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Chapter 1: Grand Strategy: A Framework for Analysis
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GRAND STRATEGY A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that renowned classic treatises in their respective fields provide, *inter alia*, a standard of evaluation for all other field-related work and serve as a cornerstone upon which new theories can be developed. As far as the study of strategy is concerned, Michael Handel has claimed that strategists are fortunate to have access to two enduring classic texts: Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Clausewitz's *On War*¹. However, we believe that another classic masterpiece needs to be added to this short list, namely Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*². The purpose of this analysis, therefore, is to demonstrate Thucydides' contribution to the study of strategy.

Undoubtedly, Thucydides ranks as both a great historian and the forefather of the discipline of international relations. Robert Gilpin has wondered whether contemporary scholars of international relations actually know anything about state behavior that was unknown to Thucydides³. What has been ignored is that in Thucydides' text we encounter for the first time in history an outline of a complete theory of grand strategy; a comprehensive theory of how states ensure their security. Thucydides' theory incorporates the economic, diplomatic, military, technological, demographic, psychological and other factors upon which a state's security depends. It is highly interesting that Thucydides did not confine his analysis to traditional strategies that focus on the military dimension. He also took into account grand strategies that emphasise dimensions other than the military one, pointing out that these may well provide states with a path to victory. (p. 1)

The main argument of this study is that Thucydides' text is a classic masterpiece of strategy that contains significant strategic insights and a wealth of strategic concepts (see Appendix). Seen in this light, Thucydides' *History* has at least equal right with Clausewitz' *On War* to be considered 'the strategist's toolkit'⁴. Needless to say, Thucydides did not use contemporary strategic jargon. One has to delve in the text in order to uncover these insights and concepts. This is where our own contribution lies: to bring to the surface and translate into modern strategic parlance the aforementioned concepts and insights.

One might perhaps doubt that a book written twenty-five centuries ago retains any relevance for today's strategic issues and problems. However, it has been correctly pointed out that "*there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.*"⁵ This is the guiding principle of the present analysis and will hopefully be demonstrated as far as Thucydides' work is concerned.

Before proceeding to the examination of Thucydides' contribution to the study of grand strategy, and strategy in general, we first need to clarify and elaborate upon these concepts. The essence of strategy and grand strategy needs to be understood, and the various characteristics of these two concepts outlined. Consequently, in this chapter we shall first elaborate on the nature of strategy and outline its various levels. We shall then examine grand strategy and certain aspects thereof while also making an attempt to categorise grand strategies, both according to the nature of the means employed and the general approach to be followed in the pursuit of policy objectives. The final issue touched upon in this chapter is that of the planning and evaluation of grand strategy. This analysis will help us comprehend the contribution of Thucydides to the study of strategy (discussed in Chapters Two to Five).

The Nature of Strategy

There have been many definitions of the term 'strategy' throughout the ages. While strategy was initially defined as "all military movements out of the enemy's cannon range or range of vision"⁶ or "the art of making war upon the map"⁷, nowadays the term has acquired a broader meaning. Two modern definitions of strategy are "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy"⁸ (p. 2) and "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute"⁹. These definitions make it clear that strategy is about a state coupling means and ends in the context of international competition, both in peacetime and wartime, and both during potential as well as actual conflict.

Strategy never exists in a vacuum; it implies an opponent, a conflict, a competition, a situation where somebody is trying to achieve a goal against somebody else. Thus, strategy is always formulated against one or more opponents, who, in turn, develop their own strategy and try to counter the former. Each side's moves are intimately connected with those of the opponent. As Clausewitz comments "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale".¹⁰ This interaction between the strategic designs of both belligerents has been referred to as the 'horizontal dimension' of strategy¹¹. The very existence of an opposing will gives strategy a comparatively paradoxical logic of its own, which differs from the traditional definition of logic that governs one's actions when no opponent is present. Thus, while a traveler, as a rule, chooses the shortest route and the best weather conditions for his/her journey, the existence of an opponent will make a military commander attack through a roundabout route instead of launching a head-on assault, attack at

night instead of daytime, etc. An even more striking example of the paradoxical logic of strategy is the well-known Latin aphorism *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war). Even though in other areas of life similar aphorisms would be clearly absurd (e.g. "if you want to be sober, prepare some drinks"), in the realm of strategy this aphorism is accepted as conventional wisdom¹².

However, states in general, and military organizations in particular, sometimes 'forget' that they are facing opponents possessing an independent will and employing a strategy of their own. Overlooking this can have dire consequences. For instance, the German Army moved from Moltke's conviction that "no plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first contact with the enemy's main strength"¹³, to the concept of "war by timetable" as promulgated by Schlieffen a century later. In strict adherence to this approach, the German invasion of France in 1914, the capture of Paris and the subsequent transfer of the German troops to the East in order to fight the Russians had been preplanned down to the last detail. However, as the failure of the Schlieffen Plan revealed, strategy can seldom be subjected to such meticulous planning-the opponent, as a rule, is bound to interfere with one's (p. 3) plans¹⁴. But it is certainly far more pleasant for an army during peacetime to contemplate what it will do to the enemy on D-day than what the enemy will do to it¹⁵.

Something that accentuates the difficulty of formulating strategy is that in strategy, as in economy, resources are normally scarce, especially as far as the smaller states are concerned¹⁶. Precisely due to this scarcity of resources, strategy ought to rate the objectives to be pursued and prioritise them accordingly.

The Levels of Strategy

Traditionally, 'strategy' has been distinguished from 'tactics'. Tactics has to do with the execution of strategy. The rule of thumb for distinguishing between the two has been that strategy ends and tactics begin the moment the opposing forces make contact¹⁷. In other words, while strategy decides *where, when* and *with what forces* an action will be conducted, tactics govern *how* this action will be conducted¹⁸. Consequently, the term 'tactics' refers to what takes place on the battlefield, taking into account the extension of the concept of 'battlefield' brought about by the advent of aircraft as well as medium and long-range missiles. In general, tactics are used in 'battle' and strategy in 'war'.¹⁹

