

MICROECONOMICS

Principles and Analysis

CONSUMER OPTIMISATION

1

WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO:

- ✗ We'll solve the consumer's optimisation problem...
- ✗ ...using methods that we've already introduced.
- ✗ This enables us to re-cycle old techniques and results.
- ✗ A tip:
 - + Run the presentation for firm optimisation...
 - + look for the points of comparison...
 - + and try to find as many reinterpretations as possible.

2


THE PROBLEM

- Maximise consumer's utility $U(\mathbf{x})$ *U assumed to satisfy the standard "shape" axioms*
- Subject to feasibility constraint $\mathbf{x} \in X$ *Assume consumption set X is the non-negative orthant.*
- and to the budget constraint $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i \leq y$ *The version with fixed money income*

3

OVERVIEW...

Two fundamental views of consumer optimisation



4

AN OBVIOUS APPROACH?

- ✗ We now have the elements of a standard constrained optimisation problem:
 - + the constraints on the consumer.
 - + the objective function.
- ✗ The next steps might seem obvious:
 - + set up a standard Lagrangean.
 - + solve it.
 - + interpret the solution.
- ✗ But the obvious approach is not always the most insightful.
- ✗ We're going to try something a little sneakier...

5

THINK LATERALLY...

- ✗ In microeconomics an optimisation problem can often be represented in more than one form.
- ✗ Which form you use depends on the information you want to get from the solution.
- ✗ This applies here.
- ✗ The same consumer optimisation problem can be seen in two different ways.
- ✗ I've used the labels "primal" and "dual" that have become standard in the literature.

6

A FIVE-POINT PLAN

- ✗ Set out the basic consumer optimisation problem.
- ✗ Show that the solution is equivalent to another problem.
- ✗ Show that this equivalent problem is identical to that of the firm.
- ✗ Write down the solution.
- ✗ Go back to the problem we first thought of...


The primal problem

The dual problem

The primal problem again

7

THE PRIMAL PROBLEM



- The consumer aims to maximise utility...
- Subject to budget constraint
- Defines the primal problem.
- Solution to primal problem


max $U(x)$ subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i \leq y$$

• But there's another way at looking at this

8

THE DUAL PROBLEM



- Alternatively the consumer could aim to minimise cost...
- Subject to utility constraint
- Defines the dual problem.
- Solution to the problem
- Cost minimisation by the firm

minimise

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i$$

subject to $U(x) \geq v$

• But where have we seen the dual problem before?

9


TWO TYPES OF COST MINIMISATION

- ✗ The similarity between the two problems is not just a curiosity.
- ✗ We can use it to save ourselves work.
- ✗ All the results that we had for the firm's "stage 1" problem can be used.
- ✗ We just need to "translate" them intelligently
 - + Swap over the symbols
 - + Swap over the terminology
 - + Relabel the theorems

10


OVERVIEW...

Reusing results on optimisation



11

A LESSON FROM THE FIRM



- Compare cost-minimisation for the firm...
- ...and for the consumer

- The difference is only in notation
- So their solution functions and response functions must be the same

12

COST-MINIMISATION: STRICTLY QUASICONCAVE U

- Minimise

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i + \lambda [v \leq U(\mathbf{x})]$$

Lagrange multiplier

- Because of strict quasiconcavity we have an interior solution.
- A set of $n+1$ First-Order Conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda^* U_1(\mathbf{x}^*) &= p_1 \\ \lambda^* U_2(\mathbf{x}^*) &= p_2 \\ \dots &\dots \dots \\ \lambda^* U_n(\mathbf{x}^*) &= p_n \end{aligned}$$

one for each good

$$v = U(\mathbf{x}^*)$$

utility constraint

- Use the objective function and output constraint
- to build the Lagrangean
- Differentiate w.r.t. x_1, \dots, x_n and set equal to 0.
- and w.r.t. λ
- Denote cost minimising values with a $*$.

13

IF ICS CAN TOUCH THE AXES...

- Minimise

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i + \lambda [v - U(\mathbf{x})]$$

- Now there is the possibility of corner solutions.
- A set of $n+1$ First-Order Conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda^* U_1(\mathbf{x}^*) &\leq p_1 \\ \lambda^* U_2(\mathbf{x}^*) &\leq p_2 \\ \dots &\dots \dots \\ \lambda^* U_n(\mathbf{x}^*) &\leq p_n \end{aligned}$$

$$v = U(\mathbf{x}^*)$$

Can get " \leq " if optimal value of this good is 0

14

FROM THE FOC

- If both goods i and j are purchased and MRS is defined then...

$$\frac{U_i(\mathbf{x}^*)}{U_j(\mathbf{x}^*)} = \frac{p_i}{p_j}$$

- MRS = price ratio
- "implicit" price = market price

- If good i could be zero then...

$$\frac{U_i(\mathbf{x}^*)}{U_j(\mathbf{x}^*)} \leq \frac{p_i}{p_j}$$

- MRS _{ji} \leq price ratio
- "implicit" price \leq market price

15

THE SOLUTION...

