling to the sea). And thus he straightaway contributed to founding the empire.[48] (1.93.3–4)

The Athenian harbors were a gift of nature, Themistocles recognized, that ought to be exploited for the protection of the navy with which the Athenians would acquire power. The seriousness with which Themistocles regards this enterprise is reflected in his plan for the Piraeus wall, which was to be very massive and high. By contrast to the hastily improvised city walls, this wall is the result of the best and most expensive materials and a laborious construction process. Thucydides' description of this wall shows that it was no common "sandwich" wall, like the city wall, but stone throughout.

καὶ ᾠκοδόμησαν τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ· δύο γὰρ ἅμαξαι ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπῆγον. ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἦν, ἀλλὰ ξυνῳκοδομημένοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἐντομῇ ἐγγώνιοι, σιδήρῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεδεμένοι. τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἥμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διενοεῖτο. ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακήν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι.

And they constructed the thickness of the wall according to his conception, the very thickness that is still now visible around Peiraeus. For two oxcarts coming from opposite directions brought the stones in. And within it was not rubble or mud, but great stones fitted together and cut square, bound together on the surface with iron and lead. But as for the height [of the wall], half of what he imagined was accomplished. For he wanted to turn back enemy attacks with the size and thickness [of the wall], and he thought that the guard of few and the weakest men would be sufficient, and that the others could get into the ships. (1.93.5–6)

Thucydides reminds his Athenian readers for the second time in the paragraph (cf. 1.93.2) that the evidence he is citing is available for them to see. He is appealing to what they know to be true, therefore, and uses this information to construct contrasting pictures of Themistocles' two walls.[49] The lightning construction process of the city wall was determined by the necessity to defend Athens immediately, and also by the opportunity the Persian destruction created to plunder stones from Athens itself; by contrast, the Peiraeus wall is made of new stones cut

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[48] The translation of τὴν ἀρχήν in 1.93.4 can be a difficulty: cf. Poppo ad loc. The translation offered here ("the empire") is accepted by both Stadter (1993) 45 and French (1971) 22.

[49] He is also able to construct the Athenian reader as a supporting authority for the future reader.

square, and bound with metal to create the heaviest and strongest possible construction. Slow oxen draw the stones to Peiraeus, and the wall itself is part of a considered strategic plan.

Each wall therefore acquires a vivid physical and political profile. Moreover, one other striking difference between them emerges. Where the city wall was completed, only half the planned height of the Peiraeus wall was actually built. Themistocles had envisioned a fortress that could be protected by only a few landlocked weaklings, expecting that Athenians in their prime would man the triremes.[50] His ambition and image of Athens took an extreme naval-centered view. Pericles is moderate by comparison, since Themistocles would have sacrificed not only Attica, but even the upper city itself in order to secure the navy:

> ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἰδών, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν· τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει, ἢν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτειχίσθησαν καὶ τἆλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδων ἀναχώρησιν.

> And he laid great importance on the ships, since he saw, I think, that access for the armies of the King was more convenient by sea than by land. And he believed that Peiraeus was more useful than the upper city and frequently advised the Athenians, if they should ever be compelled by land, that they could resist anyone with their ships if they went down to Peiraeus. And thus the Athenians acquired walls, and were also equipped in other ways immediately after the withdrawal of the Persians. (1.93.7–8)

Themistocles' Peiraeus wall was intended to produce independence from any enemy. It was a base from which the Athenians could defy "all," that is, any land or sea power. Whereas his city wall was therefore originally more defensive in intention, the subsequently constructed Peiraeus wall was designed from its inception to support the warfare that would be necessary to secure the empire.

Thucydides has chosen to illustrate Athens' progress toward imperial power as much by describing Athens' walls and their physical capacities as by relating the outlines of Themistoclean policy. The physical presence of the walls and the increasingly aggressive policies they made possible for Athens were unavoidable facts for both Athenians and non-Athenians: his depiction of the walls and their construction calls on

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[50]   Contrast this to the necessities depicted in 2.13.4: sixteen thousand men must guard the system of walls during the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Chapter 5.

supporting focalization from among Thucydides' contemporaries, who authorize his account. Together the narrator and his contemporaries confirm to the reader the reality of the walls and the history reflected in their construction. The reader is compelled to perceive that Athens' progress toward aggressive behavior was recorded in stone.[51]

Tribute

As we have seen, at the opening of the Pentekontaetia, Themistocles furnishes the Athenians (who were mocked in Herodotus for being without a city; cf. Hdt. 8.61.1) with a fortification for the city, and a harbor and home for Athens' navy.

If these walls establish the Athenian empire, tribute taken from the allies is the empire's substance. Tribute is the main element of the Athenian acme. Its forceful acquisition from the allies is the central fact of the empire and seals Athens' eventual fate. Paradoxically, in Thucydides' account, the initial acquisition of this sustaining element of Athenian power was initially as much the result of others' weakness as of Athenian strength.

In Thucydides' presentation, the tribute-paying allies subordinate themselves to the Athenians in two stages.[52] First, the allies ask the Athenians to preserve them from Pausanias, King of Sparta, who was still leading the alliance after his victory at Plataea in 479 BCE. The second stage of subordination occurs once the Athenians have taken advantage of their leadership to assess payments of tribute and ships. The allies resist this requirement, and are conquered one by one. Thucydides' accounts of both stages emphasize the psychological weakness of the allies, who in the first case cry out to the Athenians to preserve them when they fail independently to meet the challenge of Pausanias' (quickly squelched) tyrannical behavior, and in the second case fail to maintain their own potentially formidable military strength. Thucydides' brief exposition of the Ionian situation once again relies heavily on the Herodotean background.[53]

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[51] Cf. Rood (1998) 232. Westlake (1968) 49 is surprised at the "generous scale of the narrative" about the building of the wall. The tendency has been to consider such passages less important.

[52] Cf. Stadter (1993) 49–52 and Tsakmakis (1995) 86–87 on Thucydides' presentation of the allies' self-subordination.

[53] On the four subjections of the Ionians (to Croesus, to Cyrus, again to the Persians after the failed Ionian revolt, and then to the mainland Greeks after the Persian Wars) discussed or reflected in Herodotus, cf. Munson (2007). Noting the Ionians'

Like the subordination of Epidamnus to Corinth, the Ionians' sub-ordination to Athens begins with supplication. Pausanias' violence (1.95.1) and tyrannical behavior (1.95.3) causes the allies to appeal to the Athenians to rescue them and take leadership of the alliance.[54] The difference between Epidamnus and the Ionians, however, is that the Ionians were not small or materially weak. In fact, the larger pow-ers of the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor Coast were wealthy and pos-sessed of well-developed trireme navies. United they might easily have been a match for either Sparta or Athens' early power.[55] However, they unite only to turn themselves over to the Athenians, and uncondition-ally accept both Athenian command of the ongoing war against Persia and also the Athenian organization of the new alliance (1.95.1, cited in note 54).

At the same time as the Ionians entrust themselves to Athens in this way, the Spartans recall Pausanias (1.95.7, 1.131.1), and gradually reduce their military commitment to the Aegean campaigns until they have abandoned the Aegean sphere altogether. They have several reasons for doing this, none of which have to do with military weakness. First, they are afraid of the effect that foreign campaigns and victories have had on Pausanias, and "fearing that those of them who went out would become worse [i.e. corrupted]," they send no further generals to the Aegean. In addition, however, "they wanted to be rid of the Median War, and they

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consistent importance throughout Herodotus' text, she characterizes their roles as fol-lows (147): "They tend to trigger or suffer circumstances without determining them. They are capable of bouts of heroism and endurance, but they are also divided, and therefore weak, not sufficiently committed to the goal of liberty, conflicted in their allegiances, and generally requiring the oversight or support of a larger power…" Cf. 150–151 on Herodotus' "ambivalent or negative" judgments of the Ionians, and the "extraordinary direct speech [at 6.12.3] in which the Ionians declare that they prefer slavery to their present hardships."

54 Thucydides' story (1.95.1) of the allied appeal to the Athenians, uses language similar to the language of the story of the Epidamnian supplications at Corcyra and Corinth (cf. 1.24.6, 1.25.2). 1.95.1: "And since [Pausanias] was now being actually violent, the other Greeks were aggrieved, and in particular those who had just now been liberated from the King [of Persia]. And going to the Athenians they asked them to be their leaders since they were related [κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές cf. 1.26.3] and not to entrust them to Pausanias, who was treating them with violence. And the Athenians accepted [their petition] (ἐδέξαντο cf. Corinthians at 1.25.3), and assured them that they would not overlook [οὐ περιοψόμενοι: cf. περιορᾶν at 1.24.6 and 1.25.2] the other problems, and would also establish things in the way that seemed best to them."

55 Cf. Wallinga (1984) 401–403. Herodotus frequently displays Ionian prosperity; how-ever, the most prosperous states (Naxos and Miletus, for instance) also fight among themselves the most. Cf. e.g. Hdt. 5.28 with Munson (2007) 156. The Ionians' pros-perity also becomes evident in the story of the revolt of Samos at 1.116–117. Cf. *HCT* ad loc.

thought that the Athenians were adequate to lead, and friendly to themselves in the present" (1.95.7).

Thus both the Spartans and the Aegean allies, two political groups possessed of considerable power, rely on Athenian leadership in the Aegean, and the second stage of Ionian subordination begins. Thucydides' description of Athenian leadership in the Archaeology had distinguished the Athenians from the Spartans by showing that the former took payment of tribute, but the latter did not (1.19). His description of Athenian leadership in the Pentekontaetia records the decision to assess tribute payments to the allies, and provides minimal but crucial context for understanding this decision.

> παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἃς ναῦς· πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δῃοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, οἳ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον· οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ᾽ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα. ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνοντο.

> And once the Athenians had taken leadership in this way, that is, since the allies were willing because of their hatred of Pausanias, they decided which of the cities should supply money against the barbarian, and which ships. For the pretext [i.e. for taking money and ships] was to be recompensed for the damages they had suffered by wasting the territory of the king. And at that time the Athenians first established the office of the *Hellenotamiae*, who accepted the tribute. For thus the importation of money [ἡ φορά] was named [i.e. it was called tribute]. And the first tribute assessed was 460 talents. Delos was their treasury, and their meetings were in the temple. (1.96)

This is a rather astonishing paragraph. First, Thucydides explains that the Athenians took leadership over the allies on a "pretext." This observation can claim Herodotean authority, since Herodotus had also explained that the Athenians deployed a pretext to take over leadership of the alliance:

> ἐγένετο γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λόγος … ὡς τὸ ναυτικὸν Ἀθηναίοισι χρεὸν εἴη ἐπιτρέπειν. ἀντιβάντων δὲ τῶν συμμάχων εἶκον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μέγα πεποιημένοι περιεῖναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ γνόντες, εἰ στασιάσουσι περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίης, ὡς ἀπολέεται ἡ Ἑλλάς … ἐπιστάμενοι ὧν αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀντέτεινον ἀλλ᾽ εἶκον, μέχρι ὅσου κάρτα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ὡς διέδεξαν· ὡς γὰρ δὴ ὠσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἤδη τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο, πρόφασιν τὴν Παυσανίεω ὕβριν προϊσχόμενοι ἀπείλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

> For in the beginning [i.e. when the Greek allies were deciding who should lead the naval forces against the Persians] there was some talk … that it would be necessary to turn [the command of] the naval forces over to the Athenians. But when the allies resisted, the Athenians yielded since they had already done much to ensure the survival of Greece and knew that Greece would be destroyed if they quarreled over the leadership … and so, understanding this, they did not argue, but yielded – but only as long as they really needed the allies, as they later clearly showed. For once they had thrust off the Persians, they were immediately contesting for his lands, and offering the arrogance of Pausanias as their excuse, they took leadership from the Spartans. (8.3.1–2)

At 1.96, Thucydides argues that the Athenians took leadership, assigning to each ally what to contribute, on the pretext that they wanted to take revenge on the King by wasting his lands. At 8.3.1–2, Herodotus indicates the same phase of activity, describing how the Athenians took leadership as they were competing for the King's lands after the war, but does not specify that this activity supplied the pretext for Athenian leadership and the formation of the league. Instead, Herodotus argues that Pausanias' arrogance gave the Athenians a convenient pretext for taking over at this stage.[56]

Whether the pretext functions directly (as in Thucydides) to justify the destruction of Persian lands, or whether it functions to justify seizing leadership while making war on Persian lands (as in Herodotus), the context of the pretext is warfare against Persia. Nevertheless, Thucydides' statement of the pretext in 1.96 seems astonishing. French sensibly asks whether it is "credible that the official purpose of the confederacy was aggressive and amounted to a systematic plundering of the Persians by a series of Viking-like raids from the sea."[57] In the end, however, he finds this not only credible, but logical: "It explains the willingness of the allies to go on contributing ships to the allies' effort … for the ships were intended to bring in a profit." Considered in this way, Thucydides' description of the Delian league, in which the allies voluntarily turn themselves over to Athens and then join her campaigns against Persia, closely resembles the arrangement described in the Archaeology at 1.8.3, where the lesser powers voluntarily subordinate themselves to enslavement by the greater for the sake of profit.

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[56] Herodotus is harder on Athens in this explanation than Thucydides, since he does not distribute any blame to the allies. Cf., however, his depictions of the predatory campaigns of Miltiades (6.32) and Themistocles (8.11–112), and his frequent explanations of Ionian weakness, referenced in note 52.

[57] (1971) 28.

Readers will object that the allies did not "go on contributing" ships voluntarily, but soon revolted. However, in Thucydides' view, these revolts resulted directly from the fact that the Athenians were organized enough to claim whatever profit came to the allies for themselves. The subsequent sentences of 1.96 describe the mechanisms by which the allies' profits were to be brought to Athens. The Athenians, Thucydides tells us, established offices with archaic and pan-Hellenic-sounding names: the Ἑλληνοταμίαι, who received the tribute. After this, he explains the Athenians' name for monetary tribute: ὁ φόρος. The explanation runs as follows: ἡ φόρα is called ὁ φόρος. "The bringing in" (of money) is called "the collection." Next, Thucydides informs us that the amount of the first tribute payments was 460 talents. Finally, he tells us that the treasury was on Delos and that meetings of the league were in the temple (that is, the temple of Apollo).

The centered explanation of the name for and amount of tribute contrasts to the surrounding information. The names of the officers and the location of the treasury and league meetings signaled traditional and religious relations among states. However, and consistent with the strictness with which the Athenians will administrate and enforce the collection of tribute payments (1.99.1), they attached no ceremony to their name.[58] Tribute was tribute, the explanation seems to indicate, and was so called from the beginning, regardless of other performances.

Thus Thucydides' explanation of the pretext for founding the league and also his explanation of its terminology reflect his view that the original aim of the alliance was to gather money from Persia and from the allies to Athens. Whatever we think of the accuracy of the figure given for the first tribute payment (460 talents), the taking of tribute is clearly lucrative.[59] Furthermore, the Athenians also use their subordinates to make war on each other. Thucydides ends his initial description of the alliance with the observation that the allies were at first autonomous, and decisions were made in common council (1.97.1). This phase seems to have given way to a much stricter Athenian leadership quite quickly. His summary of the leagues' initial activities shows that while they did continue to combat the Persians, they were both deployed for "actions against [Athens'] revolted allies," (i.e. each other) and also against

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[58] This is perhaps a minor example of emphasis through centering, rather than through full-blown ring composition.

[59] On the figure, see the essay in *HCT*, ad loc., and on all figures provided by Thucydides in reference to Athenian monetary resources, the extensive argument of Blamire (2001).

"whoever of the Peloponnesian side happened forward in each situation" (1.97.1, cf. 1.18.3).[60] The alliance was therefore early on dedicated to combating other Greeks as well as the Persians.[61]

Athens on Campaign

The more detailed descriptions of Athens' activity in the next chapters instantly confirm this fact.[62] The quick and cruel Athenian successes of the initial sentence culminate in the "enslavement" of Naxos (1.98.4), one of the most prosperous Aegean islands (cf. Hdt. 5.28 and 5.31.1), and are followed by a discussion of the revolts caused by the necessity to pay tribute to Athens:

> αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι καὶ λιποστράτιον εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ῥᾴδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους. ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ᾽ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δέ, ὁπότε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

> And there were other reasons for revolts, but the greatest were arrears in paying tribute and ships, and sometimes desertion.[63] For the Athenians did their business precisely, and were painful to people who were neither accustomed nor willing to suffer pain prosecuting the necessary ends. And the Athenians were anyway no longer ruling in a way that was pleasing to the allies, nor did they go out on campaign on a condition of equality with

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[60] On 1.97.1, cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 79, who remarks on the fact that two out of three activities of the league do not speak to its founding purpose (i.e. to combat the Persians).

[61] Cf. Bloesel (2001) 196 on Herodotus' corresponding presentation of the story of Themistocles.

[62] On 1.98, see the description and discussion in Rood (1998) 238: "Thucydides' treatment is generic: Eion is the first Persian fortress captured, Syros the first place not held by Persia; Carystos is the first Greek state forced to join the alliance, Naxos the first to try to leave. And there is a progression: first 'took and sold into slavery' (εἷλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν); then, 'sold into slavery and colonized' (ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ ᾤκισαν αὐτοί); finally 'enslaved contrary to custom' (παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη)."

[63] Poppo noted the continuing suggestions of cowardice and softness in this description of the Ionians' situation. See λιποστρατία at 1.99.1, with Poppo's remark: "λιποστρατία does not differ much from ἡ ἀπόκνησις τῶν στρατειῶν (1.99.3) except that it takes on the coloring of cowardice" ("non multum differt, praeterquam quod ignaviae notio accepit, ἡ ἀπόκνησις τῶν στρατειῶν 1.99.3").

the others, but rather it was easy for them to bring around those who had revolted. And the allies themselves were responsible for this. For because of their reluctance to go out on campaign, most of them were assigned to pay a sufficient amount of money instead of ships, so that they would not be away from home. And the Athenian navy grew from their contributions, but the [allies] themselves, whenever they would revolt, came to war unequipped and inexperienced. (1.99)

Athens' relentless demands for resources and military service are far from welcome to their less energetic allies, but their revolts are useless, since their policy of as much as possible paying the Athenians off, rather than facing labor and risk, has left them ill-qualified to contest with the very power their contributions have made strong. Without exculpating the Athenians, Thucydides blames the allies and shows, as was mentioned, that the foundations of Athens' strength are importantly determined by the varying weakness of the states that surrounded Athens in Greece after the Persian Wars.[64]

The Athenians thus partly owe their rapid growth in the Aegean to Spartan disinclination, and Ionian inability, to lead. But the catalogue of wars provided in the last section of the Pentekontaetia is all Athens' own. Scholars have remarked on the fact that causes are not provided for Athens' continuous campaigning in the closing section of the Pentekontaetia.[65] Furthermore, chronological indications are kept to a minimum.[66] Finally, leaders are relatively equal, a fact sometimes complained of by those who feel that Thucydides is suppressing Pericles'

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[64] Contra Tsakmakis (1995) 85–87, who agrees with de Romilly that Thucydides' presentation is biased and indirectly reveals Thucydides' approval for Athens' aggressive behavior. *TAI* 91: "…he makes no mention of the transference, in 454, of the treasury from Delos to Athens; he makes no mention of the triumph, in 443, of a policy which consisted in using the money contributed by the allies for other purposes than waging war; he makes no mention of the division of the allies into five districts, which took place at the same time and marked the beginning of an imperial mode of organization, or of the fusion of Athena's treasury with the federal treasury. Yet these different measures both marked and brought about the transformation of the allies into subjects." Thucydides' book would have had to have been rather long to satisfy modern historians of the ancient world. (Cf. Stadter [1993] 37–38 who calculates how long the Pentekontaetia would have had to have been to satisfy this kind of inquiry.) It seems to me that Thucydides chose one important example of the kind of behaviors listed by de Romilly (namely, the taking of tribute) to focus on. As an important constituent of the acme, tribute, as a theme, is well suited to serving several functions in the plot at once. Thucydides is frank that the Athenians enslaved their allies (1.98.4). Cf. Rood (1998) 234.

[65] Westlake (1968) 45.

[66] Stadter (1993) 63–65.

role in the history of this period.[67] Thus Athenian campaigning in the Pentekontaetia seems to emerge *e nihilo*; possessing superior weapons, monetary resources, and confidence, the Athenians act as human beings mostly do act, in Thucydides' view, in this situation.[68] The second section of the Pentekontaetia tells the story of Athens' many wars once the empire and the acme were founded, and contrasts to these the account of Sparta's interwar years of uncertainty, which end when the Spartans finally decide to destroy Athenian strength (1.118.2).[69]

War materials are not central to this history of constant warfare: according to my count, sixteen campaign stories of the second part of the Pentekontaetia make no mention of Athenian war materials, and ten do.[70] References to war materials are therefore deployed selectively for the purposes of illustrating Thucydides' argument, and he does not glorify war materials in any way. If Thucydides had been interested in

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[67] Cf. e.g. Badian (1993) 160–161. I largely agree with Tsakmakis (1995) on the significance of Pericles' absence from the Pentekontaetia until this point: "Through these omissions [that is, the lack of reference to Pericles' political programs of the 440s] Thucydides avoids above all giving the impression that Athens' policy toward the allies changed in the course of the Pentekontaetia. Thucydides understands the entire Pentekontaetia as a unified period, the main characteristic of which is the *constant and continuous development* of the growth of Athenian power." (Durch diese Auslassungen wird vor allem der Eindruck vermieden, die Athenische Politik gegenüber der Verbündeten hätte im Laufe der *Pentekontaetie* Änderungen erfahren. Thukydides versteht die gesamte *Pentekontaetie* als eine Einheitliche Periode, deren hauptmerkmal die *konstante und kontinuierliche Entwicklung* des Athenischen Machtzuwachses ist.)

[68] On the "perceptibly accelerated" pace of narration in the second half of the Pentekontaetia, reflective of Athens' explosive energy and πολυπραγμοσυνή, cf. Rengakos (2006) 291.

[69] On the unchanging Athenian character throughout the Pentekontaetia, and the slowly changing Spartan character, cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 93–94.

[70] The type of war materials that would have been used in each case, whether infantry or naval, is often obvious and as such needs no reference, but had Thucydides wanted to emphasize the role of weapons or numbers he might have provided some sort of information about the forces engaged in these battles. Thus, in 1.98, Cimon captures Eion after a siege, defeats and colonizes Skyros, forces the Carystians to an agreement, and defeats the Naxians, again after a siege. No war materials of any kind are mentioned. Likewise, the story of Cimon's victory at the Eurymedon does not mention Athenian forces or ships, although two hundred Phoenician ships are captured or destroyed (1.100.1); the Athenian fleet that went to Thasos is likewise unnumbered (1.100.2). At 1.103.3, Thucydides mentions that the Athenians happen to have taken Naupactus, but does not say when or with what forces. No details are provided for the naval battles at Halieis and Kekruphalia at 1.105.1. Thucydides simply calls the battle for Aegina "big" (μεγάλη 1.105.2), although he mentions that the Athenians captured seventy ships. In 1.108.2, the Athenians defeat the Boeotians after their own terrible defeat at Tanagra; again, Thucydides provides no information about the Athenian forces who conquered Boeotia, other than to tell us that Myronides was their general,

praising Athens' navy or infantry, he misses many opportunities in the Pentekontaetia. In the place of praise, we read a swiftly paced catalogue that emphasizes Athens' aggression toward other Greeks, and at the center of which is a description of the destruction of an Athenian acme of sea power (1.104, 1.109–110).

This story, and others, are in fact illustrated with selected references to war materials. For instance, Thucydides repeatedly shows that Athens could keep on campaigning during and after disasters without losing confidence, and a number of his references to war materials illustrate stories in which Athens perseveres when few (not many) materials were available. Thucydides uses a contrasting strategy to show what Athens could take from others.[71]

In the following brief section of the argument, I will not review the war chapters of the Pentekontaetia in order, since several excellent descriptions are available.[72] Instead, I will analyze a small number of usually less-noticed functions of Thucydides' references to war materials in this narrative, and conclude with some observations on the significance of this section of the *History* for the reader.

First, a remark on Thucydides' use of war materials to show what Athens could and did take from defeated allies. The latter section of the Pentekontaetia demonstrates that the Athenians knew how to make revolt more expensive than tribute, and also how to reduce their allies to physical insecurity while strengthening their own defensive and offensive capacities. At 1.101.3, 1.108.4, and 1.117.3, the Thasians, Aeginetans, and Samians, respectively, are compelled to throw down their walls, give up their ships, and pay present and future indemnities, along with other more specific penalties. Thucydides structures his representation of these penalties as agreements with Athens. Thus, for instance, the story of the Thasian revolt ends in the following way:

> and no numbers are given for the ships that ravaged the Peloponnesian coast under Tolmides after this, taking Chalcis and defeating the Sikyonians (1.108.5). At 1.111.1, the Athenians take the Boeotians and Phocians with them on a fruitless campaign in Thessalia, but we do not know what size of force was gathered. No numbers are provided for the infantry forces that fought in the so-called Sacred War (1.112.5). No numbers are provided for the forces that pacified Euboia (1.114). Thus, while the motivation for omitting numbers in any particular case might be argued to be individual, it is apparent that a large number of stories in this section of the Pentekontaetia (1.98 through 115.1) describe campaigns and their results without paying more than minimal attention to Athenian war materials.

[71] All of these uses of references to war materials were noted and catalogued by Stadter (1993) 56–62.

[72] Cf. especially French (1971), Stadter (1993), and Rood (1998).

Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὡμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τήν τε ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες.

And in the third year of the siege, the Thasians came to an agreement with the Athenians by throwing down their wall and surrendering their ships, by being assigned to pay as much money as was necessary to hand over immediately and also to provide in the future, and by resigning both the continent and the metal (i.e. rights to territory on the continent and to mine metal on the continent). (1.101.3)

As Thucydides records it, the Thasians come to terms with Athens by performing the penalties Athens has assessed.[73] The participles, which depict Thasian agency in terms of obedience to Athenian requirements, reflect the subordination of Thasos.[74] The penalties themselves (the loss of walls and ships, and the payments of money) both display Thasos' loss of independence and prosperity,[75] and also create a vivid picture of the gain to Athens from victorious campaigns against revolted allies.

Thucydides uses this type of formula three times in this latter part of the Pentekontaetia, although the circumstances differ. The contrast between Athens' security behind walls and the insecurity Athens enforces upon others is conspicuous in the story of Athens' conquest of Boeotia and Aegina, where Thucydides juxtaposes the notice that the Athenians have finished the long walls connecting Peiraeus to the sea with the announcement that the defeated complied with Athens' terms:

καὶ μάχῃ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Ταναγραίων τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν. ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ

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[73] On this language, cf. Poppo ad loc.: "This treatment of the participle (he is referring to καθέλοντες) seems astonishing. Instead of this [naked participle] you would expect to see ἐφ' ᾧ or perhaps ὥστε with the infinitive or even just an infinitive by itself. But in truth the participle really means 'through the fact that they destroyed,' and Thucydides speaks in the same way at 1.108, etc." (Mirus videtur hic participii usus, pro quo ἐφ' ᾧ (τε) seu ὥστε cum infinitivo vel etiam solum infinitivum expectes. Verum participium proprie valet *dadurch dass sie zerstörten*, atque eodem modo saepe Thuc. loquitur… 108.4, 117.3, 115.1.) In a separate note, Poppo also remarks on the articles lacking before most nouns of the materials lost.

[74] The events (cf. especially 1.98.4) and these agreements throw a dubious light on Athenian claims (1.77.1) to rule according to equal laws, i.e. laws that apply to themselves as well as the allies.

[75] Cf. Themistocles at 1.92.4–7.

οἱ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

And having defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oinophytoi the [Athenians] gained control of Boeotia and threw down the walls of Phocis and of the Tanagrans, and took the hundred richest men of the Opuntian Locrians hostage, and they finished their own long walls. And after this the Aeginetans also came to an agreement with the Athenians by throwing down their walls, surrendering their ships, and being assigned tribute payments for the future. (1.108.3–4)

In this passage Athens' security increases, while her neighbors come under fierce attack. Three cities lose their walls just as the Athenians are finishing theirs, among them the Aeginetans, who, like the Thasians, must fulfill an "agreement" by carrying out the penalties assessed against themselves. The fate of Samos is depicted in very similar terms:

καὶ ναυμαχίαν μέν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι.

The Samians fought a short sea battle, but since they were unable to resist [the opposing Athenian and allied forces], they were besieged, and came to an agreement in the ninth month by throwing down their wall and surrendering hostages, and by being assigned to pay back the money that had been spent [on the war against them] over time. (1.117.3)

Pericles is the victor at Samos, and, as we shall discuss in Chapter 4, his role in the Pentekontaetia differs little from that of his predecessors, all of whom enforce Athens' imperial intentions.

Such depictions are not a glorification of empire, but rather expose the individual elements of it in a frank and direct way. Thucydides counterbalances these illustrations of Athens' profitable domination of her neighbors with examples of Athenian failure and material loss. The campaigns funded by tribute and Persian spoils sometimes succeed and sometimes drastically fail. Ten thousand settlers are lost in the attempt to found a colony at Amphipolis (1.100.3). The Athenians lose to the Corinthians at Halias (1.105), and they lose the battle of Tanagra to the Spartans. At Tanagra, substantial infantry forces were at hand for both sides. Fifteen hundred Spartiates with ten thousand allies (1.107.2) contested against fourteen thousand Athenians and allies (1.107.5), and Thucydides reports that many died on both sides (1.108.1). The Athenians subsequently conquer Boeotia, but must abandon it when their forces, one thousand men returning from victory at Chaironea,

where they had sold the people into slavery, are themselves killed or taken captive on the way home (1.113.1–2). The Athenians spend six years trying to conquer Egypt, and lose their entire force of 250 ships (1.104, 1.109–110).[76] Stalemate is also possible: the Athenians repeatedly take very substantial forces to Cyprus (1.94.2, thirty Athenian ships and twenty Peloponnesian ships; 1.104.2, two hundred Athenian ships; 1.112.2, again two hundred Athenian ships, although sixty head off for Egypt). They win large battles (1.112.2), but when Samos revolts must still fear the Phoenician navy (1.116.1 and 3).

Corinth's enraged response to the single defeat at Leukimme contrasts sharply to the never-say-die attitude of the Athenians in the Pentekontaetia. If the Athenians feel any emotion after defeat, it is not mentioned. Sixty-two days, Thucydides says, after the defeat at Tanagra, the Athenians went back to conquer Boeotia (1.108.2).[77] Only a short time after the catastrophe in Egypt, we find the Athenians sending the previously mentioned sixty ships to Egypt (although the ships return to the main fleet at Cyprus apparently without doing anything: 1.112.3–4).

Even when men and materials with which to fight seem to be unavailable, they persevere. For example, the Peloponnesians try to raise the siege of Aegina by simultaneously sending a Spartan force to Aegina and a Corinthian army to Megara: since the Athenians have a large navy in Egypt, as well as at Aegina, the Peloponnesians calculate that the Athenians will be compelled to raise the siege in order to defend Megara (1.105.3).[78] But the Athenians send out from the city an army of the youngest and the oldest under Myronides, and this leftover force successfully fends off the Corinthians (1.105.4), with the result that the Athenians can maintain the siege at Aegina until they have won. The Corinthians' anger and humiliation at this defeat, and the further rash and self-defeating actions that result from these emotions, remind us of their equally impassioned actions at the Battle of Sybota.[79]

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[76] Egypt was one of the profitable Persian territories from which the Athenians hoped to draw profit (cf. *CT* ad loc. 1.110.4). The similarity of the story of the Egyptian disaster to the story of the Sicilian expedition has often been noted (cf. *CT* and *HCT* ad loc. 1.110.1).

[77] Cf. Connor (1984) 45, who argues that the passage illustrates the Corinthian claim (1.70) that the Athenians allow defeat to have the smallest possible effect.

[78] These events take place before Megara successfully revolts from the Athenian alliance during the revolt of Euboia.

[79] On the Athenian slaughter of the fleeing contingent of Corinthians who had become trapped in an enclosed field, cf. above all Tsakmakis (1995) 91–92.

The latter section of the Pentekontaetia therefore contrasts Athens' apparently boundless energy and drive with the Corinthians' self-sabotaging pride and Sparta's indecisiveness. The narrative displays Athenian energy and determination, and all references to war materials seem to be subordinate to these purposes. In the Pentekontaetia, nothing stops the Athenians: neither revolts, nor numbers of enemies, nor long distances, nor lengthy campaigns, nor defeat. The Spartans, on the other hand, are hostages to the Helot problem (1.101–102), as well as of their fears for the corruption of their constitution in the post-Persian War world (1.95.7).[80] Despite these factors, they are formidable enemies, and when they are cornered into a battle, they deal the Athenians a decisive defeat at Tanagra (1.107–108).

