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«LA COLOMBARIA»
UNION ACADÉMIQUE INTERNATIONALE
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
STUDI E TESTI
PER IL CORPUS DEI PAPIRI
FILOSOFICI GRECI E LATINI

13

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Edited with Introduction and Commentary by

THEOKRITOS KOUBEMENOS
GEORGE M. PARÁSSOGLOU
KYRIAKOS TSANTSANOGLOU



FIRENZE
LEO S. OLSCHKI EDITORE
MMVI

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STUDI E TESTI
PER IL
CORPUS DEI PAPIRI FILOSOFICI GRECI E LATINI
(STCPF)

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
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Il patrocinio e l'onere dell'impresa *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini. Testi e lessico* sono stati assunti dall'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere «La Colombaria» di Firenze in collaborazione con l'Union Académique Internationale e l'Unione Accademica Nazionale.

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PRESENTAZIONE

Presentiamo nella nostra serie la prima edizione ufficiale e completa – corredata di apparato papirologico e tavole –, di uno dei testi più significativi emersi dai ritrovamenti in campo papirologico dello scorso secolo: non solo perché proviene dalla Grecia, ma perché restituisce un importante frammento di quella cultura fra V e IV secolo a.C., per la cui ricostruzione ogni pur minimo frustulo è accolto con vivo interesse. Non ripercorriamo qui la storia del ritrovamento del papiro, né le sue tormentate vicende editoriali. Il *Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici* si è candidato da subito come sede idonea per la pubblicazione del testo: si vedano infatti i contributi di George M. Parássoglou e Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou nel volume I.1** (Heraclitus 1T) e lo *status quaestionis* sul testo tracciato da Maria Serena Funghi nel volume dei *Commentari* (III pp. 565-585). Purtroppo i tempi non erano allora maturi per un'edizione del testo da parte dei nostri colleghi greci. Siamo dunque onorati di poter accogliere adesso nel nostro progetto un papiro così importante, e di questo ringraziamo gli editori.

Il Presidente
FRANCESCO ADORNO

AVVERTENZA

I testi accolti in questa collana vengono sottoposti alla lettura preventiva del Comitato scientifico e redazionale del 'Corpus': la loro pubblicazione non comporta peraltro che ne vengano condivisi integralmente i contenuti.

Il presente volume è stato pubblicato con il contributo finanziario della Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano, che qui si ringrazia.

Un ringraziamento particolare al dott. Davide Muratore, che ha curato la compilazione dell'*Index verborum et locorum*, per la preziosa e competente assistenza anche nella fase di preparazione dei files per la stampa e per l'aiuto offerto nella correzione delle bozze.

Il papiro è conservato presso l'Αρχαιολογικό Μουσείο Θεσσαλονίκης.

*To the memory of
Stylianos G. Kapsomenos
(1907-1978)*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

All students of the Derveni papyrus are indebted to the insight of those to whom this papyrus owes its discovery and preservation. Petros Themelis was the man who realized that the black lump found in the excavation he had been supervising was actually the first papyrus to be discovered in Greece. Charalambos Makaronas understood the importance of the find and invited the Viennese expert Anton Fackelmann to unroll and preserve the papyrus.

E.G. Turner stood firmly on the side of K. Tsantsanoglou and G.M. Parássoglou, which was actually that of due process and academic integrity, when the need arose. Together with E.W. Handley, he also helped them to obtain financial assistance from the British Academy for a summer stay at the London Institute of Classical Studies, whose director and staff were fully cooperative in all ways.

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The editorial board of the *Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini*, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere «La Colombaria», kindly accepted this edition in the series *Studi e Testi per il Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini* and arranged to partially cover the cost of the publication. Members of the board, especially David Sedley, also made various helpful suggestions on a penultimate version of the typescript. The enthusiastic and friendly support of Franco Montanari was indispensable. The touching interest that Maria Serena Funghi took in the production of a very demanding book was particularly effective. Davide Muratore, in collaboration with Daniela Manetti, undertook the onerous task of compiling the Index ver-

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Throughout the preparation of the commentary, Poulheria Kyriakou was a constant source of support for her husband Theokritos Kouremenos, who often got bogged down πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοῦς, and insightfully lent her knowledge to him. His work on the previously unknown text of a charred book found on an ancient tomb exercised a romantic fascination upon his family, friends and quite a few of the students in the classes he taught the last three years at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He thanks all of them for their curiosity. He would also like to thank his friend and colleague Yannis Z. Tzifopoulos who egged him on, inimitably boisterously as always, and clued him in on the golden lamellae of Crete.

Many thanks are due to the Leo S. Olschki publishing house for undertaking the task of publication with professionalism and efficiency.

If others have directly or indirectly assisted in the preparation and publication of this work, the authors hope that the failure to mention their names will be attributed to weakness of memory rather than egotistical ingratitude.

This edition is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Stylianos G. Kapsomenos. He was the first scholar to work on the Derveni papyrus and managed, despite the lack of a reliable text, to lay down the general directions followed by subsequent research.

June 2006

Th. K.
G.M. P.
K. Ts.

K. TSANTSANOGLOU – TH. KOUREMENOS

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

I. THE FIND

a. *Location and discovery*

1. The Derveni papyrus was found near Derveni, a narrow mountain pass in the ancient Macedonian district of Mygdonia, on the road from Thessaloniki to Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, about twelve km north of the city. 'Derveni' (δερβένι) is a now obsolete Modern Greek word for 'defile' or 'glen'. It derives, via Turkish, from the Persian *derbent* or *derbend*. Besides its usage as an appellative, it is a very common place-name throughout Greece, as is also its diminutive in the plural (Δερβενάκια) and the compound Δερβενοχώρια.¹ The defile in question, through which passed the route from the East Macedonian and Thracian hinterland to the plain of Axios river and the Thermaic Gulf, possessed an important strategic significance. By a lucky coincidence, we happen to know the ancient name of the pass. In the early nineteenth century, William Martin Leake, passing through the defile, saw "towards the middle of the pass, on a small rock by the side of the paved road, the word ΟΛΠΙΑΙ engraved in large letters on the rock".² Ὀλπῶν was also the name of a stronghold in Acarnania described by Thucydides (3.105-108), which suggests that the engraving Leake saw was a highway traffic sign.

2. On 15 January 1962, about two and a half km south of the pass, i.e. nine and a half km from Thessaloniki, a bulldozer uncovered an ancient

* Chapter I is by K. Tsantsanoglou; chapters II-VII are by Th. Kouremenos.

¹ Whence the error in HOWATSON (1989²) 184 that places our Derveni "in the North Peloponnese, on the Gulf of Corinth", where a village of the same name does exist. TURNER (1987²) pl. 51 calls the Derveni papyrus 'Pap. Thessaloniki', since it is kept in the archaeological museum of that city. Archaeologists use the name 'Derveni' as a modifier for the whole find or its individual items ('Derveni find', 'Derveni tombs', 'Derveni crater', etc.).

² LEAKE (1835) vol. 3, 235.

unlooted cist grave during public works construction. Charalambos Makaronas, then ephor of antiquities at Thessaloniki, ordered excavations in the area, which were urgently performed under the supervision of the archaeologist Petros Themelis and brought to light six more graves: four cist graves, a vaulted grave of the Macedonian type and a pit grave. All of them were found within a radius of c. 200 m from the first find, except the vaulted one which was situated some 500 m away. All were unlooted, except the vaulted one and another that seemed to have been looted quite recently, possibly right before the excavation. A great number of funeral offerings had been put into the graves, both clay and bronze vessels, jewels and other objects. Most impressive were the articles of metalware, the main specimens of metalwork from Macedonia until the discovery of the royal tombs at Vergina (Aegae).³

3. Earlier archaeological finds from the wider area of Derveni were meager but pointed to the existence of an extensive nearby settlement. The nearest town, to the north of the pass, was Lete (Λήτη).⁴ The latest investigations in the area testify to continuous occupation from the archaic era onwards.⁵ Of particular interest are the discovery of an important sanctuary of Demeter and Kore, just south of the hill at the eastern side of the pass, and the sculptures found there, dating between the second half of the fourth century and the early third century BC or later.⁶ From the second half of the fourth century dates also the first inscriptional evidence for citizens from Lete serving as functionaries abroad, *proxenoi* or *theorodokoi* to Panhellenic *hiera*, a fact that speaks of a social development from agricultural to urban organization.⁷ The references to Lete by the orator Hyperides in *Κατὰ Δημόδου* (fr. 83) and by the historian Marsyas the Younger in the sixth book of his *Μακεδονικαὶ ἱστορίαι* (*FGrHist* 136 F 6), unfortunately both in one-word fragments, possibly imply some role of the town in

³ See THEMELIS and TOURATSOGLOU (1997).

⁴ One should normally expect Λήτη, like e.g. Κρήτη or Σπάρτη, as is prescribed by Herodian (3.1.342.22 Lentz; Theognost. *Can. = An. Ox.* vol. 2, 117.15); the oxytone form has prevailed.

⁵ See TZANAVARI and FILIS (2005). Though the existence of the archaic Lete has been archaeologically established, there is still some uncertainty as to the provenance of a series of silver coins dating from about 525 to some time after 470 BC, which had formerly been ascribed to this town (HEAD [1911²] 197); see SMITH (1999).

⁶ DESPINIS, STEPHANIDOU and VOUTIRAS (1997) 48-54, no. 30-36, pl. 64-94. The sanctuary of the two goddesses must have been the most conspicuous spot in the area: in the Bordeaux Itinerary the first station on the Via Egnatia from Thessaloniki in the direction of Amphipolis, somewhat after Derveni, is named *mutatio Duodeca<e>* (corr. Hammond).

⁷ TATAKI (1998) 117-119.

the conflict between Philip II and the Chalcidian League. The etymology of Lete's name, ἀπὸ τοῦ πλησίον ἰδρυμένου Λητοῦς ἱεροῦ (St. Byz. from Theagenes' Μακεδονικά = *FGrHist* 774 F 6), suggests that the town was Ionic-speaking, for otherwise one should expect the root Λατ-. Though some sculptures found in the area may portray Artemis, Leto's daughter, the etymology need not be true.⁸

4. The cemetery of the town, containing burials dating between the sixth and the fourth century BC, has been located at some distance from the pass, to the north. Who were then the persons buried so far away, two and a half km south of the pass, in the so-called 'Derveni tombs'? The usual answer is that they were outstanding citizens of Lete, noble and wealthy, whose relatives chose this remote place for their burials to avert looting. It has been suggested that spearheads and other weapons found among the remains of the pyres together with horse gear might identify the dead as warlords or royal *hetairoi* of the Macedonian army. A golden ring found in tomb Z, which belonged to a man and a woman, bears the inscription Κλείται δῶρον. Though the name seems to be a diminutive of Κλειταγόρα, Κλειταρέτη etc. and a masculine Κλείτος is not uncommon in Macedonia, the feminine Κλείτη/Κλείτα is particularly common in Thessalian Pelasgiotis (Larisa).⁹ The well-known crater from tomb B bears the inscription (with the letters incrustated in silver on the bronze eggs of an Ionic cyma around the lip of the vase) Ἀσπιούνειος Ἀναξαγοραῖος ἐξ Λαρίσας, i.e. "(crater) of Astioun, son of Anaxagoras, from Larisa" (*SEG* xxiv 571). Ἀσπίουν is the Thessalian form of the common Ἀριστίων. The dialect is that of Thessalian Pelasgiotis (cf. the gen. sing. in -οι), as is expected in view of Astioun's birthplace. If the crater was commissioned for the burial (or if the inscription was incrustated right before the burial),¹⁰ then at least one of Lete's notables must have been Thessalian. If Kleita too was Thessalian, it is probable that the Derveni tombs belonged to Thessalians. Although there can be no certainty, it is likely that their presence in Mygdonia was somehow connected with the close relations, friendly or hostile, between Philip II and the dynastic families of Thessaly after the 350s BC.

5. The papyrus roll was found carbonized among the debris of the funeral pyre that had been strewn over the slabs covering tomb A. The deceased man had been cremated on an elaborate structure very close to

⁸ For the sculptures see TZANAVARI (2002).

⁹ FRASER and MATTHEWS (2000) s.v. In Theoc. *Ep.* 20, Κλείτα is a Thracian slave nurse.

¹⁰ THEMELIS and TOURATSOGLOU (1997) 144, 183.

the tomb; his ashes and bones were placed in a bronze crater, which was put into the tomb. The fact that the roll was burned on a funeral pyre might have something to do with the contents of the book, and the proximity of the grave to the shrine of Demeter and Kore might indicate that the cremated man was an initiate.¹¹

b. *Size and reconstruction*

6. The outer surface of the roll was partly covered with slight remains of dried mud.¹² The maximum height was 9.4 cm. When the roll broke into several pieces right after it had been taken to the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki, its written inner side was revealed. Anton Fackelmann († 1986), then conservator of the papyrus collection of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek at Vienna and an expert in the treatment of carbonized papyri, was invited by Charalambos Makaronas to unroll it. His technique, circumstantially described by Fackelmann himself in connection with his work on several Herculaneum papyri, consisted of decreasing the friability of the charred roll through the application of fresh papyrus juice or gum arabic, and putting it under an electric light bulb with a thick glass plate as a base to thermally and electrostatically separate the layers,¹³ which were then divided into five groups and placed between nine pairs of sheets of glass.¹⁴

6a. It is worth quoting here the report that Fackelmann submitted to the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki in July 1962, after he had completed the separation of the layers. In square brackets we append the numbers that we have assigned to the glasses (A to I) and the 266 papyrus fragments therein.

I. Eine kleine Rolle, Durchmesser ca 12 mm, Höhe ca 7 cm. Ihre Aufrollung ergab eine Länge von 59 cm, wobei der Schlußteil von 17 cm, wie bei größeren Rollen üblich unbeschrieben war. Der beschriebene Teil zeigt 5 Kolumnen. Die

¹¹ Whether this is so depends on the nature of the text transmitted by the papyrus; see Intro. VI.

¹² Carbonization inside a 'terracotta skin' was obviously responsible for the survival of the papyrus. For a short reference to this process see TURNER (1968) 19. For a more detailed account see SIDER (2005) 15.

¹³ FACKELMANN (1970) 145.

¹⁴ The first eight pieces in what is now glass A were erroneously connected by Fackelmann with adhesive tape. Erroneously placed were also the pieces that make up the unwritten last portion of the roll.

einzelnen Kolumnen sind im Gegensatz zu den ägyptischen Rollen nicht gleichmäßig groß. Der obere Rand ist deutlich zu erkennen und zum Großteil erhalten, der untere ist nicht festzustellen, demnach kann die ursprüngliche Höhe der Rolle nicht angegeben werden. (Bis zu 15 Zeilen sind vorhanden.) Dieses Stück läßt einwandfrei das Ende der Rolle erkennen. [= fr. A 1-9 and D 12-14.]

II. Teil einer Rolle mit ca 2 cm Stärke. Die Höhe betrug 7 cm, die Breite 5 cm. Trotzdem das Stück verkohlt war, waren die Lagen deutlich zu erkennen und sie klebten nur wenig aneinander. Sowohl die untere Lage wie auch die obere hatten das gleiche Aussehen, daher ist anzunehmen, daß es der mittlere Teil der Rolle war. Die Schrift war gleichmäßig vorhanden und im Lichtreflex gut zu erkennen. Dieses Stück der Rolle bestand aus 24 Lagen. [= fr. B 1-12 and C 1-12.]

III. Nach dem Fundzustand zu schließen, äußerer Teil derselben Rolle mit einer Stärke von 4 cm, Höhe 8 cm und Breite 3 cm. Die äußere Seite war total verkohlt, die Lagen ineinander verschmolzen und die Schrift selbst völlig verschwunden. Der Rand war zu 2/3 ebenfalls total verkohlt, während am übrigen Teil des Randes die Lagen schwach zu erkennen waren. An der oberen Fläche war die Schrift im Lichtreflex gut zu sehen. Die Lagen klebten aneinander. Das Ablösen ergab 33 Lagen, die zum Schluß durch die starke Verkohlung immer kleiner wurden. Der Rest ergab mehrere kleine Fragmente, an denen zum Teil keine Schrift mehr zu erkennen war. [= fr. D 1-11, E 1-13, and F 1-9.]

IV. Neben diesen drei Stücken waren noch zwei kleine Rollenfragmente vorhanden, die sehr stark verkohlt waren und zum Teil nur noch schwache Schriftspuren aufwiesen. Ihr Zustand ließ erkennen, daß sie dem äußeren Teil der Rolle angehörten. Sie hatten besonders als Schauobject gelitten, denn das Fragment [= fr. G 1], das in einer Athener Zeitung am 6. April 1962 abgebildet war, wurde nichtmehr in diesem Zustand vorgefunden. Beide Stücke ergaben bei der Ablösung zusammen 20 Lagen. [= fr. G 1-21.]

V. Bedingt durch die Ausgrabung, Transport, Aufbewahrung u.s.w. gab es noch unzählige kleine Fragmente (bis zur Briefmarkengröße) die wahllos umherlagen. Auch diese wurden, soweit es möglich war, konserviert und zwischen Glasplatten gelegt. [= fr. F 10-20, H 1-68, and I 1-97.]

Der Rest bildeten kleine Kohlenklümpchen und Kohlenstaub.

Die Papyrusrolle war bis auf den unbeschriebenen Schlußteil aus sehr feinen Material hergestellt. Durch die Verbrennung des Toten in der Grabkammer und vor allem durch die Lagerung bekam die ganze Rolle einen gleichmäßigen schwarzen Farbton. Die Schrift, wie auch die Faserung des Papyrus sind nur im Lichtreflex zu erkennen. Das Material selbst war äußerst spröde, brüchig und bei unsachgemäßer Berührung zerbröselte es. Durch die Konservierung wurde das Material wieder biegsam und geschmeidig. Der ganze Papyrus wurde auf weißes Fließpapier gelegt und zwischen Glasplatten eingebettet.

7. The physical condition of the pieces is so fragile (even the slightest contact might cause them to crumble) that removing them from the glass

frames in order to reconstruct the roll was out of the question. The reconstruction of the roll was made possible only after the pieces had been photographed.¹⁵ A text was constituted initially by K. Tsantsanoglou in co-operation with Stylianos G. Kapsomenos († 1978), who was the first to announce the find (1963) and publish a general description accompanied by a partial publication of the text (1964; see also 1964-65), and later by K. Tsantsanoglou and G.M. Parássoglou. As reconstructed, the surviving upper part of the roll is c. 2.60 m long. Given the gaps in the first three severely mutilated columns, however, the total length must have somewhat exceeded 3 m. The maximum height of 9.4 cm is found only in the inner part of the roll, whereas the outer layers, which have suffered the greatest damage, are considerably shorter. The original height of the roll cannot be determined. Judging from other parallels and considering also the width of the *kollemata*, it should not have been much larger than 16-17 cm. The height of the *kollemata* is, obviously, the same as that of the roll and their width ranges in most cases from 16.1 to 17 cm:¹⁶

k ₁	(col. IV-V)	14.6 cm	k ₁₀	(col. XVII-XIX)	16.4 cm
k ₂	(col. V-VII)	14.9 cm	k ₁₁	(col. XIX-XX)	16.6 cm
k ₃	(col. VII-VIII)	16.6 cm	k ₁₂	(col. XX-XXII)	16.7 cm
k ₄	(col. VIII-X)	16.25 cm	k ₁₃	(col. XXII-XXIII)	17 cm
k ₅	(col. X-XI)	16.1 cm	k ₁₄	(col. XXIII-XXV)	16.5 cm
k ₆	(col. XI-XIII)	16.5 cm	k ₁₅	(col. XXV-XXVI)	14.4 cm
k ₇	(col. XIII-XIV)	16.4 cm	k ₁₆	(col. XXVI-blank)	13.7 cm
k ₈	(col. XIV-XVI)	16.5 cm	k ₁₇	(blank)	10.7 cm
k ₉	(col. XVI-XVII)	16.2 cm			

The size of fluctuations on the millimeter scale must be due to the varying width of the consecutive *kolleseis*, the oblong overlapping areas of two adjoining *kollemata*. The length of the turns in the papyrus coil was also estimated, at least in that part of the roll where the position of successive

¹⁵ The first photographs were taken by Spyros Tsavdaroglou. The photographs published here are by Makis Skiadaressis. An attempt to photograph the whole set of frames with ultraviolet light failed. Photographs, of course, cannot help in the few cases where a tiny edge of a papyrus scrap remains folded, or where pieces from two adjacent layers are still stuck together, e.g. in the upper right-hand part of fr. G 5 (the end of col. II; about five letters and a part of the intercolumnar area are covered) and in the left-hand half of fr. F 3 (the beginning of col. VII; the first two letters in the first two lines are covered). Other such cases may remain undetected; fr. G 6 might be one.

¹⁶ In the age of Pliny the Elder, this size would be that of the 9-digit-wide papyrus sheet called *amphitheatrica*: NH 13.78.

layers could be accurately determined: for about 23 turns, it starts from 4.7 cm at the core and increases in a regular manner to 9.7 cm. This regularity was of particular importance for the reconstruction of the roll, along with the approximately equal width of most *kollemata* and the similar shape of papyrus fragments from adjacent layers that had been detached in one body. The changing thickness of the *kalamos* (see below, § 9) was also taken into consideration as much as possible. Unfortunately we failed to place quite a large number of small, tiny or unwritten fragments in their proper position. Others might be luckier than us in putting more pieces of the jigsaw together. A word of caution is in place here. Throughout the roll, the color of the papyrus and the ink is uniformly carbon black; the differences in brightness between individual fragments in the plates are due to variant exposure time or lighting during the photographic process.

8. After the end of col. XXVI, the last in the roll, there are about 17.5 cm of unwritten papyrus. From col. IV onwards, 17 *kolleseis*, i.e. 18 *kollemata*, have been preserved. If we postulate two more *kollemata* in order to accommodate the remains of cols. I-III, the roll consisted of 20 *kollemata*, the standard number in a roll according to Pliny the Elder (NH 13.77). This might suggest that we possess the severely damaged beginning of the roll, an assumption that seems to be supported by the content of the book: near the end of the roll (col. XXV.10-12) the author emphasizes the importance of the size of the sun for the formation of the present world and probably refers back to col. IV, where he quotes Heraclitus' view on the size of the sun and its necessary stability, as the beginning of his λόγος: ἐποίησε δὲ (sc. ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἥλιον) | τοιοῦτον καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον οἷος ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου | διηγεῖται (possibly erroneous transcription of διήγεται). Although the end of the roll has also been preserved, nothing indicates that the book contained an entire work, not part of a work written in two or more rolls, each of which contained a separate λόγος (cf. e.g. Hdt. 2.38.7, 2.161.9). If the latter, there is no way to know whether only the roll that has partially survived was put on the funeral pyre or the whole work, in which case the fire must have consumed the other roll(s) completely.¹⁷

c. Columns, characters, lines and lectional signs

9. The text is written in columns (σελίδες), of which twenty-six have been reconstructed. The width of a column, defined as the distance be-

¹⁷ Cf. WEST (1983) 94.

tween the left margins of two successive columns (which includes the inter-columnar area), fluctuates between 10.5 and 12.2 cm. Quite large for a prose text, it is determined by the length of the quoted hexameters which take up only one line each. The height of the characters in the first columns is 0.20-0.25 cm but from column XII onwards it decreases to 0.15 cm; the scribe sharpened his *kalamos* or changed to a sharper one. Gradually, however, the *kalamos* became blunted once again, so the height goes back to 0.20-0.25 cm. The size of the characters determines the number of letters in a line, which varies from thirty to forty-five, and the number of lines in a column. For instance, 5 cm contain about nine lines in col. III, ten in col. XI and about eleven in col. XII. The average is ten lines per 5 cm. Assuming a height of 16-17 cm for the complete roll and allowing about 2 cm for upper and lower margins, the number of lines in a column would not have exceeded 30. The number of lines preserved varies from column to column. About ten lines survive from col. I but seventeen from cols. XXIV and XXV. Most of the reconstructed columns have between fourteen and sixteen lines.

10. Lines are aligned flush with the left margin only and end, as a rule, with complete words – only two times in the surviving part of the roll does the scribe permit the overlap of a long word from one line to the next, without losing sight of the rules for syllable division: col. XII.4-5 ἐξαρπ-|άνουσιν, col. XX.6-7 ἐπι|τελέσαντες. Maas's law, according to which the scribe begins every new line slightly further to the left, does not apply.¹⁸ Columns are independent of *kollemata* and the text is written across the *kolleseis*. The only lectional signs found are the *paragraphos* and the *diairesis*. In most cases the *paragraphos* is placed conventionally, between two lines at the left margin of the column, to mark a break in the sense: in particular, it indicates the end of a section of text immediately preceding a quotation, and subsequently the end of the quotation itself. At least once it marks an example from everyday speech (col. XI.7-8; cf. col. XXIII.7-8), once the beginning of a new section (col. XIII.6-7) and once, possibly, a variant (col. XX.10-11). The function of the midline *paragraphos* at col. XXII.11 and col. XXIII.7 is perhaps to signal the beginning of a new point. For the *diairesis* see Commentary, col. IV.5-6.

d. Dating

11. The *terminus ante quem* for dating the Derveni papyrus depends on the dating of tomb A, which Themelis and Touratsoglou place at the end

¹⁸ TURNER (1987²) 5.

of the fourth or the beginning of the third century BC.¹⁹ The few surviving Greek papyri of that age have been found far from Greece and are usually undated, so it is difficult to rely on the comparative study of the Derveni papyrus script for dating the book. The Timotheus papyrus, until recently the oldest surviving Greek manuscript, was found at Abusir in Egypt; a marriage document dated to 311 BC and a papyrus with skolia and elegiac verses (*BKT* vol. 5.2, 56) were found at Elephantine in Egypt. Their scripts seem to be later than that of the Derveni papyrus. The style of certain letters in it (especially B, E, Z, Ξ, Σ, Φ and Ω) is manifestly much closer to the lapidary style of inscriptions, and the quasi-stoichedon pattern of the column points to the fourth century BC. A comparison of the Derveni papyrus script with those of papyri from Saqqara in Egypt that are dated to the end of the fourth century BC cannot lead to any conclusion. A list of accounts (Turner [1987²] no. 88) seems to be written in an off-hand manner, as is probably shown by the lunate sigma, the occasionally curved epsilon and a few other peculiarities. The papyrus of pseudo-Epicharmea is written in a still later hand.²⁰ The oldest dated Greek papyrus (Turner [1987²] no. 79) is the order of general Peukestas (331-323 BC), written in a very elaborate and ornamental script with impressively broad H, M, Π and tall I, K, P, Υ. A comparison with the script of stone inscriptions is equally meaningless, for different writing materials often dictate different writing styles. On the other hand, a comparison with painted or incised inscriptions on pottery points to the second half of the fourth century BC: the Derveni papyrus script is almost identical with those of the inscriptions on, e.g., the bell crater of Python from Paestum at the British Museum, dated to the third quarter of the fourth century BC, and the Apulian loutrophoros at Basel, dated to 340 BC. Turner dated the Derveni papyrus between 325 and 275 BC²¹ but then settled for the fourth century BC.²² Irigoin dates it to the middle or even to the first half of the fourth century BC, which is rather improbable.²³ A dating between 340 and 320 BC on the basis of script is perhaps closer to reality, but one must keep in mind that the age of the scribe, or an affectation of archaism on his part, would result in dating the document too early.

¹⁹ THEMELIS and TOURATSOGLOU (1997) 183-185.

²⁰ TURNER (1976).

²¹ See no. 51 in the first edition of TURNER (1987²).

²² TURNER (1980) 26, (1987²) 151.

²³ IRIGOIN (1972) 547.

e. *Traces of the work's transmission*

12. There is widespread agreement that the Derveni papyrus has preserved a work composed near the turn of the fifth century BC: “probably not before 400”;²⁴ “ne doit pas être très postérieure à 400”;²⁵ “its style dates its composition to 400 B.C. or before”.²⁶ If so, the work was about a century old when the roll was burnt and it had probably been around for some decades when the roll was written, too short a time for the text to have been considerably corrupted in the process of transmission but also for all spelling peculiarities of the archetype to have been corrected. Some readings that escaped regularization: κρούεν in col. XV.1 (among many infinitives in -ειν), [οι]κτέρεσθαι in col. XX.8 (but οἱ]κτε[ι]ρεσθαι three lines above), ἐρήσθαι in col. XXIV.4, possibly ἐπανερόμενοι in col. XX.7.²⁷ It should be noted that the last certain instances of ε for [e:] in Attic inscriptions date to the third quarter of the fourth century BC.²⁸ It is also very likely that διηγείται in col. XV.8, XXV.12 is an erroneous transcription into the new orthography of ΔΙΕΓΕΤΑΙ or ΔΙΗΓΕΤΑΙ = διήγεται and that, inversely, κατακείται in col. XVI.6 is an erroneous transcription of ΚΑΤΑΚΕΑΤΑΙ = κατακεύαται.

f. *Possible authorial variants*

13. Pairs of syntactically incoherent but semantically equivalent words or sentences can be plausibly assumed to be variants that go back to the author, like those often found in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.²⁹ ὥσπερ | ὡς εἰδότες in col. XX.7-8 (ὥσπερ seems preferable), λέγουσι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῶν ἐκάστωι | ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἔλθῃ, ἅπερ ἂν θέλοντες τυγχάνωσι in col. XXII.4-5. The first and largest part of the complex period in col. XX.5-12 is marked off with a *paragraphos* and could be an elaborate alternative, perhaps a second draft, of the concluding part which does not cohere syntactically with the rest and recapitulates rather dryly the preceding points (col. XX.11-12).

²⁴ WEST (1983) 77.

²⁵ BURKERT (1970) 443.

²⁶ JANKO (1997) 61.

²⁷ Cf. RUSTEN (1985) 137 n. 34.

²⁸ See THREATTE vol. 1, 189-190.

²⁹ For Theophrastus' *Char.* see STEIN (1992) 50-51 (Diggle *non accipiente*).

g. *Dialect*

14. It is difficult to decide between Attic with some Ionic features³⁰ and Ionic with an Attic overlay.³¹ Resolving the issue would not be of much help in identifying the provenance of the author. On the one hand, it is well known that Ionic had started to incorporate Attic features already at the end of the fifth century BC; on the other, some prose authors employed Ionic or mixed Ionic as a literary dialect irrespective of their provenance.

15. There follows a list of Ionicisms, excluding those in (references to) poetic quotations, the Heraclitus quotation and textual supplements.

- (i) η from ā after (ε), ι, ρ.
]ρη (fr. G 9.4), αἰτήν (col. III.9), ἁμαρτ(ι)ης (col. V.8; see *ad loc.*), δ[κι]στίη (col. V.10), Ἥρη (col. XXII.7, perhaps from a quotation), ἡμέρης (col. XXV.4). But αἰτίαν (col. XIV.3), βασιλείαν (col. XIV.9), ὁμοίαν (col. XXII.3), πλεονεξίας (col. XXII.6), ἀμαθίας (col. XXII.6), ὥραν (col. XXIV.10). Instead of the Ionic form, in which names of goddesses must have appeared in now lost hexameters from the Orphic poem, the author prefers the Attic form: Οὐρανία (col. XXI.5), Ἀρμονία (col. XXI.7, 11), Ῥέα (col. XXII.7, 14, 15).
- (ii) -εα uncontracted.
 ἐξώλεα or ἐξώλεας (col. III.5), κυκλοειδέα (neutr., col. XXIV.2), ἀλέα (neutr., col. XXV.8). But ἔπη (col. VIII.6, XXII.14), ἰσομελῆ (neutr., col. XXIV.2). Col. XXIV.1-2, ὅσα δ[ἐ μ]ῆ | κυκλοειδέα οὐχ οἶόν τε ἰσομελῆ εἶναι, is remarkable.
- (iii) σσ for Attic ττ.
 μ[ειλ]ίττοουσι (col. VI.1), ἐξαλλάσσει (col. IX.7), ἄσσα (col. X.11, 13, XI.9, XVIII.4), ἔλασσον (col. XX.2), [γ]λῶσσαν (col. XXII 9).
- (iv) ὁκ- for ὁπ-.
 ο]υδέκοτ[ε (col. III.6). But ὁπότε (col. XXIV.9), ὅπου (col. XII.7, 9), ὅπως (col. VIII.3, XIII.2, XIX.7), ὅπωςπερ (col. III.8), οὐδέποτε (col. XII.10).
- (v) ἦν for Attic ἐάν.
 col. XXIV.5. ἐάν does not occur. But see F. 20.3: ἐάν?
- (vi) ā-stem gen. pl. -εων.
 ὠρέων (col. XXIV.11). But possibly ἀρ]χῶν (col. XIX.11).
- (vii) o-stem dat. pl. -οισιν.
 ἀλλήλ[οι]σιν (col. XXI.11, but ιν extremely uncertain). Datives in -οις at col.

³⁰ FUNGHI (1997) 36.

³¹ WEST (1983) 77, BURKERT (1986) 5, JANKO (1997) 62.

- II.7, V.4, VI.5, 6, 9, 10, IX.5, 6, 10, XIII.7, XVI.7, XVII.4, XXI.9, XXII.9, 11, XXIII.1, 2, 8, XXIV.8, 9, XXV.12.
- (viii) ἑὼν for Attic ὄν.
Col. VIII.6, XI.12, XIII.11, XV.2, XVI.8, 10, XVII.2, 6, 8, 9, XVIII.2, XIX.1, 6, XXI.9, 10, 12, XXIV.5, XXV.5, 9. But ὄν at col. IX.6, XIII.10, XVI.2, 7, XVII.7, XVIII.11, 14, 15; also some uncertain readings. Col. XVI.7-8, τὰ ὄντα ὑπὲρ[ρ]χεν αἰεί, τὰ δὲ | νῦν ἐόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται, is remarkable.
- (ix) γίνεσθαι and γινώσκειν for γινν-.
Many instances; no exception.
- (x) ἔνεκεν for ἔνεκα.
Col. V.5, VI.4; no exception.
- (xi) ἑαυτοῦ.
Col. XIV.2; possibly fr. I 25.3. But ἑαυτοῦ at col. XXI.14, XXVI.9, 12, possibly fr. I 47.1; αὐτ- at col. IX.3, XXIII.5, 7.
- (xii) ἐπεί(ε), conj.
Col. XVII.5, 6. But ἐπεὶ at col. XVIII.10, XXI.13. No adverb ἐπει(ε) occurs.
- (xiii) σύν.
Col. IX.6, 8, X.13, XI.14, XVII.2, 8, 14, XXI.3, XXV.7, 8, 9, XXVI.14. No ζύν occurs.
- (xiv) Ζᾶνα.
Col. VIII.9, IX.3, 13, XXIII.4. But Ζῆνα at col. XVIII.9, 15; Διός at col. XIX.5. Always Ζεύς.
- (xv) σφιν.
Col. XX.9. But σφίσιν at col. XVIII.4.
- (xvi) τέων, gen. pl. of τίς.
Col. XX.8.
- (xvii) εἰδήσω, future of οἶδα.
Col. XX.6, 11.
- (xviii) Vocabulary.
ἀλέα (col. XXV.8), ἐκάς (col. XXV.3), θέλειν (col. XXII.3 [?], 5, XXVI.10), θόρνυσθαι (col. XXI.3 [bis], 4, 6), ἱκελ- (col. IV.6), μίσγεσθαι (col. IX.9, XXI.8), ὅσον τε (col. IX.7), ἐξ ὅσου (col. XV.7), μέχρι οὐ c. gen. (col. VII.8) (unless a scribal error for μέχρι (τ)οῦ), οὐδαμά (col. XXII.6), (κατὰ) φάτιν (col. XVIII.3, XXI.8-9).

Apart from the inconsistencies listed above (i, ii, iv, vi, vii, viii, xi, xii, xiv, xv), the text deviates from strict Ionic usage in the following points:

- (i) -ου- for contracted -εο-.
Many examples.
- (ii) -ου- for contracted -οο-.
νοῦς (col. XVI.15, XXVI.1), νοῦ (col. XVI.12), νοῦν (col. XIV.7, XVI.10).

- (iii) -εῖον (not -ήιον).
μα]γτειον (col. V.4), τὰ σημεῖα (fr. F 10.4), ἕκαστα σημεία (fr. F 18 + H 45.3).
- (iv) ᾱ retained.
ἀήρ (col. XVII.3, 4, XIX.3, XXIII.3), ἀέρι (col. XVIII.2, XXI.2), πραγμάτων (col. V.7, XIII.5).
- (v) ᾱει (not ᾱιει).
Col. XVI.7, XVII.3, XVIII.10.
- (vi) μόνος, ἔνεκεν (not μῶνος, εἶνεκεν).
μόν[ο]ν (masc., col. XVI.10), ἔνεκεν (col. V.5, VI.4, 10).
- (vii) ἀδελφή (not ἀδελφεή).
Col. XX.15.
- (viii) θαυμάζειν (not θαμάζειν).
Col. XX.2, 4, 5.
- (ix) ἱερ- (not ἱρ-).
Col. VI.6, VII.7, XX.1, 4, 11.
- (x) κοιν- (not ξυν-).
Col. IV.5.
- (xi) ὄνομα, ὀνομάζω (not σύνομ-).
Many examples.
- (xii) οὖν (not ὄν).
Col. VII.7, IX.1, 5, XIV.2, XVIII.2.

16. Some usages are uncertain. *vuv* at col. IV.9 (the Heraclitus quotation: DK 22 B 3 + 94) and XI.3 is not Ionic. Ionic uses *μιν*, which is the reading in the part of the Heraclitus fragment transmitted by Plutarch (*Exil.* 604A9-B1, *de Is. et Os.* 370D3-10 = DK 22 B 94). Attic prose does not use either.

17. *εἰδήσω*, future of *οἶδα* (col. XX.6, 11), is found in Herodotus (7.234.8) but also in Isocrates (1.44), who might have chosen this form for stylistic reasons (to effect a *homoioteleuton*: *εἰδήσεις~εὐρήσεις*).

18. The present *μίσγ-*, instead of *μείγν-*, is used by Herodotus but also by Thucydides, Plato and other Attic authors, who have a highly personal style and do not use consistently the dialect of their city of origin.

19. Whereas *μικρά* at col. XXI.2 is peculiar to Attic, *σμικρ-* prevails in the abstract *σμικρότητα*.

20. *κ[α]θ' ἕκαστον* (col. XIII.6) is in all probability not an Ionicism.

21. *αἰνίζομαι* (col. IX.10, X.11 [?], XIII.6, XVII.13) occurs in the epic (*Il.* 13.374, *Od.* 8.487) as an extended form of *αἰνέω*, 'to praise'. Here it stands for the Ionic *αἰνίσσομαι*/Attic *αἰνίττομαι*, usually explained as coming from a stem *αἰνίkj-*. In similar cases, e.g. *ἀρμόζω~ἀρμόττω* or *σφάζω~*

σφάττω, the σσ/ττ form is explained by analogy. Is then the elsewhere unattested αινίζομαι instead of αινίσσ(ττ)ομαι the original from a stem αινιγ-? In other dialects: Tarent. λακτίσσω, σαλπίσσω, Thess. ἐμφανίσσω instead of -ίζω, Cret. ἀλάδδω, φυλάδδω (= -ζω) instead of -σσ(ττ)ω.