The need to distinguish between strategy and tactics shows that strategy operates on various levels; this is the so-called 'vertical dimension' of strategy²⁰. Although still relevant, the traditional distinction between strategy and tactics far from exhausts the issue. To get the full picture, one has first to examine the roots of strategy. The governing mind behind strategy is policy. Policy sets the aims that strategy will subsequently be called upon to achieve. As far as strategy is concerned, the process by which the aims are set and the nature of the political leadership that sets them are irrelevant. As a matter of fact, the concept of political leadership varies from country to country, depending on the country's political system. Political

leadership may at times even comprise individuals who happen to be outside the official state institutions. For instance, Stalin and Deng ruled their respective countries for considerable periods of time without in fact holding any state office²¹. An individual or a group of individuals may belong to the 'political leadership' irrespective of whether they are actually politicians or not. At times, the political leadership of various countries has included hereditary rulers (like the kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco (p. 4) nowadays), clerics (Richelieu in France, Alberoni in Spain, Makarios in Cyprus) or military men (Napoleon, Pinochet, the Japanese Army leadership during the 1930s and 1940s, and the Turkish Army leadership from the 1960s onwards). In other words, as far as strategy is concerned, political leadership refers to "those who run the country". The leadership may be democratic or authoritarian, legitimate or illegitimate, but it is still this leadership that will set the aims that strategy will then serve.²²

As illustrated, when the policy objectives are coupled with the various means and care is taken to overcome the opponent's resistance, one enters the realm of strategy. We shall shortly examine the various levels of strategy. Despite their differences, they are all governed by the paradoxical logic of strategy. In addition, none of these levels are free from the difficulty of scarcity of resources that compels strategic planners to assign priorities among the objectives to be pursued. Finally, there is constant interaction with the opponent at every one of these levels; in other words, the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of strategy are constantly intermingled (see Table 1.1). The various levels are not conceived as rigidly separated and contrasted categories, but as successive areas of a continuum,²³ especially since they continuously interact amongst each other.

Table 1.1: Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Strategy

<i>State A</i>		<i>Opposing State B</i>
Grand Strategy	↔	Grand Strategy
↓		↓
Military Strategy	↔	Military Strategy
↓		↓
Operational Art	↔	Operational Art
↓		↓
Tactics	↔	Tactics

The highest level of strategy is grand strategy. Grand strategy refers to the use of all available means (military, economic, diplomatic, etc.) at a state's disposal, in order to achieve the objectives set by policy in the face of actual or potential conflict.²⁴

Grand strategy is formulated by the political leadership, as this is defined above. It is grand strategy that deals with the fundamental (p. 5) issues of war and

peace. Grand strategy will decide whether a state will go to war in order to achieve the objectives set by policy. In addition, grand strategy will align the military strategy of the war with the political, diplomatic and economic strategies that form part of the war effort, making sure that they interact harmoniously and that one of these strategies does not have a detrimental impact on another (see also below).

The domain of grand strategy is chiefly the international system. A state's grand strategy is extensively (but, as we will soon see, not solely) influenced by such factors as the structure of the international system, the international balance of power, the international diplomatic scene, and the trends in international economy. In addition, grand strategy covers the whole of sovereign space and population. This is the case both because it makes use of all national means, material and nonmaterial, and because a grand strategy must ensure its domestic legitimacy.

When a grand strategy is applied to a specific war, with a specific opponent within a specific international environment, it becomes a theory of victory. A theory of victory explains how a specific war can be won²⁵. Although a theory of victory is by definition related to a specific context, certain theories of victory contain elements of permanent importance. A highly interesting example of such permanent elements can be found in Clausewitz's analysis of how one could achieve total victory against Russia. According to him, this country could not be forcibly conquered, in contrast to the other European countries neither Napoleon's 600,000 men in 1812 nor Hitler's three million in 1941 proved sufficient for a conquest. Russia can only be destroyed from within, that is by exploiting its internal divisions. Since its government retained its composure and the Russian people remained loyal to the government, Napoleon's campaign could not succeed²⁶. Although Clausewitz's analysis did not examine the broader international context, it nevertheless provided the essential elements of a theory of victory against Russia, at least in the pre-nuclear era. In simple words, this theory stated that: "If your aim is total victory over Russia and the international environment allows it, your only chance of success lies in exploiting the internal divisions of that country." This analysis has been historically vindicated. The collapse of Russia in the First World War was caused by internal revolutionary movements that had been to some extent assisted by the Germans²⁷. On the contrary, in the Second World War, the rallying of the Soviet people behind their government (p. 6) and the final failure of the German invasion was precisely the result of Hitler's refusal to exploit the internal divisions of the Soviet Union (by playing either on the anti-communist sentiments of the population or on the division between Russians and non-Russians) and his insistence on treating the whole of the conquered Soviet population as 'sub humans' (*Untermenschen*)²⁸.

Supporting grand strategy are the military, economic, diplomatic and political strategies. The economic, diplomatic and political strategies will be discussed in the next section, where grand strategy will be elaborated upon. The rest of this section will deal with military strategy and the levels below that, namely operational and tactical.²⁹ Military strategy is the use of all military means at a state's disposal, in order to achieve the objectives set by policy in view of actual or potential conflict³⁰.

It is military strategy that determines the structure and the mission of a country's armed forces. Irrespective of the various administrative divisions adopted in different countries, a state's armed forces may be divided into land, naval, air and (where in existence) mass destruction forces³¹. The degree of participation of each of these branches in the attempt to achieve the state's policy objectives in peace and war is the object of military strategy.

Military strategies may attempt either to retain or overthrow the status quo. Both of these can be achieved either by the threat or the actual use of force. Depending on this ends-means mix, military strategies may be classified as offensive, defensive, deterrent and compellent (see Table 1.2).³²

An offensive military strategy aims at overthrowing the existing status quo by the use of force. A 'pure' offensive strategy is characterised by the emphasis it places on a) first strike; b) territorial conquest;

Table 1.2: Military Strategies

		<i>Political Objectives</i>	
		<i>Overthrow Status Quo</i>	<i>Retain Status Quo</i>
<i>Means</i>	Use of Force	Offensive	Defensive
	Threat of Force	Compellent	Deterrent

(p. 7) c) decisive victory over the armed forces of the enemy. An offensive military strategy may have unlimited or limited territorial aims, i.e. either complete conquest of an opponent (e.g. the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait), or seizure of a specific piece of territory (e.g. the Argentine conquest of the Falklands).