Nevertheless, Thucydides' catalogue of Athens' wars during her rise to power in the Aegean helps the reader to understand how Pericles could believe so firmly that Athenian power was different in kind from that of previous or future empires. In a context of Spartan and Ionian quiescence, Athens was a uniquely dynamic Greek power. Her walls and her wealth from tribute made it possible for her to expand continuously without ever suffering a threat to the city itself. Athens' war strength, moreover, seemed equally continuous, since it was constantly renewed, and any loss of men or ships, however great, was quickly re-created.

It also helps us to understand why Pericles would place his hopes on naval power in particular, which is clearly the instrument through which Athens enforces her will. But Thucydides was not Pericles. The Pentekontaetia shows the importance of infantry forces, for instance, for the defeat of Athens' huge expedition in Egypt (1.109.4), and it should not be assumed that Thucydides saw the naval expansion depicted here in the same idealistic light with which Pericles portrays it. On the contrary, the outlines of the story line up well with Thucydides' analysis of the expansion and defeat of dynamic acmes throughout history. Thucydides shows that such powers arise, come to believe in their power, fight continuously, and find an end.

Athens' end begins with the Spartan decision for war. In the chapters preceding the Pentekontaetia, the outcome of the Spartan Congress demonstrated that Athens had provoked its Greek neighbors to united resistance. The single example of the costs Corinth could cause Athens through competing over Potideia was enough to suggest that the war

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[80] Cf. Stadter (1993) 46–47.

Sparta was now willing to undertake could be very dangerous even for a power so energetic as Athens: what Pericles believes is the war to secure Athens' empire will be the war that effects its downfall. Where he sees Athenian glory in the future, Thucydides shows that it peaked in his time (2.65.5), and waned to its end during the long war of attrition that followed the Spartan decision to invade. Seen in historical context, Pericles' beliefs are understandable, but they are not shared by the analyst who discovered their nature.

4

Pericles in History

Important scholars blame Thucydides for his presentation of Pericles, arguing that no balanced report could have excluded a fuller representation of Pericles' responsibility for Athenian policy in the period before the Peloponnesian War began. Thucydides' selection of material for book one of the *History* is, from their point of view, fundamentally flawed, even dishonest.[1]

The previous chapters have suggested that we have overlooked some significant reasons why Thucydides constructed book one in the way he did. Part of his aim was to create the material acmes of the prewar period in the narrative. Thucydides announces at 1.23.6 that Spartan fear of Athenian size was the deeper cause of the war. The first sections of the book show the problem with the kind of "size" Athens possesses, illustrating the ease with which naval acmes cause wars and the unreliability of these acmes, once deployed (Corcyra and Potideia). The following sections show, among many other things, the psychological force the unprecedented Athenian acme was exerting on all relevant actors (the meetings at Athens and Sparta), and then further that the Athenian acme really existed with the size and aggressive potential

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[1] E.g. Badian (1993) 161: "We are not told that it was he who changed the mind of the Assembly over the treaty with Corcyra … We are not informed of the attacks on his friends which provided the background for the suspicion that he caused the war in order to reestablish his position and which certainly provided the background to the Spartan demand for his expulsion as tainted by a curse. We are not told of his personal responsibility for the decree against Megara … or of his very probable personal responsibility for the aggressive actions in the north … which led directly to the outbreak of the war. Pericles' bellicosity, which could not be denied, is admitted only in the most general terms, but is suppressed in all its particular instances." On Badian (1993), cf. Stadter (1994). For the argument against demanding such information from the text, cf. Pelling (2000) 101. In support of Badian's complaints, cf. e.g. Flashar (1989) 439; Will (2003) e.g. 159 and 181–182; Vogt (2009) 232–235.

Athens' enemies feared (the Pentekontaetia). The result of this size and
potential was that men as intelligent and farsighted as Pericles perceived
the Athenian acme as glorious and reliable, and felt confident to urge a
war with Sparta (Pericles' first speech).

In other words, I argue that Thucydides was interested in showing
the acme as an historical force upon Pericles and his contemporaries,
and that this aim partly explains the selection of material for book one.
Since Thucydides shows in the Archaeology that acmes of wealth and
war materials are a consistent feature of human history, his organiza-
tion of book one can be defended as more useful, from a Thucydidean
point of view, than the more detailed presentation of Pericles' policies
required by some scholars.

Opponents of this view of book one may suspect that it puts the
analytical cart before the historical horse. I argue, however, that the
opposite is true, and that this analysis works with the historical factors
that were emphasized by Thucydides himself. As a representative of the
opposing *communis opinio,* I cite a valuable synopsis of Thucydides' treat-
ment of the Athenian acme from Helmut Flashar's essay on the Funeral
Oration:

> Stand Thukydides in der Exposition seines Werkes vor der Frage, wie es zu
> einer solchen alles frühere übersteigenden Machtansammlung überhaupt
> hat kommen können, so mußte er vom Ende her die Frage beantworten
> warum entgegen aller rationale Abschätzung der Machtmittel diese Macht
> zerbrechen konnte.[2]

> If in the exposition of his book Thucydides was compelled to ask how such
> a surpassing accumulation of power could ever have arisen, looking from
> the end he was compelled to answer why, in opposition to every rational
> assessment of these means to power, this power could collapse.

Flashar argues that Thucydides narrates the rise and fall of Athenian
power, first asking how it arose, and then asking how it could fall, even
though all of the most rational parties in the *History* argue convincingly
that it ought to have prevailed. I agree with Flashar that Thucydides
explains in the Archaeology that acmes of wealth, war materials, and
power arise as a result of the drive to expansion and growth that is part
of human nature, and which constitutes a permanent challenge to each
successive political order.

I disagree that the collapse of this power was somehow inexplicable
from Thucydides' point of view.[3] The "rational assessments" to which

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[2] Flashar (1989) 479.

[3] Note that Flashar also disagrees with himself on this point: cf. Flashar (1989)
     479: "Thucydides recognized the law that governs the process of events in the drive

Flashar refers are spoken by historical characters who do not see the future, and cannot see themselves as agents of a process that reflects human nature, but who are instead enmeshed in the politics and passions that characterize their particular situation. Their assessments are rational insofar as the speakers articulate policies and judgments, and calculate with the effect of their words. However, speakers can seldom claim independence from the hatred, anger, fear, or ambition that arise from their circumstances, which include the acme itself, as well as the acme's effect on everyone around them.[4]

Pericles is one of these speakers, and in showing how his ambition, capacity, and imagination respond to the acme of power available to him, Thucydides makes him symbolic for the tragedy of Athens and his age. In Thucydides, the passions that cause the deployment of the largest Greek acme overwhelm, like a tidal wave, the political achievements of Greece up to the time of the Peloponnesian War. Seen from this perspective, the acme announced in the first sentence of the *History* was created in the narrative in order to collapse, and founds Thucydides' description of the great cycle of *pleonexia*, as Athens' ambitions increase with her increasing wealth and lead to her destruction.[5] The fall of Athens was therefore not inexplicable, but rather an organic (although not inevitable) result of the Greek acme of wealth and weapons Thucydides constructs for the reader in book one.

If we take this view of things, the presumption that Pericles and Thucydides take similar views of the Athenian acme cannot be valid. I take as representative of the view that Pericles and Thucydides share the same opinions another valuable synopsis:

> … Thucydides represents Pericles as acting upon the basis of the same historical consciousness shown by Thucydides himself in the Archaeology, where Thucydides traces the development of shipbuilding and sailing in

to power innate in human nature, which builds itself to pleonexia and hubris, and takes on ever more radical forms through errors, chance, and the inner corruption of men, and must finally lead to a fall." ("Thukydides erkannte das Gesetzmäßige in dem Ablauf des Geschehens in dem in der menschlichen Natur angelegten trieb zur Machtenfaltung, der sich steigert zur Pleonexie und Hybris, welche durch Fehler, Zufälle und innere Zerrüttungen der Menschen immer radikalere Formen annimmt und schliesslich zum Fall führen mußte.")

[4] Flashar is by no means alone in attributing explanatory rationality to the speeches of book one (i.e. rather than to the understanding that emerges from analyzing the speeches in narrative context). For instance, Immerwahr (1973) 23 writes of the speeches in book one that "the belligerents entered the war in full knowledge of the nature of power, a knowledge similar to Thucydides' own."

[5] The desire for more (πλεονεξία) as a cause of civil strife and warfare in Thucydides: e.g. 3.82.8, 4.21.2, 6.6.1, 6.24.3; cf. Diodotus at 3.45.4 and the Spartan emissaries at 4.17.4.

the context of the progressive achievement of power and wealth from the earliest times in political history … Thucydides presents Pericles as the only statesman of Pericles' time capable of thinking historically. Pericles sees that there is a new basis of power, the navy and the capital accruing to Athens from the maritime empire.[6]

My argument, based on a reading of the Archaeology that emphasizes the futile end of each such accumulation of resources, argues that Pericles did not conceive of history in the same way as Thucydides, since if he had, he would have understood that the aggressive pursuit of wealth and naval empire had each time led to disaster. Thucydides' narrative of the Peloponnesian War tells this very story in as much human detail as the writer could capture.

I repeat that Thucydides' presentation of the Athenian acme is just one narrative strand of book one. Overall, Thucydides devoted the first book of the *History* to showing how the war came to be, and before this shows how Greece came to the stage where such a war could arise (1.1–23). In this context, he was interested in depicting the conditions that produced Pericles and his contemporaries, the generation of the greatest war. The evidence suggests that he considered the acme an important element of those conditions.

Thucydides also introduces Pericles in propria persona in book one. The present chapter will briefly review Thucydides' characterization of Pericles, and then touch on some of the arguments of the Corinthians' speech at 1.120–124, before analyzing Pericles' first speech. The Corinthian speech is astonishing for its suggestion that the Athenian acme displays weakness rather than strength. At the last minute (narratively), it brings a new view of the acme into the discussion. Pericles' first speech answers both Archidamus' speech at Athens and this final Corinthian contribution to the argument.

Pericles before the Speeches

Pericles is prominent in the Pentekontaetia, being one of a small number of Athenians whose deeds are described at any length.[7] Nevertheless, Thucydides records Pericles' victories and setbacks in the interwar period without providing positive or negative assessments. His first references to Pericles note his successful campaign to Sicyon at 1.111.2

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[6] Edmunds (1975a) 28, cf. 41.

[7] The two other most prominent Athenian leaders are Cimon and Themistocles. Cf. Will (2003) 187, with note 98.

and his subsequent unsuccessful campaign to Acarnanian Oiniadae at 1.111.3 without providing information about the motivations for these campaigns or assessing their outcome in any way.[8]

Longer and more complicated stories are provided in chapters 1.114 and 1.115–117, where Thucydides relates the story of the Euboian and Samian revolts. In both narratives, we find Pericles keeping the allies firmly under Athenian political and military control. He quells both revolts with determined warfare, subjecting Samos and Euboia to the same strict treatment as Athens had applied in previous instances.

Euboia's revolt against Athens was planned in concert with the revolt of Megara and a supporting Spartan attack on Attica. Thucydides records that Pericles crossed over to Euboia in order to quell the revolt, but when he heard that Megara, with support from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, had also revolted, and that the Spartans were at the same time on their way to Attica, he brought his army back to Athens (1.114.1). The Spartans then invaded and wasted parts of Attica, but advanced only to the Thriasian plain between Eleusis and Athens before returning home (1.114.2). Thus the Athenians, under Pericles, were free to return to Euboia. They conquered the whole island and made agreements with most towns, but expelled the Histiaeans (whose city was on the northernmost section of the island) and took their land (1.114.3). As becomes apparent in the next sentence (1.115.1), Megara was not recovered. Pericles emerges from this story looking energetic and capable, and typically ruthless with respect to Histiaea.[9] He also looks lucky, since it seems possible that Athens would have lost Euboia as well as Megara had the Spartans not withdrawn from Attica so early.[10]

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[8]   Both seem to have been directed against the Corinthian sphere of influence. On the lack of authorial comment in these chapters, cf. Westlake (1968) 24.

[9]   During the Persian War, Histiaea was overrun and occupied by the Persians (Hdt. 8.23–24.1) as the first town occupied on Euboia after the Greek fleet abandoned Artemisium. Previous to the occupation, an unnamed man from Histiaea had announced to the Persians that the Greeks were gone, and it is not unlikely that Herodotus means to show that the Persian occupation of Histiaea was the consequence of the Histiaeans' own foolishness and treachery. It is possible that Histiaea was considered (or could be advertised) as having medized, and no doubt the Athenian seizure of Histiaea was intended to secure Athens' northern trade routes and allies. (On Histiaea, cf. Bloesel [2001] 183–184.) Pericles' procedure here is therefore certainly explicable in terms of imperial policy, but it is harsh. The emptying of cities and migrations of peoples caused by such procedures are listed by Thucydides as among the worst effects of the war (1.23.2–4, cf. Aegina 2.27, Potideia 2.70, Plataea 3.68, Melos 5.116.3–4).

[10]   This suggestion is supported by the fact that, even without the loss of Euboia, these events (together with other recent losses) were enough to cause the Athenians to make

Thucydides' story of the Samian revolt (1.115.2–117) follows immediately upon the story of the revolt of Euboia, and is the last story of the Pentekontaetia.[11] Athens in this story is a fully imperial power: for the first time, Thucydides displays loyal Aegean allies helping to subdue a revolted neighbor.[12] Again, he does not judge or assess the events, preferring to influence reader reception through the selection of precise details.

The story begins with an account of the warfare between Samos and Miletus over Priene. The Miletans, who are losing, come to Athens to complain, and they also bring some private citizens of Samos who want constitutional change (1.115.2). These parties evidently convinced the Athenians to set up a democracy on Samos, since after their visit the Athenians sail to Samos with forty ships, impose a democracy, and take fifty youths and fifty men hostage. They leave these under guard on the island of Lemnos, and return to Athens (1.115.3).

Some of these hostages soon escape their guards. They make for the continent, where they engage the local Persian satrap, Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, in an alliance (1.115.4). Once they have gathered about seven hundred mercenaries, they attack Samos by night and bring most of the people to revolt from Athens. The victorious Samians then bring the rest of their hostages back to Samos, turn the Athenians in the city over to Pissuthnes, and prepare to return to their war against Miletus (1.115.5).[13]

The Athenians respond to these actions with main force. Under Pericles, they sail to Samos with sixty triremes, eleven of which are divided off to scout for the Phoenician navy and five of which are sent to raise forces on the other islands.[14] With the remaining forty-four ships Pericles defeats seventy Samian ships; Thucydides mentions that twenty of the Samian ships were troop transports, since the Samians

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the thirty-year treaties and to return various Peloponnesian territories (1.115.1). On Athens' situation at the time of closing these treaties, cf. Kelly (1982) 29.

[11] On this order of narration, cf. *CT* ad loc. 1.117.3: "The long description of Samos' revolt and its suppression ends the *Pentekontaetia* in a literary sense of that word … Th. concludes emphatically with Samos, as the last major Athenian violation of autonomy which Sparta would permit…" Moreover, they nearly did not tolerate it, as the Corinthians indicate at 1.41.2.

[12] Cf. *CT* ad loc. 1.116.1.

[13] The Samians' insistence on continuing to fight for Priene while much greater enemies were at their back is reminiscent of the Athenian decision to proceed against Syracuse. Cf. Nicias at 6.10.1–5.

[14] Since the Samian rebels had allied themselves with the Persians, there was danger that the Phoenician navy would appear in support of the rebellion.

were caught on their return from an expedition to Miletus (1.116.1). Afterward, forty additional ships come from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. The combined forces (perhaps 110–120 ships) land and besiege the city, surrounding it with three walls (1.116.2).[15] Then Pericles abruptly (κατὰ τάχος) leaves Samos with sixty ships because it is announced to him that Phoenician ships are approaching (1.116.3).

The Samians grasp at their chance: they make a sudden naval sally against the allied camp, which had been left unfortified, destroy the ships guarding it from the sea side, and defeat the allied forces that subsequently put out against them (1.117.1). In this way, they manage to control their own seas for about fourteen days "and they brought in and out whatever they wished," but "upon Pericles' return with the ships, they were locked back up again" (1.117.2). Athens will now take no more chances: after this, sixty more ships come from Athens, and thirty more from Chios and Lesbos. Approximately two hundred Athenian and allied ships are therefore besieging Samos, a power with about fifty usable triremes.

The Samians nevertheless attempt resistance, but apparently see the impossibility of their position and withdraw into the city (1.117.3). They had clearly gathered a substantial supply of food during their fourteen days of freedom, since the allies are compelled to besiege them for about eight months before they will give in. As was discussed in Chapter 3, when the Samians succumb, the allies require them to throw down their walls, hand over hostages and ships, and pay substantial war indemnities (1.117.3).[16]

Like his description of the suppression of the Euboian revolt, Thucydides' depiction of the events at Samos does not seem pro-Periclean, but rather shows Pericles doing the work of warfare that the

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[15] The meaning of Thucydides' reference to "three walls" is disputed. Garlan (1974) 114: "We should not envisage the possibility of more complex fortifications during this period: the three walls constructed around Samos in 440, according to Thucydides, must have consisted of a single wall laid out along the three continental sides of the city wall." ("On ne doit guère envisager à cette époque la possibilité de fortifications plus complexes: les trois murs construits, selon Thucydide, par les Athéniens autour de Samos en 440 devaient consister en un mur simple réparti sur les trois côtés continentaux de l'enceinte urbaine.") If this is the case, Thucydides' reference to this construction as "three walls" places rhetorical emphasis on the size of the construction project. On the other hand, if the Athenians did in fact build a triple wall, they made efforts to subjugate Samos that are potentially as great or greater than those the Spartans used against the Plataeans (2.78.1, 3.21).

[16] See the argument of Chapter 3. The walls, ships, and money (hostages aside) are not only heavy material losses, but also symbolic for the loss of political independence.

maintenance of the empire requires, and experiencing the changing fortunes that war brings. For example, Thucydides shows that Pericles' initial naval victory was partly due to luck (cf. ἔτυχον twice at 1.116.1), since twenty of the Samian ships were troop transports the Samian navy was compelled to protect while fighting the battle.[17] As for the Samian breakout, Thucydides does not excuse Pericles of possible overconfidence. Thucydides shows that the Athenians built substantial siege fortifications, and trusted these and their large fleet for victory, since they did not fortify their camp. When Pericles set off on his fruitless search for the Phoenicians, the Samians capitalized on his absence and the unfortified camp to break out. The story in fact suggests that Pericles early on tended to overconfident reliance on walls and the fleet.

No strategies, policies, or intentions (except the intention to meet the Phoenicians, 1.116.3) are attributed to Pericles in the narration of events. Pericles is not mentioned again after his return with the sixty ships, and five other named Athenian generals join the campaign (1.117.2) as the siege begins. In other words, he is in no way painted as the author of victory.[18] Similar to the account of the Euboian revolt, therefore, it cannot easily be argued that Thucydides is flattering Pericles with this account. On the contrary, we could argue that the references to Pericles' treatment of Histiaea on Euboia and overconfident behavior at Samos leave a dubious impression, perhaps more of Athenian behavior in general than of Pericles himself. On the other hand, Athens' and Pericles' energy and tenacity are also visible, the very qualities responsible for the growth of Athenian power.

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[17] Cf. Thucydides' description of Phormio's defeat of a similarly hampered Peloponnesian navy at 2.83.2–5. Thucydides' use of ἔτυχον to describe the circumstances of both sides in the battle at 1.116.1 is perhaps somewhat ironic. Was it really by chance that the Athenians had sent away sixteen ships to scout for the Phoenician navy and call up their allies, or that the Samians, having imprudently continued to prosecute their war with Miletus in these circumstances, were hampered with twenty troop transports, and thus compensated for the numbers the Athenians had sent out? Or does the double use of ἔτυχον perhaps suggest that the Samians' unceasing ambitions nicely balanced out Pericles' hope for a double victory? Contra *HCT* ad loc.

[18] Contra *TAI* 111. Many of Pericles' contemporaries shared de Romilly's view, however, including apparently Pericles himself, who in a famous and well-received funeral oration after this campaign claimed the victory over Samos as a greater and worthier achievement than the victory at Troy. By contrast, other contemporaries, for instance Elpinice, sister of Cimon (Cimon was Pericles' personal enemy, but we should not discount the possibility that Elpinice had come to her own conclusions) and the sophist Gorgias, are on record as reflecting a view according to which the defeat of Samos realized the subjugation of other Greeks. Cf. Bosworth (2000) 3–4.

Thucydides thus avoids passing judgment on the Euboian and Samian campaigns, and instead allows us to see Pericles as continuing, along with others, the policies characteristic of Athens' imperial expansion.[19] Pericles begins his Thucydidean career as one of those who realized the material and political imposition of Athenian power, and as one of those who were responsible, as he himself later claims (2.36.3), for the unprecedented growth of Athenian power achieved in the pre-Peloponnesian War period. He will be recommending a policy consistent with his achievements at Euboia and Samos when he rises to speak to the Athenians in chapter 140 of book one: just as the Athenians gave no quarter at Euboia and Samos, and just as they discovered during the Euboian revolt that the Spartans were plotting against them, so (he will argue) they should give no quarter now, and should remember that the Spartans are the enemies of their empire (1.140.2).

Thus Thucydides' introduction to Pericles spotlights the campaigns that will have a formative effect on Pericles' policy toward the empire. Indirect, but important, characterization of Pericles is also accomplished, however, through Thucydides' portrayal of the curse on the Alcmaeonids and his depiction of Themistocles.

Pericles and the Curse on the Alcmaeonids

Thucydides' story of the origin of the ancient curse on the Alcmaeonids is vivid and detailed.[20] It revolves around the two poles of traditional religion and the lust for power, and begins with a description of Cylon, who wishes to become tyrant of Athens. Cylon is a well-born and capable (δυνατός) Athenian (1.126.3). Moreover, he is an Olympic victor, and is married to the daughter of the tyrant of Megara (1.126.3). Besides being dominated by the lust for power, Cylon displays some other problematic characteristics: vanity, disloyalty toward associates who risk everything for him, and indifference to religion (see below). These character traits are suggestive: Thucydides gives Cylon key characteristics of the Alcmaeonid leaders. He most resembles Alcibiades, although, like Megacles, he achieves a power base through marriage alliance to a tyrant.[21]

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[19] Balot (2001) 173: "Pericles is presented as simply another cog (albeit a very important one) in the turbinelike machine of Athenian greed."

[20] The scholiast to Thucydides remarks that the ancient rhetoricians and grammarians admired the clarity of Thucydides' account of Cylon's attempt to gain the tyranny over Athens.

[21] Megacles, son of Alcmeon, was married to the daughter of the tyrant of Sicyon, and married his own daughter into the equally ambitious Peisistratid clan. On Alcibiades'

The events of the story begin when Cylon asks the oracle at Delphi for advice on when he might successfully capture the city of Athens. The oracle responds that he will be able to capture the acropolis during "the greatest festival of Zeus" (1.126.4). Thucydides relates how vanity about his Olympic victory causes Cylon to mistake the meaning of the oracle's answer, and to make his attempt on Athens during the Olympic festival of Zeus.[22] However, for the Athenians, the greatest festival of Zeus was the Diasia. Cylon does capture the acropolis, but once the Athenians perceive this, they come in from the fields where they were celebrating and besiege the invaders (1.126.5–7).

Cylon's coup fails instantly, therefore, and after some time the Athenians grow weary of guarding the acropolis. The archons are left in charge with full authority: "the many went away, having entrusted the guard and the whole situation to the nine archons, to conduct the matter as they thought best on their own authority" (ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν 1.126.8).[23] Cylon and his brother manage to escape Athens and the archons; their friends are not so lucky: "And [the remaining conspirators], when they were hard pressed and some had died of hunger, established themselves as suppliants at the altar on the acropolis" (1.126.10).

The archons' task would now seem to be straightforward. They have full authority to manage the remnants of the conspiracy in some prudent way. However, they do not act prudently. Once the suppliants were weak with hunger, "those entrusted with the guard" moved them from the sacred area, so that "they would do no evil," that is, so that they would not pollute the sacred precincts with death.[24] This is explicable and according to law; however, they then killed the suppliants, as they killed other Cylonian conspirators who were suppliants at the altar of the Eumenides, and from this act they and their descendents were called accursed

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Olympic victories and their effect on his policies, see 6.15.2–4. On his personality in Thucydides and Athenian literature, most useful is Gribble (1999). On the story of Cylon, cf. Hdt. 5.71.1–2, and on Alcmaeonid family history, cf. Hdt. 6.126–130.

[22] Vanity thus causes Thucydides' Cylon, like Herodotus' Croesus, to misunderstand a crucial oracle. Cf. Hdt. 1.53–54.

[23] The sentence is emphatic: the archons received authority (αὐτοκράτορσι "on their own authority") over "the whole" (τὸ πᾶν) to do as thought best (ἄριστα). But cf. *HCT* ad loc. on αὐτοκράτωρ, where it is argued that the term does not imply that the archons were free from responsibility to the state.

[24] Allowing the pollution of a temple would normally have merited strict punishment. Cf. Parker (1996) 32–48 (and passim), and Jordan (1986) 130. Thucydides records the deed in this way: "But seeing that [the suppliants] were about to die in the temple,

(1.126.11).[25] Thucydides' account names no archons and does not state that Alcmaeonidae were among those who murdered the suppliants.

Thus Thucydides' story of the origins of this politically important curse is ultimately both ironic and opaque. Cylon, whose character is drawn so that he resembles the later Alcmaeonids, abuses a festival time to capture a city and deserts his comrades, who are murdered – but no religious sanctions pursue him. The archons offend the gods by murdering suppliants and are therefore called accursed. But are they Alcmaeonids? Neither Herodotus nor Thucydides will confirm this.[26]

The story is therefore mysterious. What we can observe is the longevity of the curse itself. Thucydides mentions that, under Cleomenes, the Spartans had driven out the living descendents of the accursed and taken up the bones of the dead (1.126.12). In the period immediately before the war, the Spartans reincarnate the curse with a faint hope of eliminating Pericles, but a stronger hope of introducing the suspicion into Athenian minds that the curse was part of the reason there was a war at all (1.127.1–2).[27] Pericles is again calculating with the Spartans' potential for introducing suspicions about him at 2.13.1. In Thucydides' characterization of Pericles, his family past (rather than, for instance, lawsuits directed against his associates) dogs his life and his war policy.

Themistocles' Foundation

Excluded from respectable ancestry, Pericles must make his own glory.[28] Themistocles' post-Persian War foundation of Athens provided a material and political structure that made Pericles entirely

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in order that they [the suppliants] would do no evil, they killed them once they had dragged them away" (1.126.11).

[25] In a similar incident, the Spartans killed Helot suppliants whom they dragged from the temple of Poseidon at Tainaros (1.128.1). Another example of this behavior concerns the death of the Spartan general Pausanias near the temple to Athena at Sparta. Having been shut up and starved in the temple, he was lead out at the point of death so that he would not pollute the sanctuary (1.134.3). Suppliancy after a perceived revolt against or attack upon the state was clearly a dangerous business in archaic Sparta and Athens.

[26] Cf. Hdt. 5.71.2. Thucydides is blamed for suppressing this "obvious" fact. Cf. Will (2003) 189.

[27] The Spartans' political aims were evident, as were Cleomenes' at the time of Cleisthenes. Cf. Badian (1993) 152–154 and Pearson (1936) 43: Spartan aims in deploying the curse were always the same, Pearson argues, namely "to rid Athens of the men who were most dangerous to Sparta." For a final reference in Thucydides to Cleomenes' banishment of the Alcmaeonids, cf. 6.59.4.

[28] J. K. Davies (1971) 368–370 argues that the curse was formative for the power attitudes of the Alcmaeonidae, whose "political techniques are the hallmark of a family bent

independent of any other history.[29] This fact is important for under-standing Thucydides' portrait of Pericles, as is the fact that Thucydides draws core similarities between Themistocles and Pericles.

Thucydides attributes similar virtues to both: intelligence and fore-sight, for instance (Themistocles: 1.93.3–4, 1.138.1–3; Pericles: 2.65.6, 2.65.13); furthermore, both are successful generals and leaders of the people (Themistocles: 1.14.3, 1.74.1, 1.90.3–7, 1.136.3–4; Pericles: e.g. 1.116–117, 2.65.8). Thucydides also shows that the two men had simi-lar fates: after unprecedented services to Athens, both were punished (albeit in different ways) by the Athenians (Themistocles: 1.135.3; Pericles: 2.65.3) and persecuted by the Spartans (Themistocles: 1.135.2; Pericles: 1.127.1–2). As for their deaths, both (perhaps) died from sick-ness, an evil fate for famous generals to endure (Themistocles: 1.138.4; Pericles: 2.65.6).[30]

In terms of policy, the two are linked by the focus on the city of Athens and the Athenian empire (Themistocles: 1.14.3, 1.93.3–4, 1.93.7; Pericles: e.g. 1.143.5, 2.13.2, 2.65.7), so that, in Thucydides, the two men share both a life story and a decisive policy for Athens.[31] Their situation differed, however, in one important aspect, namely in that Pericles inher-ited and sustained the empire Themistocles had founded. Themistocles was the founder of Athens' Persian War navy (1.14.3; Hdt. 7.143–144), as well as the builder of Athens' walls (1.90–93); he initiates policies, which Pericles continues, of collective expense and collective action on these

on maintaining and extending its power, prestige, and political influence, but pre-cluded from exercising effective power in its own homeland through cults and phra-tries in the way which was open to the old-established units of Athenian politics … it was the family's exclusion from cult-power which prompted successive ambitious heads of the family throughout the sixth century to devise and exploit alternative power-bases with such remarkable success." Cf. Parker (1996) 16, Balot (2001) 149, and Samons (2007) 287: "[Pericles'] family's apparent inability to consolidate its power (or, rather, achieve supremacy) through the typical aristocratic means … and their subsequent need to seek popular support … laid the groundwork for Pericles' own radicalization of the democratic regime and the demos's empowerment."

[29] Cf. Chapter 3 on Themistocles.

[30] Cf. Pelling (2000) 90–91.

[31] Thucydides might have chosen other paradigms. For instance, Thucydides could have compared Pericles to Peisistratus (both, for instance, ruled Athens for long periods and both were fervent builders, cf. Davies [1971] 216–217). On the potential for drawing a comparison to Peisistratus and on the contemporary feeling at Athens that Pericles was in fact too close to the Peisistratid model for comfort, cf. Ehrenberg (1954) 88. By contrast, Solon was apparently not a possible basis for comparison to Pericles: cf. Szegedy-Maszak (1993) 206–207, who can find only general resemblances between Pericles and Solon, although the Solonian policy of moderation is well in evidence

projects.[32] Themistocles therefore laid the groundwork for the Athenian empire (1.93.4), but it was not available to him for the actual fulfillment of imperial aims. His defection to the Persian King after his exile (1.137.3–1.138.2) distinguishes him from Pericles, to whom the Athenian empire itself was available, and who could therefore aim at achieving imperial ambitions through Athens itself, without giving up Greek ways as Themistocles had done (1.138.1–2).

This fact perhaps accounts for the difference between their materialism. Thucydides shows that both men were focused on money, but Themistocles' legendary personal greed (which is depicted in Herodotus, e.g. at 8.5.3 and especially at 8.112) contrasts to Thucydides' statement that Pericles was incorruptible by bribes (2.65.8). Pericles dedicates himself to Athens and her empire; his materialism is collective in its orientation, and is inextricably linked with the potential of Athenian imperialism.

Despite this difference, the two men share a common attitude toward imperialism itself. Themistocles' decision to pursue empire in Persia, and his promise "to enslave Greece to [the King]," as Thucydides says (1.138.2), shows that Themistocles conceives of empire as a self-justifying goal, a conception consistent with Pericles' equally amoral attitude.[33]

Thucydides and the Periclean Age

The curse against the Alcmaeonids excluded Pericles from the established routes of aristocratic influence. The secular and ambitious Themistoclean founding, together with Pericles' personal capacities as a general, orator, and politician, could be the basis for a glory untainted

in Thucydidean narrative as a whole. (Edmunds [1975a] 81 argues that the Spartans rather than the Athenians are the inheritors of Solonian virtue in Thucydides.)

[32] Cf. Kallet-Marx (1994) 243–246: "…it is worth speculating that the new mode of thinking about money and military power stimulated by Themistocles, by the application of a huge quantity of silver (in its context) to the construction of a *polis* fleet, and especially by the victory at Salamis, fostered an awareness of the power of money in a military context which otherwise might have taken years of experience to learn, and that it decisively affected the Athenians' thinking about the structure and organization of the Delian League."