22. The overall impression is of an Ionic text liberally sprinkled with Attic features rather than the other way around. The Attic elements could be attributed to the spontaneous tendency of an Ionian *physiologos* to adopt the dominant dialect of his time. A possible indication of the author's provenance is the Ionic features in the examples from everyday speech with which he often supports his views: col. XI 9: πρυσόμενοι ἄσσα ποῶσι, XV.7-8: ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἦδε | ἀρχή, XVIII.4-5: ἔσεσθαι ταῦθ' ἄσσα Μοῖρα | ἐπέκλωσεν. It should be kept in mind, however, not only that a community of intellectuals from Ionia seems to have been active in late fifth-century Athens but also that in Attic *demoi* close to Euboea the vernacular must have been something like the μεμιγμένη Ἰάς of the Derveni author.

h. Style

23. The style of the author, who speaks in the first person singular (col. XX.2) and perhaps in the first person plural (col. V.4), is informal and rather careless. Asyndeton is a standard feature, occurring almost in all surviving columns. Its use at col. VI.3, 4, 7, 8 and XXII.4 does not seem to serve any rhetorical purpose and strengthens the impression of carelessness. In most cases it occurs after a quotation and can be accounted for as introducing the author's interpretation (col. VIII.6, XI.11, XII.3, XIII.5, XIV.5, 7, XV.7, XVI.7, XIX.11, XXIII.1, 12, XXIV.4). It can also introduce the justification of a point made by the author (col. XI.8, XIII.7, XXI.7, XXV.9) or a new point (col. XXI.5). Elliptic constructions introduce quotations: col. XIV.5: τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ, XV.5: ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος, 11: τὸ δ(έ), XVI.8: τὸ δέ, XXIII.10: τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον. The connection of some ὅτι-clauses with the principal verb is not very clear. Col. IX.10: ὅτι δ' ἐν χεῖρ[εσσιν ἔλαβ]εν ἠνίξετο ["with regard to (the phrase) ... he was speaking allegorically", LSJ ὅτι A.IV], XVI.1: ὅτι δὲ | ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται λέγει ["as a proof (in support) of the fact that ... he says"; cf. XXIII.12].

24. The remaining peculiarities of the text must be due to the scribe. The reason for listing them below is that the Derveni papyrus is the only papyrus-find in Greece and the oldest known papyrus with Greek prose. In conjunction with epigraphic evidence, they may enhance our understanding of the practices of book scribes in fourth-century BC Greece.

i. *Assimilation of final ν to the following initial consonant*

25. It is abundantly attested in the papyrus. It is not limited to short words (articles, prepositions, conjunctions and other particles) or words in close syntactical connection³² and sometimes occurs even in pausa:

- (i) before π: ὑπερ]βατόμ ποῖνι (col. IV.10), ἄλλωμ πραγμάτων (col. V.7), παραδειγμάτων π[ι]στεύοιεν (col. V.8), γνώμη ποιού[με]νος (col. XI.2), μέμ πῖσαν (col. XIII.5), τῆμ πόησιν (col. XIII.5), τῶμ πραγμάτων (col. XIII.5), νοῦμ πρὸς (col. XIV.7), κρούωμ πρὸς (col. XV.8), νοῦμ πάντων (col. XVI.10), ἀξιομ πάντων (col. XVI.13), ὠνόμασαμ· πρίν (col. XVIII.9), τέχνημ ποιουμένου (col. XX.4), θέλουσιμ πάντες (col. XXII.3), πα[ρα]γωγὸμ πεπόηται (col. XXIII.1), ἂμ “πολλοῖς” (col. XXIV.7).
- (ii) before β: τῆμ βασιλείαν (col. XIV.9),]μ βασιληίδα (col. XV.13), ὅσομ βούλεται (col. XIX.4).
- (iii) before φ: νομο]θετεῖμ φη[σιν] (col. VII.10), τῆμ φρόνησ[ι]ν (col. XVIII.7), τῆμ φρόνησιν (col. XIX.5), τῆμ φύσιν (col. XXII.2), ἐμ φιλότητι (col. XXVI.10).
- (iv) before μ: τῶμ μαντευομένων (col. V.5), ἐξαλλαχθὲμ μὴ (col. IX.8), ‘εὐρύμ’ μέν (col. XII.9), ἐμ μέσῳ (col. XV.4), νῦμ μετὰστασιν (col. XV.9), προσέφωμ μάκαρες (col. XVI.4), ὠνόμασεμ Μοῖραν (col. XVIII.3), φάτιμ “Μοῖραν” (col. XVIII.3), τῆμ Μοῖραν (col. XVIII.6), φρόνησ[ι]μ Μοῖραν (col. XVIII.7), πρίμ μέν (col. XVIII.9), ἤμ Μοῖρα (col. XVIII.9), ἀρ]χῶμ μία (col. XIX.11), πρίμ μέν (col. XX.11), ἐόντωμ μυθθέντων (col. XXI.9), ἤμ μέν (col. XXI.13), ἂμ μὴ (col. XXV.7).
- (v) before κ: [λύ]σιγ καίτ[οι] (col. VII.4), οὕγ καί (col. VII.7), ἔλαβεγ καί (col. VIII.8), φωνεῖγ καί (col. X.8), πανομφεύουσαγ καί (col. X.9), αἰδοῖογ κατέπινεν (col. XII.4), τὸγ Κρόνον (col. XIV.2), αὐτόγ. Κρόνογ (col. XIV.9), μῆτιγ κα.[(col. XV.13), “σφίσιγ” καί (col. XVIII.4), μέγ καί (col. XVIII.11), [ἔκ]αστογ κέκ[λητ]αι (col. XIX.1), ἄλλωγ κατὰ (col. XXV.2), τοιοῦτογ καί (col. XXV.11).
- (vi) before γ: δαίμ]ωγ γίνετα[ι] (col. III.4), ἔο]ικεγ γάρ (col. VIII.12), τῆγ γένεσιν (col. XIII.7), ἐ]όντωγ γάρ (col. XIV.11), ἦγ γεγαῶτ’ (col. XVI.6), ἦγ γάρ (col. XVII.2), μέγ γάρ (col. XVIII.9), πάντωγ γάρ (col. XIX.3), τῶγ γάρ (col. XXI.9), μέγ γάρ (col. XXI.13), τῆγ [γ]άρ (col. XXIII.14), τῆγ γῆν (col. XXIV.8).
- (vii) before χ: σταγόσιγ [χ]λέογ[ται] (col. II.5), ἐγ χεῖρεσι (col. VIII.5), ἐγ χεῖρ[εσσιν] (col. IX.10).

There are no instances of final ν before ψ or ξ. Final ν remains unassimilated

³² SCHWYZER vol. 1, 407, MEISTERHANS 110 ff., MAYSER 203 ff.

- (i) before π: ἀν | παραδειγμάτων (col. V.7-8), ἴιον πρότερον (col. VI.11), ἀλ]κὴν | [πα]ρά (col. VIII.7-8), πόησιν περί (col. XIII.5), ἦν πρ[ιν (col. XVII.1), δα-
πάνην προανηλώσθαι (col. XX.9), μὲν | πολλοῖς (col. XXIII.1-2), ὤκεανόν πο-
ταμόν (col. XXIII.6).
- (ii) before β: ἐστὶ]ν βασιλεύς (col. XVI.14).
- (iii) before φ: ὁρ[ίζω]ν φύσιν (col. XIV.12).
- (iv) before μ: πρότερον | μή (col. XVII.5-6), ὄγ, | μέχρι (col. XVII.7-8), λόγον μεμε-
ρισμένα (col. XXV.2).
- (v) before κ: λέγειν καὶ (col. X.8), ἥλιον κρούεσθαι (col. XIV.4), βασίλευσεν". |
κρούοντα (col. XIV.6-7), αὐτὸν καὶ (col. XIV.10), ἐών. | καὶ (col. XVII.6),
τοῦτον καὶ (col. XVII.10), ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ (col. XXI.6).
- (vi) before γ: Κρόνον | γενέσθαι (col. XIV.2-3), ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται (col. XVI.8),
τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον (col. XXV.11).
- (vii) before χ: θε]ρμό[τ]ατον | χωρισθέν (col. XIV.1-2).

It is obvious that final ν at the end of a line is not assimilated to the consonant at the beginning of the next line. There are no cases of assimilation before λ (see col. X.2-3, XIV.1, XVIII.5, XIX.2-3, XIX.9 [bis], XXI.8, XXV.2; col. XI.1 and XIV.10 are uncertain). Final ν remains unassimilated before σ in one instance (col. XX.2; XV.12 and XVIII.4 are uncertain). There is no evidence for assimilation before ρ (col. XXII.14 is uncertain).

26. On the whole, there are 41 certain cases of assimilation vs. 13 of non-assimilation before labials and 29 of assimilation vs. 11 of non-assimilation before palatals.³³ This incidence of assimilation is considerably higher than that calculated from fourth-century BC Attic inscriptions in Meisterhans, viz. 65 vs. 194 and 31 vs. 180 respectively, but closer to that found in early literary papyri.³⁴

j. *Other cases of assimilation*

27. A different case of assimilation, internal and progressive, is found in λα]μμάνειν (col. IV.4), λαμμά[νειν] (col. IX.4), κατ[α]λ[α]μμάνει (col. XI.4), but λαμβά[νειν] (col. VIII.10), ἀπολαμβανομένου (col. XV.3). μβ > μμ is rarely witnessed, but the two known parallels are quite old: κράμμη for κράμβη, P. Cairo Zen. 59702.26 (third century BC), καταλαμμάνης for κατα-

³³ Or 41 vs. 7 before labials and 29 vs. 8 before palatals, if unassimilated cases of final ν at the end of the line are not taken into account.

³⁴ MAYSER 206; cf. also THREATTE vol. 1, 616-40.

λαμβάνης, P. Hib. 48.12 (255/254 BC).³⁵ The phenomenon is phonetically strange, since $\mu\beta$ is already the product of the assimilation of $\nu\beta$.

28. There is one case of irrational aspiration at col. XIII.6: $\kappa[\alpha]\theta' \epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$. The phenomenon is well attested in inscriptions and papyri ($\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\nu\iota\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\theta' \iota\delta\iota\alpha\nu$, $\epsilon\phi' \epsilon\tau\eta$); forms such as $\mu\epsilon\theta\omicron\pi\omega\rho\omicron\nu$ or $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ have survived in Medieval and Modern Greek.³⁶ Perhaps the scribe was initially planning to write $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$; cf., for instance, *Syll.*³ 955.10 $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\nu\iota\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\nu \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$. The occurrence of $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in *Syll.*³ 700.35, an inscription of 117 BC from Lete, is remarkable.

29. There are a few epigraphic parallels to $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau[\omicron\iota] \rho\acute{\rho}\eta\theta\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha$ at col. VII.4 and $\tau\omicron \rho\acute{\rho}\eta\mu\alpha$ at col. XXVI.8;³⁷ the phenomenon is presupposed by the lengthening in poetry of a short syllable before initial ρ .³⁸ Here, too, the scribe is inconsistent: at col. VII.8, XXII.7 and XXIII.10, the initial ρ is not doubled. In " $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron \rho\epsilon\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ " at col. XXIII.6 ρ is monosymphonic for metrical reasons. $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha \rho\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\iota$ at col. XIV.8, though not in a verse, recalls $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma' \epsilon\rho\epsilon\xi\epsilon\nu$ at col. XIV.5.

k. Orthography

30. The scribe follows the usual orthography. Noteworthy are $\epsilon\chi\theta\omicron\rho\epsilon$ at col. XIII.4 and $[\epsilon]\kappa\chi\theta\acute{\omicron}\rho\eta\iota$ at col. XIV.1. The first is a common form of assimilation ($\epsilon\chi\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, $\epsilon\chi \Theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$). The second is rather unusual with only a few epigraphic parallels ($\epsilon\kappa\chi\theta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, $\delta\epsilon\delta\acute{\omicron}\kappa\chi\theta\alpha\iota$, $\epsilon\kappa\gamma\delta\omicron\theta\eta\iota$, $\epsilon\kappa\gamma\delta\iota\delta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, $\epsilon\kappa\gamma \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$).³⁹

31. $]\xi\varsigma\alpha\iota$ at col. XXIII.13 is in all probability to be supplemented as $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\lambda] \acute{\epsilon}\xi\varsigma\alpha\iota$.⁴⁰

32. With regard to the orthography of $\Delta\eta\acute{\omega}$, a name of Demeter, the author prefers the form $\Delta\eta\acute{\omega}$ (extensively discussed by Herodian, 3.2.420.4 ff. Lentz) because it serves his etymology of the name from $\delta\eta\acute{\iota}\omega$. The use of two endings, $-\acute{\omega}\iota$ and $-\acute{\omega}$ (col. XXII.12 and 13 respectively), must be due to the scribe. Both belong to the feminine $\omicron\iota$ -stem

³⁵ MAYSER 157 rejects the assimilation and explains the evidence by analogy with $\kappa\rho\acute{\omicron}\mu\mu\omicron\nu\omicron$ and $\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\lambda\mu\mu\alpha\iota$; the inverse phenomenon in $\kappa\rho\mu\beta\upsilon\sigma\pi\acute{\omega}\lambda(\eta\varsigma)$, *UPZ* 180a col. 20.8, 41.7 (113 BC), is characterized in KAPSOMENOS (1958) 25 as 'dissimilatorische Geminatenauflösung'.

³⁶ SCHWYZER vol. 1, 305, MAYSER 174 ff.

³⁷ MEISTERHANS 95, THREATTE vol. 1, 519.

³⁸ SCHWYZER vol. 1, 311.

³⁹ SCHWYZER vol. 1, 238.

⁴⁰ For parallels see MAYSER 185, THREATTE vol. 1, 574.

and are abundantly attested in inscriptions. -ώ is very common; for -ώι cf. e.g. λεχώι, Χρυσόι, Συρόι, Φιλόι, Ἀρτεμίδι, Ἡρώι, Ἀρχιώι, Νικαίωι, Γοργώι.⁴¹

33. The inconsistency in the use of movable *v* is not surprising. The evidence can be laid out in a table patterned on those in Meisterhans 114 and Mayser 211 (uncertain cases and those in quotations are not counted; the numbers in parentheses are percentages):⁴²

	<i>retained</i>				<i>dropped</i>			
	<i>before consonant</i>	<i>before vowel</i>	<i>in pausa</i> ⁴³	<i>total</i> ⁴	<i>before consonant</i>	<i>before vowel</i>	<i>in pausa</i>	<i>total</i>
dat. pl. -σι	1 (25)	6 (100)	1 (50)	(67)	3 (75)	0	1 (50)	(33)
verb end. -σι	3 (27)	10 (71)	0	(45)	8 (73)	4 (29)	4 (100)	(55)
ἐστί	4 (44)	7 (100)	0	(65)	5 (56)	0	1 (100)	(35)
verb end. -ε	4 (44)	14 (93)	4 (100)	(79)	5 (56)	1 (7)	0	(21)

There is no agreement with any of the chronological subdivisions in the tables by Meisterhans and Mayser. This may be due (a) to the relative paucity of evidence in the Derveni papyrus, (b) to the fact that Meisterhans and Mayser tabulate evidence not from a single text but from a group of texts, (c) to a different conception of pause. One might add the cases of movable *v* in adverbs ending in -θε, where *v* is always retained before a vowel (col. XV.5 [in pausa], XVII.9, XVIII.11, XXI.13) and always dropped before a consonant (col. XV.4, XXV.12). Finally, before a vowel the neuter τὸ αὐτό or ταὐτό retains the movable *v* three times (col. X.2, XII.3, XXI.11; the last two in a pause) but also drops it as many times (col. X.10, XII.4, XVII.8); before a consonant this word drops the movable *v* four times (col. X.3, 8, XI.5, XXII.11).⁴⁴

34. We find three cases of *scriptio plena* in hexameters quoted by the author: col. VIII.5: χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[εν], col. XVI.9: δὲ ἄρα (but δ' ἄρα three lines above), col. XXIV.3: μερόπεσσι ἐπ' (col. XI.10, [ἡ δὲ] ἔχρησεν, is uncertain).

35. ποεῖν occurs ten times vs. five of ποιεῖν. Before -ει- we find one case of ποι- (col. XXV.12: π[ο]ιεῖται) and one of πο- (col. XII.9: ἐποεῖτο); before -η- one case of ποι- (col. XXV.10: ἐποίησε) and eight of πο- (col. IV.10:

⁴¹ SCHWYZER vol. 1, 478.

⁴² Cf. THREATTE vol. 1, 640-643.

⁴³ Only strong pauses are counted.

⁴⁴ Cf. HENRY (1967), esp. 277-284.

ποῆι, VII.3: ποιήσει, 4: πόησις, IX.1: ἐπόη[σεν, XIII.5: πόησιν, XV.1: ποιήσει, XXIII.1: πεπόηται, XXV.10: ἐπόησεν); before -ο- three cases of ποι- (col. VI.7: ποιούσι, XI.2: ποιού[με]νος, XX.4: ποιουμένου); before -ω- one case of πο- (col. XI.9: ποῶσι). The scribe's inconsistency is conspicuous at col. XXV.10: οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον. ἐποίησε δέ κτλ. The single case of πο- before -ω- is noteworthy because parallels from inscriptions or papyri are very scarce.⁴⁵

II. THE CONTENTS OF THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

The first three of the twenty-six columns that can be reconstructed are severely damaged. Col. I probably mentions the Erinyes. Col. II probably mentions the Erinyes but also the Eumenides, who ought perhaps not to be distinguished from the Erinyes and are identified with souls in col. VI.9-10, perhaps those of certain dead; libations offered to Zeus; cultic honors offered to the Eumenides; burnt poultry-offerings to demons, perhaps the same entities as the Eumenides/Erinyes; someone who is perhaps said to have added, probably to the rites in honor of the Eumenides/Erinyes/demons, hymns or poetry adaptable to music; the meaning of these works. Col. III mentions wrongdoers, probably said to be warned or punished by Dike through the Erinyes; demons who perhaps dwell in the underworld, each assigned to a person as healer; servants of gods (probably the same beings as the demons); unjust men perhaps held accountable for their crimes. Col. IV, less damaged than the three previous columns, contains a quotation from Heraclitus that can be assumed to preserve the original wording of DK 22 B 3 + 94 and, if so, leaves no doubt that the Ephesian discussed the true width of the Sun (one foot) continuously with the role of the Erinyes as servants of Dike responsible for catching the Sun in case it oversteps certain limits, clearly those of its width (in the tradition the two topics became separated). In col. V someone speaking in the first person plural castigates certain uncomprehending people who do not believe that Hades has a horrendous fate in store for them and, failing to understand dreams alongside certain other things, are overcome by pleasure and error; the speaker seems to visit oracles on behalf of these people. The topic of col. VI is prayers and sacrifices performed in order to appease

⁴⁵ MEISTERHANS 56-58, HENRY (1967) 265-6, MAYSER 87-88, SCHWYZER vol. 1, 236, THREATTE vol. 1, 328-330.

certain souls; incantations (a probable supplement) sung by the magi (μάγοι) in order to get rid of demons (probably the same entities as the angry souls) which are inimically disposed toward other souls (again a probable supplement); preliminary offerings to the Eumenides made by certain initiates (μύσται) after the manner of the magi on account of the fact that the Eumenides are souls, probably those that must be appeased (cf. cols. I-III). In col. VII we read of poetry said to be riddling for people, perhaps a hymn whose content is characterized as sound and allowed by the law of god. Its author is perhaps said to discourse on matters of paramount importance through riddles, not to have intended to pose riddles that would give rise to, presumably unworthy, disputes. In view of the following columns, the author can only be Orpheus. It was not possible, perhaps before the Derveni author came along, to solve the riddles posed by Orpheus' words. Orpheus is perhaps said to narrate a holy story from the first down to the last word, as he himself makes clear when he orders the multitude to put doors to their ears. Here the Derveni author probably paraphrases (a verse from) the beginning of Orpheus' poem whose riddles he proceeds to solve in cols. VII-XXVI. The author's discussion is interrupted in col. XX by a critique of initiates who lack understanding and, in case they paid for the services of certain experts in sacred rites, lost their money.

III. THE QUOTATIONS FROM ORPHEUS' POEM

Almost all of the hexameters quoted in full or partially in the surviving parts of cols. VII-XXVI can be plausibly thought to come from the poem attributed to Orpheus.⁴⁶ In the following list these verses are ordered as they appear in the papyrus. The asterisk indicates a complete or partial reconstruction of a verse that can be assumed to have been quoted in a lost part of the papyrus on the basis of certain words and phrases discussed in one or more columns (the corresponding words and phrases in the reconstruction are underlined). An underlined number indicates that the hexameter is said by the Derveni author to have been continuous in the poem with the last one he has quoted.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Cf. BETEGH (2004) 97-101 and see also Commentary, col. VII.9-10. In col. XXII.12 Derveni author quotes a verse explicitly said to come from some *Hymns*, apparently a different poem; in col. XXVI.4 and 6-7 he quotes *Od.* 8.335 and *Il.* 24.527-528.

⁴⁷ On the expressions the Derveni author uses to introduce a new quotation see LAMEDICA (1991).

- 1 Col. VIII.2 [ο]ἱ Διὸς ἐξεγέροντο [ὑπερμεν]έος βασιλῆος
 2 Col. VIII.4-5 Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πα[τρὸς ἐο]ῦ πάρα θε[σ]φατον ἀρχήν
 [ἀ]λκὴν τ' ἐν χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[εν κ]α[ί] δαίμον[α] κυδρόν
 3* Col. X — πανομφεύουσα θεῶν τροφὸς ἀμβροσίη Νύξ
 4* Col. XI.1 . . . χρήσαι . . . ἐξ ἀ[δύτοι]ο
 5 Col. XI.10 [ἡ δὲ] ἔχρησεν ἅπαντα τὰ οἱ θε[μ]ις ἦν ἀνύσασ[θ]αι
 6 Col. XII.2 ὥς ἂν ἔ[χ]οι κά[τα] καλὸν ἔδος νιφόντος Ὀλύμπου
 7 Col. XIII.1 Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πατὴρ ἐοῦ πάρα [θ]έσφατ' ἀκούσα[ς]
 8 Col. XIII.4 αἰδοῖον κατέπινεν, δς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος
 9 Col. XIV.5 ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξεν
 10 Col. XIV.6 Οὐρανὸς Εὐφρονίδης, δς πρῶτιστος βασιλεύσεν
 11 Col. XV.6 ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Κρόνος αὐτίς, ἔπειτα δὲ μητίετα Ζεὺς
 12 Col. XV.13-15 μῆτιν κα. [c. 13] ἐν βασιλῆϊδα τιμ[ή]ν
 ec. [] .αι ἵνας ἀπ. []
 εἰ []
 13 Col. XVI.3-6 Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοῖον· τῷ δ' ἄρα πάντες
 ἀθάνατοι προσέφυν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ θέαιναί
 καὶ ποταμὶ καὶ κρήναι ἐπήρατοι ἄλλα τε πάντα,
 ἅσσα τότε ἦν γεγαῶτ', αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῖνος ἔγεντο
 14 Col. XVI.14 [νῦν δ' ἐστὶ]ν βασιλεὺς πάντ[ω]ν καὶ τ' ἔσσειτ' ἔπειτα
 15* Col. XVIII.12-13+XVII.6 Ζεὺς πρῶτος [γέν]ετο, Ζεὺς ὑστάτος ἀργικέραυτος
 16 Col. XVII.12 Ζεὺς κεφα[λή], Ζεὺς μέσ]σα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ [π]άντα τέτ[υ]κται]
 17* Col. XVIII Ζεὺς πνοίη πάντων, Ζεὺς πάντων ἔπλετο μοῖρα
 18 Col. XIX.10 Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς, Ζεὺς δ' ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἀργικέραυτος
 19* Col. XXI.5-7 Πειθῶ θ' Ἀρμονίην τε καὶ Οὐρανίην Ἀφροδίτην
 20* Col. XXIII μήσατο δ' Ὀκεανοῖο μέγα σθένος εὐρὺν ῥέοντος
 21 Col. XXIII.11 ἵνας δ' ἐγκατ[έ]λεξ' Ἀχελωῖου ἀργυ[ρ]οδίγ[ε]ω
 22 Col. XXIV.3 ἡ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσι ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
 23 Col. XXV.14 [αὐτ]ῶρ [ἐ]πει δ[ὲ] πάν[τα] Διὸς φρήν μ[η]σατ[ο] ἔργα
 24* Col. XXVI μητρὸς ἐδς ἔθελεν μιγθῆμεναι ἐν φιλότῃ

IV. THE CONTENTS OF ORPHEUS' POEM

1. It is likely that 1 comes from the proem. If the Derveni author explains in cols. XXI-XXIII what Orpheus really means by the generation of various goddesses and gods from Zeus, the relative clause in 1 might have qualified the gods referred to in (one of) the preceding hexameter(s), where someone speaking in the first person singular (and assumed to be Orpheus by the Derveni author) perhaps declared his intention: to sing

of the gods who were born from Zeus.⁴⁸ 7 and 8 look suspiciously like a variant of 2.1 and the continuation of 2.2 respectively. Assuming that 7 is the original form of 2.1, Rusten suggests that in col. VIII the Derveni author “preferred (or invented) an alternative reading θέσφατον ἀρχήν”.⁴⁹ West thinks that in the Orphic poem 7 was

7' Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπει[τ' ἄφραστα θεᾶς] πάρα θέσφατ' ἀκούσας

(Night being the goddess in question), and that it stood after but not far from 2.1. According to West, 2.2 originally stood immediately after 7' and 8 after 2.2 but 2.2 was mistakenly transposed after 2.1, which is similar to 7'. The mistake was also aided by the similarity between 2.2 and the verse [σκήπτρον] τ' ἐν χεῖρεσσι λαβ[εῖν ἐρικυδὲς ἔμελλεν which, according to West, originally followed 2.1.⁵⁰ By West's lights, the Derveni author confused two similar verses, 2.1 and 7', on two different occasions: once in col. VIII, where he transposed 2.1 before 2.2, which originally followed 7', and once in col. XIII, where he quoted 7' but substituted the middle part of 2.1 for the middle part of 7'. It is preferable not to postulate such a baroque confusion but there is no reason to adopt Rusten's simpler hypothesis either. Calame has proposed to simply substitute 7 for 2.1 and there is strong evidence that 2.1 is a misquotation of 7.⁵¹

2. In col. VIII.6 the Derveni author notes that (some of the) words in 2 are ‘transposed’. The words in question are πατρός ἐοῦ and παρά in 2.1. As turns out from the following lines, the author assumes that the preposition παρά in 2.1 is in anastrophe, that its object is πατρός ἐοῦ and that παρὰ πατρός ἐοῦ goes together with ἔλαβεν in 2.2. In col. VIII.7-8 the Derveni author partially paraphrases 2 as “after Zeus took the power and the glorious demon from his father”.⁵² It is clear that, if παρά in 2.1 is not in anastrophe, πατρός ἐοῦ must be construed with what follows παρά; thus, if θέσφατον ἀρχήν follows παρά in 2.1, by assuming παρά to be in anastrophe, the Derveni author avoids the construal of πατρός ἐοῦ with θέσφατον ἀρχήν. The avoided construal of πατρός ἐοῦ can be gleaned from col. VIII.9-10: οὕτω] δ' ἔχοντα οὐκ ἀκούειν τὸν Ζᾶ[να ἐπικρα]τεῖ | [τοῦ πατρ]ὸς ἀλλὰ τὴν

⁴⁸ Cf. Hes. *Tb.* 43-46 and 105-107.

⁴⁹ RUSTEN (1985) 126.

⁵⁰ WEST (1983) 85-86; see also 114-115, lines 1-14.

⁵¹ CALAME (1997) 67 n. 3.

⁵² [ἔσ]τιν δ' ὁδ' ἔχοντα· Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ τῇ[ν ἀλ.]κῆν | [πα]ρὰ πατρός ἐοῦ ἔλαβεν καὶ δαίμονα [κυδρ]όν.

ἀλκὴν λαμβά[νειν παρ' αὐτοῦ]. Col. VIII.10 repeats partially the sense of 2 as explained in col. VIII.7-8 and can be safely reconstructed: since this sense presupposes that παρὰ in 2.1 is in anastrophe and is introduced by ἀλλά, what precedes the conjunction and follows οὐκ must be the sense of 2 which is avoided on the assumption that παρὰ in 2.1 is in anastrophe.⁵³ Thus, if παρὰ in 2.1 is in anastrophe, 2 states not that Zeus hears his father but that he takes the power (and the glorious demon) from his father. In view of 7, however, this makes sense only if the construal of πατὴρ εἰς τοῦ the Derveni author avoids is not with θέσφατον ἀρχὴν but with (θέσφατ') ἀκούσας; if so, the Derveni author quotes 2.1 but proceeds to interpret it as if he had 7 in mind, which suggests that 2.1 is nothing but an erroneous version of 7 (the verb ἄρχεται in col. VIII.3 might have given rise to the misquotation during copying; if so, τε in 2.2 was added to connect the erroneous ἀρχὴν with ἀλκὴν and should be removed). After quoting 7 in col. XIII the Derveni author proceeds to note that he has already made clear in what sense Ζεὺς ἤκουσεν,⁵⁴ which means that 7 has already been commented upon and thus that it has been quoted above too.⁵⁵

3. Now, if in Orpheus' poem 8 stood immediately after 2.2, καὶ in 2.2 is not connective but opens the apodosis of the ἐπεὶ clause in 7.⁵⁶ The glorious and reverend demon Zeus swallowed can be plausibly identified with the figure known from considerably later Orphic theogonies as Φάνης or Πρωτόγονος, i.e. 'the one who makes manifest' or 'the first-born' (cf. Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου in 13.1).⁵⁷ In the so-called *Orphic Rhapsodies*, composed around the beginning of either first century BC or the Christian era,⁵⁸ this figure is the son of Ether (OF 73, 74) and the first king of the cosmos (OF 107, 108).⁵⁹ Protogonos developed in a shining egg made from, or laid in, Ether by unaging Time (OF 60, 70), the primordial being that had engendered Ether and immense Chaos (OF 66, 54, 60) cov-

⁵³ ἐπικρα]τεῖ in col. VIII.9 probably denotes the prevailing of the preferred sense over the other on the assumption of anastrophe; see also Commentary, col. VIII.9-10.

⁵⁴ Col. XIII.2-3: οὐτε γὰρ τό.ε ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ δεδῆλωται ὅπως | ἤκουσεν.

⁵⁵ See also Commentary, col. VIII.11-12.

⁵⁶ Cf. Hom. *Od.* 14.111-112: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δείπνησε καὶ ἤραρε θυμὸν ἔδωδ'η, | καὶ οἱ πλησάμενος δόκε σκύφος, ὥπερ ἐπινεν; for apodotic καὶ see GP 308-309.

⁵⁷ On the number of the Orphic theogonies, their dating and the genetic relationships between them see WEST (1983) and BRISSON (1990); cf. also BETEGH (2004) 140-152.

⁵⁸ According to WEST (1983) and BRISSON (1990) respectively.

⁵⁹ For the equation of Φάνης and Πρωτόγονος see OF 73, 86, *H. Orph.* 6 and cf. BRISSON (2003) 24 n. 39.

ered with Night (OF 65); ὃς αἰθέρα ἐκθορε πρῶτος in 8 can describe Protogonos bursting out of the ether-egg in which he developed or his springing out of the ether in which this egg had been laid.⁶⁰ All became suffused with radiance when he appeared (OF 86) and he carried the seed of the gods (OF 85). With Night he fathered Uranus and Ge (OF 109) among other gods, created the Sun and the Moon (OF 88, 91-93, 96) and the cosmos for gods and humans to live in (OF 89, 108). He gave his scepter to Night voluntarily who then gave it to her son, Uranus. The succession of divine rulers then proceeds as in Hesiod's *Theogony*. When Zeus castrated and dethroned Cronus after Night told him in her cave that he is destined to be the fifth king of the gods (OF 105, 107) and gave him certain directions of cosmogonic import (OF 164-166), he swallowed Protogonos at Night's behest (OF 58, 82, 85, 87, 129) and absorbed the entire cosmic order Protogonos had produced (OF 167). He then regurgitated everything and thus generated the entire furniture of the present cosmos, a plethora of gods and goddesses included, over which he rules (OF 168). The poem ended with the story of Dionysus: born as a result of the incestuous coupling of Zeus with his daughter Kore, herself a product of Zeus' incestuous union with her mother Rhea, Dionysus receives the royal power from Zeus but is killed, dismembered and eaten by the Titans who are then punished by Zeus after he brings Dionysus back to life.⁶¹

4. If 7+2.2 was not far removed from the poem of Orpheus' poem and 8 stood immediately after this couplet, in view of what is known about the *Orphic Rhapsodies* the poem proper began at the point when Zeus has heard the prophecies of Night (τὰ θέσφατα in 7) and is about to complete the assumption of royal power from his father Cronus by swallowing Protogonos. Assuming that the Derveni author's discussion follows Orpheus' poem closely, this poem seems to have been a very condensed, partial 'summary' of the *Orphic Rhapsodies*.⁶² After the discussion of 7+2.2 in cols. VIII-IX, the Derveni author deals with the oracular instructions Night issued to Zeus (cols. X-XI); then with the objective, probably served by Night's oracles, that someone, obviously Zeus, might rule on Olympus (col. XII, where, as in the two preceding columns, the Derveni author

⁶⁰ Cf. OF 56, 57, 72; for αἰθέρα ἐκθορε cf. δίκτυον ἐκθρόσκοντα ... λαγῶν in AP 9.371.1, "a hare leaping out of a net".

⁶¹ WEST (1983) 70-75 offers a detailed summary of all evidence pertaining to the contents of the *Orphic Rhapsodies*.

⁶² Cf. BRISSON (2003) 19-22, BETEGH (2004) 130-131.

can be assumed to discuss hexameters that stood after the proem but before 7+2.2 and are presupposed by θεογοντ' ἀκούσας in 7); next comes Zeus' swallowing of Protogonos, who first sprang forth out of the ether (col. XIII); then the birth of Cronus, who is said in passing to have deposed his father Uranus in a violent way, and the succession of Cronus by Zeus (cols. XIV-XV, perhaps events that in the Orphic poem were said to have occurred after Protogonos sprang forth out of the ether and were related in a brief flashback to establish the lineage of Zeus before the account of how he cemented his rule); there follows the 'clinging on to' Zeus of all gods and goddesses together with water bodies (rivers and springs) and all other things (col. XVI, probably the absorption in Zeus of the Protogonos-made cosmos which was swallowed by Zeus along with its creator); then the assumption of royal rule by Zeus (col. XVI); Zeus as the source of all generation (col. XVII) and ultimate governing principle of the cosmos (cols. XVIII-XIX); the generation of various goddesses and gods by Zeus (cols. XXI-XXIII); the creation of celestial bodies (the Moon, the stars and the Sun) by Zeus (cols. XXIV-XXV); and, finally, Zeus' incestuous desire for his own mother (col. XXVI).

5. West argues that the poem attributed to Orpheus by the Derveni author is an abridged version of a lost Orphic theogony composed around 500 BC, the 'Protogonos Theogony' which, like the much later *Orphic Rhapsodies*, began with the figure of Unaging Time and ended with the story of Dionysus.⁶³ There is no reason to postulate the story of Dionysus as the climax in the poem of the Derveni author merely on the basis of the *Orphic Rhapsodies*.⁶⁴ According to Brisson, moreover, the figure of Time in the *Orphic Rhapsodies* was added to the Orphic genealogy of the gods around the first half of the second century AD under the influence of Mithraicism and Night is the most ancient divinity in the theogony of the poem discussed by the Derveni author; the egg whence Protogonos sprang was produced by Night.⁶⁵ Betegh thinks that Ether was Night's consort and, considering it unlikely that there was an egg or Protogonos in Orpheus' poem, takes Uranus ('the son of Night', col. XIV.6) and Gaia to be their offspring.

⁶³ WEST (1983) 82-94; cf. 108-113.

⁶⁴ Cf. BERNABÉ (2002) 122-123. BRISSON (2003) 19-22, BETEGH (2004) 164.

⁶⁵ BRISSON (1985) and (1997); see also BETEGH (2004) 157-158. In the theogony described by Aristophanes (*Av.* 693-703 = *OF* 1) Night produces an egg from which comes to light Eros; BRISSON (1985) 38 and (1990) 2876-2877 takes this theogony to be the earliest Orphic theogony, which was described by Aristotle's associate Eudemus (*Dam. Pr.* 3.162 Combès-Westerink = 1.319 Ruelle), and equates Eros with the shining creature called in later versions Protogonos because he was the first god to appear; for criticism see BETEGH (2004) 148-149.

6. In Betegh's view, what Zeus is said to have swallowed in 8 is a penis, αἰδοῖον, also referred to in 13.1 as that of the 'first-born king' (πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου); in other words, Betegh understands αἰδοῖον in 8 and αἰδοίου in 13.1 as accusative and genitive singular of the neuter noun αἰδοῖον, 'sexual organ', not as accusative and genitive singular of the masculine adjective αἰδοῖος, 'reverend'. The first-born king in question is Uranus (cf. the characterization of Uranus in 10 as the one "who became king first of all"). In 8, which on Betegh's reading of αἰδοῖον could not have followed 2.2 in Orpheus' poem, Uranus is said to be the one "who sprang from the ether first" (ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος) in the sense that he was fathered first by Ether.⁶⁶ In Orpheus' poem Uranus was deposed by his son Cronus who cut off his father's genitals, as in Hesiod's *Theogony*, though in Orpheus' poem the genitals were not thrown into the sea and the phallus became the Sun; it was swallowed later on by Zeus who became pregnant with all existing things and gave birth by throwing up.⁶⁷ The Derveni author's commentary on 8 (col. XIII.5-11) might be thought to support the view that αἰδοῖον in 8 and αἰδοίου in 13.1 are the accusative and genitive singular of the neuter noun αἰδοῖον referring to the phallus of the first born-king, i.e. Uranus, which became the Sun and was swallowed by Zeus: as the Derveni author takes it, in 8 Orpheus likened the Sun to an αἰδοῖον, a sexual organ, because the sexual organs are as necessary for the coming to be of living things as is the Sun for the coming to be of τὰ ὄντα.⁶⁸

7. Assuming that it is supplemented correctly, col. XVI.1 can be read as the Derveni author's comment on αἰδοίου in 13.1, two lines below: αἰδοῖον τὸν ἥλιον ἔφ[η]σεν εἶναι δε[δῆλ]ωται. This can mean either "it has

⁶⁶ BETEGH (2004) 163 has no view as to the identity of the demon in 2.2; BERNABÉ (2002) 102-103 thinks the demon in question is Cronus. BURKERT (2003) 98, who also takes αἰδοῖον in 8/αἰδοίου in 13.1 to be the phallus of the first-born king Uranus, assumes that the relative clause ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος in 8 qualified a possessive genitive βασιλέως (to be construed with αἰδοῖον) in the lost preceding verse (cf. βασιλέως in 13.1). His translation of the relative clause, "who first ejaculated the ether", is based on Hsch. θ 8:4 Latte: θωάσκων κνώδαλα. ἐκθορίζων καὶ σπερματίζων. γεννῶν. Αἰσχύλος Ἀμυμώνη (= fr. 15 Radt). See also BERNABÉ (2002) 110-111, JANKO (2002) 27. Burkert adduces oriental parallels for the swallowing of the phallus of the sky-god and the ejaculation of the ether.

⁶⁷ BERNABÉ (2002) 115 translates προσέφυν in 13.2 as "se sont conçus". Cf. BETEGH (2004) 119-120.