A defensive military strategy, on the other hand, attempts to retain the existing status quo by the use of force; in other words, it aims at repelling the enemy's offensive. A 'pure' defensive strategy is characterised by the emphasis it places on a) absorbing the opponent's first strike; b) denying the territorial objectives of the enemy by holding territory; c) denying the decisive victory of an adversary by limiting damage to one's armed forces. The Soviet Union followed such a strategy during the period 1941-1944, replacing it with an offensive one during the period 1944-1945.³³

It is to be noted that between offensive and defensive military strategies there exists the grey area of anticipatory first strikes. An anticipatory attack aims at the destruction of a potential source of threat before the said threat actually materialises. Depending on the maturation time of the perceived threat, anticipatory attacks may

be either preventive or pre-emptive³⁴. Prevention deals with threats expected to mature after years, while pre-emption deals with threats expected to mature within weeks, days, or even hours. The logic of prevention is that of fighting early and creating a *fait accompli* while this is still possible; that is before the balance of power tips in any decisive way and the strategic opponent becomes strong enough to be threatening (e.g. the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981).³⁵ In contrast, pre-emption does not have to do with long-term threats, but revolves around immediate crises: a state strikes against the offensive forces of another, so as to blunt an attack that is assumed to be imminent—in other words, the attack is already viewed as a matter of fact rather than as conjecture about the distant future³⁶.


There are important legal and moral distinctions³⁷ between prevention and pre-emption that make pre-emption a borderline case between offense and defense. However, in our study both strategies will be considered as offensive on the grounds of their behavioral manifestation, namely war initiation.

Deterrence is a strategy of using threat to dissuade opponents from attempting to achieve their objectives. A deterrent military strategy attempts to retain the existing status quo by the threat of force. There (p. 8) are three types of deterrent threat: denial, retaliation/retribution, and punishment. The aim is that the opponent does not attack at all, fearing that the resulting cost will be greater than the likely benefit.³⁸ There are some deterrent military strategies that, although meaningful before an opponent violates the status quo (*ex ante*), may not constitute rational choices *after* an opponent violates the status quo (*ex post*). The most characteristic example is the U.S. threat of nuclear retaliation in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union itself acquired the capability of large-scale nuclear strikes on US territory, the American threat of nuclear retaliation did retain its deterrent value, since it signified very serious consequences indeed; however, the rationality of its execution if the Soviet Union did actually invade Western Europe was put into considerable doubt.

Finally, compellence is a strategy of using threat to persuade the opponent to perform some desired action. There are several examples of compellent military strategies, namely strategies where the aim is to overthrow the existing status quo by the threat of force; in other words, to make the opponent submit without war. **In** most instances military strategies of this kind are synonymous with the offensive ones—the best way to make opponents accept an adverse change of the status quo without war is persuading them that you can bring about this change by the use of force anyway. However, as in the case of deterrent strategies, there have been some military strategies that were suitable for compellence in peacetime, but unsuitable for a victory in war. For instance, Germany launched an ambitious program of naval development, putting emphasis on battleship construction. The aim was to create a naval threat against Great Britain, so that the latter would make concessions to Germany in order to win Berlin over to London's side. During the First World War, however, the German Navy rarely used its expensive battleships and basically

resorted to submarine warfare. The conclusion; battleships were suitable for compellence in peacetime, but the submarines were suitable for victory in war.³⁹

The success of a deterrent threat is measured by its not having to be used. The success of a compellent action is measured by how closely and quickly the adversary conforms to one's stipulated wishes. In compellence, as Robert Art explains, A is doing something that B cannot tolerate; then, B initiates action against A in order to get him to stop his intolerable actions; at the end, A stops his intolerable actions (p. 9) and B stops his (or both cease simultaneously). In deterrence, A is presently not doing something that B finds intolerable; B tells A that if A changes his behavior and does something intolerable, B will punish him; finally, A continues not to do something that B finds intolerable (see Figure 1).⁴⁰



The domain of military strategy is far narrower than that of grand strategy. Military strategy covers the whole of the sovereign space, as well as the whole of the actual or potential theatre(s) of operations. Still, broader considerations are not necessarily absent from military strategy. For instance, if armaments are imported from abroad, then it is obvious that arms' procurement, which constitutes an important part of military strategy,⁴¹ can be influenced by the international environment. Military strategy used to be formulated by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who more often than not happened to be a hereditary king. The advent of the general staff and defense ministries brought more professionalism to the making of military strategy, which nowadays is viewed as the domain of the political and military leadership of a state's defense ministry.

In the context of war, military strategy determines the role of each branch of the armed forces, as well as the relative priority of the various theatres of operations. Thus, the Schlieffen Plan assigned priority to the Western theatre of operations (France) over the Eastern one (Russia), in the same way that the military strategy of the Western allies in the Second World War gave priority to the European theatre of operations over the Pacific one.

Immediately below the level of military strategy, but above that of tactics, lies the operational level. The concept of the operational level of war⁴² has only recently entered the strategic thought of the Western (p. 10) countries, being borrowed from the Soviets, who, in turn, had taken it from the Germans⁴³. Whereas military strategy has to do with the 'war' and tactics with the 'battle,' the operational level has to do

with the 'campaign'. The operational level is the domain of large military units (conventionally starting from the army corps) of one or more branches of the armed forces, that operate within a certain theatre of the war. Theatres of war vary in size. There are theatres as vast as the Pacific Ocean during the Second World War and as small as the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War (1973). Even within a particular theatre, it is possible that some smaller yet completely autonomous theatres may evolve; the Crimean theatre within the broader Russian front in 1942 was such a case⁴⁴. The operational level is basically the domain of the generals.

The scale of operations and the variety of military units are conditions necessary but not sufficient for talking about an independent operational level; the actions of these units must constitute something more than the sum of their tactical parts⁴⁵. In practice, however, these two conditions normally prove sufficient. For instance, while the single pikeman or the small band of pikemen stood no chance against the single cavalryman or the small band of cavalymen, large units of pikemen could hold their own against similar bodies of charioteers or cavalymen.

Some analysts believe that, since different operational situations may exist and different operational methods may be used within the same theatre of operations, one should discern both a separate level of 'theatre strategy', located immediately below that of military strategy and covering the activities within a theatre, and an 'operational level', located below the level of theatre strategy and dealing with the various operational methods of action⁴⁶. The Kosovo War (1999) is a striking example of different operational conditions and methods co-existing within the same theatre. On the one hand there was the high-technology air-war, while on the other the irregular operations on the ground reminded one of the wars of the Middle Ages or the Thirty Years' War. Nevertheless, the continuum 'battle-campaign-war' is neat enough and we see no compelling reason why it should be broken by the introduction of another level dealing with the style in which war is waged.