[33] E.g. at 2.41.4. Overall, the argument presented here opposes *TAI* 231: "everything [i.e. the whole presentation of Themistocles] is chosen, developed, and presented in order to glorify him" (cf. *TAI* 119). It is difficult to see how Thucydides' report of Themistocles' promise "to enslave Greece" can be construed as glorification. It is also difficult to imagine that Thucydides would take glorification as the aim of his larger presentation, since the vividly mixed portrait of Themistocles available to his readers in Herodotus would impose restraints on the plausibility of such an account. Cf. e.g. Hdt. 8.109–112 and Bloesel (2001).

by the accusations of a jealous old religion. Pericles needed neither the
past nor (like Themistocles) other empires; all was now encompassed
by the combination of the democratic culture of contemporary Athens
with imperial ideals.

Consistent with his portrait of Pericles as a man who was indepen-
dent of all but the recent past, Thucydides' explicit judgments pinpoint
Pericles as an historical figure in his own particular time. In his first
description of Pericles at 1.127.3, he identifies Pericles by his capacities
and by the intransigence of his war policy, fixing those characteristics
in their historical context: "being the most capable man of those of
his own time [τῶν καθ' ἑαυτόν] and leading the state, he refused the
Lacedaimonians in everything, and he would not allow [the Athenians]
to yield, but urged [them] to the war." Thucydides' introduction to
Pericles' first speech again emphasizes Pericles' capacities in the histori-
cal moment, arguing that he was "the foremost man of the Athenians at
that time [κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον], the one most capable of speaking
and of getting things done" (1.139.4).

Thucydides' introduction to the Funeral Oration also pinpoints
Pericles as the man of the hour: he had the requisite authority and social
standing, and was therefore chosen to speak over "these first [dead]"
(τοῖς πρώτοις 2.34.8).[34] Once Pericles begins to speak, furthermore, he
describes the history of Athens as one in which his own generation plays
the most important role (2.36.1–3).[35]

Finally, two further Thucydidean passages introduce Pericles' con-
temporaneousness. At 2.65.5, Thucydides shows that the Athenian
demos recognized that Athens reached its acme of prosperity under
Pericles: ἐγένετο ἐπ' ἐκείνου μεγίστη ("it became greatest during his
time"). Likewise, Thucydides concludes his assessment at 2.65 with the
remark that "Pericles recognized a superabundance of factors at that
time [τότε] from which the city would very easily prevail in a war with
the Peloponnesians alone" (2.65.13). Thucydides' narrative remarks on
Pericles identify him with his times, his intransigent war policy, and the
acme of Athenian wealth.

[34] Cf. Bosworth (2000) 3.
[35] Cf. Orwin (1994) 16; Balot (2001) 173. Pericles himself consistently devalues the
achievements of any historical period before his own, showing, for instance, less
respect for previous Athenian generations (2.36.1–3), dismissing Homer (2.41.4), and
suggesting to the Athenians that they could melt down the spoils from the Persian
Wars if they needed money (2.13.4).

Thucydides therefore gives Pericles a specific character and place in historical time. By contrast, the narrator claims an overview of the war as a whole. After praising Pericles (and blaming subsequent leaders) in his famous postmortem assessment of Pericles' leadership at 2.65, the narrator provides an overview of Athens' path to defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Not only here, but in other important explanations (e.g. 1.1.2, 1.10.3, 1.23.1–4, 1.93.5, 3.82.1, 5.16–17, 6.1–6, 7. 87.5–6, etc.), Thucydides characterizes himself as a man of the whole war, including the postwar period, whereas Pericles is continuously shown to be a (or the) man of its hopeful beginning.

Pericles is therefore an historical figure in Thucydides' *History*. Thucydides' construction of Pericles in book one is fragmentary and reticent, but it is complete enough to enable the reader to grasp certain general psychological probabilities. The curse on Pericles' ancestors made him more likely to resent the conventions of Athens' landed culture, and very likely to be detached from its religion.[36] Pericles' relevant past is the Themistoclean founding, the success of which gave him the opportunity to earn present glory. The success of Themistoclean Athens also caused the unprecedented prosperity characteristic of the age in which Pericles came to power. Pericles was himself, through his conquests, partly responsible for the fullest extent of this prosperity, and he became a defender of his own achievement. To Pericles, and for just this reason (namely that they own the most, 2.36.2), his generation seems greatest.

None of this entirely explains how Pericles could succumb to the belief that Athens' Aegean empire would achieve eternally valid significance, but together with Thucydides' presentation of the Athenian acme throughout book one, the historical factors Thucydides introduces suggest the background of Pericles' decision to seek Athenian greatness through acquisitive warfare rather than through any other kind of achievement. The Athenian acme made Athenian warfare possible on a scale not seen before in Greece; to a leader whose potential was defined by present human achievement and its future glory, this unprecedented capacity seemed uniquely significant.

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[36] A comparison to Sophocles' *Oedipus* would be worth a review, in my opinion. Contra Ehrenberg (1954) 115–116 (cf. 148): "…some scholars of the last century were induced to recognize Pericles in Oedipus. Even the notorious charge of the Alcmaeonid pollution was regarded as reflected in Oedipus' guilt as his father's murderer, although that was an essential feature of the old story. Nobody will think of reviving such theories."

By contrast (once again), Thucydides was well aware that Athens was a medium-sized power. In chapter one, we discussed the passage of the Archaeology in which Thucydides argues that Athens' beautiful buildings can cause spectators to think that Athens was twice as powerful as she really was (1.10.2–3). In this passage, Thucydides argues that we should not allow the magnificent appearances of Athens' acme to disguise to our minds the real limits of Athens' power.

Later in the text, Thucydides' description of Sicily (6.1–6.6) demonstrates his awareness that Athenian power was equal or inferior to that of the Sicilians, and Athenian power appeared even smaller when compared to Persia. Thucydides would know both from Herodotus and from experience the size of the Persian Empire. We note, for instance, his description of Themistocles' Persian holdings (1.138.5–6): once Themistocles was established in Persia, the king gave him three provinces to furnish his table with grain, wine, and meat, from which a single province, Magnesia, brought in fifty talents a year. Since the entire Athenian empire collected six hundred talents a year (2.13.3), at a conservative estimate this single gift of the King was worth a sixth of the Athenian empire. As Thucydides also records, Persian money was a significant factor in Athens' ultimate defeat (2.65.12–13). However, his assessment of Athenian or Spartan power does not ultimately rely on the comparison to Persia, but on a broader understanding of Spartan or Athenian limitations as compared to their goals. As we shall discuss, at 2.7, for instance, Thucydides shows that both Athens and Sparta developed war plans that were beyond their power to achieve.

Thucydides' awareness that Athens was one power among many competing powers is consistent with his awareness that Pericles, as singular as he was, also had faults and limitations. As we have just seen, in his first introduction (1.127.3), Thucydides makes Pericles personally responsible for the war policy that prevailed at Athens.[37] Thucydides announces that the conqueror of Euboia and Samos is urging the Athenians to war with Sparta, that is, to the greatest and simultaneously most destructive endeavor of his age. Pericles was successful in convincing his countrymen to wage this war so that his historical role is of the first importance for understanding the beginning of the war.

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[37] Cf. Samons (2007) 290–291 and Monoson (1998) 292: "At 1.127.3 Pericles urges (*hormā*) the Athenians to war. The verb *hōrmaō*, which Crawley translates as "urge" (cf. English "hormone"), literally means to set in motion or to rush at something or someone, as in battle. The use of this term further supports our view that Thucydides regards Pericles as a source of *kinēsis*."

The Corinthians on the Weakness of Athens' Purchased Strength

Before engaging with Pericles' first speech, it is important to analyze the relevant themes from the Corinthians' last. Our analysis of the Corinthians' last speech will focus on their representation of the Athenian acme and Athenian strength.

The Corinthians begin their speech with congratulations to the Spartans for having (finally) decided for war (1.120.1), and with exhortations to the inland allies not to think about Athens' misconduct as a matter that pertains only to sea powers, but to prosecute the war vigorously (1.120.1–2). After this appeal to unity, they quickly turn to general observations that demonstrate Corinthian wisdom and reasonableness in respect to warfare: they tell the Spartans and their allies that they know when to attack and when to quit (1.120.3, cf. 1.121.1), are not to be led to hesitation by present comforts, or to rash behavior by success (1.120.4), and finally, that they understand that bad plans can succeed and good ones can fail (1.120.5). So far, the Corinthians have transgressed in obvious ways against all of these principles.[38] It seems to be Thucydides' way with the Corinthians to stress their blindness in respect to their own behavior and passions, while showing them to be perceptive about the conduct and motivations of others.

The Corinthians' commonplace teachings on how to conduct a war also belie the interest of their renewed assessment of the comparative strength of Athenian and Lacedaimonian power. Breaking with Archidamus and their own earlier criticisms of Sparta, the Corinthians now argue that the Spartan alliance will win the war, and not only win, but win easily and quickly. Their argument tends from the outset to rely on the premise that the Spartan alliance is founded upon natural advantages, or upon advantages that have solidified over a long period of time and are therefore nearly natural. First, the Corinthians argue that the Peloponnesians exceed the Athenians in numbers of men and experience of war. Second, the Corinthians refer to the fact that "all [allies] obey in the same way to commands" (1.121.2), an assertion of cultural unity that assumes association over a long

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[38] For instance, the Corinthians initially attacked Corcyra before they were ready (1.29), were overwhelmed by their first taste of victory at Sybota and committed a horrible error (1.50.1–2), and in their disastrous attempt to plant a trophy in territory dominated by Athens seem not to understand that not only good, but also bad plans, can fail (1.105. 5–6). Cf. Macleod (1983) 124.

period.[39] In the Corinthians' presentation, numbers, experience, and obedience create the character of the Peloponnesian force.

These descriptors introduce an argument that aims to relieve Spartan fears of Athens' acme of wealth and war materials by showing that the acme reveals Athens' natural inferiority. The Corinthians argue that the Peloponnesians will be able to find the money (at Delphi and Olympia, or through subscriptions) both to fit out a navy and also to lure away Athens' mercenary rowers (1.121.3). In this way, they will remove Athens' core advantage, which is nothing more than something someone buys. Contrary to Archidamus' argument that Athenian materials reveal Athens' great strength in war and make her a very dangerous, if not actually invincible, adversary, the Corinthians argue that the possession of these materials reveals Athens' weakness:[40]

> ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία· ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν. μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται·

> For Athenian power is bought rather than innate. Our power suffers this [i.e. τὸ ὠνητή εἶναι: being bought] less, since it is strong rather with bodies than with money. And likely the [Athenians] shall be captured with a single victory in a sea battle.[41] (1.121.3–4)

By contrast to Archidamus' presentation of Sparta as the weaker power, the Corinthians argue that Athens' reliance on money means that her power does not belong to her, but to her money. Sparta's reliance on (virtuous) men means her power is her own. Where Archidamus had argued that bodies are useful only when supported by money (1.83.2), the Corinthians argue that Peloponnesian bodies are strong precisely because they are not dependent on money. According to this view, the Athenians have bought themselves a navy in order to compensate for their natural deficiencies.[42]

The Corinthians' wild prediction of an easy victory over Athens is couched in absolute terms, which claim not only victory, but the actual

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[39] Athens has changed, but Sparta has not (cf. Sthenelaidas at 1.86.2), and contrary to their previous arguments (e.g. 1.71.2), the Corinthians now argue that this stability of character is a Peloponnesian advantage. In general, however, the appeals to unity in this speech are undercut, since they remind us of the Corinthians' recent threat to leave the alliance (1.71.4–5).

[40] Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 90.

[41] For the supplement τὸ ὠνητή εἶναι, see Poppo ad loc.

[42] Hobbes' translation: "For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic; whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more

capture of Athenian power as a result of a single sea battle. This claim must have sounded incredible to Corinth's listeners, who would know that Corinth had very recently failed to fulfill exactly this plan (i.e. to capture a nation's power in a single sea battle) when they fought Corcyra, a much weaker power than Athens. However unrealistic Corinthian boasts may sound, the argument is framed in terms that fundamentally praise Spartan ways. The prediction of swift victory is the conclusion of an argument that claims dependence on money as a *pathos*, a misfortune or disease the Peloponnesians are not enduring, and strength "with bodies" as a reliable advantage.[43]

The Spartans should therefore be less afraid of Athens' war materials, according to the Corinthians, since they can acquire the Athenian materials, whereas Athens will be unable to find the natural sources of power that sustain the Peloponnesians. Should Athens hold out longer (i.e. longer than a single naval battle), the Peloponnesians will find the money (1.121.5) to pay for the naval practice that will make their skill at sea equal to that of the Athenians, and after this the Peloponnesians' natural virtue (courage) will provide victory (1.121.4).[44] The Athenians are doomed:

ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ· ὃ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμῃ προύχουσι, καθαιρετὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι μελέτῃ.

For that courage which we have by nature cannot come to them through teaching. And in whatever science these excel [us], we must acquire [this] through practice. (1.121.4)

According to the Corinthian description, the Peloponnesians have a secure nonmaterial advantage that cannot be taken away from them, and also cannot be acquired by the enemy. By contrast, anyone who has money can acquire Athenian materials and practice the skills necessary to use them.

In the short run, the Corinthians' claims of natural superiority will come to nothing.[45] In the long run, however, Athens' competitors will

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in the persons of men than in money" (1989) 68. Note in Greek the initial position of ὠνητή, emphasizing the Corinthians' contempt for the *nouveaux riches* Athenians.

[43] This passage is not examined in Wohl (2002) but bears close relation to the infections of the desire for more that are part of her main topic.

[44] We note that the Corinthians' solution is ultimately very similar to Archidamus' solution (1.82.1), and moreover that it recommends the sin it chastises: the Corinthians' idea that they can buy what the Athenians have bought without themselves suffering the consequences of having bought power seems to be an example of self-delusion.

[45] For narrative descriptions of the failure of Peloponnesian sea power during the Archidamian War, cf. Kelly (1982) and Krentz (1997).

learn to equal her skill at sea, and Corinth herself, that backward power of the Battle of Sybota, will initiate changes in trireme design that are fatally harmful to Athenian navies (e.g. 7.34.5, 7.36.2). As the Corinthians later say, "war itself contrives" (1.122.1). Over time, navies can be bought and trained, skills and technical devices can be appropriated or outdone. Furthermore, Peloponnesian plans to cause revolts among the allies (1.122.1) in order to rob Athens of the money with which (as the Corinthians also say) the allies pay for their own enslavement (1.121.5), or to build forts in Attica (1.122.1) will in one way or another finally be realized. Thus, while the Athenians will for the present be able to punish Corinthian overconfidence, the Corinthian analysis of Athens will become more adequate as the war wears on and the Athenian *demos* is progressively undermined by its hope for empire.

Pericles' First Speech

Pericles' first two speeches (the direct speech at 1.140–144 and the speech in indirect discourse at 2.13) describe the Athenian wealth and war materials at length, and together form the culminating presentation of Athens' post-Persian War acme. As we shall see, Pericles claims the entire Athenian acme for the war with Sparta, and therefore defines the destiny of Athens' resources in terms of their use as war materials. Pericles' assertions that Athens' materials are reliable guarantors of her superior power contrast sharply with Thucydides' analysis, in which weapons, money, navies, and so on have an unpredictable relationship to power.[46] Thucydides has therefore endowed Pericles' speeches with arguments that reveal his reliance on the acme of wealth and war materials that enables his imperial ambitions.

Pericles' defense of these ambitions begins in the first words of his speech, which are framed as a response both to the accumulated Peloponnesian complaints against Athens, and also to Athenian speakers who argue that Athens should negotiate on one or another of the Spartans' complaints, especially the Megarian decree (1.139.4). Pericles counsels the Athenians to yield to none of the Spartan requirements: "I always cleave to the same opinion, Athenians: not to yield to the Peloponnesians" (τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις 1.140.1, cf. 1.127.3).

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[46] On Thucydides' narrative corrections of Pericles' descriptions of chance and unpredictability, see Stahl (2003) e.g. 95–99.

This unchanging intransigence is justified, Pericles argues, by the fact that the Spartans are enemies: "And clearly the Spartans were plotting against us before, and now most of all" (Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερόν τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἥκιστα 1.140.2). He argues that the Spartans have ignored offers to submit to arbitration on the basis that each side would keep what it possessed (εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν), and that they prefer to settle matters with war.[47] Their demands are a sign of this: they are already at Athens giving orders (ἐπιτάσσοντες) rather than making criticisms (αἰτιώμενοι). He lists Spartan claims: "And they are telling us to clear out of Potideia, and to allow Aegina to be independent, and to dissolve the Megarian decree, and now these last messengers have arrived and are telling us to allow the Greeks their independence" (τοὺς Ἕλληνας προαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι 1.140.3). He warns the Athenians that the demand to rescind the Megarian decree, in particular, is a trap and a test: if the Athenians give in, the Spartans will follow up with greater demands (1.140.4–5).[48]

Pericles does not otherwise discuss the merits or justice of any Spartan complaint. Rather, he treats all Peloponnesian claims as signifying the same thing: great or small, the Spartan demands represent a challenge to Athens' right to possess "without fear, what we have acquired":

αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρίν τι βλαβῆναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἔμοιγε ἄμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐπὶ βραχείᾳ ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ξὺν φόβῳ ἕξοντες ἃ κεκτήμεθα· τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἥ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἐλαχίστη δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη.

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[47] Pericles' uncompromising attitude toward the possession of the empire is reflected in his description of the negotiating terms he would accept. Arbitration on the basis that each side keeps what it possesses could not be useful to the Spartans, for whom Athens' possessions are the main issue. Thus he is offering the Spartans a standard that requires them to begin from what they would consider the potential result of an agreement, not its beginning. Cf. these exact words (i.e. ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν) as the result of agreements at 4.65.1 or 4.188.4. This fact reflects his general attitude. Pericles knew that negotiations could end with Athens giving back properties she had taken, and that honorable peace could be negotiated on this basis. Cf. for instance, the results of the negotiations that led to the thirty-year treaties at 1.115.1. He is refusing this option. Cf. Samons (2007) 290: "Pericles opposed *all* concessions to Sparta on principle: that is, his policy rested on a commitment to absolute Athenian superiority rather than on a calculation of diplomatic or political advantage in particular circumstances."

[48] On the fact that Pericles could have given in on the Megarian decree and yet preserved every imperial acquisition, cf. Badian (1993) 155–156.

From this [i.e. from what I have just described, that if you accede to the Spartans in any point, they will make further demands] take as your purpose either to obey before you are harmed in any way, or if we go to war, as I think better: holding that which we have acquired without fear, equally unyielding to great and small pretexts.[49] For the greatest and the smallest penalty assigned by similar parties to their neighbors as if it were justice produce the same slavery. (1.141.1)

Using the language of obedience (ὑπακούειν, cf. 1.140.4) and slavery (δούλωσιν) to describe the concession of any part of the empire to the Spartans, Pericles insists that Spartan demands are pretexts and constitute an attempt to rule Athens as a master rules a slave.[50] He construes Spartan demands as an attack on Athens, and thus lays claim to Athens' undiminished possession of the empire as a reason to go to war.

By contrast, Thucydides shows that the Spartans conceive of their situation in defensive terms.[51] Moreover, the Spartan attitude or dilemma was certainly known to Pericles, who was a guest-friend of the Spartan king, Archidamus (2.13.1). Nevertheless, Thucydides shows that instead of pursuing a policy of detaching Sparta from Corinthian hatred, for instance, Pericles pursues the war: he vilifies the Spartans to the Athenians by identifying them with a policy of domination, and argues for complete resistance to any Spartan attempt to check the growth of Athenian power.

A less confident Pericles must have made a different argument. If Pericles had been compelled to admit that Athens could not defend her possessions, he would surely be arguing for the compromise most honorable to Athenian glory and least harmful to Athenian prosperity. Instead, he is confident enough to dismiss all Spartan demands with equal contempt. This confidence is based on his calculation that Athens can win the war, and his calculation that Athens can win the war is fundamentally based on his belief in Athens' visible and concrete material superiority to Sparta. The Athenian acme of wealth and war materials is a necessary foundation of Pericles' bellicosity.

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[49] On the rhetorical effect of the grammatical inconcinnity of this sentence, cf. Hagmaier (2009) 209.

[50] Spartan negotiations in the period before the war were problematic, and to a certain extent obviously disingenuous. (Archidamus in fact publically advises the Spartans to use negotiations as a delaying tactic at 1.85.2.) Nevertheless, they addressed real issues, and Pericles' characterization is stubbornly uncompromising. Cf. Will (2003) 201: "Pericles denounces Sparta's suggestions as commands that can be the basis only for obedience, not for negotiations." ("Perikles denunziert Spartas Vorschläge als Diktate, die kein Verhandeln, sondern nur Gehorchen ermöglichen.")

[51] Cf. especially 1.118.2 and the argument of Chapter 3.

This fact is reflected in his speeches. War materials, as we have seen, make wonderful rhetorical centerpieces, whether they illustrate a positive claim, as for the Corcyraeans, a negative argument, as for Archidamus, or a critique of the enemy, as in the Corinthians' last speech. Likewise, Pericles' explanation of Athens' reliable superiority to the Peloponnesians in the coming war rests upon a vivid description of her superior and continuous supply of the materials of warfare. These he promises to list individually: "As far as the things of war and the things available to each side, know that we will not be weaker, hearing them one by one" (τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ὑπαρχόντων ὡς οὐκ ἀσθενέστερα ἕξομεν γνῶτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀκούοντες 1.141.2). He will fulfill this promise not once but twice. The present speech shows Athens' superiority to Sparta in regard to money and a navy. In the speech at 2.13, Pericles provides a second, more detailed list of Athens' monetary assets.

Pericles begins the argument for Athens' superiority by stressing that there is no proportion between Athens and Sparta in respect to their material resources. He identifies the Spartans' agricultural lifestyle as the basic cause of Spartan poverty:

> αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πληροῦντες οὔτε πεζὰς στρατιὰς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε ἅμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δαπανῶντες καὶ προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι· αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφοραὶ ἀνέχουσιν.

> For the Spartans are farmers who do not have any public or private money, and are also inexperienced of long overseas wars since they attack each other [αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους] at close quarters because of their poverty. And these sorts of people are able neither to man ships nor to send out their infantry frequently, since [if they do] they are at the same time away from their private holdings and spending their own money, and in addition, they are restricted from the sea. But surpluses support wars better than violent confiscations. (1.141.3–5)

In this depiction of Spartan ways, Spartan warfare is foolish brother war (note αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους), fought at close range because the combatants are too poor to leave their land.[52] Overseas warfare fought by those who are able to "man ships" and "send out infantry frequently"

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[52] Cf. Archidamus at 1.80.3, who, however, says something different: "Our power is similar to that of the Peloponnesians and our neighbors, and we are able to reach each

is the positive standard to which this less productive kind of warfare is compared. According to Pericles, the Spartans farm their land themselves (they are αὐτουργοί) and cannot afford to leave their farms and spend what little money these provide. Therefore, they will never be able to undertake the more serious campaigns Pericles describes, and thus they will eternally be poor. Turning to warfare too late, that is, to "violent confiscations," will not compensate for these systemic deficiencies.[53]

In the Archaeology, Thucydides had argued that landed stability was responsible for both Athens' and Sparta's advancement to leading powers.[54] By contrast, Pericles equates agriculture with poverty and weakness, arguing that agricultural poverty makes a navy impossible and an infantry ineffective. Consistent with this polemical description of agriculture, Pericles' recommendation of acquisitive warfare (which in the Archaeology brings continuous instability) begins here and does not change throughout his speeches. According to Pericles, Athens is rich, and therefore superior to Sparta, because she can man ships and send out infantry frequently, that is, attack her neighbors more easily and with greater force.

Pericles continues by arguing that "the farmers" (1.141.5), as he again calls the Spartans, have so little ready cash that they will invest the bodies (or lives) of men in a war sooner than their money (σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν).[55] They do this because they are confident that they will survive the physical dangers of war, but fear that their money will not last, especially if the war drags on (1.141.5). Thus Pericles answers the Corinthian argument that bodies are the true natural strength of an army: for Pericles, the Spartans' use of bodies is just a sign that they can better afford to throw away men than to use up the money that will truly defend them. The Spartans know this and act accordingly, spending their less valuable resources first.

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matter quickly." His words imply efficiency and effectiveness in a limited and chosen sphere.

[53] For the opposite view of Spartan poverty, cf. Herodotus' Demaratus on poverty, virtue, and Spartan strength at Hdt. 7.102.1.

[54] 1.2.5–6, 1.6.3–6, 1.18.1–2.

[55] The word σῶμα could mean either life or body. In this speech, it is used here and at 1.143.5, where the scholiast decides that σῶμα = ἀνήρ [i.e. the word body is just another word for man]. By this reckoning, σώμασί … τῶν ἀνθρώπων could be a pleonasm for "people." Perhaps; even so, Pericles is comparing the investment of Athenian money to the Spartan investment of lives.

Pericles' argument defies even the most basic knowledge of Sparta, and if the Corinthians were wrong to exclude the Athenians from the possession of martial virtue, and to argue that their power was merely purchased (1.121.3–4), Pericles seems equally to miss the mark when he projects upon the Spartans the attitude that hoplites are materials equivalent to money.[56] But the reality of Spartan practices and thinking is not an issue here, since the picture of Sparta that Pericles produces for the Athenians is fundamentally distorted: the Spartans are not αὐτουργοί, that is, men who work the land for themselves, but, as Pericles himself says in the Funeral Oration, spend their whole youths painfully struggling for the attainment of military virtue (2.39.1). The result was the infantry force with which Sparta dominated the Peloponnesus, and which it was Pericles' policy never to challenge.[57] Not the Spartans themselves but the Helots farmed Spartan land; Pericles' representation of the Spartans' agricultural powerlessness is a rhetorical construction designed to lessen the Athenians' fears of Sparta's fabled infantry while emphasizing Athens' material advantages.[58]

Spartan infantry power was too well known at Athens for Pericles' argument to succeed outright (that it succeeds at all is a testimony to Athenian self-absorption and overconfidence): in his next sentence, Pericles admits that in a single battle, the Spartans could defeat all other Greeks combined. However, he argues that they will be unable to fight a war (as opposed to a battle) against a power that possesses dissimilar materials (πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι 1.141.6). Athens' deep resources of men, ships, and money will make Athens superior for a longer conflict, and are the means of resisting, if not actually prevailing, against Sparta.

In his effort to deter the Spartans from the war, Archidamus had also stressed this point (1.80.3–4). It seems possible that the pressure of present circumstances has caused both leaders to overemphasize war

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[56] Sparta was willing to concede the whole war to Athens for the sake of recovering Spartiate prisoners of war. Cf. e.g. 4.15, with 4.41.3, and 5.17.1.

[57] 1.143.5. Cf. Adcock (1951) 7: Pericles avoided giving the Spartans a chance to score a victory comparable to their victory over Athens at Tanagra (1.108.1).

[58] Cf. Crane (1992a) 231–232: Corinthian exaggerations of Spartan lethargy in their speech beginning at 1.69 are equivalent to Pericles' disqualifications of Sparta in this first speech. Both Athenians and Corinthians underestimate the Spartans. This creates an ironic distance (cf. Connor [1984] 50–51) between the reader's knowledge that the Spartans will win and the ideas expressed in the speech. Cf. also the monitory words of Kallet-Marx (1994) 239–240 on the rhetorical equation of "power with expense, and power with imperial revenue" that excludes the Spartans (and anyone else unwilling to practice imperial acquisition and expenditure) from the present and potential possession of power, with Lendon (2007) 258.

materials, in the narrator's view, or to misconstrue their importance, so that the presentation of both leaders displays an important effect of the acme on the agents of this war.

In the following sentences (1.141.6–7), Pericles argues that the disunity of the Spartan alliance will also prevent the Spartans from successfully prosecuting a long-term war.[59] This theme is a strong one, but he soon resumes the argument for Athens' material superiority. The main thing, he says, returning to his topic, is that the Spartans are hobbled by their lack of money (μέγιστον δέ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται 1.142.1), which they acquire only slowly. But "the opportunities of war do not wait" (τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί 1.142.1).[60] Ignoring factors such as leadership, chance, and morale, Pericles speaks as if the Spartans would miss important opportunities to attack Athens because they lack the money Athens does possess.

Whoever has money possesses the initiative in the war, Pericles argues: money is the liberator of military action, and Athenian military action is above all naval action. In the second section of his speech, Pericles exposes the weakness of Corinthian plans to defeat the Athenians at sea (1.121.3–4) by showing that the Corinthians have not understood the Athenian navy.

By contrast to his somewhat contrived depiction of the Spartans, Pericles' description of the Athenian navy is more convincing than any previous praise of naval forces in the *History*, except perhaps for the Athenians' description, at Sparta, of the navy that won the battle of Salamis.[61] The Corcyraeans, for example, who represent their navy as if each ship automatically represented the force a properly handled ship would exert, seem naïve in comparison to Pericles. Pericles' description does not rely on stressing the size of Athens' navy, although size is important. Rather, the experience and skill won from many years of practicing warfare are the Athenians' primary qualifications for naval superiority.[62] In stressing the nonmaterial elements of Athens'

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[59] Pericles' insights into the disunity of the Spartan alliance have been verified by Corinthian behavior, and are immediately confirmed when the Thebans attack Plataea and begin the war before the Spartans are ready (cf. 2.7.1). Nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic to find Pericles, the great leader of the democracy, criticizing to the Athenian demos the democratic ways of the Spartan alliance, where each city has a vote (cf. 1.125). Cf. Hagmaier (2009) 213–214.

[60] Note Pericles' jingle here: οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί, which seems to be a statement of the Athenian restlessness that Pericles both shares and encourages.

[61] 1.74.1. As in Pericles' description, the description at 1.74 stressed nonmaterial advantages (best leader, most unhesitating courage) as well as material advantages (most ships).

[62] Cf. Edmunds (1975a) 24–25.

superiority, Pericles makes an argument that agrees more reliably with the narrator's emphasis on the crucial importance of skill.[63]

Pericles takes on the Corinthians' plans one by one. The Peloponnesians may build forts in Attica (1.142.2), he says, but this will not stop the Athenians from sailing against their shores (1.142.4). Pericles argues that the Peloponnesians will not be able to defend themselves against marine attacks.[64] Athenian experience on land is much greater than Peloponnesian experience at sea (1.142.6), and how will "farming men" (i.e. landlubbers, 1.142.7) acquire skill at sea, especially since the Athenians will not allow them to practice?[65] Pericles stresses the difficulty of the skills the Corinthians contemn: fifty years of unimpeded practice since the Persian Wars have not sufficed to bring the Athenians to perfect mastery over skills the Athenians will now prevent the Peloponnesians from acquiring at all (1.142.7).

In combination with Athens' superior skills, the size of the Athenian navy practically guarantees Spartan failure. "In the rashness of their ignorance," he says, "they might risk something against a few ships blockading them, but if they are restrained by many ships they will be still, becoming less intelligent through not practicing and because of this [i.e. not practicing] more hesitant" (πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας ἐφορμούσας κἂν διακινδυνεύσειαν πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, πολλαῖς δὲ εἰργόμενοι ἡσυχάσουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ ὀκνηρότεροι 1.142.8). Athens' combination of experience and numbers will overwhelm Peloponnesian plans. By contrast to the Corinthians' joyful prediction of instant victory over Athens, Pericles predicts a slow degeneration of Peloponnesian skill and intelligence.

Neither are this skill and intelligence for sale, as the Corinthians had suggested. The Corinthians had argued that the Athenians could not achieve virtue. Pericles argues, very plausibly to the reader who is by now somewhat familiar with Corinthian ways, that the Corinthians

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[63] Cf. e.g. 1.49.1–3, 2.84, 2.90–92.

[64] Cf. 1.73.4, 1.74.4.

[65] The cities that supplied the Peloponnesian alliance with naval forces (e.g. Corinth, Megara, or Aegina) are no more "landlubbers" than the Spartans are farmers, so that the passage contains another strategic distortion and therefore overstates Athens' invulnerability. Thucydides' vivid demonstration of the relative inadequacy of these navies, in his account of the Battle of Sybota, helps us to understand why Pericles would discount their importance. The reader's perspective is different from Pericles' perspective, since Thucydides shows that in the long run the Corinthian navy will be an important contributor to Athens' defeat, for instance at Syracuse. Cf. note 68.

will not be able to acquire skill. In a famous statement, he punishes the Corinthians' oligarchic disdain for democratic hard work:

> τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκείνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι.