⁶⁸ Indirect evidence that in an Orphic text Zeus was said to have swallowed Uranus' severed penis is offered, according to BURKERT (2003): 99, by the allusion in Diogenes Laertius' preface to the despicable practice of fellatio attributed to gods by Orpheus. BETEGH (2004) 121 thinks that this allusion furnishes one of the strongest arguments in favor of taking αἰδοῖον in 8-αἰδοίου in 13.1 to mean 'sexual organ'. Since swallowing a severed penis can hardly be described as fellatio, invoking Diogenes Laertius' testimony in this context cannot carry much weight. One might, of course, assume that the biographer opted for fellatio for want of a better description of the diseased act Orpheus' dark mind had Zeus perform in a poem, but this sounds like special pleading.

been made clear above that Orpheus said that the Sun is a phallus” or “it has been made clear above that Orpheus said that the Sun is reverend”, in which case αἰδοίου in 13.1 is genitive singular of the masculine adjective αἰδοῖος, ‘reverend’, not of the neuter noun αἰδοῖον, ‘sexual organ’. Nothing compels to assume the former, all the more so since on this reading the Derveni author would not say what he says in his commentary on 8, i.e. that Orpheus *likened* the Sun to a phallus, unless one is willing to assume that the Derveni author loses sight of, or disregards, the difference between likening and identifying. If one wants to be charitable, one should assume that the Derveni author’s point in his commentary on 8 is that Orpheus *likened* the Sun to a phallus by *saying* that the Sun is reverend: in other words, one should assume that αἰδοῖον in 8 is accusative singular not of the neuter noun αἰδοῖον, ‘sexual organ’, but of the masculine adjective αἰδοῖος, ‘reverend’, and that Orpheus likened the Sun to a penis, αἰδοῖον, by attributing this adjective to a masculine bearer who was swallowed by Zeus and is assumed by the Derveni author to stand for the Sun. Since the adjective αἰδοῖος is phonetically similar and semantically related to the neuter noun αἰδοῖον, Orpheus predicates it appropriately of its bearer in an implicit allusion to the sexual organs because the bearer in question stands for the Sun and the Sun is similar to the sexual organs in that this celestial body is as necessary for the coming to be of τὰ ὄντα as are the sexual organs for the generation of living beings.⁶⁹ 2.2 could be joined with 8 and, if the two hexameters did form a couplet in Orpheus’ poem, the characterization αἰδοῖον, ‘reverend’, in 8 would be predicated of δαίμονα in 2.2. One could then identify the glorious and reverend demon whom Zeus is said to have swallowed in the hypothetical couplet 2.2-8 with the king also said to be reverend in 13.1, where one could plausibly read Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου, “of the reverend king Protogonos”, and see a reference to the king Protogonos Zeus swallowed in the *Orphic Rhapsodies*.⁷⁰ If so, one might

⁶⁹ BURKERT (2003) 98-99 argues that seeing a pun on the noun αἰδοῖον in the adjective αἰδοῖος would be semantic shenanigans unacceptable to a Greek audience or readership; positing this pun, however, would not be more outrageous on the Derveni author’s part than detecting in the ordinary noun ἄδυστον, ‘that which is not to be entered’, a pun on the adjective ἄδυστον he coins, ‘that which (unlike the Sun) does not set’ (col. XI.1-3).

⁷⁰ In his paraphrases of 2.2 (col. VIII.7-8, IX.3-4 and 13) the Derveni author treats δαίμονα as an object of ἔλαβεν, though it is object of κατέπιπεν in 8, not because separating 2.2 from 8 makes him lose sight of the fact that καί in 2.2 is apodotic but rather because taking δαίμονα as the object of ἔλαβεν in 2.2 or κατέπιπεν in 8 makes no interpretative difference. Swallowing is a form of taking and, if Zeus took the power from his father and swallowed the demon, the Derveni author can quite plausibly say that Zeus took the power and the demon from his father; see Intro. V § 5.

also accept West's reconstruction of the verse that preceded 13: καὶ τότε δὴ κατέπινε θεοῦ μένος, ὡς θέμις ἦεν (the subject of κατέπινε being Zeus).⁷¹ As for the fact that Uranus is said in 10 to have become king first of all, he might be said to have become king first of all in some qualified sense and not absolutely, i.e. in the sense that he was the first king to ever come into existence (πρωτόγονος).⁷²

V. THE DERVENI AUTHOR'S COSMOLOGY

1. The event Orpheus describes in 13 is understood by the Derveni author as an allegory of a fundamental cosmological principle. This principle is evidently one of the matters of paramount importance which, as the Derveni author puts it in col. VII.5-7, Orpheus treats in his poem through riddles. In introducing 23, which most probably opened Orpheus' account of how Zeus conceived a desire to copulate with his own mother, the Derveni author notes that Orpheus puts up a screen to conceal his true meaning, for he does not want everybody to understand what he has to say (see col. XXV.12-13). The outrageous ascription of incestuous lust to Zeus is in all probability understood as a device intended by Orpheus to signal that here one should neither cringe in prudish disgust nor blithely believe what is said (cf. Isoc. 11.38-39) but rather try to penetrate the surface meaning of the words and uncover the truth hidden underneath: Orpheus poses a riddle that cannot even be recognized as such, let alone solved, by the uncomprehending many. In the case of 13, a riddle awaiting solution is probably signaled by the grotesqueness of the event described.

2. When Orpheus says that all things, immortal gods and goddesses included, clung onto, or became absorbed in, Zeus after the latter swallowed Protogonos and the entire cosmos the first king had created, he means this: all things that are now come to be from preexisting things (col. XVI.2: ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται) or, equivalently, the things that are *always* and the things that are *now* come to be from these preexisting

⁷¹ WEST (1983) 114, line 20. Cf. BRISSON (2003) 23-26 who assumes that αἰδοῖον in 8 and αἰδοῖον in 13.1 are accusative-genitive singular of the masculine adjective αἰδοῖος, 'reverend', which qualifies Protogonos but does not join 2.2 with 8 and also thinks that in Orpheus' poem Uranus' severed penis became the Sun; Brisson is followed by JOURDAN (2003) 13 n. 1 and 60-63. See, however, Commentary, col. XIV.1-2, 2-3, 3-4.

⁷² See RUSTEN (1985) 135 n. 31 and BRISSON (2003) 27-28; for objections see BETEGH (2004) 118-119.

things (col. XVI.7-8: τὰ ὄντα ὑπῆ[ρ]χεν αἰεί, τὰ δὲ | νῦν ἔόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται). The Derveni author can be plausibly assumed to presuppose that in Orpheus' poem, as in the much later *Orphic Rhapsodies*, Zeus eventually regurgitated what is said in 13 to have been absorbed in him; what he regurgitated was the present cosmos he rules, 'the things that are now'. These things came to be as much from Zeus himself as from what he had swallowed. Zeus and what clung onto him are thus understood by the Derveni author as allegories of the things that are always; the author can be plausibly assumed to think of regurgitation as an allegory of coming to be from preexisting and everlasting things. What comes to be is the cosmos itself, the organization of the universe as we see it today on the large scale, but the principle the Derveni author reads in 13 applies also to the manifold transient furniture of the cosmos (middle-sized objects such as animals). Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the atomists, the Derveni author follows in Parmenides' footsteps and rules out generation *ex nihilo*.⁷³ The things that are now are ontologically and temporally secondary to the things that are always. These derivative entities range from the large-scale structures in the universe at the present epoch to the transient middle-sized objects that are in it at any time of this epoch. They come to be from the things that are always in the sense that the latter are the ultimate principles of reality, i.e. (a) eternally stable entities whose temporary configurations are all derivative entities and into which all derivative entities eventually dissolve; (b) efficient causes of these configurations, which might be brought about exclusively by the basic entities themselves and their interactions (as is the case in the cosmology of the atomists), or ultimately by powers as changeless and everlasting as the other basic entities. Such powers are analogous to external 'forces' acting on the other basic entities but are also conceived of as semi-divine agents (Anaxagoras' Mind, Empedocles' Love and Strife).⁷⁴

3. According to the Derveni author, moreover, by saying in 13.4 that Zeus was alone after he engulfed the Protogonos-made cosmos and its creator⁷⁵ Orpheus actually means that Mind alone is always worth all other

⁷³ Cf. BETEGH (2004) 225-227. For Empedocles and Anaxagoras see DK 31 B 11, B 12 and DK 59 B 17 respectively; cf. CURD (1998) 127-131. For the atomists see Leucipp. DK 67 A 7; cf. CURD (1998) 180-184.

⁷⁴ For the conception of these powers as agents cf. BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 118. For the two senses of the preposition 'from', ἐκ, cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1023a26-31.

⁷⁵ αὐτὸς δ' ἅρα μόνος ἔγεντο.

basic things, as if they were nothing.⁷⁶ In the Derveni author's view Zeus is an allegorical personification of Mind (as is any other god in Orpheus' poem; see e.g. cols. XIV-XV). What Orpheus calls Zeus is elsewhere said to be the air (col. XVII.1-6). Air/Mind never came to be: it existed before the cosmos came to be and will always exist. Air/Mind/Zeus is thus undoubtedly one of the basic entities. It/he dominates all derivative entities to any extent it/he wants and is called fate because it/he possesses wisdom (φρόνησις) which has determined how the derivative entities that are and come to be at any moment, as well as those whose coming into being is future at that moment, must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.1-7); in other words, the wise air determines the behavior of the other basic entities from which the derivative entities come to be and into which they eventually dissolve (see Intro. V §§ 20-23). Air/Mind is thus worth all other basic entities, worth being measured by causal efficacy, but this relation is clearly asymmetrical. Compared with air/Mind in terms of causal efficacy, the other basic entities are wanting to such an extent that they are as good as 'nothing' (which, of course, is not literally true): 'nothing' is unreal and thus lacks causal powers – as Parmenides puts it, coming to be cannot start from 'nothing' or from 'what is not' (μὴ ὄν), for 'nothing' cannot contain any principle sufficient to cause or explain generation.⁷⁷ If air/Mind did not want it to, the universe would not be as it is now (col. XXV.9-12), for it is air/Mind that caused the other basic entities to be configured into the cosmos. As is explained in col. IX.5-10, they were originally dominated by fire which caused them to mix together and prevented the formation of coherent structures (fire era). Air/Mind opened a new chapter in the history of the universe (Mind era) when it came to dominate all other basic entities (in allegorical terms, when everything became absorbed in Zeus) and caused them to condense out of their primordial mixture. The first to separate out was fire. When the fire content of the mixture dropped to a sufficiently low level, the other basic entities would not be prevented any more from accreting to form the large-scale structures we see in the universe. Since the existence and size of the Sun are thought of as necessary conditions for the generation and existence of all other derivative entities,⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Col. XVI.9-11: τοῦτο δὲ [λ]έγων δηλοῖ | [ἀεὶ] τὸν Νοῦν πάντων ἄξιον εἶναι μόν[ο]ν ἐόντα, | [ὥστε] εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλα εἶη.

⁷⁷ DK 28 B 8.9-10: τί δ' ἂν μιν καὶ χρεός ᾤσεν | ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τὸ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φθν; Cf. KRS 250. See also Commentary, col. XIX.11-13. The Derveni author could have said that all other basic entities are not worth the Mind, which is only one thing; cf. Hom. *Il.* 8.234-235.

⁷⁸ See col. XIII.10-11 and XXV.9-12.

the quantity of fire air/Mind caused to separate out first can be plausibly assumed to have become the Sun.

4. If in Orpheus' poem Zeus swallowed a reverend demon, who is to be identified with the figure known from the *Orphic Rhapsodies* as king Protogonos, and in the characterization of this demon as reverend (αἰδοῖος) the Derveni author sees a pun on a word for a generative organ (αἰδοῖον) signaling that the bearer of this characterization is an allegory of the Sun,⁷⁹ the Derveni author perhaps thinks that Orpheus called the personification of the Sun Protogonos, i.e. 'first-born', on the ground that the Sun is the first part of the cosmos to have come into existence. He must, moreover, think that Zeus' swallowing the demon is an allegory of Mind's causing some of the fire in the primordial mixture of all other basic entities to separate out and become the Sun, though what he seems to explain is not Zeus' swallowing of the demon in 2.2+8 but rather Zeus' taking the demon from his father along with the power in 7+2.2;⁸⁰ that is, contrary to what one would expect if 2.2 was followed by 8 in Orpheus' poem (see Intro. IV § 3), the Derveni author treats καὶ in 2.2 not as apodotic after the ἐπεὶ clause in 7 but as connective, which does not rule out continuity between 2.2 and 8 in Orpheus' poem, for an act of swallowing is an act of taking and can be treated as such.

5. Dismissing those who believe that Zeus literally took the power and the demon from his father as unable to understand the import of Orpheus' words (col. IX.2-4), the Derveni author proceeds to explain how air/Mind initiated the cosmogony (col. IX.5-10). It is quite likely that the Derveni author understands Zeus' taking the power from his father as allegory of the transition from the fire era to the Mind era. What, according to the Derveni author, Orpheus presented in 7 (= 2.1) as a son of a father deposed by his son is perhaps the dominant force in the universe at the present epoch (col. IX.1-2), i.e. air/Mind which Orpheus calls elsewhere (Zeus) the king of all (col. XVI.14-15). When air/Mind triggered the cosmogony, it put an end to the domination of the other basic entities by fire, as if it were a son who πατὴρς ἐοῦ πάρα ... | ἀλκὴν ἐν τ' χεῖρεσσι ἔλαβεν in a dynastic succession and fire were his father. Since air/Mind initiated the cosmogony by causing a sufficiently large part of the fire in the primordial mixture of all other basic entities to separate out, the demon Zeus took from his father is probably an allegory of the fire that became the Sun.

⁷⁹ See Intro. IV § 7.

⁸⁰ For the substitution of 7 for 2.1 see Intro. IV §§ 1-2.

6. In Orpheus' riddling poem the Derveni author sees what can be reasonably called allegoresis of a cosmology founded on Parmenides' rejection of coming to be and perishing. Parmenides argues that coming to be and perishing presuppose a change from $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, 'what is not', to $\delta\upsilon\nu$, 'what is', and vice versa. However, since 'what is not' is unknowable and unsayable, 'what is' turns out to be everlasting and uniform and unchanging in its nature.⁸¹ Thus a well-founded cosmology must explain coming to be (perishing) as coming to be from (perishing into) everlasting and changeless $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha$, i.e. basic entities or elements, not as the transformations of opposites such as the cold and the hot, each of which is defined in terms of what the other is not, into one another.⁸² Parmenides posits two basic entities, the bright (light) and the dark (night), which combine variously within the cosmos to form derivative entities, and presumably also became mixed on the large scale into the stable structure called cosmos, because of a power external to them. He conceives of this power in traditional terms, as a goddess who governs hateful birth and sexual intercourse from the center of the universe and sends female to mix with male and vice versa.⁸³

7. The number and character of basic entities in a cosmology founded on Parmenides' principles can vary wildly. Anaxagoras posits an infinite number of basic things ($\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$), namely all observable stuffs (e.g. air, ether, earth but also flesh, blood and bone) and qualitatively determinate kinds of stuff (such as the hot and cold, wet and dry, light and dark);⁸⁴ he conceives of them as continuous distributions of matter, without particulate structure and void, all of which are blended through and through everywhere in the universe.⁸⁵ Empedocles singles out only four observable stuffs which he calls roots, namely earth, water, air and fire;⁸⁶

⁸¹ See the arguments in DK 28 B 8.

⁸² For the account of Parmenides' project presupposed here see CURD (1998), e.g. 127-128, and cf. GRAHAM (1999). CURD (1998) 34-51 interprets the notorious $\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ in Parmenides as predicative and argues that the implicit predicate picks out the nature of the implicit subject, a basic entity. She thinks that Parmenides reacts to earlier cosmologists (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Alcmaeon and Heraclitus) who conceive of the basic entities as enantiomorphic opposites (like right-handedness and left-handedness), each of which is defined in terms of what the other is not and changes into the other as a terminus of change; see CURD (1998) 98-126.

⁸³ See DK 28 B 10, A 37 and B 12.

⁸⁴ See DK 59 B 1, B 2, B 4 and A 46 (for the text of B 1 see SIDER [1981] 49-51 and CURD [1998] 132 n. 11); cf. BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 18-20 and see also the discussion in CURD (1998) 131-141.

⁸⁵ Anaxagoras seems to have offered empirical arguments to show that there is no void (see DK 59 A 68). Against the ascription of a particulate theory of matter to Anaxagoras see BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 21-24 and CURD (1998) 147-151.

⁸⁶ See e.g. DK 31 B 17.18.

though he conceives of them as particulate, he does not assume that their particles are indivisible or separated by void.⁸⁷ The atomists Leucippus and Democritus posit infinitely many unobservable and indivisible material corpuscles, homogeneously full, solid and hard masses partly filling an infinite void; the atoms possess only shape, size, ordering and orientation within an ordering.⁸⁸

8. Diogenes of Apollonia agrees with Parmenides that there cannot be generation from 'what is not'.⁸⁹ Although a well-founded cosmology as Parmenides conceives of it cannot but rule out the early Ionian notion of a basic substance capable of turning into all the other substances,⁹⁰ Diogenes revives this notion and assumes that all substances in the cosmos derive from one basic substance through condensation and rarefaction, namely air, and *are* this substance.⁹¹ Like the Derveni author, Diogenes ascribes to (a type of) air knowledge and power over anything and calls it god.⁹² Further points of contact with Diogenes provide two views that the Derveni author is likely to have held: air permeates reality throughout;⁹³ the predictable regularity of meteorological phenomena which benefits human beings evinces the purposive work of the divine wisdom which has disposed all aspects of the cosmos in the best possible way.⁹⁴ These parallels, however, do not mean that the Derveni author espouses Diogenes' Parmenidean monism. As seen above, the Derveni author posits a multitude of everlasting elements already in the fire era and there is no reason to burden his cosmology with a hypothetical earlier era when air somehow turned into all other basic entities (the characterization 'basic' could be justified on account of all these things *being*, as Diogenes would put it, everlasting air).⁹⁵

⁸⁷ For the particulate structure of the four Empedoclean roots see DK 31 A 43, 43a and 44. For Empedocles' rejection of the void see [Arist.] *MXG* 976b22-29 = *Metaph.* DK 30 A 5.

⁸⁸ See *Democr.* DK 68 A 47, *Leucipp.* DK 67 A 6; on weight see KRS 421-423 and FURLEY (1987) 150-151. CURD (1998) 180-206 argues that not only the atomists' characterization of the full, i.e. atoms, as 'what is' but also their calling the void 'what is not' satisfies Parmenides' criteria for 'what is'.

⁸⁹ For the influence of Parmenides and Melissus on Diogenes see CURD (1998) 222-228.

⁹⁰ Cf. GRAHAM (1999) 171-172.

⁹¹ See DK 64 A 1, B 2 and B 5. BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 272-274 argues that Diogenes posits as the basic form of matter not air, a form of which is identified with the intelligent principle in the cosmos, but body, a stuff lacking any determinate characteristic.

⁹² See col. IX.5-8, XVIII.9-10 and XIX.1-4 (in the second passage, as well as in col. XXI.5-7 and XXV.10, air/Mind is referred to as god); cf. *Diog. Apoll.* DK 64 B 5 and 8.

⁹³ See col. XVIII.9-10 and cf. *Diog. Apoll.* DK 64 B 5.

⁹⁴ See col. XXIV.7-12, XXV.3-12 and cf. *Diog. Apoll.* DK 64 B 3.

⁹⁵ Cf. BETEGH (2004) 265.

9. Whether the Derveni author posits infinitely or indefinitely or finitely many basic entities, among which are properties conceived of as stuffs, is unclear. If a reference to earth can be restored in col. XVIII.1, this stuff is in all probability a basic entity; water, mentioned in col. XXIII.12, is most probably another basic entity. In col. XXI.1 the Derveni author mentions τὸ ψυχρόν, one of Anaxagoras' substantialized properties, but it is unclear whether he refers collectively to cold basic entities or to the property *being cold* conceived of as a stuff present in anything that has this property. λαμπρότης, mentioned in col. XXV.1, as well as the hypothetical but plausible θερμότης, with which λαμπρότης was most probably connected in the lost part of the clause through a copulative conjunction, might refer to a property of the fire, from which the Sun formed at the beginning of the cosmogony. Alternatively, these property-nouns might stand for τὸ λαμπρόν and τὸ θερμόν, qualities conceived of as stuffs which are constituents of the Sun because they are always present where fire is and account for the sensations caused by fire. If so, τὸ λαμπρόν and τὸ θερμόν are two basic entities; again τὸ λαμπρόν and τὸ θερμόν are two of Anaxagoras' property-stuffs.

10. Similarly ambiguous is the Derveni author's reference to the constituents of the Moon as the whitest (λευκότατα) of all kinds of matter.⁹⁶ It might be the case that lunar matter, whatever it might be,⁹⁷ has the property *being white* to the highest degree. Alternatively, what the Derveni author wants to say might be that τὸ λευκόν is the quantitatively predominant ingredient in lunar matter. Referring to Anaxagoras, Aristotle mentions τὸ λευκόν as one of the infinitely many stuffs in a piece of matter which, unlike other pieces of a similarly complex constitution, is perceived as white and is accordingly said to be white (which is strictly speaking inaccurate) because in it τὸ λευκόν is one of the quantitatively predominant ingredients at the level of material structure within the range of human perception.⁹⁸

11. In one of his doxographical reports on Anaxagoras Simplicius calls the quantitatively predominant ingredient in an Anaxagorean piece of matter τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν,⁹⁹ and, if a parallel to Anaxagoras' view can be read in col. XIX.1-3, it might suggest that, like Anaxagoras, the Derveni author thinks

⁹⁶ Col. XXV.1-2.

⁹⁷ Cf. BETEGH (2004) 261.

⁹⁸ Arist. *Ph.* 187b1-7. Cf. the conclusion to Anaxagoras' elaborate account of Mind (DK 59 B 12): ὅτων πλεῖστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἔστι καὶ ἦν.

⁹⁹ Simp. *in Ph.* 26.31-27.11 Diels = DK 59 A 41.

of properties as everlastingly stable stuffs: ἐκ [τοῦ δ] ἔ τὰ ἑόντα ἐν [ἔκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺ[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν | λόγον ἐκλήθη.¹⁰⁰ All beings were said to be Zeus, the Derveni author explains next, because air dominates, ἐπικρατεῖ, all of them as far as it wishes,¹⁰¹ apparently in the sense that the wisdom of god, i.e. air, has determined how the things that are and those that come to be and those that will be must come to be and be and cease to be.¹⁰² The beings in question are, therefore, the derivative entities (for they are subject to coming to be and passing away), i.e. temporary configurations of basic entities. Zeus/air is predicated of them in the same sense that Sophocles says at the end of the *Trachiniae* “there is nothing in all this that is not Zeus”.¹⁰³ All derivative entities ‘are’ air in the sense that the causal power of air is manifest in them throughout their life, not in the sense that air is the quantitatively predominant ingredient in them, though the Derveni author probably assumes that air reaches through all derivative entities, perhaps so as to dominate them as far as it wishes.¹⁰⁴ However, the principle by an application of which all derivative entities are said ‘to be’ air (τὰ ἑόντα ἐν [ἔκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἐπικρατοῦντος) is consistent with Anaxagoras’ view.¹⁰⁵ If the derivative entities are each said ‘to be’ those of the many fundamental things in them that are causally dominant, i.e. those whose causal powers are always manifest at the level of material structure within our perception (fire, hot, bright etc.), nothing prohibits these fundamental things from being quantitatively predominant as well: by the same principle, all derivative entities ‘are’ air because the causal power of air is manifest in all of them throughout their life, even though air not is the quantitatively predominant ingredient in them.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ If correctly supplemented, ἐκ τοῦ is equivalent to ἐξ οὗ, ‘since’, and introduces a causal clause stating a general principle which is then particularized.

¹⁰¹ Col. XIX.3-4.

¹⁰² Col. XIX.4-7, an explanation of the expression ‘Fate spun’. It is not explicitly connected with the preceding explanation of why all things that are were said to be Zeus.

¹⁰³ *Tr.* 1278: κούδεν τούτων ὃ τι μὴ Ζεὺς. See Jebb’s note *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁴ See Commentary, col. XVIII.9-10. As will be seen below, the Derveni author might think of air/Mind as the medium within which the particles of the other basic entities are situated and move. It is unlikely that he would assume the presence of air within these particles.

¹⁰⁵ According to BETEGH (2004) 266-272 and 303-305, the context of this principle makes unlikely the often suggested view that in laying down the principle in question the Derveni author agrees with Anaxagoras that any type of matter in the cosmos is a mixture of all fundamental types of matter but is characterized according to the quantitatively predominating ingredients. This is not so, however.

¹⁰⁶ If so, during the cosmogony air/Mind did not cause the other fundamental entities to

12. If the Derveni author believes that in the cosmos any piece of matter is a mixture of all fundamental types of matter but is characterized according to those that are quantitatively predominant in it, he need not be committed to Anaxagoras' ontology and theory of matter.¹⁰⁷ When he points out that a mixture of a large quantity of wine with a much smaller quantity of water is said to be wine on account of the quantitatively and causally predominant ingredient in the mixture, Aristotle does not presuppose Anaxagoras' profligate ontology and extravagant theory of matter or versions thereof.¹⁰⁸ Empedocles has a parsimonious ontology and assumes that the four elements combine by being not blended through and through but laid alongside one another in small non-atomic particles.¹⁰⁹ According to Empedocles, it is the proportion in which finitely many corpuscular elements bind together to make up a composite that determines the nature of the composite, but there is some evidence that he might have attributed various prominent features of the composite, and thus some of the characterizations it receives, to the element which predominates quantitatively in the composite and whose causal powers are thus always manifest in the composite.¹¹⁰ One can thus read col. XIX.1-2 as suggested above while attributing to the Derveni author a parsimonious ontology and a corpuscular theory of matter like Empedocles'. In his report on Democritus' explanation of taste, moreover, Theophrastus ascribes to Democritus the view that, although a substance consists of atoms of many different shapes that affect the sense in diverse ways, each producing a different sensation and allowing a different characterization of the composite, causally relevant and thus dominant are only the atoms of the quantitatively predominant types.¹¹¹ In

separate from one another completely – in the cosmos they are still mixed but not as they were in the fire era when they had formed an internally undifferentiated hot mass or cloud. This is what one would expect, for on the Parmenidean model of cosmology unlike elements must combine to produce the constantly changing multiplicity of the things that are said to come into being. A universe in which the elements have completely separated would be dead, devoid of all change. The Derveni author does seem to hold that in the first phase of the cosmogony air/Mind caused the particles of the other basic entities to separate and sort like to like, whereas in the second phase it caused particles of many unlike basic entities to harmoniously combine into derivative things of which 'to come into being' is properly said. See Commentary, col. XXI.9-10, 10-11, 11-12, 13-14.

¹⁰⁷ BETEGH (2004) 304 assumes the affirmative, which he finds implausible. He thus rejects the hypothesis.

¹⁰⁸ Arist. *GC* 321a34-b2 (see also 328a23-28).

¹⁰⁹ See DK 31 A 43.

¹¹⁰ See DK 31 B 96 and Philp. *in de An.* 178.6-8 Hayduck, Simp. *in de An.* 68.10-13 Hayduck, Sophon. *in de An.* 32.14-21 Hayduck.

¹¹¹ Thphr. *Sens.* 67 = DK 68 A 135.

short, reading col. XIX.1-2 as suggested above does not commit the Derveni author to a specific ontology or theory of matter, nor does it help delineate the influence of its author on him.¹¹²

13. The Derveni author seems to hold that, when air/Mind caused the primordial mixture of the other basic entities to break up and triggered the cosmogony, the minute particles of the ingredients in the mixture kept on moving within air/Mind and colliding with each other until those that are like in character aggregated and were put together side by side.¹¹³ Underlying this account of the cosmogony must be the observed articulation of the universe on the largest scale: the Earth at the center with various hydrographical features on it, next the lower atmosphere with vapors and condensations, then the upper clear atmosphere and, finally, the celestial fires. This stratification, i.e. the cosmos, is the pattern in which the elements got distributed during the transition of the universe to its present state, when they clumped together into the large-scale structures observed today in the universe.

14. Anaxagoras assumes that originally the infinitely many *chremata* were mixed so uniformly that none would have been visible to a hypothetical observer except perhaps air and ether, i.e. fire,¹¹⁴ which held all the rest in subjection (without, as it seems, causing them to mix together) since they are the largest in both size and multitude;¹¹⁵ the universe of the Derveni author in the fire era is perhaps to be imagined in similar terms, as a bright and hot undifferentiated mass or cloud contained in air.¹¹⁶ Anaxagoras further assumes that one *chrema* was not mixed with any other. The *chrema* in question is Mind (*νοῦς*), the finest and purest thing of all,

¹¹² The view that a composite is characterized according to the predominant ingredient might be traced back to Parmenides who, on Plutarch's testimony (*adv. Col.* 1114B = DK 28 B 10), produces all phenomenal objects by mixing the bright and the dark, most likely in various proportions, as is suggested by his explanation of thinking (A 46). He asserts that all things are named light and night, descriptions having been assigned to different things in accordance with the powers of light and night (DK 28 B 9):

αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ πάντα φάος καὶ νύξ ὀνόμασται
καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσι τε καὶ τοῖς,
πᾶν πλεον ἑστὶν ὁμοῦ φάος καὶ νυκτὸς ἁόαντου,
ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδέτερον μέγα μὲν

(I assume that τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις are τὰ σήματα which according to B 8.53-58 have been assigned to light and night, i.e. the adjectives picking out properties of light and night).

¹¹³ Col. XXI.1-5; for the collisions see col. XV.8-10 (cf. XIV.3-4).

¹¹⁴ See Arist. *Cael.* 270b24-25.

¹¹⁵ DK 59 B 1; cf. KRS 358-359.

¹¹⁶ Whether air is assumed to extend *ad infinitum* beyond the farthest reaches of the finite cloud or the cloud is also infinite and the cosmos forms an isolated bubble within it cannot be determined from the surviving parts of the papyrus.

which has knowledge about everything and the greatest power, controls all living things, knew all things that are mixed and separated off and divided up and, like the Derveni author's air/Mind, arranged all things that were to be: those that were but are not now and those that are and those that will be.¹¹⁷ Mind, which is also said to permeate all reality,¹¹⁸ initiated a rapid rotation of the primordial mixture and the force generated by the speed caused the other *chremata* to begin their separating off, the dense and the wet and the cold and the dark collecting where the earth is now, the rare and the hot and the dry and the bright flying off towards the outer reaches of the ether.¹¹⁹

15. As in the Derveni author's description of the cosmogonic process, operative here is undoubtedly the kinetic principle attributed to Anaxagoras by Simplicius (on the authority of Theophrastus) in connection with the breaking up of the primordial mixture: like is attracted to like,¹²⁰ though one should add that this attraction is activated, as it were, by the imposition of an external force, an assumption explicitly stated by Democritus as will be seen below. Anaxagoras, however, conceives of the cosmogonic separating out of the *chremata* as the thickening of continuous distributions of matter which were originally blended through and through homogeneously, whereas the Derveni author in all probability conceives of the cosmogonic process as the sorting together of the particulate ingredients in a mixture of such a nature that every particle of each ingredient is placed side by side with particles of all other ingredients, just as each grain of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat in a mixture of barley and wheat.¹²¹ The Derveni author's implicit conception of mixing as composition of minute particles would have a parallel in Empedocles but also in Democritus,¹²² though the particles in the cosmology of the Derveni author are not Abderite atoms but bits of observable stuffs, like those of Empedocles' roots, and perhaps of observable qualities conceived of as stuffs in Anaxagoras' manner. As to whether these

¹¹⁷ DK 59 B 12.

¹¹⁸ See DK 59 B 14, a fragment perhaps hopelessly corrupt; cf., though, Pl. *Cra.* 413c5-7, Arist. *Metaph.* 984b15-19.

¹¹⁹ DK 59 B 15; cf. B 16.

¹²⁰ Simp. *in Ph.* 27.11-15 Diels = DK 59 A 41.

¹²¹ For the example see Arist. *GC* 327b31-328a18. That the Derveni author conceives of the ingredients in the primordial mixture as continuous distributions of matter blended through and through which then separated out in corpuscles cannot be ruled out but seems unlikely.

¹²² See DK 31 A 34, 43 and DK 68 A 64 respectively. On Empedocles' conception of mixing see WRIGHT (1981) 34-40 and CURD (1998) 164-171.

particles are similar to the particles of Empedocles' roots also with regard to divisibility, one must suspend judgment.

16. The fact that in his description of the cosmogonic process the Derveni author refers to particles of basic entities moving within air/Mind and colliding with each other might suggest that air/Mind is the same as, or similar to, the void of the atomists, space conceived of either as emptiness or as a very subtle plenum which separates things and is the theater of motion.¹²³ The author's identification of space with the basic entity Orpheus calls by the names of various 'gods' in his poem would be reminiscent of the way in which the conception of space as a unitary substance, simultaneously present everywhere, resembles the conception of god according to traditional theism.¹²⁴ If air/Mind functions as space, in the fire era the particles of all other basic entities were perhaps not contiguous but separated by air/Mind, just as at the microscopic level the bits of the ingredients in a mixture are separated by void according to the atomists.

17. The conception of the cosmogonic process as the separation/condensation of everlasting ingredients in a primordial mixture is also characteristic of Empedocles who, unlike Anaxagoras, posits a cause of this mixture analogous to the Derveni author's fire, namely an invisible but spatially extended power called Love which joins unlike roots.¹²⁵ Strife, an antagonistic power which separates unlike roots, advances gradually from the center of the originally undifferentiated universe and through the action of a vortex begins to separate the four roots, pushing Love towards the periphery. The parts of each root are gradually drawn together from throughout the mixture and collect where each root will predominate in the cosmos. The stratified cosmos eventually forms and living compounds of the four roots arise in it as the roots separate. Strife effects a complete separation of the roots into concentric layers before Love begins to gradually encroach on its antagonist, having taken control of the vortex. Through the action of the vortex it begins to combine the separated roots to an ever greater extent, pushing Strife towards the periphery of the uni-

¹²³ In the first case the Derveni author would be earlier than Anaxagoras or unaware of his 'experiments' designed to show the corporeality of air (DK 59 A 68, 69) and earlier than Melissus or unaware of Melissus' apparently novel conception of void as nothing (DK 30 B 7).

¹²⁴ See LOWE (2002) 253-257.

¹²⁵ See DK 31 B 17.20-26. However, Empedocles might conceive of the precosmic mixture of the four roots at the peak of Love's reign as lacking motion, which seems also to be the case with Anaxagoras' mixture of all *chremata* before Mind set it in cosmogonic motion (see Arist. *Ph.* 250b23-29 and 252a5-11), whereas the Derveni author assumes that in the precosmic mixture fire agitated, i.e. stirred or churned, all other ingredients (see col. IX.5-8).

verse and producing a second generation of living compounds of the four roots. When it eventually reigns supreme once again, Love has mixed together the four roots to the greatest possible extent.¹²⁶ Strife will then reassert itself in an eternal cycle of cosmic birth and death.¹²⁷ On an alternative view, Strife does not effect a complete separation of the roots but there is only a constant struggle between Strife and Love, which eventually wins, and only one generation of living compounds of the four roots during Love's ascend.¹²⁸ Though the Derveni author can be assumed to hold that the cosmos will eventually dissolve and that the universe will revert to its precosmic state,¹²⁹ there is no evidence for an eternal cycle of cosmic birth and death in his cosmology;¹³⁰ nor is there any evidence as to why air/Mind will let go of its dominance over the other basic entities and fire will become dominant once again.

18. In Empedocles' cosmos, moreover, Love seems to be coextensive, and to operate in tandem, with a cosmic mind which Empedocles does not call νοῦς but φρήν. Empedocles describes a non-anthropomorphic god as φρήν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ... φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θεήσιν.¹³¹ Since the holy mind that darts through the whole cosmos with swift thoughts and the complete mixture of the four roots at the peak of Love's reign are described in the same non-anthropomorphic terms,¹³² this holy mind and the complete mixture of the roots are one and the same. For Empedocles, thought is a property of substances in which the roots are mixed as completely as possible¹³³ and, since the completeness with which the roots are mixed at the peak of Love's reign is unsurpassed, their mixture at that time constitutes a holy mind. Insofar as it operates in the cosmos, however, this holy mind cannot be the complete mixture of the four roots at the peak of Love's reign because the cosmos does not exist when Love reigns supreme: it must be this complete mixture during its gradual expansion through the Strife-formed cosmos, when Love steadily advances against Strife, having taken control of the vortex, and populates the cosmos

¹²⁶ See DK 31 B 35.

¹²⁷ See DK 31 B 17.1-18.

¹²⁸ For references see GRAHAM (1999) 161 n. 5.

¹²⁹ See Commentary, col. XVII.8.

¹³⁰ A cyclical cosmogony is assumed by BETEGH (2004) 257-259.

¹³¹ DK 31 B 134.4-5.

¹³² Cf. DK 31 B 134.1-3 and B 29.

¹³³ See DK 31 A 86, B 98 and 105.

with compounds of the four roots. This process is most probably determined by the swift thoughts of the holy mind, the product of Love, which gradually fills out the whole universe via the action of the vortex. If the four roots form a complete mixture when broken up into so minute and homogeneously mixed particles that no part of any root could be discerned, the holy mind is the subtlest substance in the universe, just like Anaxagoras' Mind and perhaps the Derveni author's air/Mind.¹³⁴

19. The similarities between Anaxagoras and Empedocles indicate that one reacts to the other. However, which one published first or which one was the first to conceive of the cosmogonic process as the separation/condensation of everlasting ingredients in a primordial mixture, a mechanism also adopted by the atomists, is unclear.¹³⁵ Although the adoption of the same mechanism by the Derveni author cannot in itself suggest that he follows Anaxagoras, even if Anaxagoras was the first to propose it, the author's characterization of the agent-like force that powers the cosmogony as Mind and his identification of Mind with air has been thought to suggest the profound influence of Anaxagoras, on the one hand, and Diogenes of Apollonia, who is himself heavily influenced by Anaxagoras, on the other.¹³⁶ As seen above, Diogenes not only takes air to be the basic substance but also attributes to (a form of) this substance properties similar to those Anaxagoras attributes to Mind and the Derveni author to air/Mind, though he would call air not Mind (νοῦς) but Intelligence (νόησις).¹³⁷ Whereas the Derveni author casually calls air/Mind god and Diogenes states confidently his belief that air is god, in the surviving fragments Anaxagoras does not call Mind god¹³⁸ but Archelaus of Athens, a contemporary of Diogenes and pupil of Anaxagoras, is said to have held the view that god is air and Mind (he is also said to have denied the cosmogonic function

¹³⁴ This would account for the inaccessibility of the divine to the senses; see DK 31 B 133. On how the four roots blend at the peak of Love's dominance see CURD (1998) 155-164.

¹³⁵ According to Aristotle, *Metaph.* 984a11-13, Anaxagoras was older than Empedocles but later in publishing his work. The second part of the testimony, however, might mean that Anaxagoras was a lesser thinker than Empedocles; see A. ex. Aphr. in *Metaph.* 28.1-10 Hayduck, Ascl. in *Metaph.* 25.25-28 Hayduck. For the difficulties in the chronological ordering of the philosophers who came after Parmenides and were influenced by him see CURD (1998) 15-18.

¹³⁶ For Anaxagoras' influence on Diogenes see DK 64 A 5. The assumption that Anaxagoras and Diogenes are (among) the chief influences on the Derveni author has been dominant since the late 1960s, when scholarly work on the Derveni papyrus began; see BETEGH (2004) 279-280 and 306-307.

¹³⁷ See DK 64 B 3 and 4.

¹³⁸ Cf., though, DK 59 A 48.

of Mind, though another testimony includes him among those who believe that Mind is the motive cause in the universe).¹³⁹

20. The Derveni author's reference to particles of elements colliding with one another as the cosmos was taking shape finds a parallel in the atomist cosmogony attributed to Leucippus, another variant of the cosmogonic process hypothesized by Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the Derveni author: a precosmic 'cloud' of randomly moving atoms of all kinds evolves into a cosmos as the causally linked motions of individual atoms somehow self-organize into a collective rotary motion on account of which the atoms are sorted like to like, colliding with one another in the process – atoms of unlike shape and size apparently move in different directions, articulating the cosmos.¹⁴⁰ Democritus lays down vividly the kinetic principle according to which like is attracted to like under the imposition of an external force, be it caused by the speed of a Mind-generated rotary motion as in Anaxagoras, or by a Strife-controlled vortex as in Empedocles, or by a self-organized vortex as in the atomist cosmogony, or by the agency of air/Mind as in the Derveni papyrus: similar grains or similar pebbles in the sea-shore sort together under the action of a sieve or the waves respectively.¹⁴¹ He thinks, moreover, that within a cosmos everything happens by fate, in the sense that fate applies the force of necessity, and calls the cosmogonic vortex necessity.¹⁴² Given that the action of the vortex and the agency of air/Mind play the same role in the cosmogonies of the atomists and the Derveni author respectively, Democritus' association of fate and the cosmogonic vortex might have a parallel in the Derveni author's view that what Orpheus calls fate is the *πνεῦμα*, which is all other things that are situated in air/Mind (col. XVIII.1-3).

