ABHANDLUNGEN

THE CHARACTER OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE[1]

Was the Athenian empire[2] a selfish despotism, detested by the subjects whom it oppressed and exploited? The ancient sources, and modern scholars, are almost unanimous that it was, and the few voices (such as those of Grote, Freeman, Greenidge and Marsh) raised in opposition to this harsh verdict— which will here be called "the traditional view" — have not succeeded in modifying or even explaining its dominance. Characteristic of the attitude of many historians is the severe judgment of Last,[3] who, contrasting Athens as the "tyrant city" with Rome as "*communis nostra patria*", can see nothing more significant in Athenian imperial government than that "warning which gives some slight value to even the worst of failures".

The real basis of the traditional view, with which that view must stand or fall, is the belief that the Athenian empire was hated by its subjects — a belief for which there is explicit and weighty support in the sources (above all Thucydides), but which nevertheless is demonstrably false. The first section of this paper will therefore be devoted to showing that whether or not the Athenian empire was politically oppressive or economically predatory, the general mass of the population of the allied (or subject) states, far from being hostile to Athens, actually welcomed her dominance and wished to remain within the empire, even — and perhaps more particularly — during the last thirty years of the fifth century, when the ὕβρις of Athens, which bulks so large in the traditional view, is supposed to have been at its height.

[1] Much of this article is based on a paper on "The Alleged Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire," read to the London Classical Society on 14th June, 1950. I have to thank Mr. R. Meiggs, Dr. V. Ehrenberg, Prof. A. Andrewes and Mr. P. A. Brunt for making valuable criticisms. I am specially grateful to Prof. A. H. M. Jones for his help and encouragement at every stage. This article, although written earlier (1950–51), may be regarded as a supplement to his "Athenian Democracy and its Critics," in Camb. Hist. Journ. XI (1953) 1–26. Among publications, I owe most to A. W. Gomme, Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. I (hereafter referred to as HCT I), and B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery and M. F. McGregor, The Athenian Tribute Lists (ATL).

[2] The word "empire" (which often has a very different connotation) is used here, in most cases, simply as a convenient translation of ἀρχή.

[3] In Camb. Anc. Hist. XI 435–6.

I. The Alleged Unpopularity of the Empire

By far the most important witness for the prosecution, in any arraignment of Athenian imperialism, is of course Thucydides; but it is precisely Thucydides who, under cross-examination, can be made to yield the most valuable pieces of detailed evidence of the falsity of his own generalisations. Before we examine his evidence, it will be well to make clear the conception of his speeches upon which some of the interpretations given here are based. Whatever Thucydides may have meant by the much discussed expression τὰ δέοντα,[1] whatever purpose he may originally have intended the speeches to serve, there can surely be no doubt that some of the speeches[2] in fact represent what the speakers would have said if they had expressed *with perfect frankness* the sentiments which the historian himself attributed to them,[3] and hence may sometimes depart very far from what was actually said, above all because political and diplomatic speeches are seldom entirely candid.

Now Thucydides harps constantly on the unpopularity of imperial Athens, at least during the Peloponnesian War. He makes no less than eight of his speakers[4] accuse the Athenians of "enslaving" their allies or of wishing to "enslave" other states, and he also uses the same expression in his own person.[5] His Corinthian envoys at Sparta, summarising the historian's own view in a couple of words, call Athens the "tyrant city".[6] Thucydides even represents the Athenians themselves as fully conscious that their rule was a tyranny: he makes not only Cleon but also Pericles admit that the empire had this character.[7] It must be allowed that in such political contexts both "enslavement" and "tyranny" — δουλεία and τυραννίς, and their cognates — are often used in a highly technical sense: any infringement of the ἐλευθερία of a city, however slight, might be described as "enslavement";[8] and terms such as τύραννος πόλις do not necessarily imply (as the corresponding English expressions would) that Athens was an oppressive or unpopular ruler. However, it will

[1] I 22.1. I would translate, "what was most appropriate" (cf. I 138.3; II 60.5).

[2] Above all that of the Athenians at Sparta in 432 (I 73–8).

[3] Cf. J. H. Finley, Thucydides (1947) 96: the speeches expound "what Thucydides thought would have seemed to him the factors in a given situation had he stood in the place of his speakers." This is almost the same thing. And see Jones, op. cit. (on p. 1 n. 1) 20–21.

[4] The Corinthians (I 68.3; 69.1; 121.5; 122.2; 124.3), the Mytileneans (III 10.3, 4, 5; 13.6), the Thebans (III 63.3), Brasidas (IV 86.1; 87.3; V 9.9), Pagondas (IV 92.4), the Melians (V 86; 92; 100), Hermocrates (VI 76.2, 4; 77.1; 80.5; cf. 82.3), Gylippus and the Syracusan generals (VII 66.2; 68.2). And see III 70.3; 71.1 (Corcyra). All occurrences of the words for political "enslavement" are collected and analysed in ATL III 155–7.

[5] I 98.4; VII 75.7. See also Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 18 (cf. I 8, 9; III 11; and Thuc. IV 86.4–5, for δουλεία as subjection to the opposite political party); Plut., Cim. 11.3; Isocr. XII 97; cf. the repudiation in IV 109. [6] I 122.3; 124.3.

[7] III 37.2; II 63.2. Cf. VI 85.1. [8] See Thuc. I 141.1.

hardly be denied that Thucydides regarded the dominance of Athens over her allies as indeed oppressive and unpopular. The speech he puts into the mouths of the Athenians at Sparta in 432 admits that their rule is "much detested by the Hellenes" and that Athens has become "hateful to most people".[1] At the outbreak of the war, says Thucydides,[2] "people in general were strongly in favour of Sparta, especially as she professed herself the liberator of Hellas.[3] Every individual and every city was eager to help her by word and deed, to the extent of feeling that personal participation was necessary if her cause were not to suffer. So general was the indignation felt against Athens, some desiring to be liberated from her rule, others dreading to pass under it". In the winter of 413–12, when the news of the Athenian disaster in Sicily had become known, Thucydides[4] would have us believe that all Hellas was astir, neutrals feeling that they ought to attack Athens spontaneously, and the subjects of Athens showing themselves ready to revolt "even beyond their capacity to do so", feeling passionately on the subject and refusing even to hear of the Athenians' being able to last out the summer.

This is what Thucydides wanted his readers to believe. It is undoubtedly the conception he himself honestly held. Nevertheless, his own detailed narrative proves that it is certainly false. Thucydides was such a remarkably objective historian that he himself has provided sufficient material for his own refutation. The news columns in Thucydides, so to speak, contradict the editorial Thucydides, and the editor himself does not always speak with the same voice.

In the "Mytilenean Debate" at Athens in 427, Thucydides[5] makes Diodotus tell the assembled Athenians that in all the cities the demos is their friend, and either does not join the Few, the ὀλίγοι, when they revolt, or, if constrained to do so, at once turns on the rebels, so that in fighting the refractory state the Athenians have the mass of the citizens (τὸ πλῆθος) on their side. (The precise meaning of these expressions — δῆμος, πλῆθος, ὀλίγοι and the like — will be considered in the third section of this paper). It is impossible to explain away the whole passage on the ground that Diodotus is just saying the kind of thing that might be expected to appeal to an Athenian audience. Not only do we have Thucydides' general statement[6] that throughout the Greek world, after the Corcyraean revolution of 427, the leaders of the popular parties tried to bring in the Athenians, as οἱ ὀλίγοι the Spartans; there is a great deal of

[1] I 75.1, 4. Cf. I 76.1; II 11.2 Isocr. VIII 79, 105; XII 57; Dem. IX 24. [2] II 8.4–5.

[3] Cf. Thuc. I 69.1; II 72.1; III 13.7; 32.2; 59.4; IV 85.1; 86.1; 87.4; 108.2; 121.1; VIII 46.3; 52; Isocr. IV 122 etc. [4] VIII 2.1–2; cf. IV 108.3–6.

[5] III 47.2. Diodotus just afterwards lets fall a remark which is a valuable clue to Thucydides' mentality: he advocates the acquittal of the δῆμος of a revolting city, ὅπως ὃ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχόν ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται (III 47.4). It is "only the mass of the people" in an allied state which is likely to be loyal. [6] III 82.1.

evidence relating to individual cities, which we must now consider. Of course, the mere fact that a city did not revolt from Athens does not of itself necessarily imply fidelity: considerations of expediency, short-term or long-term, may often have been decisive — the fear of immediate Athenian counter-action, or the belief that Athens would ultimately become supreme.[1] But that does not alter the fact that in almost every case in which we do have detailed information about the attitude of an allied city, we find only the Few hostile; scarcely ever is there reason to think that the demos was not mainly loyal. The evidence falls into two groups: for the 450s and 440s B.C. it is largely epigraphic, for the period of the Peloponnesian War it is mainly literary. We shall begin with the later period, for which the evidence is much more abundant.

The revolt of Lesbos in 428–7, in which Mytilene was the ringleader, is particularly interesting, because it is only at the very end of Thucydides' account that we gain any inkling of the real situation. At first, Thucydides implies that the Mytileneans were wholehearted and that only a few factious citizens, who were proxenoi of Athens, cared to inform the Athenians of the preparations for revolt.[2] We hear much of the determined resistance of the Mytileneans and of their appeal to Sparta, and we may well be astonished when we suddenly discover from Thucydides[3] that "the Mytileneans" who had organised and conducted the revolt were not the main body of the Mytileneans at all, but only the governing oligarchy, for no sooner had the Spartan commander Salaethus distributed hoplite equipment to the formerly light-armed demos, with the intention of making a *sortie en masse* against the besieging Athenian force, than the demos immediately mutinied and the government had to surrender to Athens.

In describing the activities of Brasidas in the "Thraceward region" in 424–3, Thucydides occasionally gives us a glimpse of the internal situation in the cities. First, it is worth mentioning that in recording the northward march of Brasidas through Thessaly, Thucydides says[4] that the mass of the population there had always been friendly to Athens, and that Brasidas would never have been allowed to pass if ἰσονομία instead of the traditional δυναστεία had existed in Thessaly. When Brasidas arrived in the "Thraceward district," probably in September 424, there seem to have been few if any Athenian garrisons there, for Thucydides mentions none, except that at Amphipolis, and represents the Athenians as sending out garrisons at the end of that year, "as

[1] Any such considerations must have become much weaker after the Sicilian disaster in 413 and the offer of Persian financial support for Peloponnesian operations in the Aegean during the ensuing winter: see e.g. Thuc. VIII 2.1–2; 5.5; 24.5.

[2] III 2.3.

[3] III 27–28. Against Cleon's πάντες in III 39.6, see III 47.3. And note the mercenaries who appear in III 2.2; 18.1, 2.

[4] IV 78.2–3.

far as they could at such short notice and in winter."[1] Brasidas made his first attempt on Acanthus. The inhabitants were divided, the common people being faithful to Athens; but eventually the citizens gave way and opened their gates, influenced not only by an able speech from Brasidas, a judicious blend of threats and promises, but also by "fear for their fruit", for it was just before vintage, and Brasidas had threatened to ravage.[2] When the Spartan invited the surrender of Amphipolis, he at first found little support within that town.[3] However, the combined effect of his military success in occupying the surrounding country, the advantageous terms he offered, and the efforts of his partisans within, was sufficient to procure the surrender of the city.[4]

Thucydides[5] declares now categorically that there was general enthusiasm for revolt among the Athenian subject cities of the district, which sent secret messages to Brasidas, begging him to come to them, each wishing to lead the way in revolting. They had the additional inducement, as Thucydides points out, of the recent Athenian defeat at Delium. On the face of it, Thucydides' account is plausible enough. There is good reason to suppose, however, that when he speaks of the "cities" that were subject to Athens, he is thinking merely of the propertied classes. When Brasidas marched into the peninsula of Acte, most of the towns (which were insignificant) naturally surrendered at once, but Sane and Dium, small as they were, and surrounded by cities now in alliance with Brasidas, held out, even when their lands were ravaged.[6] Turning his attention to the Sithonian peninsula, Brasidas captured Torone, though it was held by an Athenian garrison (probably just arrived); but this was done only through the treachery of a few, to the dismay of the majority, some of whom joined the Athenian garrison when it shut itself up in the fort of Lecythus,[7] only to be driven out to Pallene. A Spartan commander was subsequently put in charge of the town.[8] In 423, after Scione had revolted spontaneously, its neighbour Mende was betrayed to Brasidas by a few.[9] Later, when the Athenian army arrived, there were disturbances at Mende, and soon the common people fell upon the mixed Scionean and Peloponnesian garrison of seven hundred. After plundering the town, which had not made terms of surrender, the Athenians

[1] IV 108.6. It appears from IV 104.4 that apart from Eucles and his garrison in Amphipolis there were no reinforcements available except the seven ships of Thucydides at Thasos, half a day's sail distant. Thuc. IV 105.1 shows that Amphipolis could hope for no reinforcements from Chalcidice, but only ἐκ θαλάσσης ..... καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θρᾴκης. In Thuc. IV 7 (425 B.C.), Simonides collects a few Athenians ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων, which may have been almost anywhere in the N. Aegean. Part of the evidence on the subject of garrisons in the Athenian empire is given by A. S. Nease in The Phoenix III (1949) 102–11.

[2] Thuc. IV 84.1–2; 87.2; 88.1; cf. Diod. XII 67.2.

[3] Thuc. IV 104.3–4. Although an Athenian colony, it contained few citizens of Athenian origin (IV 106.1). [4] Thuc. IV 103–106. [5] IV 108.3–6; cf. 80.1; Diod. XII 72.1.

[6] Thuc. IV 109.5. [7] Thuc. IV 110–113; cf. Diod. XII 68.6. [8] Thuc. IV 132.3.