> Managing a navy is this kind of an art (just like any other art, really): you cannot learn it whenever you like, and practice it as a pastime, but rather [if you want to learn it] you can have no other pastime in addition to that one. (1.142.9)

The Corinthians believe that virtue is inborn. Pericles argues that Athens has the key element of power, a navy, and that unlike her adversaries, she has devoted whatever resources she has to learning to use this weapon well. The Corinthians are doomed. Their plan to buy naval practice directly, by hiring away Athens' crews, was based on a misconception and also cannot succeed. Athens' crews are not foreign or mercenary crews, as the Corinthians had claimed to their allies; instead, Pericles can boast that Athens has more and better citizen pilots and trained sailors than all the rest of Greece (1.143.2).

To the end, then, Pericles' description of the Athenian navy emphasizes both the quality and the quantity of Athens' naval resources. His argument predicts a nearly inevitable defeat of the Spartan farmers and their misinformed and poorly trained allies, who have no apparent long-term means of defending themselves against Athenian attacks, while no one ever suggests that the Spartan infantry will be able to attack the city of Athens itself, guarded as it is by Themistocles' walls.

This seems like a beautifully airtight argument that Athens cannot lose, and will most likely win, the war. Above all, it reduces the Spartans to their power to waste Attica.[66] In the final sections of the speech, Pericles must convince the Athenians that Attica, land Athens has held outright for hundreds of years, should be sacrificed so that Athens can fight a war to protect her claim on an overseas empire. In order to accomplish this, Pericles argues not that Attica has been wasted before by Athens' enemies, and that the Athenians know from experience that Attica can recover (cf. 2.16.1), but much more radically that

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[66] Cf. *TAI* 114: "The dominant theme (of the initial sections of the speech) is that the Spartans can do nothing against Athens, who, being mistress of the sea, is almost completely invulnerable. It is this which constitutes her superiority, which is based essentially on a negative factor: the powerlessness of Sparta. Once this has been proved, all that needs to be shown is that Athens herself can act…"

Attica is dispensable. Attica is land commensurate with other territory the Athenians possess, and can be replaced:

> ἤν τε ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῇ ἴωσιν, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί, ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ κατ' ἤπειρον· μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν;

> If they attack our land with their infantry, we will sail against theirs, and it will not be the same thing for some part of the Peloponnesus to be wasted as for all of Attica [to be wasted]. For they will not have any other place they can take as a replacement without a battle, but we have much land both on the islands and the continent. For control of the sea is a great thing. Only consider: if we were islanders, who would be harder to capture? (1.143.4–5)

All of Attica can be wasted without much harm to Athens, Pericles argues since this loss can be compensated with holdings elsewhere.[67] Although the allies' land must be taken and held by force, Pericles does not distinguish Athens' ownership of this land from Athens' ownership of territory in Attica. His rhetorical stance throughout the speeches will be to treat allied land as a unified and subordinated entity, particular problems with which he will not address. This is a striking contrast to Thucydides' narrative presentation; moreover, Pericles' analysis in this passage is also at odds with subsequent events. In one of his least accurate forecasts, Pericles predicts that it is the Spartans who will fight to preserve their land, not the Athenians.[68]

According to Pericles' argument, however, Athens' imperial properties importantly reduce the Spartan advantage: the Spartans believe that Athenian land is their hostage (1.82.4), and this may be true, but their hostage is not particularly valuable, or perhaps not valuable at all. The image of Athens as an island erases Attica so that Athens can be redefined as a sea empire alone. Pericles imagines the security Athens would gain if she shed Attica in terms of the greatest possible invincibility, and urges the

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[67] Cf. Sicking (1995) 410–412, who argues that Pericles' disqualifications of Attica and infantry warfare are both aimed at disqualifying the conservative landed Athenians who resisted his war policies.

[68] As Connor (1984) and Flashar (1989) foresaw, the postwar reader would read Pericles' speeches as a record of arguments that seemed very convincing at the time, but were proven by the events to have been problematic. I argue that this perspective is useful, but not always necessary for understanding the potential difficulties with Pericles' plans and influence. As we have discussed here, even considered by themselves, Pericles' words reveal the problematic nature of many of his plans and ideas.

Athenians to join him in this reimagining of the city. As we shall discuss in Chapter 6, in his speeches, Pericles repeatedly enjoins the Athenians to abandon their earthbound lives and devote themselves to the elements of the world that bring mobility, power, and wealth. However, even in this initial statement, Pericles' argument is somewhat difficult to accept, since his policy statements in the next paragraph contradict his implicit claim that allied land is securely held.

Pericles' choice of words at the end of the previous quotation is striking. His use of "harder to capture" (ἀληπτότεροι) rather than something like "more secure" (e.g. βεβαιότεροι) suggests that enemies might have cause to chase the Athenians back to their island of security. This single reminder of the cost of Athenian warfare does little to disturb the flow of Pericles' increasingly direct and urgent recommendations to the Athenians, although it does remind us that he is aware of the consequences of the warfare he is recommending:

> καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι (κρατήσαντές τε γὰρ αὖθις οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχούμεθα καὶ ἢν σφαλῶμεν, τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅθεν ἰσχύομεν, προσαπόλλυται· οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάσουσι μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν), τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται. καὶ εἰ ᾤμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἂν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δῃῶσαι καὶ δεῖξαι Πελοποννησίοις ὅτι τούτων γε ἕνεκα οὐχ ὑπακούσεσθε.

> And now, having imagined things as closely as possible to this [i.e. to the idea of Athens as a secure island], it is necessary to let go of the land and the houses, and guard the sea and the city. And do not fight with the Peloponnesians, who are by far more numerous [than we are], because you have become angry on behalf of these things, since if we won we would fight no fewer at the next battle, and if we should lose, the affairs of the allies, from which we are strong, will also be destroyed. For the allies will not rest if we are not sufficient to campaign against them. Mourn not for houses and land, but for lives. For these do not acquire men, but rather men these. And if I thought I could persuade you, I would command you, having gone out of the city, to waste these things yourselves, and to show the Peloponnesians that you will not obey for the sake of these things. (1.143.5)

In Pericles' view, "the houses and the land," constricted properties similar to those that doom the Spartans to their second-rate agricultural

existence, should be traded for "the city and the sea," the expansive, indeed endless, elements of Athens' success and glory.[69] However, the rule of the sea requires constant vigilance: the allies will not rest if Athens allows herself to be weakened in a futile struggle with Sparta. This is why the Athenians should not fight for Attica. The "houses and land" in Attica are unimportant in comparison to ensuring Athens' independence from Sparta and safety from the allies who will threaten Athenian security if Athens loses a battle.

Pericles thus reverses age-old conventions about what a city ought to defend: for Athens, it is more rational, in Pericles' view, to defend possessions overseas than the ancient homeland of the city. At the same time, however, Pericles' statement that the allies "will not rest" if they suspect Athenian weakness confirms our doubts that allied land could be considered a possession equivalent to Attica. The allies will revolt, Pericles warns, at the first sign of serious Athenian weakness. He is therefore asking them to trade Attica for land that is not entirely under Athenian control. Pericles passes over the dangers of the empire, however, and is so anxious to show that Attica should be worthless in Athenian eyes that he recommends the preemptive destruction of Attic property as a display of defiance against Sparta. Thus, Pericles argues for the voluntary destruction of land that has been held for centuries as a sign that the Athenians will not allow the Spartans to restrict their claims to "that which we have acquired" (1.141.1), that is, the empire.

But how is this property "acquired" if the first sign of Athenian weakness makes the possession of this territory insecure? Even without considering the narrative corrections that surround this speech, we can observe that Thucydides exposes to the reader's mind the tensions between the reality of Greek affairs and Pericles' estimation of Athenian power.

However, policies are often incoherent, and the aggressive stance Pericles recommends is absolutely nothing new at Athens, where risky civic undertakings were common. Had Thucydides wished to defend Pericles against the charge of leading Athens into a disastrous war, he could perhaps have tried to show that Pericles had little real choice concerning which policy to undertake. Instead of laying the blame with the

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[69] "Pericles' strategy … rests entirely on the principle of thalassocracy, conceived as a sufficient and wholly satisfactory weapon…" (*TAI* 116).

Athenians, however, in his introduction at 1.127.3, in the first speech, and in his summary at 1.145 of the Athenians' obedience to Pericles' policy, Thucydides makes Pericles personally responsible for the policies that frightened the Spartans into war.[70]

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[70] 1.145: ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες ἄριστα σφίσι παραινεῖν αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο ἃ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν… (Pericles said these sorts of things, and the Athenians, who believed that he was advising them in the best way, voted as he suggested and answered the Spartans according to his recommendations, both according to each individual issue and in general…).

5

Pericles and Athens

Pericles' Speech in Indirect Discourse in Narrative Context

In his first speech, Pericles created oppositions between Athens' profitable and powerful sea empire and Spartan agricultural poverty. The opening narrative of book two offers a contrasting point of view. In the story of the defeat of the Theban invasion of Plataea, Thucydides opposes Pericles' disqualifications of landed ways with a detailed depiction of the formidable strengths of an agricultural community. Where Pericles had assessed the significance of a campaign according to the profit of money and territory it brought to the aggressor, the ineluctable consequences of this small event make it significant for Thucydides, for whom the profit of warfare is just one potentially problematic result among many of waging war on Greek neighbors.[1]

This chapter will therefore begin by discussing the story of the Theban attack on Plataea. After this, it will briefly review Thucydides' account of the pan-Hellenic preparations for war (2.7–8), and take up Archidamus' address to the Peloponnesian captains before settling in to an analysis of Pericles' speech at 2.13. Pericles' speech in indirect discourse responds to Archidamus' speech in direct discourse: Archidamus is afraid that the Spartans' very large forces will cause overconfidence on campaign, and spends most of his speech arguing for restraint. Pericles does the opposite, cataloguing Athenian wealth with the aim of bolstering Athenian confidence. After discussing Pericles' speech in detail, the chapter will close with an analysis of Thucydides' contrasting history of Attica at 2.14–17.

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[1] Cf. Stahl (2003) 70: "It is … the irrevocable character of events, which can never be canceled out or reversed, that most interests Thucydides." As for profit, Thucydides' parallel stories of Plataea and Potideia both show how much expense and how little gain could result from aggression against smaller powers.

The Theban Attack on Plataea

The physical contest of Thucydides' Peloponnesian War begins with the Theban invasion of Plataea. By contrast to the huge forces deployed in the conflict that follows, this invasion is minute. On a wet spring night in 431 BCE, a few more than three hundred Theban men, with weapons, entered Plataea, an Athenian ally situated on the boundary of Attica and Boeotia, at first watch. (Θηβαίων ἄνδρες ὀλίγῳ πλείους τριακοσίων … ἐσῆλθον περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίδα 2.2.1).[2]

The Thebans have arranged with traitors inside Plataea to be admitted into the city (2.2.2).[3] Therefore, they "quite easily" (2.2.3) pass the gates unnoticed, but once inside the city, the invaders do not take the traitors' injunctions "to set to work immediately and go to the houses of their enemies" (2.2.4); instead, the Thebans try to lure the city into an alliance by instituting negotiations.

Weapons are the characterizing attribute of the Theban invaders; Thucydides does not explain that the Thebans are invading, but depicts them entering the city at night "with weapons." The Thebans will now attempt to manipulate the meaning of these weapons, and begin their negotiations by placing them in the *agora*. Their herald says, "If anyone wishes to fight with us for the fatherland of all the Boeotians, let him place his weapons beside ours" (καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κῆρυξ, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα 2.2.4). The Thebans believe, Thucydides says, that they will easily (2.2.4) bring the city over to their side in this way.[4]

The gesture and the speech attempt to redefine the presence of Theban weapons in Plataea as the beginning of an alliance rather than

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[2] The structure of the sentence at 2.2.1, in which the announcement of the event is delayed by the six ways of dating it, and then, once disclosure of the attack has begun, further delayed by naming the Theban leaders of the expedition, creates the maximum suspense for the announcement of the small event with which it ends. Only the end of the sentence is quoted here.

[3] Once more the combination of civil strife and external attack will bring down a functioning polis (cf. Thucydides' description of the Epidamnians' troubles at 1.24.5), so that book two begins in a way similar to book one.

[4] Like Archidamus later on (2.75.1), who incorrectly believes that he will take Plataea quickly because his army is so large, or Pericles, who foresaw on the basis of Athens' available materials that Athens would "very easily" survive the war with Sparta (2.65.13), the Thebans believe that it will be easy (ῥᾳδίως, 2.2.4) to bring the Plataeans around. The word ῥᾳδίως (and related expressions) frequently indicates an incorrect assessment of reality. Cf. Connor (1984) 112 note 9 and Rood (1998) 34 note 30.

the sign of an attack. With their gesture (they have laid down their arms), the Thebans pretend friendship. With their speech, they offer the Plataeans an opportunity to join the Theban cause, namely to fight for "the fatherland of all Boeotians." The messenger's short speech also asks for a gesture in return: since the Thebans and Plataeans will be allies, the Plataeans should fearlessly place their weapons beside the Theban weapons in the agora.

In this way, the Theban speech depicts the joining of weapons in the Plataean agora as a symbol of political unity. The reader has the advantage of having read Thucydides' previous account of the Thebans' real intentions (2.2.3): "…foreseeing that the war was coming, the Thebans wished to capture Plataea, which had always been hostile to them, during peacetime and when the war had not yet openly begun."[5] Readers are therefore less likely to be deceived by the Thebans' performance. But the Plataeans, who do not have Thucydides to guide them, are also not deceived by a ploy that would have the short-term effect of disarming them and the long-term effect of detaching them from Athens. They are at first afraid and take steps toward an agreement, but while they are doing this, they recognize how few Thebans have entered the city (2.3.2). Most of the Plataeans do not wish to revolt from Athens, and seeing that the Thebans are "not many," they believe that they can "easily" (2.3.2) gain control of the invading force.[6] The narrative presentation provokes admiration for the Plataeans, who remain unmoved by the Thebans' attempt to exploit the symbolism of unity and alliance for their own advantage.[7]

Confidence that victory will be easy has now shifted to the Plataean side. Who (if anyone) will be right about what is easy, and what will be

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[5] Cf. Hdt. 6.108. The Thebans have been trying to compel the Plataeans to join the Theban confederacy since before the Persian wars, and at 2.2.3 Thucydides deploys emphatic repetition: "in peacetime" and "when the war had not yet begun" repeat each other. The repetitions emphasize the illegality of the Theban attack. The advantage to Thebes of capturing Plataea before the war is that Plataea would then become a Theban possession, rather than an object of the larger war fought by the two alliances. Cf. Theban claims at 5.17.2.

[6] That the Theban contingent is small compared to the size of the war it provokes seems indisputable; that it seems small to the Plataeans is less inevitable. The focalization Thucydides reports here constructs the Plataeans, who are shown to see this armed invading force of three hundred as small and easily defeated. Contrast Xerxes' fear of the Spartan three hundred at Thermopylae at Hdt. 7.212.1. On the relation between Herodotus' Thermopylae narrative, Thucydides' Pylos narrative, and this story, cf. Foster, forthcoming.

[7] The Plataeans are famous precisely as allies, so the scene is well chosen to elicit sympathy, particularly from Athenian readers. On the length of the Plataean alliance with Athens, see 3.68.5.

the consequences? So far, the Thebans' overconfident appeal to raise
swords in common has backfired. Rather than bringing the Plataeans
to an agreement convenient to themselves, by negotiating the Thebans
have betrayed the crucial information (i.e. their small numbers) that
leads to the Plataean decision to resist.

The Plataean counterattack against the Thebans is entirely improvised
and deploys every man-made and natural advantage the Plataeans can
discover. Thucydides' story emphasizes Plataean unity and intelligence.
The Plataeans meet in secret, digging through the house walls so as to
stay unseen (2.3.3). They detach their oxcarts from the harnesses and
place them as barriers in the roads, and then attack the Thebans while
it is still night so as to preserve the full advantage of their familiarity
with the dark city. Once the revolt has begun, the whole city unites
to fight the invaders: the men attack, the women and servants scream
and throw stones and roof tiles (2.4.2). Moreover, it has been raining
and everything is muddy. Surprised in their turn, the Thebans panic and
fall into confusion.

In opposition to Pericles' rhetorical emphasis on the costly weapons
that enable imperial expansion, this story displays the potential of any
material to become a weapon. Cheap or even free, the reconfigured
oxcarts of the Plataean αὐτουργόι or the shouting, stones, and roof
tiles of female and servile combatants are the weapons of the Plataean
revolution against Thebes. Natural advantages, also free, are equally
important for Plataean success. The Plataeans get the full benefit of the
dark and their own knowledge of the city. By contrast, the overconfident
Thebans must suffer from natural disadvantages; they had not allowed
the heavy rain to delay their attack and are now hampered by the mud
and the swollen Asopus River (2.4.2 and 2.5.2).[8]

Moreover, the Plataeans' fierce sense of resistance is also not mea-
surable with money. The Theban hope that they would "easily" (2.2.4)
bring the city over to themselves turned out to be entirely unfounded.
Thucydides illustrates Plataean determination to resist with a brief
account of the deed of an anonymous Plataean:

> τῶν δὲ Πλαταιῶν τις τὰς πύλας ᾗ ἐσῆλθον καὶ αἵπερ ἦσαν μόναι
> ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔκλῃσε στυρακίῳ ἀκοντίου ἀντὶ βαλάνου χρησάμενος ἐς τὸν
> μοχλόν, ὥστε μηδὲ ταύτῃ ἔξοδον ἔτι εἶναι.
>
> Some Plataean locked the gates by which [the Thebans] had come in, and
> which were the only ones that were open, using the butt end of his spear

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[8] The Thebans are themselves to blame for the fact that the Asopus River is the bound-
ary between Thebes and Plataea. Cf. Hdt. 6.108.5–6.

rather than the bolt for a bar, so that there would no longer be any way out at this gate. (2.4.3)

The spear butt that replaces the bolt that usually locks the gate is a vivid symbol of the Plataeans' determination not to allow the Thebans to escape back out into the countryside, where many civilians remain to be harmed (cf. 2.5.4). As for the Thebans, who had "quite easily" (2.2.3) escaped notice entering these very gates, they are now trapped.

Their condition quickly becomes desperate. Thucydides tells all the ways in which they tried to get out of the city, many dying in the attempt (2.4.4). Finally, a large group of Thebans (perhaps 150 men) falls into a building that is built against the inside of the Plataean city wall, and which they have mistaken for a way out (2.4.5).[9] The Thebans are therefore captured, and the Plataeans debate what they should do. In particular, they debate whether or not they should burn the building down: at this point, the fierce character of the Plataean response to the Thebans turns cruel. However, the Thebans' fate is briefly deferred: "...finally," Thucydides tells us, "these [i.e. the men in the building] and whatever other Thebans had survived wandering about the city came to an agreement to surrender themselves and their weapons to the Plataeans, to treat them in whatever way they wished" (2.4.7).

Thucydides has framed the story of this invasion with accounts of negotiation, both of which involve weapons. Far different from the negotiations the Thebans had mimicked upon their arrival, the negotiations at the end of the invasion are real, and definitive in their result: the Thebans surrender themselves and their weapons unconditionally. The tightly controlled plot is finished. Thucydides adds only a tag to separate this story from the information that follows: "Thus these [i.e. the Thebans] fared in Plataea."

Thucydides' suggestive precision in this story relies on and appeals to the reader's understanding of weapons and their meaning in each situation. For instance, Thucydides deployed references to weapons as signs of an invasion, as signs manipulated for the purposes of false friendship, as signs of resistance, and finally as signs of defeat. The weapons he chooses to mention are frequently unconventional: resistance to Thebes is effected with oxcarts, roof tiles, spear butts, and so on. Precisely by showing that the Plataeans use anything that comes to hand as a weapon, Thucydides shows that their main weapons are determination,

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9 Stahl (2003) 65–72 discusses comprehensively the role of accident, chance, and error in this suspenseful story.

intelligence, and surprise: nonmaterial factors that thwart the Thebans' attack. He therefore illustrates that the proportions of things can be different than Pericles describes: the story of Plataea's "success on a shoe-string" is ominous for parties dependent on aggression to fund their lifestyle, since it shows that the invader's investment of wealth can be wasted by resistance that costs little or nothing.[10] Of note is the fact that Thucydides' decision to portray the Plataeans as he does here is innovative: as every Athenian knew, the Plataeans were a famous hoplite band.[11] Rather than relying on this tradition, Thucydides adds to it a story in which weak combatants (unarmed women and slaves) contribute to the success of an improvised plan of guerilla warfare.

Once his story of the invasion proper is concluded, Thucydides' account of events at Plataea is complicated by the claims that became important for the Spartans' later trial of the Plataeans (3.52–68). Our sketch of the relevant elements of the rest of the story evades these complications and focuses on the Plataeans' final rash action and its implications for Athens.

The Theban army, which had been delayed by the wet landscape (2.5.2–3), and had therefore not arrived at Plataea soon enough to help the initial invaders, arrives on Plataean soil to find the three hundred dead or captured. They think to take hostages from among the Plataeans on the land, and to trade these for any Thebans who may still be alive inside (2.5.4). However, the Plataeans suspect that they must be planning some such thing, and send a messenger to tell the Thebans that if they harm those outside the city, they will kill their prisoners (2.5.5).

Thucydides tell us that whatever other promises the Plataeans made (i.e. whether they promised to return the Theban prisoners if the Thebans withdrew without harming anyone, and whether they swore oaths to keep these promises) became a matter of dispute between the Plataeans and Thebans (2.5.6). What happened was this: the Thebans withdrew from Plataea without harming anyone; the Plataeans quickly brought in everything from the land, and then killed their Theban prisoners right away (εὐθύς 2.5.7).[12] Had the Athenians been able to advise

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[10] Cf. the story of the Athenian siege of Potideia, or of the siege of Plataea itself by the Spartans (2.71–78).

[11] For instance, Athenians honored Plataean participation at the Battle of Marathon at quadrennial festivals (cf. Hdt. 6.111.2).

[12] Given Thucydides' emphasis on each party's belief that it would "easily" prevail, one is tempted to analyze this terrible misstep as a result of the fact that the victory was all too easy for the Plataeans, and that they had in their turn become overconfident. However, this is an opaque murder, like the Athenian slaughter of the trapped

the Plataeans in time, they would have prevented this action, but the speed of events surpassed the speed of the constant messengers going back and forth to Athens (2.6.3). Correctly predicting the Theban and Peloponnesian reaction to this defeat and these deaths (cf. 2.12.5), once they understand what has happened, the Athenians send supplies and a garrison to Plataea, and bring away the women, children, and weakest men (2.6.4).

The Thebans have now openly broken the thirty-year treaties, and the war must begin. Where Pericles had argued that money gave Athens the power of initiative in the war (1.142.1), we find that initiative has been stolen from both great powers, regardless of their military resources. In fact, the Plataean story shows for the third time how an ally's decisions entangle the Athenians.[13] Corcyraean imprudence, Potideian resistance, or Plataean rashness hamper and ensnare Athens, just as Corinthian belligerence and Theban treachery trap Sparta. The dangerous overconfidence of Pericles' suggestion that Athens can milk income from its allies while "keeping them in hand" during a war with Sparta is exposed by the unexpected twists and turns of events at Plataea (even Plataea, the most loyal of allies!). At the same time, his willingness to argue that only naval power matters is put in the context of real events. Far from sharing Pericles' generalized view that Peloponnesian infantry raids on other landed city-states are insignificant, Thucydides locates the forced beginning of the war Athens will lose in a specific, small, and even failed Peloponnesian infantry raid.

ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι (Both Sides Were Thinking Big): The Preparations for War

In the chapters of the text that follow his description of the Theban invasion of Plataea, Thucydides shows the depth of passion impelling the larger powers and their allies to war, and the corresponding size of their preparations.[14] He informs us first about the material preparations

Corinthians at 1.105, for instance, or the Athenian and Spartan decisions to kill suppliants (1.126 and 1.128); Thucydides offers no explanation. Contrast, for instance, the Corinthian murder of their allies at 1.50, which is explained, or, much more copious, the murder of Nicias at 7.86.2–4.

[13] Cf. the arguments about the Corcyraeans and Potideians in Chapter 2.

[14] Popular enthusiasm regularly generates accumulations of weapons in Thucydides, for instance at Corinth (1.31), and at Athens before the Sicilian expedition (6.24).

of the two sides, both of which are trying to borrow money from the Persians or from whatever barbarian power will help them (2.7.1).[15] Individually, the two cities do whatever they can to compensate for perceived material weakness. The Spartans begin to take money and ships from their allies, hoping for an ultimate total of no fewer than five hundred ships (2.7.2).[16] The Athenians firm up their alliances in the West, hoping "to reduce the Peloponnese by surrounding it" (2.7.3).[17] The material preparations of the Spartans and Athenians reflect enormous ambitions and energy, and a determination to win at any cost, even if the cost would be, for instance, to owe a successful outcome to the benefactions of the Persian King.[18]

In the first flush of preparation, Thucydides emphasizes, both sides were thinking big (ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι 2.8.1). The huge material ambitions of the combatants were a product not only of the application of their characteristic mindsets to the available acme of materials, but also of the social and psychological factors driving both sides and in fact all of Greece to war at that time. As Thucydides represents them, these factors were nearly irresistible. A numerous, youthful, and inexperienced population was available to both powers, and was feeling the energy of beginning on a great project (2.8.1).[19] The passions

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[15] Cf. Archidamus at 1.82.1.

[16] The number seems fantastically high, and never in the *History* do we see the Spartans possessing anything even close to this many ships, so that editors have suggested emending the sentence (see Poppo ad loc., and *CT* ad loc. with literature). There is, however, no textual basis that we know of for an emendation. Poppo's conclusion (which does not differ significantly from Hornblower's): "But we ought to consider that [Thucydides] is explaining not how many ships they collected, but how many they hoped to collect." (Debemeus tamen perpendere non explicari quot collectae sint naves, sed quot colligi posse tunc speraverint.) Spartan hopes are excessive, and are also misdirected, since Thucydides' accounts of the battles of Phormio, in which the Peloponnesians always outnumber the Athenians by far (2.83–92), show that the Peloponnesians' initial lack of skill could not be compensated with numbers.

[17] Hornblower's translation from *CT* ad loc., where he mentions Alcibiades' echo of both these words and this aim in his speech to the Spartans at 6.90.3. Athenian ambitions to surround and attack the Peloponnesus correspond to the Spartans' outsized hopes for their navy. It will be long before the Athenians gain so much as a foothold on the west coast of mainland Greece (at Pylos, 4.4ff).

[18] A didactic juxtaposition to the Plataean story can be sensed: as the πόλεις go under, a prey to the unregulated warfare resulting from the quarrels between Athens and Sparta, both sides turn to the dependence on Persia that Sparta, Athens, and Plataea had previously bravely resisted.

[19] Stahl (2003) 71 points out another juxtaposition: "We are probably justified in saying that the author has deliberately juxtaposed the costly (for the Thebans) first experience of this war with the inexperienced eagerness of the youth of Greece."

at the foundation of this enthusiasm originated in deeply felt personal and civic hopes for significance and autonomy (2.8.4), and a collective fear of slavery (2.8.5). These passions were further augmented by prophecies and religious interpretations of natural events (2.8.2–3).

Hope and fear are therefore the underpinnings of the κίνησις the Greeks experienced at that time. As for hope, a great cause, Greek Freedom, was resuscitated (2.8.4). Every individual and city wished to be associated with this cause and to make a necessary contribution (2.8.4). As for fear, most people directed their passions at Athens, since they wished either to escape or to avoid domination (2.8.5). Commensurate with the depth of their collective emotion, both sides were preparing for a war even larger than the one they eventually conducted; a terrible irony, since even as it was, the war they fought was so very destructive.[20]

Archidamus Addresses the Peloponnesian Captains

The narrative now turns to a closer examination of the perspective of each side. Immediately (εὐθύς 2.10.1) after the Theban attack on Plataea, the Spartans ask their allies to muster at the Isthmus of Corinth.[21] Once all are gathered together, Archidamus addresses the most important leaders. His speech demonstrates his awareness of the unprecedented size of the Spartan expedition and the danger of overconfidence on this account.

He begins by saying that this campaign is different both in quality and quantity from those of the past. Despite their many past campaigns inside and outside the Peloponnesus, the Spartans have never yet led out such a large army, with so many and such excellent men, against such a powerful enemy:

ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πολλὰς στρατείας καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἔξω ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι οὐκ ἄπειροι πολέμων εἰσίν· ὅμως δὲ τῆσδε οὔπω μείζονα παρασκευὴν ἔχοντες ἐξήλθομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατωτάτην νῦν ἐρχόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι στρατεύοντες. δίκαιον οὖν

[20] Chapter 9 of book two, and in particular 2.9.3–5, lists the alliances of both sides, introducing the allies as suppliers of war materials in the same way as previously (e.g. 1.27.2, 1.46.1). Since I am not convinced of the authenticity of 2.9, I am using no evidence from this chapter.

[21] Two thirds of the forces of each city take part, so that the description contains another response to Pericles' claims that the Peloponnesians could not go on long or frequent campaigns out of concern for their land.

ἡμᾶς μήτε τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι μήτε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἐνδεεστέρους.

Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers also made many campaigns in the Peloponnesus itself and abroad, and the older men among us are not without experience of wars. Nevertheless, we have never yet gone out with an expedition larger than this one, but rather we are now both advancing upon the most powerful city and also we ourselves who are campaigning are the most and the best men [i.e. of the Peloponnesians]. Therefore it is just that we neither appear worse than our fathers nor inferior to our own reputation. (2.11.1–2)

Archidamus stresses that the Spartan expedition is unprecedented in its size and quality, and in the size and quality of its object. We might expect that he would want to inspire this unprecedented gathering with a strong sense of purpose. But Archidamus does not announce a goal or plan for the expedition. Instead, he draws an unusual connection by relating the Peloponnesians' large numbers not to potential power or victory, but to responsibility: we have so many good people out here, he reminds his captains, that to fail our fathers' or our own reputations would be to fail a justified (δίκαιον) expectation. Furthermore, it would be to fail the expectations of all of Greece, which Archidamus in the next sentence characterizes as bearing the Spartan expedition goodwill because of their hatred of Athens.[22]

The way to fulfill this responsibility and these expectations is to remain ever vigilant. He warns the Spartans against feeling safe because of their numbers, and advises "the leader and soldier of each city personally to expect that some danger will come upon him" (2.11.3). War is unpredictable, he argues, and battles begin suddenly and mostly because of passion. Careless contempt for smaller forces has before now proved fatal to large armies (2.11.4). The focus should be on safety: the Peloponnesians, Archidamus advises, should campaign confidently, but prepare fearfully; they would thus be most courageous in their approach to an enemy, and safest in their attack (2.11.5).

Responsibility, vigilance, safety: Archidamus' speech warns against failure rather than outlining a positive plan. Of course, he is on record (1.82.1) as opposing an overhasty expedition such as this one, which has been provoked by the Theban attack on Plataea, and not undertaken as

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[22] Their reason for goodwill toward Sparta is a dubious passion toward Athens. Archidamus had repudiated such passions as a reason to go to war in his explanation of Sparta's superiority at 1.84.1–2 (cf. 1.82.6).

a result of proper preparation and a considered Spartan decision. His reluctance to lead a huge army on this enforced expedition is palpable.[23]

Archidamus continues by warning the Peloponnesians that the Athenians may well lose their heads. The Athenians, he says:

> … τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένην, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἰέναι αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὥρμηνται ἐν ᾧ οὔπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δῃοῦντάς τε καὶ τἀκείνων φθείροντας. πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄηθες ὀργὴ προσπίπτει· καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται.

> … are prepared in the best possible way with everything, so that we certainly ought to expect that they will come out to battle: perhaps they will not attack us now while we have not yet arrived, but rather when they see us wasting and destroying property on their land. For passion falls upon all who see before their eyes and in the present that they are suffering something untoward. And they undertake to act influenced least by calculation, and most of all by anger. (2.11.6–7)

Archidamus argues that anyone who is well armed and confident might be moved to attack an invading party by anger at destruction that takes place before his eyes.[24] The Athenians will be particularly vulnerable to this anger, Archidamus predicts, because they "think they are worthy to rule others" and are used to inflicting damage on others rather than having it inflicted on themselves (2.11.8): their dignity as a ruling power will suffer insult from this invasion, and Archidamus is hoping that the insult to their pride, added to their inevitable anger, will provoke them to action.