21. *πνεῦμα* can be plausibly assumed to mean 'wind', the motion of air/Mind. If all other things that are situated in air/Mind 'are' the wind called fate in the sense that they are causally determined by this wind and are thus said 'to be' that which determines them (see § 11 of this section), the motion of air/Mind which is called fate might be the analogue of the vortex in the atomist cosmogony, a rotary motion called by Democritus necessity

¹³⁹ See DK 60 A 12 and 18. For the sense in which the Derveni author might refer to air/Mind as god see Intro. VI § 16.

¹⁴⁰ DK 67 A 1. The atomists probably understood collision as repelling interaction between atoms at an extremely short distance; see TAYLOR (1999) 154 with further references.

¹⁴¹ DK 68 B 164. See TAYLOR (1999) 188.

¹⁴² DK 68 A 1 and 66. Leucippus identifies necessity with fate on the ground that nothing happens without cause but everything from a reason and by necessity (DK 67 B 2).

whose force is applied by fate. The wind, in other words, could be the event air/Mind caused in order to break up the precosmic mixture of the other basic entities and force their particles to sort out by likeness, shaping the cosmos. Democritus relates the cosmogonic vortex to the traditional concept of fate because, by causing the initial motions and collisions of the atoms in a precosmic farrago of atoms beginning to develop into a cosmos, the vortex fixes all subsequent states of the compound system and thus all macroscopic events in the cosmos that are constituted by these states.¹⁴³ The fact that in his description of the cosmogonic process the Derveni author refers to air/Mind as the medium in which the particles of the other basic entities kept moving and colliding with each other might suggest that a similar conception of mechanistic determinism underlies the identification of fate with the cosmogonic motion of air/Mind. Given the prominent role rotary motion plays in the prevalent model of cosmogony after Parmenides, is it not unlikely that the cosmogonic motion of air/Mind is rotary, all the more so since vortices are easily observed to form in air.

22. Whereas in the cosmogony of the atomists the vortex arises spontaneously out of the innumerable and purposeless interactions between the atoms in the precosmic 'cloud', the cosmogonic motion of air/Mind would be a basic action of god:¹⁴⁴ air/Mind set itself in rotary motion, thereby forcing the other basic entities to separate out and clump into the cosmos, because it wanted the cosmos and all things in it to come into being and be as they are.¹⁴⁵ As seen above, the Derveni author seems to share with Diogenes of Apollonia the belief that a wise god has disposed all aspects of the cosmos in the best possible way and, like Diogenes, he might see evidence of god's purposive work in the predictable regularity of meteorological phenomena which benefits human beings. He would not agree with the atomists that the universe is governed by a sort of irrational nature (i.e. natural necessitation) or chance, not by purpose;¹⁴⁶ it is likely that

¹⁴³ See BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 111. By necessity Democritus means not only the cosmogonic whirl but also the motion and impacts of matter (DK 68 A 66).

¹⁴⁴ A basic action is an agent's causing an event without causing it by any means whatsoever.

¹⁴⁵ See col. XXV.9-12.

¹⁴⁶ See Leucipp. DK 67 A 22; cf. A 24 and Democr. DK 68 A 70. For the equation 'E happens by necessity' = 'E happens by chance' = 'E was not brought about by design' see BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 120-123. One could make a plausible case that Leucippus posited universal purposiveness in nature; see the discussion of Leucippus' single fragment (DK 67 B 2) in BARNES (1984) but cf. TAYLOR (1999) 185-186. Chance and necessity seem to have been accorded a prominent role also in Empedocles' cosmology (see DK 31 B 103, A 45). BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 123

he criticizes this view in col. IV.3-4. Indeed, what Orpheus calls fate is in the Derveni author's view not only the cosmogonic wind but also the wisdom (φρόνησις) of god which determined how the things that are and those that come to be and those that will be must come to be and be and cease to be.¹⁴⁷

23. Simplicius says that Anaxagoras' Mind created motion in all other constituents of reality because it wanted them to separate out¹⁴⁸ and, although in the surviving fragments of Anaxagoras Mind is nowhere said to have wanted the cosmos to come into being and be as it is now, the description Mind receives, in terms quite similar to those the Derveni author uses in his identification of god's wisdom with fate, has undoubtedly teleological import.¹⁴⁹ Mind, according to Anaxagoras, not only knew all things that are mixed and separated out and divided off but also arranged what was to be, i.e. what was but is not now and what is now and what will be. It did so probably in the sense that by purposefully imparting rotary motion to the originally inert and undifferentiated universe it forced all other latent constituents of reality to separate out but then let them interact mindlessly through natural mechanisms; there are some things that are under the direct control of Mind, however, namely those that are alive.¹⁵⁰ The workings of natural mechanisms can be plausibly assumed to be objects of Mind's knowledge as is also the vast web of their necessary effects through space and time, i.e. what was but is not now and what is now and what will be;¹⁵¹ in all probability there is not any given time at which, or any means by which, it obtained this knowledge. The Derveni author assumes that air/Mind knows the workings of natural mechanisms¹⁵² and, if air/Mind is no less knowledgeable than Anaxagoras' Mind is likely to be, the conception of fate as the wisdom of air/Mind could be assumed to complement the mechanistic conception of fate as the cosmogonic motion of air/Mind, the trigger of a vast causal chain-reaction mapped and ultimately grounded in the content of air's/Mind's wisdom. It is very likely that the Derveni author's air/Mind is similar to the Anaxagorean Mind

notes that denial of design in nature does not sit well with the agent-like conception of Love and Strife; it does, however, if understood as TRÉPANIER (2003) suggests.

¹⁴⁷ See col. XVIII.6-10, XIX.4-7.

¹⁴⁸ Simp. *in Ph.* 1123.21-24 Diels = DK 59 A 45.

¹⁴⁹ See BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 115 and FURLEY (1987) 64.

¹⁵⁰ See BARNES (1979) vol. 2, 115-116.

¹⁵¹ Cf. BETEGH (2004) 290-291.

¹⁵² This can be safely inferred from col. IX.5-8.

also in that it is assumed to exercise direct control over some aspects of reality, e.g. the size of the Sun and how the fire that constitutes the stars is distributed in the cosmos.¹⁵³

VI. THE DERVENI AUTHOR'S AIMS

1. Col. V contains a critique of uncomprehending people who do not believe that Hades has a horrendous fate in store for them and fail to understand dreams and certain other things, being overcome by pleasure and error; they are castigated by someone who speaks in the first person plural and seems to visit oracles on their behalf. Tsantsanoglou assumes that it is the Derveni author who speaks in col. V and that he speaks as a religious practitioner who desires to disseminate his professional secrets to the faithful:

What sort of a religious practitioner the author could have been is not so difficult to decide [...] the repeated references to oracle-consulting in col. V, and especially the statement 'we enter the oracle in order to seek divination with regard to the inquirers', would make him a *mantis*. His reference to disbelievers who do not know how to interpret dreams would make him an *oneirokritēs*. His references to 'other things', which ordinary people apparently do not know how to interpret, would perhaps make him a *teratoskopos*.¹⁵⁴

According to Tsantsanoglou, in col. VI the Derveni author puts forward the magi, the Persian priestly caste, as venerable paradigms of piety and wisdom to lend antiquity and authority to the cultic practices of those who are initiated by him (μύσται): he is one of the so-called ὀρφεοτελεσταί,¹⁵⁵ in Plato's words (see R. 364b5-365a3) a 'begging priest' (ἀγύρτης) and a 'diviner' (μάντις) who performs rituals in accordance with books by Orpheus and, targeting the rich, advertises his ability to harm anyone with spells for a small fee and purify the unjust deeds of living and dead alike through sacrifices and incantations in order to ensure an afterlife free of punishment for the participants in his initiatory rituals.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ See col. XXV.3-12.

¹⁵⁴ TSANTSANOGLOU (1997) 98-99.

¹⁵⁵ For the term see Thphr. *Char.* 16.11, [Plu.] *Apophth. Lac.* 224E.

¹⁵⁶ See TSANTSANOGLOU (1997) 110 and 117. On this class of religious professionals see BURKERT (1983) and cf. OBBINK (1997) 46-47. As will be seen below (Intro. VI § 12), they seem to have laid claim even to the power of changing the course of the heavens.

2. In col. V Tsantsanoglou sees the Derveni author's view that participation in sacred rites is only one of the conditions that must be met if salvation in Hades is to be ensured. Apart from leading a life free of indulgence in wrong-doing and pleasure, the initiates must also obtain through teaching special knowledge about eschatology, divination and what the Derveni author seems to be treating in cols. I-III and in col. VI, namely the demons/Erinyes/Eumenides and the rites in which the initiates participate.¹⁵⁷ The most important part of the Derveni author's teaching comes after col. VII, in the 'second part' of the Derveni papyrus, and is the interpretation of a hexametric poem attributed to Orpheus. The author emphasizes that *hoi polloi* fail to understand Orpheus' λεγόμενα (col. XXIII.1-3) and Tsantsanoglou suggests that the term is used in the mystical sense: it implies that Orpheus' poem formed at least part of what was said (vs. what was done, τὰ δρώμενα) in the Derveni author's initiation rites (cf. the passage from Plato's *Republic* referred to above).¹⁵⁸ The Derveni author's central tenet, that mere participation in sacred rites cannot be effective unless accompanied by understanding, is brought to the fore by his critique in col. XX of those initiates who do not understand Orpheus' *legomena* and, in case they paid for the services of other 'experts' in sacred rites, lost their money.¹⁵⁹

3. Several contributors to LM, a volume that sprung from a 1993 Princeton conference and includes the first publication of cols. I-VII (Tsantsanoglou's contribution), attempt to elucidate the professional identity of the Derveni author with the help of the well-known passage in Plato's *Meno*, where Socrates introduces to Meno the doctrine of metempsychosis, a preamble to the so-called 'theory of recollection', as a true and beautiful story he has heard from certain priests and priestesses and from divine poets such as Pindar.¹⁶⁰ The priests and priestesses in question are wise about di-

¹⁵⁷ See TSANTSANOGLOU (1997) 101.

¹⁵⁸ See TSANTSANOGLOU (1997) 102; the context of Orpheus' poem as a *hieros logos* can be plausibly assumed to be the same as that of the 'Orphic' gold lamellae, on which see ΤΖΙΦΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ (forthcoming) ch. 3. The distinction between *legomena* and *dromena* is explicitly formulated in e.g. Paus. 2.37.2 with regard to the mysteries of Phlyā (τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ἐπὶ τοῖς δρωμένοις δὴλὰ ἔστιν οὐκ ὄντα ἄρχαῖα); for the literature accompanying Orphic ritual see BURKERT (1982) 8-9, (1983) 116 and 119.

¹⁵⁹ The distinction between *legomena* and *dromena* is most probably implicit here; see HENRICHES (1998) 33 n. 2.

¹⁶⁰ FUNGHI (1997) 29 n. 14, KAHN (1997) 55, WEST (1997) 83. From *Men.* 86b1-c2 it is clear that Socrates is not committed to the immortality of the soul and, by implication, to metempsychosis – he rather uses the doctrine of metempsychosis as a dialectical ploy to lead a recalcitrant Meno in the right direction and then lets it fall by the wayside.

vine matters (81a5-6) and are distinguished from their colleagues in that they are concerned to be able to account for their practices: ¹⁶¹ οἱ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷσις τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοι εἰσιν (81a10-b2). The priests and priestesses who propound the doctrine of metempsychosis emphasize the need to lead as pious a life as possible and the atonement one must pay for an 'ancient grief' after death in connection with how one's soul returns to the upper world (see 81b3-c4). In light of *Lg.* 870d4-e3 and *Cra.* 400b11-c9, they can be safely thought to be 'begging priests' and 'diviners' who, according to the *Republic* passage mentioned above, peddle initiation rites performed according to the books of Orpheus and promise among other things salvation after death to the participants.¹⁶²

4. According to West, the Derveni author is a religious specialist of this sort. He gives to the members of an Orphic/Bacchic society an account of their ritual and of a holy Orphic book recited in conjunction with the ceremony.¹⁶³ The author's account, at least of the Orphic poem, is of a very innovative and eccentric sort, influenced by the natural philosophy of Ionia and far removed from the culture of the religious circles in which the poem had emerged and circulated; however, such societies always reserved a place for the speculative theologian who, for a fee, was ready to explain to the members the esoteric meaning of their rites and holy texts or myths. West suggests that the need for such accounts arose as soon as Bacchic societies began to use Orphic scriptures, around the end of the sixth century BC, perhaps under influence from Babylonia, where priestly explanation of rituals and obscure religious material had been practiced since the Kassite period¹⁶⁴ and is amply documented in cuneiform texts. He further suggests that the Babylonian priests who engaged in such explanation might have been called *magi* by the Greeks¹⁶⁵ and that the Babylonian influence may be implicit in col. VI of the Derveni papyrus, where the author relates the ritual of the Orphic initiates to that of the *magi*, implying that the wisdom of the *magi* lends authority to the cultic practices of the Orphic initiates.

¹⁶¹ That they are really able to do so by Socrates' lights is, though, unlikely in view of 86b1-c2. Socrates is most probably 'ironic'.

¹⁶² See, however, KINGSLEY (1995) 160-165.

¹⁶³ See WEST (1997) and cf. WEST (1983) 108-113. On Orphism see PARKER (1995); on Orphism and Bacchic cults see BURKERT (1977), GRAF (1991) and (1993).

¹⁶⁴ From about 1570 to about 1155 BC.

¹⁶⁵ Babylonia was part of the Persian state since 539 BC.

5. Most sees in the Derveni author an Orphic, a leader or would-be leader of a sect within Orphism which distinguishes itself doctrinally from other Orphic groups (cf. the critique in col. XX).¹⁶⁶ The people criticized in col. V are distrustful laymen who send him to oracular shrines to obtain responses for them but, though they dread the horrors in Hades, they do not believe in his eschatological vision. Orpheus, who brings the message of salvation, founded eschatology upon the history of the world conceived of in mythical terms, as was appropriate for his time, but times have changed and Orpheus' word must be brought up to date, if it is going to resonate with modern initiates: it must be couched in terms of modern cosmology – hence the violence the Derveni author does to the Orphic poem through allegoresis. Most offers tentatively a detailed hypothesis as to how the Derveni author thought his cosmology might allay the initiates' fear of death. Based on the Derveni author's reference to obstructing demons and to paying a penalty¹⁶⁷ as well as on that to unjust men and to bearing guilt,¹⁶⁸ Most suggests that the Derveni author's idea of what happens after death can be gleaned from 'Orphic' gold leaves, which also mention paying a penalty on account of unjust deeds. He utilizes leaves from Zuntz' groups A and B,¹⁶⁹ the Hipponion leaf and the Thessalian leaf.¹⁷⁰ The parched soul is trying to reach a certain fountain that comes from the lake of Mnemosyne (it must at all costs avoid drinking from another tempting fountain) but guards stand in the way and prevent the soul's access to this fountain unless the soul declares its intense thirst and begs for cool water from the lake of Mnemosyne so that it will be able to follow the souls of other initiates and Bacchantes. Most goes on to suggest in effect that fear of death is fear of thirst in Hades, which is implicitly associated with the destructive effects of fire or 'warm organic decomposition' on a cremated or inhumed body respectively. The Derveni author's cosmology teaches one not to fear the destructive effects of fire by explaining how the cosmos came about, namely through the agency of the wise and divine air/

¹⁶⁶ Most (1997).

¹⁶⁷ See col. VI.2-3 and 5.

¹⁶⁸ See col. III.8-9.

¹⁶⁹ ZUNTZ (1971).

¹⁷⁰ Published by PUGLIESE CARRATELLI (1974) and BRESLIN (1977) respectively. For commentary on the gold leaves by groups see BERNABÉ and JIMÉNEZ SAN CRISTÓBAL (2001); texts now in BERNABÉ vol. 2 (fr. 474-496). For the lamellae of Crete see TZIFOPOULOS (forthcoming). For a reconstruction of the *hieros logos* that might lie behind these texts see RIEDWEG (1998) and (2002); the Cretan evidence is discussed in TZIFOPOULOS (forthcoming) ch. 3.

Mind which stopped the domination of the universe by fire in order to bring about a cosmos purposively designed for the benefit of humans. In a similar manner god will rid the soul of the tormenting effects caused by the heat of cremation or decomposition and will allow it to drink the cool water of memory; this water will express the divine intelligence and permit the soul to partake of it.

6. Starting from the central thesis in Jaeger (1947) that most Presocratic cosmogonies are in fact rational theologies, Laks suggests in a similar vein that the Derveni author must have felt committed to finding the standards of the new theism already at work in the old religion.¹⁷¹ He is an up to date believer in divine providence and omnipotence and an interesting representative of a trend that could be called *religious secularization*.¹⁷² To show that the new theism and the old religion say the same thing, the Derveni author (most probably an Orphic deeply committed to the holy nature of Orphic texts) offers a rational account of the latter. In the first six surviving columns of the text his point is to dispel the fear of death and to submit eschatological beliefs and ritual practices to rationalization, perhaps in moral terms, which is compatible with the critique of col. XX in that under attack in both cases is some form of superstition: such rational explanation of ritual is nicely complemented from col. VII onwards by a rationalistic interpretation of an Orphic *hieros logos*, which formed part of mystic rites, as a cosmological allegory culminating in the assertion of god's rationality.

7. Janko draws a parallel between the Derveni author and Empedocles, "a hierophant initiating his hearers into mystery rites, blurring to an extraordinary degree the boundaries between philosophy, science, religion and magic".¹⁷³ He assumes that in col. V the Derveni author offers an audience of potential initiates true religious faith which is achieved not via oracles, dreams or visions and blind belief in the traditional stories about the horrors in Hades, but through knowledge of the real significance of these stories, for lack of knowledge leads to lack of faith (cf. col. V.10-12): the tradi-

¹⁷¹ See LAKS (1997) 137-138.

¹⁷² LAKS (1997) 138 n. 58 refers to FUNKENSTEIN (1986) for possible modern parallels; MOST (1997) 122 also assumes that the Derveni author is a representative of what Funkenstein terms secular theology, "a movement within religion that does not dream of questioning the authority of a sacred text but accepts the challenge of accommodating that text to the most up-to-date doctrines of contemporary secular science".

¹⁷³ JANKO (1997) 69, referring to KINGSLEY (1995), esp. 217-232. On Empedocles and Orphism see RIEDWEG (1995) and BETEGH (2004) 370-372. TRÉPANIÉ (2004) 116-126 aligns Empedocles with Pythagoreanism, not Orphism.

tional stories about the horrors in Hades cannot but be false if taken at face value and lack of belief in these stories leads to lack of belief in the existence of gods.¹⁷⁴ In col. XX the Derveni author reproaches those who undergo initiation in ignorance of the true meaning of the ceremony and expect futilely to be enlightened by their initiators because he purports to give a more accurate account of the nature of the mysteries than the professional priests can.¹⁷⁵ Part of the Derveni author's program is also to offer knowledge of the true significance of bizarre and scandalous stories about gods with which traditional religious texts are replete, presumably because such stories are again unbelievable and thus might engender lack of belief in the existence of gods. In order to do so, he interprets a poem by Orpheus as an elaborate allegory of a cosmology chiefly influenced by Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia; he thereby purifies the poem from any scandalous element.¹⁷⁶ Janko locates the Derveni author in the wake of Anaxagorean rationalism. Assuming that Anaxagoras provoked a virulent reaction from the established purveyors of religious teaching and ritual that culminated in his trial and exile from Athens,¹⁷⁷ he suggests that the Derveni author is a follower of Anaxagoras who attempted to demonstrate not only his deep religious faith (in order to avoid the fate of his master) but also the validity of his cosmological physics: he did so by explaining in terms of Anaxagorean physics not only a holy scripture by Orpheus, who knew Anaxagorean physics all along and hid it in his poem for the benefit of the *cognoscenti* (the holiness of his poem rests exactly in the fact that it encodes the Anaxagorean worldview), but also cultic practices in initiation rites and other aspects of traditional religion.

8. In the most extensive study of the Derveni papyrus to date, Betegh considers it possible that, when the Derveni author speaks about magi in col. VI, he refers not to the Persian priestly caste but to the group that would include himself.¹⁷⁸ These priests are most probably those 'begging

¹⁷⁴ Cf. the skeptical argument about the existence of gods sketched by Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 9.66-67); JANKO (1997) 68 suggests that this argument might have been deployed in Protagoras' *On the Things in Hades*, which the Derveni author might be developing in col. V.

¹⁷⁵ In the surviving part of col. XX, however, there is no evidence that ordinary initiates risk losing their faith because they do not know the true meaning of the ceremony.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Isoc. 11.38-39.

¹⁷⁷ See DK 59 A 1; cf. KRS 354.

¹⁷⁸ BETEGH (2004) 82: "If so, the magi could designate leaders of the initiates, priests of a private religious group, and the column could thus be speaking about the parallel actions of magi and initiates within the same cult".

priests' and 'diviners' scorned by Plato in *R.* 364b5-365a3 – “although, of course, Plato’s depiction is negative, whereas that in the papyrus is positive”.¹⁷⁹ Betegh accepts the view that the Derveni author is one of those priestly persons in Plato’s *Meno* who are concerned to be able to give an account of their practices.¹⁸⁰ He finds the hypothesis that the cultic practices dealt with in cols. II and VI constitute the immediate topic of this part of the text, where these practices are explained, to be the most probable scenario.¹⁸¹

The subject matter of the text as a whole is a specific ritual, for example a certain funerary or initiatory ritual. The explanation of ritual actions in the first columns and the commentary of the Orphic poem complement each other, because they represent the two aspects of the ritual, the *dromena* and the *legomena*.¹⁸²

He proposes, moreover, that by teasing a cosmology out of the Orphic poem the Derveni author bolsters his claim to expertise in the field (τέχνη) of sacred rites over those of his professional rivals who simply cheat their clients and are criticized in col. XX. Giving an account of his professional practices involves cosmology, as is the case in the Hippocratic corpus where doctors assert their superiority over rival professionals, presumably in order to attract clients, by grounding their therapeutic practices in a scientific theory of the constitution of the human body as well as in the even broader context of a general cosmological theory, often influenced by Presocratic philosophy.¹⁸³ Betegh criticizes Most’s hypothesis as to how the Derveni author thought his cosmology would assuage the initiates’ fear of death, and offers tentatively an alternative based on the assumption that for the Derveni author (as for Diogenes of Apollonia and Heraclitus) the soul shares in the nature of the divine intelligence which rules the cosmos and is identified with air in the Derveni author’s cosmology.¹⁸⁴ The fact that the soul is akin to air/Mind, which controls for the best the agency of fire at the cosmic level, liberates one from the fear of funeral pyre and

¹⁷⁹ BETEGH (2004) 80.

¹⁸⁰ See BETEGH (2004) 350-351.

¹⁸¹ See BETEGH (2004) 75.

¹⁸² BETEGH (2004) 350. He takes this to be simply the most economical hypothesis and is skeptical about the possibility of determining the subject matter of the text with certainty.

¹⁸³ BETEGH (2004) 350-359. He refers to *Carm.*, *Nat. Hom.* and *Vict.*

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Aristotle’s reference to a view in Orphic texts that the soul enters the body with breath and is carried by the winds (*de An.* 410b27-30). For further relevant evidence see BETEGH (2004) 346 n. 71.

death, provided that one has no reason to fear god, for the pyre merely helps the soul join god, just as at the cosmic level fire helps god govern the cosmos.¹⁸⁵

9. Obbink, who thinks that the Derveni author sees in his Orphic text “clues for understanding the true basis of cult and the craft of initiation”, points out that it cannot be known if the Derveni author is a *telestes* but, apparently taking the view that the Derveni author is a *telestes* as the default position, adds that the case against this has yet to be made.¹⁸⁶ Assuming that the case for the received view of the Derveni author as a *telestes* is good, in skeptical fashion one can indeed make an equally good case (before suspending judgment) that the Derveni author is neither a *telestes*, nor an Empedocles-like hierophant straddling the boundaries between religion/magic and philosophy/science, nor a representative of ‘secular theology’ rising to the challenge of accommodating a sacred text to the most cutting-edge science of his day. On the contrary, he is wholeheartedly committed to what can be called a ‘protoscientific’/naturalistic worldview and has no use for mystery cults with their obscurantist conception of the world as subject to capricious intervention, not only of supernatural powers but also of mere humans, and the related eschatological concerns.¹⁸⁷ As Henrichs puts it, the Derveni author is non-Orphic or even anti-Orphic;¹⁸⁸ this can only mean that he is opposed to traditional or mainstream Orphism because he undoubtedly acknowledges Orpheus as an authority on cosmology.¹⁸⁹ His attitude to the Olympian gods and to religion is that of a non-believer.¹⁹⁰ If one is bent on providing a link between the content of the Derveni author’s work and the sepulchral context in which the sole copy of this work survived,¹⁹¹ it might be assumed that a non-believer desired to be cremated with a book about true Orphism bearing testimony to

¹⁸⁵ See BETEGH (2004) ch. 9, esp. 347. He utilizes the extremely problematic lamella in Zuntz’s group C, on which see BERNABÉ and JIMÉNEZ SAN CRISTÓBAL (2001) 273-277 (no. L 12).

¹⁸⁶ OBBINK (1997) 53.

¹⁸⁷ MOST (1997) 121-122 points out that one’s attitude towards religion vis-à-vis science could be ‘fundamentalist’, ‘scientific’ or that of ‘secular theology’ but then simply opts for the third alternative with regard to the Derveni author and proceeds to flesh it out.

¹⁸⁸ See HENRICHs (1984) 255-256.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. WEST (1983) 3: “As for ‘Orphism’, the only definite meaning that can be given to the term is ‘the fashion for claiming Orpheus as an authority’. The history of Orphism is the history of that fashion”.

¹⁹⁰ See the last paragraph of this section. RUSTEN (1985) 140 suggests that in col. XX the Derveni author might implicitly deny any way of gaining knowledge of the divine.

¹⁹¹ Cf. LAKS (1997) 140, MOST (1997) 134, BETEGH (2004) 65-68.

his lack of any worry about the non-existent afterlife, just as benighted fellows used to take to the grave 'Orphic' texts of eschatological content because of their deep anxiety about achieving bliss in the unreal afterlife.

10. It is quite probable that the cultic practices dealt with in cols. II and VI constitute the immediate topic of this part of the text. In the light of the above mentioned passage from Plato's *Republic*, moreover, it is conceivable that these practices and the Orphic poem interpreted by the Derveni author from col. VII onward complemented each other as *dromena* and *legomena* respectively in initiatory rituals; there is no reason, however, why such a ritual should be the subject matter of the Derveni text as a whole or why one should assume that the discussion of cultic practices in cols. II and VI and the commentary on the Orphic poem complement each other in constituting an account of such a ritual. Moreover, if the magi in col. VI are the same as Plato's 'begging priests' and 'diviners' who perform for a fat fee initiatory rituals in accordance with Orpheus' books such as the one commented upon by the Derveni author and guarantee to the participants an afterlife free of punishment among other things, the Derveni author's attitude toward these people and their cultic practices might very well be as negative as Plato's,¹⁹² all the more since the term μάγος is used pejoratively in the sense 'charlatan' or 'quack' unless it refers to a member of the priestly Persian caste; that the Derveni author uses the term positively, either in the sense 'Persian priest' (Tsantsanoglou) or in the elsewhere unattested sense 'priest of a private religious group' (Beteġh), is an unsubstantiated assumption.¹⁹³

11. *Pace* Beteġh, moreover, that the Derveni author speaks in the first person plural in col. V, "where he describes what he and his 'colleagues' do for those seeking their religious services", is by no means a fact clearly showing that the Derveni author is a religious professional who in col. VI invokes the Persian magi, as Tsantsanoglou assumes, or that he considers himself one of the magi in Beteġh's sense of the term ('priests of private religious groups').¹⁹⁴ If the term 'magi' in col. VI means 'charlatans', it is equally possible that the speaker in col. V is one of those charlatans hawking to potential initiates the sacred rites described next in col. VI. The charlatans in question can very well be self-styled experts in sacred rites whose clients the Derveni author pities in col. XX. His negative attitude

¹⁹² Cf. JOURDAN (2003) 37-38.

¹⁹³ See TSANTSANOGLOU (1997) 110 n. 25, BETEGH (2004) 79 and 82.

¹⁹⁴ See BETEGH (2004) 82.

toward these people might be due not to simple professional rivalry but to his belief that rites performed according to the poem of Orpheus he interprets cannot be a true field of technical knowledge, though the interpretation of the poem itself does constitute such a field in which he is an expert. With his work he might aim to reveal the imposture of those 'Orphics' who pretend to know what Orpheus really says in the poem they abuse but in fact purvey hocus-pocus for a living. In a similar vein, the author of the Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* attacks in the well-known preface of his work a motley crew of charlatans, purifiers, begging priests and impostors (μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες) who pretend to possess superior knowledge and promise to effect cures of epilepsy with purification rituals and incantations but in truth mask their ignorance with sham.¹⁹⁵

12. It is quite probable that the Derveni author began his work with an account of certain eschatological doctrines asserting the possibility of altering the fated lot of the soul after death and propounded by religious professionals who advertised their expertise in sacred rites they performed according to Orpheus' poems to ensure for the paying participants salvation in the netherworld among other things.¹⁹⁶ He could then have proceeded to denounce these self-styled experts as charlatans by arguing in the same manner as the author of *On the Sacred Disease*. According to the Hippocratic author, if the purveyors of sacred rites are able to bring down the Moon with initiation rites (τελεῖται) or with any practice (μελέτη) they might engage in, to make the Sun disappear, to change the weather at will and achieve all other things they claim to know, they certainly think that gods do not exist or that gods do exist but are utterly powerless, which is absurd: for, if celestial bodies and the weather are assumed to be controllable by means of magic and sacrifices, they are thought to belong not to the divine but to the human sphere, the power of what is rightly thought of as divine being supposedly under the control of, and enslaved to, the purpose (γνώμη) of humans.

13. The Derveni author could have drawn, e.g. in the lost part of col. III, the conclusion that the 'experts' in sacred rites, whose clients he will

¹⁹⁵ *Morb. Sacr.* 1; see also the comments in LLOYD (1987) 27-28, which *mutatis mutandis* are applicable to the Derveni author. This Hippocratic treatise is also brought to bear on the explanation of the Derveni author's aims by BETEGH (2004) 356-357.

¹⁹⁶ Cols. I-III would be part of this early section, assuming that not too many columns preceded col. IV; see Commentary, col. IV.2-3.

pity in col. XX, base the purported effectiveness of their practices on the conception of gods and the order of things as subject to human will.¹⁹⁷ He could then have argued like this. The true account of reality is encoded in Orpheus' poem about the gods that the Derveni author will interpret in his work, one of the Orphic texts that the 'experts' in sacred rites claim to understand and according to which they perform their rites.¹⁹⁸ Had these 'experts' understood Orpheus' teaching, they would have known that the cosmos has been intentionally constituted by air/Mind, the basic entity all gods actually personify.¹⁹⁹ The cosmos and its manifold furniture could not have arisen by mere chance. How the things that are and those that come to be and those that will be must come to be and be and cease to be is determined by the wisdom of air/Mind,²⁰⁰ the causally most powerful basic entity in the universe.²⁰¹ The goodness of this entity is manifest not only in the stability of the heavens, which ensures the preservation of the cosmos, but also in the predictable regularity of meteorological phenomena that benefits humans.²⁰² It is ridiculous to think that humans can overcome their puny causal efficacy via practices such as sacred rites to affect a cosmic order that has been constituted for the best by the wisdom and the causal powers of the entity Orpheus called by the names of various gods, all the more so since any change in e.g. the heavens, such as an increase in the size of the Sun, could only have had detrimental consequences for the cosmos. As it is, the foundational assumption of sacred rites is not grounded in reality, which means that such practices do not constitute a genuine field of expertise. Those claiming to be experts in sacred rites are plain charlatans.

14. Col. IV.2-4 may be supplemented so as to conclude such an argument and the Heraclitus quotation a few lines below might provide parallels to two important tenets of the Derveni author that are central to it: the

¹⁹⁷ For the promises of ὀρφεοτελεσταί to influence the gods see Pl. *Lg.* 909a8-c4.

¹⁹⁸ We do not know whether, by the Derveni author's lights, all or some other poems probably ascribed to Orpheus in his time also allegorize the same true account of reality.

¹⁹⁹ Col. XXV.3-12.

²⁰⁰ Col. XIX.4-7.

²⁰¹ Col. XVI.9-11.

²⁰² For the goodness of air/Mind see col. XXVI.1-2. In col. XXIV.10-12 the Derveni author says that human beings could not have been able to tell the season of the year and predict the weather if there had been no Moon, a probable reference to telling the time of the year and predicting the weather at that time with the help of the regular appearances and disappearances of the fixed stars around the year, phenomena which will fall in a given month of a well regulated luni-solar calendar.

stability of the most prominent celestial body, the Sun, which is necessary for the preservation of the cosmos, and the ultimate dependence of the cosmos on a wise entity.²⁰³ If the quotation is introduced by the remark that Heraclitus' revelation of the truth overthrows the false beliefs of uncomprehending people,²⁰⁴ this might be so because the Derveni author is engaged in the same enterprise:²⁰⁵ by revealing the truth, he overthrows the false beliefs purveyed by 'Orphic' pseudo-experts in sacred rites, one of whom is shown in col. V trying to attract potential clients, and uncritically held by those pitied in col. XX, fools who fall victim to the charlatans and take part as initiates in the silly rituals described in col. VI.²⁰⁶

15. It is, moreover, interesting to note that Heraclitus seems to have attacked charlatans and initiates, though it is difficult to see how much in the following passage from Clement's *Protrepticus* (2.22.2) records Heraclitus' own words:

τίσι δὴ μαντεύεται Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος; νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λήναις, μύσταις; τοῦτοις ἀπειλεῖ τὰ μετὰ θάνατον, τοῦτοις μαντεύεται τὸ πῦρ· τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερῶσι μνεῦνται.²⁰⁷

The last sentence of this passage can be understood as an outright condemnation of mysteries.²⁰⁸ If Heraclitus' charlatans are the same as Plato's

²⁰³ See Commentary, col. IV.2, 2-3, 3-4, 4, 9. Cf. BETEGH (2004) 328-329 who, though, goes on to propose that the Heraclitus quotation is also intimately connected with the Derveni author's eschatology. Following SEAFORD (1986) 14-20 and SIDER (1997) 147-148, BETEGH (2004) 341-348 assumes that Heraclitean thought is indebted to Orphic eschatology, in both form and content, for which reason Orphics then got interested in it, as is evinced by the Heraclitus quotation in the Derveni text.

²⁰⁴ Col. IV.5-6. This heavily damaged passage, differently interpreted, is also central to Betegh's hypothesis about the aims of the Derveni author; see BETEGH (2004) 326-348.

²⁰⁵ Cf. HENRICHs (1984) 256.

²⁰⁶ JOURDAN (2003) 31-32, who assumes that the Derveni author is an Orphic *telestes*, suggests in a similar vein that the Heraclitus quotation in col. IV might belong to the Derveni author's critique of the magi mentioned in col. VI, rival religious professionals who tout the capacity of their ritual practices to influence in favor of their clients the divine justice, Dike, that strikes after death.

²⁰⁷ DK 22 B 14. MARKOVICH (1967) 466 brackets μάγοις. This fragment is also discussed by JOURDAN (2003) 37-38 (see previous note) and BETEGH (2004) 81, who brings it in as possible evidence that the initiates mentioned in col. VI of the Derveni papyrus belong to an Orphic/Dionysiac cult.

²⁰⁸ For a different view see ADOMÉNAs (1999) 94. According to Adoménas, the target of Heraclitus' criticism is not the religious practices themselves but their popular interpretation. Heraclitus simply reinterprets religious practices in terms of the conceptual structures of his own philosophy and, in contrast to Xenophanes, is not a reformer or an *Aufklärer* but an interpreter who tries to discern the structures of meaning inherent in the existing practices; cf. Gu-

'begging priests' and 'diviners',²⁰⁹ they can be plausibly identified with the 'Orphic experts' in sacred rites who, on the hypothesis developed here, are denounced by the Derveni author as charlatans. Heraclitus threatens night-wanderers, charlatans, bacchants, maenads and initiates with τὰ μετὰ θάνατον perhaps because what happens after death is, by his lights, totally unlike anything believed in mystical circles.²¹⁰ He thinks that the soul is a portion of fire, the fundamental matter which in its constant but regulated change into other types of matter manifests at the cosmic level the universal governing principle of clash between unified opposites. After death, the soul enters the cosmic circle of constant but regulated change.²¹¹ Afterlife as promised in the overlapping Bacchic, Orphic and Pythagorean circles is thus precluded by the true account of reality;²¹² this might be the view held by the Derveni author too. Insofar as fire is a manifestation of the universal governing principle which is also called Dike,²¹³ its 'prophesies' to night-wanderers, charlatans, bacchants, maenads and initiates perhaps in the sense that the truth about the universal governing principle is everywhere evident, for everything happens according to this principle, though charlatans and foolish mystics of all stripes fail to grasp, and live by, it.²¹⁴ They are fabricators of, and bear witness to, falsehoods but Dike will eventually 'catch up' with them.²¹⁵

16. One can only speculate on how the Derveni author would explain Orpheus' decision to disguise his cosmology as a poem about gods; as for the means by which the author could claim to have come to know the truth about Orpheus, speculation is obviously a waste of time.²¹⁶ Continuing the

THRIE (1962) 476, KRS 209-210, SEAFORD (1986) 19. SEAFORD (1986) 20-21 seems to suggest that in col. XX of the Derveni papyrus (which he takes, following RUSTEN [1985] 138-139, to contain in the main a quotation from an unknown author) the author adopts a view of initiation rites similar to Heraclitus'; cf. OBBINK (1997) 52-53. On the dominant view in Heraclitean scholarship (references in ADOMÉNAS [1999] 87-88) the Ephesian is a fiercely uncompromising rationalist who derides the foolishness and absurdity of religious phenomena such as initiation rites and mystery cults.

²⁰⁹ Cf. GRAF (1994) 32-33.

²¹⁰ DK 22 B 27: ἀνθρώπους μένε: ἀποθανόντας ἅσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν.

²¹¹ See DK 22 B 36 and 31.

²¹² See KRS 207-208 and cf. BURKERT (1985) 300.

²¹³ See DK 22 B 80.

²¹⁴ See DK 22 B 1.

²¹⁵ See DK 22 B 28: καὶ μέντοι καὶ Δίκη καταλήγεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας.

²¹⁶ Cf. Sir Isaac Newton's belief that the most important propositions in his *Principia* were known to ancients such as Pythagoras and Plato who, though, concealed their knowledge beneath the veil of mystery and myth. On Newton's belief that he had actually rediscovered lost knowledge of the past, which could still be gleaned from ancient texts, see RATTANSI (1988).

rationalist critique of myth and anthropomorphic gods, Aristotle hypothesizes that each science has been developed as far as possible and perished many times in the past, when natural catastrophes almost wiped out all civilization. Remnants of old scientific knowledge, however, have been handed down to posterity in the form of myths about gods, barnacled with anthropomorphic and zoomorphic elements that were added to persuade the multitude as well as for legal and practical purposes:²¹⁷ belief in traditional gods is nothing but a corrupt form of the knowledge that there are first causes of motion and change in the cosmos, the principles on which heavens and nature depend.²¹⁸ The Derveni author's air/Mind is such a principle (see Intro. V §§ 21-23); whose workings are assumed to have been turned by Orpheus into a myth about gods, personifications of the first cause of motion and change at the cosmic level in its various workings. Though the author differs from Aristotle in thinking that the well-designed cosmos has come into being because of the first cause of motion and change in it, an entity possessing wisdom and goodness, he need not pass in Platonic fashion from the assumption that the cosmic order as a whole manifests this wisdom and goodness to the belief that the entity Orpheus called by the name of the god Zeus among many others is concerned about humans and rewards or punishes their behavior, in this world or the next; by calling air/Mind god the Derveni author might simply be drawing attention to the fact that a god(dess) is nothing but an allegory of air invented long ago by Orpheus. Did the Derveni author hold a cyclical view of history similar to Aristotle's (there is nothing particularly Aristotelian about it) and did he perhaps believe that Orpheus, a cosmologist of old living in a post-cataclysmic era of rapid descent to primitiveness, concealed the cosmological knowledge of his time beneath a bizarre story about anthropomorphic gods in order to ensure its transmission to the brightest minds of posterity, those somehow able to see past all allegorical/theological claptrap and successfully recover it?