[9] Thuc. IV 121.2; 123.1–2; 129–30.

wisely told the Mendeans that they could keep their civic rights and themselves deal with their own traitors. In the case of Acanthus, Sane, Dium, Torone and Mende, then, we have positive evidence that the bulk of the citizens were loyal to Athens, in circumstances which were anything but propitious. In Aristophanes' *Peace*,[1] produced in 421, it is οἱ παχεῖς καὶ πλούσιοι whom the Athenians are said to have pursued with charges of favouring Brasidas. It would be simple-minded to suppose that this happened just because the richest citizens were the most worth despoiling. It may be that some of the other towns went over to Brasidas with the free consent of the demos, but only in regard to Scione,[2] and possibly Argilus (whose citizens apparently hoped to gain control over Amphipolis by backing Brasidas)[3] does the narrative of Thucydides provide any grounds for this assumption; and even at Scione, which did not revolt until 423, some at first "disapproved of what was being done".[4]

We now have to examine the movements in the Ionian cities after the Sicilian catastrophe, in 412 and the years following, when Thucydides, in the statement quoted earlier, attributes to the subjects of Athens a passionate desire to revolt, even beyond their capacity to fulfil. Jacqueline de Romilly, in her recent book, Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien,[5] asserts that although "l'opposition oligarchie-démocratie" played an important role until the time of Brasidas, thereafter "l'opposition maître-sujets balaye tout", and "on verra les Athéniens incapables de retenir leurs sujets par l'appui d'aucun parti: le désir d'indépendance aura pris le pas sur toutes les autres querelles". This statement is not borne out by the evidence. In only a few cases have we sufficient information about the internal situation in a given city. Again we find, in all these cases, with perhaps one or two exceptions, that it was only the Few who had any desire to revolt. The events at Samos are particularly interesting: the Samian demos, after at least two if not three "purges" of δυνατοί or γνώριμοι,[6] remained faithful to Athens to the bitter end, and were rewarded with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[7] At Chios, although Thucydides speaks in several places[8] of "the Chians" as planning to revolt from Athens early in 412, it is perfectly clear from two passages[9] that it was only the Few who were disaffected, and that they did not even dare to disclose their plans to the demos until Alcibiades and a Spartan force arrived. The leaders of the pro-Athenian faction were then executed and an oligarchy was imposed by force, under the supervision of the Spartan commander Pedaritus;[10] but this had no good

[1] 639–40. Cf. Ar., Vesp. 288–9 (καὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ παχὺς ἥκει | τῶν προδόντων τἀπὶ Θρᾴκης· | ὃν ὅπως ἐγχυτριεῖς), also 474–6, 626–7.

[2] Thuc. IV 120–1. [3] Thuc. IV 103.4. [4] IV 121.1. [5] Pp. 77–8, 263 n. 4.

[6] Thuc. VIII 21 (412 B.C.); 73 (411); Xen., Hell. II 2.6 (405—but this may be a reference back to the earlier purges). See also IG i² 101/102.

[7] Tod 96 (= IG i² 126 = ii² 1). [8] VIII 5.4; 6.1, 3–4; 7.1; cf. 2.2. [9] VIII 9.3; 14.2.

[10] Thuc. VIII 38.3. Until now Chios may have been a moderate oligarchy rather than a democracy.

results. When the Athenians invested the city, some of the Chians plotted to surrender it to them,[1] but the blockade eventually had to be abandoned. At Rhodes, again, it was the δυνατώτατοι ἄνδρες who called in the Spartans.[2] When ninety-four Peloponnesian ships arrived at unfortified Camirus, οἱ πολλοί fled in terror; but they were later got together by the Spartans (with the people of Lindus and Ialysus, the other two Rhodian cities) and "persuaded" to revolt from Athens.[3] (With the terror of the Rhodians at the sight of the Peloponnesian fleet we may usefully contrast the friendliness of the Ionians in 427[4] towards ships which they took to be Athenian but which were in fact a Peloponnesian squadron — a friendliness which had fatal consequences). About a year later there was an attempted revolution at Rhodes, which was suppressed by Dorieus.[5]

When Astyochus the Spartan, with twenty ships, made an expedition to the mainland cities opposite Chios, with the intention of winning them away from Athens, he first failed to take so small a town as Pteleum, which must have put up a stout resistance, and then failed again in his assault on Clazomenae, though it too was unwalled.[6] Clazomenae had revolted a little earlier, but this seems to have been the work of a small party of oligarchs, and the movement had easily been suppressed.[7] At Thasos, the extreme oligarchs in exile were delighted when the Athenian Dieitrephes set up a moderate oligarchy, for this, according to Thucydides, was exactly what they wanted, namely, "the abolition of the democracy which would have opposed them" in their design of making Thasos an oligarchy independent of Athens.[8] The demos was not easily crushed, however, and the island remained in a very disturbed condition until Thrasybulus brought it back into the Athenian alliance in 407.[9] That the Thasian demos should have been friendly to Athens is all the more remarkable when we remember that the island had revolted,[10] about 465, as the result of a dispute with Athens about its ἐμπόρια and gold mine in Thrace, had stood a siege of over two years, and upon surrendering had been given terms which have been described as "terribly severe"[11] — a sequence of events which has often been

[1] Thuc. VIII 24.6. [2] Thuc. VIII 44.1.

[3] Thuc. VIII 44. The Spartans then raised a levy of no less than 32 talents from the Rhodians (VIII 44.4). [4] Thuc. III 32.1–3. [5] Diod. XIII 38.5; 45.1.

[6] Thuc. VIII 31.2–3. [7] Thuc. VIII 14.3; 23.6; cf. Diod. XIII 71.1.

[8] Thuc. VIII 64.2–5; Hell. Oxy. II 4. Of course the demos would oppose the destruction of the democracy: ἐναντιωσόμενον (note the tense) must also apply to the revolt from Athens, referred to in the previous sentence.

[9] Xen., Hell. I 4.9; Diod. XIII 72.1; cf. Corn. Nep., Lys. II 2. And see Dem. XX 59 for the grant of privileges to the pro-Athenian party. In Xen., Hell. I 1.32 we should probably read ἐν Ἰάσῳ, with U. Kahrstedt, Forsch. z. Gesch. d. ausgeh. V. u. d. IV. Jahrh. 176 n. 17.

[10] Thuc. I 100.2; 101.3; Diod. XI 70.1; Plut., Cim. 14. For the date, see Gomme, HCT I 391.

[11] E. M. Walker in Camb. Anc. Hist. V 59.

cited as an example of "Athenian aggression".[1] After describing what happened at Thasos in 411, Thucydides[2] makes the very significant comment that what occurred there was just the sort of thing that did happen in the subject states: "once the cities had achieved σωφροσύνη" — he means, of course, oligarchies of a moderate type — "and impunity of action, they went on to full independence". We must not fail to notice that Neapolis on the mainland opposite, apparently a colony of Thasos, refused to join the island in its revolt, stood a siege, and finally co-operated in force in the reduction of Thasos, earning the thanks of the imperial city, expressed in decrees recorded in an inscription which has survived.[3]

There is reason to think that in Lesbos[4] also there was little enthusiasm for revolt, except among the leading citizens. Although a Chian force of thirteen ships procured the defection of Methymna and Mytilene in 412, an Athenian expedition of twenty-five ships was able to recover Mytilene virtually without striking a blow (αὐτοβοεί), and when the Spartan admiral Astyochus arrived, in the hope of at least encouraging Methymna to persevere, "everything went against him". In the following year, 411,[5] a party of Methymnaean exiles — evidently rich men, since they were able to hire two hundred and fifty mercenaries — failed to get possession of their city. In 406 Methymna,[6] which then had an Athenian garrison (probably at its own request), was faithful to Athens and, refusing to surrender to Callicratidas the Spartan commander, was captured (with the aid of traitors within) and plundered. Mytilene[7] remained even longer on the Athenian side, only submitting to Lysander after Aegospotami. Other cities also refused to desert Athens, even when confronted with a formidable Peloponnesian armament. In 405, Cedreae in Caria[8] resisted Lysander's attack but was stormed and the inhabitants (whom Xenophon describes as μιξοβάρβαροι) were sold into slavery; and soon afterwards Lampsacus,[9] which also resisted Lysander, was taken and plundered. Most

[1] E. g. by Meiggs in JHS LXIII (1943) 21.

[2] VIII 64.5. (The participial clause has been deliberately ignored here, since the text is uncertain).

[3] Tod 84 (= IG i² 108), lines 39–55, re-edited by Meritt and Andrewes in BSA XLVI (1951) at pp. 201–3, lines 48–64. The date of this part of the inscription must be 407/6. As to whether Neapolis was a Thasian colony, see ATL II 86.

[4] Thuc. VIII 22–23; 32. The events of 427 (even the cleruchy) had evidently not created general hostility to Athens in Lesbos.

[5] Thuc. VIII 100.3. Athenian φρουροί from Mytilene joined in the defence.

[6] Xen., Hell. I 6.12–15 (specifically recording that those in control of affairs at Methymna were pro-Athenian); Diod. XIII 76.5. Cf. p. 39 below.

[7] Xen., Hell. I 6.16, 38; II 2.5; Diod. XIII 76.6 to 79.7; 97.2; 100.1–6. It is true that Mytilene was a main Athenian base, but the Mytileneans seem to have been friendly: see Diod. XIII 78.5; 79.2.

[8] Xen., Hell. II 1.15. [9] Xen., Hell. II 1.18–19; Diod. XIII 104.8.

remarkable of all in this group is Carian Iasus.[1] Although it had paid heavily for its alliance with Athens by being sacked by the Peloponnesians in 412, and garrisoned after that, we find it loyal to Athens seven years later, for according to Diodorus, Lysander now took it by storm, massacred the eight hundred male citizens, sold the women and children as slaves, and destroyed the city — a procedure which suggests that resistance had been vigorous. So much for the alleged enthusiasm of the allies of Athens for "liberation".

Only at Ephesus,[2] and perhaps (during the Ionian War) Miletus,[3] among the cities about which we have any information, is there no visible trace of a pro-Athenian party. We may remember that Ephesus was always a centre of Persian influence: for example, its large donation in gold to the Spartan war-chest, probably in 427, recorded in an inscription found near Sparta,[4] consisted of a thousand darics, the equivalent of four Attic silver talents or a little more.

We can now go back to the 450s and 440s B.C., a period for which, as mentioned above, the evidence on the questions under discussion is predominantly epigraphic. The revolt of Erythrae,[5] from 454 or earlier to 452, was almost certainly due to the seizure of power by a Persian-backed tyranny. Miletus[6] was also in revolt from at least 454 until 452/1; but during this period she was apparently under the control of a close oligarchy or tyranny, which seems to have driven out an important section of the citizen body (perhaps with Persian support), and was sentenced in its turn to perpetual and hereditary outlawry about 452, when the exiles returned and the city was brought back into the Athenian empire. The probable absence of Colophon[7] from the tribute quota-lists of the second assessment period (450/49 to 447/6), and the Athenian decree relating to that city of (probably) 446, certainly point to a revolt about 450; but the known Persian associations of this inland city, the fact that it was handed over to the Persian Itamenes in 430 by one of two parties in a στάσις (presumably of the usual character — oligarchs against democrats), and the Colophonian oath to preserve democracy — perhaps newly introduced, or

[1] Thuc. VIII 28.2–3 (the attack was a surprise) and 36.1; 29.1; Diod. XIII 104.7; perhaps Xen., Hell. I 1.32 (see p. 7 n. 9 above).

[2] Ephesus was in revolt by 412 (Thuc. VIII 19.3) and seems to have been in Persian hands (VIII 109.1: Xen., Hell. I 2.6). It remained an important Persian-Peloponnesian base for the rest of the war (Xen., Hell. I 5.1, 10; II 1.6, etc.).

[3] For the earlier history of Miletus, see below and n. 6. For Miletus in the Ionian War, see esp. Thuc. VIII 17.1–3 (cf. Ar., Lysistr. 108–9); 25.1–3; 28–29; 33.1; 36.1; 84.4–5; Xen., Hell. I 2.2–3; 6.8–12. Cf. Diod. XIII 104.5–6 and Plut., Lys. 8; 19.

[4] Tod 62 (= IG V i 1), lines 22–23. For the date, see p. 13 below.

[5] See Tod 29 (= SEG X 11 = D 10 in ATL II 38, 54–57) and the very probable reconstruction of events in ATL III 252–5.

[6] See the admirable account by Meiggs in JHS LXIII (1943) 25–27; cf. ATL III 257. (For IG i² 22, with later additions, see now D 11 in ATL II 57–60; SEG X 14).

[7] See Meiggs, op. cit. 28; ATL III 282–3. For IG i² 14/15 (probably 447/6), see now D 15 in ATL II 68–69; SEG X 17. For the events of 430 and later, see p. 11 below.

at any rate restored — in the treaty made with Athens in 446 or thereabouts, strongly suggest that the revolt was the work of oligarchs receiving Persian support. The revolt of Euboea in 446 may well have been mainly the work of the Hippobotae, the aristocrats of Chalcis, for the Athenians drove them out on the reduction of the island and probably gave their lands to cleruchs,[1] but inflicted no punishment beyond the taking of hostages,[2] as far as we know, on the other Euboeans, except that they expelled the Hestiaeans (who had massacred the crew of an Athenian ship) and settled an Athenian colony on their lands.[3] The revolt of Samos in 440/39,[4] after certain Samians who "wished to revolutionise the constitution" had induced the Athenians to set up a democracy, was certainly brought about by exiled oligarchs, who allied themselves with the Persian satrap Pissuthnes, employed a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and worked in conjunction with the δυνατώτατοι remaining in the city. Here again there is no evidence of general hostility to Athens among the Samians, although once the oligarchs had got a firm grip on the city, and had captured and expelled the democratic leaders,[5] they put up a stout resistance to Athens and were no doubt able to enforce the adherence of a considerable number of the common folk.

It is significant that in this early period, whenever we do have information about the circumstances of a revolt, we find good reason for attributing it to oligarchs or tyrants, who could evidently rely on Persian assistance wherever the situation of the city permitted. This is precisely the state of affairs we have already seen to exist later, during the Peloponnesian War. In some cases, both early and late, the bare fact of a revolt is recorded, without detail. Some of these revolts may have been wholehearted, but we certainly cannot assume so just because we have no evidence. Surely the reverse is true: surely we may assume that the situation we find in virtually all the towns for which we do have sufficient information existed in most of the remainder. The mere fact of the coming to power of an oligarchy in an allied city immediately upon a revolt from Athens, as evidently at Eretria in 411,[6] tends to confirm that the democratic party in that city was pro-Athenian.

It is not difficult to find other examples of loyalty to Athens on the part of

[1] Plut., Per. 23; Ael., VH VI 1 (2000 κλῆροι). See the highly ingenious arguments of ATL III 294–7, where the other evidence is cited. For the Hippobotae, see also Hdts. V 77.2; Strab. X 1.8, p. 447.

[2] For the hostages, see Tod 42 (= IG i² 39), lines 47–52 (Chalcis, 446/5); IG i² p. 284 (Eretria, 442/1: note the reference to the πλουσιώτατοι). Examination of the quota-lists shows that almost certainly none of the Euboean cities suffered any increase in tribute.

[3] Thuc. I 114.3; Plut., Per. 23 etc.

[4] Thuc. I 115.2 to 117.3 (cf. VIII 76.4); Diod. XII 27–28; Plut., Per. 24–28 etc.

[5] Thuc. I 115.5; Diod. XII 27.3.