We have already devoted some attention to tactics, the lowest level of strategy,⁴⁷ Clausewitz defined tactics as "the use of armed forces in the engagement"⁴⁸. The tactical level is characterised by its small scale. (p. 11)

The military units that operate within it can be as small as a rifle squad or a machine gun crew (there are even 'individual tactics', referring to the conduct of the individual soldier), and their actions take place in comparatively limited space. Details of weather and terrain are crucial and the same applies to details of the order of battle⁴⁹. Last, but not least, the tactical level is the area of personal bravery.⁵⁰ Tactics are basically the domain of the officers and, where very small units are concerned, the non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

When making a strategic analysis, it is very important to think in terms of the levels of strategy. This is for two reasons: a) a course of action feasible or advisable on a certain level may be impractical or even detrimental on another level; b) since

there is constant interaction amongst the various levels, a possible malfunction in one of them may have an adverse impact on the whole strategic structure.

Regarding the second point, both Clausewitz and Moltke have emphatically pointed out that when strategy is wrong, tactical dexterity is not enough to make up for the strategic mistake. The examples of Japan and Germany in the Second World War have often been used to make this point. Although their armed forces (especially Germany's) displayed a high degree of effectiveness at the tactical and operational level, gross blunders at grand strategy level (going to war against vastly superior opponents) condemned these two countries to defeat⁵¹.

It is still rather early to talk about the political consequences of the recent Iraq War (2003), let alone pass judgment on the soundness of the American grand strategy that led to it⁵². Nevertheless, it does not seem unlikely that the US will not only fail to achieve one of its core political objectives of that war, namely creating a stable and democratic Iraq ruled by a friendly regime and serving as a model of democracy in the Middle East, but will also remain entangled in a deepening morass for a long time. The American armed forces performed excellently indeed in the realms of military strategy, operational art and tactics during the conventional phase of the Iraq War⁵³. They have also displayed high-quality performance at these levels during certain stages of the counterinsurgency phase of that war.⁵⁴ However, if the dire predictions regarding Iraq's future come true, then this war will prove to be another example where dexterity in the lower levels of strategy could not help a flawed grand strategy achieve the policy objectives of the state.

However, the interaction of the levels works the other way round as well; lower levels may influence the higher ones. As Sir Basil Liddell (p. 12) Hart stated, a strategy's success depends on whether it is tactically feasible. Thus, Stalin's generals, after pushing back the Germans from the outskirts of Moscow in December 1941, launched a massive counteroffensive in the middle of winter 1941-42, aiming to shatter the German Army, whose vulnerability he had correctly grasped. Despite their enthusiasm though, the Soviet troops and their commanders had not yet reached the necessary level of operational and tactical efficiency. The result was that they suffered casualties disproportionately high compared to the meagre results of their offensive.⁵⁵ It took the Red Army less than two years to improve on its operational and tactical skills. Then, by following the same strategy that had failed in the beginning of 1942, the Red Army proved capable of achieving total victory.

We conclude the discussion of the levels of strategy by pointing out that, apart from strategies (grand and military) that are or have not been feasible at lower levels, there are also instances of strategies that are in principle feasible operationally and tactically, but nevertheless fail because of mistakes at those levels. Xerxes' Persian invasion of Greece (480 B.C.) is such a case. Xerxes' grand strategy consisted of taking care to amass immense military power, so as to ensure the achievement of his political objective (conquest of Greece), while at the same time exploiting the divisions among the Greek city-states and winning many of them over to his side.

His military strategy placed emphasis on cooperation between army and navy, so as to keep his immense army supplied with wheat from Asia. Everything was going well and Athens was captured. However, the disaster came at the operational level, namely Xerxes' decision to engage in battle at the straits of Salamis (480 B.C.). The narrow front neutralised Persian numerical superiority, and the heavier ships of the Greeks gave the latter victory. The Persians, however, could still have achieved their objectives, since their remaining forces in Greece were substantial. Nevertheless, through a tactical blunder they contrived to lose the battle of Plataea (479 B.C.), where they initially had held the advantage: the main body of their army was moved behind the archers that had been confronting the Spartans opposite them, thus cutting the archers' line of retreat and leaving them defenseless against the determined Spartan assault; the Persian army was thrown into disarray and took flight. A brilliant strategic design that was objectively bound to succeed was ruined by operational and tactical ineptitude.⁵⁶ (p. 13)

*Aspects of Grand Strategy: Military
and Non-Military Components*

Given that the concept of grand strategy is central to *our* analysis, we need to elaborate on it a little further.⁵⁷ Essentially, grand strategy is a state's theory about how it can 'cause' security for itself, namely preservation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and relative power position⁵⁸. Indeed, the way states choose to ensure security for themselves forms the very core of grand strategy, and their success in so doing is the crucial test of any particular grand strategy. In other words, the validity of a grand strategy can be empirically tested. Ideally, grand strategy must include an explanation of why this security producing theory is expected to work in a given environment. Grand strategy can be understood as a state's response to specific threats to its security; it must identify potential threats and devise political and other remedies for them. Grand strategy should be viewed as a politico-military means-ends chain in which military capabilities are linked to military strategies that are in turn connected with political objectives. In theory, grand strategies exploit the advantages that the state possesses and aim to minimise those of the opponent. It has already been mentioned that strategy is labouring under scarcity of resources, and grand strategy is no exception. In an anarchic international environment the number of possible threats is great and resources to meet them are bound to be scarce; consequently, priorities must be established among both threats and remedies.

An elaborate treatment of the concept of grand strategy, containing an excellent description of the various means grand strategy employs, both in peacetime and in wartime,⁵⁹ has been given by Liddell Hart. According to him:

[T]he role of grand strategy-higher strategy-is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations towards the attainment of the political object of the war-the goal defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in

order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources-for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy-which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will.⁶⁰ (p. 14)

Since we have already dealt extensively with the military component of grand strategy, let us also briefly comment on its other important, non-military components.⁶¹ Diplomacy is a component of grand strategy that can contribute to national security by securing allies, minimizing the number of potential antagonists, negotiating with opponents or diplomatically isolating them⁶². A high premium is put on identifying and exploiting opportunities offered by the existing or evolving situation in the international (or regional) system. An eye keen on detecting such opportunities, coupled with a capacity to exploit them, may enable statesmen to achieve extraordinary results.