VII. THE DERVENI AUTHOR

Of considerable help in deciding between the incompatible readings of the work that the Derveni papyrus has preserved in a fragmentary state

²¹⁷ *Metaph.* 1074a38-b14; cf. *Cael.* 270^b1-25 and fr. 13 Rose. See JOHANSEN (1999) 287-291.

²¹⁸ Cf. *Metaph.* 1072b13-14.

would be the identification of the author with someone about whom we possess reliable relevant information. However, since the author could be identified only on the basis of evidence from the work, deciding between incompatible readings of a fragmentary work in this way would turn into reinforcing one's own preferred reading by attaching to the work a suitable name. It is difficult to see how this vicious circle could be broken. The chances of discovering another copy of the work in question with the author's name or some piece of information that links an already known name with this work are rather slim, unless the fact that the Derveni papyrus was burnt on a funeral pyre and its carbonized remnant then accompanied the remains of the deceased entails that the papyrus transmits a text similar to that of the 'Orphic' lamellae, in which case other copies of the text might be reasonably expected to appear.²¹⁹ Moreover, when one takes into account, first, that the suggested candidates for the authorship of the work are often obscure figures about whom too little is known on which one can base a case for the probability and even possibility of their candidacy and, second, that the probability of the Derveni author's being one whose name is never mentioned in any surviving record not only cannot be ruled out but should be considered high, attempting to identify the author in the light of the available evidence seems to be an exercise of rather low epistemic value.²²⁰

²¹⁹ TZIFOPOULOS (forthcoming) ch. 3 tentatively includes the text of the Derveni papyrus within Zuntz's group C of Orphic lamellae on the basis of its similarities with the sole member of this group in ZUNTZ (1971); see BERNABÉ and JIMÉNEZ SAN CRISTÓBAL (2001) 183-200.

²²⁰ For a survey of hypotheses about the identity of the author see FUNGHI (1997) 36 and BETEGH (2004) 64. For the most elaborate hypothesis see JANKO (1997), (2001) and (2002-03); for criticism see BETEGH (2004) 373-380.

K. TSANTSANOGLOU – G.M. PARÁSSOGLOU

TEXT

COL. I

(G 17, G 3)

]
]ιϣ[
 [νεκαστον[]
].α
].δ....
]..ων
]....
].....
]..[....]εΙα

5

2 ι rather than η , μ , or π . 3 ψ : only the left-hand vertical survives. A white horizontal fiber running across it gives the false impression of a c. 4 The area before α is worn. α is likelier than δ or λ . Following it, a dark spot. Probably not ink. 5 A vertical, like the right-hand leg of η , v . Following δ , a letter entirely fretted. Next, a letter resembling ϵ but with its vertical unusually inclined to the right. A spot in the middle of the line like the horizontal of δ , rather narrow but not unparallelled. Two uprights

COL. I

5

]
]ιγ[
]ν ἑκαστον []
].α
].δ....
 'Ερι]γύων
].....
].....
]..[.....]εια
 — — —

resembling those in η. 6]...: probably the right-hand vertical of ν. υ rather than τ.
 7-9 Fr. G 17 is badly charred at this area. Visible traces of ink are not identifiable. 7 Nothing can be made out. 8 Very uncertain readings. A leftward sloping oblique (α, δ, λ). Following it, ν is possible, though very doubtful. ειε? At the end, a detached piece with the upper half of a c. 9 Unidentifiable tops of two letters.

COL. II

(G 8, G 7, G 15, G 6, G 5, H 7)

	[]
]ωι[
]εριν[
]ιδ[]τιμωσι[
5	αυ[]δαρ α.[]ραιταγοσι[.]εο.[
	.[]νταν.[]τουσπμας[.]ρη
	.[]ιδινει.[]εκατο[.]co...θξιοντι
	κ.[]επεθηκε[]οcto[.]στ...ου[.]κηι
]τασημαι[]ζτ[.]ντ[.]
10]ετωνκατ[]ε[
]μωξεπ[]
]ει

— — —

The text of col. II published here is different from that published in Tsantsanoglou (1997). The expected position of fr. G 7 in the reconstructed roll would be close to the beginning of col. II, as is also suggested by the pattern of the fibers, but fr. G 7 is similar in both size and shape to the pieces in groups F and E. This suggests that fr. G 7 ought to be placed low in the column and to the left. Apparently, this piece has been erroneously included in group G and its place in the column is halfway between the beginning and fr. G 15. The pattern of the fibers in fr. G 17 + G 8 matches that in fr. G 15 + G 6 + G 5 and thus fr. G 17 + G 8 must be placed in the roll one turn before or after fr. G 15 + G 6 + G 5. If the second, fr. G 17 + G 8 fall in the middle of a column, which is impossible, for they contain the end of a column, the intercolumnar area and the beginning of the next column. Fr. G 17 + G 8 must thus be placed before fr. G 7. They contain the end of col. I and the beginning of col. II. Fr. G 5a, called G 5b in Tsantsanoglou (1997), belongs to col. III. The wide central lacuna should be filled with one or more F fragments but none seems to fit; all supplements are *exempli gratia*.

2 ι[: no trace of ink is visible after ι, although there is space for two more letters. 3]ε: at first glance, two obliques meeting in midline, like the obliques of κ or the right-hand part of χ, but ε is likelier. 4].: the foot of an upright. .[: the feet of two uprights. 5 αυ[: initially read ψυ but closer examination showed the oblique legs and the crossbar of α. Only the left-hand arm and the fork of υ survives.]δαρ α[: uncertain traces, a δ almost completely effaced, a faint α, a roundel like that of ρ and,

COL. II

[]
]ωι[
]ἔριν[υ
]γιδ[] τιμῶσι[
 5 αν[]θαα.[χ]θαὶ στα/όσιγ [χ]έον[ται
 Δ[ιὸς κατὰ π]άγτα να[όν. ἔτι δ' ἐξαιρέ]τους τιμὰς [χ]ρῆ
 τ[ῆι Εὐμεν]ίδι νεῖμ[αι, δαίμοσι δ'] ἐκάστο[ι]ς ὀργι[θειόν τι
 κα[ίειν. καί] ἐπέθηκε[ν ὕμνους ἀρμ]οστο[ὺ]ς τῆι μουσ[ι]κῆι.
 [τούτων δὲ] τὰ σῆμαι[νόμενα]ετ[...υτο[...]
 10]ετων κατ[]ε[
]μωξ ἐπ[]
]
]ει

— — —

after the clear α, an upright slightly sloping to the right, perhaps μ, ν or π. α: the lower part of the letter has been wiped off, the remaining part thus giving the impression of a thick blot. ι.: a vertical, somewhat shorter than the preceding ι and joined on the top to a slightly sloping horizontal. γ or ρ. ν is rather unlikely, for its top angle should have been more acute. ο.: the lower part of a vertical. 6 .[: traces of a triangular letter. α, δ, or λ.]γαν[: the first two strokes of ν, traces of the top horizontal and the vertical of τ. After the clear αν, the foot of an oblique as in α or λ.]τ: almost certain, though the top horizontal is slightly lower than usual. 7 .[: uncertain traces. ει.: a top horizontal, probably ε. After the clear ι, the top fork of μ.]: top part of a leftward sloping oblique. ...θε: a long vertical close to the preceding ο, probably ρ. After a narrow lacuna, the foot of a leftward sloping oblique joined to a vertical as in ν. Traces of a narrow vertical, certainly an ι. Α circular letter, almost certainly a θ. Traces compatible only with ε. 8 κ.: the letter looks like λ, but may well be also an α. ο[: space for one letter, covered by a foreign piece. τ...ο: after τ, at first glance οι but, on close inspection, both verticals of an η and its crossbar are visible. Following it, a vertical. Next, an upright, sloping to the left and compatible with the right-hand leg of μ. .[: traces compatible only with the middle strokes of c and a small area covered by a foreign piece. 9 Nothing is certain before and after ετ. .[: the left-hand part of a circle. 10]: the upper part of a vertical, slightly sloping to the right; most probably ν. 12 ι seems clear. The oblique that makes it look like a ν is perhaps a fiber.

COL. III

(F 9, F 8, G 11, G 5a, F 7)

	[]
	[]
	[c. 6]	α..c.[....]cι.ατ.[
	[....(.)]φγγινετα[....]cιτωια.[][
5	[.....].ηεξωλεαc[.....]ε..[]	ρνυυ.[]δε
	[.]μονεκοικατα[....]υδε.οτ[]ci
	θεωνυπηρεταιδ[...].ν.α..[]ι
	ειcινοπωςπερα[.....]αδικο.θ.[]voi
	αιτιην[..]χουci[
10	οιουσ.[..].[
	[..]υct[

— — —

The text of col. III published here is different from that published in Tsantsanoglou (1997). After fr. G 11, an adjoining G fragment is expected, which must have broken into small pieces, like fr. G 5a.

3].: uncertain traces of two bottom ends of uprights. Following them, an oblique sloping to the left. α..c[: following the lower end of an α, the bottom end of a vertical. If the following letter is ω, it can only belong to an ι. After some distance, perhaps the right-hand part of an ω. Following c, uncertain traces of ink.]cι.ατ[: the first two letters are more or less certain. The next letter has a left-hand upright, slightly sloped like that of κ; its right-hand part has been wiped off. Then, the right-hand leg of an α, followed by what is certainly a τ. After the vertical, possibly a middle horizontal like the left-hand one in ω. 4]φ: middle stroke, compatible with the right-hand horizontal of ω. α[: the first letter, divided into two pieces, is certainly an α. Next, the bottom end of an upright where the upright of τ or υ would be expected.]....[: the upper part of fr. G 5a. A slightly sloped vertical; if independent, it must be an ι. A long vertical, jointed at the top left to a short horizontal; ρ? A left-hand vertical. Two obliques meeting at the top; most likely λ.]η: perhaps a top roundel, like that of ρ. The right-hand vertical of η is partly effaced. 5]η: perhaps the right-hand lower end of an oblique. c[: two specks, compatible with the left-hand ends of the angles in c.ε..[: reading this part is extremely difficult because the letters are much worn. First, traces of three parallel horizontals; undoubtedly ε. The next letter is most likely a τ, followed by the faint vertical and horizontals of an ε. Then, an ι is very likely. In the fifth place, a bottom horizontal, joined at its left-hand end to an oblique in an acute angle; δ is very likely. Then, an ι with an un-

COL. III

[
[
[
[c. 6]..σιωc.[....]σι κάτω [
[δαίμ]ων γίνεται[ι ἐκά]σται ιατ[ρὸς]ρελ[]ρ. ἡ
5 [γὰρ Δί]κη ἐξώλεας [νουθ]ερεῖ δὲ ἐκά[στης τῶν] Ἑρινύω[v. οἱ] δὲ
δαίμονες οἱ κατὰ [γῆς ο]ὐδέχοτ[ε τ]ηροῦσι,
θεῶν ὑπηρεται δ' [εἰς]ῖ πάντας υ[-ο]ι
εἰσὶν ὅπωςπερ ἄ[νδρες] ἀδικοὶ θ.[]νοι,
αἰτίην [τ' ἔ]χουσι [
10 οἶους.[..].[
[..]υετ[

usually large inclination to the left. After ε, most probably a κ, followed by the foot of the left-hand oblique of α or λ.]:: the right-hand tip of a high horizontal.]: the left-hand part of a middle horizontal, most probably ω.]δε: an oblique, sloping to the left like the right-hand stroke in α, δ or λ. Its length relative to the following ε suggests δ. 6]:: the right-hand foot of α or λ. α[: a tiny tear in the middle of the rightward sloping oblique gives the impression of ω but α is certain. .οτ[: the right-hand angle of κ or χ. The left-hand part of the letter is smudged but tiny traces of a vertical suggest κ.]...cι: ink-traces resembling η. A vertical joined at the top to a small roundel; certainly ρ. The following traces suggest ου. At the end, cι is clear. 7]...v.: faint traces of ink in a space that can accommodate three letters. The upper end of a vertical, followed by a vertical joined on top to a horizontal, as in γ or π, and a descending oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ, λ. Following v, a top horizontal, perhaps of τ; its vertical coincides with a tear in the papyrus. α..[: following α, traces compatible with c. Then, the upper part of an oblique, much like the left-hand arm of υ. 8]α: at first glance, ε. α is much likelier, however. ο.θ[: if the third letter is θ, as the traces suggest, there is no space before it for any letter wider than ι, but the traces suggest an ι with an unusually pronounced leftward slope. No letter can be read with certainty after θ. Shadows and fibers conspire to create the illusionary impression of an ε touching θ above the level of the letters. 10]: a tear in the papyrus gives the impression of an ι and a top horizontal. It is very likely that there is only one letter, γ or π.][: a slightly curved stroke, level with the tops of the letters.

COL IV

(F 7, G 13, G 4, H 46, F 15, H 8)

[.]ουε.[]ων[
 οκειμ[...]με...[]..φυναι
 μαλλ[...]ινεται[]ατητυχηγ.[
 ουκει[...]μμανε..αρουτ.[.....].δεκοσμος
 5 κατα[.....]αηρακλιτοσμ.[.....]τακοινα
 — κατ[.....].ειταϊ.[.]οσπερικελ[.....]λογωιλεγων[
 ηλ.[.....].ουκατα.υσινα.θρω[.....].εγυροσποδος[
 το.[.....]ζουχυπερβαλλωνεικ[.....]ρουσε[
 [.....].ερινυε[.]νινεξευρησο.[
 10 [c. 16]βατομποηικ[
]..θυ..[
]αδικης[
]μηνιτακ[
]....ις.[

Fr. H 8 is added to the text published by Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou (1988) on account of some vertical fibers which seem to run from fr. G 4 to fr. H 8.

1 .[: slightly sloped foot of vertical. ι, κ, μ are possible.].: right-hand ends of a top and a bottom horizontal. Certainly ε. 2 ...[: the foot of a middle vertical and perhaps the left-hand tip of a horizontal; τ is possible. Feet of obliques, as in α or λ. The lower left-hand arc of a large circle; θ rather than ο.]..ο: a slightly bent foot of a vertical and the low part of a downward oblique, compatible only with κ. Traces of a bottom horizontal, joined at its right-hand end to the low part of an oblique sloping to the left; almost certainly δ. 3].: a dot below the top of the letters and a sloped bottom horizontal. c is very likely.]α: the right-hand tip of a top horizontal. It is uncertain whether the traces at the bottom are ink or not. γ[: the foot of an oblique, sloping to the right. 4 ι[: the vertical (very clear in other photographs) may also belong to η or κ but not to any other letter. ε.: a speck, level with the top of the letters. A tiny middle trace, perhaps of a vertical. τ[: faint traces of the lower parts of two obliques, one ascending and one descending. Probably α.].: upper part of an ascending oblique, like the right-hand arm of υ. However, if a dark area below the oblique is ink, perhaps the right-hand stroke of η or ν, though it would end lower than expected. 5 λ.ι[: only the lower part of an ascending oblique survives. After a short gap, the right-hand ends of a high and a low horizontal, the latter touching the ι. μ[: a vertical fiber and some horizontal traces give the impression of an ε but, under the microscope, α is certain. 6]ε: the right-hand part of a flattened triangle, very much like the loop of φ; too low and narrow for ρ.].: a low speck.

COL. IV

- [.]ου ε.[θ]εῶν[
 ό κείμ[ενα] μετᾱθ[ε ἐ]κδοῦναι
 μᾱλλ[ον ᾱ] σίνεται [] τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ]
 οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μβάνειν. ἄρ' οὐ τά[ξιν ἔχει διὰ τό]γδε κόσμος;
 5 κατὰ [ταύτ]ᾱ Ἡράκλειτος μα[ρτυρούμενος] τὰ κοινὰ
 — κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἰδ[ι]α· ὅσπερ ἱκελᾱ [ἀστρο]λόγῳι λέγων [ἔφη·]
 “ἥλι[ος ...].ου κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρῳ[πῆϊου] εὔρος ποδός [ἔστι·]
 τὸ μ[έγεθο]ς οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων εἰκ[ότας οὔ]ρους ε[ὔρους]
 [έοῦ· εἰ δὲ μ]ῆ, Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου[σι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι·]
 10 [ὅπως δὲ μηδὲν ὑπερ]βατὸν ποῆι κ[
]αι θυο.[
]α δίκης [
] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι
]..ἡταιε[

Most probably the foot of an oblique, sloping to the right.]o: faint traces of a letter resembling α, δ or λ; considering the size of the letter, certainly the first. ικελ[: λ is somewhat wiped off but certain. Following it, tiny and uncertain traces of the feet of two obliques, one ascending and the other descending; α or λ. 7 [: the lower part of a vertical.].: the faint trace was originally thought to be a high horizontal but, under closer inspection, it seems to be the right-hand half of a δ, cut in the middle by a tear in the papyrus. α.v: traces of a flattened middle triangle, most probably belonging to a φ. α.θ: the foot of a vertical and, at some distance, the top of a second one; undoubtedly ν. 8 o[: a faint trace of a slightly sloping vertical as in ε, ι, κ, μ.]c: the right-hand end of the base stroke and the upper angle of c are visible in a slightly transposed piece of papyrus. κ[: a vertical joined to a descending oblique as in κ. Of the ascending oblique only the very top is visible. We owe this reading to L. Schönbeck. 9 Some faint traces at the left-hand end of the line are too close to line 8 to be ink.]e: upper part of a vertical, slightly sloping to the right as in η or ν. o[: a high spot. 11]..: a descending oblique, like the right-hand leg of α, δ or λ. A high vertical.].: upper arc of a rounded letter. A dot of ink, level with the tops of the letters and rather close to the preceding arc. 14 A sloping horizontal (c, τ). Traces in a space wide enough for a letter. The upper end of an upright. A high horizontal (ε, ξ, ζ, π, τ). Space that could accommodate a letter, perhaps with a high middle tip (α, δ, λ).].: top left-hand right angle as in γ, ε, π. The sloping of the horizontal suggests ε.

COL. V

(G 12, G 1, H 2, F 5a, F 12, F 13, F 11, G 10, G 3)

]ηδε.[
 χρη[...ριαζομ[]οι.ε[
 χρης[.]ηριαζον[][...].....[.]ι
 αντοιςπαριμε.[.....]γτειονεπερ[.]η.[
 5 τωμμαντενομενω[.]εκενειθεμι[...]......[
 ..αιδουδεινατιαπιςτουσιουγινω.[.....]..πνια
 ουδετωναλλωμπ.αγματωνεκατ[.]ιαποιωναν
 πα.αδειγματωμπ[.]ςτευοιενυπο[.....].μαρτη.
 .αι[.]ησαλληρηδον[.]νενηκημεν[.....]......[.]υειν
 10 [....].ςτευουσια[.]ςτιηδεκαμ.[
 [....].θανωσιμ[.]εγινω[.]ωσ[
 [.....]..νκαιορ[
]ηναπιςτι[
]φαινετα.[

The transcription of fr. G 1 has been made from a photograph published by Ch. Makaronas (see plate 1). Many more letters were visible then. A small foreign piece (fr. F 5a) upon the upper left part of fr. F 5 (col. VII) belongs here. Fr. G 10 is securely placed on account of fibers continuing into fr. G 3. Its upper part is much worn and occasionally seems to consist of two layers; it is likelier that some foreign pieces on its surface have not been removed.

1]η: lower part of vertical, its end sloping to the right. .[: vertical, close to the preceding ε. 2]: perhaps a low horizontal, like that of δ. ι.ε[: the middle letter has a vertical close to the preceding ι and its low end slopes slightly to the left. Possibly γ or ρ. κ is less likely. 3 χρ: in the photograph both letters give the impression of κλ. ε[: the bottom angle and horizontal are visible. ρ: the largest part is covered by a fiber.].....[: nothing can be read. 4 υ: its top is worn, giving the impression of τ. ε[: the top left-hand angle of υ is visible, the rest being either defaced or covered by a folded edge. More of the left-hand vertical is visible in the Makaronas photograph. π: only the vertical survives.]η[: a top horizontal; τ rather than γ. Following η, uncertain traces of a middle angle; probably c. 5 ων: the right-hand end of the horizontal of ω and the foot of the left-hand upright of ν are visible in the piece still placed on top of fr. F 5.[:]: nothing is visible in the area of the first two letters. Following them, faint traces of a letter like η. An oblique and a low horizontal broken in two; probably δ. An oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, in the detached piece with the right-hand part of the horizontal of δ. The following gap could accommodate only one letter. 6 ..α: faint traces of two

COL. V

-]ηδε.[
 χρη[στη]ριαζομ[]οι.ε[
 χρησ[τ]ηριάζον[ται]...[...].ι
 5 αὐτοῖς πάριμεν [εἰς τὸ μα]γτεῖον ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες,]
 τῶν μαντευομένων [ἐν]εκεν, εἰ θεμι[...].ηδ[α]
 ἄρ' Ἄιδου δεινὰ τί ἀπιστοῦσι; οὐ γινώσ[κοντες ἐ]γύπνια
 οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων ἔκαστ[ον,] διὰ ποίων ἄν
 παρὰδειγμάτων π[ι]στεύοιεν; ὑπό [τε γάρ] ἀμαρτ(ι)ῆς
 10 καὶ [τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νενικημέν[οι, οὐ] μαγθ[άνο]υσιν
 [οὐδὲ] πιστεύουσι. ἀ[πι]στίη δὲ κάμα[θίη ταῦτόν· ἦν γάρ]
 [μὴ μα]γθάνωσι μη[δ]ὲ γινώ[σ]κωσ[ιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως]
 [πιστεύσου]σιν καὶ ὁρ[ῶντες
]ην ἀπιστί[ην
] φαίνεται [

— — —

obliques; almost certainly α. A vertical close to the preceding letter with some traces of ink in its upper right-hand part; most likely ρ. [: uncertain traces of ink near the end of the right-hand horizontal of ω.]...: unidentifiable traces of ink. 7 ρ: faint traces of a small circular letter. π.α: the foot of a vertical is visible. [: uncertain traces of ink, perhaps of a low horizontal. ω: its left-hand part is visible. The impression of μ given by the photograph is due to errant fibers. 8 α.α: the foot of a slightly sloping upright, close to the preceding α. π[: its left-hand vertical survives. ο[: after ο, there is space for a letter which has been wiped off.]: a top angle and an oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α. η.: unidentifiable smudges divided between fr. G 10 and G 3. 9 .α: nothing is visible.].v: the right-hand ends of the horizontals of c.]...[: relics of the top tips of μ, followed by the top of α. The upper part of v. The upper left-hand part of θ on a detached piece of papyrus; if this piece belongs here, it must be turned counterclockwise to have its fibers aligned with those of the surrounding piece.]y: the upper end of an ascending stroke, compatible only with the right-hand prong of v. 10].ic: more clearly visible in the Makaronas photograph; the first letter is likely to be π. [: an oblique, sloping to the right, and at some distance a low trace; α or λ. 11].θανω: the first two letters, of which the first is probably v, and the lower parts of ανω are visible only in the Makaronas photograph. [: the upper end of a vertical, like the left-hand stroke in η or κ.]: the top tip of the vertical and the upper oblique of κ. 12]...: traces of a low horizontal, compatible only with ε or c. The foot of a vertical; on account of its distance from the neighbouring letters, it can only belong to ι. 14 .[: traces of a vertical.

COL. VI

(G 3, H 18, E 1, G 14, G 2, H 28, F3a)

- [c. 10]..ικαιθuc[.]ιμ[...]....φucιτ.[
 ε.[.....].μαγωνδυν[.]ταιδαιμοναεμ[
 γ.[.....].cμεθictαγαιδαιμογεεμπο[
 ψ[.....].οιτηνθuc[...].τουτογενεκε[.].[.....].[
 5 οιμ[...].ω.περειποινη.αποδιδοντεςτοιδε
 ιεροι[.]επισπενδουσινυ[.]ρκαιγαλαεξωμπερκαιταc
 χοασποιουσιναναριθμ[...].πολυμοφαλαταποπανα
 θουσινοτικαιαιψυχα[...].ριθμο.εiciμυσται
 ευμεγiciπροθουσικ[.....]αυταμγοισειμενιδεcγαρ
 10 ψυχαι..cινωνενε.[.....]αθεοicθυειν
 .[.]...[.]ιονπροτερον[c. 11].....[.]ται
 [...]ω[.]τεκαιτοκ.[]ου...[.]ι.
 εiciδε[...].ι...[]τουτο.[
 οcαιδε[]ωναλ.[
 15 φορρου[]...[

1]..ι: the feet of the obliques of χ are visible. Following it, the lower ends of α or λ.]..ι: the right-hand foot of α or λ.]...φ: lower end of an upright. A tiny speck, level with the bottom of the letters, could be the lower left-hand tip of c. The lower end of an oblique, like the bottom stroke of c or ξ. o faint but certain. τ.: a folded triangular edge of papyrus hides the greatest part of the last two letters. Enough, however, is visible of the horizontal of τ and the left-hand oblique of α or λ. 2 ε.: the first letter, certainly ε, is not visible in the photograph. An unusually long vertical, perhaps ν or π. For equally long left-hand verticals following ε cf. (Εὖ)εν(ίδες) in 9 and ἐπ(εί) in col. VIII.7.].: the area near the left-hand edge of fr. E 1 is covered by a foreign piece down to line 3. A thick horizontal low may belong to an ε. 3 γ.: a fiber near the angle of γ gives the impression of ρ. Next, extremely uncertain traces of a vertical.]c: sigma is very clear. The preceding letter is covered by a foreign piece but its lower part is visible, suggesting τ, υ, φ, ψ. 4].: a midline spot. What seems like the foot of the right-hand stroke of α or λ is probably not ink.]τ: the high peak of a vertical; most probably ν. ε[.][: the left-hand vertical of π.][: the lower end of a vertical. 5].: the foot of an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α or λ.]ω.: the low end of an upright. Following ω, uncertain traces of ink. ηα: the high peak of a vertical; most probably ν. 7]: the foot of an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, δ or λ.].: traces of an upright. 8].: low traces of ink. ο.: the relics of an upright. 10 ...: the lower part of a vertical. Uncertain traces of ink under a foreign piece.].: the foot of a vertical. At some distance, a tiny

COL. VI

- [c. 8 εὐ]χαὶ καὶ θυσ[ί]αι μ[ειλ]ίσσονται τὰς ψυχὰς,
 ἐπ[ωιδῆ] δ]ὲ μάγων δύν[α]ται δαίμονας ἐμ[ποδῶν]
 γι[νομένο]υς μεθιστάγει· δαίμονες ἐμπο[δῶν δ' εἰσὶ]
 ψ[υχαῖς ἐχθ]ροί. τὴν θυσ[ί]α_γ τούτου ἔνεκε[ν] π[οιοῦσ]ι[ν]
 5 οἱ μ[ά]γ[οι], ὥσπερ εἰ ποινὴν ἀποδιδόντες. τοῖ(ς) δὲ
 ἱεροῖ[ς] ἐπισπένδουσιν ὕ[δω]ρ καὶ γάλα, ἐξ ὧν περ καὶ τὰς
 χοὰς ποιοῦσι. ἀνάριθμα [κα]ὶ πολυόμφαλα τὰ πόπανα
 θύουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχὰ[ι ἀν]άριθμοί εἰσι. μύσται
 Εὐμεγίστι προθύουσι κ[ατὰ τὰ] αὐτὰ μάγοις· Εὐμενίδες γὰρ
 10 ψυχὰι εἰσιν. ὧν ἔνεκε[ν] τὸν μέλλοντ]α θεοῖς θύειν
 ὁ[ρ]γίθ[ε]ιον πρότερον [c. 11] ις ποτε[...]ται
 [...]ω[...]τε καὶ τὸ κα[]ου...[...].ι.
 εἰσὶ δὲ [...]ι...[]τουτο.[
 ὅσαι δὲ []ων ἀλλ[
 15 φορου[]...[

spot level with the top of the letters. 11 .[: a circular letter, crossed by a vertical. It cannot be ϕ, which it resembles, for the vertical slopes to the right, not to the left, as in ϕ, and the circle is much larger. The overall impression is of an inverted P. Perhaps a corrected letter? A clear o in the margin to the left of the line is perhaps a correction of the illegible first letter. [...][: two parallel and uneven verticals, joined to an oblique; almost certainly ν. Uncertain traces of ink in an area that can accommodate no letter wider than ι. A circular letter larger than ο; almost certainly θ.].....[: uncertain traces of ink. Perhaps a leftward sloping oblique or the right-hand part of an arc. At some distance, the upper part of a vertical. An ascending top horizontal, very much like the upper stroke of c. A short top horizontal, meeting an upright at its right-hand end; a τ with the right part of its horizontal effaced rather than a π with its horizontal shorter than usual. A top arc. At some distance, the right-hand end of an ascending top horizontal. A top horizontal, meeting an upright at its left-hand end; γ or ε. 12 κ[: an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α or λ. ...[: the foot of an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α or λ. An undulating low horizontal, as in ε. At some distance, perhaps the low end of a vertical. 13]ι...[: an oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ or λ. Following ι, unidentifiable traces of ink. .[: uncertain traces of two obliques, like the left-hand end of χ, but the lower one may be a black horizontal fiber. 14 .[: probably the foot of an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α or λ. 15 p: β is also possible. [...][: uncertain traces of ink.

COL. VII

(F 5, I 59, C 1, H 65, H 64, F 3, I 85, F 6)

[...(.)]οε[
 [...]μνογ[...]ηκαιθεμ[...]αλεγο[c. 11]ογαρ
 [...]ποησει[...]αιειπεινουχοιοντ[.....]νοματων
 [...]ειγκαιτ[...]ρηθενταεστιδε[.....]ποησις
 5 [...]αιανθρω[....]αιν[...]ατωδης[...]ι[.....]ζαντ[...]ς
 [...]ρισταιν[....]ταο.κ.θελελεγειν[.....]ιγμα[.]νδε
 [...]αλαιερ[....]ταιμενουγκαι[....]υπρωτου
 [...]μεχριου[....]υ...ουρηματος[.....]καιεντωι
 [...]ρινητ[.....]αζγαρεπιθε[.....]ευακτο[.]
 10 [...]ναυτ[.....]τειμοφη[.....]πολλο:ς
]νακοην[.....]ντασκατ[
].ειτ[...].
]ωιτ[...].εγ[...].
]ετωιε.ομ[.]γωιπα[
 15]....ειγ[...].ατ[

— — —

The shape of fr. F 5 is unparalleled. Its position was determined by the content and the kollesis in its lower right-hand part, and by estimating a reasonable distance between the beginning of this column and the end of the preceding one in light of the fact that the circumference of the roll decreases towards the center.

1-2 A foreign piece, which belongs to col. V 5-7, covers the first two letters of both lines.

1 Only the lower part of ε survives. Its bottom horizontal is shorter than usual.

2 γ[: only a left-hand vertical survives, whose length and inclination suggest v.]η: lower part of an upright, close to the following η. Probably ι. A semi-circular cut in the edge of the papyrus gives the false impression of β.]α: the low tip of a vertical, as in τ or υ.]ο: relics of a low vertical and of the right-hand end of a high horizontal; τ probable. 3]: relics of a vertical. 4 τ[: it is uncertain if the traces of a curve after τ are ink or not.]: the left-hand end of a low horizontal and uncertain traces of a second one a bit higher; ζ, ξ? 5 v[: a high tip.]α: the right-hand ends of the two lower strokes of α. τ[.]c: the final c, though faint, is certain. 6 ο.κ: the low part of an upright, equally distanced from ο and κ; τ or υ. κ.θ: the lower end of a left-hand vertical, joined to a bottom horizontal and giving the impression of ε; the horizontal is, however, unusually thick and does not have a wavy appearance, as in ε. Uncertain traces of a second vertical, perpendicular to the bottom horizontal in its right-hand end: ε corrected to η?]: a bottom trace of ink, compatible with the right-hand end of the low stroke of c.

7]αλ: there is space for one letter before α; what seems to be a low horizontal is a break along a fiber. The second α looks like a λ because its middle stroke has van-

COL. VII

- [...(.)]οce[
 [..ύ]μνον[ύγ]ιῇ καὶ θεμ[ι]τὰ λέγο[ντα·] ιερουργεῖ[το γὰρ
 [τῇ]ι ποήσει. [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἶόν τ[ε τὴν τῶν ὀ]νομάτων
 [λύ]σιν καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα. ἔστι δὲ ξ[ένη τις ἡ] πόσις
 5 [κ]αὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι[γμ]ατώδης, [κε]ι [᾽Ορφεύς] αὐτ[ὸς]
 [έ]ρίστ' αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐκ ἤθελε λέγειν, [έν αἰν]ίγμασ[ι]ν δὲ
 [μεγ]άλα. ιερ[ολογ]εῖται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄ[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου
 [ἀει] μέχρι οὗ [τελε]υταίου ῥήματος. ὥ[ς] δηλοῖ[καὶ έν τῶι
 [εὐκ]ρινήτῳ[ι ἔπει· "θ]ύρας" γὰρ "ἐπιθέ[σθαι] κελ]εύσας τοῖ[ς]
 10 ["ώσι]ν" αὐτ[οὺς οὗτι νομο]θετεῖν φη[σιν τοῖς] πολλοῖς
 τῇ]ν ἀκοήν [ἀγνεύο]ντας κατ[ὰ]
]χειτ[...].
]οι τ[...εγ. [...]]
 έν δ]ὲ τῶι ἔχομ[έ]γῳ πα[
 15].τ..εἰγ[...].κατ[

ished.]..: this part of fr. I 59 is much worn. Traces of the lower part of an upright and a bottom horizontal belong to the first letter, obviously ε. Next, there is space only for ι, whose sole surviving trace is a blurred lower part. .[: the peak of a letter as in α, δ, λ. 8 υ[: only the fork survives.: the left-hand end of a top horizontal and relics of a middle vertical; obviously τ. A very dim oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ, λ. There is space only for ι, whose lower part is very faint in this blackened area. .[: a short oblique, starting from the middle of c and sloping downwards; it looks like the left-hand horizontal of ω. 9 τ[: a middle horizontal, like the left-hand stroke of ω.]..: traces of the fork of υ. The upper part of ρ, dim but certain. ο[: an ι, half-covered by a foreign piece which is placed upside down:

]κ[
]δο[

10]..τ: the right-hand part of a circular letter. Next, uncertain traces of three parallel horizontals, like those in ε or ξ, and almost certainly τ. 12].ε: traces of the top and bottom strokes of c. .[: a high horizontal; uncertain if ink or not. 13 γ[: uncertain traces.]..[: very uncertain traces. Upper end of an ascending oblique, as in κ, c, υ, χ, or the bent end of a vertical, as in ν. An oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, δ, λ. 14 ε.ο: prima facie a π but the traces speak for χ. 15]....εἰγ[: an uncertain speck, level with the top of the letters. The wavy horizontal of τ. A top horizontal. The upper end of an upright; perhaps ι. Uncertain traces of two parallel horizontals, as in ε. The next letter looks like ρ but it can only be ι. Following γ, uncertain traces of an upright.]..: the ends of two diverging obliques, as in κ, c, χ; κ seems likelier.

COL. VIII

(C 2, I 33, H 44, F 4, F 2, C 7)

- [c. 10].δηλω[.....].ετωιε.[
 [.]ιδιοεξε..νοντο[.....]εοcβασιλ.οc
 οπωcδαρχεταιεντω[.....]λοι
 ζευcμενεπειδη..[.....]υπαραθε[.]φατοναρχην
 5 [.]λκηντεγχειρεccιε[.]αβ[...].[.]δαιμογ[.]κυδρον
 [.]υταταεπηυπερβαταεο[.]ταλανθα.[..]
 [..]τινδαδεχονταζευcμενεπειτ.[...].ην
 [..]ραπατροcεουελαβεγκαιδαιμονα[....]ον
 [....]δεχονταουκακουειντονζα[.....]τει
 10 [.....]οcαλλατηναλκηνλαμβ.[c. 10]υ
 [.....].ονταπ.ρ.θεcφαταδ[].
 [c. 10]ικε.γαρτουτωιμα[
 [c. 10]ναγκηννομιζοι.[
 [c. 9]καιμαθωντ..[.]..[
- — —

1].δ: surface covered by a foreign piece. Traces of a low horizontal.].ε: if ink, trace of a low horizontal. .[: upright close to ε. 2 ε..v: upright, joined to top horizontal; γ or π. Right-hand end of high horizontal; possibly ends of a middle and a low horizontal. λ.ο: upright close to ο. 4 ..[: two high points of ink, like tops of uprights. A peak, as in α, δ, λ. 5][: surface covered by foreign piece; visible oblique apex, as in α, δ, λ. The space before δ could accommodate only ι. 6]: possibly right-hand foot of oblique, as in α, δ. .[: faint vertical. 7 .[: faint traces of a vertical.]: two obliques, joining on the left at middle height; κ slightly preferable to χ if traces of an upright are indeed ink. 10]ο: worn surface. Visible traces best read

COL. VIII

- [c. 10] ἐδήλω[σεν ἐν τῷ]δε τῷ ἐπ[ει]
 (—) “[οἱ] Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο [ὑπερμεν]έος βασιλῆος”.
 [—] ὅπως δ’ ἄρχεται ἐν τῷ[ιδε δη]λοῖ
 “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πα[τρὸς ἐο]ῦ πάρα θέ[σ]φατον ἀρχὴν
 5 [—] [ἀ]λκὴν τ’ ἐν χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[εν κ]α[ι] δαίμον[α] κυδρόν”.
 [τ]αῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λανθάν[ει]
 [ἔσ]τιν δ’ ὧδ’ ἔχοντα· ‘Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ τῇ[ν ἀλ]κὴν
 [πα]ρὰ πατρὸς ἐοῦ ἔλαβεν καὶ δαίμονα [κυδρ]όν’.
 [οὔτω] δ’ ἔχοντα οὐκ ἀκούειν τὸν Ζᾶ[να ἐπικρα]τεῖ
 10 [τοῦ πατρ]ὸς ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀλκὴν λαμβά[νειν παρ’ αὐτο]ῦ.
 [ἄλλως δ’ ἔ]χοντα παρὰ θέσφατα δ[όξειεν ἂν λαβεῖ]ν
 [τὴν ἀλκὴν· ἐο]ικεν γάρ τούτῳ μα[
 [κατ’ ἀ]νάγκην νομίζοιτ[
 [c. 9] καὶ μαθὼν το[.].].

— — —

as a circle missing part of its left-hand arc. .[: faint traces of an oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, δ, λ.]ν: two diagonals, like the two prongs of ν. 11]: top end of an oblique, as in κ, χ. π.ρ.: an oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ, λ. Uncertain traces of an oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ, λ.]: if ink, a speck level with the tops of the letters, possibly the high end of a vertical. 12 ε.γ: upright, close to ε and at a distance from γ; only γ is possible. τ: only the horizontal survives. 13 .[: a high horizontal. 14 ..[.]..[: upper half a circle; o or ρ (too small for θ). Oblique apex, as in α, δ, λ. High points or smudges of ink.