[6] Tod 82 (= IG XII 9, 187), the prescript of which refers to the βουλή but not to the

her allies, or pro-Athenian movements inside cities in revolt. When the Athenian armament in Sicily was at its last gasp, the division under Demosthenes being on the very point of surrender, the Syracusans made a proclamation offering freedom to any of the islanders (the Athenian allies) who were willing to come over to them. Further resistance was now quite hopeless, and nothing could have restrained the allies from deserting except the strongest sense of loyalty. Yet Thucydides tells us that "not many cities went over".[1] The majority remained, to undergo a fate which they must have well known could only be death or enslavement. In 428 Methymna[2] refused to follow the rest of the Lesbian cities in their revolt. In 430 there was a στάσις at Colophon:[3] one faction called in the Persians and expelled the other, which removed to Notium but itself split into two factions, one of which gained control of the new settlement by employing mercenaries and allied itself with the medising citizens remaining in Colophon. In 427 the defeated party, no doubt democratic in character, called in the Athenians, who founded a new colony at Notium for the exiled Colophonians. The capture of Selymbria[4] and Byzantium[5] by the Athenians in 408–7 was brought about in each case by the treachery of a faction inside the city.

In the light of all the evidence which has been cited above, we can understand and accept Plato's explanation of the long life of the Athenian empire: the Athenians, he says, kept their ἀρχή for seventy years "because they had friends in each of the cities".[6]

On many occasions we find support given to Athens by states, or democratic parties within states, outside the Athenian "empire" proper. The bulk of the Plataeans, of course, were always faithful to Athens; it was only a few wealthy aristocrats who called in the Thebans in 431.[7] The Athenians had democratic supporters at Corcyra[8] and Argos,[9] and in the Boeotian cities,[10] especially

[1] Thuc. VII 82.1. [2] Thuc. III 2.1, 3; 5.1; 18.1–2; 50.2.

[3] Thuc. III 34. [4] Diod. XIII 66.4; Plut., Alc. 30.

[5] Xen., Hell. I 3.16–20; II 2.1; Diod. XIII 66.6; 67; Plut., Alc. 31.

[6] Epist. VII 332c. Since Plato gives this as the one sufficient reason, it will hardly be maintained that he is merely referring to a handful of pro-Athenian individuals of note, such as those who received Athenian proxenia and were evidently expected (see Thuc. III 2.3) to act as Athenian watchdogs. [7] Thuc. II 2.2; 3.2; III 65.2.

[8] See esp. Thuc. III 70.1 (cf. I 55.1) to 81; 85; IV 2.3; 46–48; Diod. XIII 48.1–6.

[9] See esp. Thuc. I 102.4; V 29.1; 76.1–2; 78; 81.2; 82; 83.1–2; 116.1; VIII 86.8–9; Diod. XII 81.2–5.

[10] Thuc. III 62.5 and IV 92.6 (458/7–447/6); IV 76.2–3 and 89 (424, specifically mentioning Siphae and Chaeronea); Diod. XII 69.1 (also 424); Thuc. IV 133.1 (Thespiae, 423); VI 95.2 (Thespiae, 414). IG i² 36, of c. 447/6 (SEG X 33 gives a new fragment), is an Athenian proxeny decree in favour of four named Thespians, one of whom is called, significantly, Athenaios. SEG X 81 (= IG i² 68/69, with a new fragment) may refer to the settlement of the Thespian and other Boeotian exiles in 424/3. Thuc. III 62.5 (cf. IV 92.6) makes the Thebans say that before Coronea (447/6) the Athenians had already made themselves

Thespiae, Chaeronea and Siphae. In 424 the leading democrats at Megara[1] plotted to betray the city to Athens. Here we find the popular party, in a state which had been specially harassed by the Athenians, by a stringent trade embargo (the "Megarian Decree", of c. 432 B.C.) and two ravaging expeditions a year,[2] prepared to take desperate risks to re-enter the Athenian alliance. There were pro-Athenian parties at Thurii and Messana;[3] and three other Sicilian towns (Egesta, Naxos and Catana), as well as certain Sicel communities, were on Athens' side. It would be unsafe to draw any general conclusions from the existence of pro-Athenian elements in the Sicilian states, since fear of Syracuse[4] may well have been the decisive factor in most cases. In his comment on the first naval defeat of Athens by Syracuse, however, Thucydides[5] clearly implies that the Athenians were used to creating dissension among their opponents by holding out the prospect of constitutional changes — in the direction of democracy, needless to say. And indeed, apart from the examples already mentioned, there are several recorded attempts, successful or unsuccessful, by parties inside cities, especially besieged cities, to betray them to the Athenians, notably at Syracuse,[6] and also at Spartolus,[7] Eion ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης,[8] Anactorium,[9] Cythera,[10] Tegea,[11] and even Melos.[12]

Now Melos is, for most people, the characteristic example of Athenian brutality. The cruel treatment of the conquered island was certainly indefensible. There are, however, certain features in the affair, often overlooked, which may at least help us to see the whole incident in better proportion. Although we have no record of any recent hostilities between the two states, we know that earlier the Melians had not remained neutral in the war, as so many people, obsessed by the Melian Dialogue[13], seem to think. Doubtless in 416 the Melians,

masters of most of Boeotia κατὰ στάσιν. The στάσις may well have involved pro- and anti-Athenian factions in the other towns (cf. Xen., Mem. III 5.2), but in view of Thuc. IV 76.2; VI 95.2, can we doubt that the strife took the usual social form, even if the question of Theban supremacy also entered into it? As for that well known puzzle, Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. III 11, there seems to be no certain evidence that Athens set up democracies in 458/7 in the Boeotian cities, other than Thebes (Ar., Pol. 1302b 29–30), and it is possible she may have accepted the existing oligarchies for a time, only to be compelled to remove or exile them for oppressive conduct (ὁ δῆμος ἐδούλευσεν: Ps.-Xen.) before 447/6, when they made their come-back. For an equally possible alternative, see Gomme, HCT I 318.

[1] Thuc. IV 66–74; Diod. XII 66–67. [2] Thuc. IV 66.1; cf. Plut., Per. 30.

[3] Thuc. VII 33.5–6 (Thurii); VI 74.1 (cf. 50.1) and Plut., Alc. 22 (Messana). Cf. Thuc. VI 52.1; 88.1 (Camarina). [4] See e.g. Thuc. VI 88.1. [5] VII 55.2.

[6] Thuc. VII 48.2; 49.1; 73.3; Plut., Nic. 21; 22; 26. There were Syracusan exiles with the Athenian army in 415 (Thuc. VI 64.1). Thuc. VII 55.2 conveys the impression that in 415 Syracuse was a full democracy, just like Athens; but in view of Thuc. VI 41; Ar., Pol. 1304a 27–29; Diod. XIII 34.6; 35, it seems certain that its constitution was distinctly less democratic than that of Athens. [7] Thuc. II 79.2. [8] Thuc. IV 7. [9] Thuc. IV 49.

[10] Thuc. IV 54.3. [11] Thuc. V 62.2; 64.1. [12] Thuc. V 116.3.

[13] Thuc. V 85—113. This is not to be treated as an historical record: see H. Ll. Hudson-Williams in AJP LXXI (1950) 156ff., esp. 167–9. Cf. now M. Treu in Historia II 253 ff.

when confronted with a large Athenian armament, said they would like to be regarded henceforth as neutrals.[1] In the Dialogue,[2] Thucydides appears to make the Athenians concede that they are committing what would nowadays be called "unprovoked aggression". Just before he begins the Dialogue, however, Thucydides[3] tells us that during the war the Melians had at first remained neutral, but that when the Athenians used violence towards them and plundered their lands, ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. Epigraphic evidence allows us to go further still: it puts the original Athenian attack on Melos in quite a different light. The inscription found near Sparta, to which reference has already been made, records[4] two separate donations by Melos to the Spartan war-funds, one of twenty Aeginetan minae (roughly half an Attic talent): ἔδον τοὶ Μάλιοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀργυρίω Ϝ(ί)κατι μνᾶς. The other figure has perished. The donors are described, it will be noticed, as τοὶ Μάλιοι. Contrast the wording of another part of the same inscription, recording a Chian donation: [ἔδον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοι]ς τῶν Χίων τοὶ φίλοι ποττὸν [πόλεμον .....]. This shows that the Melian subscription was an official one. According to a speech of Brasidas, in Thucydides,[5] the payment of tribute to Athens by Acanthus was regarded by Sparta as a hostile act; and the same interpretation would not unreasonably be placed by Athens, *a fortiori*, on a voluntary donation to Sparta. Now Adcock[6] showed a few years ago that there is good reason to think these gifts to Sparta were made in the spring of 427, during Alcidas's expedition, when the Melians very probably gave aid and comfort to Alcidas. The Athenian ravaging expedition, which did not take place until the following year (and was led, incidentally, by Nicias),[7] was doubtless sent in retaliation for the assistance the Melians had given to Sparta. At any rate, Thucydides says expressly that after this the Melians ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. Diodorus[8] describes Melos as the one firm ally of Sparta among the Cycladic islands in 426. It is particularly interesting to observe that in 416 the Athenian envoys were not permitted by the Melian authorities to address the assembled people but were made to state their case "before the magistrates and the few"[9] — a circumstance upon which Thucydides allows the Athenians to make scornful comment. Melos put up a stout resistance to Athens, it is true, but so at first

[1] As in V 94; 112.3.

[2] See V 89: οὔτε ....μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς .... ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, and ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε.

[3] V 84.2. Cf. the use of the expression ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν in V 25. 3.

[4] Tod 62 (= IG V i 1), lines 24–30, 36–41. The Chian donation is recorded in lines 8–10.

[5] IV 87.3. Cf. SEG X 89 (= Tod 68 = IG i² 90), lines 19–20.

[6] In Mélanges Glotz I 1–6.

[7] Thuc. III 91.1–3. A command would seldom be entrusted to a general not in sympathy with its objectives.

[8] XII 65.2. Probably this statement is technically incorrect. [9] Thuc. V 84.3; 85.

did Mytilene, where, as we have seen, the majority had no great desire to fight Athens. As we learn from Thucydides that at the end of the siege there was treachery inside Melos, it seems likely that the Melian commons did not entirely share the passion for neutral autonomy so eloquently expressed by their oligarchs.[1]

On the question of atrocities in general, it should be emphasized that very few acts of brutality are recorded against the Athenians during the war: the only serious ones[2] are those at Melos and Scione[3] and those (less shocking) at Torone[4] and Thyrea.[5] All these were to a greater or less extent sanctioned by the Greek laws of war,[6] even if they shocked some of the more humane Greeks of the time. The essential point is that the Athenians were certainly no more brutal, on the whole, in their treatment of the conquered than were other Greek states of their day; and the behaviour of the demos (in striking contrast with that of their own oligarchs) under the greatest test of all, civil strife, was exemplary: Aristotle's reference[7] to the "habitual clemency of the demos" was well deserved, in particular by their conduct in 403, to which Aristotle and others pay tribute.[8] The Argives enslaved the whole population of Mycenae and destroyed the town on capturing it about 465 B.C.[9] In the Peloponnesian War, we are told by Thucydides,[10] the Spartans began the practice of butchering all the traders they caught at sea — Athenians and their allies and, in the early part of the war, even neutrals. The Spartan admiral Alcidas slaughtered most of the prisoners he had taken from the Ionian states during his expedition in 427,[11] although apparently they were not in arms. The Spartans in the same

[1] Some problems remain. Melos was evidently a prosperous island in 416: it was assessed for tribute in 425 at 15 talents (the same assessment as that of e.g. Andros, Naxos, Eretria), and shortly before the siege it seems to have issued a plentiful new coinage (see J. G. Milne, "The Melos Hoard of 1907" = Amer. Num. Soc. Notes and Monographs no. 62, 1934); yet the Athenian cleruchy sent to Melos was of 500 men only. Thuc. (V 116.4) tells us that the Athenians put to death Μηλίων ὅσους ἡβῶντας ἔλαβον. But surely the traitors at least were spared? Were they perhaps very numerous? And who were the Melians restored by Lysander in 405 (Xen., Hell. II 2.9; Plut., Lys. 14)?

[2] Even minor acts of cruelty seem to have been rare: the massacre of the crews of two captured ships in 405, by order of Philocles (Xen., Hell. II 1.31–32), was remembered as an isolated atrocity. The decree mentioned by Xen. (ibid.) and Plut., Lys. 9; 13 may or may not be historical (Grote rejected it), and certainly never took effect.

[3] Thuc. V 116.4 etc. (Melos); V 32.1 and Diod. XII 76.3–4 (Scione). These two massacres were evidently a favourite theme of anti-Athenian propaganda: see e.g. Xen., Hell. II 2.3; Isocr. IV 100; XII 63.

[4] Thuc. V 3.4; Diod. XII 73.3. Here the men were spared.

[5] Thuc. IV 56.2 (cf. II 27.2); 57.3–4. But these men were in the position of the garrison of a fort and hence were liable to be slaughtered on capture.

[6] Xen., Cyrop. VII 5.73; cf. Xen., Mem. IV 2.15. [7] Ath. Pol. 22.4.

[8] Ath. Pol. 40.3; Ps.-Lys. II 63–66; Xen., Hell. II 4.43; Isocr. XVIII 31–32, 44, 46, 68; Epist. VIII 3; Plat., Menex. 243e; Epist. VII 325b; Cic. I Phil. I 1.

[9] Diod. XI 65.5. [10] II 67.4. [11] Thuc. III 32.1–2.

year, to gratify their implacable Theban allies, killed every one of the surviving defenders of Plataea in cold blood and enslaved their women.[1] When the Helots were felt to be specially dangerous, apparently in 424, the Spartans secretly and treacherously murdered two thousand of the best of them.[2] The Spartans massacred all the free men they captured on the fall of Argive Hysiae in 417.[3] The men of Byzantium and Chalcedon slaughtered the whole multitude of prisoners (men, women and children) they had taken on their expedition into Bithynia in c. 416/5.[4] After Aegospotami, in 405, all the Athenian prisoners, perhaps three or four thousand in number,[5] were put to death by the Peloponnesians under Lysander, who during the same campaign killed all the men and enslaved the women and children of at least one city he took by storm, and enslaved all the inhabitants of at least one other.[6] The close oligarchies which Lysander installed at this time in the Aegean and Asiatic cities executed their political opponents wholesale,[7] as did Lysander's *protégés* the Thirty at Athens, and the victorious revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries at Corcyra, Argos and elsewhere. It is necessary to emphasize all this, because isolated Athenian acts of cruelty have been remembered while the many other contemporary atrocities have been largely forgotten, and the quite misleading impression has come to prevail that the Athenians, increasingly corrupted by power, became ever harsher and more vindictive as the war progressed. In reality, this impression is probably due mainly to the Mytilenean Debate and the Melian Dialogue, in both of which our attention is strongly focussed upon the character of Athenian imperialism, as Thucydides conceived it. In the Mytilenean Debate,[8] by the nature of the arguments he presents, Thucydides conveys the impression that the Athenians were swayed only by considerations of expediency. As Finley puts it,[9] "the advocate of simple decency had no other course than to talk in terms of calculation". But mark how Thucydides explains the holding of the second assembly on the very next day after that on which the cruel sentence was pronounced. On the following day, he says, μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα

[1] Thuc. III 68.1–2, 4; Diod. XII 56.4–6; cf. Isocr. XIV 62; XII 93. Some may feel that Thuc. is over-anxious to extenuate the *Spartan* share in the massacre: notice, in § 1, the apologetic clauses beginning νομίζοντες and ἡγούμενοι, and the placing of ultimate responsibility on the Thebans in § 4.