The Austrian chancellor Clemens Metternich offers an excellent example. The Austrian Empire had been in decline since the mid-eighteenth century; it had suffered badly during the Napoleonic Wars, and its multinational composition was a cause of major concern, especially in view of the emergence of the new concept of nationalism. Nevertheless, not only did Metternich manage to extract substantial territorial gains after Napoleon's defeat, but also ensured Austrian supremacy in both Germany and Italy for many decades to come. The secret of his success was simple: after the turmoil created by the French Revolution and Napoleon's campaigns, the watchword among the European great powers was 'stability'.⁶³ Metternich managed to persuade the two key players, namely Great Britain and Russia, that Austria was the ideal guardian of stability in Central Europe and the Italian peninsula, whilst itself posing absolutely no threat to the balance of power.

The economic component of grand strategy also exercises profound influence on national security. This is done in two ways: a) by supporting military strategy (e.g. enabling arms' procurement, sustaining long periods of mobilization, etc.) and diplomacy (e.g. by financing influential groups in foreign countries); b) in an independent capacity, by granting economic aid to foreign countries or conducting economic warfare against them.⁶⁴

Although possession of a strong economic base does not automatically guarantee military prowess (e.g. the Persian Empire *vs.* Alexander, or the West Roman Empire *vs.* the barbarians), nevertheless the connection between the two is too well-known to require elaboration. Similarly, the idea of paying one's way to an alliance is probably as old as the mountains. **In** early modern history, Cardinal Richelieu set a pattern by offering subsidies to the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus (p. 15) in order to secure the support of the mighty Swedish army against the German Emperor. In the same manner, the British subsidised Frederick the Great of Prussia so that he could preoccupy not only the Austrians, but the French as well.

Economic aid is another familiar concept. The Napoleonic Wars witnessed an interesting case of reciprocal economic warfare: Napoleon forbade the Europeans to trade with Great Britain, whereas the British, by means of a naval blockade, tried to make sure that the Europeans would trade *solely* with Great Britain. The British blockade was irksome and not altogether in compliance with international law, but trading with Great Britain carried many attractions, since the advanced British economy had many valuable goods to offer. Thus, the temptation to break with the Napoleonic 'Continental System' was too great. Actually, Russia's decision to opt for trade with Great Britain was one of the reasons the French emperor undertook the disastrous Russian campaign.⁶⁵

Apart from the military, economic and diplomatic power (alliances, etc.), that constitute the so-called 'hard power', states also possess and employ in their grand strategies the so-called 'soft power'.⁶⁶ Cultural, ideological or religious affinity or influences are different forms of this power, while nowadays a state might enjoy a certain amount of influence by participating in some key international organizations (e.g. EU, NATO).

Soft power is not to be underrated. In fact, it can play an important role in securing the legitimacy of a grand strategy both home and abroad. This is indeed the political component of grand strategy. The Byzantine Empire provides a textbook case of exploitation of soft power, namely the conversion of various barbarian nations to Christianity, with a view to minimizing the number of opponents and extending the Empire's influence.⁶⁷ The exploitation of Communist ideology by the Soviet Union is another case in point whereas, in the same vein, Iran's exploitation of Islamic fundamentalism enabled that state to achieve an international influence out of all proportion to its hard power.

Typologies of Grand Strategies

We have already encountered a typology of military strategies according to their ends-means mix, namely offensive, defensive, deterrent and compellent strategies. There has been no dearth of typologies of grand strategies as well. A particularly important typology that will be used (p. 16) extensively in our study, is the one devised by the prominent German historian Hans Delbrück, based on the means that a strategy employs.

Delbrück outlined two basic forms of strategy: the strategy of annihilation (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*) and the strategy of exhaustion (*Ermattungsstrategie*)⁶⁸. The aim of the strategy of annihilation is that of the decisive battle (*Vernichtungsschlacht*),⁶⁹ whereas the strategy of exhaustion employs the battle as but one of a variety of means, such as territorial occupation, destruction of crops, blockade, etc. In general, the concept of economic damage to the enemy plays a key role in this strategy. The strategy of exhaustion is neither a variation of the strategy of annihilation, nor inferior to it. On the contrary, such a strategy can often be the only way for a state to achieve its political aims. It must be noted that these two strategies are ideal types; in practice, one often encounters a mix between them.

Although Delbrück referred to military strategies, not necessarily mentioning grand strategies, his distinction between a strategy of annihilation and a strategy of exhaustion may be invaluable to the study of grand strategies. One must also note that in Delbrück's time the term grand strategy was used in a much more restrictive sense than at present; that is, as only covering the overall war policy of a state. Nowadays, a grand strategy by definition makes use of all available means and does not restrict itself to the traditional military ones. Nevertheless, a distinction between a grand strategy of annihilation and a grand strategy of exhaustion can still be made, depending on which means feature most prominently in a grand strategy. In a grand strategy of annihilation the state depends mainly on military strategy; all other strategies (economic, diplomatic, etc.) are essentially subservient to it. On the other hand, a grand strategy of exhaustion makes simultaneous use of all possible means so as to achieve the aims set by state policy.⁷⁰

The Napoleonic campaigns constitute classic examples of the strategy of annihilation. They culminated in decisive battles (e.g. Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram), in which the French emperor completely crushed the armed forces of his enemies, forcing them to sue for peace.⁷¹ On the other hand, the grand strategy that Great Britain adopted from the seventeenth century onwards was a typical example of a strategy of exhaustion. The so-called 'British way of warfare' can be described as entailing: a) blockade of continental ports, b) distant maritime operations directed against the colonies and the overseas trade of the rival continental powers, c) subsidies to allies, d) nominal (p. 17) ground forces' commitment to the continent, and e) peripheral raiding around the continental littoral to exploit the flexibility of sea power for surprise maneuver.⁷²

In effect, the Napoleonic campaigns created the second typology of grand strategies that will be used in this study, namely, of the direct and indirect approach. It must be noted that these concepts are not confined to the grand strategy level, but extend to all levels of strategy; nevertheless, we will focus on their application at the level of grand strategy.

The campaigns of Napoleon formed the basis of the theory of war that Clausewitz promulgated shortly afterwards. Clausewitz laid emphasis on the direct approach, namely the direction of one's war effort primarily towards the main opponent and/or the 'centre of gravity' (i.e. the strongest component) of the enemy war effort. In most instances, this centre of gravity was the armed forces of the enemy; consequently, these forces had to be destroyed. Obviously, the strategy of annihilation occupies a central position in Clausewitz's theory and it is no wonder that it continues to be associated with him, as well as with Napoleon to this day.⁷³ However, 'strategy of annihilation' and 'direct approach' are not identical concepts, as shall be illustrated later.