COL. IX

(C 7, H 36, F 16, I 54, F 1, H 61, I 34, I 9, C 5, H 53, E 6)

.ι.αιτ.[...].ηνουντουιχυρ[.]τατουεπο.[
 ειναιω.[...]ιπαιδαπατρ.κοιδεουγινωσκον[
 ταλεγο[...].αδοκουσιτογζαναπαρattuαντο[
 πατρος[...].αλκηντεκα[.]τονδαιμοναλαμια[
 5 γινωσκ[...].ουντοπυραγ..εμειγμενοντοις
 αλλοιςοτιταρασσοικαι.[...]υοιταοντασυνισταςθαι
 διατηνθαλψινεξαλλας[.....]οντεικανονεστιν
 εξαλλ.χθεμμηκων[.....]οντασυμαγνηται
 οαδα[...].φθηιεπικρα[c. 10]ρατηθενδεμικ.εται
 10 τοιςα.[...].ισοτιδεγχει.[c. 10].νηνιζετο
 ωπε[...].λλατα.[c. 14].ομεν[....]α
 [...].βαιοτατανο..[c. 15].γιεχυρωε
 εφητονζανατ.[c. 17]νδαιμονα
 [...].περειε[c. 22].....υρο.[

— — —

1 .ι.αιτ. : first, a low horizontal. Of ι only the bottom tip survives, inclined to the left; the trace cannot belong to another letter, for it is very close to the preceding and following letter. Oblique trace, like the left-hand foot of α or λ; both must be ruled out, however, because there is no visible trace of their right-hand foot, though there is ample space for it; the trace probably belongs to the foot of an upright which is inclined to the left (γ, ρ must be ruled out if the next letter is α, as seems to be the case: most likely ν, π). Following α (less likely δ or λ), a slightly sloped upright (ι rather than ρ; too close to the preceding trace to have a top inclined to the left). The penultimate trace is a straight upright, perhaps with relics of a high horizontal (probably τ, though shorter than expected; if so, the preceding upright is an ι, being too close to the following letter for a γ). At the end, a slightly sloped upright (γ, η, ι, κ, ν, π, ρ). The last three uprights belong to three separate letters. [.] : the foot of a leftward sloping oblique, less steep than that of α, λ; compatible with the right-hand foot of κ, χ or the tip of the bottom stroke in c, ζ, ξ [.] : lower half of an upright, close to the preceding o. 2 [.] : a high and a low point of ink. [.] : right-hand ends of a high and a low horizontal. ρ.c: worn right-hand section of a circle. 5 [.] : low point of

COL. IX

- εἶναι· τῇ[ν ἀρ]χὴν οὖν τοῦ ἰσχυρ[ο]τάτου ἐπόη[σεν]
 εἶναι ὡς[περ]εἰ παῖδα πατρός. οἱ δὲ οὐ γινώσκον[τες]
 τὰ λεγόμεν[α] δοκοῦσι τὸν Ζᾶνα παρὰ τοῦ αὐτο[ῦ]
 πατρός [τὴν] ἀλκὴν τε κα[ὶ] τὸν δαίμονα λαμβά[νειν].
 5 γινώσκ[ω]ν οὖν τὸ πῦρ ἀγαμμευγμένον τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ὅτι ταρασσοῖ καὶ κ[ωλ]ύοι τὰ ὄντα συνίστασθαι
 διὰ τὴν θάλπιν ἐξαλλάσσει ὅσ[ον] τε ἱκανόν ἐστιν
 ἐξαλλαχθὲν μὴ κωλύ[ειν τὰ] ὄντα συμπαγῆναι.
 ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἀφῆμι ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ μίσγεται
 10 τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις. ὅτι δ' "ἐν χεῖρ[εσσιν] ἔλαβ[εν]" ἠνίζετο
 ὥσπερ τ[ῶ]λλα τὰ π[ρὶν] μὲν ἄδηλα φα[ι]γόμεν[α, ἀλλ]ᾶ
 [β]εβαιοτάτα νοηθ[έντα. αἰνιζόμενος ο]ὕν ἰσχυρῶς
 ἔφη τὸν Ζᾶνα τῇ[ν ἀλκὴν] λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ[ν] δαίμονα
 [ὡ]σπερ εἰ[]οῦ ἰσχυροῦ

ink. γ.: the middle diagonal of ν is wiped off; definitely not η or π. Uncertain traces of ink. Small diagonal, joined on the top to a slightly sloped upright: μ or π. 6 .[: an upright. 8 λ.χ: the cusp of α, δ, λ. 9 .[: the right-hand oblique of α, δ, λ. c.e: the right-hand end of a high horizontal. 10 α.[: the left-hand oblique of α, δ, λ. .[: the right-hand arc of a circle. ι.[: a top left-hand right angle: γ, ε, ρ? .v: the right-hand ends of a high and a low horizontal. 11 .λ: end of the right-hand oblique of α, δ, λ. .[: an upright, joined on the top to a horizontal: γ or π. .o: an oblique and a vertical, like the right-hand half of ν. 12 .β: faint high top, the right-hand end of a horizontal. ..[: two high points (the apices of η, μ, ν; less likely of υ). A small top left-hand arc: ο or θ, not ω. .γ: the foot of a vertical, reaching quite low: υ, φ or ψ? 13 ε: in older photographs the letter was intact; its vertical is now preserved on a small detached piece. .[: a high trace, most likely the upper half of a vertical. It is slightly curved, like the left-hand upright of η, κ, ρ. 14 .[: faint trace, compatible with the top of c.].....: faint traces, not all of them certainly ink, compatible with ουιχ. .[: a diagonal, like the right-hand part of υ.

COL. X

(E 6, C 6, H 25, I 2, E 5, C4)

και λε....[.....]αρ λε[.]ει νοι ον τε μ. φων ον τ[
 ε νο μι ζε δε το αυ το νει ναι το λε γ. ιν τε και φων ει ν
 λε γει ν δε. αι δι δα σκει ν το αυ το δ. να ται ου γαρ[
 5 ο ι ον τε δι[.]α σκει ν αν ευ του λε γει νο σα δι α λο γων[
 δι δα σκε τα[.]νο μι ζε ται δε το δι δα σκει ν εν ται
 λε γει νει.[...]ου το ιν νυ το με ν δι δα σκει ν εκ το
 λε γει ν ε.[...]σθη το δε λε γει ν εκ του φων ει ν
 το δ αυ το[.....]αι φων ει γ και λε γει ν και δι δα.[
 ον τω.[.....]υ ει πα νο μ φε ν ου σα γ και π..[
 10 — δι δα[c. 11].ο ει ναι
 τρο φ[c. 11]......[.]ται ο τι[.]cca
 σ η λ.[c. 13].λ υ ει τα. τα η ν υ ξ η ν[
 ς.[c. 15]α ς α σ η λ. ο ς ε..ρ[
]τα[

— — —

1[: the foot of an upright, inclined to the left. A low horizontal. An upright, slightly inclined to the left. A similar upright, close to the preceding one. μ.φ: lower half of two uprights: π or η. 2 γ.ι: high and low points of ink. 3 ε.α: upper third of an upright and, after the break, a high point of ink. δ.ν: a high point of ink before the break. 6 .[: an upright, followed by a point of ink at mid-height. 7 .[: a high point of ink, descending to the right. Underneath it, a low point: the tips of two diagonals (as in χ) or the top and bottom of a sloped upright. 8].: high horizontal, ending with an upward turn: γ or τ. .[: point of ink, slightly lower than the peak of the preceding α. 9 .[: a high point of ink with an arc underneath it; compatible with the left half of c. ..[: foot of a diagonal (like the left-hand stroke of α, δ, λ). Next, a peak (?). Faint traces of the upper part of an

COL. X

- καὶ λέγειν· [οὐδὲ γ]ὰρ λέ[γ]ειν οἶόν τε μὴ φωνοῦντ[α·]
 ἐνόμιζε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ φωνεῖν.
 λέγειν δὲ καὶ διδάσκειν τὸ αὐτὸ δύναιται· οὐ γὰρ
 οἶόν τε δι[δ]άσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ λέγειν ὅσα διὰ λόγων
 5 διδάσκετα[ι·] νομίζεται δὲ τὸ διδάσκειν ἐν τῷ
 λέγειν εἶν[αι·] οὐ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν διδάσκειν ἐκ τοῦ
 λέγειν ἐχ[ωρί]σθη τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἐκ τοῦ φωνεῖν,
 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ [δύνα]ται φωνεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διδάσ[κειν·]
 οὕτως [οὐδὲν κωλ]ύει “πανομφεῦουσιν” καὶ πάγ[τα]
 10 — διδά[σκουσιν] τὸ αὐ[τὸ] εἶναι.
 “τροφ[ὸν]” δὲ λέγων αὐ[τὴν] ἀνί[ζε]ται ὅτι [ἄ]σσα
 ὁ ἥλι[ος] θερμαίνων δι[α]λύει ταῖτα ἢ νύξ ψύ[χουσα]
 συνίστησι ἄσσα ὁ ἥλιος ἐθερμ
]τα[

— — —

upright. 10]: slightly sloped high horizontal. 11[: the first three dots stand for uncertain and unusual high smudges and traces. An apex and the feet (now lost but visible in an older photograph) of α or λ. Two high points (tops of up-rights). The feet of two uprights, the second descending more than the first and slightly sloped to the left. 12]: high point of ink.]: descending oblique, like the right-hand stroke of α, δ, λ. α.τ: high traces of a descending oblique and, after the break, faint traces of an ascending one. 13 ς[: only the unmistakable top of c survives. Following it, two high spots, like the top tips of υ. λ.ο: a faint high point. ..ρ[: a high trace, possibly an arc (perhaps ο or θ). A high and a low point of ink, close to ρ.

COL. XI

(C 4, I 5, E 4, C 3)

- [.] .cγυκτοceξ.[.....]οδαυτην[.....]χρησαι
 γνωμημποιου[.]νοσαδυ.ον..ναιτοβαθος
 τηςνυκτους.[.]δυνειω.περτοφωαλλανιν
 εντωιαντωιμε[.] .ανγηκ.τα[.]αμμανει
 5 χρησαιδεκαια.κεσαιταντο[.]ναται
 κεψασθαιδεχρηεφωικειτα[....]αρκεσαι
 — ..ιτοχρησαι
 χραντονδετονθεοννομιζο..[....]χονται
 .ευομενοιασκαποωσιταδ[.....]φιλεγει
 10 [....]εχρηεναπανταταιοιθε[c. 11]θαι
 [....]..ιεδη.ωceνο.ιο.[.....].
 [.....]ιπαρα...οντα.[
 [.....]αιοιοντ[
 [.....]..εθαιcυ.[
- — —

1]: bottom tip of an upright, followed by a second upright slightly sloping to the right; certainly η. [: left-hand diagonal as in α, λ. 2 υ.ο: left-hand and right-hand ends of a high horizontal; certainly τ. υ..υ: upright close to υ. After the break, bottom tip of a stroke. 3]: short upright, with a slight slope to the left at its bottom and a trace of a horizontal at its top; γ, π. ω.π: after a break, the right-hand tip of a bottom horizontal. 4]: upright with a knob at the bottom, where it met another stroke; certainly υ. κ.τ: left-hand oblique as in α, λ. 5 α.κ: traces of an upright before the break; uncertain traces of ink after the break. 7 :: a high trace of ink. A right-hand oblique as in α, λ. 8 :: vertical, followed by the top of a sec-

COL. XI

- [τ]ῆς Νυκτός. “ἐξ ἀ[δύτοι]ο” δ’ αὐτὴν [λέγει] “χρηῆσαι”
 γνώμην ποιού[με]νος ἄδυτον εἶναι τὸ βάθος
 τῆς νυκτός· οὐ γ[άρ] δύνει ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ νιν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέ[νο]ν ἀγῆ κατα[λ]αμβάνει.
 5 χρηῆσαι δὲ καὶ ἀρκέσαι ταὐτὸ [δύ]νεται.
 σκέψασθαι δὲ χρὴ ἐφ’ ᾧ κεῖται[ι τὸ] ἀρκέσαι
 — καὶ τὸ χρηῆσαι.
 ‘χρᾶν τόνδε τὸν θεὸν νομίζοντ[ες ἔρ]χονται
 [—] πρυσόμενοι ἅσσα ποῶσι’. τὰ δ’ [ἐπὶ τούτ]ωι λέγει·
 10 [—] “[ἡ δὲ] ἔχρησεν ἅπαντα τὰ οἱ θέ[μις ἦν ἀνύσασ]θαι”.
 [....]θεῖς ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ο.[]ε
 [.....]ι παρὰ τὰ ἐόντα .[
 [.....]αι οἷόν τε[
 [.....]..σθαι συ.[

— — —

ond slightly higher vertical. Left-hand tip of a high horizontal. 9 .ε: vertical close to ε. 11]...: uncertain traces of a circular letter. Two horizontals, like the top and middle ones in ε. η.ω: the peak of a letter as in α, δ, λ. ο.ι: traces of a top horizontal. ο.[: unidentifiable traces of ink.]...: right-hand end of high horizontal; ε rather than c. 12 α...: lower part of an upright at a distance from α. Foot of what could be the left-hand oblique in α, λ. After the break, the right-hand ends of three horizontals; ε or ξ. .[: top of a vertical? 14]...: unidentifiable traces of ink. A top horizontal and, underneath, the right-hand end of a second horizontal; ε or ξ. .[: tiny spot of ink in the middle of the line.

COL. XII

(C 3, E 3, I 49, I 58, C 12, H 51, E 2)

καιαφ.[...].τοδεχομε[....].οωδεχει
 — ωσα..[.....]τακαλονε.οcνιφοεντοcολυμπου
 ολυμπ[.....].ονοcτοαυτονοιδεδοκουντες
 ολυμπ[.....].υρανον[.]αυτοειναιεξαμαρ
 5 ταν[...].[....]ινωcκον..cοτιουρανονουχοιον.ε
 μακ[...].ερονηευρυτε[..]νειναιχρονονδεμακρον
 ειτι.[....]αζο[.]ουκα.[...]μαρτανοιδοεποουμεν
 ουρανονθ.[c. 12]προcθηκηευρυ
 επο.ιτοοπου[c. 11].γαντιονευρυμεν
 10 ουδεποτεμ.[c. 11]...δεφθαcειναι
 τη[.]υναμειε[]νιφετωδε.[]
 [....]νιφετω[]υκονε[]
 [....].αμ.[]ολιονδα[...].
 []ιακαιτα.[]
 15 [.....]δε[]

— — —

The text of I 49 is based on an old photograph (see pl. 12). The piece is now inverted in the glass.

1 .[: foot of oblique, like the left-hand stroke in α, λ.]: upright, its lower end slightly sloping to the right. Not ι; possibly the right-hand vertical of η, ν.]: o: foot of a short vertical, sloping to the right as in π. 2 α..[: peak of a vertical close to α; not ι, because the remaining distance to the next letter would suffice to accommodate only another ι. Top horizontal as in γ, ε, ζ, ξ, π, c, τ. ε.o: bottom angle, similar to the left-hand foot of δ. 3]: upper right-hand arc, not completing a circle; ρ likely. 4]: bottom traces of arc as in θ, ο. 5]: an upright. ...: uncertain traces of ink at the top. Right-hand ends of horizontals as in ε, ξ. ν.e: low descending vertical, at some distance from adjacent letters; τ, υ. 6]: right-hand end of top horizontal and bottom end of vertical; certainly τ. 7 ι: left-hand ends of top and

COL. XII

- (—) καὶ ἀφα[...]: τὸ δ' ἐχόμε[νον ἐ]πος ὡδ' ἔχει
 — “ὡς ἂν ἔ[χ]οι κά]τα καλὸν ἔδος νιφόμεντος Ὀλύμπου”.
 “Ὀλυμπ[ος καὶ χ]ρόνος τὸ αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ δοκοῦντες
 “Ὀλυμπ[ον καὶ] οὐρανὸν [τ]αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐξαμαρ-
 5 τάν[ουσι]ι[ν, οὐ γ]ινώσκοντες ὅτι οὐρανὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε
 μακ[ρό]τερον ἢ εὐρύτε[ρο]ν εἶναι, χρόνον δὲ μακρὸν
 εἴ τις [όνομ]άζο[ι] οὐκ ἂν [ἐξ]μαρτάνοι. ὁ δὲ ὅπου μὲν
 ‘οὐρανὸν’ θέ[λοι λέγειν, τήν] προσθήκην ‘εὐρὺν’
 ἐποιεῖτο, ὅπου [δ] “Ὀλυμπον’, το]ύγαντίον ‘εὐρὺν’ μὲν
 10 οὐδέποτε, ‘μα[κρὸν]’ δέ. “νιφόμεντος” δὲ φήσας εἶναι
 τῇ [δ]υνάμει ε[ικάζει] χρόνον τῷ] νιφετώδει.
 [τὸ δὲ] νιφετώ[δες ψυχρόν τε καὶ λ]εγκόν ἐ[στι].
 [....] λαμπ[ρ]] πολὺν δ' ἀ[έρ]α
]ια καὶ τα.[
 15]...τοδε[

— — —

bottom strokes as in c, χ. α.: uncertain traces of ink. 8 .[: foot of vertical close to θ, slightly sloping to the left. 9 o.: top horizontal and left-hand foot of upright, slightly inclined to the left; γ, ε.].: uncertain traces of ink, possibly a high and a middle horizontal as in ε, ξ. 10 .[: oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, λ.].....: unidentifiable top ends of letters; the last one may be the upper part of α, δ, λ. 11].: top of vertical close to v. .[: middle part of vertical. 12].: right-hand end of top horizontal. 13].α: relics of ascending and descending obliques as in α, δ, λ. .[: foot of vertical, close to μ and slightly inclined to the left.].o: short upright, close to o and slightly inclined to the right. 14].: uncertain traces of a vertical. .[: low vertical as in υ, τ. 15 Uncertain traces of top ends of three letters. Top horizontal, free in its right-hand end. Top right-hand arc.

COL. XIII

(E 2, I 26, C 11, H 49, E 12, C 10)

ζευμενεπειδ..ατροεσουπαρ.[.].αφατακουα[
 ουτεγαρτο.εηκουεναλλαδεδηλω.αιοπω
 — ηκουενοντεηνυξκελευειαλλαδηλοιωδελεγων
 — αιδοιογκα.επινενοσαιθεραεχθορεπρωτος
 5 οτιμεμπα.αντημποησινπεριτωμπραγματων
 — αινιζεται.[.]θεποσεκαστοναναγκηλεγειν
 εντοια[....]ισορωντηγγενεσιντουσανθρωπου[
 νομιζο.[....]ι.αιτουταιεχρηατοανευδετωγ
 αιδοιων[.....]εσθαιαιδοιωεικασαστονηλιο[
 10 ανε.[.....].[..].ταοντατοιαυταουχοιο.[
 γιν[c. 14]ενωντωνοντων[
 ηρ.[c. 14].ονηλιο[.]πανταο.[
].υδεου[..]ογ.[
]περιεχειν[
].....[
 — — —

The text of I 26 is based on an old photograph (see pl. 13). The piece is now broken and inverted in the glass.

1 δ..α: high point of ink and uncertain traces of a horizontal at midheight. After the break, the foot of an upright, slightly inclined to the right. [: the foot of a diagonal, like the left-hand stroke of α or λ.]: bottom horizontal, free in its right-hand end; certainly ε. 2 ο.ε: the photographs show two points of ink immediately before the break, a high one, like the beginning of a horizontal, and a low one, like the left-hand foot of α, δ or λ; on examination under the microscope, only the low trace seems to be ink. A low point after the break may also be ink. ω.α: the right-hand end of a high horizontal, slightly upturned. 4 α.ε: a high point of ink. 5 α.α: a high and a low point of ink. 6 [: uncertain traces, probably of an upright. 8 [: traces of

COL. XIII

- “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πατὴρ ἐοῦ πάρα [θ]έσφατ’ ἀκούσα[ς]”
 οὔτε γὰρ τόδε ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ δεδήλωται ὅπως
 ἤκουσεν, οὔτε ἡ νῦξ κελεύει. ἀλλὰ δηλοῖ ὧδε λέγων·
 “αἰδοῖον κατέπινεν, δς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος”.
 5 ὅτι μὲν πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
 αἰνίζεται κ[α]θ’ ἕπος ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη λέγειν.
 ἐν τοῖς αἰδοίοις ὁρῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπου[ς]
 νομίζον[τας] εἶναι τοῦτοι ἐχρήσατο, ἄνευ δὲ τῶν
 αἰδοίων [οὐ γίν]εσθαι, αἰδοίωι εἰκάσας τὸν ἥλιο[ν].
 10 ἄνευ [γὰρ τοῦ ἡ]λ[ιο]υ τὰ ὄντα τοιαῦτα οὐχ οἶόν [τε]
 γίν[εσθαι][ένων τῶν ἐόντων]
 ἥρε[μεῖν] διὰ τὸν ἥλιο[ν] πάντα ὁμ[οίως]
]οὐδ’ ἐοῦσ[ιν] οὐ.[
] περιέχειν [
].....[

— — —

an upright. υ.: an upright at some distance from, and rising higher than, ι; η or ν.
 10 .[: top of a diagonal, descending to the right and perhaps preceded by a high point of ink; υ or χ.][: cusp of α, δ or λ.][: the upper part of a diagonal, descending to the left and perhaps preceded by a high point of ink: κ, υ, χ.][: uncertain traces, possibly of an upright. 12 .[: uncertain traces, possibly of an upright with a knob at the bottom.][: unusual high traces. ο.[: uncertain high trace, possibly of an upright. 13][: the upper right-hand arc of a circle.][: uncertain traces, partially covered by a foreign piece of papyrus. 14 υ[: κ is not impossible. 15 High traces, most of them very unusual. The second letter may be χ. The fourth is probably κ, χ or υ. The fifth is α, δ or λ (the peak is preserved). The sixth probably has a vertical. The seventh seems to have an arc on the top.

COL. XIV

(C 10, H 34, E 11, I 63, C 9, H 52)

[.]κχθ.ρηιτονλα.προτατοντε[.....]..ο[.]ατον
χωριςθenaφεωντουτοντονουντογκρονον
γενεσθαιφηεινεκ.ουηλιουτηιγιοταιτιανεςχε
διατονηλιονκρονεσθαιπροαλ.ηλα
5 — διατουτολεγειοσμεγερεξεντοδεπιτουται
— ουρανοσευφρονιδησοσπρωτιστ..βασιλευσεν
κρουοντατοννουμπροαλληλ[.]..ονονονομασac
μεγαρεξαιφηειτονουρανοναφ[.]ρ.θ.ναιγαρ
τημβασιλειαναντογκρονο.δεω..μασenaποτου
10 .[.]ουαντονκαιταλλακατα.[.....]φγον
[.....]οντωγαπαπαντ[.].[c. 10]νων
[.....].cor[...].φυσιν[c. 17]ν
[.....]αφαιρ[...].εθαιδα.[c. 15]ιαν
[.....]μενωντ[...].[.]..[]ντα

— — —

1 θ.ρ: uncertain middle traces of ink. α.π: three feet of uprights, the first inclined to the right, the second ending at midheight and the third very uncertain.]...: very low end of an upright. At some distance, foot of an upright, considerably higher than the preceding one, followed by the lower part of an upright inclined to the left. 3 κ.ο: the right-hand end of a high horizontal. 4 λ.η: the right-hand oblique of α, δ or λ (visible in another photograph). 6 ...: left-hand part of rounded letter. Right-hand ends of high and low horizontals, compatible with those of c. 7]...: low end of oblique, inclined to the left. Foot of an upright with slight inclination to the left. 8 ρ.θ: an upright. The upper right-hand arc of θ, with relics of the middle

COL. XIV

- [ἐ]κθόρηι τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον
χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν Κρόνον
γενέσθαι φησὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἥλιου τῇ Γ' ἡι, ὅτι αἰτίαν ἔσχε
διὰ τὸν ἥλιον κρούεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα.
- 5 — διὰ τοῦτο λέγει “ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξεν”. τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ·
— “Οὐρανὸς Εὐφρονίδης, ὃς πρώτιστος βασίλευσεν”.
κρούοντα τὸν Νοῦν πρὸς ἄλληλ[α] Κρόνον ὀνομάσας
μέγα ῥέξαι φησὶ τὸν Οὐρανόν· ἀφ[αι]ρεθῆναι γὰρ
τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτόν. Κρόνον δὲ ᾤγόμασεν ἀπὸ τοῦ
- 10 ἑ[ρ]γου αὐτόν καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τ[ὸν] αὐτόν λ[ό]γον.
[τῶν ἐ]όντων γὰρ ἀπάντ[ω]ν [οὐ]πω κρουομέ]νων
[ὁ Νοῦς] ὥς ὁρ[ί]ζω]ν φύσιν [τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχε]ν
[Οὐρανός]· ἀφαιρ[εῖ]σθαι δ' αὐ[τόν] φησι τὴν βασιλ]εῖαν
[κρουο]μένων τ[ῶν] ἐ[ὶ] γ[εν]ε[σ]ε[ω]ν]ντα
- — —

point, is visible. Top of an upright, slightly inclined to the left and followed by the low end of an upright also slightly inclined to the left. 9 o.δ: vertical close to o. φ...: vertical, close to the right-hand side of ω. Middle traces of right-hand part of a letter.

10 .[: high horizontal, perhaps joined to an upright at its left-hand end.].: right-hand end of a high horizontal as in γ or τ. α[: traces of an upright. 11][: an upright. 12].: right-hand end of a slightly descending low horizontal.]φ: descending oblique joined at its bottom to a vertical; certainly v. 13 .[: the left-hand prong of v.].: uncertain high and low traces. 14][: high ascending horizontal.]..[: uncertain high traces.].: middle trace, probably the right-hand arc of o.

COL. XV

(C 9, H 52, E 10, C 8, H 56, E 7)

- κρ.υεναυταπρ.[...]ηλακ.[]τρησιτο[....]ον
 χω.ιϑθενταδιαστηναιδιχαλληλωνταεροντα
 χω.[.]ζομενουγαρτουηλιουκαιαπολαμβανομενου
 εμ.εσωπηξασιςχεικαιτανωθετωηλιου
 5 — καιτακατωθενεχομενονδεεποσ
 — εκτουδηκρονος.υτιεπειταδεμητιεταζευσ
 λεγειτιεκτουδε[.]χηεστινεξουβασιλευειδε
 αρχηδιηγειται.[....].οντακρουαμπροσαλληλα
 διαστησαςτ.[.....].νυμμετασταεινουκεξετε.[
 10 — ετεραλλετ.[]
 — τοδεπειτ.[c. 11].κοιμεν..χετερ[
 — αλλαοα.[]ιδε[.]ο..
 — μητιγκα.[]μβασιληιδατι.[
 — ες.[]αινα.ατ.[
 15 ε.[]

— — —

1 p.v: traces of bottom arc of rounded letter. p.: left-hand half of rounded letter.].: foot of right-hand oblique as in α, δ. κ.: foot of left-hand oblique as in α, δ. 2 ω.ι: low descending vertical, joined to top and middle horizontals on the right-hand side; certainly ρ. 3 .[: upright with uncertain high traces to its right. 4 μ.ε: left-hand and right-hand bottom tips. 6 c.v: foot of right-hand oblique as in α, δ, λ. 7 ιτ: there is a smudge in this area and the space between the letters, especially between ι and τ, is wider than usual; but there is no room for another letter.].: right-hand part of the roundel of ρ. 8 .[: high trace of a vertical, joined to descending oblique.].: traces incompatible with any letter; possibly a foreign piece. 9 τ.: the right-hand part of the horizontal of τ and the upper part of its vertical; the left-hand part of the horizontal, partly wiped off and overlapping with the unusually extended upper horizontal of the preceding c. High horizontal.].: the edge of the papyrus is folded; visible is only the peak of a vertical, slightly

COL. XV

- κρούε(ι)ν αὐτὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα κα[ι] ποήσῃ τὸ [πρῶτ]ον
 χωρισθέντα διαστήναι δίχ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐόντα·
 χωρ[ι]ζομένου γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ ἀπολαμβανομένου
 ἐν μέσῳ πῆξας ἴσχει καὶ τᾶνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου
- 5 — καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν. ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος·
 — “ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Κρόνος αὖτις, ἔπειτα δὲ μητίετα Ζεὺς”·
 λέγει π' ἐκ τοῦδε [ἀ]ρχή ἐστιν, ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἦδε
 ἀρχή'. διηγεῖται Ν[οῦς τ]ὰ ὄντα κρούων πρὸς ἄλληλα
 διαστήσας τε [πρὸς τῇ] γ νῦν μετάστασιν οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρ[ων]
- 10 — ἔτερ' ἀλλ' ἐτε[ροῖα ποεῖν.]
 τὸ δ' “ἔπειτα [δὲ μητίετα Ζε]ῦς”· ὅτι μὲν οὐχ ἔτερ[ος]
 — ἀλλὰ ὁ αὐ[τὸς δῆλον· σημαίν]ει δὲ [τ]όδε·
 — “μῆτιν κα.[c. 13]εν βασιλῆϊδα τιμ[ήν]
 ec.[]αι ἵνας ἀπ.[
- 15 ει[

— — —

inclined to the right. .[: if ink, the top and bottom tips of an upright, close to the preceding ε. 10 .[: vertical, joined to top stroke on the right-hand side. 11 .[: middle trace of left-hand oblique as in α, δ, λ. .[: the prongs of υ. ...: upper left-hand arc. The prongs of υ. 12 .[: top end of oblique like the left-hand prong of υ or χ. .[: top and bottom trace of ink. ...: bottom horizontal. Right-hand ends of high and low horizontals. 13 α.[: upright, coinciding with a vertical fiber; a serif-like turn to the left at its low end rules out ι; probably π. .[: right-hand end of bottom wavy horizontal. ι.[: vertical, inclined to the right and joined to descending oblique at the top; certainly μ. 14 c.[: trace of upright, sloped to the right as in μ. Visible in old photographs; now in a detached piece. .[: right-hand end of high horizontal as in γ, τ. α.[: traces compatible with c. π.[: if ink, low horizontal, compatible with the left-hand one in ω, or the left-hand oblique of α, λ. 15 .[: a vertical.

COL. XVI

(E 7, I 41a, B 6, H 55, E 8, I 41, B 5, H 35)

[4-5]οντονηλιονεφ[.]ενειναιδε[...].ταιοτιδε
 — εκτωνυπαρχοντωντανυνονταγινεταιλεγει
 πρωτογονουβασιλεωσαιδοιουταιιδαραπαντες
 αθαναιοιπροεφυμμακαρεςθεοιηδεθεαιναι
 5 καιποταμοικαικρηναιεπηρατοιαλατεπαντα
 — .cατοτηγεγαωταυτοcδαραμουνοceγεντο
 [.]ντουτοicσημαιειοπιταοντανπη[.]χεναιεταδε
 v.νε.νταεκτωνυπαρχοντωνγι[.]αιτοδε
 [...]οcδεαραμουνοceγεντοτουτοδε[.]εγωνδηλοι
 10 [...]ο.ννουμπαντωναξιοεινιγαμον[.]νεοντα
 [.....]ειμηδενταλλαειηουγα.[]υταιειναι
 [5-6].οντα..[.]υτουνο.[]ομενωι
 [6-7]ουαξιομ.αντ..[]ιναι
 [7-8]νβασιλευ.παντ[]ειτα
 15 [7-8]νουcκαιπ[]τον

— — —

1].ε: low descending horizontal.].τ: low right-hand tip, somewhat higher than the bottom level. 4 α.ο: parts of the top horizontal and the middle upright of τ. 5 α.λ: right-hand oblique as in λ. 6 .c: uncertain bottom traces at both sides of the break. 8 v.v: high left-hand trace of ink. ε.v: uncertain middle traces of ink. [.: upright, joined at its top to descending oblique as in v.].: traces of high horizontal, considerably lower than the top of the adjacent α. 9].: uncertain high traces of ink. 10].: high horizontal, free at its right-hand end as in γ, τ.

COL. XVI

- [αἰδοῖ]ον τὸν ἥλιον ἔφ[η]σεν εἶναι δε[δῆλ]ωται· ὅτι δὲ
 — ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται λέγει·
 “Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου· τῷ δ’ ἄρα πάντες
 ἀθάνατοι προσέφυν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ θεάιναι
 5 καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ κρῆναι ἐπήρατοι ἄλλα τε πάντα,
 — ὅσσα τότε ἦν γεγαῶτ’, αὐτὸς δ’ ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο”.
 [ἐ]ν τούτοις σημαίνει ὅτι τὰ ὄντα ὑπῆ[ρ]χεν αἰεί, τὰ δὲ
 νῦν ἐόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίγ[ε]ται. τὸ δὲ
 “[αὐ]τὸς δὲ ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο” τοῦτο δὲ [λ]έγων δηλοῖ
 10 [ἀεὶ] τὸν Νοῦν πάντων ἄξιον εἶναι μόν[ο]ν ἐόντα,
 [ὥσπερ]εἰ μὴδὲν τᾶλλα εἶη· οὐ γὰρ [οἶόν τε δι’ α]ὐτὰ εἶναι
 [τὰ νῦν] ἐόντα ἄγ[ε]ν τοῦ Νοῦ. [ἔ]τι δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐχ[ο]μένῳ
 [—] [ἔ]πει τούτ[ο]ν ἄξιον πάντῳ [τὸν Νοῦν ἔ]φησεν εἶναι·
 [—] “[νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ]ν βασιλεὺς πάντ[ων καὶ τ’ ἐ]σσεῖ ἐπ[ε]ιτα”.
 15 [δῆλον ὅτι] Νοῦς καὶ π[άντων βασιλεὺς ἐστὶ τα]ύτόν.

— — —

11 .[: an upright. 12].: right-hand end of high horizontal. ..[: left-hand oblique as in α, δ or λ. Uncertain high trace. .[: middle vertical (visible in old photographs). 13 .α: lower part of right-hand vertical as in μ, π (visible in old photographs). ...: lower part of ω. Uncertain traces of ink (visible in old photographs). 14 .πα: high traces of ink (visible in old photographs). πα on a tiny piece of papyrus now slightly transposed. 15].: the prongs of υ.

COL. XVII

- π[ρ]ότερον ἦν πρ[ιν ὄν]ομασθῆναι, ἔπ[ει]τα ὠνομάσθη·
 ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρόσθεν ὦν· ἢ τὰ νῦν ἑόντα συσταθῆναι
 ἄηρ καὶ ἔσται ἀεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ἦν. δι' ὃ τι δὲ
 ἄηρ ἐκλήθη δεδήλωται ἐν τοῖς προτέροις. γενέσθαι δὲ
 5 ἑνομήσθη ἐπεὶτ' ὠνομάσθη Ζεὺς, ὥσπερ εἰ πρότερον
 μὴ ἑών. καὶ "ὔστατον" ἔφησεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον, ἐπεὶτ'
 ὠνομάσθη Ζεὺς καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῷ διατελεῖ ὄνομα ὄν,
 μέχρι εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδὸς τὰ νῦν ἑόντα συνεστάθη
 ἐν ὧπερ πρόσθεν ἑόντα ἡωρεῖτο. τὰ δ' ἑόντα δ[ηλοῖ]
 10 γενέσθαι τριαὺτ[α] διὰ τοῦτον καὶ γενόμενα π[άλιν]
 ἐν τούτῳ[.ση]μαίνει δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔπεισι το[ῖσδε·]
 — "Ζεὺς κεφα[λή, Ζεὺς μέσ]σα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ [π]άντα τέτ[υκται".]
 — κεφαλήν[τὰ ὄν]τ' αἰγ[ι]ζεται[.]
 κεφαλή[] ἀρχὴ γίνεται συ[στάσεως]
 15 δ[συστ]αθῆναι γ[

— — —

traces of top and bottom horizontals. .[: peak of letter at some distance from α
 (visible in old photographs). 10 .[: the top of a descending oblique as in α, δ
 or λ. .[: if ink, vertical joined on the top to a horizontal. 11 ω.[: peak of letter
 close to the preceding ω. τ.[: left-hand middle dot of ink. 12 .[: high traces of
 ink. α.υ: high angle as in α, δ or λ. 13 .[: the foot of an oblique, near following
 ε. ..[: foot of vertical, followed by second vertical; vertical with joint on the top as
 in γ, ν. .[: ζ: foot of upright, slightly sloped. .[: bottom arc as in θ or ο. 14 κ.φ:
 high horizontal of ε. λ.[: left-hand half of η (visible in old photographs). ..:
 traces of high horizontal. Right-hand end of ascending high horizontal. .[: the top
 of the left-hand prong of υ. 15 .[: left-hand half of δ. ι.[: peak of upright,
 with descending joint as in ν.

COL. XVIII

- καὶ τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα. '[τῖν δὲ "Μοῖραν]" φάμενος [δηλοῖ]'
 τήνδ[ε γῆν] καὶ τάλλα πάν[τ]α εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν. τούτ' οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα Ὀρφεὺς
 ὠνόμασεν Μοῖραν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι κατὰ φάτιν Ὀρφῆαν
 ἐπικλῶσαι' φασί[ν] 'σφίσιν' καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταῦθ' ἅσσα Μοῖρα
 5 ἐπέκλωσεν', λέγοντες μὲν ὀρθῶς, οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ
 οὔτε τὴν Μοῖραν ὃ τι ἐστὶν οὔτε τὸ ἐπικλῶσαι. Ὀρφεὺς γὰρ ρ'
 τὴν φρόνησ[ι]ν Μοῖραν ἐκάλεσεν· ἐφαίνετο γὰρ αὐτῷ
 τοῦτο προσφερέστατον ε[ῖ]ναι ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι
 ὠνόμασαν· πρὶν μὲν γὰρ κληθῆναι Ζῆνα, ἣν Μοῖρα
 10 φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ αἰεὶ τε καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκλήθη
 Ζεὺς, γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθ]η, ὄντα μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν
 [ὀ]νομαζόμε[ε]νον δ' ο[ὐ]. διὰ τοῦτο λέ[γει] "Ζεὺς πρῶτος
 [γέν]ετο"· πρ[ὸ]ν γὰρ ἦν Μοῖρα φρόνησις], ἐπειτ[α δ'] ἱερεῦθη
 [Ζεὺς ὧν. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ γινώσκοντ]ες τὰ λεγόμενα
 15 [ὥς π]ρῶτόγονο[ν] ὄντα [θεὸν νομίζουσι] τὸν Ζῆνα [
]...[...][]..[

— — —

oblique; α, λ or μ but the low part of the upright of ε with its middle horizontal cannot be ruled out. Uncertain traces of upright ι, inclined to the right. At some distance, uncertain high traces of ink. 14 θ: upper part of a vertical inclined to the right. 15]...: extremely blurred traces of ink. ...[: uncertain middle traces of ink. A descending oblique as in ν. Traces of rounded letter; ο rather than θ. οντα[: on a small piece stuck on fr. D 2; its placing here is uncertain. 16]...[: unidentifiable high traces of ink.]...[: unidentifiable high traces of ink.]...: right-hand part of high horizontal as in γ, ε, τ etc.

COL. XIX

(D 2, I 40, B 1, H 31, D 3, B 7, H 39)

- εκ[....].[...]...νταεν[...].ατογκεκ[...].ααποτου
 επικρατουντοςζευ[.]παντακατατοναυτον
 λογονεκληθηπαντ..γαροαηρεπικρατει
 τοσουτονοσομβουλ.ταιμοιραγδεπ.κλωσαι
 5 λ.γοντεστουδιοστημφρονησινεπικρωσαι
 λεγουσινταεοντακ.ιταγινομενακαιταμελλοντα
 .οπωςχρηγενεσθαιτεκαιειναικα[.]πασαεσθαι
 βαα..ειδεαυτονεικαζειτουτογαροιπροσφερειν
 — εφ[.]νετοεκτωνλεγομενωνονοματωνλεγωνωδε
 10 ζευ.βασιλευςζευδαρχοσαπαντ.νοργικεραυνος
 [.....]αεφηναιιοτιπολλ[.....].αμμια
 [.....].ατεικαιπαντατελει[.....].ωνουδενι
 [.....]τιντ.[.]εσαι..[.....].ν.[.].ν.[
 [.....]αρχονδε[c. 15]υτον
 15 [.....]χεταιδι.[]δε

— — —

1].: blurred traces of a vertical and a low wavy horizontal.]...: foot of right-hand oblique as in α or λ. Lower half of ε. Uncertain traces of bottom arc of a curved letter. 3 ...: bottom left-hand end of ascending horizontal as in ω. High horizontal as in γ. 4 λ.τ: wavy bottom horizontal. 5 λ.γ: left-hand upright, with joints at both ends; certainly ε. 6 κ.ι: foot of right-hand oblique as in α or λ. 8 ...: top tips of two letters. 10 υ.β: right-hand ends of diverging upper and lower horizontals as in ζ or c. τ.ν: right-hand bottom end of horizontal as in ω. 11 .[: low left-hand trace of ink.].: uncertain high trace of descending

COL. XIX.

- ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ἐ [τ]ὰ ἐόντα ἐν [ἐκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺ[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον ἐκλήθη· πάντων γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐπικρατεῖ
τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται. ‘Μοῖραγ’ δ’ ἐπικλῶσαι’
5 λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι
λέγουσιν τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα,
ὅπως χρή γενέσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ι] παύσασθαι.
βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει (τοῦτο γάρ οἱ προσφέρειν
ἐφα[ι]νετο ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων) λέγων ὧδε·
10 [—] “Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἀργικέραυνος”.
[βασιλέ]α ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶ[ν τῶν ἀρ]χῶν μία
[πασῶν κ]ρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [ἄπερ θνη]τῶν οὐδενὶ
[ἄλλωι ἔξεσ]τιν τε[λ]έσαι· ..[] .v.[.]ε.v.[
f] ἀρχὸν δὲ [ἀπάντων ἔφη εἶναι α]ὐτὸν
15 [ὅτι πάντα ἀρ]χεται δια[] .δε

— — —

oblique as in χ. 12]α: right-hand part of the roundel of ρ.]α: right-hand part of the top horizontal and the upright of τ. 13 τ[: high and low traces of ink. ..[: uncertain left-hand trace of descending oblique. High horizontal. .v[: right-hand end of top horizontal as in γ, ε or τ. Following ν, the upper part of α, δ or λ. .v[: traces of parallel horizontals as in ε. Following ν, uncertain traces of a low descending horizontal as in c. 15 .[: foot of left-hand oblique as in α or λ.].: the right-hand prong of ν.

COL. XX

(D 4, I 64, B 8, H 43, D 5, I 61, B 9, H 50)

- ανθρωπω[...]πολεσινεπι.ελεσαντες[...]εραειδον
 ελασσονσφασθαυμαζωμηγ.νωσκεινουγαροιοντε
 ακουσαιομουκαιμαθεινταλεγομενασοειδεπαρατου
 τεχνημποιουμενουνταιεραυτοιαξιοιθαυμαζεσθαι
 5 καιοικτε[.]ρεσθαιθαυμαζεσθαιμενοτι.οκουντες
 προτερονηεπιτελεσαιειδηειναπερχονταιεπι
 τελεσαντεςπρινειδεναιουδεπανερομενοιωσπερ
 ωσειδοτες.ξωνειδονηκουσανηεμαθον[.]κτερεσθαιδε
 οτιουκαρκε.σφιντηνδαπανηνπροανηλω.θαιαλλα
 10 — καιτη.γνωμησπερομενοιπροσκαπερχονται
 πριμμεντα[.].ραεπιτελεσαιελπιζον[.]σειδησειν
 επ[.....]αν.[..]δεστερηθεντεςκ.[....]ελπι[...].απερχοντα.
 — τ.[]υοντ[...].λογος[...].ται[...].να
 .[]ιτηεα..ουο..[]ητριμεν
 15 []αδελφη[]ωσειδε
 [..]

1 ι.ε: low end of an upright, at some distance from the preceding ι. 2 γ.ν: uncertain traces of an upright. 5 ι.ο: oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, δ or λ. 8 .ε: left-hand end of high horizontal and foot of a vertical; obviously τ. 9 ε.ε: uncertain traces of ink in a very narrow area. ω.θ: a spot between right-hand ends of top and bottom horizontals; c rather than ε. 10 η.γ: right-hand high and low traces of ink. 11].ρ: right-hand ends of high and middle horizontals. 12 ν.[: left-hand end of high descending stroke. κ.[: high peak of letter as in α, δ or λ. α.[: top of an upright. 13 τ.[: left-hand traces of a curve and a bottom stroke extending to the

COL. XX

- ἀνθρώπων ἐν πόλεσιν ἐπιζέσαντες [τὰ ἱ]ερά εἶδον,
 ἔλασσόν σφας θαυμάζω μὴ γινώσκειν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε
 ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα· ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ
 τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά, οὗτοι ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι
 5 καὶ οἴκτε[ι]ρεσθαι· θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν ὅτι δοκοῦντες
 πρότερον ἢ ἐπιτελέσαι εἰδήσειν ἀπέρχονται ἐπι-
 τελέσαντες πρὶν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἐπανερόμενοι ὥσπερ
 ὡς εἰδότες τῶν εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσαν ἢ ἔμαθον· [οἴ]κτε(ι)ρεσθαι δὲ
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄρκεῖ σφιν τὴν δαπάνην προαηλωσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 10 — καὶ τῆς γνώμης στερόμενοι πρὸς ἀπέρχονται.
 πρὶν μὲν τὰ [ἱ]ερά ἐπιτελέσαι ἐλπίζον[τε]ς εἰδήσειν,
 ἐπ[ιτελέσ]αντ[ες] δὲ στερθηθέντες κα[ὶ] τῆς ἐλπί[δος] ἀπέρχονται.
 — τῷ[c. 10] .vοντ[...] λόγος ..[...]ται[..].va
 .[] .ι τῇ ἀναγοῦ ο..[] μ]ητρί μὲν
 15]δ' ἀδελφῇ[] ωσειδε
]..[

— — —

left; probably ω.] .v: right-hand end of high ascending horizontal.] .: bottom hor-
 izontal, joined at its right-hand end to the foot of a leftward sloping oblique. Low left-
 hand right angle. ι.: uncertain traces of a vertical, lower than the adjacent ι.] .v:
 upper right-hand arc. 14] .: upper left-hand spot, possibly an upright joined to a
 top horizontal; γ, ε, π?] .: right-hand ends of three parallel horizontals; ε or ξ, not
 c. α.: the left-hand prong of v. Upper right-hand end of ascending stroke.] .:
 the obliques of α, δ or λ. Uncertain trace cf ink. 15] .: the right-hand half of δ.
 16] .: a peak as in α, δ or λ. Top horizontal, with left-hand vertical joint.

COL. XXI

(D 6, B 10, H 60, D 7, D 6a, I 48, B 11, H 38)

οντετοψυχ[...]τωιψυχρωιθορννηιδελεγ[...].ηλοι
 οπιεντωιαε.ικαταμικραμεμερικμεναεκινειτο
 καιεθορννυτοθορννυμεναδεκατασυνεσταθη
 5 προσαλληλαμεχριδετουτο.εθορννυτομεχρι
 εκαστονηλθενειστοσυνηθεσαφροδιτηουρανια
 καιζευσκαιαφροδιγιαζειν.αιθορννυθαικαιπειθω
 καιαρμονιατωιαυτωιθεωινονομακειταιανηρ
 γυναικιμιγ.μενοσαφροδιγιαζεινλεγει.ικατα
 φατιντωγα.νυνεοντωμμιχθεντωνολ[...].λοις
 10 αφροδιτηων.μασθηπειθωδοτειξενταε[...].ντα
 αλλη[...].....[...].κεινδεκαιπειθειντοαντο[...].ρμοναδε
 οτιπο[] ρμοσετωνεοντωνεκατω[]
 ημμεγγ[] οσθενωγ.μασθηδεγενεσ[...].επει
 15 διεκριθ[] κριεη.ιδηλοιοτ[...].[] ...c
 [] .ατειωστεδι...[]
 [] .[] ..[] .υv

1].: the lower right-hand part of δ. 2 ε.ι: lower part of vertical, close to ε and at a distance from ι; γ or ρ possible. 4 ο.ε: the ends of both prongs of υ or ψ. 6 ν.α: the right-hand ends of two obliques as in κ or χ. 8 γ.μ: the right-hand half of ο; a dark spot touching the lower part of the curve gives the false impression of a vertical. τ.ι: the foot of a right-hand oblique as in α or λ; some high traces may belong to the same letter but the papyrus is crumpled and a foreign piece covers a part of it. 9 α.ν: a spot, level with the top of the letters. [: the foot of a left-hand oblique as in α or λ. 10 ν.μ: middle traces of ink. 11 η.ι: the peak of α, δ or λ. The upper left-hand arc of ο or θ.]....[: high trace of right-hand end of ascending horizontal as in c, τ etc. Near it, a high trace of ink. At a distance from the previous trace, the top of a vertical with a slight inclination to the right, like the right-hand upright of η or ν. A high right angle as in γ, ε or π. ο.[: the feet of two uprights. An inverted λ on the top of ο belongs to a tiny foreign piece. 12 εχ: clearly visible in

COL. XXI

- οὔτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῷ ψυχρῷ. “θόρ(ν)ηι” δὲ λέγ[ων] δηλοῖ
 ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα ἐκινεῖτο
 καὶ ἐθόρνυτο, θορνύμενα δ’ ἕκα(σ)τα συνεστάθη
 πρὸς ἄλληλα. μέχρι δὲ τούτου ἐθόρνυτο, μέχρι
 5 ἕκαστον ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σύνηθες. Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία
 καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ θόρνυσθαι καὶ Πειθῶ
 καὶ Ἀρμονία τῷ αὐτῷ θεῷ ὄνομα κεῖται. ἀνὴρ
 γυναικὶ μισγόμενος ἀφροδισιάζειν λέγεται κατὰ
 φάτιν· τῶν γὰρ νῦν ἐόντων μιχθέντων ἀλλ[ή]λοις
 10 Ἀφροδίτη ὠνομάσθη· Πειθῶ δ’ ὅτι εἶξεν τὰ ἐ[ό]ντα
 ἀλλήλο[ι]σιν· ε[ῖ]κειν δὲ καὶ πείθειν τὸ αὐτόν· [Α]ρμονίᾳ δὲ
 ὅτι πο[λλὰή]ρμοσε τῶν ἐόντων ἐκάστω[ι].
 ἦν μὲν γ[ὰρ] καὶ π[ρ]όσθεν, ὠνομάσθη δὲ γενέσθ[αι] ἐπεὶ
 διεκρίθη· δι[α]κριθῆναι δηλοῖ σ[τ]...[.....]τεῖς
 15 κ[ρ]ατεῖ ὥστε δι...[]
].[]γ.[] γῦν

— — —

older photographs. 13].: middle traces of ink. γμ: upper part of curved letter. .[: upper left-hand part of oblique or curve. 14].κ: foot of right-hand oblique as in α or λ. ...: the left-hand vertical and the oblique of ν. Uncertain middle and low traces of ink. [...][: the missing letter can only be ι. Following it, a top horizontal as in ε. Uncertain high traces of ink. 15].: the right-hand part of the roundel of ρ. τεδι...: on a piece (fr. D 6a) stuck to the bottom of fr. D 6, possibly consisting of two layers. The traces following δι cannot be reconciled with any known letter-form; from the lower layer? κ]ρατεῖ or ἐπικ]ρατεῖ followed by ὥστε διακρ[ιθῆναι]? 16].[: high trace, perhaps of an upright.].[: the oblique and the right-hand upright of ν. Uncertain high traces, perhaps of the right angle of γ or ε.].υv: the right-hand upright of ν. A short upright, visible on the top of the left-hand prong of υ, is not ink.

COL. XXII

(B 11, H 38, D 8, I 10, B 12, H 37, D 9, A 9, I 60, A 1, H 19)

- πα.[...]νομοιω[.]νομασενωσ.αλλισταη[.]ατο
 γινωσκωντωνανθρωπωντημφυσινωσ.ο.παντες
 ομοιανεχουσινουδεθελουσιμπαντεςταυτα
 κρατιςτενοντεςλεγουσιοτιαναντωνεκαται
 5 επι.υμονελθιαπερανθελοντεςτυγχανωσι
 ουδαματαυταυποπλεονεξιασταδεκαιυπαμαθιας
 γηδεκαιμητηρκαιρεακαιηρηαντηεκληθηδε
 γημενομωιμ.τηρδοτιεκταυτηςπανταγ[.]εται
 γηκαιγαιακατα[.]ωσσανεκαστοιςδημητη.[]
 10 ωνομασθηωσπε.ηγημητηρεξαμφοτερωνε[.]φνομα
 — τοαυτογαρην — εστιδεκαιεντοιςυμνοισει.[.]μενον
 δ.μητηρ[.]εαγημ..ηρεσπαδη.ωικαλε[.]αιγα[]
 καιδηιωσπεδη[.]ηνετημειξειδηλωσειδ.[...]αν
 κ.ταταεπ.γε.[...]ρεαδοτιπολλακαι..[] []
 15 ζωιαεφυ[] ξαντηςρεακ..[]
 κα.[] ηδεκ[]
- — —

1 .[: lower part of upright, close to the preceding α. c.α: uncertain traces of ink in fr. B 12; high and low traces in fr. D 9, compatible with the right-hand tips of the obliques in κ.].: uncertain bottom traces, close to the following α. 2 ο.π: very low middle vertical as in τ, υ, φ, ψ. 5 ι.υ: upper right-hand arc. 8 μ.τ: foot of vertical, close to the preceding μ. 9 .[: the upper part of α, δ or λ. .[: lower part of vertical. 10 ε.η: uncertain high traces of ink. 11 .[: upper left-hand right angle as in γ, ε, π or ρ. 12 δ.μ: right-hand vertical. ..: left-hand vertical. Right-hand end of high horizontal as in γ, ε or τ. η.ω: uncertain low traces of ink. The available space can accommodate only ι. ε[: ε is clearly visible in older photographs. Its upper horizontal and part of its middle horizontal are now in a detached piece of pa-

COL. XXII

- πάν[τ' οὐ]ν ὁμοίω[ς ὦ]νόμασεν ὡς κάλλιστα ἡ[δύ]γατο,
 γινώσκων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι οὐ πάντες
 ὁμοίαν ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ θέλουσιν πάντες ταυτά·
 κρατιστεύοντες λέγουσι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν ἐκάστωι
 5 ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἔλθῃ, ἅπερ ἂν θέλοντες τυγχάνωσι,
 οὐδαμὰ ταυτά, ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ' ἀμαθίας.
 Γῆ δὲ καὶ Μήτηρ καὶ Ῥέα καὶ Ἥρη ἡ αὐτή. ἐκλήθη δὲ
 Γῆ μὲν νόμωι, Μήτηρ δ' ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης πάντα γ[ίν]εται,
 Γῆ καὶ Γαῖα κατὰ [γ]λῶσσαν ἐκάστοις. Δημήτηρ [δὲ]
 10 ὠνομάσθη ὥσπερ ἡ Γῆ Μήτηρ, ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἔ[ν] ὄνομα·
 — τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἦν. — ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ὑμνοῖς εἰρ[η]μένον·
 “Δημήτηρ [Ρ]έα Γῆ Μήτηρ Ἑστία Δηιών”. καλεῖ[τ]αι γὰρ [ρ]
 καὶ Δηιών ὅτι ἐδηϊ[ώθ]η ἐν τῇ μείξει· δηλώσει δὲ [λί]αν
 κατὰ τὰ ἔπη γεγ[νάν]. Ῥέα δ' ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ προ[ι]κ[ί]λα]
 15 ζῶια ἔφθ [ἐκρεύσαντα] ἐξ αὐτῆς, Ῥέα καὶ [Ρεΐη]
 κατ[ὰ] γλῶσσαν ἐκάστοις. Ἥρη δ' ἐκ[λήθη] ὅτι

— — —

pyrus. 13 .[: upper left-hand right angle as in γ, ε, π or ρ. 14 κ.τ: uncertain
 low left-hand traces of ink. π.γ: left-hand foot of vertical. ε.[: top of vertical,
 close to the preceding ε. ..[][: traces of top horizontal. Top arc or peak of α, δ
 or λ. Top of vertical, slightly inclined to the left. If ι or the left-hand part of a letter
 (η or κ), there is enough space for another letter before it; if the right-hand part of a
 letter (ν?), this letter covers the entire space. 15 .[: right-hand ends of the hori-
 zontals of ε. ..[: oblique, like the left-hand s-rope of α, δ or λ. The top of a vertical
 in a detached piece. 16 .[: uncertain traces of a high horizontal. .[: the roundel
 and top part of the upright of ρ, torn in the middle.

COL. XXIII

(A 1, H 19, D 10, A 2, H 26, D 11, I 73, I 65, A 3)

- του το το ε πο σ π. [...] γω γο μ πε πο η ται και το [...] εν
 πολ. οι α δη λο νε σ π ν το ις δε ο ρ θω σ γινω σ κού σιν
 ευ δη λο νο τι ω κε α νο σε σ π ν ο η ρ α η ρ δε ζ ευ σ
 ου κ ου νε μ η ρ α το ν ζ α ν α ε τ ρ ο ς ζ ευ α λ λ α ν το ς
 5 αυ τω ις θ νο ς με γ α ο ι δο υ γινω σ κ ο ν τε σ τ. ν
 ω κε α ν ο ν πο τ α μ ο ν δο κ ου σι ν ει ν αι ο τι ε υ ρ υ ρ ε ο ν τ α
 — προ σ ε θ η κ ε ν — ο δε σ η μ αι ν ει τ η ν αυ το υ γ ν ω μ η ν
 εν το ις λε γ ο μ ε ν [...] ις και νο μι ζ ο μ ε νο ις ρ η μ ασι
 και γ α ρ τ ω ν α ν [...] ρ ω π ω ν το υς με γ α δ υ ν α [...] ν τ ας
 10 — με γ α λ ο υς φ α σ ι ρ. η ν αι το δε χ ο μ ε ν ο ν
 — ι ν α σ δε γ [...] α χ ε λ ω ι ο ν α ρ γ [...] ο δι γ [...] τω [...] υ δ α [...] ι α χ ε λ ω ι ο ν ο νο μ [...] ι δ [...] τα [...] δ ι ν α [...] ξ α ι ε σ τ [...] ε. γ. τ. [...] ι [...] τη [...] ω ν α ν [...] ...
 15 ε κ α [...] δ ε β ο υ λ [...] .. γ [...] ν τ ε [...]

— — —

1 .[: oblique, like the left-hand leg of α or λ.].: bottom spot of ink. 2 λ.ο: foot of oblique, like the left-hand one of α or λ. 5 τ.ν: upper left arc of circular letter. 9 .[: high spot of ink and traces of the foot of a middle vertical. 10 ρ.η: the right-hand prong of υ. 11 ...[: upright close to the preceding γ. Muddled traces, like the right-hand oblique and the cross-bar of α. High horizontal.].: right-hand part of ξ or c. γ.[: high spots of ink as in υ or χ. γ.[: high spot of ink; perhaps an upright. 12].: uncertain traces of the right-hand arc of a rounded letter. Oblique, like the left-hand stroke of α, δ or λ.].: right-hand end of ξ or c.].: a long top horizontal: γ or τ. If the latter, the vertical has disappeared under a thick fiber.].: left-hand foot of an oblique as in α, λ or c; alternatively, the bottom knob of ε. 13]ξ: bottom spot of ink.]ε: a low horizontal, joined to a descending oblique; apparently δ. ε.γ: high horizontal, joined to vertical on the left

COL. XXIII

- τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γωγὸν πεπόηται καὶ το[ῖς] μὲν
 πολλοῖς ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώσκουσιν
 εὐδηλον ὅτι “Ὠκεανός” ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ, ἀήρ δὲ Ζεὺς.
 οὐκ οὖν “ἐμήσατο” τὸν Ζᾶνα ἕτερος Ζεὺς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς
 5 αὐτῷ “σθένος μέγα”. οἱ δ’ οὐ γινώσκοντες τὸν
 Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ὅτι “εὐρὺ ρέοντα”
 — προσέθηκεν. — ὁ δὲ σημαίνει τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην
 ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ο]ις καὶ νομιζομένοις ῥήμασι.
 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀν[θ]ρώπων τοὺς μέγα δυνατ[οῦ]ντας
 10 — “μεγάλους” φασὶ ῥυῆναι. τὸ δ’ ἐχόμενον·
 — “ἵνας δ’ ἐγκατ[έ]λεξ’ Ἀχελωῖου ἀργυ[ρ]οδίνε[ω]”.
 τῷ[ι] ὕδα[τι] ὄλ[ως τίθη]σι Ἀχελῷον ὀνομ[α]. ὅ[τι] δὲ
 τα[ρ]δίνα[ς ἐγκαταλ]έξαι ἐστ[ι] ...]δε ἐγκατ[έ]λ[ου]σιν
 τὴν [γ]ὰρ [c. 10]των αυ[τ]]...
 15 ἐκασ[τ]]δε βουλ[]
 ε.γ[]οντε[]

— — —

(γ, ε, π). γ...: an upright close to γ and the lower part of a descending oblique; most probably κ. A triangular letter: α or λ. τ[: a thick midline trace; if ink, perhaps ω?].ι: uncertain bottom traces, like the right-hand foot of α, δ or λ. 14 η[: muddled traces of a vertical and a top horizontal as in γ.].ι[: peak of α, δ or λ. The upper part of ρ.].ω: upper horizontal.]...: upper right-hand end of oblique as in κ or υ; if a trace δη its left belongs to the peak of a vertical, the letter is κ; if this trace is not ink, κ, c, τ, υ, χ are possible. Upper part of a rounded letter: θ or ο. Peak of vertical, at some distance from the preceding letter; α cannot be excluded. 15 .ι[: left-hand foot of oblique and a top spot; almost certainly c. 16 ..γ[: left-hand vertical, joining horizontals at the top and middle; ε, β or ρ? Peak of a letter at the middle between the adjacent letters; α, δ or λ?].: right-hand part of rounded letter.

COL. XXIV

(A 3, H 6, D 12, H 9, I 20, D 13, A 4, H 15)

ιαεστινεκτου[...]συμετρουμεναοσαδ[...].η ι
 — κυκλοειδεαουχοιοντειομεληειναιδηλοιδοδε
 — ηπολλοιςφαινειμεροπεccieπαπειροναγαιαν
 τουτοτοεποcδοξειεναντιcαλλωcερηc.αιoτι
 5 ηνυπερβαλημαλλονταεονταφαι..ταιηπριν
 υπερβαλλεινοδεουτουτολεγειφαινειναυτην
 ειγαρτουτοελεγεουκαμπολλοιcεφηφαινειναυτην
 αλλαπαcιναματοιcτετηγγηνεργαζομενοιc
 και.οι.ναυτιλλομενοιcοποτεχηρπλειντουτοιc
 10 τηνωρανειγαρμηγηνσεληνηουκανεξηρ[...].cκον
 οιανθρωποιτοναριθμονουτετωνωρεωνο.τετων
 ανεμω[]καιταλλαπαντα[]ην
 εκ[]cαεν[]ξει
].θατω.[]ι
 15].νητουτ.[]
].αλλα.ο.[]c
]...c[]

— — —

4 c.α: traces of the left-hand part of a rounded letter. 5 ..: top ends of two up-
 rights, the second higher than the first. High horizontal, joined at its left-hand end
 by an upright as in γ or ε. 9 ι.ο: left-hand end of high horizontal. ι.ν: uniden-
 tifiable middle traces of ink. 11 ο.τ: high right-hand end of ascending o-
 blique. 14].θ: low right-hand end of descending oblique. .[: foot of an up-
 right, close to the preceding ω. 15 .[: unidentifiable middle traces, close to the

COL. XXIV

- ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ [μέ]σου μετρούμενα· ὅσα δ[ὲ μ]ή
 — κυκλοειδέα οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσομελῇ εἶναι. δηλοῖ δὲ τόδε·
 — “ἡ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσι ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν”.
 τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος δόξειεν ἂν τις ἄλλως ἐρῆσθαι, ὅτι,
 5 ἦν ὑπερβάλῃ, μᾶλλον τὰ ἐόντα φαίνεται ἢ πρὶν
 ὑπερβάλλειν. ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, φαίνειν αὐτήν·
 εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγε, οὐκ ἂν “πολλοῖς” ἔφη φαίνειν αὐτήν,
 ἀλλὰ ‘πᾶσιν’ ἅμα τοῖς τε τὴν γῆν ἐργαζομένοις
 καὶ τοῖς ναυτιλλομένοις, ὅποτε χρὴ πλεῖν τοῦτοις
 10 τὴν ὥραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν σελήνη, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηγύ[ι]σκον
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὔτε τῶν ὥρέων οὔτε τῶν
 ἀνέμων [c. 8] καὶ ἄλλα πάντα [c. 7] ἦν
 εκ[]σα εν[]ξι
]θατω.[]ι
 15]νητουτ.[]
] ἄλλα ἐόν[τα]ς
]φη[]
- — —

preceding τ. 16 α.ο.[: high horizontal and right-hand middle spot of ink; certainly ε. Following ο the bottom tip of a vertical slightly inclined to the right. 17]...: very long upright, slightly inclined to the left and smudged in the middle; most likely φ. An upright, at some distance from the preceding letter.

COL. XXV

(A 4, H 15, D 14, A 5, H 23, A 7, H 54, A 4a, H 27, A 6, H 5)

και λαμπρο[.]ταταδεξωνησελην[.].υκοταταμ.ν
 τωναλλαγκατατοναντονλογονμε.ερισμενα
 θερμαδου.εσπιεστιδεκαιαλλαανιν.ντωιαερικας
 αλληλωνα[.]ωρουμενααλλατηςμενημερησαδηλεστιν
 5 υ[.].τουηλιουεπικρατουμενατηςδευνεκτοσεοντα
 δηλαεστινεπικρατειταιιδεδιαμικ[.]οσητα
 αιωρειταιιδαντωνεκασταεναναγκηιακαμψυνητι
 προσαλληλαιγαρμηκυνηλθοιαλαεσοσπηναυτην
 δυναμινεχειεξωνηλιοςκυνησταθητανυνεοντα
 10 οθ.οσειμηθη.λενειναιουκανεποηκενηλιονεποιησεδε
 τοιουτογκαιτ[.]σουτονγινομενονιοσεναρχηιτουλογου
 διηγε..αιτα..πιτουτοιεπιπροσθετ[.]ιειται
 _ [...]ου[.]μενο[.]παντασγιν[.]σκ[.].ενδε[.]ωιδεσμηαι[.]ε[
 _ [...]..[.].ειδ[....].αδιο[.....]σα[.].γα
 15].τρονη.[
].πηγ[.
]ων.[

1 Ꞥ: foot of an upright. Ꞥ.: upright, bending to the left in its lower part. Ꞥ.v: right-hand end of top horizontal. Ꞥ.v: top and bottom right-hand ends of horizontals. 2 ε.ε: upright, bending slightly to the right. 3 v.ε: upper part of an upright. v.v: upright. 5 Ꞥ.: uncertain high traces. 10 θ.o: traces of the lower part of an upright and, after the break, of the right-hand end of a low horizontal. θ.λ: upper end of an upright and, after the break, the right-hand end of a top horizontal. 12 ε.: a high spot of ink. A top horizontal in a slightly transposed piece of papyrus. α.: left-hand end of a low horizontal. Right-hand end of a top

COL. XXV

καὶ λαμπρό[τ]ητα· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡ σελήνη [λ]ευκώτατα μὲν
τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεμερισμένα,
θερμὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νῦν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἐκὰς
ἀλλήλων α[ι]ωρούμεν', ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἡμέρης ἄδηλ' ἐστὶν
5 ὑ[π]ὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπικρατούμενα, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐόντα
δηλὰ ἐστίν, ἐπικρατεῖται δὲ διὰ σμικ[ρ]ότητα.
αἰωρεῖται δ' αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκῃ, ὥς ἂν μὴ συνίπῃ
πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ μή, συνέλθοι (ἂν) ἀλέα ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν
δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθῃ. τὰ νῦν ἐόντα
10 ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ᾔθελεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον. ἐποίησε δὲ
τοιοῦτον καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον οἷος ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου
διηγεῖται. τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπίπροσθε π[ο]ιεῖται
—[οὐ β]ου[λό]μεν[ο]ς πάντας γιν[ώ]σκε[ι]ν. ἐν δὲ [τ]ῶιδε σημαί[ν]ε[ι].
—“[αὐτ]ὰρ [ἐ]πεὶ δ[ὲ] πᾶν]τα Διὸς φ[ο]ρὴν μή[σατ]ο ἔ[ργα]”.

15]τρωνη[
]πηγι[
]ων[

horizontal. 13 .[: upright. .[: upright. 14 ..[: descending oblique. α, δ or λ possible. Top left-hand right angle. .[: upright. .[: α: top horizontal. .[: left-hand end of top horizontal. .[: γ: lower end of an upright with traces of a middle curve. ρ is likely. 15 .[: right-hand foot of a descending oblique. α or λ rather than κ. .[: left-hand foot of an ascending oblique, more bent than α or λ. c or χ. 16 .[: traces like the right-hand half of μ or η. ..[: three parallel uprights with uncertain traces of a stroke between them. 17 .[: traces like the left-hand ends of the obliques in χ.

COL. XXVI

(H 5, A 6, H 20, H 14, I 35, A 8, H 33, I 21)

- μη[.]οcμενοτιμητηρον..cectινωναλλω.
 εacδεοτιαγαθcδηλοιδεκαievenτοicδετοιceπε.ιν
 — οτιαγαθηνcημαινει
 — ερμημαιαδοςνιεδιακτορεδωτορε.ων
 5 — δηλοιδεκαievenτ[.]ιδε
 — δοιοιγαρτεπιθοικατακηγαιενδιοcουδει
 — δωρωνοιαδιδουcικακωνετεροcδετεαων
 — οιδετορρημαουγινωcκοντεcδοκο.cινειναι
 μητροceαυτοουδειπερηθελeneαυτουμητροc
 10 εμφιλοτηπαποδειξαιθελονταμιχθηναιτον
 θεονεξηναυτωιγραμματαπααρακλιναντα
 μητροceοιοειπε[.]νουτω.[.]ανεαντ..γινοιτο
 [.....].υτηcανε[.....]ηλονοτι.[.....]..[]
 [.....]εντηcυ.[.....].αμφοτερ[
 15 [.....]αγαθι.[.....].α..[
 [.....].ενα.[

— — —

1 ..: uncertain high traces of ink. Foot of an upright. ω: upright, followed by uncertain traces. 2 ε.ι: uncertain low traces. 4 ε.ω: two obliques meeting on top. α or λ. 8 ο.c: high ascending stroke, like the right-hand oblique of υ. 12 μητρο: only the upper part of the letters survive, but the readings are reliable. .[: upright.].: right-hand part of a high circle, like the roundel of ρ. ...: left-hand part of a circular letter. Right-hand end of an ascending stroke, like τ or υ. 13].: foot of descending oblique. [: left-hand ends of top and bottom hor-

COL. XXVI

- “μη[τρ]ός” μὲν ὅτι μήτηρ ὁ Νοῦς ἐστὶν τῶν ἄλλων,
 “ἑᾶς” δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθῆς. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν
 ὅτι ἀγαθὴν σημαίνει.
 — “Ἑρμῇ Μαιάδος υἱὲ διάκτορε δῶτορ ἑάων”.
 5 — δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τ[ῶ]ιδε·
 — “δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακίηται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
 δῶρων, οἷα διδοῦσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ τ’ ἑάων”.
 οἱ δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα οὐ γινώσκοντες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι
 ‘μητρὸς ἑαυτοῦ’. ὁ δ’ εἴπερ ἤθελεν “ἑαυτοῦ μητρὸς
 10 ἐν φιλότῃ” ἀποδεῖξαι “ἑέλοντα μιχθῆναι” τὸν
 θεόν, ἐξῆν αὐτῶι γράμματα παρακλίναντα
 ‘μητρὸς ἑοῖο’ εἶπε[ι]ν. οὕτω γ[ὰ]ρ ἂν ‘ἑαυτοῦ’ γίνοιτο,
 [υἱὸς δ’] αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη δ[η]λον ὅτι .[.....]..[]
 [.....] ἐν τῇ συγ[γ].....]. ἀμσοπερ[
 15 [.....] ἀγαθῇ. []..[
 [.....].ενα.[

— — —

izontals. ζ, c or, less likely, ξ.]..[: uncertain high traces. 14 .[: upright, meet-
 ing on top with a horizontal. γ or π.]..[: bottom tip of a upright, close to the follow-
 ing α. 15 .[: left-hand end of a bottom horizontal. ω rather than δ.]..[: high
 traces, perhaps of a horizontal.]..[: upper arc of a circular letter. Uncertain high
 traces. 16]..[: traces of a circular letter.]..[: ink-traces, like the left-hand part
 of ζ or c.

UNPLACED FRAGMENTS*

GROUP F

F 10

]κε.[
]επιτα[
].οις καὶ κα[
]αι τὰ σημεῖα
5]υ.ευχης[
]...[

F 18 + H 45

]χης[....]..λ[
]υρος ὕδατος δ.[
].ν ἕκαστα σημεῖα [
].υκα....λος.[

* All fragments are to be understood as having dashes below and above them. There are no certain cases of remains of the upper margin.

F 10

1 κ rather than α. Then, a low wavy horizontal, certainly an ε. Then, the low tip of an upright, quite lower than the bottom line and at somewhat greater distance from the preceding letter than one would expect if it belonged to an ι or ρ. E.g. οὐκ εἶ [, οὐκ εἶ [λογον or κεφ[αλ? 3].: κ rather than λ. At the end, after κα, a folded edge. 5]υ.ευχης[: the second letter might be θ but not π. 6].: the right-hand ends of two parallel horizontals. If ε, then possibly χ[.

If τὰ σημεῖα are supernatural signs (cf. ἕκαστα σημεῖα in fr. F 18 + H 45), fr. F 10 (and fr. F 18 + H 45) can be plausibly assumed to come from the first columns; see Commentary, col. V.6-7. If]υθευχης in 5 is correctly read, one can think only of ἐν-τα]θθ' εὐχῆς; the poetic ἀνε]υθ' εὐχῆς would be out of place.

F 18 + H 45

1]...: uncertain low tips. 2 At the end, following δ, a tall upright, almost certainly ι. 3].: lower part of an upright, most probably ι. 4].: upper part of a leftward sloping oblique as in α, δ, λ. Its lower part might be hidden in a tiny fold of the papyrus. α....λος.: following α, upper part of upright, almost certainly ι. Then, left-hand tip of high horizontal as in τ; the right-hand end of the horizontal is visible in fr. H 45. The lower left-hand side of fr. H 45 had been somewhat displaced downwards but, if aligned, the letter- and fiber-sequences become clear. Following c, a rightward sloping oblique. Read]υκαταλλος[.

In 1 one could supplement εὐ]χῆς (cf. fr. F 10.5). In 2 π]υρὸς ὕδατος suggests itself. The asyndeton is remarkable. Fire and water are referred to here probably as means of divination (pyromancy and hydromancy), not as elements. For ἕκαστα σημεῖα in 3 see above on fr. F 10; if φαίνουσ]ιν, the subject are those whose ranks include the speaker in col. V. In 4, we should probably punctuate after]υ. (πο)λύς(?) and read καὶ τῶν ὅσων, perhaps a reference to signs obtained by means other than pyromancy and hydromancy.

F 14	F 17	F 19	F 20
.περ φυσ..[]υπελα.[.ερ.[].[
]μενα εύχ.[]α δίκης []ναι..[]ιν άμφ.. [
]ανημμε[] άνθρω[π]ι έᾱμ μ.. [
]....[]...υ[]...[

F 14

1]: low tip of leftward sloping oblique, possibly α. φυσ..[: ικ rather than ιν. 2 χ[: after χ the surface is worn. A misaligned, rightward sloping oblique might belong to another layer. 3] άνημμέ[v- 4 Uncertain top tips of letters.

In 1 οἱ]απερ or καθ]άπερ φυσικῶς? Cf. col. IV.6, ὅσπερ ἵκελα[άστρο]λόγωι. It is conceivable that here the Derveni author refers to Orpheus as a μυθολόγος who is in fact a φυσικός (see col. XIII.5-6, Intro. V §§ 1-6). If so, άνημμέ[v- in 3 could pick out the domination of the precosmic universe by fire in the cosmology that the Derveni author teases out of Orpheus' poem about the gods (cf. εἰσθεῖ in col. IX.9).]μενα εύχ.[in 2 could be a reference to the religious use Orpheus' poetry or words (ἔπη) are put by people like the speaker in col. V, claimants to expertise in sacred rites whose clients are pitied in col. XX; see the discussion of the Derveni author's aims in Intro. VI, esp. §§ 10-16. The fragment might come from the vicinity of col. IV with the Heraclitus quotation; see Commentary, col. IV §§ 2-3, 5-6.

F 17

1]: rightward sloping oblique, with a sharp angle at the top. Certainly μ.

Most probably υπελάμ[βαν-. For]α δίκης[in 2 cf.]α δίκης[in col. IV.12, where the reference might be either to justice or to Dike in the Heraclitus quotation (col. IV.7-9). The fibers in fr. F 17 resemble those in the right-hand part of col. IV, after the kollesis visible in fr. H 46, F 15. Could υπελάμ[βανε be said of Heraclitus with regard to his use of personification and allegory in setting out cosmological doctrines? If so, the verb could pick out the sense in which Heraclitus speaks of the Erinyes and Dike as guardians of the size of the Sun. See Commentary, col. IV.9.

F 19

1]: an upright, possibly ι.]: a curved trace of ink at midline. Perhaps ο. ιεpp[? 2]: a tiny foreign piece of papyrus covers the ink-traces.]: much like λ, though its left-hand oblique is anomalously short. Then uncertain traces. 4]...υ[: the upper end of a vertical. A top horizontal. Space for a thin letter. A curved top stroke, as in θ or ο. Then, the left-hand half of the fork in υ.

F 20

1 Lower half of ο rather than θ. 2]: right-hand ends of two parallel horizontals. ε? Following φ, uncertain traces of ink. 3]: top angle as in α.]: illegible traces. A piece of papyrus from another layer has stuck to the right-hand part of the fragment.

GROUP G

G 9	G 16	G 18
] ...[].. [].. οιϐ . []ριη [5]αιφ[]..πλ.. .. c[]..εη []..ειδ. [5].. []..ειϐ[]...[]...[]υϐ[]..ολιγ[5]..τ[

G 9

A vertical break in the fiber sequence is visible in the middle of the fragment. Though it looks like a *kollesis*, it is rather the edge of a second layer that remained on the right-hand part of the fragment, at the edge of which there might be shreds of a third layer.

1 In the lower layer, a faint και. In the upper one, an upright and then an ε followed by α. Then, uncertain traces. 2 In the lower layer, uncertain high tips of letters. In the upper one, an ε followed by uncertain traces. 3 In the lower layer, uncertain traces. In the upper one, οιϐ. Then, possibly in a third layer, an upright. 4 In the lower layer,]ριη. The upper one seems to be unwritten. 5 In the lower layer,]αιφ. In the upper one, a faint ο followed by unidentifiable traces.

G 16

The letters are smaller than usual, as in col. XII, where the scribe must have used a new or sharpened *kalamos*. The smaller size of the letters affects the density of the lines, which is also comparable to that in col. XII. The fragment, however, must come from the first columns. The letters in 1 are not in the right distance from the next line; they may belong to a foreign piece, possibly a second layer.

1].: an upright, which might not be ink. λ..|..|: α is also possible. Then ε, with its bottom horizontal covered by a fiber, rather than γ. After the gap, a low horizontal like that of c. πλε[ι]σ[τ]-? 2 No traces of ink are visible. 3].: uncertain traces. 4].: uncertain traces. .|.: uncertain traces. 5 Nothing visible. 6].: uncertain traces of an upright. Traces of a triangular letter, apparently α. 7 Nothing visible. 8 Nothing visible.

G 18

Very worn. Only a few letters are visible in the low right-hand part of the fragment.

2 The handwriting is unusually small and dense; a thick *kalamos* must have been used. 3]..τ.: first, the right-hand end of a middle horizontal, perhaps ε. Following τ, an oblique, possibly α.

G 19

]..τ.[
].οιϛ[
]...ω[
]....[
 5] [
]...[
] [

G 20

.[
 .[
].δη ε[
 ω[

G 21

G 19

1]..τ[: traces of a low horizontal, perhaps ε. Then, an upright like ι. After τ, an oblique, possibly α. ἔπ]εῖτα? 2].: a top horizontal, possibly τ. 3]...ω[: a slightly curved oblique, like the right-hand leg of μ. Then, possibly a round letter; ο. The space in between suffices only for ι. The last letter may perhaps be not ω but a triangular letter, like α, δ or λ. 4 α, δ or λ, followed by uncertain traces. 5-7 Nothing certain is visible.

G 20

The fragment may well contain the end of a column and the beginning of another.