[2] Thuc. IV 80.3–4 seems to put this event in 424, as does Diod. XII 67.3–4, no doubt following Thuc. For another Spartan killing of Helots, apparently in the early 460s B.C., see Thuc. I 128.1 (cf. Paus. IV 24.5). [3] Thuc. V 83.2; Diod. XII 81.1.

[4] Diod. XII 82.2.

[5] Xen., Hell. II 1.31 (no figure); Plut., Lys. 11 (3000); 13; Paus. IX 32.6 (4000). Cf. the massacre of prisoners after the battles of Leucimme and Sybota (Thuc. I 30.1; 50.1).

[6] Iasus and Cedreae (see pp. 8f. above). [7] See p. 38 below.

[8] Thuc. III 36–49. One may well wonder how fully the Athenian Assembly was informed, especially at its first meeting, about the mutiny of the Mytilenean demos.

[9] Thucydides 177.

ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους — no mere prudence here, but the moral emotion of remorse. Arguments from expediency may have predominated in the second assembly,[1] but in view of the passage just quoted it is difficult to accept Thucydides' implication that what really changed the minds of the Athenians was nothing but a callous consideration of self-interest.

An overwhelming body of evidence has now been produced to show that the mass of the citizens in the allied or subject states were loyal to Athens throughout the whole period of the empire, until the final collapse in the Ionian War, and could on occasion give proof of a deep devotion to the imperial city, which can only be compared with the similar devotion of contemporary oligarchs to Sparta.[2] This judgment holds, whatever the character of Athenian imperialism may have been and whatever verdict we ourselves may wish to pass upon it. The evidence is all the more impressive in that it comes mainly from Thucydides, who, whenever he is generalising, or interpreting the facts rather than stating them, depicts the subjects of Athens as groaning under her tyrannous rule. A subsidiary conclusion of no small importance which has emerged from this survey is that Thucydides, generally (and rightly) considered the most trustworthy of all ancient historians, is guilty of serious misrepresentation in his judgments on the Athenian empire. He was quite entitled to disapprove of the later empire, and to express this disapproval. What we may reasonably object to is his representing that the majority of its subjects detested it. At the same time, it must be laid to Thucydides' credit that we are able to convict him of this distortion precisely because he himself is scrupulously accurate in presenting the detailed evidence. The partiality of Thucydides could scarcely have been exposed but for the honesty of Thucydides.

II. "Independent" Allies and "Subject" Allies

In the opinion of Thucydides, as we have seen, Athens was clearly guilty of abusing her power as hegemon of the Delian League, above all by destroying the autonomy of her allies and, as the "tyrant city", turning them into her subjects. No one will wish to deny that Athens did change, during the first thirty years after the formation of the League, from a hegemon into a ruler, and the

[1] What precisely does Thuc. III 49.1 mean by ῥηθεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας? "After the delivery of these two opinions, directly contradicting each other?" Or something like "The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other" (Crawley), suggesting that there were other opinions too? At any rate, it is quite impossible to believe that on such an occasion only two speeches were made.

[2] Cf. Xen., Hell. II 3.25; Thuc VI 11.7 (πόλιν δι' ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσαν). This situation tended to reassert itself during the first half of the 4th century: see e.g. Xen., Hell. IV 8.20, 27; VI 3.14; Isocr. IV 16; VI 63.

other member-states from allies into subjects. One may feel, however, that Thucydides' thought on this subject is confused, and particularly that his division of the allies into two groups, "autonomous" and "subject", is misleading.

From the earliest days of the Delian League some of the allies furnished ships, with their crews, while others paid tribute. The two groups will be referred to here as "naval allies" and "tributary allies" respectively. In the early period of the League this distinction had no particular political significance, but in the eyes of Thucydides the transformation of the Athenian hegemony into an empire was very closely connected with the conversion of naval allies into tributary allies,[1] and only the former remained in some sense autonomous. This distinction, between tributary allies who were mere subjects of Athens, and a class of "autonomous" allies — usually equated, as by Thucydides, with naval allies — has been widely accepted in modern times. In fact the whole conception is wrong: the only valid reason for distinguishing naval allies from the rest is that the former provided contingents and the latter tribute, and there is no justification for singling out a class of "autonomous" allies, in theory or in practice, whether these are thought of as identical with naval allies or in slightly different terms.

Thucydides conceived the condition of the tributary allies, whom he describes as φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι,[2] as one of δουλεία;[3] but except on one occasion he is willing to call the naval allies αὐτόνομοι and ἐλεύθεροι.[4] The one exception is his clumsily worded list of Athenian allies in the Sicilian expedition:[5] here, although he describes the Chians as autonomous, he puts

[1] The reason given by Thuc. (I 99) and Plut. (Cim. 11) for the allies' eagerness to change to tributary status — in effect, their laziness — is not convincing. Athens seems to have had no difficulty later in procuring paid foreign volunteer crews. It is tempting to speculate that when Aristides attempted (as he must have done) to equate the alternative burdens of tribute and contingents, he made no allowance for the grant of pay to the crews, and that the alleged reluctance of the allies to serve was really a very reasonable refusal on the part of the poorer classes, from whom the rowers and sailors (c. 180 per trireme, out of c. 200) were drawn, to serve without pay. Pay being by far the largest item of expense in maintaining warships, its provision would have made the cost of a naval contingent altogether disproportionate to the corresponding tribute. This is immediately evident when calculations are made of the minimum cost of providing a contingent of reasonable size for almost any known tributary state, even on the assumption that a contingent might not be required every year.

[2] VII 57.3–5; cf. I 19; 56.2; II 9.4–5; III 46.2; V 111.4; VI 22; 43; 69.3; 85.2 etc.

[3] See p. 2 above.

[4] III 10.5 (αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι); 11.1, 3; 36.2; 39.2; 46.5; VI 85.2.

[5] VII 57, esp. 3–5: "clumsily worded," because the μέν of τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων is never answered — the δέ in ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων and ἐκ δ' Ἰωνίας refers back to ἀπ' Εὐβοίας. Chios is first included among the ὑπήκοοι, and then in the next sentence characterised as autonomous.

Methymna, the only other naval ally at that date, in quite a different category, among the ὑπήκοοι, although the Methymnaeans are described as ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι, in contrast with other Aeolians, who are ὑποτελεῖς. And incidentally it is evident from what Thucydides[1] says of the condition of the Boeotian towns after 447/6 that he did not regard them as autonomous in 458/7–447/6, when they were in alliance with Athens, although there is no reason whatever to suppose that they paid tribute.

Let us try to see whether we really can distinguish a class of Athenian allies who were specially autonomous, either *de jure* or *de facto*.[2] First we may consider the position in constitutional theory. It was of course originally understood that all the allies, naval or tributary, would be autonomous,[3] whether or not it was thought necessary to state this specifically in the treaties of alliance. In later times the Athenians probably still maintained that all their allies were autonomous. In decrees and treaties they seem to have inserted the word or not, according as the convenience of Athens in the particular situation seemed to require.[4] No constitutional principle can be detected, and it is impossible to identify a particular class of "autonomous" allies in virtue of the possession of navies or any other fixed characteristic.

When we turn to consider the allies' *de facto* enjoyment of autonomy, we find precisely the same situation: no general rules can be laid down, because every case was dealt with separately on its merits, and there is not the slightest reason to suppose that, in so far as coercion of the allies was practised by Athens, the naval allies or any other identifiable category fared better than the rest. Chios was the premier ally, especially during the Peloponnesian War, but in 425 Athens made Chios pull down her newly erected wall,[5] on suspicion (probably

[1] I 113.4.

[2] The distinction here made between theory and practice is probably sharper than any Greek would have been prepared to draw and has been made merely to facilitate analysis.

[3] See Thuc. I 97.1. Ar., Pol. 1284a 41 (παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας) cannot be regarded as conclusive. In Thuc. I 98.4, παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός need not mean more than "contrary to established usage."

[4] We can infer from Thuc. I 67.2 (cf. 108.4; 139.1; 144.2) that the Thirty Years' Peace, or conceivably the treaty by which Aegina became the ally of Athens in 457, specifically provided for Aegina to be autonomous, though she paid tribute. Tod 63, lines 11–12 (= D 22 in ATL II 76, lines 12–13 = SEG X 69, lines 5–6), of 427/6, seems to say that the Mytileneans (now deprived of their ships and left in the position of virtual tributary allies) are to be αὐτόνομοι. The Peace of Nicias (Thuc. V 18.5) declares that certain "Thraceward" cities, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, the discreetly ambiguous participial clause demonstrating that in the official Athenian and Spartan view at this time αὐτονομία was not incompatible with the payment of tribute—at any rate, a fixed tribute. The Athenians in 412 decreed αὐτονομία to Samos (Thuc. VIII 21). And according to a quite probable restoration, an Athenian decree of c. 407 (Tod 88 = IG i² 116, lines 5–6) provided for the Selymbrians to be αὐτόνομοι. See also Gomme HCT I 225–6. [5] Thuc. IV 51.

not without foundation)[1] of an intended revolt, and the comic poet Eupolis,[2] in his play *The Cities* (probably produced in 422), where the chorus consisted of member states of the empire, could say of Chios,

πέμπει γὰρ ὑμῖν ναῦς μακράς, ἄνδρας θ' ὅταν δεήσῃ,
καὶ τἄλλα πειθαρχεῖ καλῶς, ἄπληκτος ὥσπερ ἵππος.

Moreover, the one probable allusion in our literary sources[3] to the infliction of the standard penalty of five talents for the murder of an Athenian in an allied state suggests that Chios had suffered in this way shortly before 421 B.C. Samos in 440, while still a naval ally, was coerced by Athens, which not only interfered to stop her private war against Miletus, but even changed her government to a democracy.[4] A final argument is provided by the numismatic evidence:[5] no category such as the known naval allies can be distinguished as a group by their coinage from the remaining states of the empire. The strikingly realistic formula which first begins to occur in surviving Athenian decrees not later than the early 440s,[6] ἐν τῶν πόλεων ὧν 'Αθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι (or some similar expression), surely includes any and every city in the empire in which the writ of Athens could be made to run.

Thus the important difference which Thucydides and those who follow him have professed to see between the two kinds of allies cannot be shown to have any justification in constitutional theory, and it can also be seen to have no regular application in practice. The confusion to which it leads is well illustrated by a quotation from a recent paper:[7] "Phaselis, though a tributary ally, was accorded the rights of an independent ally". The mistaken conception of Thucydides is not easy to explain. It may have been due chiefly to four factors. First, it may have been customary for Athens, on the reduction of an ally which had revolted or for some other reason was being coerced, to deprive it of its warships.[8] Navies thus came to be invested with a special dignity, in the minds of the ὀλίγοι above all, as the distinguishing mark of cities which had not yet been coerced by Athens. Secondly, the possession of a navy would, for all except a few inland towns, be almost a necessary condition of that revolt for

[1] See Tod 62 (= IG V i 1) lines 8–10; also SEG X 76 and Meritt in Hesperia XIV (1945) 115–9. [2] Fr. 232 in Kock CAF I 321.

[3] Ar., Pax 169–72. The allusion has been detected independently by P. Roussel in REA XXXV (1933) 385–6; S. Y. Lurie in Vestnik Drevnej Istorii (1947) 20; R. Meiggs in CR LXIII (1949) 9–12. [4] See p. 29 above.

[5] Very well analysed by E. S. G. Robinson in Hesp. Suppl. VIII (1949) 324–40.

[6] The two decrees in this series which are apparently the earliest, SEG X 19 and 23 (= IG i² 27 and 28), have the three-bar sigma and therefore can hardly be later than 445. See Meiggs as cited in p. 9 n. 6 above.

[7] R. J. Hopper in JHS LXIII (1943) 51, n. 149.

[8] Certainly Thasos, Samos and the Lesbian cities other than Methymna, and perhaps several others. Thuc. I 98.4 implies that Naxos was of this number but does not say so explicitly.

which the allied ὀλίγοι longed. Thirdly, the burden of the tribute, small as it was in most cases, may have fallen mainly on the propertied classes in at least some of the allied states. Except perhaps where the payment could be made out of indirect taxes, such as customs or market dues, something in the nature of an eisphora may sometimes have been levied on the richest inhabitants. It will be seen that all these three considerations are such as would appeal only to the ὀλίγοι with whom Thucydides in the main sympathised. Finally, it appears that there was a not unreasonable general feeling that the payment of tribute to any state, according to its own sweet will, was somewhat degrading.

It is a great pity that Thucydides did not clearly express his own view about the condition of Sparta's allies. At times[1] he seems to contrast the subjection of the Athenian allies in the late fifth century, if only by implication, with the independence which Peloponnesian League members were supposed to enjoy;[2] yet he can represent the Mantineans as referring to their former membership of that League as δουλεία,[3] and his statement[4] that Sparta, though she did not impose tribute on her allies, took care that they should be kept friendly to herself by oligarchical governments surely involves the tacit admission that the members of the Peloponnesian League were not really autonomous.[5] Again, the cleverly evasive and sarcastic reply given by the Athenians in 432, on the advice of Pericles, to the Spartan demand that they should "let the Hellenes be autonomous", declares that Athens will leave her allies autonomous if they were so at the date of the treaty (the Peace of 446/5), and if the Spartans "give back to their own cities the right to be autonomous, not in a manner designed to serve Spartan interests (μὴ σφίσι ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι), but in such a way as each may choose."[6]

Did αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία have generally accepted meanings in the later fifth century; and if so, what were they? The concept of ἐλευθερία seems to have been as conveniently imprecise then as it was later under the Hellenistic kings and the Romans.[7] Its antithesis, δουλεία, was also a favourite propaganda term, as we saw earlier. Both words defy exact definition. Αὐτονομία, perhaps,

[1] See e.g. I 141.6. [2] See on this V 77.5; 79.1.