In contrast, and throughout his work, Liddell Hart has argued in favour of the advantages of the indirect approach,⁷⁴ The term 'indirect approach' has had a


turbulent history and Liddell Hart's repeated elaborations of it have rendered it practically meaningless.⁷⁵ However, we believe that something of use can still be salvaged from the conceptual mess: 'indirect approach' generally denotes the sidestepping of the enemy's strong points and the avoidance of attrition warfare. At the level of grand strategy, the indirect approach may be regarded as the evading of the main opponent by directing one's war effort against the secondary opponent(s), postponing the decisive strike in favour of a more suitable moment.

Planning and Evaluating Grand Strategy

Taking into account the analysis so far, one reaches the conclusion that, in order to be considered successful at the level of grand strategy, planning needs to address the following four dimensions⁷⁶ (see Table 1.3):

1. Assessment of the international environment, so as to identify potential or actual threats to national security, as well as the various (p. 18) constraints and opportunities for the implementation of the grand strategy that may be present in this environment. Clearly then, the crucial test for a grand strategy in this dimension is international strategic fit.
2. Identification of the ends that the grand strategy is to pursue, in view of the means available, plus the aforementioned threats, constraints, and opportunities. In view of the ever-present scarcity of resources, there are certain limits to the ends pursued. As already mentioned, priorities must be established among the various aims but one must make sure that the aims set do not exceed the means available. This would lead to the phenomenon of overextension on which we shall elaborate later. The avoidance of overextension is one important indicator of the performance of a grand strategy.
3. Allocation of resources so as to achieve the objectives outlined by grand strategy. The means have to be tailored to the ends so as to avoid both wasting scarce resources and marshalling inadequate resources for the tasks ahead. Thus, the avoidance of redundancy or inadequacy of means is the critical test that a grand strategy has to meet.
4. Shaping the 'image' of the grand strategy both at the domestic and international level, so that: a) the society actively supports the grand strategy of the state; b) all parts of the state structure work towards the same purpose; c) the grand strategy of the state is viewed as legitimate by the international community. In other words, to be successful in this dimension, a grand strategy has to be accepted both at home and abroad.

Table 1.3: Planning of Grand Strategy



(p. 19)

We have already pointed out that grand strategy is a security-producing theory whose validity can be empirically tested. In addition, we outlined the crucial tests that this theory has to meet to prove its validity. There are, however, five more criteria that are used for evaluating grand strategies⁷⁷.

The first is the external fit criterion, namely the degree to which a grand strategy fits in with the international and domestic political environment. Thus, the advent of a bipolar world in 1945 made it difficult for small states to pursue a grand strategy based on shifting their allegiance among the various great powers as they saw fit; instead, they had to choose camp (if they were in fact allowed to) practically once and for all⁷⁸. As far as the domestic political environment is concerned, increased public concern about foreign policy, that began with the French Revolution, has made it difficult for decision makers to follow a policy of constantly shifting alliances, where yesterday's friend becomes today's enemy.

The second criterion is the relation between means and ends, namely the degree to which the objectives of a grand strategy correspond to the available means and vice versa. This has to do with the traditional problem of how to avoid overextension (i.e. pursue aims beyond one's capabilities),⁷⁹ while at the same time not unduly reducing one's objectives (see Table 1.4). As noted, this is a very important criterion of grand strategy.

The third criterion is that of efficiency, namely whether a grand strategy makes the best use of the available resources. This leads to the issue of cost-benefit assessment. Each of the alternatives of strategic designs available to a state at a given moment leads to different calculations (p. 20) of costs and benefits. Thus, the task of the strategist is to hit upon the optimum strategy, the most efficacious one, the one that yields the best results in this cost-benefit analysis.

Table 1.4: Linking Means and Ends of a Grand Strategy

		<i>Political Commitments</i> (Ends)	
		Few	Many
<i>Available Means</i> (Capabilities)	Few	Passivity	Overextension
	Many	Reduction of Objectives	Strategic Sufficiency

The fourth criterion is internal coherence, namely that one element or one means of the grand strategy does not hamper the function of another. Indeed, this is what happened to Israel in 1973, prior to the Yom Kippur War. Israeli military strategy, that gave emphasis on striking first, was in conflict with the state's diplomatic strategy, which emphasised enlisting US support. However, if Israel, by striking first, gave the impression of being the aggressor, then it would forfeit American support and thus invalidate its diplomatic strategy.⁸⁰

Finally, the fifth criterion is durability to mistakes, namely the ability of a grand strategy to withstand coincidental mistakes and mishaps without prohibitively high costs. The aforementioned example of the Persian invasion of Greece is a typical example of a grand strategy with low durability to mistakes. On the other hand, the American grand strategy during the Cold War proved durable enough to sustain the mistakes and/or mishaps associated with the involvement of the US in Vietnam.

We shall now proceed to the examination of Thucydides' contribution to the study of strategy, and in doing so we shall be assisted by the concepts outlined above.

¹ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 1; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (trans. by Samuel B. Griffith) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

² Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (trans. Rex Warner) (London: Penguin, 1972).

³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 227.

⁴ Colin Gray has declared that 'the strategist's toolkit' is Clausewitz' *On War*; Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 3. We do not dispute that, but want to point out that Thucydides' *History* may legitimately aspire to at least equal status.

⁵ Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 1, emphasis in text.

⁶ Definition by the German war theorist Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow, early 19th century. See Peter, "Clausewitz," in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 190.

⁷ Definition by the Swiss General and strategist Antoine Henry de Jomini (1779-1869); Henry de Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War* (abridged edn. by Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle) reproduced in *Roots of Strategy*, Book 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), p. 460.

⁸ See B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (2nd revised edn.) (London: Meridian, 1991), p. 321.

⁹ See Andre Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 22.

¹⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 75.

¹¹ For the 'horizontal dimension' of strategy, see Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 70.