Thus Archidamus urges the Spartans to resist overconfidence, and projects that the Athenians will succumb to that very error once they are assailed by anger and pride. He closes with further injunctions to obedience, order, caution, and unity; he seeks with each command to school his captains to the delay and caution he will in fact exercise (2.18–20).[25]

Archidamus' attempt to eradicate overconfidence on the basis of Sparta's visibly impressive military resources contrasts directly to

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[23] Cf. Pelling (1991) 126.

[24] On the projected emotional impact of autopsy of one's own land being wasted, cf. 2.74.1.

[25] Archidamus' caution is not specific to this situation or war, but is also a theme of his description of Spartan virtue (1.84.4). Therefore it is ironic when he later commits exactly the error he warns against here, expecting a "swift" victory at Plataea because of the large army he has available (2.75.1). Thus the overconfidence caused

Pericles' attempt, in the following chapter, to encourage the Athenian people with money. The contrast furthers Thucydides' characterization of the winners and losers in this war, since Athens' defeat is predicated on the materialistic overconfidence Pericles will encourage here.

χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς (And in This Way He Encouraged Them with Money): Pericles' Speech in Indirect Discourse

Pericles' speech in indirect discourse is of particular relevance to our argument because of its focus on Athens' material resources for the war. Furthermore, in building a picture of Athens' advantage, it no longer relies on a comparison to Sparta, as had the speech at 1.140–144. It focuses on Athenian strength exclusively, and portrays this strength largely in terms of money, and whatever, being made of precious metal, can become money. This money, and the other material advantages Pericles advertises (walls, men, horses, ships) are the Athenian acme. In the speech at 2.13, Pericles claims Athens' accumulated resources for the war, sparing nothing, sacred or profane.

The speech at 2.13 is Pericles' only speech in indirect discourse. This fact has led to a certain neglect of the rhetorical character of the speech, which is often treated as informational in its intentions.[26] I suggest, however, that the use of indirect discourse in the composition of this speech allows for a variety of rhetorical strategies. First, and as readers have remarked (cf. footnote 26), indirect discourse allows for narratorial

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by possessing large military resources befalls the wise Archidamus, as well as his opponent, Pericles. Cf. note 4.

[26] Cf. *TAI* 50: The speech at 2.13 offers "purely practical details on the nature of Athenian resources" (cf. 120). *CT* ad loc.: "Why then is the one speech [i.e. Archidamus' speech at 2.11] in direct and the other [i.e. Pericles' speech at 2.13] in indirect speech? Perhaps because the material put into Pericles' mouth is too technical and precise, including a statement of financial (3–6) and human (6–8) resources." For views that make the rhetorical intentions of the passage more central, cf. Rusten (1989) 115, with references, and Kallet-Marx (1994) in agreement with Rusten: "…the use of *oratio obliqua* allows Thucydides to step in and gloss the speech as he does, which would be impossible in oratio recta" (234). On direct and indirect speech in general, cf. Pelling (2000) 121, and especially Scardino (2007) who includes a discussion of indirect discourse in Herodotus on pp. 332–335, and in Thucydides on pp. 656–659. He argues that indirect speech is in general treated with less rhetorical elaboration than direct speech, but that a functional difference between direct and indirect speech is nevertheless difficult to establish: quite important speeches are found in indirect discourse (see for example the speeches of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus at 6.47–49, or the debate of Nicias and Demosthenes at 7.47–48).

intrusions. Thucydides interrupts Pericles' brief speech with explanations three times.[27] I shall argue that the intrusions have an important role in directing the reader's interpretation of Pericles' words. Second, and in addition to this already rather punctuated presentation, Thucydides inserts a frame around the central section of the speech (2.13.3–6). This frame directs the reader's attention to Pericles' purposes in an emphatic way. It opens by disclosing to the reader Pericles' rhetorical purpose, namely to give the people courage with money, and closes by stating that he has fulfilled this purpose. We shall discuss this section of the speech in detail. Finally, the choice of indirect discourse allows Thucydides to place verbs of speaking strategically, in order to emphasize particular statements as Pericles' words.[28] The frequent narratorial intrusions in this short speech sharply separate the reader, who is conducted through the speech by the narrator, from the text internal audience, which enjoys no such guidance.[29]

The use of indirect discourse also allows for targeted deployment of the information the speech contains. Pericles' speech contains a catalogue of materials, and these have a rhetorical impact of their own. The following interpretation takes the meanings of Pericles' references to Athenian cultural and economic resources into account.

The speech at 2.13 is set in the last moment at which Athens is untouched by the war. The exact time (while the Spartans were on their way to Attica, but had not yet arrived) and opportunity of Pericles' speech (Pericles addresses the Athenians in the *ecclesia*) are provided.[30] Pericles' focalization of the situation that provokes his opening remarks

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[27] 2.13.3, 2.13.7, and 2.13.9. Each intrusion is introduced with the particle γάρ.

[28] On this tentative assertion, some initial evidence: the last sentence of a speech in indirect discourse in Thucydides is sometimes marked with the reiteration of a verb of speaking (e.g. ἔφη at 1.91.7, 6.49.4, 7.48.6, or ἔλεγε at 2.13.9). However, other inserted verbs of speaking seem to function to associate a particular statement more closely to the reported speaker. For example, in Nicias' speech at 7.48, verbs of speaking are deployed where Nicias is responsible for making a particularly significant statement: at 7.48.3, where he states that the expedition should not leave Sicily, and at 7.48.4, where he argues to the other commanders that the very soldiers who are at the moment complaining will prosecute them if they return to Athens. I will suggest that Thucydides' treatment of Pericles' speech at 2.13 displays a similar practice, in other words, that verbs of speaking are inserted where Thucydides wishes to confirm that the statement was unquestionably made by Pericles himself.

[29] Some readers pass over the narrator's role in this speech and therefore associate Thucydides to the materialism Pericles expresses. Cf. e.g. Crane (1998) 40 and Will (2003) 195.

[30] Cf. Bosworth (2000) 2 on the similar treatment of the Funeral Oration.

is also provided: Pericles has recognized (ἔγνω) that the Spartan attack is imminent and he has come to suspect (ὑποπτήσας) that for (friendly) private reasons or (hostile) public reasons, Archidamus may spare his land. Given his insistence that other Athenians abandon their attachment to Attica, Pericles has little choice but to distance himself from this special treatment, should it occur, and in the prelude to his speech offers his property to the city in the case that the Spartans show his land preferential treatment (2.13.1).[31]

It is conspicuous that Thucydides foregrounds this speech with Pericles' declaration of a (potential) sacrifice of private property to the collective.[32] The declaration models both the particular attitude Pericles wishes Athenians to hold toward Attic property, which is to be considered dispensable, and also the general attitude of dedication to the collective he expects Athenians to assume. The wealth Pericles is about to list is entirely collective; regardless of what any particular Athenian feels about any part of it, he will be expected to devote it to Athens.

Thucydides begins the speech proper with a summary of Pericles' war policy, marking the summary with verbs of speaking (the initial παρήνει, and supplementing with λέγων where he wishes to emphasize Pericles' insistence that Athens' strength derives from the profit won from the allies):[33]

> παρῄνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον, παρασκευάζεσθαί τε ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐσκομίζεσθαι, ἔς τε μάχην μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν, ἐξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, *λέγων* τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμῃ καὶ χρημάτων περιουσίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι.

> And concerning the present situation, *he advised* the same things as before, namely to prepare for war and to bring in their things out of the fields, and not to go out to battle, but once they had withdrawn to guard the city and tend the navy from which they drew their strength, and to keep the affairs of the allies in hand, *saying* that their strength derived from the income of money from the [allies] and that war was mostly won by intelligence and a reserve of money. (2.13.2)

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[31] Consistent with the remarks in his first and last speech, Pericles describes his Attic property as "houses and land" (2.13.1).

[32] Cf. Balot (2001) 146. The introduction to this speech also accomplishes several other tasks, since it exposes Pericles' political balancing act. The curse on the Alcmaeonids is mentioned, and on the other hand also the friendships that attend Pericles' aristocratic status. Both factors complicate Pericles' relationship to the *demos*.

[33] Verbs of speaking are italicized throughout the discussion of this speech.

The war policy (as Thucydides confirms) is much the same as that presented at 1.143.5: evacuate Attica, do not fight the Spartan infantry, guard the city, and tend the navy. However, the explanation of Athens' reasons for such caution is expanded. At 1.143.5, Pericles had argued that "the affairs (or matters) of the allies" (τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων) would be destroyed if Athens lost a battle to Sparta, but does not offer further description of these affairs. At 2.13, Pericles specifies that "the affairs of the allies" must be kept in hand, and also explains the reason for this, namely that Athenian strength was dependent on income from the alliance.[34] Thus for Pericles the "affairs of the allies" are the actions necessary to subordinate the allies in order to continue to take their money.[35] This money is essential for the war effort. War is won, he argues, through intelligence (here clearly Pericles' own) and a standing reserve of money, the collection of which would necessarily be thwarted if the allies were to revolt.

Contrary to many readers, who take this connection between Athens' money and Athens' power to be Thucydidean, I would like to emphasize, with Kallet-Marx, although not in precisely the same terms, that Pericles is creating a rhetorical connection between money and power.[36] Our examination of Pericles' first speech showed some of the means by which this rhetorical connection was created. The systematic attribution of significance to campaigns that bring profit to the aggressor,

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[34] Notice the emphatic repetition in the phrase ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου [lit.: is from the profit of those moneys]. "The profit" would have been sufficient to express Pericles' meaning; "the profit of money" is a more concrete and therefore vivid expression of Pericles' claims. Contrast this vivid expression of the gain to be won from the alliance, and the euphemisms (see next note) used to disguise the behavior necessary to win that profit.

[35] Just as the words "the affairs of the allies" are a disguise, the expression "to keep the allies in hand" is a euphemism. The implications of this sentence were already recognized by the Hellenistic scholiast (cited in Poppo ad loc.). διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν] δι᾽ ἐπιμελείας ἵνα μὴ ἀποστῶσι (to keep the allies in hand: through taking care that they do not revolt). Cf. *CT* ad loc. "…it should not be too easily assumed that Th. intends to imply that the Athenians of the Melian Dialogue represent a decline from the standards of Pericles…" On Pericles' own campaigns to "keep the allies in hand," cf. the discussion in Chapter 4.

[36] Kallet-Marx (1994) 238: "Pericles' speech was produced in such a way as to recreate and reinforce a context within which the *demos* could understand and interpret his remarks. That the statesman used as a chief means of producing the desired emotional response of confidence, θάρσος, a list of Athenian resources – much like a catalogue of ships – illustrates neatly the predisposition of Athenian attitudes. The Athenian audience had to have been *conditioned* [her italics] to think of Athens' strength as lying in its money in order to be emboldened by a financial list."

the disqualification of nonprofit-bearing agricultural ways as a source of weakness, the accompanying redefinition of Attica as dispensable, and of the empire as reliable and valuable property: these arguments and evaluations were constructed in order to achieve a positive evaluation of acquisitive warfare at Athens, and Pericles did not shy away from employing mischaracterization and exaggeration in order to achieve this end.

Pericles is therefore indeed "conditioning" the Athenians. Our analysis of the first speech also noted that Pericles avoided mentioning the ongoing cost of the empire; the speech in indirect discourse displays this strategy as well. Pericles insists that Athens must keep the allies in hand, since wars are won with the surpluses of money Athens takes from the allies. However, he does not discuss how the continuous subordination of the allies is to be accomplished, but instead describes the profits the empire brings to Athens. By describing Athens' money, and what can become Athens' money, Pericles creates a close rhetorical association between money and power, but he does so at the expense of a realistic assessment of Athens' situation.

Thucydides makes this stratagem visible by framing the central section of the speech with words that focus the reader (the listener, as we have pointed out, had no such aids) on Pericles' purpose, and by inserting corrections into the speech as a whole. The framed passage begins at 2.13.3 by stating Pericles' words in the following way: "He told them to take courage, since about six hundred talents of tribute were coming into the city annually…" (θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν…). The passage closes at 2.13.6 with the narrator's restatement: "And so, in this way he encouraged them with money…" (χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς…).[37] The opening phrase of the frame reports that Pericles tells the Athenians to take courage because so much money is coming to the city on a regular basis; the closing phrase uses the same verb (θαρσεῖν) and emphasizes that Pericles encouraged the Athenians with money in the manner Thucydides has just recorded.

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[37] Cf. the verb θάρσειν at 2.65.9 where Thucydides confirms Pericles' ability to restore the People to confidence. Probably the most famous use of this verb appears in Thucydides' account of the departure of the Athenian fleet for Syracuse at 6.31.1: "but the power before their eyes, the quantity of what they saw, gave them courage again [ἀνεθάρσουν]" and Macleod (1983) 144. By 415, the *demos* trusts that the appearance of copious war materials in the manner of Herodotus' Xerxes. (Cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.100–103.)

How does the passage work? Let us review it in detail, noting also the narrator's other intrusions. I have included the end of 2.13.2, so that the opening of the frame can be seen in context:

τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, *λέγων* …, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμῃ καὶ χρημάτων περιουσίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι. *θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε* προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τῆς ἄλλης προσόδου, ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων

[And he advised them] to keep the allies in hand *saying …* that war was mostly won by intelligence and a reserve of money. And *he told them* to take courage, since about six hundred talents of tribute a year came into the city, without consideration of other income, and [he said] that there were still at that time [ἔτι τότε] six thousand talents of coined money on the acropolis. (2.13.2–3)

Pericles names two factors that win wars: intelligence and money. He makes no further remarks about intelligence (his plan has been adopted in every detail, cf. 1.145), but as far as money is concerned, states that the Athenians should take courage, since the allies pay six hundred talents a year of tribute. As has been noticed by others, this creates a false sense of the reliability of Athenian income.[38]

Thucydides immediately confirms that Athens' profit from the empire was more tenuous than Pericles is indicating. In his next sentence, Pericles informs the Athenians that six thousand talents are "still" available at that time.[39] The word "still" is an admission that money has been spent, and Thucydides intervenes to explain: There had been as much as 9,700 talents in the treasury, but some money has been spent on "the gateway of the Acropolis and the other buildings" and some on the siege at Potideia (τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔς τε τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τἆλλα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν ἀπανηλώθη 2.13.3). Thus, despite the fact that 9,700 talents is a very large amount of money, it has been depleted by more than a third in recent times.

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[38] Cf. Will (2003) 194.

[39] How much money is this? *HCT* notes (ad loc.) that the average pay for a skilled worker or a hoplite on special commission was about a drachma a day. 600 talents = 3,600,000 drachmas. Seen from the allied perspective, the Athenian standing reserve is equivalent to ten years of allied contributions.

This narratorial intrusion contains a rare Thucydidean reference to the Periclean building program on the acropolis.[40] The recent period, in which Athens has been dominated by Periclean policies and projects, has been expensive as well as lucrative, and the building program has been costly. Equally problematic for Pericles' presentation, however, is Thucydides' reference to Potideia. Thucydides' mention of Athens' failure to control this small tribute-paying ally raises the specter Pericles' recitation of Athenian wealth avoids: Pericles catalogues calculable amounts of wealth as if they were secure; in fact, Athens' income is dependent on suppressing exactly such revolts as the one Athens has so far failed to suppress at Potideia. Efforts to end this revolt have already cost Athens much more money than Athens could hope to claim from such a small contributor.[41] Could the policy of "keeping the allies in hand" potentially cost more than it brings in? The speaker and the narrator contrast: where Pericles shows us how much money the city has, Thucydides shows us how much money the city spends, even before she is engaged in a full-scale war. Where Pericles boasts about Athens' supply of money, Thucydides' interruption brings to mind the combined expense of imperial decoration and the ongoing siege of Potideia, and suggests the fragility of the empire's economic benefit to Athens.

Pericles goes on to list all of the unofficial sources of wealth in Athens. The great builder of temples reveals a frankly mercenary view of the riches deposited inside them:

> …χωρὶς δὲ χρυσίου ἀσήμου καὶ ἀργυρίου ἔν τε ἀναθήμασιν ἰδίοις καὶ δημοσίοις καὶ ὅσα ἱερὰ σκεύη περί τε τὰς πομπὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκῦλα Μηδικὰ καὶ εἴ τι τοιουτότροπον, οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν *προσετίθει* χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα, οἷς χρήσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται πάντων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ τοῖς περικειμένοις χρυσίοις· *ἀπέφαινε* δ᾽ ἔχον τὸ ἄγαλμα τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμὸν χρυσίου ἀπέφθου, καὶ περιαιρετὸν εἶναι ἅπαν. χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ *ἔφη* χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν. χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς…
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> … and in addition [to the six thousand talents] there was unstamped gold and silver in public and private dedications, and such sacred equipment as

was used for parades and games, and Persian spoils and whatever else there was of this kind [worth] no less than five hundred talents. And *he added* also the things from the other temples, being no small amount of money they could use, and if they should be entirely depleted of everything, also the golden veneer of the goddess herself. And *he showed* that the statue had a forty talent weight of refined gold, and that all of it could be taken off. But if they used it for their salvation *he said* that they had to replace it undiminished. Thus he cheered them up with money...[42] (2.13.4–7)

Pericles transforms all available Athenian resources into money, and turns all money toward the prosecution of the war. He lists Athens' valuables without description or differentiation, but this does not mean that the objects to which he refers have no particular meanings for the assembled Athenians or the reader, or that Thucydides is not creating associations through contrast.[43] For instance, Pericles' reference to melting down the equipment for religious parades and athletic competitions reminds us of Thucydides' reference to the Propylaia, the main function of which was to be a ceremonial gateway for the pan-Athenaic procession. Members of the assembly may or may not have been shocked by Pericles' suggestion that they should consume religious apparatus for the sake of the war; the reader must wonder about the coherence of Pericles' plans. Pericles was willing to spend large amounts of money on the Propylaia, certainly enough, as Thucydides pointed out at 2.13.3, to diminish what Athens had available to prosecute the war, and then, if Athens ran out of money, to compensate by melting down the equipment of the festivities the building was (theoretically) intended to glorify. Besides demonstrating Pericles' fundamental indifference to these festivities, Pericles' argument reinforces the reader's sense that the city is living beyond its means.[44]

[42] Verbs of speaking (in italics) accumulate in this part of the speech, emphasizing that these are Pericles' statements. Thucydides thus ensures that Pericles' words are associated with Pericles himself, and not with any Thucydidean view or summary. The passage contains a number of characteristically absolute and urgent adjectives: Pericles is insistent about the perfect nature (ἀπέφθου) of the gold, the fact that absolutely all of it (ἅπαν) is available, and that all of it must be replaced (μὴ ἐλάσσω) if used.

[43] In this regard, the tight narratorial control afforded by indirect discourse helps isolate particular objects for the readers' attention, since the objects mentioned seem to be chosen as exemplary from a longer list. Note the words καὶ εἴ τι τοιουτότροπον (2.13.4) and τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα (2.13.5), which are summaries of other secular and sacred objects that Pericles may have mentioned but Thucydides does not record.

[44] The debate about whether or not the Athenians took money from the allies for the building program on the acropolis is summarized in Kallet (2005) 57 and explicated

Further questions are provoked by Pericles' suggestion that Athens could consume the spoils from the Persian War.[45] These spoils are reminders of Athens' great defensive victory over an imperialistic effort, and therefore of the spirit of resistance imperialistic efforts can provoke. For both reasons, Pericles would perhaps be glad to melt them down, but his willingness to do so once again demonstrates his indifference or even hostility to Athens' proudest memories.[46] It seems likely that Thucydides' references to Pericles' argument that Athens should consume these kinds of objects for the sake of the war are intended to characterize Pericles and his leadership.[47]

Thucydides' firm control over this speech is therefore evident in his selection of references that subvert Pericles' message despite the wealth he is displaying. The key example of this technique is Thucydides' presentation of Pericles' culminating argument that as a last resort the Athenians could use the gold veneer covering the statue of Athena in order to fund the war.[48] Thucydides has Pericles protect himself from

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as fully as possible in Samons (2000) 150–163. The argument made here does not rely on any conclusion about this difficult problem.

[45] The scholiast (with Poppo's help, ad loc.) interprets as follows: "Median spoils: Xerxes' silver-legged (or footed) throne, and Mardonius' golden acinaces (sword)." (Σκῦλα Μηδικά] τὸν ἀργυροποδὰ θρόνον [Xerxis] καὶ τὸν ἀκινάκην τὸν χρυσοῦν [Mardonii].) The scholiast's thought, then, was that the spoils were unique objects intended to commemorate Athens' victories at Salamis and Plataea.

[46] Pericles would have a particular interest in leaving behind any victory accomplished in alliance with Sparta. On Pericles' hostility to Athenian hoplite culture, closely allied to his hostility to Attica, see Sicking (1995) 418–419.

[47] This is especially the case in that Thucydides never records that these objects were melted down, so that the Periclean plans Thucydides is outlining in 2.13 reflect Pericles' vision of the future more than any actual event he would narrate.

[48] This gold was very valuable. Lapatin (2005) estimates the weight at forty-four talents. "44 talents of gold was worth 616 talents of silver, sixteen talents more than the annual tribute of Athens' allies/subjects under Perikles … The purchasing power of this sum was immense: 616 silver talents were the equivalent of 3,696,000 silver drachmai … thus the gold of the Athena alone could have kept an army of 10,000 or a fleet of one hundred triremes at sea for more than a year…" (270). Gold is often deceptive or a bad omen in Thucydides. Cf. 6.46.3–5 (the Egestaeans display borrowed gold and silver in order to deceive the Athenians), and 6.32.1 (the Athenians pour libations from golden cups at the beginning of the expedition to Syracuse); cf. Hdt. 7.35, where Xerxes pours libations from a golden cup before crossing the Hellespont into Europe. Even the golden cicadas of 1.6.3 are somewhat problematic, since they indicate a focus on the display of wealth (by contrast, the Spartans manage to avoid such display; 1.6.4). Gold in Herodotus is equally treacherous and much more prominent. A few examples: Amasis' golden footbath turned god (2.172), the Ethiopian King laughs at Persian golden necklaces, which he had mistaken for shackles (3.22.2), the golden spoils of the failed expedition to Greece (7.190, 9.80, cf. 9.83.1). Cf. note 50.

the charge of impiety by positing an absolute financial emergency as the basis upon which the Athenians would make use of the Athena statue: "if they [i.e. the Athenians] should be entirely depleted of everything" (καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται πάντων), then they might use the gold. Then Thucydides reports that Pericles described the gold's tempting value and accessibility like a man planning a robbery ("he showed that the statue had a forty talent weight of refined gold, and that all of it could be taken off"), but afterward added a pious caveat (another defense against a charge of impiety) that the gold would have to be exactly replaced if it were used.

Thucydides vividly exhibits Pericles' daring depiction of the statue as a valuable treasure that could be considered part of Athens' standing reserve, even if it was a religious object. Pericles' focus is the money this treasure preserves; his remarks constitute a defense of the building program as an investment in addition to being a civic decoration. For Pericles, Athena herself (rather than merely the Parthenon temple) is a kind of bank.

Thucydides' closing remark: "And so, in this way he gave them courage with money" may therefore strike the reader as ironic or even sarcastic. Pericles' way of giving the Athenians courage anticipates melting down religious and cultural artifacts in order to fund the war. His final suggestion was to strip the gold from the statue of Athena, should the war cause desperate financial need, so that his argument ends by constructing both the Athenians and their goddess as destitute because of the war. He insists that they would replace the gold, but if Athens were to reach such a state of emergency, how would the city ever replace such a treasure? Pericles, who knows his audience well, has shown them that they have a lot of money to spend, if they need to spend it.[49] Thucydides' interpolations address the reader. In repeating that Pericles "gave the people courage with money in this way," Thucydides ironizes Pericles' strategy and provokes us to ask whether courage could really be taken from Pericles' argument that the Athenians could spend everything, if they needed to.

Overall, Pericles has replaced a discussion of issues such as the siege at Potideia with an enumeration of everything valuable in the city. Listeners might have been very impressed with the evident surplus available to

[49] Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 104: "The copiousness of the description and elaboration, the quantities that were immediately accessible and expendable, combined with the great area throughout which more wealth existed and could come into the city, would have created an impression of near invincibility."

Athens. Thucydides' remarks and careful structuring of Pericles' speech have separated the reader from this kind of listener. For the reader, and perhaps also some listeners, Athens' religious and cultural memorials emerge from Pericles' list transformed into a horde with which the war is to be supported. Pericles himself, the leader of this wealthy state, is by his words transformed into the Athenian Midas. He turns everything to money, including even Athena herself.[50]

Once Pericles has given the people courage with money in this way, he continues to list Athens' material resources. Athens has thirteen thousand hoplites and, in addition to the men guarding the forts in the countryside, sixteen thousand guards for the walls. Population is the primary sign of prosperity, and these are impressive numbers for a single Greek city.[51] Thucydides, however, interrupts Pericles again, in order to explain the numbers: for the number of guards exceeds the number of fighting hoplites. He explains the length of the Phaleric wall, the circuit of the city, the long walls, and the Piraeus. The statistics are impressive. The sixteen thousand men (the old, young, or otherwise unoccupied metics) guard thirty-five stades of the Phaleric wall, forty-three stades of the circuit around the city, and forty stades of the long walls toward the Piraeus. Furthermore, half of the circuit around the Piraeus and Mounichia also required guards, which adds another thirty stades (2.13.7).[52] Thucydides' interruption shows that Athens, its treasure, and its harbor are sealed off from the continent by a huge and

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[50] Edmunds (1975a) 37–38 argues that Pericles' daring words in respect to the Athena statue are a response to those who thought he might still be able to be cowed by accusations originating in the curse against his family. I suggest that Pericles' suggestion could also be seen as vengeance: disgrace the goddess by undressing her (cf. Hdt. 1.8.3), and profit from it, a kind of sacred prostitution the pious Herodotus had not invented. Herodotus is by no means absent from the picture, however, since Thucydides' Pericles appears as a continuator of the love of gold famous to the Alcmaeonids in Herodotus. On Alcmeon's founding of the Alcmaeonid house on the gold he carried bodily from the treasury of Croesus, tyrant of Lydia, cf. Hdt. 6.125.3–5.

[51] As Archidamus knew (1.80.3). Nevertheless, the Peloponnesians are more populous. *HCT* (ad loc.) reckons the total Peloponnesian forces at about thirty thousand, so that Pericles would be right, at 1.143.5, when he argues that Athens should not fight the Peloponnesian infantry, since if they did win, the Peloponnesians would return with another army just as large as the first.

[52] The total length of wall to be garrisoned is 148 stades or about 26,000 meters: two meters per man, or four meters per man if half the men are on duty at any one time (*HCT* ad loc.). Whatever lengths of wall do not require guards are between two guarded walls. Contrast this situation to Sparta's situation. Sparta has no wall, and thus no men guarding a wall (cf. 1.10.2).

ceaselessly guarded system of walls.[53] We may compare Sparta, which has little money but also no walls, to Athens, and marvel at the burden the defense of Athens represents.

The speech concludes with Pericles' enumeration of Athens' cavalry and archery (twelve hundred), light armed forces (sixteen hundred), and triremes (three hundred), and with the narrator's emphatic confirmation that Pericles was not exaggerating. "These things were available to Athens, and no less than these things in each category, when the Peloponnesians were about to attack and the war was beginning" (2.13.9).[54] Although the narrator has displayed contrasting evaluations of the significance of Pericles' list, he does not dispute its accuracy. Both here, and again at 2.65.13, Thucydides argues that Pericles correctly assessed Athens' material resources for the war. As I shall emphasize in Chapter 6, however, in Thucydides, a rational calculation of the exact extent of particular war resources regularly coexists with an irrational attachment to those same resources.

In sum, Thucydides uses Pericles' speech in indirect discourse to display some of the least attractive aspects of Pericles' policy. I suggest that this speech would have been unbearable in direct discourse. The narratorial interruptions, subtly ironized frame, and selected references to specific objects not only set Pericles' words in the context of Thucydidean correction, but also break up the speech, reducing the intensity of Periclean rhetoric. Spoken in direct discourse, this confident list of everything Pericles could take from Athens to fund the war might have created an ineradicable impression of ruthless materialism. This would confound the complexity of Thucydides' characterization of Pericles, which compels us to admire Pericles and his capacities, and therefore to realize that intelligent and dedicated people can make these mistakes and fall into these attitudes.

At the same time, however, Thucydides' explanations of the points of this particular speech reflect his determination that the reader should understand Periclean materialism. Pericles here advertises Athens' war materials as Athens' great advantage in the war with Sparta. He states that money, in combination with intelligence, wins wars, and lists the

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[53] This was not part of Themistocles' plan. Themistocles' walls were intended to be guarded by "few and the weakest" (1.93.6). However, they were never completed to the height he had conceived. For the Themistoclean walls, see Chapter 3 on 1.90–93.

[54] The navy especially, is Greece's biggest and proudest. Three hundred triremes would require about fifty thousand rowers and about three thousand *epibatai*. (Cf. *HCT* ad loc.)

materials upon which Athens should rely. Thucydides' interventions clearly separate his own views from these opinions.

We should also remember the contrast to Archidamus. Where Archidamus had been concerned to restrain the passions provoked by his impressive army, Pericles' display of the profit already gained from the empire encourages both the desire for more wealth and also the fear that income may somehow diminish (καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται πάντων … χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν…). Pericles' rhetorical strategy therefore both models and promotes collective *pleonexia*. In the Thucydidean context, this influence is very problematic.[55] Thucydides identifies *pleonexia* as a foundation of civic disaster (3.82.8, with 3.82.6) and particularly of Athens' reckless prosecution of the disastrous Sicilian expedition.[56] What societal influences restrain *pleonexia*? Could it not be strong attachments to elements of life for some other reason than that they are materially valuable? Such attachments are on emphatic display in Thucydides' contrasting narrative of the Athenian city and its history.

Thucydides on Attica and Athens

Thucydides' explanation of the character and history of Attica and Athens in 2.14–17 is juxtaposed to Pericles' speech at 2.13 in the same abrupt way that the plague narrative at 2.47–53 is juxtaposed to the Funeral Oration.[57] In 2.13, Pericles counts stored up tribute money, never considering the cost to its human sources. More surprising is that he is not much kinder to the Athenians than to the allies. He integrates Athenian cultural objects into the same reserve of money as tribute, disregarding traditional Athenian values and attachments.

[55] Such influence is equally problematic in Herodotus. Cf. e.g. Artabanus at Hdt. 7.16.2, where Artabanus expresses his concern that Xerxes might be led to arrogance and πλεονεξία, and therefore lead the Persians as a whole toward such passions, through the influence of poor advisers. The adviser in question is Mardonius, whose advice may fruitfully be compared to Pericles' arguments. For instance, Mardonius incites πλεονεξία by arguing that Greece is a prize the king deserves to possess (Hdt. 7.5.3; cf. Pericles at 1.141.1) and that it will moreover be easy to possess through the proper application of force (Hdt. 7.9α.1–2; cf. Pericles at 1.143.5).

[56] Money as the incentive to pursue the conquest of Sicily: 6.6.2–3, 6.8.1–2, 6.24.3 (cf. Nicias' warnings at 6.22.1 and the revelations of 6.44.4 and 6.46.1–5); contrast the collection of money from the defeated Athenians at 7.82.3.

[57] Note the structural similarity between the two passages that frame the plague narrative at 2.47.4 and 2.53, and our present passage. Like the description of Attic

Thucydides' contrasting explanations turn to personal attachments and to the history that makes Attica a foundation of Athenian cultural stability. In opposition to Periclean inhumanity, the passage begins and ends with explanations of the emotional distress caused by the displacement of Attic farmers from their ancestral lands in Attica:

οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείθοντό τε καὶ ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ᾗ κατ᾽ οἶκον ἐχρῶντο, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες τὴν ξύλωσιν· πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ὑποζύγια ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν διεπέμψαντο καὶ ἐς τὰς νήσους τὰς ἐπικειμένας. χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εἰωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαιτᾶσθαι ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο. ξυνεβεβήκει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάνυ ἀρχαίου ἑτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις τοῦτο.

The Athenians, having heard [Pericles' speech] obeyed, and brought in their children and wives and whatever equipment belonged to their households, even pulling down the woodwork of the houses themselves. Their flocks and draught animals they sent across to Euboia and to the near lying islands. And the move was hard for them, because most of them had always been accustomed to pass their lives in the fields. For this had been the case for the Athenians, more than for others, since very ancient times. (2.14.1–15.1)

Most Athenians did not live in the city Pericles described in chapter 13, but rather in Attica.[58] Chapter 14 describes the migration of the Athenian citizens into the fortified city and the dissolution of a settled way of life. The dispersion of Attic families echoes the separation of Plataean families at 2.7; the Spartans are on their way to Attica (2.12.4) and the Boeotian cavalry is on its way to Plataea (2.12.5). As the war enforces itself, Greece becomes a scene of *kinesis*.