[3] V 69.1. Cf. Diod. XII 80.2 (the Mantineans ἠναγκάσθησαν ὑποταγῆναι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις).

[4] I 19; cf. 76.1. The fact that Sparta's allies remained armed no doubt weighed with Thucydides.

[5] There is no doubt that Sparta did on occasion intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Peloponnesian states. For clear examples during the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. V 81.2 (Sicyon); 82.1 (Achaea); for the 4th cent., see Xen., Hell. V 2.7 and Diod. XV 5; 12 (Mantinea); Xen., Hell. V 2.8–10; 3.10–17, 21–25 and Diod. XV 19.3 (Phlius). For other occasions on which Sparta coerced her allies, see Thuc. V 31.1–4 (Elis); 64 ff. (Tegea); 81.1 (Mantinea); also Xen., Hell. III 2.21–31 and Diod. XIV 17.4–12; 34.1 (Elis); and doubtless Hdts. IX 35.2 and Paus. III 11.7 etc. (battles of Tegea and Dipaea, c. 465).

[6] Thuc. I 144.2. Cf. I 76.1.

[7] See A. H. M. Jones in Anatolian Studies presented to W. H. Buckler (1939) 103–17.

had three essential elements: the right of the city concerned to choose, alter and administer its own laws (above all, of course, its political constitution), to elect and control its own magistrates, and to exercise full judicial sovereignty in its own courts. Membership of a league without the right of secession, or the unwilling reception of a garrison, might, as Gomme points out, limit the ἐλευθερία of the city but not, strictly speaking, its αὐτονομία.[1] But even if all fifth century Greeks had been prepared to agree on a definition of theoretical αὐτονομία, there might be complete disagreement over its application to each individual case. If Sparta assisted a ruling oligarchy to crush a democratic revolution, could she not claim that she was merely helping to preserve an "ancestral constitution"? If Athens put down an oligarchy at the request of the democratic majority, could she not equally claim that the city concerned had, by the free decision of the majority, "chosen its own constitution"? Each would be appealing to a fundamentally different set of principles, between which reconciliation was in the nature of things impossible. Thus αὐτονομία too, under the pressure of class strife, could become, like ἐλευθερία, an empty slogan.

III. Democracy and Oligarchy

We have seen that in the second half of the fifth century the struggle between Athens and Sparta coincided to a very large degree with the struggle between democracy and oligarchy. Now the fundamental truth — far too seldom explicitly stated — is that the oligarchs[2] were, in general, the propertied classes, and the democrats were the poor. This is easily understandable. After the passing away, except in backward areas like Thessaly, of the old hereditary ruling aristocracies, there was only one conceivable basis for the definition of the governing class (the πολίτευμα)[3] in a Greek oligarchy, namely ownership of property; and it was only natural that the majority of the rich should favour a form of constitution in which they themselves were all-powerful, instead of being outnumbered (as they were liable to be in a democracy) by a mass of poor citizens.

In a series of striking passages in the *Politics*, Aristotle[4] makes the economic basis of Greek party politics as clear as anyone could wish. Oligarchy, of

[1] Gomme, HCT I 384–5. In his definition of αὐτονομία, Gomme omits the first of the three elements given above, which, as the etymology of the word suggests, must have been primary.

[2] This term is used here, for convenience, to include not only oligarchs, in the strict sense (i.e. members of a ruling oligarchy), but also all who favoured oligarchy.

[3] Note the significant remark made twice by Aristotle (Pol. 1278b 11; 1279a 25–26): πολιτεία and πολίτευμα are the same thing.

[4] Pol. 1279b–80a. Cf. 1290b 1–20 (more orthodox); also 1302a 12–13, where Ar. refuses to admit that any στάσις worth mentioning can take place within the demos.

course, means literally "rule by the few", but Aristotle insists that the criterion of mere number is not at all essential, and that the small number of the governing body in an oligarchy is quite accidental and due to the simple fact that the rich are generally few and the poor generally numerous. The real basis of the distinction between oligarchy and democracy, he says, is not the small or large size of the governing class but πενία καὶ πλοῦτος, poverty and wealth. If the rulers rule in virtue of their wealth, it is an oligarchy — and Aristotle says he would still call it an oligarchy, even if the rich rulers were a majority![1] So he formulates his definitions: oligarchy exists "whenever those who own property are masters of the constitution"; democracy, by contrast, exists "when those who do not possess much property but are poor are the masters". Aristotle also says that oligarchy serves the interests of the wealthy, democracy those of the poor — in fact, he will not call it democracy at all when the masses govern in the interests of the whole body of citizens.[2]

This brings out a point of great importance in the Greek conception of democracy. Corresponding to the two principal meanings of the Greek word δῆμος (the whole people, or the lower classes, the poor), there are two meanings of δημοκρατία: first, a constitution in which the whole people (the demos in the broad sense) is sovereign; and secondly, a constitution in which the sovereign power is the demos in the narrower, technical sense: the mass of poor citizens. The first conception of democracy (government by all citizens) was probably held by most democrats,[3] the second (government by the poor) by all oligarchs. It is of course the first conception which corresponds to our own idea of democracy; the second one (a state of affairs in which the poor rule — of course entirely in their own interests) has affinities with the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marxist theory. Greek oligarchs, when they were in a position to do as they liked, naturally put first the interests of the propertied class (and if they were extreme oligarchs, only a section of that); it is hardly surprising, therefore, that they should have insisted on representing democracy as a form of government under which the poor necessarily exploited the rich for their own benefit.[4]

Much light may be thrown upon Greek politics by an analysis of the word δημοτικός, which serves as the normal adjective both for δῆμος, in its narrower sense, and for δημοκρατία. There is often no way of rendering it adequately in

[1] The way Ar. expresses himself is confused. What he is really saying is: "The only distinction I will recognise, the prime one, whether rich or poor are the majority, is between political rights based on wealth and political rights available to all citizens—among whom the poor are in practice, of course, the majority."

[2] Similarly, Thuc. (II 37.1) makes Pericles say that Athens is called a democracy because it is governed μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας—not, it will be noticed, ἐς πάντας. Pericles would surely have been more likely to say the latter; but cf. what has been said about the speeches in Thuc., at p. 2 above.

[3] As by Athenagoras, in Thuc. VI 39.1. [4] Cf. Ar., Pol. 1318a 18–26.

English except by a periphrasis. It is unfortunate that the English transliteration "demotic" has become attached to a certain type of Egyptian writing.[1] Now δημοτικός is the adjective naturally derived from the noun δῆμος, but in almost all its various uses it corresponds to the more restricted, the specifically party-political, sense of that term; the word δημόσιος is the standard adjective applied to things pertaining to the whole people, the State. The Greeks had a perfectly good adjective, δημοκρατικός, derived directly from the noun δημοκρατία; but this word is very much less common than δημοτικός, and we often find δημοτικός when we should have expected the other. In his *Constitution of Athens*, for example, Aristotle never once employs δημοκρατικός but uses δημοτικός again and again. A point which deserves special attention is that δημοτικός, unlike δημοκρατικός, carries no suggestion of *rule by* the demos, either in its strict etymology or in popular usage. A man was δημοτικός if he was on the side of the lower orders, the poor, or if he acted against the interests of a ruling oligarchy or even of the propertied classes in general. Thus Aristotle[2] twice speaks of Peisistratus as δημοτικώτατος. Yet Peisistratus was a tyrant. Here, and in many similar contexts, it gives a decidedly misleading impression if, as is very commonly done, we translate δημοτικός by "democratic". There was nothing democratic about the popular tyrants, yet they were emphatically δημοτικοί. Our word "democratic", as it is generally employed nowadays, stresses method rather than aim and attitude and suggests decision by majority vote; whereas the Greek, stressing aim and attitude and paying much less attention to method, applied the term δημοτικός above all to such people and such measures as were opposed to the interests of the wealthy class. The connotation of the word δημοτικός, as it is commonly used in classical Greek, is often closer to the Soviet than to the Western sense of the word "democratic". The ordinary poor Greek seems not to have expected to have much personal say in the management of public affairs — at any rate, if he had not already tasted the sweets of democratic government, and sometimes not even then. He was content as a rule if the state was administered by men of the upper classes who were reasonably δημοτικοί, especially if these men were elected by and responsible to him and his fellows; but where no sufficient supply of men of this stamp existed, he might be quite ready to accept a tyrant who was δημοτικός in preference to an oligarchy which was the reverse. He might even prefer an aristocrat like Pericles to a man of humble origin, as a democratic magistrate, because other things being equal the aristocrat would have had a much better start in life and would be more competent and perhaps less easily corruptible. The poor, Aristotle says,[3] are willing enough to remain quiet, even when they have no political power, provided no one does violence to them or robs them of their substance. Any

[1] As in Hdts. II 36.4. [2] Ath. Pol. 13.4; 14.1. [3] Pol. 1297b 6–8; cf. 1318b 16–20.

ambitions they may entertain will be satisfied if they are given the right of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; and they can sometimes be fobbed off with even less.[1]

It is not legitimate to object that although the economic character of Greek party divisions is clear enough by Aristotle's time, the situation was not the same in the fifth century.[2] In fact there is ample evidence to prove the existence of precisely the same general groupings, not only in the earlier fourth century, but also in the fifth. Xenophon, for example, specifically opposes the terms δῆμος and πλουσιώτεροι,[3] and defines the demos (whose rule is δημοκρατία) as οἱ πένητες τῶν πολιτῶν;[4] and in the brilliant little oligarchical pamphlet containing a fictitious conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles, incorporated in the Memorabilia,[5] we find the ruling power in a democracy, τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος, opposed to (and conceived as tyrannising over) the owners of property. Similarly, the Oxyrhynchus historian,[6] writing of the year 396, divides the Athenians into οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, and οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί. For the fifth century we have a contemporary political pamphlet, that of the Pseudo-Xenophon (the "Old Oligarch"),[7] which takes it for granted that the Greek states were deeply divided on social and economic lines into broad groups between which there existed a permanent and deep-seated antagonism. Various terms are applied by the Old Oligarch to each of his two categories, but all those of each set are used more or less as equivalents. On the one hand we have the propertied class, who are usually called οἱ χρηστοί,[8] but also οἱ πλούσιοι, γενναῖοι, ὀλίγοι, δυνατώτατοι, δεξιώτατοι, εὐδαίμονες, ἄριστοι, βέλτιστοι, τὸ βέλτιστον; on the other hand there are the poor, usually described as οἱ πονηροί or ὁ δῆμος, but also as οἱ πένητες, δημοτικοί, δημόται, χείρονες, τὸ κάκιστον, πλῆθος, ὁ ὄχλος. The characterisation of the demos as οἱ πένητες is explicit in two passages,[9] where ὁ δῆμος is opposed to οἱ πλούσιοι, and it is implicit throughout. The Old Oligarch emphatically asserts[10] that in every country τὸ βέλτιστον is opposed to democracy, in no city is it well disposed towards the demos. Possibly most upper-class Athenians of the fifth century, before about 413 at any rate, would have repudiated many of the Old Oligarch's assertions or at least deprecated such

[1] Pol. 1318b 21–22, 23–27.

[2] For this view, see e.g. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes[2] 372, cf. 361.

[3] Hell. IV 8.20. [4] Mem. IV 2.36–37. [5] I 2.40–46. [6] Hell. Oxy. I 3. Cf. Ar., Eccl. 197–8.

[7] The most useful recent discussions of Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. are those by Gomme, "The Old Oligarch," in Athenian Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson (HSCP Suppl. I, 1940) 211–45, and by H. Frisch, The Constitution of the Athenians (1942), who give full references to the earlier literature.

[8] With the Old Oligarch's persistent use of χρηστοί and πονηροί in a social and political sense, cf. Cicero's description of the Roman Optimates as *boni* and of their political opponents as *improbi*. [9] I 13; II 10; cf. I. 5; II 14, 18.

[10] I 5; III 10. In the latter passage, the demos may perbaps be that of Athens.

plain speaking. But that is not the point: the Old Oligarch is surely writing for a non-Athenian audience, and his pamphlet is particularly valuable for the light it sheds on the viewpoint of the upper classes in states other than Athens. The picture he draws, with its extremes of black and white, is of course somewhat exaggerated and over-simplified, but its basic division of the citizens of the Greek states into two broad economic and social categories between which there existed a deep-seated political tension, is amply confirmed by other contemporary evidence.

Thucydides,[1] in the speech he puts into the mouth of Athenagoras the Syracusan, represents the alternative to δημοκρατία as the rule of the owners of property. And, as we saw in the first section of this paper, Thucydides, Xenophon and the rest, in their accounts of the political struggles of the late fifth century, constantly bring before us cities divided into two factions, of which one, normally pro-Athenian, is called the δῆμος, πολλοί, πλέονες or πλῆθος, and the other is referred to by some such name as the ὀλίγοι, δυνατοί, δυνατώτατοι or γνώριμοι, and is usually pro-Spartan. The various terms in each group are all more or less synonymous. It would be perverse in the extreme to pretend that the word demos (by far the most common in its group) does not normally mean the mass of the common people — as the other terms obviously do — but simply a leading clique of democratic politicians, or something of the sort. Occasionally the expression may have the latter meaning — but if so, the clique is called the demos because it is regarded as acting on behalf of the real demos, the lower classes as a whole.[2] There is an excellent example of this in Thucydides' account of the events at Samos in 412–11. First,[3] the "demos" puts down an oligarchy of aristocratic landowners. Later,[4] we discover that this "demos" was essentially a small body of about three hundred. But since the oligarchs were very much more numerous (six hundred were killed or exiled, and others remained), the three hundred must have been supported by the lower classes as a whole. And when they themselves turn against the common people and try to seize power for themselves as an oligarchy, they automatically cease to be the demos. The wording of the crucial phrases deserves to be quoted: οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, and καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθήσεσθαι. The ultimate demos straightway sets up a democracy and is referred to as οἱ πλέονες.

Thucydides, in his rather rhetorical reflections[5] — prompted by the appalling

[1] VI 39.1. Euripides, too, makes his basic political classification (Suppl. 238–45) in economic terms.

[2] The popular *leaders* are normally referred to as οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται, as by Thuc. III 75.2; 82.1; IV 46.4; 66.3, the last passage distinguishing between such people at Megara and their own rank and file (evidently numerous: note πλῆθος in 68.4).