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- ¹²For an analysis of the paradoxical logic of strategy, not free from overstatement, see Luttwak, *Strategy*.
- ¹³Daniel J. Hughes (ed.), *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (trans. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell) (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), p. 45.
- ¹⁴See Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," Pared, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 296-325, as well as the famous analysis of Gerhard Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan* (London: Wolff, 1958).
- ¹⁵Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 43. See also S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975).
- ¹⁶Athanassios Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries* (Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University, 1986), pp. 3-4.
- ¹⁷Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1892), p. 8.
- ¹⁸See Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, reproduced in *Roots of Strategy*, Book 2, p. 460; Clausewitz, *On War*, bk. 2, ch. 1, p. 129; Helmuth von Moltke, *Moltke's Kriegslehren*, extract reproduced in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 221.
- ¹⁹Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 35.
- ²⁰See Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 70.
- ²¹Stalin ruled the Soviet Union from the beginning of the 1920s until the eve of the German invasion of 1941 by merely holding the party office of General Secretary, while Deng during the last years of his life was officially nothing more than Chairman of the Chinese Bridge Federation.
- ²²On this issue, see Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (London: Cassell, 1973).
- ²³Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969) (mimeo), p. 245.
- ²⁴See Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983); Luttwak, *Strategy*; Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategies in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," in Paul Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1-7. The French General Andre Beaufre uses the term 'total strategy'; see Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*.
- ²⁵See Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, pp. 38-41. In that text Gray uses the term 'theory of war', but we believe that 'theory of victory' is a better term, as in fact used by Gray himself in "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87.
- ²⁶Clausewitz, *On War*, bk. 8, ch. 9, pp. 627-628.
- ²⁷Lenin openly favoured both Russia's defeat in the war and a subsequent civil war that would enable him to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. The German assistance to Lenin was not confined to helping him reach Russia in 1917, but also extended to granting financial support to the Bolsheviks. For these two points, see Dmitri Volkogonov, *Lenin: Life and Legacy* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 79-81, 109-128.
- ²⁸During the initial stages of 'Operation Barbarossa' the Germans were often welcomed as liberators by the Soviet population; see Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* (New York: Da Capo, 1996), pp. 159, 193-194; J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (London: Methuen, 1972), pp. 262-264. For the amazing results of the friendly policy towards the conquered population, followed-on his own initiative-by the German Field-Marshal Ewald von Kleist, see Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., "Kleist," in Correlli Barnett (ed.) *Hitler's Generals* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), pp. 256-257.
- ²⁹There is no reason why the concepts of the operational and tactical level cannot be applied on the other components of grand strategy as well.
- ³⁰For an analysis of the concept of military strategy, see Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), ch. 1. It must be mentioned here that Posen uses the term 'military doctrine' in order to describe both military strategy and what we will later call 'operational doctrine.'
- ³¹The spread of chemical (and to a lesser extent biological) weapons makes it preferable to talk about 'mass destruction forces' instead of 'nuclear forces', although the destructive capacity of chemical and biological weapons cannot be compared to that of nuclear ones.
- ³²Barry Posen distinguishes only the first three categories; see Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 14. Robert Art distinguishes four purposes of force: defensive, deterrent, compellent, and swaggering (*viz.* the display of military force in order to enhance prestige); Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," *International Security*, vol. 4, no. 4 (spring 1980), pp. 4-35.
- ³³. For a further discussion of offensive and defensive military strategies, with special emphasis on the various forms of defense, see Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries*, pp. 31-58.
- ³⁴For a discussion, see Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries*, pp. 32-34.
- ³⁵Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), ch. 8.
- ³⁶Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), part 4.
- ³⁷For a moral argument concerning the distinction between preventive and pre-emptive war, see Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (2nd. edn.) (New York: Basic Books, 1992), ch. 5.
- ³⁸The bibliography on deterrence is immense. For two classic analyses, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961) and Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). For a recent treatise, see Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
- ³⁹See the excellent analysis of Robert Art, "The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower," *Sage Professional Papers in International Studies*, 2, 02-019 (Beverly Hills, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1973). See also Constantinos Koliopoulos, *Understanding Strategic Surprise* (Ph.D. Diss., Lancaster University, 1996), ch. 7.
- ⁴⁰Art, "To What Ends Military Power."

⁴¹ Andre Beaufre prefers to view procurement as operational strategy in peacetime; see Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*. For the importance of procurement strategies, see Ariel Levite and Athanassios Platias, "Evaluating Small States' Dependence on Arms Imports: An Alternative Perspective," *Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 16* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983).

⁴² One should note that the lower levels of strategy appear solely in wartime. Cf. the dissenting view of Beaufre, mentioned above.

⁴³ The concept of the operational level entered Western strategic thought only in the 1980s. Characteristically, Constantine Fitzgibbon, the translator of the German General Guderian's book in English is somewhat at a loss when encountering this term (the book was translated in 1952). See Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 22, fn. 1. Sir Basil Liddell Hart immediately after the Second World War made an unsuccessful attempt to bring back the usage of the pre-Napoleonic term 'grand tactics' which, in any case, was less broad than the "operational level". For a presentation of the pre-Napoleonic terminology, see Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, reproduced in *Roots of Strategy*, Book 2, p. 460 and Whaley, *Stratagem*, pp. 245-246.

⁴⁴ The German Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein makes it clear that, as far as the Germans were concerned, the Crimean theatre was autonomous to such a degree, that there was no interference even from the High Command itself; see Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), pp. 204, 285.

⁴⁵ Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 92.

⁴⁶ Luttwak, *Strategy*. The concept of operational method is closely connected with that of military doctrine. Military doctrine is a particular range of ideas that explains how an armed force will fight; see Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, p. 41.

Obviously, the concept of military doctrine can be employed at all levels of military strategy, depending on the range of forces it covers. When a military doctrine governs all or most branches of the armed forces (e.g. the German Blitzkrieg in Operation Barbarossa), it then becomes part of military strategy. At the same time, there are smaller range doctrines, which usually represent the way each service prefers to accomplish its mission. These can be called operational doctrines or operational methods. For instance, aerial bombardment can be conducted through the operational methods of deep interdiction, area bombing or precision bombing and each of these operational methods can in turn be implemented through various tactical methods; see Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 108. Of course, this is not the only contemporary use of the term 'military doctrine'; we have already encountered a different use by Barry Posen (see above, n. 30). In Soviet strategic thought, the concept of military doctrine had a far broader meaning. For the Soviets, military doctrine had two dimensions: political-military and military-technical. The first specifically stated the requisite criteria for a Soviet decision to wage war, whereas the second concerned all aspects of military practice, from military strategy to tactics (as defined above); see Todd Clark, "Soviet Military Doctrine in the Gorbachev Years: Doctrinal Revolution and Counter Revolution, 1985-1991," *Bairrigg Paper 24* (Lancaster: CDIIS, Lancaster University, 1996), pp. 7-8.