Thucydides provides the Attic migration with a treatment the Plataean diaspora does not receive: concrete details illustrate the dissolution of the farmsteads Pericles had disparaged in his first speech.[59] The small houses (the farmers themselves pull down the woodwork), domestic equipment, and displaced families form a striking contrast to the huge stone fortress and copious military materials of the previous chapter. As with the Plataean narrative, Thucydides focuses on objects and subjects

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immigration, the plague narrative begins and ends with a statement of the significant social effect of the event.

[58] Note in the Greek the emphatic position of the subject noun (οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι), and the claim this implies that the ensuing argument is not about some part of the population, but the population as a whole.

[59] Thucydides' emphasis on houses and fields responds in a precise way to Pericles' terms. Cf. the arguments in Chapters 4 and 6 with Chapter 6, notes 13 and 14.

Pericles contemns: agricultural equipment, families, and personal emotional responses.

Thucydides argues that it was difficult for the Athenians to leave this landscape because they had always lived there, and then sets out to explain and illustrate that they had always done so. His argument takes the antiquity of the Athenians' stable habitation in Attica as the cause of the Athenians' attachment to Attica, and the breaking of those attachments as the cause of deep distress. Pericles' hostility to such attachments seems well founded. These attachments would tend to attenuate the Athenians' desire for empire (i.e. such attachments would tend to make them satisfied with what they have). In his last speech, Pericles will urge contempt for such attachments in terms that directly oppose Thucydides' emphases here (2.62.2–3).

Attica, Thucydides tells us, had been cultivated for a much longer time than other Greek territories (2.15.1, cf.1.2.5–6). Eventually, however, Theseus united the stubbornly independent Attic *poleis* into one city administered from Athens:[60]

> ξυνῴκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάστους ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾷ πόλει ταύτῃ χρῆσθαι, ἣ ἁπάντων ἤδη ξυντελούντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ Θησέως τοῖς ἔπειτα…
>
> He united them all [i.e. the Attic poleis], and although each group cultivated its properties in the very same way as before (ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ) he compelled them to use this one city, which, since everyone was contributing to it, was handed on by Theseus to his descendants a great city… (2.15.2)

Like Periclean Athens, ancient Athens required money. Contributions of some kind were necessary, and after unification came to Athens exclusively. As a result, the city "became great" (2.15.2). This wealth was based in Attica; Thucydides emphasizes that under Theseus' political unification, the Athenians cultivated their old holdings "in the very same way as before" (cf. 2.15.2, 2.16.2).

Thucydides does not idealize this unification: force (notice ἠνάγκασε) had been involved in the unification of Attica. But the effect of unification had evidently been positive enough that whatever resentments this produced were long forgotten, and the people still celebrated the *sunoikia* as Thucydides was writing (2.15.2). Theseus, praised like Pericles, Themistocles, and Archidamus for his intelligence and capacity

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[60] Thucydides argues that these *poleis* had their own officers and governments and did not consult with the king at Athens unless under attack from outside; the proof of their political independence is that there were even wars among them (2.15.2).

(2.15.2), had founded the Athenian state, and made it prosperous without disturbing the landed culture of Attica.

Despite Themistocles' innovations, Theseus' balance of city and country had by no means disappeared from Athenian life at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. On the contrary, Thucydides' examples of ancient Athenian culture are formed exclusively from practices still current and buildings still visible and used in Pericles' and his own day. His ancient Athens is one aspect of his modern Athens, so that his description begins as follows:

> καὶ ξυνοίκια ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῇ θεῷ ἑορτὴν δημοτελῆ ποιοῦσιν.τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἡ νῦν οὖσα πόλις ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμμένον. τεκμήριον δέ· τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει † καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἵδρυται, τό τε τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου καὶ τὸ Πύθιον καὶ τὸ τῆς Γῆς καὶ τὸ <τοῦ> ἐν Λίμναις Διονύσου, ᾧ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια [τῇ δωδεκάτῃ] ποιεῖται ἐν μηνὶ Ἀνθεστηριῶνι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων Ἴωνες ἔτι καὶ νῦν νομίζουσιν. ἵδρυται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἱερὰ ταύτῃ ἀρχαῖα.[61]

And the Athenians even now hold a festival to the goddess, celebrating his [i.e. Theseus'] *sunoikia* at public expense. And in earlier times that which is now the acropolis now was the city, together with the area beneath it on the southward side. And there is proof. For the temples of the other gods are both on the acropolis itself and founded mostly in the area outside [the acropolis] in this part of the city, such as the temple of Olympian Zeus, and the Pythian temple, and the temple of Gaia, and that of Dionysus in the Marshes, at which the more ancient Dionysia is celebrated on the twelfth day of the Anthesterion, just as the Ionians who are descended from the

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[61] Editors have been unsure enough about this passage that the *Oxford Classical Text*, quoted here, includes a dagger after ἀκροπόλει. The *apparatus* of the *OCT* suggests an emendation with no warrant in the manuscripts: the German editor Friedrich Classen (a near contemporary of that Friedrich Poppo whose commentary I have often cited) suggested that some reference to the Athena temple must have been lost from the manuscript, and this idea was taken so seriously that the text was presumed to be defective. The *OCT* remarks: "After the word 'acropolis' Classen established that there was a lacuna, and added the words 'and the [temples] of Athena.' ("post ἀκροπόλει lacunam statuit Classen, qui καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς addidit.") The emendation has passed (for instance) into the Crawley translation, now the basis of Robert Strassler's popular "Landmark Thucydides" and may give unwary readers the impression that Thucydides referred to the Parthenon temple in this passage. However, he did not (Thucydides never explicitly refers to the Parthenon temple), and Thucydides' sentence also does not need the emendation. Since the acropolis as a whole belonged to Athena, Athena's presence there could be taken for granted and all other temples could be referred to as the temples of "the other gods." Cf. Rusten (1989) ad loc. on the passage, and Camp (2001) 14–17 on the basic reliability of Thucydides' account.

Athenians still practice it. And also other ancient temples are founded in this area. (2.15.3–4)

Athens was a smaller but nevertheless wealthy city in earlier times, and besides referencing temples still existing from this time, in our passage, Thucydides provides two examples of persisting practices: the Sunoikia and "the more ancient Dionysia," still held in the spring both at Athens and in Ionia.[62] In Thucydides' description, the Ionians reassume their identity as relatives who practice the same rites as the Athenians (cf. 1.6.3, 3.104). These are the tribute paying allies Pericles enjoined the Athenians to "keep in hand."

The history of a fountain house supports the narration of a third tradition:

καὶ τῇ κρήνῃ τῇ νῦν μὲν τῶν τυράννων οὕτω σκευασάντων Ἐννεακρούνῳ καλουμένῃ, τὸ δὲ πάλαι φανερῶν τῶν πηγῶν οὐσῶν Καλλιρρόῃ ὠνομασμένῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐγγὺς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐχρῶντο, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου πρό τε γαμικῶν καὶ ἐς ἄλλα τῶν ἱερῶν νομίζεται τῷ ὕδατι χρῆσθαι·

And the spring which is now, since the tyrants fixed it up, called Nine-Spouts, but anciently, when the streams were visible, was called Fair-Flowing, they used, since it was near, for the most important things, and from this ancient habit it is still customary to use the waters before weddings and other sacred rites... (2.15.5)

Modern Athenians still use the traditional waters to mark the regular changes of family life. Thucydides stresses the continuity of this custom. The tyrants' domestication of the fountain (the name changes from "Fair-Flowing" to "Nine-Spouts") has not changed the *demos*' original relationship to the site. They had used it earlier on for "the most important things" because of its convenience, and presumably also because the water was clear and attractive, as the name Fair-Flowing seems to imply.[63] They are still using it according to the "ancient habit." The example therefore illustrates a stable persistence of ritual and therefore of

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[62] Cf. Capps (1907) for a thorough discussion of the distinction between the words "ancient" and "old" in this passage (and in Greek in general). The "more ancient Dionysia" is the Lenaian Festival; cf. Goldhill (1987) 61 on the contrast between this older civic festival and the imperial display of the Great Dionysia.

[63] Note the focalization here: for the people, private rites are the most important things. This view, which Thucydides in this passage seems to share with the Athenians, is in broad agreement with Herodotus' Solon's description of human happiness (Hdt. 1.30.3–5).

memory at Athens, as does Thucydides' fourth example, which remarks on preserved language: the Athenians still call the acropolis "the city" (2.15.6). A sense of the historical urban topography exists among the Athenians of Thucydides' time.[64]

The persistence of these habits demonstrates the achievement of cultural stability over generations. For Pericles, temples are storehouses for money and valuables. For Thucydides, they are the site for the continuation of practice and memory that creates a stability of attachment to Athens. Thucydides might have argued the social and political consequences of disturbing such stability, but he will do this after the plague narrative at 2.53ff.[65] Here, he stresses the emotional disturbance that demonstrates the depth and reality of the Athenians' attachments. The excursus closes as follows:

τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει μετεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνῳκίσθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὅμως οἱ πλείους τῶν τε ἀρχαίων καὶ τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου γενόμενοί τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες οὐ ῥᾳδίως πανοικεσίᾳ τὰς μεταναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνειληφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά· ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια δίαιτάν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος.

Thus the Athenians for a long time shared in the autonomous lifestyle on the land, and since because of this ethos even after they had been united most of the ancient and later [generations] were born and dwelt in the countryside up to the time of this war, they could reconcile themselves only with difficulty to migrating with their whole households, especially as they had just now recovered their establishments after the Persian Wars. And they were distressed and took it hard, since they were leaving the homes and ancestral temples which had been theirs throughout time as a result of governance in the ancient way. And each person was both in the process of overthrowing his inherited way of life and also leaving behind nothing other than his own city. (2.16.1–2)[66]

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[64] Seen in the context of the *History* as a whole, this passage and these examples seem somewhat exceptional. Since no study is available, I suggest that Thucydides is the usual preserver of memory in the *History*, and that historical agents more frequently forget or wish to forget (cf. his accusations at 1.20.1 and 6.54.1). For instance, Thucydides preserves the inscription the Athenians erased from the tyrant's altar (6.54.7) or the Spartans erased from Pausanias' tripod (1.132.3), and he also thwarts the Spartans' efforts to erase Plataea (3.68). Some memories are lost forever, however, as when *stelai* disappear into Athens' wall (1.93.2).

[65] Cf. Chapter 6.

[66] On the difficulties of translating this passage, see Pearson (1964) and Rusten (1989) ad loc.

The simultaneous freedom and cultural support offered by Attic life had created steadfast habits and deep attachments among the people. This has created a πολιτεῖα founded on a basis of ancient habits. In its emphasis on tradition, family, and agriculture, this constitution contrasts to the system of governance Pericles describes in the Funeral Oration (2.37).

An important element of this contrast is Thucydides' emphasis on the agricultural basis of life. Our examination of the Archaeology brought out Thucydides' views on the important effect of the natural environment for the development of human societies. Poor land encouraged cooperation and the development of politics, especially in Attica. Rich land caused competitive warfare, and therefore poverty (1.2–6). Nature's beneficent role in Attica is also evident in the passage we are examining. The life "in the fields" offers human beings a consistent and necessary basis for existence, and the generational habitation of the place also offers something more, namely a setting in which individuals can be independent of the aggressive πλεονεξία that befalls those who are without those stable familial and cultural achievements that come to seem "most important" (2.15.5) when private life is able to develop (cf. 1.6.4). The stages of this private life were marked with simple ceremonies and natural (not golden and glorious) materials: for example, water (2.15.5, for marriage), the wooden houses, land, and suburban temples of the Athenian landscape, cypress wood boxes (2.34.3, for death in battle). Like the Plataean story, in which the agrarian weapons of the victors contrasted to Pericles' emphasis on money and naval power, both Thucydides' description of Attica (2.14–17) and the so-called *patrios nomos* chapter (2.34) deploy signs that oppose Periclean materialism.[67]

By contrast, in his first speech, Pericles treated the supposed agricultural ways of the Spartans as a systemic source of weakness and argued that Attica was property Athens could replace with land wrested from the allies; indeed, he suggested that the Athenians should be willing to destroy it even without this compensation, in order to show the Spartans that they were unwilling to sacrifice any part of their overseas holdings (1.143.5). In the same sentence, Pericles had reimagined Athens as an island: a naval state, disburdened of the disadvantage Attica's vulnerability to Spartan attack continuously posed, as if Attica were a pure disadvantage.

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[67] On the *patrios nomos* chapter, cf. also note 18 in Chapter 6.

In Thucydidean context, Pericles' views emerge as antihistorical and unrealistic. Pericles' requirement that the Athenians imagine themselves as something physically impossible (as an island, when they are not; as rulers of the sea, when this cannot happen) separates the foundations of his policy from the cultural foundations that Athens had actually achieved. Thucydides' presentation, characterized by precision and grounded in history, contrasts sharply to the exaggerations of Athenian imperial greatness that will become so prominent in Pericles' last two speeches. Furthermore, Thucydides' descriptions of Attica defend the evaluations of the Attic farmers. They perceive their own history in Attica correctly, and are mourning the loss of consciously possessed cultural goods.[68] By contrast to Pericles' dismissive contempt, Thucydides treats the end of the continuous culture of Attica as a serious political event, worthy of detailed historical explanation because it is the story of an important consequence of the war: the loss of a culture that cannot be bought for any price. Thucydides' recognition of the political significance of private attachments is as un-Periclean as his refusal to make wealth the standard of historical importance.[69]

A long process of civilization has now ended. Upon entering the city, the Attic citizens become a homeless rabble, and the close associations they have lost are in no way replaced. Most find no "refuge," although some are preserved by family or friends (2.17.1).[70] They settle in the empty places of the city and in "all the temples and shrines, except for the Acropolis and the temple of Demeter, and whatever other building was securely locked" (2.17.1). Pericles has just explained how much valuable property each temple contains. The immigrants' exclusion from the main sanctuaries was perhaps necessary, but was also a sign that the property and money in these temples took precedence over the people's pressing needs.

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[68] Cf. Sicking (1995) 56.

[69] It also shows that Thucydides could see the other side of the Athenian people, whom he frequently condemns.

[70] Here, it seems just to remark that Thucydides was fully aware that such immigrations could be and were being organized more capably. Cf. 1.58.2, where Perdiccas, King of Macedon, resettles the Chalcideans, bringing them all together to "one large city," namely Olynthus. Thucydides' depictions of the Athenians' ability to organize common projects (cf. e.g. 2.56.1–2) leaves no doubt that arrangements could have been made, had these been a priority, especially since the evacuation was long foreseen. The political will to organize properly the influx from the country into the town seems to have been lacking, and Thucydides will describe the slumlike conditions in which the Attic immigrants were living in vivid colors at 2.52. Cf. the argument of Chapter 6.

Finding nowhere else to go, the immigrants also settle in the accursed Pelargikon. They have exchanged their ancestral temples for places actually accursed, then, and Thucydides confirms that the prophecy foresaw an ill future for Athens if such an occupation became necessary (2.17.2).[71] The excess population disperses toward the vast walls Thucydides described at 2.13.7. They find shelter in the towers of the walls, "or as each one was able." But the circuit wall cannot contain them. Finally, they settle outside, in the area between the great walls and in the Peiraeus, so that at the end of the passage, as we turn our attention to the approaching Spartans, we leave the Themistoclean walls burgeoning with Periclean money and displaced farmers – a complicated, unpredictable combination.

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[71] 2.17.2: "And it seems to me the prophecy happened in the opposite way than they expected. For the disasters did not happen to the city on account of the illegal occupation, but rather [the oracle refers to] the necessity of occupation because of the war. Although the oracle does not name the war, it looks forward to the fact that it would never be for a good reason if this area were occupied."

6

Thucydides and Pericles' Final Speeches

For both Herodotus and Thucydides, acmes produced by men arise, exert force, and self-destruct. Both historians also show that nature exerts force that overwhelms human powers, and their account of natural facts and events serves to put men's ambitions in the context of the necessary and the possible. In Thucydides' account of the meeting of Athens and the plague, a man-made acme of wealth and population confronted a natural acme. As was inevitable, the force of the natural acme prevailed.

The following chapter will conclude the exposition of Pericles' speeches in narrative context by comparing the simultaneously idealized and evasive presentation of Athenian imperial rule in Pericles' last two speeches with Thucydides' inexorably precise descriptions of the war and the plague. Once again, the argument will not offer a comprehensive analysis of the speeches, but will highlight the differences between Pericles and Thucydides. It will conclude with a discussion of Thucydides' praise of Pericles in chapter 65 of book two. If Thucydides displays Pericles' failings to this extent, how can he praise him so highly?

Pericles and Thucydides on the Reality of the Athenian Empire

Besides representing the Athenian empire as a single entity, subordinate to Athens, Pericles frequently depicts Athens as ruling the sea, or the earth and the sea. His imagery contrasts sharply with Thucydides' description of Athens' imperial existence, which discusses collecting money and putting down particular revolts.[1] Moreover, this language

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[1] Cf. 1.96–99, discussed in Chapter 3.

also contrasts to Thucydides' portrait of Pericles' experience and personality, since Thucydides does not attribute to Pericles a relationship to the natural world. Although he characterizes some of the smartest people in the *History* (including, for instance, Themistocles) by describing their ability to assess natural surroundings accurately, Pericles is not among them.[2]

Instead, Thucydides emphasizes Pericles' accurate perception of Athens' material resources. As we have seen, in the speeches at 1.140–144 and at 2.13 Pericles explains Athens' resources for the war at length. The accuracy of Pericles' knowledge of these resources is then confirmed by the narrator at 2.13.9, by the views of the *demos* recorded at 2.65.5, and again by the narrator at 2.65.13.[3] I suggest that Thucydides' repeated announcements of the accuracy of Pericles' assessment of Athenian resources have received too little consideration in the scholarship. Thucydides emphatically associates Pericles with an accurate knowledge of Athens' acme, at the same time as repeatedly demonstrating that his speeches exaggerated the power and meaning of those very resources. Pericles argued that Athens controls land, sea, and time. As Thucydides shows in many places (we might think, for instance, of the apparently inexplicably lengthy coda to his account of the Battle of Sybota), this control is impossible for human beings. Thucydides' contrast between Pericles' close practical knowledge of Athens' resources and the impossible aims to which he argued Athenians should devote these resources displays the extent to which the desire for glory was ruling Pericles' political program.

Thucydides has therefore endowed Pericles' speeches with impressive, even unforgettable, statements that reveal his deeper motivations. He is careful to mold his narratorial voice in an opposing way. Thucydidean *akribeia* contrasts to Pericles' idealizing language, and helps to mark the substantive differences between the narrator Thucydides and his Pericles. We have observed this contrast throughout our analysis. Thucydides' narrative technique favors vivid description over narratorial explanation and is distinguished by an astonishing degree of

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[2] For example, Themistocles sees the natural advantages of Athens' harbors (1.93.3), Demosthenes sees the advantages of the site at Pylos (4.3.2, cf. 4.29.3–4), and Phormio assesses sea conditions correctly (2.84.2). For a more mysterious example, cf. Alcmeon at 2.102.6. Parties who can assess their environment also include the Plataeans (2.3.4, cf. 3.20.3–4, 3.22.1), discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5.

[3] For the argument that the view of Pericles recorded at 2.65.5 is that of the *demos*, see the final section of this chapter.

coherence. To say the same thing in another way, Thucydides supports narratorial reticence with a carefully ordered and suggestive presentation of the events and physical details of each story; in order to understand the story, Thucydides' reader must construct hypotheses about meanings and causes from these details. The very process of constructing meaning from the narrative in this laborious way creates our trust in the narrator, who withstands a thousand tests as we read each narrative.[4] By contrast, Thucydides' speakers, Pericles included, have not withstood these tests, but, as compared with our knowledge of their situation, wrung from close examinations of Thucydides' descriptions, they have displayed moments of incoherence, ignorance, exaggeration, or disingenuousness. Comparison of the speeches to the narrative has been a key interpretive tool of this study.

This study has in particular endeavored to show that Thucydides' narratives lead the reader to conclusions opposed to the idealization of warfare, and perhaps of naval warfare in particular. Thucydides' narrative of the Battle of Sybota showed that it was a waste of lives in which men's hatred and greed dissolve every element of human order and their corpses return to nature and the streams of Acheron. At Potideia, the Athenian navy is an expensive tool, consuming Athens' resources for a questionable return. The ambitions that caused these incidents, and the hatred and fear they create, builds inexorably until finally a small band of Thebans impels the great Athenian navy and the great Spartan infantry into a war of attrition that will last twenty-seven years and cause the greatest suffering known to the Greeks (1.23.1–5).

Nothing in this plot would tend to idealize warfare, war materials, or to show that warfare leads to secure power. Thucydides' treatment of the first years of the Peloponnesian War is no different. As Thucydides tells us immediately upon the conclusion of Pericles' Funeral Oration, the plague fell upon the Athenians in the second year of the war. He describes the terrors of the plague in the chapters preceding Pericles' final speech, and then relates that Pericles led a very large Athenian and allied expedition around the Peloponnesus, which wasted land in several places on the Peloponnesian coast, although it captured and sacked only one small town (2.56.6).[5] This expedition was a response to the Spartan invasion of

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[4] On Thucydides' simultaneous artistic coherence and historical authority, cf. the introduction to Dewald (2005) 1–22.

[5] The expedition was comprised of 150 Athenian and allied ships. Cf. also Thucydides' foreboding references to the ineffective expeditions of this summer at 6.31.2: in terms

Attica in that year. Before it set out, the similarly destructive and unsuc-
cessful Spartans had stayed in Attica for forty days, wasting all of Attica
(2.57.2). Thucydides next relates that the Athenian general Hagnon, who
has lost fifteen hundred of his four thousand troops from the plague, and
in fact spread the infection to previously healthy parts of the Athenian
forces, had just returned from Potideia (it is now two years since the orig-
inal revolt of this small ally) having failed to lift the siege (2.58).

Without further comment, therefore, Thucydides catalogues the dam-
age each combatant is causing, and reminds us of the Potideians' so-far
successful resistance. The events of the war had already overwhelmed
the Athenians, who were urging Pericles to come to an agreement with
the Spartans and had in fact sent ambassadors to Sparta independently
of Pericles. These, however, had also failed (2.59.2). Coming as they
do, directly on the heels of Thucydides' description of the horrors of
the plague, the chapters of the narrative that introduce Pericles' final
speech are as discouraging as possible that warfare is grand.[6]

Once he begins to speak, Pericles does not evade mention of Athens'
civic disasters. He begins and ends his final speech with appeals to the
Athenians to rededicate themselves to the common interest and to
accept suffering on behalf of Athens and the war (2.60–61, 2.64.2–6).
He also reaffirms his personal and unchanging commitment to the war
and to Athenian greatness (2.61.2). Finally, he reminds his audience that
things could be worse, speaking more frankly than previously of the
dangers that will follow if Athens does not both prosecute and also win
the war (2.63.2–3).

However, neither the situation depicted in Thucydides' narrative
explanations nor his own warnings of Athens' potential vulnerability to
allied revenge prevent him from presenting Athens' power as potentially
endless and already eternally famous. We will initially examine one key
passage. In a mid-speech description that claims Athens' rule of the
allies as secure, and sees Athens' rule extending from this basis to an
endless realm, Pericles founds Athenian power on a vision of the capaci-
ties of the Athenian navy to dominate not only the allies, but nature, the
Persians, and any other enemy that may appear:

> οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνων ἄρχειν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν
> τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς

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of the armaments sent out, they were as large as the equally ineffective initial contin-
gent sent on the Sicilian expedition.

[6] On Hagnon's expedition as setting the context for Pericles' speech at 2.60–64, cf.
Bloedow (2000) 298. On the plague, see the subsequent sections of this chapter.

κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἢν ἐπὶ πλέον βουληθῆτε·
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας
ὑμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει.

For you [Athenians] believe that you rule only the allies. But I argue that of
the two visibly useful parts of the world, namely earth and sea,[7] you are the
absolute masters of all of the latter, both to the extent that you now possess
it and also to whatever extent you wish, since no one, neither the King nor
any other people of those presently existing will hinder you from sailing
with your present naval resources. (2.62.2)

Athens rules the empire and the Athenian navy is invincible, Pericles
argues, by any human force; furthermore, no one can hinder the
Athenians from making themselves masters of as much of the sea as
they wish: the sea, an element of the world, is a possession of their will.[8]
Like gods, the Athenians will decide their wishes (these will include pos-
sessing more of the world) and fulfill them, such is the power of Athens'
navy to elevate mortal men. Pericles' claims are un-Thucydidean, and
ought to have been un-Periclean: as we mentioned, Thucydides repeat-
edly shows that Pericles knew both Athens' vulnerabilities, and also the
real extent of Athens' resources, down to the last penny.

In a striking article of 2000, Bloedow argues that Thucydides shows
us two Pericles: one who has learned carefully prudent policy through
Athenian failures of the past, and another who is an ideological impe-
rialist (308).[9] Taking into account Pericles' cautious injunctions against

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[7] Note the lack of the article in the Greek. The reference is not to any particular earth
and sea, but to earth and sea as a conceptual entirety.

[8] The argument about the exact character of Pericles' references to nature in this pas-
sage is nearly as old as the scholarship on Thucydides: cf. Poppo, ad loc.: "I do not
think that two elements are being opposed to the other two with these words (for who
will pay attention to the scholiast's remark: 'for fire and air are not such as to be obvi-
ously useful, for they are common to all?'), but I think that the world is being divided
into land and water (cf. the share of the sea, 8.46.3), of which both are useful to man."
(Non putamus his verbis duo elementa duobus reliquis contraria poni (quis enim veram
existimaverit scholastiae adnotationem (τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ οὐ τοσοῦτον εἰσιν ἐς
χρῆσιν φανερὰ· κοινὰ γὰρ πᾶσι;) sed orbem terrarum in continentem et aquam (τὸ τῆς
θαλάσσης μέρος 8.46.3) discerni, quarum utraque hominibus usui sit.) Poppo's view
is sensible. For instance, the Persian King took earth and water from places declaring
their subjection (cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.32), and Pericles' words in fact remind us too much of
this. Nevertheless, I am not sure Poppo is entirely justified in dismissing the scholiast's
instinct (cf. Foster 2009). Cf. also Edmunds (1975a) 42, who broaches a Heideggerian
reading: "The Athenian *techne* of sailing … converts the sea to usefulness."

[9] On the division in Pericles' character, cf. also Orwin (1994) 28: "In principle or in
speech, the empire is universal (2.41.4, 2.43.1–3); in practice Pericles promotes a strat-
egy of temporary restraint (1.144.1; 2.65.6–7). Yet in urging the Athenians to stick
by this strategy, he does not refrain from reminding them that their dominion is

expanding the empire during the war he argues that "one has … to distinguish between Pericles the radical imperialist and Pericles the careful conservative" (307). He argues that both cannot be historical: "We have therefore to confront the question, as reluctant as one might be to do so, whether Thucydides himself may have erred" (308). My argument is that Thucydides displays both elements of Pericles' character. Thucydides shows Pericles' superior skills, intelligence, and political capacities, and also that these did not secure him against delusions of power. For Thucydides, Pericles' character was not entirely coherent, but characterized by contradictions and flaws, as well as virtues. The conflict between rhetoric such as we see in this passage, and the prudent advice or accurate assessments Pericles also provides, is not an error, but rather part of Thucydides' portrait of Pericles.

Pericles' rhetoric of ruling the sea was extremely influential after his death: as the story of the expedition to Sicily demonstrates, it was far more influential than his advice not to expand the empire during the war. How pervasive was rhetoric throughout his speeches? Pericles had introduced his remarks at 2.62.2 with the statement that he was telling the Athenians something they had not thought of before, and that he would not be advertising this boastful thought at all if they were not so stricken down by the plague (2.62.1). Despite this claim, his language is familiar.[10] Pericles had configured Athens' "control of the sea" in the first speech: μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν (For the rule of the sea is a great thing. For if we were islanders, who would be harder to capture? 1.143.5) and in the Funeral Oration, he brought this theme to a rhetorical climax: ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες (…but compelling the whole sea and earth to be accessible to our daring, and at the same time founding ageless monuments of good and evil 2.41.4). In his previous speeches, therefore, Pericles had already employed the language of ruling the sea to create an imaginary empire that extended far beyond the physical reality of Athenian rule over the islands and coasts of the Aegean.[11] Pericles' claims for the significance

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potentially as boundless as the sea (2.62). His poetic vision is at some odds with his prosaic policy."

[10] Cf. Rusten (1989) and *CT*, ad loc., Connor (1984) 70, Flashar (1989) 465–466.

[11] For an Herodotean comment on Pericles' imagery and its consequences for Athens, cf. Artabanus' speech at Hdt. 7.49. He warns Xerxes that his real enemies are the land

of the Athenian navy are similar to the Corcyraeans' exaggeration of the power of their navy (cf. 1.33.2), and border on suggesting its divinity: through its power, Athens dominates the endless elements of the world (1.143.5, 2.41.4, 2.43.3, 2.62.2), and the glory of her achievements is eternal (2.43.2, 2.64.3, 2.64.5).

Pericles' impious and dramatic rhetoric therefore challenges both Poseidon and Athena for their kingdoms.[12] As in the previous speeches, the endless realm Pericles envisions is consistently contrasted with the uselessness of Attica. The mental image of Athens as an island (1.143.5) had freed Athens from Attica's burdensome existence. The proclamation of Athens' power over the sea in the final speech is again combined with a renewed appeal to abandon any attachment to Attic possessions (I repeat the end of 2.62.2):

> ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν οἰκιῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς χρείαν, ὧν μεγάλων νομίζετε ἐστερῆσθαι, αὕτη ἡ δύναμις φαίνεται· οὐδ᾽ εἰκὸς χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου πρὸς ταύτην νομίσαντας ὀλιγωρῆσαι…

> So that this power [i.e. the mastery over sea and land] is not measured by comparison to the usefulness of the houses and land you so greatly mourn. For it is not reasonable to be upset about these things rather than to take them lightly, believing them the kitchen garden and ornament of wealth compared with this [power]… (2.62.2–3)

In Pericles' argument, land possessed by the Athenians overseas reflects Athenian greatness, but the possession of Attica, which is property with a trivial monetary and sentimental value, does not. The Attic possessions to which the people are so attached are merely decorations of Athenian greatness, an ornamental garden of wealth, not its essence.[13] Athenians should understand that if they preserve their freedom, these properties will easily (ῥᾳδίως) be reclaimed, but that those who must obey others usually lose what they previously possessed (2.62.3).[14]

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and the sea, i.e. famine and the sea's unpredictably destructive power over Xerxes' fleet. Xerxes answers that only the courageous progress in power (Hdt. 7.50, especially 7.50.3), an equation of acquisitive warfare with courage, like the one supplied by Pericles at 2.64.3. Cf. Pelling (1991) 134–139.

[12] Pericles' fearless treatment of the statue of Athena (2.13.5) is more easily explicable in light of this sense of superiority to the gods.

[13] Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 116: "homes and land have no relevance to Athens' naval *dunamis*, and therefore, individual wealth is essentially a useless trifle."

[14] To wander outside of the text for a split second, Pericles' reduction of Attica to property is perhaps a consequence of Athens' policy of making cleruchies of the land of

As Thucydides shows, Attica, which had just previously to the war finally recovered from the Persian depredations (2.16.1), will not easily be regained, but repeatedly wasted and ultimately occupied, to the tremendous harm of the Athenians (cf. 7.27–28). He also shows that the Athenians' attachment to Attica was an important basis of Athenian stability, not to mention his vivid demonstrations that Athens does not securely control even individual small allies (Plataea, Potideia) much less the earth and sea. By contrast, in his effort to convince the Athenians to continue to fight the war, Pericles rejects Athens' actual natural surroundings in Attica and employs the endless and symbolic elements of nature to create, in speech, a glorious, but impossible, even unreal, naval empire for Athens. Pericles is the poet of the empire, as he himself partly admits (cf. ὕμνησα at 2.42.2), and therefore "adorns things to make them seem greater" just as Thucydides says poets will do (1.10.3, 1.21.1).[15]

As we shall discuss, in the plague narrative, Thucydides opposes both the claim that Athens dominates nature as well as the exaggerations that support this claim. Before examining the plague narrative, this analysis will focus on the strategic suppressions and generalizations that support Pericles' idealization of Athens' imperial project.