[3] VIII 21. [4] VIII 73.2. [5] III 82–83.

events at Corcyra in 427 — on the acute political strife in the Greek cities in the late fifth century, makes it quite clear that the conflicts which he describes as now taking place throughout the Greek world were between the same basic factions everywhere: one consisting of the popular party, having as its slogan πλήθους ἰσονομία πολιτική, its leaders eager to call in the Athenians, and the other, the ὀλίγοι, with the slogan ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων, equally anxious to bring in the Spartans. This analysis tallies well with the detailed factual evidence and is certainly correct in its broad outlines. There will of course have been exceptions — cities, for example, in which the demos was too much intimidated or too politically immature to offer much resistance to rule by the ὀλίγοι, and where the active democratic faction was quite small. In these exceptional cases it would be wrong to conceive the great mass of the people as being pro-Athenian. But words such as πολλοί, πλέονες, πλῆθος are so habitually applied by our sources to the democratic or pro-Athenian factions, and their opponents are so invariably spoken of as a minority of ὀλίγοι, δυνατώτατοι or γνώριμοι, that we must suppose the former to have greatly outnumbered the latter in the great majority of cities. The *leaders* of the demos, needless to say, would nearly always be members of the upper classes who were (or at least were considered to be) δημοτικοί in outlook; but the rank and file, as we have already established, would be drawn mainly from the poorer classes. There may well have been in many cases a considerable minority, sometimes even a majority, who joined neither side; but as we hear little or nothing about such people[1] we cannot argue about them except *a priori*.

The only times in fifth century history when we have some detailed information not only about the composition of the various parties in a state and their activities but also about their political programmes, are the years of oligarchic revolution at Athens, 411 and 404. A particularly valuable piece of evidence is Aristotle's brief analysis[2] of the political factions existing in the year 404. His three groups can be shown to have existed equally in the years 412–10, when they seem first to have crystallised. Aristotle distinguishes three parties: (1) οἱ δημοτικοί, the common people, who wished to preserve the existing democracy, and are set apart from οἱ γνώριμοι,[3] subdivided into (2) outright oligarchs, organised in political clubs, and (3) "those who, though not members of the political clubs, were yet considered to belong to the best class of citizens, and desired the ancestral constitution". These last we can call moderate oligarchs. (The extreme oligarchs had no real constitutional programme: they simply wanted irresponsible personal power for their own small group, both in 411 and in 404). Now it has not been sufficiently realised that the oligarchical "terror" at Athens in the spring of 411, vividly described by

[1] Cf. Thuc. III 82.8 (p. 53 below). [2] Ath. Pol. 34.3.

[3] Elsewhere (e.g. in Pol. 1291b 28; 1303a 8) Ar. sometimes uses this term in a broad sense, as here.

Thucydides,[1] could not have been so completely effective, nor could the crucial assembly have been held more than a mile outside the walls, at Colonus (with the Spartans close at hand, so that none but cavalry and hoplites could attend), and the drastic constitutional changes put through with not so much as a single dissentient voice,[2] except with the connivance, or at least the passive acquiescence, of the majority of the hoplite class. It is clear from Thucydides' narrative that the "demos" — at this juncture, essentially those of the Thetic class who were not serving as rowers in the fleet — were never won over to willing acceptance of the oligarchy. The behaviour of extreme oligarchs need never surprise us; what seems astonishing at first sight about the events of 412–10 is that so many men of the hoplite class who had surely been loyal enough to the democracy in earlier years[3] should develop into oligarchs, to the extent of first countenancing a "terror" directed against the radicals,[4] then submitting for some months to a regime which put power into the hands of a set of unprincipled extremists, and finally setting up a constitution which disfranchised at least half the citizen population, including the whole body of sailors upon whom success in the war mainly depended — ὁ θρανίτης λεώς, ὁ σωσίπολις, as Aristophanes[5] had called them earlier. The explanation surely lies in the unprecedented combination of a military catastrophe, a desperate financial situation, and the greatly increased ravaging of Attica from the new fortified enemy base at Decelea.[6] The process which had begun to lower the

[1] VIII 65; -66; cf. Ps.-Lys. XX 8–9; Plut., Alc. 26. See also Thuc. VIII 70.2. Ar., Ath. Pol. 29 ff. gives an entirely different and on the whole much inferior version of these events: he ignores the "terror" and does not even mention that the vital assembly took place at Colonus, or its suspicious unanimity; he contradicts himself (cf. 30.1 and 32.1 with 32.3) in trying to make out that a "moderate" constitution was produced under the authority of the (as yet non-existent) "Five Thousand." Ar.'s account must go back ultimately to a source the writer of which was anxious to make the "revolution of the 400" appear a much more constitutional affair than it actually was, and manipulated his facts accordingly: the most obvious possibilities which have been suggested are Antiphon's famous speech in his own defence, and the Atthis of Androtion, whose father Andron was one of "the 400". [2] Thuc. VIII 69.1: οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος.

[3] Thuc. VIII 66.5 notes that the conspirators included some men whom no one would ever have suspected of oligarchical tendencies.

[4] Cf. the attitude of Theramenes, the moderate oligarch *par excellence*, in 404: as a member of the "Thirty," he seems to have made no real resistance to the new "terror", until the extremists began to "liquidate" wealthy aristocrats and showed they had no real intention of associating the upper classes as a whole in the government (Ar., Ath. Pol. 35.4; 36.1). It even appears from Xen. (Hell. II 3.15, 38), who admired Theramenes and had rather similar political views, that the only executions against which Theramenes protested were of men who had not worked against the interests of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

[5] Acharn. 162–3.

[6] The devastation during the Decelean War was evidently much more prolonged and severe than that of the Archidamian War: see e.g. Thuc. VI 91.6–7; 93.2; VII 19.1–2; 27.2–5 (esp. 5); 28.1, 4; VIII 69.1; 71.1; Hell. Oxy. XII 3–5; Lys. VII 6–7, 24.

relative status of the more prosperous landed proprietors during the Archidamian War[1] set in again, in an intensified form.[2] The richest citizens were bearing the burden of the now regularly recurring and very expensive trierarchy,[3] and both they and an unascertainable proportion of the men of moderate wealth may have been saddled with several levies of eisphora.[4] The economic basis of the influence of the old governing class may have been seriously impaired. In time of severe financial stringency, those who control the state politically can usually manage to put most of the burden on to others. The obvious solution for the Athenian upper classes in 411 was to make a twofold reform, both economic and political, by ceasing to give pay for the performance of public duties. This would both save money and exclude many poor citizens from playing much part in politics. But in order to do this, and effect other reforms in their own interests, the propertied class had to take the state machine entirely into their own hands, by force. No doubt there were numbers of hoplites, especially the poorer ones, who did not willingly accept the policy of the oligarchs in 411; but among the "notables" we know of only a handful in this category,[5] and there is no reason to suppose there were many others. Thus in 411 (and again in 404) we see the propertied class as a whole turning against democracy, even at Athens itself — for it is surely ludicrous to describe as a democracy, even as a "limited" or "moderate" democracy, a regime such as that of the Five Thousand, which disfranchised the poorer half at least of the citizen population.

The miserable results of the two revolutions finally discredited oligarchy at Athens. For much of the fourth century it seems to have had no open advocates there; those who were in fact moderate oligarchs found it politic to pretend that what they wanted was nothing but democracy — only of course it must be the good old democracy which had flourished in the good old times, not the vicious form of democracy which had led to all sorts of unworthy men gaining

[1] It was precisely the best land which must have suffered most from the Spartan ravaging (see e.g. Thuc. II 19.2), and here the wealthiest landowners would have been found. The rich also lost their fine and well-furnished country houses (Thuc. II 65.2; cf. Hell. Oxy. XII 4–5; Isocr. VII 52). See also W. G. Hardy in CP XXI (1926) 346–55.

[2] It was the δυνατώτατοι who ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, according to Thuc. VIII 48.1.

[3] The speaker in Lys. XXI 2 claims to have spent 6 talents in 7 years as trierarch during the Ionian War. As late as 415 this service could be cheerfully and even enthusiastically fulfilled (see Thuc. VI 31.3), but in 405 Aristophanes (Ran. 1065–6) spoke disapprovingly of attempts by the rich to evade the burden, and it appears from Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. III 4 that prosecutions of trierarchs for failing in their duty were not uncommon.

[4] There are references in the orators to πολλαὶ εἰσφοραί being paid during the Peloponnesian War (e.g. Lys. XII 20; XXV 12; XXX 26; also perhaps Antiph. II β 12—but see K. J. Dover in CQ XLIV, 1950, at p. 59). There seems to be a reference to unwillingness to pay as early as 411 (Ar., Lys. 654).

[5] Leon and Diomedon, Thrasybulus, Thrasyllus and Chaereas (Thuc. VIII 73–74).

power for their own nefarious ends, and so forth.[1] Isocrates furnishes some excellent examples of this kind of propaganda, notably in his speech *On the Peace* and in his *Areopagiticus*. Even Demetrius of Phalerum claimed that he οὐ μόνον οὐ κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηνώρθωσε.[2]

We are constantly told that it was city particularism, the passion for αὐτονομία of the πόλις, which was of paramount importance in Greek political life. Ehrenberg in a recent article,[3] after admitting that the rule of Athens may have brought many benefits to her empire as well as to herself, goes on to say: "But no Greek, and therefore not Thucydides either, would ever see things in this light — not because the Greeks did not value material prosperity (they certainly did), but because they could not help thinking mainly, if not exclusively, in political terms, that is to say, in terms of Polis life and in particular of Polis autonomy... Nothing counted when weighed against the loss of political freedom". The historical evidence, on the contrary, shows beyond doubt that at times of crisis the passion for polis autonomy proved less powerful, with many if not most citizens, than class feeling. If our sources, when they are generalising, often fail to reveal this fact, that is because they reflect almost exclusively the opinions of those moderate oligarchs who were on the whole prepared, except at moments of extreme crisis, to tolerate either oligarchy or democracy, under both of which they could normally hope to maintain their own position. It is most interesting, however, to find Thucydides[4] making Brasidas admit to the Acanthians that for either the Few or the Many to be put under the domination of the other would be more unpleasant than subjection to a foreign yoke. Few would-be oligarchs would have admitted they were in a state of political freedom under a democracy, and no democrat would have felt that he was free under an oligarchy. The willing subservience of democrats to Athens, of oligarchs to Sparta, examples of which were cited in the first section of this paper, often involved the deliberate sacrifice of αὐτονομία. It was a sacrifice of a sort which many Greeks were evidently quite prepared

[1] It would be foolish to swallow all this anti-democratic propaganda—for that is what it is. For example, we shall not take seriously the piteous complaints of Isocr. XV 159–60 when we recall that the orator himself, although a very rich man, had borne a remarkably small share of State burdens (he was trierarch not more than thrice, each time jointly with his son: Isocr. XV 145; cf. Ps.-Plut., Mor. 838a), and that the eisphorae paid at Athens during some 20 or more years of particular strain (377 to 357–5) did not total much more than 300 talents (Dem. XXII 44)—an exceedingly small amount. Very many passages in the orators show that the wealthy habitually concealed their property and thus evaded their obligations to the State: see Classica et Mediaevalia XIV (1953) at p. 34 and n. 17.

[2] Strab. IX 1.20, p. 398. [3] In JHS LXVII (1947) 48.

[4] IV 86.4–5. Cf. G. B. Grundy, Thuc. and the History of his Age² I 172; N. M. Pusey in HSCP LI (1940) 215–31. The statement of Brasidas is in effect contradicted in Thuc. VIII 48.5 (the passage beginning οὐ γάρ); but the facts compel us to accept the opinion put into the mouth of Brasidas in preference to the other.

to make, if only it would save them from falling under the domination of their political opponents.

The exiled ἄνδρες τῶν παχέων of Naxos who in 499 invited Aristagoras to restore them[1] knew perfectly well that this would involve subjection to Persia. The demos of Aegina, probably two or three years before or after Marathon, plotted to betray the island to an Athenian expeditionary force, but were massacred, to the number of seven hundred, by the governing oligarchy of wealthy men.[2] The Samian oligarchy was put down by Athens in 441/0, as mentioned earlier,[3] at the request of Miletus and certain Samians "who wished to revolutionise the constitution". The Samian oligarchs retaliated by allying themselves with Pissuthnes, the Persian satrap. Reference has already been made[4] to some very probable examples of aristocratic medising in the mid-fifth century, at Erythrae, Miletus and Colophon, to further medising and atticising by the Colophonians early in the Archidamian War, and to the attempted betrayal of Plataea to her hereditary foe, Thebes, in 431, by a few citizens conspicuous for their wealth and their noble birth. At Athens, where the remarkable economic expansion of the sixth and fifth centuries, and the benefits of empire, did much to mitigate class conflict among the citizens, a considerable proportion of the propertied classes must have accepted the democracy — even the radical democracy of 461 onwards — until the tide of prosperity began to turn and the adverse effects of the war made themselves seriously felt, as already described. Yet even at Athens we find oligarchs ready to become subject to an outside power, if only the democracy could be put down. Isagoras and the aristocrats were willing to become dependants of Sparta in 508/7, rather than submit to the democratic reforms proposed by Cleisthenes.[5] In 479 and 457 there were oligarchic plots at Athens involving treasonable correspondence with an enemy,[6] first Persia, then Sparta; and at the time the Old Oligarch wrote the betrayal of the city "by a few" was evidently a distinct possibility.[7] The extreme oligarchs of 411 would of course have preferred autonomous oligarchy to anything else; but we know from Thucydides[8] that they would have chosen a necessarily Spartan-dominated oligarchy in preference to autonomy under a restored democracy. And the extreme oligarchs of 404/3 were willingly subservient to Sparta, to the extent of sending for a Spartan garrison and harmost.[9]

[1] Hdts. V 30. [2] Hdts. VI 91–93. [3] See p. 10 above. [4] See p. 9 above.
[5] Hdts. V 70; Ar., Ath. Pol. 20. 2. [6] Plut., Arist. 13 (479); Thuc. I 107.4, 6 (457).
[7] See Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. II 15. [8] VIII 91.2–3; cf. 90. 2.
[9] Xen., Hell. II 3.13–14; Ar., Ath. Pol. 37.2; Diod. XIV 4.3–4; Plut., Lys. 15. The sacrifice of αὐτονομία to class and party interests became even more common, of course, in the 4th century—especially during the rise of Macedon; but Ps.-Dem. XVII 10, 15 sufficiently accounts for the existence of well-to-do φιλιππίζοντες. Specially interesting is the obsession of Aeneas Tacticus with the likelihood of the betrayal of the city by a discontented faction.