- Solving the FOC, you get a cost-minimising value for each good...

$$\mathbf{x}^* = H(\mathbf{p}, v)$$

- ...for the Lagrange multiplier

$$\lambda^* = \lambda^*(\mathbf{p}, v)$$

- ...and for the minimised value of cost itself.
- The consumer's cost function or expenditure function is defined as

$$C(\mathbf{p}, v) := \min_{U(\mathbf{x}) \geq v} \sum p_j x_j$$

vector of goods prices

Specified utility level

16

THE COST FUNCTION HAS THE SAME PROPERTIES AS FOR THE FIRM

- Non-decreasing in every price. Increasing in at least one price
- Increasing in utility v .
- Concave in \mathbf{p}
- Homogeneous of degree 1 in all prices \mathbf{p} .
- Shephard's lemma.

17

OTHER RESULTS FOLLOW

- Shephard's Lemma gives demand as a function of prices and utility
- H is the "compensated" or conditional demand function.

$$H^i(\mathbf{p}, v) = C_i(\mathbf{p}, v)$$

- Properties of the solution function determine behaviour of response functions.
- Downward-sloping with respect to its own price, etc...

- "Short-run" results can be used to model side constraints
- For example rationing.

18

COMPARING FIRM AND CONSUMER


- Cost-minimisation by the firm...
- ...and expenditure-minimisation by the consumer
- ...are effectively identical problems.
- So the solution and response functions are the same:

	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Consumer</u>
Problem:	$\min_{\mathbf{z}} \sum_{i=1}^m w_i z_i + \lambda[q - \phi(\mathbf{z})]$	$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i + \lambda[v - U(\mathbf{x})]$
Solution function:	$C(\mathbf{w}, q)$	$C(\mathbf{p}, v)$
Response function:	$z_i^* = H^i(\mathbf{w}, q)$	$x_i^* = H^i(\mathbf{p}, v)$

19

OVERVIEW...


Exploiting the two approaches



20

THE PRIMAL AND THE DUAL...


- There's an attractive symmetry about the two approaches to the problem
- In both cases the p s are given and you choose the x s. But...
- ...constraint in the primal becomes objective in the dual...
- ...and vice versa.



21

A NEAT CONNECTION

Compare the primal problem of the consumer... with the dual problem



- The two are equivalent
- So we can link up their solution functions and response functions

22

UTILITY MAXIMISATION

- Maximise $U(\mathbf{x}) + \mu \left[y - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i \right]$
 - If U is strictly quasiconcave we have an interior solution.
 - A set of $n+1$ First-Order Conditions
 - $U_1(\mathbf{x}^*) = \mu^* p_1$
 - $U_2(\mathbf{x}^*) = \mu^* p_2$
 - ...
 - $U_n(\mathbf{x}^*) = \mu^* p_n$
- If U not strictly quasiconcave then replace "=" by " \leq "
- budget constraint $y = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i^*$

Use the objective function ...and budget constraint ...to build the Lagrangean Differentiate w.r.t. x_1, \dots, x_n and set equal to 0. ... and w.r.t. μ Denote utility maximising values with a $*$.

23

FROM THE FOC

- If both goods i and j are purchased and MRS is defined then...

$$\frac{U_i(\mathbf{x}^*)}{U_j(\mathbf{x}^*)} = \frac{p_i}{p_j} \quad \text{*(same as before)}$$

- MRS = price ratio * "implicit" price = market price

- If good i could be zero then...

$$\frac{U_i(\mathbf{x}^*)}{U_j(\mathbf{x}^*)} \leq \frac{p_i}{p_j}$$

- MRS _{ij} \leq price ratio * "implicit" price \leq market price

24

THE SOLUTION...