⁴⁷ Some analysts discern yet a lower level, namely the technical one (military technology); see Luttwak, *Strategy*. We contend that technology would be better viewed as one of the structural factors influencing strategy, such as geography. For a treatise following this approach, see Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

⁴⁸ Immediately after that, he defined strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war"; see Clausewitz, *On War*, bk. 2, ch. 1, p. 128. It has been argued that Clausewitz had also discerned what was later to be defined as operational level; see Wallace P. Franz, "Two Letters on Strategy: Clausewitz' Contribution to the Operational Level of War," in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 171-194.

⁴⁹ Cf. the increased importance Clausewitz assigned to the availability of reserves at the tactical level, while at the same time claiming that reserves have no place on strategy, which must make use of all available forces; Clausewitz, *On War*, bk. 3, chs. 12-13.

⁵⁰ This does not mean that senior commanders should not be brave, but only that personal bravery is not the primary thing to ask from them. The French Field-Marshal Bazaine, despite his unsurpassed bravery, proved disastrous as commander-in-chief of the French Army during the Franco Prussian War of 1870-1871. In fact, there were instances where his very bravery was a disadvantage, since he insisted on being on the front line and thus was in no position to exercise overall command; see Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 155.

⁵¹ For a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of the main belligerents in the Second World War at various levels of strategy, see Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), *Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

⁵² For competing views on the soundness of the American grand strategy and the prospects for Iraq, see among others Wesley K. Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004); Toby Dodge, "Iraq's Future," *Adelphi Paper 372* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005); Daniel Byman, "Five Bad Options for Iraq," *Survival*, vol. 47 no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 7-32; Yahia Said, "Iraq in the Shadow of Civil War," *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 4 (Winter 2005-06), pp. 85-92; Christopher J. Fettweis, "On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq," *Survival*, vol. 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007-08), pp. 83-98.

⁵³ See Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁵⁴ This refers chiefly to the inspired leadership of Generals Petraeus and Odierno; see Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "The Patton of Counterinsurgency: With a sequence of brilliant offensives, Raymond Odierno adapted the Petraeus doctrine into a successful operational art", *The Weekly Standard*, vol. 13, no. 25 (March 10, 2008).

⁵⁵ See John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), ch. 8.

⁵⁶ The classic description of Xerxes' campaign can be found in Herodotus, bks. VII-IX. For the battles of Salamis and Plataea, see VIII 84-89 and IX 60-65. For a modern analysis, see J.F.C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954), ch. 1. For a less satisfactory analysis, attributing the Persian failure to the psychological need of every Persian king to achieve conquests, which in turn made him prone to committing the sin of

overextension, see Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, *The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), ch.1. The psychological need for making conquests and the concomitant danger of overextension certainly existed, but if the Persians had not given battle at Salamis and had not committed that tactical blunder at Plataea, it is difficult to see how they would have lost the war. Many of the points highlighted in our analysis have been touched upon by the late Professor Olmstead, an eminent historian of the Persian Empire. However, he also made the completely unsubstantiated claim that even after Plataea the Persians were still capable of "throwing fresh troops upon the battle weary allies and sweeping them rapidly to the southernmost tip of the Peloponnese"; A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 259. In fact, not only were the Persians unable to do anything of the sort but, as will be seen in the next chapter, immediately after Plataea the Greeks were able to mount offensive operations against the Persians in Asia.

⁵⁷ This section draws heavily on Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p.13.

⁵⁸ For a more elaborate analysis of the concept of security, based on the distinction between strong and weak states, see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (2nd edn.) (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), ch. 2.

⁵⁹ According to Paul Kennedy, the idea that grand strategy functions in peacetime as well as in wartime was Liddell Hart's (and, to a lesser degree, Edward Mead Earle's) own contribution to the study of the concept; in other words, this is a comparatively recent idea; see Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategies in War and Peace."

⁶⁰ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 322.

⁶¹ See also Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in Michael Howard, *The Causes of War* (London: Temple Smith, 1983), pp. 101-109.

⁶² See for instance Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), chs. 1, 2, 8.

⁶³ See Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

⁶⁴ See David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

⁶⁵ The classic analysis on this subject is Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812* (2 vols.) (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1893).

⁶⁶ For this concept, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁶⁷ See Haralambos Papanotiriou, *Byzantine Grand Strategy* (Ph.D. Diss., Stanford University, 1991).

⁶⁸ Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War (4 vols.)* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1975-1985). See also Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in Pared, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 326-353.

⁶⁹ As Lawrence Freedman points out, wars are rarely confined to pitched battles that lead to the decisive victory of one combatant. This, however, does not negate the utility of the ideal type of the strategy of annihilation as a tool of strategic planning and analysis. See Lawrence Freedman, "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict," *Survival* 40, 4 (Winter 1998-99), p. 40.

⁷⁰ The term 'grand strategy of exhaustion' roughly coincides with what Andre Beaufre terms 'indirect strategy'; see Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*. Though he does distinguish between 'indirect strategy' and 'indirect approach', we feel that the confusion between these two terms cannot be altogether avoided; hence the term 'grand strategy of exhaustion' serves the analyst better.

⁷¹ The bibliography on Napoleon is immense. See among others Fuller, *The Conduct of War*, pp. 42-58; Peter Pared, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in Pared, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 123-142; David G. Chandler, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1997). For a critical view, see Correlli Barnett, *Bonaparte* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997).

⁷² See B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber, 1932). For a critical presentation of the "British way of warfare," see Colin Gray, "History for Strategists," in Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 23-25.

⁷³ On Clausewitz, see Clausewitz, *On War* and Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). For the association of Napoleon and Clausewitz with the strategy of annihilation, see Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74, 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109-122 and Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1-45.

⁷⁴ For the strategic thought of Liddell Hart, see Liddell Hart, *Strategy* and Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought* (London: Cassell, 1977).

⁷⁵ For the early incarnations of the concept of indirect approach in Liddell Hart's strategic thought, as well as the fluidity of the concept, see John J. Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988), pp. 89-93.

⁷⁶ See, among others, Kennedy, "Grand Strategies in War and Peace"; Papanotiriou, *Byzantine Grand Strategy*.

⁷⁷ See the analysis in Papanotiriou, *Byzantine Grand Strategy*, pp. 34-37; also, Haralambos Papanotiriou, *Byzantine Grand Strategy, 6th-11th century* (Athens: Poyotita, 2000) (text in Greek), pp. 33-34.

⁷⁸ Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries*, ch. 2, and Michael I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1981).

⁷⁹ For a classic analysis, see Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

⁸⁰ See Platias, *High Politics in Small Countries*, ch. 5; Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).