IV. The Political Outlook of Thucydides

Our subject is the Athenian empire and not its great historian; but as certain criticisms have been made of Thucydides in the first and second sections of this article, it is only right that an explanation should be offered of the reasons for the defects in his History which have been pointed out above. Why did Thucydides, who was an exceptionally truthful man and anything but a superficial observer, so deceive himself about the attitude of the Greeks towards the Athenian empire? There can only be one answer: political and social influences, at the end of the fifth century exceptionally powerful, drove the historian to look at the whole Greek world in terms of that relatively small section of the Athenian citizen body to which he himself belonged, so that when he wrote of the detestation of Athens, or the longing for revolt, felt by οἱ πολλοί, or οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες, or αἱ πόλεις ὑπήκοοι, or οἱ ξύμμαχοι, or πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις,[1] he was thinking only of the upper classes, of that comparatively small body of what is sometimes called "educated opinion". This point of view he quite honestly conceived as that of the Greeks in general. It is a perfectly natural and very common failing, and it is entirely characteristic of the Greek and Roman historians, most of whom, if they did not actually belong to the governing class of their day, had thoroughly acquired its outlook. When we are studying Thucydides, then, we must never forget that we are studying a member — if an exceptionally intelligent and gifted member — of the Athenian propertied class.

The nature of Thucydides' political outlook is a very complicated question, especially since that outlook must have undergone considerable development during the period of some thirty years in which he was writing his great History. Attempts have been made to sketch that development, in accordance with theories about the dates at which certain parts of the History are held to have been written; but they are all subjective, and agreement has not been reached on any of the major problems involved. For present purposes, the History of Thucydides must be considered as a unity,[2] and references here to Thucydides' attitude are to the outlook which he eventually came to possess, so far as we can infer it from the History.

Four points are particularly material for establishing Thucydides' political position. First, as we have seen, when he generalises about the attitude of the allies and others towards the Athenian empire he identifies himself with the outlook of the anti-Athenian Few and ignores the generally pro-Athenian Many. Secondly, although he clearly had a great admiration for Pericles, he is at

[1] Thuc. I 75.4; VIII 2.1; IV 108.3 and VIII 2.2; IV 80.1; II 8.4.

[2] This must not be taken to imply acceptance of the extreme "unitarian" view of the composition of the History, ably presented by J. H. Finley in his book, Thucydides, and his article, "The Unity of Thucydides' History," in Athenian Studies (see p. 24 n. 7 above) 255–97.

pains to insist that the Periclean regime was a democracy in name only[1] — a statement which gains point if we take the word δημοκρατία here in the narrower sense: government by the demos, the lower classes. Thirdly, there is a significant passage[2] in Thucydides' much-praised lament over the bitter political strife of which Corcyra provided the first example, and which then became general: the moderates among the citizens (τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν), he says, perished at the hands of (the extremists on) both sides, either for not joining in the struggle or because survival was begrudged them. This statement — and indeed the whole context — shows emotional sympathy with the moderates.[3] In fact they must usually have fared much better than the extremists of both parties, who no doubt tended everywhere, as at Athens and Corcyra, to destroy each other first, and had no reason for special animosity against the moderates. Fourthly, Thucydides[4] speaks of the moderate oligarchy of the "Five Thousand", which governed Athens for about eight months, from October 411 to June 410,[5] in terms which leave little doubt that it was the form of constitution he most admired (as did Aristotle and so many others): he calls it a balanced combination of oligarchy and democracy, and he expresses the opinion that οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες. The precise form of the "constitution of the Five Thousand" is a well known puzzle, but two features of it are reasonably certain: both Thucydides and Aristotle[6] tell us that it was based on a hoplite franchise and non-payment for office. What Thucydides eventually came to desire, then, was an outright oligarchy of (roughly speaking) the hoplite class. It would be absurd to suppose that he ever became a narrow oligarch, after the stamp of the "Four Hundred" or the "Thirty". He makes it clear, by the tone of some of the passages he has inserted in his History, notably the Funeral Speech and the glowing tribute to Pericles,[7] that he found values in the way of life of Periclean Athens which he realised were an integral if not a necessary part of its democratic constitution. Indeed, the passages which have just been mentioned and parts of the speeches in which the empire is defended may be considered, from one aspect, as a defiant reply to the wholesale denunciations of the way of life of the imperial city which Thucydides himself must have heard from the extreme oligarchs.[8] Nevertheless, the fact remains that in pronouncing his favourable verdict on the regime of the "Five Thousand" Thucydides was in

[1] II 65.9. Plut. (Per. 9) remarks that this is tantamount to calling the Periclean regime an aristocracy. [2] III 82.8 (fin.).

[3] Cf. the praise of "the men of moderate possessions" in such passages as Eurip., Suppl. 238–45; Ar., Pol. 1295b 1–96a 40; 1296b 34–97a 7.

[4] VIII 97.1 (cf. 65.3); Ar., Ath. Pol. 33.1, 2 (cf. 29.5).

[5] On the dates, see Meritt, Athenian Financial Documents 104–114, 176–9.

[6] VIII 97.1; cf. Ar., Ath. Pol. 33.2. [But see Addendum, p. 40 below].

[7] Also, e.g., VIII 48.6 (see p. 37 below).

[8] Cf. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thuk.[2] 237–42.

effect approving the total disfranchisement of the poorer half (if not more than half) of the citizens of Athens.[1] To call such a man a democrat, even a moderate democrat, is impossible, by contemporary Greek standards even more than by our own. [But see Addendum, p. 40 below.]

So long as the lower orders had been willing to accept with little or no question the leadership of aristocrats (exercised to a remarkable degree, during the Periclean regime, in their interests), Thucydides, like many other members of the Athenian propertied class, may have been content with the forms of democracy. During the Peloponnesian War, however, the economic situation changed, probably to the special detriment of the upper classes,[2] and there seems also to have been a pronounced change in the political climate, no less real because its nature is difficult to describe. The root of the matter probably is that after the death of Pericles the lower orders began to assert themselves much more in the Assembly, the Council and the courts. The Assembly, though it continued to elect mainly men of position to the strategia,[3] took a decidedly more active part in governing the state, exercising a strict control over the policy of the officers it elected, and punishing them for negligence and even lack of success — sometimes, it would seem, with excessive harshness.[4] For this new activity the demos found a new type of leader: the series of so-called "demagogues", beginning with Eucrates, Lysicles and Cleon, satirised by Aristophanes as "sellers" of something or other,[5] and continuing with men like Hyperbolus, Androcles and Cleophon. The main function of these "demagogues" — about whom we are very ill informed — was to be spokesmen of the demos in the Council and Assembly. When Thucydides[6]

[1] Five thousand would of course have been very much less than half the citizen population in 411, but Polystratus, member and καταλογεύς of the Four Hundred, claimed (rightly or wrongly) that he had enrolled 9000 (Ps.-Lys. XX 13), and if the πολίτευμα under the "Five Thousand" in fact consisted of the hoplite class, it may have numbered very roughly a third to a half of the citizen body. [2] See pp. 27—8 above.

[3] From certain passages in the comic poets, it can surely be inferred that recently, perhaps from the early or middle years of the Archidamian War, at least one or two men of no social standing had been elected generals, and that this was regarded as an innovation: see e.g. Eup., fr. 117 (in Kock, CAF I 288—9), from the Demoi, usually dated 412; cf. fr. 100 (CAF I 283), also from the Demoi, and the earlier fr. 205 (CAF I 314), from the Poleis, probably of 422 B.C., where Cleon may be one of the targets. (Contrast Ar., Ath. Pol. 26.1; Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 3). In fact the generals were always chosen mainly from the leading families: for the 4th century evidence, see the admirable work of J. Sundwall, Epigraphische Beiträge (Klio, Beiheft IV, 1906). Some families had a tradition of public administration: see e.g. Lys. XVI 20; Plat., Menex. 234b.

[4] At least twice: Thuc. IV 65.3 (Sicily); Xen., Hell. I 7 and Diod. XIII 100—3 (Arginusae). But see Grote's comments on the latter incident.

[5] See the list of — πῶλαι in Ar., Eq. 128–43, with Schol. ad id. 129, 132, naming Eucrates and Lysicles; for the latter see also Plut., Per. 24.

[6] II 65.10—12.

lays the chief blame for the fall of Athens upon the successors of Pericles,[1] he is surely thinking above all of these men.[2] According to him,[3] in their competition for leadership they ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι, by which he seems to mean that they made it their special aim to please the people (in order to win popularity for themselves). This is just the sort of thing a member of the old governing class would have said about "upstart radicals", whatever their real aims and behaviour might have been, and we are under no obligation to accept mere generalised political propaganda of this sort, even from Thucydides, in the absence of confirmatory factual evidence.[4] What evidence of this kind is there? Cleon was probably responsible[5] for the increase — a very necessary increase, if prices were rising — of one obol a day in the jury pay. He may well have been the prime mover in the great increase in the tribute in 425; but it is significant that there is no complaint about the increase in Aristophanes' Knights, produced only a few months later, although the whole play is essentially an attack on Cleon.[6] The absence of any blackguarding of Cleon on this point is hardly explicable unless we assume that his political

[1] Himself rightly called δημαγωγός by Isocr. VIII 126; XV 234; cf. II 16; VIII 122; X 37; Lys. XXVII 10.

[2] Prima facie, all the post-Periclean political leaders are included in the indictment. But Nicias must certainly be left out, in view of the remarkable encomium in VII 86.5. Nor can Thuc. be thinking of the oligarchic leaders (of the extremists, like Antiphon and Phrynichus, or of the moderates, like Theramenes), for it is evident from VI 65.11 that he has in mind particularly men who strove for the προστασία τοῦ δήμου—i.e. the demagogues, and no doubt Alcibiades.

[3] II 65.10; cf. Ar., Ath. Pol. 28.4. The allegation that one's political opponents are mere flatterers of the demos seems to have been very common in the 4th century: see e.g. Dem. III 22 and VIII 34 (where the ῥήτορες concerned, the spokesmen of the peace party, are certainly not radical democrats); Isocr. VIII 3–5, 9–10, 121; XII 140; XV 133; Aeschin. III 127, 134.

[4] Similar general accusations in Aristophanes, of which there are many (e.g. Acharn. 370–4, 633–5; Eq. 213–8, 801–4, 1115–50, 1340–57; Vesp. 665–8 etc.), and in the other comic poets, are not factual evidence. Unanimity among the comedians on political matters need not surprise us or oblige us to believe them. They all seem to have belonged to the propertied classes (see Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes[2] 20–21), and they naturally detested the πολυπράγμων—a term which seems to have been applied freely to (among others) the humble citizen who ventured to take more interest in politics than his betters thought was good for him.

[5] There seems to be no earlier direct assertion of this than Schol. ad Ar., Vesp. 88, 300, who does not quote any ancient authority. Passages such as Ar., Eq. 51, 255 do not prove the fact, though it is probable enough in itself.

[6] None of the passages (e.g. Ar., Eq. 313, 326, 839f.) usually quoted in support of the theory that the decree of Thudippus (Tod 66 = A 9 in ATL I and II) was Cleon's work proves anything of the kind. The whole theme of the Knights is that Cleon manages everything in the State, and some reference to the tribute was unavoidable, but there is not even a hint of the recent great increase. None of the literary sources (see e.g. Ps.-Andoc. IV 11; Plut., Arist. 24) connects Cleon with the raising of the tribute. Cf. also Theopomp. fr. 94 in FGH II B no. 115—if this is indeed a quotation from Theopompus. But the se-

opponents fully supported the increase in the tribute — as they would surely have done, once they realised that repeated eisphorae, which would fall mainly on them, could only be avoided by passing the burden on to their *protégés*,[1] the men of property in the allied states. Thucydides detested Cleon and could not bring himself to be just to him: West and Meritt,[2] themselves hostile to Cleon, have shown reason to suppose that Thucydides has completely misrepresented the results of his campaign in the "Thraceward region" in 422. Of the policy of the other demagogues we know virtually nothing. But Cleophon surely did anything but curry favour with the demos on easy terms, even if he did introduce the diobelia,[3] apparently a form of poor relief, which must have been very necessary after the Spartan occupation of Decelea. Cleophon's war policy, whether mistaken or not, called for great efforts and great sacrifices, and he seems to have been the mainstay of Athenian resistance in the last months — so much so that, as Lysias[4] says, he was the one man the oligarchs were most anxious to destroy. If these "demagogues" were really mere flatterers of the demos, it is strange that of the six whose names were mentioned above, at least four or five should have died violent deaths: Cleon and probably Lysicles fell in battle, Hyperbolus and Androcles were assassinated, Cleophon was judicially murdered.[5] Naturally enough, it was against these men that the resentment of the political conservatives was concentrated; but they evidently had a large following in their own day, and the memory of some of them (Cleon and Cleophon, at any rate) was still honoured by many in the fourth century, as we know from Lysias and a speech in the Demosthenic corpus.[6] Can any direct factual evidence be brought forward in support of Thucydides' generalisation about the policy of the "demagogues"? Unless it is forthcoming, it would be wiser to reserve judgment on them.

Thucydides himself was an exile from 424 to 404.[7] But before 424 the change of heart among the Athenian upper classes had already begun, and during the latter part of his exile he could not have failed to learn that that change had become much more pronounced. His new environment would also have had a profound effect on his outlook. Now that he was far removed

quence of events reconstructed with great probability by Wade-Gery and Meritt in AJP LVII (1936) 377–94, and their attractive suggestion (p. 392, n. 36) that Thudippus was Cleon's son-in-law, combined with the general statements in the Knights, make it difficult to resist the conclusion that Cleon was behind the decree.

[1] Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 14. [2] In AJA XXIX (1925) 59–69.

[3] Ar., Ath. Pol. 28.3. The διωβελία first appears in 410: Tod 83 (= IG i² 304), line 10.

[4] XXX 12.

[5] Thuc. V 10.9 (Cleon); III 19 (Lysicles—if this was indeed the "demagogue," as is probable but not certain); VIII 73.3 (Hyperbolus); VIII 65.2 (Androcles); for Cleophon, see Lys. XIII 12; XXX 10–14; cf. Xen., Hell. I 7.35.

[6] Ps.-Dem. XL 25 (Cleon); Lys. XXX 12–13 (Cleophon). And see Ar., Ran 569–78, where the two distressed innkeepers invoke Cleon and Hyperbolus as their protectors.

[7] Thuc. V 26.5.

from daily contact with the life of Athens, and obliged to associate almost exclusively with those ὀλίγοι who hated the Athenian democracy, he was bound to become much more critical of the Athenian demos.