- Solving the FOC, you get a utility-maximising value for each good...

$$x_i^* = D^i(\mathbf{p}, y)$$

- ...for the Lagrange multiplier

$$\mu^* = \mu^*(\mathbf{p}, y)$$

- ...and for the maximised value of utility itself.
- The indirect utility function is defined as

$$V(\mathbf{p}, y) := \max_{\{\mathbf{x} \mid p_i x_i \leq y\}} U(\mathbf{x})$$

vector of goods prices

money income

25

A USEFUL CONNECTION

- The indirect utility function maps prices and budget into maximal utility
- $$v = V(\mathbf{p}, y)$$

The indirect utility function works like an "inverse" to the cost function

- The cost function maps prices and utility into minimal budget
- $$y = C(\mathbf{p}, v)$$

The two solution functions have to be consistent with each other. Two sides of the same coin

- Therefore we have:
- $$v = V(\mathbf{p}, C(\mathbf{p}, v))$$
- $$y = C(\mathbf{p}, V(\mathbf{p}, y))$$

Odd-looking identities like these can be useful

26

THE INDIRECT UTILITY FUNCTION HAS SOME FAMILIAR PROPERTIES...

(All of these can be established using the known properties of the cost function)

- Non-increasing in every price. Decreasing in at least one price
- Increasing in income y .
- quasi-convex in prices \mathbf{p}
- Homogeneous of degree zero in (\mathbf{p}, y)
- Roy's Identity

But what's this...?

27

ROY'S IDENTITY

$$v = V(\mathbf{p}, y) = V(\mathbf{p}, C(\mathbf{p}, v))$$

"function-of-a-function" rule

- Use the definition of the optimum
- Differentiate w.r.t. p_i .
- Use Shephard's Lemma
- Rearrange to get...
- So we also have...

$$0 = V_i(\mathbf{p}, C(\mathbf{p}, v)) + V_y(\mathbf{p}, C(\mathbf{p}, v)) C_i(\mathbf{p}, v)$$

$$0 = V_i(\mathbf{p}, y) + V_y(\mathbf{p}, y) x_i^*$$

Marginal disutility of price i

Marginal utility of money income

Ordinary demand function

$$x_i^* = - \frac{V_i(\mathbf{p}, y)}{V_y(\mathbf{p}, y)}$$

$$x_i^* = -V_i(\mathbf{p}, y)/V_y(\mathbf{p}, y) = D^i(\mathbf{p}, y)$$

28

UTILITY AND EXPENDITURE

- Utility maximisation
- ...and expenditure-minimisation by the consumer
- ...are effectively two aspects of the same problem.
- So their solution and response functions are closely connected:

Primal

Problem: $\max_{\mathbf{x}} U(\mathbf{x}) + \mu \left[y - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i \right]$

Solution function: $V(\mathbf{p}, y)$

Response function: $x_i^* = D^i(\mathbf{p}, y)$

Dual

Problem: $\min_{\mathbf{x}} \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i + \lambda [v - U(\mathbf{x})]$

Solution function: $C(\mathbf{p}, v)$

Response function: $x_i^* = H^i(\mathbf{p}, v)$

29

SUMMARY

A lot of the basic results of the consumer theory can be found without too much hard work.

We need two "tricks":

A simple relabelling exercise:

cost minimisation is reinterpreted from output targets to utility targets.

The primal-dual insight:

utility maximisation subject to budget is equivalent to cost minimisation subject to utility.

30

1. COST MINIMISATION: TWO APPLICATIONS

- | | |
|--|--|
| ▪ THE FIRM | ▪ THE CONSUMER |
| ▪ min <i>cost of inputs</i> | ▪ min <i>budget</i> |
| ▪ subject to <i>output target</i> | ▪ subject to <i>utility target</i> |
| ▪ Solution is of the form $C(\mathbf{w}, q)$ | ▪ Solution is of the form $C(\mathbf{p}, v)$ |

31

2. CONSUMER: EQUIVALENT APPROACHES

- | | |
|---|---|
| ▪ PRIMAL | ▪ DUAL |
| ▪ max utility | ▪ min <i>budget</i> |
| ▪ subject to budget constraint | ▪ subject to <i>utility constraint</i> |
| ▪ Solution is a function of (\mathbf{p}, y) | ▪ Solution is a function of (\mathbf{p}, v) |

32

BASIC FUNCTIONAL RELATIONS

- $C(\mathbf{p}, v)$ **cost (expenditure)** Utility
- $H^i(\mathbf{p}, v)$ **Compensated demand for good i** (H is also known as "Hicksian" demand.)
- $V(\mathbf{p}, y)$ **indirect utility**
- $D^i(\mathbf{p}, y)$ **ordinary demand for input i** money income

33

WHAT NEXT?

- ✗ Examine the response of consumer demand to changes in prices and incomes.
- ✗ Household supply of goods to the market.
- ✗ Develop the concept of consumer welfare

34