Unnameable Acquisitions

Pericles' rhetorical enlargements of the power of the Athenian navy and concomitant disqualifications of Attic and Spartan agriculture are important foundations of his argument for Athenian imperialism. What is surprising is that this clear binary arrangement is not completed with equally vivid praises of the specific acquisitions of the Athenian navy, since these are the profit of empire. However, with one exception that I can find, in the last two speeches Pericles does not specify the acquisitions that comprise Athens' empire, be they territories, money, or war materials. Moreover, despite Pericles' consistent praise of acquisitive warfare as the source of imperial glory, the reader will search these speeches in vain for a particular story of warfare successfully prosecuted. By rigorous contrast

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other Greek cities; to him, all agricultural land, no matter where it was, had come to seem interchangeable. If this is the case, this is another ill effect of imperial circumstances upon Pericles' mind. On Pericles and the cleruchies, cf. Vogt (OCRST) 226.

[15] Pericles' rhetorical devices are also poetic: e.g. metaphors (ornamental garden), metonymy (rule of the sea), imagery (Athens as an island), superlatives, repetition of key themes (sometimes carefully disguised: cf. his claim at 2.62.1 that his explanation of Athens' rule of the sea will be new), and exaggeration, as I argue throughout.

to the speech at 2.13, in his latter speeches, Pericles signifies Athenian acquisitions with generalizing adjectives or with no word at all. Even his climactic and defiant statement at 2.64.3, that Athens "has acquired the greatest power up to this time … ruled the most Greeks … and resisted the greatest enemies" remains general: no specific example of successful conquest or defense is provided.

This rhetorical proportion, according to which acquisition is a main theme, but specific acquisitions are not mentioned, is familiar to us from the Corinthian speech at the first Spartan congress (1.68–71). In this speech, the Corinthians had emphasized Athens' acquisitive behavior, but in order to conceal their damning similarity to the Athenians they were criticizing, had as much as possible avoided mentioning exactly what the Athenians were taking from others.[16] One would think that pride in Athens' achievements would lead Pericles to exactly the opposite rhetorical strategy. Instead, however, Pericles passes in silence over every real event or possession. In the following paragraphs, we will engage with Pericles' avoidance of naming Athens' particular acquisitions and campaigns.

Successful imperial acquisition is established as the important standard for judging the generations of men at the beginning of the Funeral Oration.[17] According to Pericles, the generations further in the past were worthy of praise, since each successive generation preserved "the land" from conquest (2.36.1).[18] However, the generation of Pericles'

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[16] Cf. Chapter 3.

[17] Even beyond the wise remarks in Bosworth (2000), it is important to note the contrast between the immediate narrative context of the Funeral Oration and the speech itself. The *patrios nomos* chapter (2.34), like the plague narrative we will discuss, contrasts profoundly to both the meaning and the rhetoric of Pericles' Funeral Oration. The modernity and self-invented ways of the Athenians described in the Funeral Oration bear little resemblance to the traditional practices of the funeral ritual described in 2.34, and the careful Thucydidean *akribeia* with which the rite is described is foreign to Pericles' rhetorical enlargements. Just as he had emphasized the persistence of memory in 2.14–17, Thucydides emphasizes the persistence of this burial rite (2.34.5, 2.34.7). Two other elements of the *patrios nomos* chapter are relevant to our discussion: first, the reference to the dead from the Battle of Marathon, which is incompatible with Pericles' hostility to Athenian hoplite culture (the Athenians reward their bravery with a grave on the spot where they fell; contrast Pericles' dismissal of physical tombs at 2.43.2–3), and Thucydides' mention that regular Athenian war dead are buried in "the most beautiful suburb of Athens" (2.34.5). It is worth remarking upon this judgment, which seems to reflect the narrator's opinion (cf. *CT* ad loc.). If Thucydides were ever to expose such an opinion about war materials, we could rest in the confidence of his emotional attachment to such objects.

[18] The Greek is τὴν χώραν. The designation is already avoidance of naming, familiar from previous speeches. Pericles will not name Attica (in all his speeches he names

fathers is worthy of more praise. "For having acquired (κτησάμενοι), in addition to what they inherited, as much empire as we possess, they left it – not without labor – to us who live now" (2.36.2). Most praiseworthy of all is the present generation, which consolidated Athens' hold over the empire and made Athens self-sufficient:

> τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἵδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηυξήσαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη, ἢ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω· ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ' οἵας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον…

> But we ourselves who are now alive and still approximately middle-aged brought the empire to greater growth, and we have equipped the city for the greatest independence for both war and peace in every regard. And the deeds of war, by which each thing was acquired, if either we ourselves or our fathers bravely warded off a barbarian or Greek enemy when they were attacking, since I do not wish to tell long stories to an audience that already knows these things, I will let them go [i.e. unmentioned]. But from what sort of practices we came to these things, and from what constitution and habits [the city] became great, having shown these, I will proceed to praise these [dead cavalrymen]… (2.36.3–4)

In Pericles' view, the culminating achievement of Athens' greatest generation was to make Athens self-sufficient through the defensive warfare that enlarged the empire to its present size. Proclaiming his consideration for the audience (he does not wish to bore the Athenians with long stories about familiar events), Pericles excuses himself from mentioning specific achievements or acquisitions. Instead, he praises his own generation for acquiring to a greater extent, or simply, for acquiring "more" than the previous generation.[19] Without naming any particular victory or territory gained, Pericles thus sets up imperial acquisition as the foundation of Athenian success, and announces that he will set

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    Attica only once, at 1.143.4), and thus imply that the preservation of Attica was important.

[19] Note the initial position of τὰ πλείω. On the dangerous long-term effect of such praise of conquering and acquiring "more," cf. e.g. Macleod (1983) 143 "It was overconfidence … which led the Athenians to 'want more' (4.17.4, 21.2, 41.4, 65.4) and reject the Spartans' appeal for a peace [after Pylos]. The same spirit of pride and greed is one motive for the Sicilian expedition (6.11.5, 24.3–4 and 17–18)." Cf. Bloedow (2000) 300 and 308, Vogt (2009) 237.

Athens' habits, constitution, and ways in the context of an explanation of their usefulness for acquiring the things that made Athens great.[20]

What exactly Athens acquired that brought her to greatness remains opaque, therefore, and the rhetoric of our passage is further complicated by Pericles' claim that the Athenians are said to bring Athens to growth by "warding off" (or "taking vengeance on") her enemies.[21] In other words, Pericles claims the moral high ground of the defender simultaneously with the achievement of acquisition.

Moreover, Pericles assimilates the defeat of Greek and barbarian enemies. In his presentation, it does not matter whether Greek or barbarian attacks were warded off: as long as Athens' power was advanced by the particular action, it was praiseworthy. Pericles ignores the distinction that founds the Spartan war effort, the aim of which was to liberate Greek cities from Athenian oppression (cf. e.g. 1.86.5, 1.139.3, 2.8.4; Corinthians at 1.124.3–4). Instead, he characterizes any power that stands in the way of Athenian expansion as an offender who is legitimately warred down.[22] Pericles' claim that Athens' acquisitive behavior is defensive therefore conveniently negates arguments that Athens' defeated opponents might have legitimate claims to their property. Since all enemies are equally offenders, all possessions resulting from Athenian victories can be claimed by the empire.

An initial motivation for Pericles' strategy of leaving particular conquests unnamed emerges from this fact: by generalizing all acquisitions into the same unnamed pool of "the acquired," Pericles claims it all equally for Athens, regardless of its origin. Other important motivations for suppressing references to particular acquisitions also exist, however, and become more evident if one analyzes Pericles' unique reference to the realities of Athenian warfare. Farther on in the Funeral Oration, Pericles compares Athens to Sparta, and in the course of his remarks,

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[20] Generalizing language in the Funeral Oration referring to whatever the Athenians have acquired: 2.36.3–4 τὰ δὲ πλείω, τοῖς πᾶσι, ἕκαστα, ἐπ' αὐτά, μεγάλα, 2.43.1 αὐτά, 2.63.1–2 ὧν. Cf. in the final speech 2.64.4: εἰ δὲ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει; the acquisitions in question are marked with aposiopesis. (This strategy is not entirely new to the latter speeches. Note for instance the generalizing ἃ κεκτήμεθα at 1.141.1.) On μεγάλα, which particularly as a plural is very general and means both large and great (cf. the uses of Latin *magnus*), cf. LSJ ad verbum.

[21] For the ambiguous meaning of ἀμύνομαι, see again LSJ ad verbum.

[22] This attitude was established in Pericles' first speech at 1.140ff, in which Pericles treated all Spartan complaints equally as attacks on Athens' claim to hold "that which we have acquired" without fear (1.141.1). Cf. the Persian attitude to Greek resistance as an intentional insult to the King's authority, as expressed, for instance, at Hdt. 7.5.2 or 7.8β3.

once indicates what sorts of things Athens acquires from her enemies. By contrast to his claims at the beginning of the speech, the warfare Pericles describes is not defensive, and the acquisitions it gains are not glorious:

τεκμήριον δέ· οὔτε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καθ᾽ ἑαυτούς, μεθ᾽ ἁπάντων δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στρατεύουσι, τήν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυνομένους μαχόμενοι τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν. ἀθρόᾳ τε τῇ δυνάμει ἡμῶν οὐδείς πω πολέμιος ἐνέτυχε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τε ἅμα ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίπεμψιν· ἢν δέ που μορίῳ τινὶ προσμείξωσι, κρατήσαντές τέ τινας ἡμῶν πάντας αὐχοῦσιν ἀπεῶσθαι καὶ νικηθέντες ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἡσσῆσθαι.

And there is proof: The Spartans do not attack our land by themselves, but together with all [their allies], whereas when we alone attack our neighbor's land we usually conquer without difficulty, although we are fighting in someone else's land against people defending their own domestic goods. And no enemy ever met with our consolidated power, since we attend to the navy and send out land forces both frequently and simultaneously. And whenever they encounter some part [of our forces], if they win, they boast that they have pushed back all of us, and if they lose [they boast] that they were worsted by all. (2.39.2–3)

Pericles is boasting that Athens' attacks on her neighbors, whoever they may be, are often easily successful, although Athens can fight each campaign with only part of her forces, and is fighting men who are mobilized by the necessity to defend their home resources.[23] He takes for granted that Athens will undertake such attacks: his point is that Athens alone and fragmented is more successful than Sparta together with her allies.[24]

This passage is particularly interesting for our argument, since Pericles does describe Athens' activity and also names the resources

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[23] This description seems rather deceptive. Pericles' campaigns to Samos (1.115–117) and Epidauros (2.56.1–2) gathered the massive forces of the empire against much smaller parties; the attack on Megara (2.31) led out Athens' full infantry. The latter two campaigns were fruitless of any result but destruction. On the historians' rigorous punishment of parties who claim that warfare will be easy, cf. note 4 in Chapter 5.

[24] Not a fair comparison, incidentally, since when Sparta attacks Athens, she attacks a huge power, and when Athens attacks her neighbors, she attacks smaller powers. (And cf. note 23.) In addition, moral distinctions must once again give way: Pericles equalizes Sparta's punitive attacks on Attica with Athens' imperial adventures as if they had the same meaning, namely the meaning derived from winning or losing. The different reasons for attacking (the Spartans are not attempting to acquire Attica in order to exploit the land and people for revenue) disappear. We may notice also the apparent contradiction between these passages and Pericles' claims for Athenian generosity at 2.40.4–5. Cf. Macleod (1983) 150 and Orwin (1994) 27.

Athens takes from the defeated. His description of Athens' capture of their neighbors' οἰκεῖα (domestic properties) echoes Thucydides' description of piratical behavior in the Archaeology:

> …ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσθαι ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο…

> …when they began to travel amongst one another more commonly in boats they turned to piracy. The most powerful men led them, both for the sake of their own profit and also for the sustenance of the weak, and falling on cities that were unwalled and inhabited in groups of villages they plundered them and got most of their living from this source … (1.5.1)[25]

Although Athens' resources are far larger and better developed than those of the pirates, Athens falls upon weaker states for the sake of profit, and gets vital resources from this source, as Pericles himself has argued (1.143.5, 2.13.2). Pericles' description of Greek-on-Greek warfare also reminds us of Thucydides' insistence on the reciprocity of piracy between the pirates themselves (cf. 1.7). Himself one of the powerful men who leads such attacks, Pericles has the luxury of providing for the sustenance of the strong rather than the weak. His attitude toward the suffering of the defeated is correspondingly arrogant. His reference to the potential loss of home resources that motivates the resistance of the attacked serves only to prove Athens' superiority: in Pericles' (over-confident) presentation, even with only part of their forces, the Athenians easily defeat people who are obviously going to put up a desperate defense. For Pericles, their situation merits no further attention than is necessary to stress the extent to which Athens can ignore such responses.[26]

The fact is, however, that taking personal property from weaker peoples is not glorious. Pericles' moment of frankness in this passage reveals why he cannot generally be so frank. His characterizations of the empire as eternal and glorious rather than simply rapacious partly rely on suppressing the mention of the specific actions that win the empire most of the time. His evasions disguise the piratical nature of Athens' imperial enterprise, while his exaggerations clothe the empire with a

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[25] This passage is discussed in Chapter 1.

[26] Pericles here projects, on behalf of the city as a whole, an attitude toward the attachments of others that is similar to the attitude he displays toward the Athenians' attachments to Attica. Cf., in Thucydides' account, the Attic οἰκεῖα at 2.14.1 and 2.16.1.

glory that justifies turning the energy and lives of the citizens toward acquisition.[27]

Pericles is a brilliant speaker, and his generalizing mode adopts a variety of impressive registers. For instance, a strategy of sublime abstraction, which lifts Pericles above and away from such sordid details, is displayed in the statement at 2.43.1 that Athenians should become lovers of their city.[28] Here, Pericles gestures toward the city, but mentions nothing concrete, saying to the Athenians "that men who were daring and who recognized the necessary and avoided shame in their deeds acquired these things (αὐτά)," but never specifying exactly what things the Athenians should look at and love:

> …ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ πείρᾳ του σφαλεῖεν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας ἀρετῆς ἀξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτῇ προϊέμενοι.

> …rather, [you] should be daily spectators of the actual power of the city and become her lovers, and when the city seems to you great, [you should] ponder that men who were daring, who recognized the necessary, and practiced honour in their deeds acquired these things (αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο). And even if she should fail of some endeavor, not even then did they think it right to rob the city of their virtue, but brought it forward as the noblest love gift for her. (2.43.1)

Pericles' recommendation that the citizen should "be a spectator of the actual power of the city" asks him to look at something immaterial and invisible. On the other hand, the acquisitions of daring Athenians are material and can be perceived. But these are unnamed, and it is up to us to imagine what Pericles might be referring to (and perhaps gesturing at). Whatever they are, the visible acquisitions Pericles does not name have the capacity to symbolize the invisible power of the city to which Pericles asks his listeners to devote their love, and toward the end of the sentence, their lives.[29] In this sentence, Thucydides shows

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[27] Cf. Balot (2001) 175: "If we accept Thucydides' own view that the Athenian empire was driven by the impulse of greed within the Athenian national soul, then we should see Pericles as brilliantly reimagining that characteristic as, now, no longer greed, but glory."

[28] Cf. Hussey (1985) 125.

[29] Pericles' description of death for the city as an ἔρανον (love gift) is a famous transference of private feelings to the public realm, and simultaneously an astonishing euphemism. Cf. Connor (1984) 69.

Pericles deploying a strategy of intense abstraction that allows him to reference concepts of the deepest dedication without getting entangled in any particulars.[30]

Thus Pericles has practical reasons for avoiding references to particulars, even in his most moving passages; another aim of his rhetoric is to construct a vision of eternal glory. In the sentences of the Funeral Oration that follow directly upon the passage we just reviewed, the immaterial memory of Athenian war dead is praised as more important for glory than their physical tombs:

> κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μὴ προσηκούσῃ ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ' ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται.

> For having given their lives for the common cause, individually they received ageless praise and the most conspicuous tomb, not so much that one in which they lie, but rather the one in which their glory is deposited, ever-remembered at each chance opportunity for speech or action. For of famous men all the earth is the tomb,[31] and not only the writing on steles gives a sign of this in their own land, but rather even in a land that does not belong to them, the unwritten memory of their resolve, more than their deed, lives in everyone. (2.43.2–3)

Pericles denies that the physical monument, "the tomb in which [the war dead] lie," has very much value. The immaterial memory of the dead cavalrymen's glory is the actually valuable memorial.[32] It stretches over "all the earth" and does not diminish with time (cf. "ageless praise"). That is to say, Athenian glory is exempt from natural limitations.[33] Physical writing on a tomb at home may indicate this

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[30] Pericles' treatment of Athens' temples as repositories of treasure and the statue of Athena as a standing resource in the speech recorded at 2.13 was materialistic, so that if Pericles had mentioned any specific building, including the Parthenon temple, or any object that was supposed to mean more than its monetary value, he might not have been able to redefine it successfully. Thus the speech in indirect discourse is not unconnected to the speeches in direct discourse, but rather imposes restrictions on Pericles' rhetoric here.

[31] A striking phrase, entirely devoid of definite articles in Greek.

[32] Notice, in the Greek, the emphatic placement of the negation in 2.43.2: μᾶλλον is placed in the first clause. Cf. the explanations of Rusten (1989) ad loc. The second, eternal "tomb" is a negation of the first, material one.

[33] Cf. Crane (1998) for an interesting analysis, opposed to the analysis offered here, of Pericles' "aggressive idealism" (315) in this passage.

glory, but is superseded by the anonymous and universal "unwritten memory" of Athenian resolve. We note that the deed itself has a lower status than the "resolve" (γνώμη) with which it is accomplished: no physical accomplishment, be it a deed, a stele, or a written memorial, is allowed to restrict, through its imperfect reality, Athens' eternal glory.

Thus individual things, deeds, or men are the rhetorical enemies of Periclean glory, just as the individual speaker Pericles characterized at the beginning of the Funeral Oration was the enemy of the fame of those praised: if the speaker spoke badly, he would endanger the fame of the dead (2.35.1). There was a great danger that particular materials (our οἰκεῖα, for instance) or particular deeds (Corcyra, Potideia, Megara) would not speak well enough of the empire to support its idealized image. The rule of the sea, by contrast, is great without reference to any person, event, time, or place.

Athenian Glory and Imperial Acquisition

In the previous section of the argument, we saw that Thucydides endows Pericles' latter speeches with a rhetorical style characterized on the one hand by absolute claims about Athenian rule and glory, and on the other hand by opaque generalizations about particular imperial acquisitions and the means by which they were acquired; the lists and assessments of Athens' war materials so prominent in the first speeches give way to claims of imperial glory undisturbed by the reality of particular calculations. Many other themes besides imperial glory are also broached in these speeches, especially in the Funeral Oration, and in the last section of this chapter, I shall attempt to do brief justice to the breadth of Pericles' conception of Athens. In this section, I shall, however, hew to the topic already begun, and argue that in the absence of particulars, in Pericles' speeches the acquisition of more becomes in itself the aim and guarantor of Athenian glory and self-sufficiency.

We have already seen several striking examples of Pericles' tendency to present the allies collectively as Athens' unified possession; perhaps the most striking instance so far was at 2.62.2. Pericles' description of this possession varies, but his claim to the empire does not, even in the most dramatic statements of Athens' vulnerability to Sparta and the allies:

> …μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἑνὸς μόνου, δουλείας ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε.

ἧς οὐδ᾽ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς
ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν
λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

…and do not believe that you are fighting about only one thing, freedom
or slavery, but rather about the loss of the empire and about the dangers
resulting from those things for which you are hated in the empire. It is
not possible for you to stand aside of it, in case someone who is afraid
right now is ready on account of his idleness to die in battle even for this.
For you hold it like a tyranny, which it seems unjust to take, but which it is
extremely dangerous to let go. (2.63.1–2)

Pericles has from the beginning identified concessions to Spartan
complaints and demands as "slavery" (cf. 1.141.1).[34] In this last speech,
he couples a renewed deployment of this argument with the suggestion
(also not new, cf. 1.143.5) that if Athens loses the war, she will lose the
empire and face the responses motivated by allied hatred.[35] Thus the
empire is a possession it is imperative to retain, even if the continuing
domination of the allies (notice the present tense of the verbs) seems
tyrannical. The passage is remarkable for the way it treats the empire
as a single entity, to be held or lost as a whole; this is a sharp contrast to
Thucydides' narrative of events.

Who would want to exchange tyranny over this entity for slavery to
general hatred? At 2.63.1–2, Pericles goes out of his way to ridicule men
who would die in battle in order to give up the empire. For Pericles'
imperial purposes (as opposed to his civic purposes), the pursuit
of justice makes no sense, since the tyrants and the slaves will simply
exchange places if Athens releases her allies.[36] Moreover, in the subse-
quent sentences, Pericles' brief suggestion that the empire might seem
unjust to someone is overwhelmed by the vision of the undying great-
ness of Athens' future reputation. Far better for Athens to retain the

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[34] The slavery to which Pericles here refers is the acceptance of restraint on Athenian
expansion. For the argument that this is the case, see Chapter 4.

[35] A position Strasburger OCRST 215 calls "logically inescapable … a city which has
made itself despised by using its strength oppressively can for that reason never retrace
its steps, since it must now fear not only for its power, but for its very existence." Cf.
Connor (1984) 69–70 who argues that the dangers faced by the Athenians because
of the empire become in this passage "an active power," against which the Athenians
must defend themselves.

[36] Justice was equally absent from his statement in the Funeral Oration that "we
[Athenians] have forced the whole earth and sea to be embarkable to our daring and
at the same time have established everywhere deathless monuments of good and evil"
(ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες
γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες 2.41.4).

empire, which compensates for every injustice, difficulty, and labor with its eternal glory:

> γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλεῖστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε κεκτημένην, ἧς ἐς ἀΐδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρός τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν.

> Know that [the city] has the greatest name among all men because of this: that she has not yielded to disasters and has spent the most lives and labor in war and has acquired the greatest power up to this time, a memory of which will forever be left behind for those who follow us, even if we should someday give way somewhat (for it is natural that all things also deteriorate). Also because being Greeks, we ruled the most Greeks and we endured the greatest wars against their collected power and also against individual enemies, and we passed our lives in the city that was most open to all and the greatest. (2.64.3)

The cause of Athens' glory is an intransigent pursuit of the empire that spares no cost and counts no consequence except the attainment of power. Pericles is explicit: more Athenians have died and labored in war than citizens of any other people. This greatest effort has acquired the greatest reward, since Athens possesses the greatest power among the Greeks. This power, in turn, will fade away, but the glory of having conquered other Greeks, and of having resisted attempts to recapture Athens' gains, and of all the while having maintained Athens as Athens: that this achievement will meet eternal remembrance is Pericles' great hope.[37]

Pericles' magnificent language is founded on simple physical proportions. It relies on the impressiveness of the largest possible size of whatever is named (e.g. the *greatest* name among *all* men; acquiring the *greatest* power; ruling the *most* Greeks, resisting the *greatest* enemies).[38] This reliance arises perhaps not only from a desire to be impressive and inspiring, but also because acquisition is at the center of Pericles' claims.

On this passage and its history of emendation, see Flashar (1989) 455 note 52. Unannounced emendations appear in Lamberton (1905) and Nagy (2005).

[37] Samons (2007) 298: "Pericles' ideals, his integrity, and his personal charisma, combined with his ability to abstract himself and other individual Athenians from their real political environment in order to focus on Athens' position in history, made Pericles both the greatest and the most dangerous leader Athens ever produced."

[38] On superlatives in Thucydides, cf. Grant (1974) 83–85, and cf. Rusten 1989 ad loc.

The acquisition of "greatest power up to this time" is the reward for Athens' heroic labors; the biggest acquisition is clearly the best acquisition, since it has brought eternal fame. Pericles' assessment of the Athenian achievement reflects the drift of πλεονεξία itself toward desiring the greatest imaginable amount of whatever is desired.

In the next sentences, Pericles designates the ability to fulfill the desire for more as the capacity that defines the status of each man, just as it had defined the status of the successive generations at the beginning of the Funeral Oration (2.36.1–3). The failure to acquire excludes a man from respect and accomplishment. Nonacquirers are consigned to resentment and unimportance:

> καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει· εἰ δέ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν· ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται. μῖσος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει, ἡ δὲ παραυτίκα τε λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται.

> And certainly the useless man would blame these things [i.e. Athens' labor to possess the empire], but anyone who can do anything, and wants to, will imitate them. And if someone does not acquire, he will be envious. And certainly all who think that they are worthy to rule others are hated and burdensome in the present. But whoever puts up with resentment in return for the greatest things is thinking correctly. For hatred is short lived, but present splendor and ever-remembered glory are left behind for the future … (2.64.4–5)

The man who cannot value Athens' rule over the greatest number of Greeks and simultaneous prosecution of the democracy is useless. By contrast, the useful and active man will imitate Athens, and acquire. Acquisition is enviable, and the man who does not acquire will feel envy.[39] The acquirers should ignore him. He is contemptible, and the ruled always hate those who rule them. Athenian acquisitions and rule are "the greatest things" and are worth enduring resentment for, particularly as the duration of this hatred will be short, while the glory of their deeds will last forever.[40]

Success or failure to acquire therefore determines both a city's station in the world and also the status of individuals. Acquisition leads to freedom and the claim to rule. Failure to acquire results in envy and

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[39] The verb κέκτηται has no direct object, so that Athens' acquisitions, the cause of the hatred Pericles once again references, remain to the end unspecified.

[40] Cf. note 24 of Chapter 1, and also the contrast between the people's "most important things" (2.15.5, discussed in chapter 5), according to Thucydides, and Pericles' "greatest things."

hatred. Pericles opposes the achievement of eternal glory through successful acquisitive warfare to the humiliations of loss and insignificance that attend inactivity, and engages each Athenian to avoid, both for himself and for Athens, the disqualifications of slavery (cf. 1.141.1, 2.63.1–2).

Self-Sufficiency through Materialism

Pericles therefore claims individual Athenian citizens, as well as the city itself, for his materialism. The assumption that wealth is the central concern for each individual emerges most conspicuously in the Funeral Oration. Here, Pericles describes the desire for wealth as the single factor that might restrain an Athenian from dying for the city. Referring to the men who had recently died for Athens, he says, "No one of these grew soft because he gave precedence to the further enjoyment of wealth, or put off the terrible things in the hope characteristic of poverty, namely that fleeing it, he might become rich" (2.42.4).[41] On the contrary, he goes on, they chose to punish their enemies. According to Pericles, these cavalrymen were thinking about whatever wealth they were giving up or might have had, not past happiness or family or the gods, when they decided to die for Athens.

Nevertheless, the citizen should consider the maintenance and defense of Athens, which upholds all citizens (cf. 2.60.2–4) more important than his personal wealth.[42] At the same time, and despite the fact that Athenian *tropoi* have made it possible to escape some of poverty's consequences, to attempt to rise from poverty is an ethical imperative (2.37.1).[43] Wealth is therefore a central concern of the Athenian citizen, and Pericles further binds the individual to the acquisition of personal wealth by constructing each citizen's self-sufficiency along the model he constructs for the city.

[41] Cf. Rusten (1989) ad loc.: "the soldier's choice (usually between bravery and cowardice on the field) is presented as one between military action and personal prosperity." Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 113 and also Pericles' later argument that "in the uselessness of old age" honor means more than money (actually, more than profit making: τὸ κερδαίνειν 2.44.4), which implies that youth, which is useful, is oriented in the opposite way.

[42] This Periclean principle, Thucydides emphasizes, began to evaporate during the plague (2.53), and private interests highjacked Athenian policy after Pericles' death (2.65.7). Cf. the subsequent sections of this chapter.

[43] 2.40.1: φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον. A useful gloss of this sentence is found in Rusten (1985) 18: "For in the first place (τε) we seek what is noble with moderation

Periclean Athens, as we have seen, is an invincible island (1.143.5), and is fundamentally independent of physical and moral restrictions (2.41.4). The most self-sufficient city (τὴν πόλιν … αὐταρκεστάτην) was beholden to no one for help in either peace or war, and relies on no one for examples (2.36.3, 2.37.1, 2.41.1).

The individual Athenian is equally beyond the need of others. According to Pericles, Athenian men have achieved an unprecedented combination of respect for law with a versatile competence in many different spheres of life (2.40.2, 2.41.1). This makes them far superior to the Spartans, who produce a single virtue, courage, by means of laborious exercises and strict law (e.g. 2.39.1, 2.39.4).

Nor are individual Athenians burdened by ordinary attachments to family and gods.[44] The gods play almost no role at all in Pericles' discussion.[45] Moreover, and as we saw, not family but the hope for personal wealth is the one thing that might attenuate an Athenian citizen's dedication to Athens. In the Funeral Oration, the family is treated as a supplier of men; it is mentioned as the producer of those materials (here, people) that uphold the Athenian *tropoi*, and has no meaning outside of this civic function (2.44.3, 2.46.1).[46] Just as the empire is free of Attica, the Athenian male is free of family: only φθόνος (envy) bites him, and drives him to greater accomplishments to the extent that he has not acquired more material wealth or personal glory than others (cf. 2.35.2, 2.45.1).[47]

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in expense, and seek wisdom without becoming soft; furthermore (τε), wealth is for us an opportunity to act rather than something about which to speak boastfully, and as for poverty, it is not a disgrace for anyone to admit to it, but it is a disgrace not to attempt actively to escape it; finally (τε), those who manage our city do the same for their households as well, and others, even though they pursue their trades, have a thorough knowledge of politics."

[44] Flashar (1989) 459: "…every reference to the divine or religious practice is absent from the whole speech, although the contents would have supplied good opportunities, for instance when [Pericles] refers to the contests and sacrifices (2.38.1). Thus the human being and city are entirely without outside support, and man's life is seen from an entirely human point of view…" (…in der ganzen Rede jeder Bezug zum göttlichen, religiösen Brauch fehlt, obwohl vom Inhalt her durchaus Anlass dazu gegeben wäre, etwa bei der Erwähnung der Agone und Opfer [2.38.1]. So ist der Mensch und die Polis ganz auf sich selbst gestellt, das Leben des Menschen vom rein menschlichen Aspekt her gesehen).

[45] Pericles once refers to the plague as τά δαιμόνια at 2.64.2.

[46] On Pericles' subordination of the family to the state, cf. Samons (2007) 296–298. Cf. Flashar (1989) 458.

[47] On Pericles' encouragement of such values among the Athenians, cf. Edmunds (1975a) 82–83: "the [Periclean] polis serves as both the model and goal of that striving and

Pericles' Athenian citizen therefore has a "self-sufficient life" (cf. τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες 2.41.1). He has produced his own character through the exercise of the particularly Athenian virtues, and has escaped family and gods, just as Pericles himself, and just as the glory of the empire has escaped Attica and any other earthly limitation.[48]

Thucydides' Plague Narrative on Self-Sufficiency and Materialism

Thucydides' explicit assertion in the plague narrative that no person was self-sufficient against the plague (there was no σῶμα αὔταρκες 2.51.3) directly contradicts, in its choice of words, at least, Pericles' claim that Athenians lived a "self-sufficient life" (σῶμα αὔταρκες 2.41.1). What does this contradiction mean?

At first sight, it is not clear that the two statements are relevant to each other. Thucydides' account of the plague's symptoms is a record of observations, and when he states that no one's body was self-sufficient against the plague, his statement generalizes from the observation of medical symptoms, not social principles.[49] By contrast, when Pericles used the words σῶμα αὔταρκες, he meant that Athens had produced a man whose intellectual versatility and energy allowed him to handle the world on his own. He was not thinking of the strength to resist disease.

Pericles and Thucydides use these words differently, therefore, and the identical phrase is moreover familiar from Herodotus (1.32.8), whose Solon had argued that no man was complete and self-sufficient,

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acquisitiveness to which the theological mind of Solon saw no end but hubris and *ate*." Cf. Flashar (1989) 443–444, and especially Strasburger OCRST 211.

[48] Cf. Wells (1983) 152: "Athens seems to have created a man who was more than the fragile creature, tied to his human weakness or folly and his mortal destiny."

[49] ἔθνῃσκον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀμελείᾳ, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. ἔν τε οὐδὲ ἓν κατέστη ἴαμα ὡς εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῆν προσφέροντας ὠφελεῖν· τὸ γάρ τῳ ξυνενεγκὸν ἄλλον τοῦτο ἔβλαπτεν. σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα (Some died of neglect, others [died] although they received very good care. There was no one remedy that was going to help if someone applied it. For what helped one patient, harmed another. And no body at all appeared, either because of its strength or its weakness, sufficient to fight off the disease, but it destroyed all bodies, even those cared for with every possible regimen 2.51.2–3). The statement is very decisive. See ἔν τε οὐδὲ ἓν κατέστη ἴαμα: "absolutely no remedy existed," σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν: "no body at all was sufficient," and the double deployment of πᾶς, πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα "it destroyed every body, even those treated with every regimen." Cf. e.g. Adam Parry (1969), Macleod (1983) 151–152, Flashar (1989) 463–464.

meaning that no one's life was invulnerable from insufficiency, harm, and chance.