What was Thucydides' attitude to the Athenian empire? This is a question to which almost everyone gives a different answer. The principal reason for this is that the historian's attitude to the empire was thoroughly ambivalent, that he could habitually entertain quite different feelings towards it at one and the same time, now one and now another coming uppermost. On the one hand he was much impressed by the greatness and brilliance of imperial Athens, in which, as a patriotic Athenian, he must have felt a deep pride. In inter-state politics he was a realist, calmly accepting the fact that in the relations between Greek cities force and not justice was in practice the supreme arbiter. He was not shocked by the calculated and restrained exercise of state power, which he regarded as an inevitable and in some ways a desirable feature of the contemporary scene. On the other hand, sharing as he did the outlook of the allied ὀλίγοι, he felt that Athens had abused her power — not as much as another imperial city in her position might easily have been tempted to abuse it,[1] but enough to provoke general hatred and a longing to be quit of her rule. In the Melian Dialogue, with enigmatic impartiality, he gives the Athenians an unanswerable case, according to the prevailing practice of inter-state relations, based ultimately on the appeal to force, in the name of expediency; but he has chosen for this highly generalised debate a setting which could not fail to arouse in his readers, knowing of the massacre that was to come, the strongest prejudice against the Athenian speakers.

One thing Thucydides does not say, explicitly or implicitly, although the statement is often attributed to him: he does not say that the Athenian radical democrats believed that "Might is Right". When the Athenian envoys at Sparta say, αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι,[2] they are simply saying, "It has always been the rule for the weaker to be subject to the stronger". They are merely recognising a natural tendency, a "law of human nature",[3] not trying to adduce a moral justification. The theory that the interest of the stronger is τὸ δίκαιον, that Might is Right, does not seem to make its appearance in surviving literature until the time of Plato, who puts it into the mouths of Callicles, not an historical character, and Thrasymachus, a sophist whom there is not the slightest reason to connect with the radical democrats.[4] Did any fifth century Greek seriously maintain that Might is

[1] See e.g. I 76.3 to 77.6. [2] Thuc. I 76.2; cf. V 89 and the next note.

[3] See IV 61.5; V 105.2; cf. Democritus fr. 267 Diels[6]. And see Demosth. XV 28–29: inter-state relations are decided by force, because there are no accepted laws to be invoked, such as guarantee private rights, within a city, to weak and strong alike.

[4] Plat., Gorg. 483d; Rep. 338c ff.; cf. Laws 714c; 890a. It is quite possible that the extreme oligarchs of the late 5th century did openly declare that Might is Right.

Right, or is this merely a clever distortion of the realist position actually held by the Athenian radicals. It is easy to imagine how this distortion could come about. The oligarchs had been accustomed to maintain that under the old regime, where they had been masters, Right rather than Might had prevailed. When the democrats exposed this pretence, the obvious counter-attack was to twist the democratic admission that force did govern into the claim that force ought to govern.

V. Why the Many were Friendly to Athens

It is part of the traditional view of the Athenian empire that the common people of Athens, under the influence of the "demagogues", drove the allies hard, while the "best people" did what they could to protect them. Of course oligarchs like Thucydides the son of Melesias, and perhaps Antiphon,[1] would pose as defenders of the allies, by way of showing their opposition to the whole policy of the democrats. But the traditional view cannot be allowed to stand here either. Apart from the other evidence, there is a very striking and important passage in the last book of Thucydides,[2] which seldom receives the attention it deserves. The whole passage (which would presumably have been worked up into a set speech if the History had ever been finished) describes the point of view of Phrynichus, the Athenian oligarch, in 411. Phrynichus realised, says Thucydides, that the setting up of an oligarchy at Athens would not have the effect of making the allies, many of whom were then in revolt, any better disposed towards Athens. He admitted "that the allies expected the upper classes (of Athens) to prove just as troublesome to themselves as the demos, as being those who devised the acts injurious to the allies, proposed them to the demos, and gained most of the benefit from them; and that as far as the upper classes were concerned, they (the allies) might come to a violent end without trial, whereas the demos was their refuge and the chastiser of these men".[3] This is a very remarkable statement, all the more valuable in that it is put by Thucydides (without contradiction) into the mouth of an oligarch, who could have no possible reason for making an admission so damaging to his own party if it were not true. It gives us two pieces of information: that most of the

[1] For Thucydides, see Plut., Per. 11–14. We know from Harpocration that Antiphon wrote speeches on the tribute of Lindus and Samothrace. According to Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 14, the Athenian χρηστοί tried to protect the χρηστοί in the allied states.

[2] VIII 48.6. On the interpretation adopted here, there is a grammatical anomaly: ἄκριτοι for ἀκρίτους. But if, as has been suggested, we take ἄκριτοι to refer to Phrynichus and his party, we make nonsense of the passage.

[3] A pleasant illustration, if historical, would be the story told by Agathias in Anth. Pal. VII 614 (with which cf. Plut., Nic. 6; Arist. 26). An example of clemency on the part of the Assembly is the sparing of the Rhodian Dorieus, the famous athlete, in the Ionian War (Paus. VI 7.4–5; Xen., Hell. I 5.19).

perquisites of empire went to the Athenian upper classes; and that the Athenian demos was more just and merciful towards the allies than were its "betters".

Humble folk in the allied cities who were oppressed by their own ὀλίγοι would have had no hesitation in trying to obtain redress from Athens, either in the form of assistance for a *coup d'état* or by recourse to recognised judicial procedure. The power to transfer certain cases to Athens, especially serious criminal cases, was one of the most important features of the government of the empire. The Old Oligarch[1] shows how the process operated to the advantage of the common people both at Athens and in the allied states. He says outright that the Athenians persecute the χρηστοί, ... τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αὔξουσιν, and again that in the law courts τοὺς μὲν τοῦ δήμου σῴζουσιν, τοὺς δ' ἐναντίους ἀπολλύουσιν. He explains that by compelling the allies to sail to Athens for judicial decisions the Athenians not only derive financial benefit (which he probably exaggerates); they can govern the allied states, supporting the popular side and making short work of their opponents, without having to go overseas; and thus the allies are obliged not merely to pay respect to visiting generals, trierarchs and ambassadors (who would at least be gentlemen) but also to curry favour with the Athenian demos itself and lick its boots, thus becoming "slaves of the Athenian demos". He adds the information that if the allies were allowed to try their cases at home, they in their turn, detesting Athens as they do, would make short work of the pro-Athenian parties in their midst — by which he means democratic agitators and suchlike. If you want real εὐνομία, he says, you must have the laws made for the demos by the δεξιώτατοι, and then the χρηστοί will chastise the πονηροί and not allow μαινομένους ἀνθρώπους any voice at all. The Old Oligarch reflects with satisfaction that in such a desirable state of affairs the demos would rapidly fall into δουλεία. These passages give us an interesting glimpse of the attitude of many influential members of the propertied classes in the fifth century, against whose interests the Athenians were working when they claimed overriding powers in respect of certain judicial cases. We are able for a moment to foresee what would happen when Athenian control was removed — what actually did happen after the "liberation" of the allies by Sparta, when (as at Athens itself under the "Thirty") there were "many massacres", and "the slaughter of countless numbers of the popular party".[2]

We need not be surprised, then, that the masses in the cities of the Athenian empire welcomed political subordination to Athens as the price of escape from the tyranny of their own oligarchs. This is not the place to consider whether they received other benefits from Athenian rule; protection against their own oligarchs is enough for our present purposes. Athens undoubtedly gave much

[1] Ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. I 9, 14, 16–18 (cf. I 4; III 10).

[2] Plut., Lys. 13; 19. See also Diod. XIII 104.5–7; XIV 10.1–2; 12.3; 13.1; Isocr. IV 110–4; Polyaen. I 45.4.

support to the Many in the allied states against their own Few, who of course (with the sympathy of the Few at Athens, including Thucydides) regarded the resulting democratisation as the direct consequence of Athenian tyranny. Almost all our literary sources, imbued with oligarchical prejudice, present this point of view only. Active Athenian support of the Many must certainly have increased after 461, and may perhaps have become intensified again after the death of Pericles; but in the absence of confirmatory detailed evidence there is no reason to suppose that the Athenians became to any marked extent increasingly "oppressive", except in the peculiar oligarchical sense, during the second half of the fifth century.

We may accept the statement of Isocrates[1] that the Athenians did not set up "opposition governments" unjustifiably in the allied states, and thus stir up factional strife. On the contrary, it was the boast of the Athenian democrats that they had suppressed στάσις.[2] To borrow a phrase from a modern politician, Athens did not "export revolution", at any rate to states which were not already well supplied with that commodity. The way Isocrates[3] puts it, in another speech, is that "our fathers tried to induce (ἔπειθον) the allies to establish in their cities the same form of government as they themselves preserved with loving care". This may not be so very far from the truth. At any rate, it is a grave error to take the introduction of a democracy on the Athenian model as a necessary indication of Athenian "bullying". Would not the Many in an oligarchical state be only too delighted to copy, even in minute details, the famous constitution of democratic Athens? Might they not even be glad to have an Athenian garrison on hand while they were learning to work their new constitution? We know that the democrats at Corcyra in c. 410, having reason to suspect that their δυνατώτατοι were about to hand the city over to Sparta, obtained a garrison from the Athenians.[4] And the Athenian garrison at Lesbian Methymna, as already mentioned,[5] had probably been supplied at the request of the party in power. At Erythrae the well known inscription[6] shows the Athenians installing a garrison whose commander is given the task of supervising the selection by lot of the vital Council. But there is not the slightest warrant for inferring from this that Erythrae required to be "held down" by an armed force; and as for what have been referred to as the "important political functions" of the garrison commander, these were limited (in the surviving portion of the decree) to supervising a choice by lot, and

[1] IV 104; cf. XII 99. Even the Old Oligarch does not accuse the Athenians of stirring up civil strife, but only of habitually taking the side of the "worse" in a στάσις (III 10). And see ATL III 149–54. [2] Ps.-Lys. II 55–56; Isocr. IV 106.

[3] XII 54; cf. IV 105–6. The Athenians boasted that they gave the allies freedom, equated with democracy: Ps.-Lys. II 18–19, 55–56; Isocr. IV 104–6; XII 68; cf. the clever satire on such claims in Plat., Menex. 242–3.

[4] Diod. XIII 48.5–6. Cf. Thuc. III 75.2. [5] See p. 8 above.

[6] Tod 29 (= D 10 in ATL II 38, 54–57 = SEG X 11), esp. lines 11–14.

therefore amounted to no more than ensuring that there was *no* jiggery-pokery. Democracies cannot easily be created overnight; it may take a long time to learn how to work one. Clever oligarchs, skilled in the hereditary art of government, would know just how to take advantage of the inefficiency of a new democratic regime, and they could probably rely in most cases on getting power back into their own hands before very long, unless the popular government received assistance as well as advice from the parent democracy. If the city could not afford to pay its councillors and dicasts (and probably very few cities could), the Many would find it very difficult to prevent the Few from regaining domination of the Council and the courts, upon which so much would depend. If it came to fighting, a small body of determined hoplites could be relied upon to deal with a much larger number of unpractised light-armed[1] — and if the odds were too great, mercenaries could be hired. The Athenians, therefore, must have received many requests for assistance from the democratic parties in other states, and of course their intervention was regarded by the oligarchs — themselves quite prepared to call in the Spartans, if not the Persians — as an intolerable infringement of αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία. If the Athenian ἡγεμονία changed by degrees into an ἀρχή, (ἀρχή) the responsibility would seem to lie partly with the Many in the allied states, who often welcomed and even invited intervention. It may well be embassies bearing appeals of this sort, δῆμος to δῆμος, which Aristophanes has in mind when he sneers in the Acharnians[2] at allied ambassadors who come to Athens with fine, complimentary phrases, flattering the Athenians in order to gain their own ends; he adds an encomium of himself as τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δείξας, ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται.

No attempt has been made here to present a complete defence of the Athenian empire, or to give a "balanced judgment" upon it. There is no doubt that the Athenians did derive considerable profits for themselves out of the empire, and to some extent exploit their allies. But if, as we have seen, the empire remained popular with the Many, then its benefits, from their point of view, must have outweighed the evils. The more abuses we find in Athenian imperialism (and of course abuses were not lacking), the more virtues, from the point of view of the Many, we must at the same time discover, or else we shall be further than ever from being able to account for the popularity of the empire.

ADDENDUM

When this article was already in proof, I realised that a different interpretation of Thuc. VIII 97. 1–2 is preferable to that adopted in the text (pp. 27, 28, 32–3). There is in fact no valid evidence that under the regime

[1] Ar., Pol. 1321 a 19–21 refers to Ar.'s day, after the rise of the peltast, and is not applicable to the 5th century. [2] 633—42.

of "the Five Thousand", praised by Thucydides, those below hoplite status were denied the franchise altogether. It is more probable that they were merely excluded from the βουλή — the key institution of the democracy — and perhaps other ἀρχαί: this would be sufficient to give the ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι effective control of τὰ πράγματα. (I shall be defending this view in detail elsewhere). But if ultimate sovereignty thus reposed in the whole body of citizens, the majority could at any time vote away the privileges temporarily reserved to the upper classes — as they eventually did.

The dividing line between oligarchy and democracy must be drawn somewhere. Surely the essential criterion is whether or not there is a property qualification for voting in the sovereign Assembly (see Busolt, Gr. Staatsk. I 444 n. 1, 572). Thucydides, on the interpretation of VIII 97. 1–2 now proposed, was giving his approval to what was substantially a democracy, with oligarchic elements which could be (and were) got rid of at the will of the majority.

This gives a satisfactory meaning to μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο. On the usual interpretation the πολλοί had in fact no share and there was thus no real ξύγκρασις.

Oxford G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX

ATHEN UND KARTHAGO UND DIE THUKYDIDEISCHE DARSTELLUNG

„Denn auf jede größere und tiefer begründete Wahrheit beziehen sich immer viele untergeordnete Dinge... Es ist der Nebenvortheil der einfach richtigen Beobachtung, daß sie zur sichern Berichtigung vieler andern Umstände und Beziehungen Veranlassung giebt; denn die meisten Widersprüche in dem gesammten Gebiet der Geschichte sind nur scheinbar ... und lösen sich auf in höheren und immer höheren Vereinigungspunkten".
F. G. Welcker (Kl. Schr. II, 1845, 129)

Am Rande des großen Krieges, den die Athener gegen die Peloponnesier führten und den man mindestens seit dem 1. Jhdt. v. Chr. den Peloponnesischen nennt, tauchen bei Thukydides die Namen zweier auswärtiger Großmächte des Westens auf: der Name der Etrusker und der Name der Karthager, beide in Zusammenhang mit der sizilischen Expedition Athens genannt. Wohl nimmt Karthago an diesem Kampf nicht teil, — noch nicht, — und die 3 Schiffe, die aus Etrurien den Athenern zu Hilfe kommen, sind faktisch kaum