Thus the meaning of these words could be broader or narrower; Thucydides' use of the phrase seems narrowest, since it includes no reference to social life. Herodotus' Solon and Thucydides' Pericles both use broader, social meanings of the phrase, and seem clearly to disagree, since Pericles denies the importance of the very forces – the gods, chance, family fortunes – Herodotus' Solon says rule all men.

In my view, Thucydides' view of the power of chance, nature, and the physical vulnerability of human life is close to Solon's, and despite the apparently narrower focus of his reference, I suggest that Thucydides is using this well-established phrase to highlight an important difference between himself and Pericles. Pericles' speeches treat the plague as an incident. In his view, the plague was a terrible and unexpected event from which the Athenians must now recover so that they can proceed down the path toward empire (2.61.3–4, 2.64.2). Thucydides, on the other hand, treats the plague as a reversal from which there was no return. In his presentation, the effects of the plague began a permanent deterioration of Athenian morals that would change the character of Athens, weakening in particular the dedication of citizens to the city as a whole, a hallmark Periclean virtue (cf. 2.53). Thucydides therefore thought he saw something that Pericles did not or could not see at that time, namely that the plague changed Athens forever. Furthermore, Pericles would die of the plague: this event would also have a decisive destabilizing effect.[50]

By contrast, Pericles' description of Athens' self-sufficiency was founded on the principle that Athens and the Athenian citizen of his day were immune to such deterioration. Deterioration might set in someday, but the Athenian he addresses has all the powers of self-sufficiency and the full capacity to create Athens' glory (2.64.3). Thucydides' remark and his plague narrative as a whole, I argue, respond to Pericles' overconfident description of himself and his generation. There was no σῶμα αὔταρκες because Pericles' generation was not in fact immune or above the laws of nature: the Athenians, like all human beings (1.50.1), could be overwhelmed by natural forces and their history changed.

Moreover, the plague narrative is a fierce correction of Periclean views in many other ways. The plague was announced early on (1.23.3) as an important instance of the extreme suffering caused by the war,

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[50] Cf. Flashar (1989) 469.

and demonstrates Thucydides' contrasting narrative priorities: not glorious battles, but inglorious ones, not the ἀναίσθητος θάνατος (unperceived death 2.43.6), but the terrifying death from the plague. It sets not only Pericles' topics but also Pericles' rhetoric in the light of contrast. The bases of this contrast touch Thucydides' character as a narrator: in the plague narrative, Thucydides claims a different situation for himself, in his relationship to the reader, than Pericles claimed in respect to the Athenians. Thucydides' statement that he cannot explain, but only describe, the plague (2.48.3) enacts the opposite of a Periclean mastery over nature, and also the opposite of Pericles' stance as leader and seducer of Athenian minds.[51] His announcement that he knows the limits of his own understanding returns the task of understanding to the reader. By contrast, Pericles understands for his audience, to whom he explains their duties and themselves. In addition, right up to the very last sentence of Thucydides' characterization, he is shown to claim knowledge of the unpredictable future (cf. 2.65.13).

Thus Thucydides' account of the plague narrative refuses both Pericles' claims about Athens and the language and attitude with which he makes those claims. In Thucydides' account, the plague arrives over land and sea that is subject to the Persian King, not Athens (1.48.1). Its path covers specific lands and territories, so that the opening sections of the plague narrative recover us back to the real world of existing peoples and geography. The description of the symptoms of the plague that follows is a famous example of *akribeia*, and confronts Pericles' motivated suppression of evidence and complexities with a precise and detailed description of the plague's destruction of individuals and the city. The length of Thucydides' description of the plague allows many opportunities to perceive the contrast between Thucydidean narrative and Pericles' speeches, which Thucydides endowed with a suggestive and generalizing treatment of nature that is opposed to his own.

The plague narrative has been the object of massive scholarly attention, and I will highlight only two further aspects of Thucydides' differences from Pericles. The first is the role Thucydides gives to compassion. The only immediate gain from the experience of the plague was the lesson of compassion: from their own suffering, Thucydides and others who survived learned to pity the suffering of others (2.51.6). Pericles, as he himself boasts, is unchanged by the plague (1.61.2). He

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[51] On the Thucydides' narratorial stance at 1.48.3, and its relation to his statements at 1.22, cf. Thomas (2006) 101–102. On Pericles' power over the assembly, cf. 2.65.8.

has not learned compassion, and as we have seen, in his postplague speech, Pericles is still urging the Athenians to disregard the hatred that arises from their indifference to the suffering of those they dominate (2.64.5).

Truly remarkable, however, is Pericles' indifference to the Attic immigrants. Consistent with the sympathies we observed in his description of Attica at 2.14–17, Thucydides details especially the suffering of those who immigrated into the city from Attica, and who, having lost their homes and land, are now living in poverty and disorganization in the city.[52] These die in hordes and under the most wretched conditions imaginable:

> ἐπίεσε δ' αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι πόνῳ καὶ ἡ ξυγκομιδὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοὺς ἐπελθόντας. οἰκιῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καλύβαις πνιγηραῖς ὥρᾳ ἔτους διαιτωμένων ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνῄσκοντες ἔκειντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως.

> And the immigration from the fields into the city oppressed them more because of their present suffering, and especially [oppressed] those who had come in. For since houses were not available and they were living in huts that were stifling because of the season of the year, the disaster happened in entire disorder. Instead [i.e. instead of some order prevailing], the dying corpses were lying upon each other and in the roads, and the half dead were rolling about all of the fountain houses because of their lust for water. And the temples in which they had taken shelter were full of corpses, since they were dying there. For defeated by their misfortunes and not knowing what would become of them, the people turned to contempt for both the temples and the sacred places.[53] (2.52.1–3)

The passage is followed by Thucydides' well-known description of the breakdown of Athenian burial practices, in which Athenians come to treat their family members and fellow citizens as a disposal problem, stealing pyres from one another because of the short supply of wood, or simply throwing corpses on top of pyres that were already lit (2.52.3–4).

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[52] Cf. note 70, Chapter 5.

[53] Contrast the Cylon story, and other passages mentioned in the notes to this story, reviewed in Chapter 4, in which the living were dragged from the temples lest they pollute them with death. On this passage and its literary devices (oxymoron, in particular), see Foster (2009).

This detailed description responds to Pericles' attacks on the Athenians' attachment to Attica. As we have seen, in the speech he is about to give (2.60–64), Pericles will reproach the Attic refugees with this attachment, disqualifying their prewar, preplague lives with words about overvaluing kitchen gardens (2.62.3). Seen in the context of Thucydides' description of the sufferings of the Attic immigrants, it seems astonishing, even simply from the point of view of political prudence, that he would have said things so likely to increase their resentment against him. Perhaps he was simply compelled by Spartan policy to continue to argue that Attica was worthless.[54] Perhaps he was determined to disqualify the enemies of his war policy.[55] Whatever his motivations, the contrast between the suffering Thucydides depicts here and the carelessness of Pericles' description of Attica illustrates the extent to which Pericles was willing to ignore actual conditions at Athens in order to achieve an ideal and future glory.

Finally, it is perhaps worth returning to the theme of materialism. Since the plague compelled all Athenians, including both Thucydides and Pericles, to experience death or the fear of death, it was an effective teacher on this topic. In chapter 53, Thucydides addresses the question of how the plague changed the Athenians' views of the importance and end of money and worldly goods.

The Athenians saw that the rich died, he reports, and that wealth came suddenly to people who previously had nothing. The collapse of expectations of security and predictability, together with the sense that death was likely to come soon, caused them to abandon long-term goals and turn to the pursuit of immediate pleasure. The plague began what was to be a progressive deterioration of Athenian lawfulness:

πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τἆλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἃ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες τῶν τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θνῃσκόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τἀκείνων ἐχόντων. ὥστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ἠξίουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγούμενοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται· ὅτι δὲ ἤδη τε ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον κατέστη.

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54 Cf. Vogt OCRST 236 : "…in the last reworking of his history, [Thucydides] shows us in the terrifying third speech a Pericles who like a despot forces his people to endure, a politician without alternatives, a leader utterly paralyzed."

55 Cf. Sicking (1995) 419–420.

θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους …

The plague first began a turn toward greater lawlessness in the city, even in respect to other things [i.e. than burial practices]. For anyone dared more confidently [to do] things, the taste for which he would previously have concealed, since they saw the swift changes: both among the rich, who died suddenly, and also among those who had formerly possessed nothing, but straightaway possessed their goods. The result [of seeing these changes] was that they made immediate enjoyment and pleasure their priority, since they considered their lives and money equally ephemeral. And no one was interested in enduring any extra hardships for the sake of something that seemed right, thinking it was unclear whether he might not be dead before it was accomplished. On the contrary, whatever was already pleasant or whatever led straight to pleasure became both good and useful. No fear of the gods or customs of men restrained them, since they judged that it was a matter of indifference whether they showed respect or not, since they saw that everyone was destroyed equally… (2.53.1–4)

Thucydides chooses to discuss the responses of those who suddenly inherit, or see that others do, when the rich die of the plague.[56] In their terrible situation, those Athenians who are able to do so turn to instant personal gratification, since they believe they have no future to be concerned about. They have forgotten Pericles' teachings along with everything else: their behavior reflects indifference to present reputation, much less eternal glory.[57] Concern for his words would also make no sense: the city and empire that he advertised as powerful over nature has failed to protect them from the natural threat that is destroying them.[58]

The Athenians therefore ignore the city along with the future. Since money cannot buy life, it buys momentary forgetfulness of death. This is its only power: it certainly cannot restore the Athenians to health or happiness.[59] Wealth is turned entirely toward swift gratification, and rather than leading to independence helps to establish a dependence on pleasure in which (similar to the corruptions listed at 3.82.4ff.)

[56] Thucydides shows in chapter 52 that many who suffered from the plague were desperately poor. His choice in chapter 53 to analyze the situation not of those who were thus ruined, but of those who suddenly became wealthy, would therefore be deliberate.

[57] On the persistent contrast between momentary pleasures and prudence in Thucydides, cf. de Romilly (1966).

[58] Orwin (1994) 175.

[59] Herodotus' stories, and particularly Solon's story of Tellus the Athenian (cf. Hdt. 1.30.4), tend to show that health makes possessions useful, and is the basis upon which possessions are a blessing.

concepts of good and usefulness are corrupted for the sake of an imme-
diately attainable end. Thucydides' determination to analyze the role of
money in the worst of times, just as Pericles has showcased its role in the
best of times, may be taken as another demonstration of the difference
between the historian and the statesman.

Pericles in Thucydides

We have now argued Pericles' differences to Thucydides at length, so
that an important question arises: if Thucydides had such significant dis-
agreements with Pericles, why did he not display this in his assessment of
Pericles' leadership in chapter 65 of book two? I have already indicated
my response to this question: Pericles' vulnerability to πλεονεξία is as
much a part of his character, in Thucydides, as his intelligent devotion
to Athens. Thucydides' praise of Pericles is therefore as genuine as the
character portrait that showcases his imperialism. Both are true, and
both sides of his character also reflect Athens during this period.

Pericles' final speeches obviously contain many important statements
outside of the passages we have been able to review. I will cite Helmut
Flashar's summary of the contrasting topics of the Funeral Oration:

> Whoever reads the speech [i.e. the Funeral Oration], or even just chap-
> ters 37–41, could get the impression, again and again, that Thucydides
> speaks through Pericles' mouth directly to the particular present of each
> modern interpreter. And in fact it is nearly astonishing how the jargon of
> the most contemporary political discussions is named in the text: a func-
> tioning democracy, equality before the law, recognition of the principle of
> merit, possibility of occupying public offices without regard to rank and
> wealth, free development of the individual, freedom of opinion, no mali-
> cious prosecution, observance of the unwritten laws in reference to justice
> and morality, no discrimination against those seeking asylum, no hostility
> to foreigners, high value recreational opportunities through sports and
> culture, free market and trade, no restrictions on travel, open borders,
> strong military, but without excessive discipline and secrecy, high prior-
> ity on art and education: all this is really explicitly in the text. It is like an
> advertisement for a [political] union of our time, or the description of the
> essential features of a modern state of the western type.[60]

An entire constitutional world accompanies Pericles' invocations
upon Athens' rule of the sea. Flashar's astonishment at the modernity
and importance of Pericles' political ideas mirrors our own. Pericles'

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[60] (1989) 46. My guess is that when Flashar wrote "Gemeinschaft" (which I have trans-
lated with the words "political union") in the last sentence, he was thinking of the

intelligence and grasp of these matters was unrivaled among his con-
temporaries, and he articulated democratic ideas whose importance
has withstood the test of time. Thucydides' presentation of Pericles'
grasp of these concepts is a central part of his characterization, equal to
or more important than the material we have reviewed in this and the
preceding chapters.

Moreover, Thucydides depicted not only the strength of Pericles'
ideas, but also Pericles' practical political skills. In chapters 2.21–22,
Pericles prevents the Athenians from leaving the walls of the city to fight
the Peloponnesian army that was ravaging Attica:

> Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ
> ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι,
> ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι
> μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι᾽
> ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν.

> Pericles, since he saw that [the Athenians] were angry about what was hap-
> pening and not thinking in the best way, and trusted that he had come to
> the right conclusion about not going out of the city [to meet the invading
> Spartans], neither called an assembly nor any kind of meeting, in order to
> prevent them from making some error from gathering more because of
> passion than resolve, and he watched over the city and kept it as calm as
> he could. (2.22.1)

Regardless of whether or not we believe that Pericles was right to
sponsor the war so fervently, his actions here, in which he exercises
individual control without resorting to any faction for support, and is
able to oppose the People's passionate response to the Spartan pres-
ence in Attica with his personal confidence that he has correctly recog-
nized the right course of action, display both a remarkable control over
Athens and also the psychological constitution that made that control
possible.[61] Pericles remains calm in a crisis, while the majority fail to do
so: Thucydides' dim view of the democracy emerges from such presenta-
tions, and the problem such a person as Pericles potentially represents
for democratic Athens is also implied, although in this instance Pericles
exercises his influence in a beneficial way.[62]

European Union, in its first idealistic stages of formation in the Europe of the 1970s
and 1980s.

[61] Cf. 2.55.2, where Thucydides confirms Pericles' constancy to this same policy during
the second Spartan attack.

[62] Cf. Lugenbill (1999) 207, who argues that Pericles' ability to prevent the assembly from
meeting could be seen as a sign of tyrannical control over Athens. Rusten (1989) ad
loc. 2.22.1 provides arguments that rather than preventing meetings of the assembly,

That a person capable of such self-control, as well as the deep under-standing of Athens Pericles displays, should have succumbed to the attractions of empire in the way we have described is an important fact Thucydides wishes us to observe. In order to complete the separation of Thucydides from his portrayal of Pericles, in the following paragraphs we will review Thucydides' famous assessment of Pericles in book two, chapter 65, seeking to discover whether any part of it can be construed as support for Periclean imperialism or materialism.

Thucydides' final assessment of Pericles' leadership begins with his review of Pericles' purposes in holding his last speech.[63] Pericles wanted to free the Athenians from their anger against him (2.65.1), and also to lead their minds from "the present terrible events": the plague and the Spartan invasions.[64] He aimed, Thucydides says, to calm the assembly's strong passions. Pericles himself had stated a further aim at the end of his speech (2.64.6), namely that he wished to firm up Athenian resolve to continue the war, and to prevent the Athenians from sending further embassies to Sparta.

Pericles achieves his political but not his emotional aims. In public (δημοσία), the Athenians obey Pericles, that is, they stop sending embas-sies to the Spartans and prosecute the war more vigorously (2.65.2). In private (ἰδίᾳ), however, they are still angry. The people have been robbed of what little they had, and the rich have lost their beautiful and expensive establishments in the country. Most important, all have war instead of peace (2.65.2).

They blame Pericles for these troubles, (and Pericles says that they also hate him for the plague itself, cf. 2.64.1), but as Pericles also points out, they had voted for the war (2.60.4). Thucydides relates, with some disgust, how, in their anger, "the crowd" first fined Pericles, but then

Pericles took control of the agenda to the extent that he prevented debate over going out to meet the Spartans.

[63] Gribble (1998) 52–54 argues consistent with the analysis presented in this chapter that two important themes in the narrative, namely the assessment of Pericles and the assessment of Athens' strength, reach their culmination in 2.65, which is thus deeply bound to the surrounding narrative, and not a separate essay, as has sometimes been maintained (41).

[64] These remarks are an abbreviated version of the remarks with which Thucydides had introduced the speech. Thucydides had explained Athenian anger in his introduc-tion at 2.59.2: "they held Pericles responsible for having persuaded them to go to war, and because they had fallen into disasters because of him…" Pericles had expected the People to become angry, according to Thucydides; he called a meeting intending to encourage them and to lead them from their anger to a gentler and less fearful attitude (2.59.3).

reelected him general, "and turned over to him all of their affairs," once their personal sufferings had somewhat receded from their minds, since they concluded that he was "most worthy in respect to the things the whole city needed" (2.65.4).[65]

Thus the first sentences of 2.65 demonstrate the People's swiftly changing moods and dependence on Pericles.[66] They also display the People's ultimately positive judgment of Pericles' leadership. The next sentences turn to an explanation of the People's view of Pericles: we learn why they believed Pericles to be Athens' best leader. In the following quotation, I have included 2.65.4 with 2.65.5, so that the relation between the sentences will be evident:

> ὕστερον δ᾽ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὧν μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕκαστος ἤλγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἤδη ὄντες, ὧν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον *νομίζοντες* εἶναι. ὅσον τε *γὰρ* χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδή τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ *φαίνεται* καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν.

> Not much later [i.e. than they fined him] they elected him general, just as the crowd usually does, and they turned over all of their affairs to him, since the pain of those personal things each one had suffered was now less sharp, and because *they believed him* to be most worthy in respect to those things the whole city needed. *For*, as long as he was chief of the city in peacetime he led it moderately and kept it safe; and it was greatest in his time, and when the war began, he *seemed* also in this [situation] to have recognized [the city's] power.[67] (2.65.4–5)

In peacetime, according to the *demos*, Pericles led the city moderately and safely. He led moderately, that is, according to an ancient commentator, he was neither violent nor greedy for personal gain, and he kept the city safe, that is, he did not risk the city or its power for imprudent

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[65] Cf. a basic similarity to the Cylon story (1.126), in which the Athenian People turn over preeminent power to the nine archons when they tire of besieging Cylon and his supporters but then also punish the archons when they use this power.

[66] Cf. de Romilly (1965) 566–567.

[67] My interpretation assumes that the sentence introduced with γάρ has its usual explanatory function: it explains why the people believed Pericles to be "most worthy." φαίνεται in the same sentence does not seem to refer to Thucydides' view, but still reflects the People (i.e. φαίνεται could be supplemented with αὐτοῖς). Even if we argue that the narrator shares focalization (as an Athenian or as a contemporary of the *demos* whose opinion he is here summarizing), it is the People who are mainly characterized by this focalization.

adventures.[68] Furthermore, the Athenians associate Pericles with the acme of prosperity characteristic of his time, and when the war came, they thought he assessed the city's power accurately. Thus the Athenians' view of Pericles responds to their concerns for security and prosperity for the whole city, which they entrust to Pericles, who in their opinion knows best what to do. Does Thucydides agree with their assessment?

In 2.65.6, Pericles suddenly dies.[69] The announcement of his death separates the People's assessments of Pericles from Thucydides' post-mortem analysis. Nevertheless, the two views are connected. Thucydides in fact sharpens his praise of Pericles to exceed the People's perceptions. Pericles' insight was recognized even more after his death, Thucydides says, confirming his agreement with the People's admiration, and raising a question: why would the postmortem perception of Pericles' *prognoia* be even more approving than during his lifetime?

The explanation is that by doing everything opposite to Pericles' policy and leading the city to catastrophe and defeat, the Athenians proved Pericles' wisdom:

> ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο.

> [Pericles] said that if they stayed still and took good care of the navy and did not bring risk to the city by adding possessions to the empire during the war, they would prevail. But they did everything in the opposite way, and on account of private ambitions and private profit they also managed other affairs, which were extraneous to the war, poorly in respect both to themselves and to their allies, which things, if they succeeded, brought honor and advantage more to private parties, but if they failed, harmed the city in respect to the war. (2.65.7)

Left to itself, the Athenian People utterly failed to control the desires for honor and profit that have been the instigators of warfare throughout

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[68] Μετρίως – τοῦτο ἐστιν ἐναντίον τοῦ βιαίως καὶ πλεονεκτῶς. Aristides quoted in Poppo ad loc.

[69] Thucydides' anachronistic narrative tendencies are at their most extreme here, since the presentation is about two and a half years ahead of itself. For Thucydides' treatment of Pericles (after 2.65 he will entirely disappear from the narrative), cf. Connor (1984) 63 and Monoson (1998) 290, who argues that Pericles' death is in itself a demonstration of the power of chance over Pericles' calculations for the war.

Thucydides' explanations. After Pericles' death, private projects dominated the city's policies and brought some gain to individuals but damage to the city as a whole: the repetition of the word private at 2.65.7 contrasts sharply to Thucydides' ensuing description of Pericles' abilities.[70] Pericles could not be bribed (2.65.8). Furthermore, he possessed the authority, intelligence, and integrity to restrain the many. He led them more than they led him. He did not flatter the crowd in order to gain power; on the contrary, he was able to displease the crowd, such was his authority (2.65.8). He struck them down when they became hubristic, and encouraged them when they became fearful. Thus Athens was reputed to be a democracy, but was really ruled by the *princeps virorum* (2.65.9).[71] No one could doubt Thucydides' admiration for Pericles' political capacities. Thucydides' analysis absorbs the People's assessment by showing that Pericles was not led astray by the People's high estimation of his worth, however it may have been expressed: it was not in order to feel the high opinion Thucydides has recorded here that Pericles led Athens.

Pericles had therefore brought leadership and unity to Athens, which was, however, so dependent on his political, military, and intellectual capacities that it could be suggested that the *demos* was deluding itself that Athens was a democracy: really, Pericles was in charge. In Thucydides' view, Pericles' successors did not possess his capacities, but were interested in occupying his position (2.65.10). In their desire for private advancement, they turned affairs over to the whims of the People.[72] Many mistakes necessarily followed: the leadership of the Sicilian expedition was particularly poor, and led to Athens' defeat (2.65.11). Nevertheless, Athens sustained the war for much longer than anyone could have expected:

σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλῃ τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως † τρία † μὲν ἔτη ἀντεῖχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

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[70] Cf. de Romilly (1965) 570.

[71] *CT* ad loc. refers to the Herodotean precedent for this view of democracy.

[72] Cf. de Romilly (1965) 568 and Flashar (1989) 471.

And once they had fallen in Sicily with a great part of the navy and the rest of their military resources, and were already in civil strife at home, they nevertheless held out for three years against their already existing enemies and their enemies from Sicily, and when many of their allies had revolted; and in addition [they withstood] Cyrus the son of the King, who was supplying money to the Spartans for their naval effort. And they did not give in before they themselves among themselves were ruined, wrecked by their private quarrels. So great was the abundance available to Pericles at that time from which he foresaw that the city would very easily prevail in a war with the Peloponnesians alone. (2.65.12–13)

The resources upon which Pericles had depended at the beginning of the war were ultimately sufficient for a much larger and longer conflict than he had foreseen. This is shown by the fact that despite the number of enemies that accumulated, civil strife, not a lack of money, caused Athens' defeat. Pericles' assessment of Athens' resources was therefore correct, Thucydides argues, as long as we remember that he was calculating at or before the beginning of the war, and for a war with the Peloponnesians.[73] It was Pericles' successors who undertook imperial adventures (such as the Sicilian expedition) during the war, and in addition quarreled with each other, and in this way caused Athens' demise. In sum, Pericles' leadership of the assembly and correct knowledge of Athenian resources was to be preferred to the selfish quarrels and mistakes of his successors, or at least we have no reason to look with contempt upon Pericles' failings.

W. R. Connor argued that "the force of the apparent defense of Pericles in chapter 65 is, then, not to develop a theory about the war, but to prevent premature and facile judgments about it."[74] I concur, and extend this analysis to the character of Pericles himself. Pericles was not simply a fervent imperialist who drove his city into the most destructive Greek war, but also a talented and devoted leader, whose best calculations, founded

[73] Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 119. The translation of 2.65.13 is difficult. Poppo's gloss: "Tantum superabat (suppetebat) Pericli eorum quorum ope facillime eos victuros praevidit." He supplies a useful reference from an imitation by Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* 19.1.18): τοιόνδε ἐπερίσσευεν αὐτοῖς εὐνοίας. I have translated accordingly, taking into account the arguments made by Connor (1984) 63 note 30 and Rusten (1989) ad loc. For a contrasting translation, cf. de Romilly (1965) 560.

[74] Connor (1984) 74–75. Cf. de Romilly (1965) 562 who argues (for reasons opposed to my own) that the main aim of the assessment at 2.65 is to defend the idea that Pericles' prediction of victory was reasonable.

on an accurate knowledge of Athenian prosperity, made him believe that Athens would "very easily" survive the war.[75]

Thus his strength was also the foundation of his characteristic error. The words "very easily" are strongly marked as a Periclean focalization. They are characteristic of Pericles' overconfidence about the war, and so is Pericles' reliance on war materials in order to found this confidence.[76] From the point of view of Thucydides' reader, both Pericles' assumption that a war of this size could somehow easily be withstood, and also his idea, where the empire was so restive, that the main war would be with the Peloponnesians, seem far too confident. Moreover, both sides were from the beginning trying to claim Persia for their side, so that to plan for a war with the Peloponnesians seems unrealistic. Without claiming to know what Pericles ought to have done, or arguing that Pericles ought to have known at the beginning of the war what Thucydides learned by observing it, Thucydides displays both Pericles' talents and his limitations, and prevents any easy judgments for or against him. The strategy seems to aim at supporting the maximum complexity over the length of the narrative presentation of the events and speeches of the early part of the war, and as we have just seen, Thucydides sustains that complexity to the end.

In the meantime, the temperature of Thucydides' opinions on warfare and war materials is unchanging: for Thucydides, Athens' war resources are, regardless of their size and power, just that – materials vulnerable to misuse and defeat. Thucydides' explanations at 2.65 show that the resources Pericles endowed with eternal glory were wasted only a few years later by internal quarrels between poor leaders. As for the war itself, Athens' tenacious self-defense at the end earns Thucydides' astonished comment, but the Sicilian expedition, the one imperialistic venture he mentions here, is singled out as a sordid mess. Had Thucydides been an exponent of Athens' imperialism, he missed a further opportunity to lament over the empire when he remarks that many of the allies had revolted toward the end of the war (2.65.12). His explanation of the fall of Athens is, however, consistent with the dry-eyed presentation we have observed all along: enemies of Athenian rule gradually accumulated, the allies revolted, and the Athenians finally did themselves in

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[75] περιγενέσθαι can be translated with terms ranging from to prevail over (i.e. to defeat) or to survive. I have chosen from the more careful range of possible translations.

[76] Connor (1984) 63 note 30: "πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως suggests a Periclean disregard of the cost, sufferings, and *kinēsis* of even a short war."

with internal quarreling. Human nature being consistent, it is a common story, and one that applied to Athens as much as any other place.

A review of Thucydides' assessment of Pericles at 2.65 does not therefore provide any evidence that Thucydides was an exponent either of Periclean imperialism or of the view that the Athenian navy and empire were glorious and eternal. Thucydides praises Pericles' leadership because he thought it was genuinely praiseworthy, but does not justify the empire or mourn its fate; nor does he ever cease portraying Pericles' overconfidence.

Conclusion

Thucydides showed in Pericles' speeches that the power warfare can potentially provide had become for Pericles the aim of Athenian existence. Despite his exact knowledge of Athens and Athenian war resources, and despite his personal experiences of war, Pericles spoke of Athenian warfare as great, unique, and of never-ending importance and grandeur. A psychological progress had occurred, in which Pericles had left behind all other attachments and become attached to a sense of Athens' unlimited future. As we have discussed, this progress had several foundations, but one of the most important was Athens' unprecedented growth after the Persian Wars. The power and resources Pericles both inherited and helped to create allowed him to leave behind all other considerations, and to seek significance in Athens' empire alone. It is to defend the empire that he urges the Athenians to fight the war with Sparta, and the possession of the empire and its resources, as we have just reviewed, caused him to believe that Athens would prevail.

In Chapter 1 of this book, we saw Thucydides' analysis of the fact that similar beliefs are likely to be characteristic of successive generations. The Archaeology describes and analyzes the continuously arising and self-destructing material acmes of human history.

Chapter 2 discussed an example of this cycle, namely the creation, deployment, and destruction of Corcyra's navy. In this story, both Corinth and Corcyra deploy navies of unprecedented size as a result of arrogance, hatred, and anger. Their warfare is anything but glorious, and furthermore, Athens plays a malevolent role, arrogantly exacerbating the combatants' passions. Athens pays the price at Potideia, the story of which, like a gadfly, haunts the first two books of the *History* until after Pericles' death (the siege of Potideia is finally relieved at

2.70), continuously exposing the difficulty and expense of firmly conquering even one small city of the empire. In the introductory sections of the *History*, Thucydides provides an account of naval warfare that stresses its horrors, and introduces us to the fragility of Athens' empire.

The Spartan Congress met to discuss whether Athens should or could be tamed with warfare. The Corinthians urged the destruction of this too similar and too powerful adversary, but the Athenians proudly laid claim to their right, by history and by present fact, to their empire. Archidamus' argument – that Athenian power was too great for Sparta to meet without much intensive (and un-Spartan) preparation – failed. Sthenelaidas, who refused to fear Athens, but had no plan for meeting Athens' power, carried the day. Taking over from his speakers, in the Pentekontaetia Thucydides displays the resources and behavior the speakers at Sparta described. Once again, his presentation is concrete. He shows the foundation of the empire and its continuously accumulating acme in his stories of Athens' walls and system of tribute, and catalogues the aggressive behavior that followed their establishment.

Chapter 4 discussed the figure of Pericles in Thucydides, focusing on his history as a general in the service of the empire, the isolating effect of the curse on his family, and the Themistoclean inheritance that partly replaced normal aristocratic foundations and social connections. Finally, the chapter reviewed Pericles' first speech. Thucydides states that Pericles drove the city into the war (1.127.3), and the speech, in which the Spartans are characterized as enemies whose weak agricultural basis will prevent them from capably prosecuting any war, but in particular a war against Athenian naval power, confirms this statement.

Chapter 5 discussed Pericles' speech in indirect discourse together with its intense, and intensely corrective, narrative context. It reviewed the initial chapters of book 2 in order, focusing on Thucydides' account of the Theban attack on Plataea, the war preparations of each alliance, and Archidamus' address to his powerful Spartan army. Pericles' speech in indirect discourse replaces a discussion of Athens' specific challenges in the war with a display of Athens' material resources. As was also the case with Pericles' first speech, the speech exhorts the Athenians to rely on these resources for the coming war. By contrast, Thucydides' many internal corrections of this speech cast doubt on Pericles' materialistic emphases, and his stories of the Theban attack on Plataea and of Attic history (2.14–17) suggest alternative sources of civic strength.

The present chapter discussed Pericles' imperial aims, and argued further that both Pericles' arguments and his rhetoric form a stark contrast, intended by the author, to the narrative context that surrounds them. Our tendency to identify Periclean and Thucydidean views has resulted in scholarship that more frequently asks how the Periclean–Thucydidean identification functions, than what character Thucydides wrote up for Pericles. Here, we have separated the author from his depiction, and asked the question directly: Thucydides shows simultaneously a Pericles who is a dedicated and incorruptible leader, entirely focused on his city, and a man who was cruel to Athenian citizens and entirely materialistic in his attitude toward the value of nearly anything in human life. He shows a man with the most refined rhetorical skills and a correspondingly sophisticated grasp of emerging political institutions, and at the same time a man who could heap up superlatives to project a vision of Athenian power over the natural elements of the world. He shows Pericles' complex personality, which operated under the pressure of the possession of resources and imperial capacity that seemed to Pericles unique. The historian knew better, and offered a study of Pericles' deepening dilemma. I suggest that his analysis cannot be a matter of indifference to us.

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General Index

Index Locorum