G 21

Completely effaced and tattered.

GROUP H

H 1	H 4	H 10	H 11
] μέχρ[ι] καμ.[] .καίτ[] ..[
] προκει.[] νῆδιδιε.[] ...[] ..[
] ἰλην δε[] νουτε[] .v..[] [
][] νε[

H 12	H 13	H 16	H 17	H 21
] .[] ...[
][
][

H 1

1 The left-hand half of the initial μ is on a torn-off piece that partly covers the second and third letters (εχ). 2 .[: though there is plenty of space to the right of ι, no trace survives to indicate whether the last letter was μ or τ.

H 4

1 .[: ε rather than ι. 2 .[: top and bottom horizontals. c or ζ. 4 Uncertain traces.

H 10

1].: a leftward sloping oblique. 2 No certain traces. 3 Midline traces of ink. Following ν, probably a δ.

H 11

Very tattered fragment. Possibly the beginning of a column. The readable letters are small and delicate; cf. fr. G 16 and col. XII.

H 12

The sole visible trace may belong to a round letter, possibly ο.

H 13

Uncertain traces of ink. At the right-hand part of the middle line, possibly an oc.

H 16

Completely effaced.

H 17

Nothing visible.

H 21

Nothing visible.

H 22	H 24	H 29	H 32
] .[] . [
] — μ[] .ειναρ[
] — .[] εικω[
] ...[
H 40	H 41	H 47	H 48
] χ.[] ευ[] .ωμεν[] ..ε.[
] ο[] τω.[] υειν τι.[] ..ητ[
] οτ'ο[] δο.[
] .[

H 22

The beginning of a column. The size of the sole visible letter is small, which means that in all probability the fragment comes from the part of the papyrus after col. XII.

H 24

Either unwritten or completely effaced.

H 29

1 Bottom horizontal, perhaps excessively large, which is not unlikely in e.g. a δ. 2].: uncertain midline traces. 4 Uncertain top tips of letters, perhaps υτ.

H 32

Illegible traces of ink.

H 40

The distance between the two lines is unusually large. If this is the beginning of a new column, the letter aligned with, and at the right distance from, the ο at the beginning of the next line is not the χ but the next uncertain letter, perhaps an α, in which case the meaning of the χ is unclear.

H 41

2].: the foot of an upright, ι or υ. 3 οτο: above the line, between τ and the second ο, an ι. Apparently οτ ο[. 4 An upright whose slope suggests π or γ.

H 47

1].: a bottom tip. 2].: midline trace, perhaps ω.

H 48

1 A folded edge covers the first letters. Following ε, most probably a δ. 2]...: unidentifiable letters. 3 Before δ, two layers.

H 57	H 58	H 59	H 62
].[].ιϰμ[].[].ταζ[
]ογκα[].ιϰι[]τηρ[]...[
].[]θου[]με[].ε[
H 63	H 66	H 67	H 68
]ϰτε.[].εϰ.[].[]ϰτειναι.[
]ατα.[].....[]ιγ[]βιαϰτ.[
]υπε.[]γτ.[]τογ γεγρα[
]...ϰιγ.[
			5]οτα[

H 57

1 Unidentifiable traces. 3 Unidentifiable traces.

H 58

1].: a folded edge covers the first letters. A sloped bottom stroke. 2].: unidentifiable. .[: either η or ν.

H 59

1 Uncertain bottom traces of ink. 2].: an upright. 3].: either the right-hand stroke of ν or the fork of υ.

H 62

The density of the lines suggests a column written in small letters; cf. above on fr. H 22.

1].: unidentifiable bottom stroke. 2 Unwritten or completely effaced. 3 Unidentifiable traces.

H 63

1].: an upright with an angular top. γ rather than ν. 2].: an upright. ι or ρ.
3].: an oblique sloping to the right. λ or δ.

H 66

Only one line is visible.

1].: unidentifiable traces. After c, nothing can be made out.

H 67

1].: foot of a vertical. 2 γ[: ε is also possible. A folded edge gives the false impression of a β.

H 68

1].: an upright. 2].: ο is likely. 3]τογ γεγρα[μμένον. 4]...: a tiny middle trace that may well not be ink. A round letter; ο is likely. Finally, the fork of υ. Possibly,]οϰιγ.[? 5].: nothing can be made out.

GROUP I

Group I, which contains the tiniest fragments, contains also a great number of illegible pieces, either because the writing is completely effaced or, usually, because they were not written originally. Such fragments will, naturally, be listed with no text whatsoever and no apparatus.

I 1	I 3	I 4	I 6	I 7	I 8	I 11	I 12	I 13	I 14
].[]ε.[]....[].. [
]κνο[]πο[]... [
]ιμι[]δη[
]ομε[]ο[
		5]...[
I 15	I 16	I 17	I 18	I 19	I 22	I 23	I 24		
]ειc[]....[]..[]...[]αι.[]τ...[
]οcμε[]ραι.[]νχρη[]αιεχξε[
]υφ[]οcαα[]..α...[

I 6

The upper part of the photograph is damaged by a fingerprint.

1].: an upright joined at its low end to a horizontal; perhaps ε. 3].: on top the right-hand end of a horizontal and at the bottom an uncertain trace. Perhaps c. If so, there are relics of two words: -ci μι-. 5]...[: uncertain top trace, a top horizontal as in ε, the top stroke and part of the upper oblique of c. A curved trace on c may belong to a second layer.

I 7

1].: part of a midline curve meeting an upright, possibly φ. 4].: end of top horizontal meeting o; possibly γ, ε, τ.

I 11

Top horizontal joined to a vertical; γ or ε. The following traces are not identifiable.

I 13

Illegible traces of four lines.

I 14

Unidentifiable traces.

I 15

2].: leftward sloping upright close to o, perhaps μ. ἡρ]μοσμέ[v-? Many possibilities if ἡρος μελ. 3 Top tips of νο.

I 25

].[
]κα.[
]φυτ[

I 27

].μ[
].ηρ^α|τωιθ[
].αλιπιδομε[
].υς.[

I 28**I 29****I 31**

]νομηεν[
]..[

I 16

A vertical followed by a top acute angle as in α. The remaining traces are uncertain and out of alignment; they might belong to a second layer.

I 17

1].[: two spaced feet of uprights. 2].ρ^α.[: rightward-looking obliques, like the fork of κ or χ, then ρ rather than β and, following α, perhaps π. μι]κρ^αi (-αι or -αι) π[, κρ^αiπ[αλ- and κρ^αiπ[v- are possible.

I 18

1]...[: feet of verticals. 3 Circular letter, most likely ο; traces of top and bottom slanting horizontals, possibly c; αα or αλ.

I 23

1 .[: a round letter, ο or θ. 2 χ is unusually wide. 3 At the left-hand end, a folded edge, then probably an η. After α, probably α.

I 24

Foot of the right-hand oblique of α or λ followed by a τ. Then, uncertain traces of ink.

I 25

1].[: foot of upright. 2 κ rather than υ. Then, probably ε.

I 27

The right-hand part of the fragment seems to be covered by a second layer.

1].: low part of an upright, slightly sloping to the left; perhaps μ. 2].: the right-hand ends of the prongs of κ or χ. After ρ, the left-hand oblique of α, whose right-hand part is covered by the second layer (τωιθ). 3].: uncertain top trace. Half of π is covered by the second layer (δομε).

I 31

1 Perhaps ἵνα] νομη εὖ [or εὖ[κόλως or εὖ[χερῶς *vel sim.* 2 Nothing can be identified.

I 32	I 36	I 38	I 42	I 43	I 44	I 45
]πρ[]....[]εα[]με[]εμ[
]..τοδ[]....[]μαιν[]ολ[
]αυθ.α[]ο[
]..[
I 46	I 47	I 50	I 51	I 52	I 53	
]..[]δαξαντ[]ο.[
]οϛ[]ενονεπ[]..ορ[
]υϛ[

I 32

2 Although there is enough space for two letters to the left of τοδ, nothing is visible. 3 The traces of the letter between θ and α give the impression of υ. ἐντ]αυθ' ὑα[or τ]αυθ' ὑα[?

I 36

Two lines of ink-traces are visible but the letters they belong to cannot be identified with certainty. Possibly μιζ in the first line and πομ in the second.

I 42

1].: ν is likely.

I 44

An ε is perhaps visible.

I 45

1 A vertical before ε may be a tear in the papyrus.

I 46

1].: ο or, more likely, ω. 2]ο: the right-hand part of a high horizontal joined to a vertical; τ rather than γ.

I 47

1 Though extremely effaced by the fire, the letters are more or less certain, even the τ, of which only the left-hand tip of the horizontal is visible. πατ]δα ἐαντ[οῦ or ἐαντ[ῆς? 2 A tiny piece of papyrus, slightly transposed near the left-hand edge, shows the lower part of the initial ε. ἐχόμ]ενον ἐπ[οϛ? Cf. col. XII.1, where this line fits exactly, but the whole fragment is impossible to accommodate.

I 52

1]ο.: a bottom stroke, curved like the low horizontal of c. Following ο, an upright joined to at least one horizontal; η or ε. 2]..: uncertain ink-traces.

I 55	I 56	I 57	I 62	I 66	I 67
]..[].ç[].ε[
].[]ατ[]..τ[
].c[]..ε[
I 68	I 69	I 70	I 71	I 72	I 74
].[].[
]μα[].υ[
]ρα[].ο[
I 75	I 76	I 77	I 78	I 79	I 80
].ωct.[].c[]απ[].[
]..[]νηφ[]απν[

I 55

1]..[: the feet of two converging obliques like those of α. Foot of upright sloping to the right. 2].: traces of a triangular letter like α, δ or λ.

I 62

1 A tiny circle, perhaps not of ink, followed by a c. 2 Probably α; then, a top horizontal which can only belong to τ, for otherwise the vertical would fall upon the right-hand leg of α.

I 69

Perhaps not ink-traces.

I 70

3].: ι is very likely.

I 71

1 Uncertain traces before and after υ. 2 A top horizontal before ο.

I 75

1 The first letter is most probably a c. After ι, ν is likely. 2 Two successive high horizontals.

I 78

1].: foot of oblique sloping to the left; perhaps α.

I 80

Probably ρ.

I 81	I 82	I 83	I 84	I 86	I 87
	.υθ.[.ομ.[]ανθ[]υ[
I 88	I 89	I 90	I 91	I 92	
]....[]çπ[].[
I 93	I 94	I 95	I 96	I 97	
]....[].[]οι.[].[

I 82

Before υ, an oblique sloping to the left; after θ, an oblique sloping to the right. ἐντ]αῖθα [?

I 83

Right-hand ends of two parallel horizontals; the distance between them does not suggest ε. ζ is likely. Following μ, traces of a vertical like that in ε; -ζομε- ?

I 84

1 ἀνθ[ρωπ-?

I 88

1]...[: at the left-hand side, an oblique sloping to the left and, at the right-hand side, an oblique sloping to the right. In between, traces of ρ rather than υ;]αρε[?

I 90

The feet of two converging obliques; α, λ?

I 93

High or low ends of letters, depending on whether the fragment is placed upside down.

I 94

1].[: low horizontal with an oblique starting from its left-hand end, perhaps a δ. 2 .[: left-hand end of middle horizontal. ω?

I 97

A vertical like ι or as in υ, π.

K. TSANTSANOGLOU – G.M. PARÁSSOGLOU

TRANSLATION

K. TSANTSANOGLOU – G.M. PARASSOGLOU

TRANSLATION

This translation, which follows the Greek original very closely, is only intended to demonstrate the way the two editors of the text understand it. In a few instances it incorporates supplements that, being very uncertain, do not appear in the edition but are mentioned in the commentary. The commentary itself at times adopts a different interpretation and translation, something only natural in such a fragmentary and enigmatic text.

Col. I

... each ... of the Erinyes ...

Col. II

... Erinyes ... they honor ... libations are poured down in drops for Zeus in every temple. Further, one must offer exceptional honors to [the Eumenis] and burn a bird to each [of the daimons]. And he added [hymns] adapted (or: poems well-adapted) to the music. And their meaning ...

Col. III

... below ... each (masc.) acquires a daimon as healer ... For Dike punishes pernicious men through each of the Erinyes. And the daimons who are in the underworld never observe [sleep? rest?] and, being servants of gods, they ... all (masc.), ... are [mindful?] so that unjust men ..., and are responsible for ... such as (masc. pl.) ...

Col. IV

... that [one] of the gods who has (or: had) altered what is stable ... to hand over [to Dike? to the Erinyes?] rather what are harmful [to the human

race?]. For he did not allow (Dike? the Erinyes?) to seize what comes by chance (or: For he did not allow chance to seize them). Is it not then because of him that the universe has order? In the same manner Heraclitus invoking common truths presents his own views upside down (?); he who said, speaking like an astronomer:

The sun in the nature of ... is a human foot in width, not exceeding in size the proper limits of its width. Or else the Erinyes, assistants of Dike, will find it out. And [they will punish it?], so that it will not transgress ...

sacrifice ... of justice ... on a fixed month (?) ...

Col. V

... consult an oracle ... they consult an oracle ... for them we enter the oracle in order to ask, with regard to those seeking a divination, whether it is proper ... Why do they disbelieve in the horrors of Hades? Without knowing (the meaning of) dreams or any of the other things, by what kind of evidence would they believe? For, overcome both by error and pleasure as well, they neither learn nor believe. Disbelief and ignorance [are the same thing. For if] they do not learn or know, [it is not possible that] they will believe, even when they see ... disbelief ... appears ...

Col. VI

... prayers and sacrifices appease the souls, while the [incantation] of the magi is able to drive away the daimons who are hindering; hindering daimons are vengeful souls (or: hostile to souls). This is why the magi perform the sacrifice, just as if they are paying a retribution. And on the offerings they pour water and milk, from which (plural) they also make the libations to the dead. Innumerable and many-knobbed are the cakes they sacrifice, because the souls too are innumerable. Initiates make a preliminary sacrifice to the Eumenides in the same way the magi do; for the Eumenides are souls. On their account anyone who is going to sacrifice to the gods must first [sacrifice] a bird ... and the ... and they are ... this and as many (fem.) as ...

Col. VII

... a hymn saying sound and lawful words. For [a sacred rite was being performed] through the poem. And one cannot state the solution of the (enigmatic) words though they are spoken (i.e. not secret). This poem is strange and riddling to people, though [Orpheus] himself did not intend to say con-

tentious riddles but rather great things in riddles. In fact he is speaking mystically, and from the very first word all the way to the last. As he also makes clear in the well recognizable verse: for, having ordered them to “put doors to their ears”, he says that he is not legislating for the many [but addressing himself to those] who are pure in hearing ... and in the following verse ...

Col. VIII

... he made plain in this verse:

who were born from Zeus, the mighty king.

And how they (sc. the present things) begin he makes clear in these words:

Zeus then, when from his father the prophesied rule
and power in his hands had taken, and the glorious daimon.

It has escaped notice that these words are transposed; (in fact) they are as follows: ‘Zeus, when he took the power from (πάρα) his father and the glorious daimon.’ [In this] word order the prevailing meaning is not that Zeus hears his father but that he takes power from him. [In the other] word order the impression would be given that he took the power contrary to (παρά) the prophecies. For it seems that to him ... it might be thought [that Zeus took his father’s power?] by force ... and having learned ...

Col. IX

to be (?). So in the poem he made the [power?] belong to the strongest, just like a son to his father. But those who do not understand the words spoken think that Zeus takes the power and the daimon from his own father. So, knowing that fire, when mixed with the other things, agitates the things that are (τὰ ἐόντα) and prevents them from coming together because of the heat, he removes it to such a distance as to render it unable, once removed, to prevent the ὄντα from condensing. For whatever is ignited is subdued, and having been subdued it is mixed with the others. With regard to the phrase “he took in his hands”, he was allegorizing just as in everything else which formerly seemed uncertain but has been most certainly understood. So, [allegorizing] he said that Zeus took the power and the daimon by force, just as ... of the powerful ...

Col. X

and 'saying'; for neither is it possible to say without uttering; but he considered saying and uttering to be the same thing. 'Saying' and 'teaching' mean the same; for it is not possible to teach without saying whatever is taught by means of words; and teaching is considered to be one and the same as saying. Therefore, 'teaching' was not considered different from 'saying' and 'saying' from 'uttering', but 'uttering', 'saying', and 'teaching' mean the same. Thus nothing prevents "all-voicing" and 'teaching all things' from being the same thing. And by calling her "nurse" he is saying in an enigmatic way that those things which the sun thaws by heating, night congeals by making cold. ... those things which the sun heated ...

Col. XI

of Night. He says that "she prophesied from the innermost shrine (ἄδυτον)" meaning to say that the depth of night is unsetting (ἄδυτον); for it does not set as the light does, but daylight occupies it as it remains in the same place. And 'prophesying' and 'availing' mean the same. One has to consider what 'availing' and 'prophesying' are applied to: 'Believing that such and such a god prophesies/avails (χρᾶν) they go to inquire what they should do'. And after this he says:

And she prophesied everything that was proper for him to accomplish.

... he made clear that ... beside the εὐντα ... possible ...

Col. XII

and ... The next verse is as follows:

so that he might occupy the fair seat of snow-clad Olympus.

Olympus and time are the same. Those who think that Olympus and heaven are the same are mistaken, because they do not realize that heaven cannot be long rather than wide, while if someone were to call time long, he would not be mistaken. Wherever he wanted to say 'heaven' he added 'wide', but wherever (he wanted to say) 'Olympus' he did the opposite, he never (added) 'wide' but 'long'. By saying that it is snow-clad [he likens time] in its property to the snowy. And the snowy is [cold and] white. ... gleaming ... and the air bright ...

Col. XIII

When Zeus, having heard the prophecies, from his father.

For neither did this one (neut.) hear (or: did he hear this and that) – it has been explained in what sense ‘it (or: he) heard’ – nor does Night give instructions. But he makes it clear by saying as follows:

the reverend one (αἰδοῖον) he swallowed, who first sprung out of the aither.

Since he is speaking through the entire poem allegorically about the real things, it is necessary to speak about each word in turn. Seeing that people consider all birth to depend on the genitals and that without the genitals there can be no birth, he used this (word) and likened the sun to a genital organ (αἰδοῖον). For without the sun it is not possible for the ὄντα to become such ... ἐόντα ... to come to rest ... because of the sun everything in the same manner ... nor to the ἐόντα ... to encompass ...

Col. XIV

to spring out of the brightest and hottest one (masc.) having been separated from itself. So he says that this Kronos was born from Helios to Ge, because it was on account of the sun that (the ἐόντα) were induced to be struck against each other. For this reason he says:

who did a great deed.

And the verse following:

Ouranos, son of Euphrone, who was the first to become king.

Because Mind was striking (κρούειν) (the ἐόντα) against each other, he named it Kronos (i.e. Striking Mind) and says that he did a great deed to Ouranos; for the latter was deprived of the kingship. He gave it the name Kronos after its action and the other (names) according to the same principle. For when all the ἐόντα [were not yet being struck, Mind,] as determining (ὀρίζειν) the creation, [received the designation Ouranos (i.e. Determining Mind)]. And [he says] that it was deprived of its kingship when [the ἐόντα] were being struck ...

Col. XV

[in order to prevent the sun] from striking them (sc. the *έόντα*) against one another and cause the *έόντα*, once separated, stand apart from each other. For when the sun is separated and confined in the middle, it (sc. Mind) holds fast, having fixed them, both those above the sun and those below. And the next verse:

following him (*έκ τοῦ*) in turn was Kronos, and then Zeus the contriver.

He means something like 'from that time (*έκ τοῦδε*) is the beginning (*ἀρχή*), from which this magistracy (*ἀρχή*) reigns.' It has (already) been related that Mind, striking the *έόντα* to one another and setting them apart toward the present transformative stage, [created] from different things not different ones but diversified ones. As for the phrase "and then Zeus the contriver", that he is not a different one but the same is clear. And this indicates it:

Metis ... royal honor
... sinews ...

Col. XVI

[that] he called the sun a genital organ has been made clear. And in support of the fact that the present *έόντα* come to be from existent ones, he says:

Of the First-born king, the reverend one; and upon him all
the immortals grew, blessed gods and goddesses
and rivers and lovely springs and everything else
that had then been born; and he himself became the sole one.

In these verses he indicates that the *έόντα* always existed and that the present *έόντα* come to be from the existing ones. As for the phrase "and he himself became the sole one", by saying this he makes it clear that Mind, being alone, is always worth everything, as if the rest were nothing. For it is not [possible] for the present *έόντα* to exist [because of] them (sc. the existing ones) without Mind. [Also in the verse] after this [he said that Mind] is worth everything:

[And now he is] king of all [and will be] afterwards.

[It is clear that] 'Mind' and ['king of all' are the] same thing. ...

Col. XVII

it (sc. air) existed before it was named; then it was named. For air both existed before the present ἐόντα were set together and will always exist. For it did not come to be but existed. And why it was called air has been made clear earlier in this book. But after it had been named Zeus it was thought that it was born, as if it did not exist before. He also said that it will be “last”, after it was named Zeus and this continues being its name until the present ἐόντα were set together into the same state in which they were floating as former ἐόντα. And it is made clear that the ἐόντα became such because of it and, having come to be, [are again] in it. He indicates in these words:

Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus is everything fashioned.

Head ... he allegorizes that the ἐόντα ... head ... beginning of constitution ... to have been constituted ...

Col. XVIII

and those (neut.) moving downwards. And by saying [“Moira” he makes it clear] that this [earth] and all else are in the air, being breath (or: wind). It is this breath (or: wind) that Orpheus called Moira. The other people in their everyday talk say that ‘Moira has spun for them’ and that ‘it will be as Moira has spun’, speaking correctly but not understanding either what Moira is or what spinning. For Orpheus called thought Moira. This seemed to him to be the most suitable of the names that all people had given. Because, before it was called Zeus, Moira existed, being the thought of god eternally and ubiquitously. But after it had been called Zeus it was thought that it was born, though it existed before too but was not named. [This is why] he says

Zeus was born first.

For first was [Moira the thought], later it was held to be sacred being Zeus. But people [not understanding] the meaning of what is said [come to view] Zeus as being the first-born [god] ...

Col. XIX

since the time when the ἐόντα were given names, each after what is dominant (in it), all things were called Zeus according to the same principle. For

the air dominates all things as much as it wishes. So when they say that 'Moira spun (ἐπικλώσαι)', they are saying that the thought of Zeus ratified (ἐπικυρώσαι) in what way what exists and what comes to be and what will come to be must come to be and be and cease. And he likens it (sc. air) to a king – for this among the names in use seemed to be suitable for it – saying thus:

Zeus the king, Zeus the ruler of all, he of the bright bolt.

He said that it is king because, though the magistracies are many, one prevails over all and performs all that no other mortal is allowed to perform ... And he said that it is ruler (ἄρχός) of all, because all things start (or: are ruled, ἄρχεσθαι) through ...

Col. XX

[As for those men who believe that they learned] when they witnessed the rites while performing them [together with other] people in the cities, I wonder less that they do not understand; for it is not possible to hear and simultaneously comprehend what is being said. But those (who believe that they learned) from someone who makes a profession of the rites deserve to be wondered at and pitied: wondered at because, although they believe before they perform the rites that they will learn, they go away after performing them before having learned, without even asking further questions, as if they knew something of what they saw or heard or were taught; and pitied because it is not enough for them that they paid the fee in advance – they also go away devoid even of their belief. Before they perform the rites expecting to acquire knowledge, but after performing them they go away devoid even of expectation. ... account ... to his own ... mother ... sister

Col. XXI

[For if the ἐόντα did not move so that they could first be separated, hot would not join with hot] nor cold with cold. By saying "to jump" he makes it clear that (the ἐόντα), divided into small particles, moved and jumped in the air, and by jumping all and each severally were set together with one another. And they continued jumping until each came to its like. Ouranian Aphrodite, Zeus, aphrodising, jumping, Peitho (i.e. Persuasion), Harmonia are established names for the same god. A man having sexual contact with a woman is said in everyday usage to be 'aphrodising'. So, because the ἐόν-

τα were brought into contact with each other, it (or: the god) was called Aphrodite. Persuasion because the ἐόντα yielded to each other; 'yielding' and 'persuading' are the same thing. And Harmonia because it (or: the god) attached closely (ἀμύζειν) many ἐόντα to each (of the ἐόντα). For they existed even before, but the term 'being born' was used for them after they had been separated. [For] 'being separated' is clearly ... prevails (?) so that they separate (?) ... now ...

Col. XXII

So he named everything in the same way as best he could knowing the nature of men, that not all have the same (nature) nor all want the same things. When they possess power they say whatever happens to come into the heart of each of them, whatever they happen to desire, never the same things, since they are induced by greed and to some extent by ignorance as well. Ge, Meter, Rhea, and Hera are the same. She was called Ge by convention and Meter (i.e. Mother) because everything comes to be from her; Ge and Gaia according to each man's dialect. She was named Demeter like Ge-Meter, one name from both; for it was the same. It is also said in the *Hymns*:

Demeter, Rhea, Ge, Meter, Hestia, Deio.

For she is also called Deio because she was ravaged (δῆϊοῦσθαι) during engendering (or: procreation); it will be made clear that, according to the poems, she had profuse parturitions. Rhea because many and all kinds of living creatures were born [having flowed forth (ἐκρέω)] from her; Rhea and [Rheie] according [to each man's dialect]. She was named Here [because ...

Col. XXIII

[And he contrived the great might of wide-flowing Oceanus.]

This verse is composed so as to be misleading; it is unclear to the many, but quite clear to those who have correct understanding, that "Oceanus" is the air and that air is Zeus. Therefore, it was not another Zeus who "contrived" Zeus, but the same one (contrived) for himself "great might". But the ignorant ones think that Oceanus is a river, because he added "wide-flowing". He, however, indicates his own opinion in everyday and conventional words. For those who have great power among men are said to 'have flowed big'. The next verse:

and he placed therein the sinews of (i.e. the mighty; or: the eddies of) silver-eddying Achelous.

He gives the name Achelous to water [in general]. And ... to place the sinews (or: eddies) therein is to push them down therein; because the ... each ...

Col. XXIV

are equal when they are measured from the center; but those that are not circular cannot be equal-membered. This makes it clear:

She (sc. Moon) who shines (φαίνειν) for many mortals on the boundless earth.

One might think that this verse has been said in a different sense, namely that if (the moon) is at its utmost, the other ἐόντα ... are more apparent (φαίνεσθαι) than before it is at its utmost. But he does not mean this, that it shows (φαίνειν); for if he had meant this, he would not have said that it shows for “many” but for ‘all’, both for those who till the land and for those who go by sea, when they should sail, the right time. For if there were no moon, men would not have discovered the reckoning either of the seasons or of the winds ... and all else ... other ἐόντα ...

Col. XXV

and brightness; but those out of which the moon (is composed) are the whitest of all, distributed according to the same principle, but are not hot. There are also others now in the air floating at a great distance from each other, but during the day they are invisible because they are overcome by the sun, while during the night they are visible but are overcome because of (their) smallness. Each of these is floating of necessity so as not to come together with one another; for otherwise all those that have the same property as those from which the sun was composed would come together in a mass. If the god did not wish the present ἐόντα to exist, he would not have made the sun. But he made it of such a form and size as is related at the beginning of this account. And the words that follow he puts before as a screen, not wishing all men to understand. He indicates in this verse:

but when the mind of Zeus devised all things

Col. XXVI

“of mother” because Mind is the mother of the other things, and ἐᾱς (‘good’) because she is good. It is made clear in these verses too that it means ‘good’:

O Hermes, son of Maia, messenger, giver of goods (ἐάων).

And it is clear in this too:

For two jars are placed down on Zeus’ floor
of gifts such as they give, one of evils, and another of goods (ἐάων).

But those who do not understand the word think that it means ‘of his own’ (i.e. ἐᾱς) mother. But if he wanted to show the god “desiring to mingle in love with his own mother”, he could have said, altering (a few) letters, ‘ἐοῖο mother’. For thus it would become ‘of his own’, and he would be her [son]. ... it is clear that ... in the relationship (?) ... both ... good (fem. sing.) ...

TH. KOUREMENOS

COMMENTARY

TH. KOUREMENOS

COMMENTARY

COL. II

4]γιδ[]τιμῶσιγ[: Εὐμε]γιδ- is probable but the context of the reference to these beings at this point can only be guessed at. If the Erinyes are mentioned in the preceding line, the context could be in part the identification of the Erinyes with the Eumenides who in col. VI.9-10 are said τῷ be souls. This supports Rohde's view that the Erinyes/Eumenides (he does not differentiate the two groups) were the souls of the dead (see Rohde [1898²] vol. 1, 269ff. and [1901] vol. 2, 229ff.; cf. Henrichs [1984] 265 n. 44). As far as col. III and cols. V-VI allow one to judge, the souls in question are not of those who died violently, as Rohde held, but of those who led a just life, obtained certain knowledge and engaged in certain cultic practices as initiates; see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 99-101 and cf. Betegh (2004) 86. Henrichs (1984) 264-265 notes that the Eumenides and the Erinyes are often equated in literature but rarely connected in cult, and considers it unlikely that the Derveni author, who is more interested in cult than in myth, equates them; Betegh (2004) 88 considers the equation, which would be grounded in the tradition, quite likely. Against the identification of Erinyes with souls see Johnston (1999) 276; cf., though, Betegh (2004) 86 n. 39. The subject of τιμῶσι could be the initiates who in col. VI.8-10 are said to offer preliminary sacrifices to the Eumenides in the same manner that the magi do (on the magi and the initiates see below on col. VI.1). The object might be Zeus, not the Erinyes; see next note.

5 αψ[]ῥαα[: if the next letter is μ, cf. αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο, sc. Zeus (col. XVI.6). Tsantsanoglou suggests τιμῶσιγ [ῥα] | αψ[τὸς Ζεὺς] δ' ἄρα μ[όνος ἐγένετο, not a partial quotation of the Orphic hexameter but a reference to it; he acknowledges, however, that the position of δ' is problematic and that the resemblance between the few letters that can be read

here and the Orphic hemistich might be purely coincidental. See also next note.

5-6 χ]ραὶ σταγόσιν [χ]έον[ται | Δ[ιὸς κατὰ π]άγτα να[ρόν: χοαί are libations offered to deities of the netherworld or the souls of the dead (see next note and cf. above on 4). As Tsantsanoglou (1997) 102 remarks, these libations were made from large vessels whose contents were emptied onto the ground, and thus 'in drops' is rather puzzling. If correct, Δ[ιὸς is probably to be construed with χ]ραὶ, not να[ρόν. The reference is perhaps to the well-known libation to Zeus Soter, with which all offerings of libations ended; the custom could be an illustration of the unique position occupied by Zeus in cult, a fact memorably expressed by the Orphic hemistich just quoted on Tsantsanoglou's reconstruction of line 5 (see previous note).

6-7 ἔτι δ' ἐξαιρέ]τους τιμὰς [χ]ρῆ | τ[ῆι Εὐμεν]ίδι νεῖμ[αι: reading Εὐμεν]ίδι νεῖμ[αι seems preferable to restoring a form of δινεῖν, e.g.]ι δινεῖ μ[or περ]ιδινεῖ μ[, or ὠδίνειν. δινεῖν, which is very rare, could refer to the rotation that air/Mind forced the other basic entities of reality to undergo at the beginning of the cosmogony (see on col. IX.7-8), but it is probably too early for the author to have started the exposition of his cosmology; ὠδίνειν is very unlikely to have occurred here. If correctly supplemented, τ[ῆι Εὐμεν]ίδι is perhaps a collective singular. Cf. the mention in col. VI.8-10 of preliminary sacrificial offerings to the Eumenides. If these offerings are the same as the honors mentioned here, perhaps they precede a sacrifice to Zeus; see previous notes. Outside Attica Zeus was worshipped as Meilichios alongside the Eumenides and unnamed ἥρωες, denizens of the underworld; see Henrichs (1984) 263.

7 δαίμοσι δ'] ἐκάστο[ι]ς: δαίμονες are mentioned in col. III.4, 6, VI.2, 3. If a reference to these entities is correctly restored here, the context does not allow to decide whether they are the same as the Eumenides/Erinyes or constitute a distinct class of beings, analogous to the unnamed ἥρωες in the underworld who were worshipped alongside the Eumenides and Zeus Meilichios outside Attica (see previous note). It is reasonable to assume that, at least in col. VI, οἱ δαίμονες are the Eumenides; see the first three notes *ad loc.*

7-8 ὀρνίθε^διόν τι | κα[ί]ειν: the noun implied "is not κρέας, but ἱερεῖον: αἴγειον, βοείον or βοϊκόν, ὕειον or ὕϊκόν are found in inscriptions, some-

times followed by $\iota\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ ” (Tsantsanoglou [1997] 104, with n. 13). If so, the sacrificial poultry is one of the $\tau\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}$ mentioned in 6 and was offered to each of the demons; τ suggests that any kind of poultry was deemed suitable as an offering. Based on the reading $\phi[p]\gamma\iota\theta[\epsilon]\iota\omicron\nu$ in col. VI.11, a characterization of a sacrificial offering to the Eumenides before a sacrifice to gods that might point to the identity of the Eumenides with the demons (see previous note), and the mention of sacrificial cakes in col. VI.7, Betegh (2004) 76-78 suggests that $\phi\rho\nu\theta\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ might mean ‘birdlike’, and that the Derveni author perhaps refers to sacrificial cakes shaped like birds and offered to the Eumenides/Erinyes; Betegh considers also the possibility that the word might mean ‘of a bird’ or ‘belonging to a bird’, in which case $\phi\rho\nu\theta\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ τ can very well be a part of a bird, e.g. feathers. For further speculations on $\phi\rho\nu\theta\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ see Jourdan (2003) 29-30. For burnt meat-offerings to the dead see Garvie (1986) 177.

$\delta\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon[\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\mu\iota\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron[\acute{\upsilon}] \varsigma\ \tau\eta\iota\ \mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma[\iota]\kappa\eta$: hymns sung to music can be plausibly assumed to have accompanied the offering of poultry to the demons, which might be the same beings as the Eumenides/Erinyes (see the two previous notes). If the subject of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon[\nu$ is Orpheus, the sage might be considered the founder of $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}$, to which he added enigmatic hymns sung to music (for Orpheus as the founder of *teletai* see frs. 547, 549-554 Bernabé): the Derveni author’s point might be that the meaning of both the *teletai* in question and the accompanying hymns, one of which he will interpret in his work, is understood only by himself and perhaps by a few experts belonging to his ‘school’ (cf. col. VII.2-5 and the critique in col. XX, which can be assumed to target the author’s professional rivals). If so, he is a priest wise about divine matters and concerned to account for his practices (Pl. *Men.* 81a10-b2), one of the begging priests and diviners to whom Plato refers scornfully in *R.* 364b5-365a3. These religious professionals tout their ability to cleanse the wrongdoings of both the living and the dead through sacrifices, claiming that participation in *teletai* performed according to the books of Orpheus ensures an afterlife free of horror; unless one takes part in these rites, a dreadful fate awaits him or her after death. Alternatively, the subject of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon[\nu$ might be $\delta\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\nu\ \pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ (col. XX.4), a collective singular denoting the religious professionals who advertize their expertise in both *teletai* ($\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$) performed according to books by Orpheus and the interpretation of these texts, people (criticized alongside their blithe clients in col. XX) whom the author’s interpretation of the Orphic hymn might aim at denouncing as charlatans

who graft uncomprehendingly the poetry of Orpheus onto ritual hocus-pocus for purposes of profit. See Intro. VI.

9 [τούτων δὲ] τὰ σημα[νόμενα: see previous note.

COL. III (fr. 472 Bernabé)

4 δαίμ]ων γίνεται[ι ἐκά]στωι ἰατρ[ρὸς: cf. above on col. II.7 and see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 100-101 on demons as the souls of the dead who distinguished themselves in life. “δαίμων γίνεται ἐκάστωι seems to reflect the widespread concept of a *daimon* who accompanies every person either as a ‘guardian angel’ or as his or her fate, from the moment of birth until death” (Tsantsanoglou [1997] 105). See Pl. *O.* 13.105, δαίμων γενέθλιος, *P.* 3.108-109, τὸν δ’ ἀμφέποντ’ αἰεὶ φρασίν δαίμον’ ἀσκήσω, *A. Ag.* 1341-1342, τίς τὰν ἐξεύξαιτο βροτῶν ἀσινεῖ δαίμονι φῦναι, *E. Supp.* 592, ἐγὼ γὰρ δαίμονος τοῦμοῦ μέτα, *Andr.* 98, τὸν ἐμὸν δαίμον’ ᾧ συνεζύγην. δαίμων is accompanied by ἐκάστω, -ωι remarkably often: see Pl. *Ti.* 90a3-4, αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἐκάστω δέδωκεν, *Phd.* 107d6-7, ὁ ἐκάστω δαίμον ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, *R.* 620d8-e1, ἐκείνην δ’ ἐκάστω ὃν εἶλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου, *D.L.* 7.88, τοῦ παρ’ ἐκάστω δαίμονος, *Epict. Diss.* 1.14.12, ἐπίτροπον ἐκάστω παρέστηκεν (sc. *Zeus*) τὸν ἐκάστω δαίμονα, *Marc. Aurel.* 5.27, ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάστω προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ *Zeus* ἔδωκεν. There is a reference to signs of disease and health sent by demons and heroes in Alexander Polyhistor (*FGrHist* 273 F 93 = *D.L.* 8.32), who quotes from the *Pythagorean Notebooks* (*DK* 58 B 1a); the belief in signs of health sent by demons might very well entail the conception of the sign-sender as a healer. The excerpt from the *Pythagorean Notebooks* might be relevant also in that it equates demons with souls (cf. below on col. VI.4), connects them with various cultic practices and divination (cf. col. V), and emphasizes the importance of goodness or badness for the soul (cf. 5 and 9):

εἶναι τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἐμπλεῶν καὶ τούτους τοὺς δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας νομίζεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων πέμπεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τοὺς τε ὄνειρους καὶ τὰ σημεῖα νόσου τε καὶ <ὑγείας, καὶ> οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ προβάτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτήνεσιν. εἷς τε τούτους γίνεσθαι τοὺς τε καθαρμούς καὶ ἀποτροπιασμούς μαντικὴν τε πᾶσαν καὶ κληδόνας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. μέγιστον δὲ φησι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πεῖσαι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν.

4-5 ἡ | [γὰρ Δί]κη ἐξώλεας [νουθ]ερεῖ δι' ἐκ[σ]της τῶν] Ἑρινύ[ν: note the Ionic ending in ἐξώλεας. It is plausible to assume that the reference here is to wrongdoers, not just perjurers (as the phrase κατ' ἐξώλειας ὀμνύναι might lead one to assume). [νουθ]ερεῖ might mean either 'warns' or 'chastises'. If the first, the Erinyes might be assumed to warn wrongdoers of the horrors waiting them in Hades through dreams and other omens; cf. col. V.6-8 (if the demons mentioned in the following line are the Erinyes, they might be senders of omens, like those in the excerpt from the *Pythagorean Notebooks* quoted in the previous note). If the second, the Erinyes probably punish the souls of wrongdoers in Hades (cf. col. VI.4-5). The supplement Δί]κη yields an obvious parallel with the Heraclitus quotation in the next column, where the Erinyes figure as servants of Dike ready to punish the Sun in case this celestial body exceeds its right width. Interpreting the parallel depends on one's preferred view of what the Derveni author is up to (see above on col. II.8). Perhaps he quotes Heraclitus to argue that the Ephesian and the religious professionals, who purvey the eschatological beliefs explained here, invoke the same divinities, but in Heraclitus these divinities are mere allegories useful for conveying fundamental facts of cosmology incompatible with the tenets of religious/cultic circles, not real existents; in the author's view, this is also the case with all divinities in the Orphic poem(s), according to which the religious professionals perform meaningless 'sacred' rites to ensure for their blithe employers salvation in the non-existent afterlife among other things, as if humans could intervene in the natural order. See also below on col. IV.9; extensive discussion in Intro. VI, esp. §§ 12-16.

5-6 οἱ] δὲ | [δ]αίμονες οἱ κατὰ [γῆς ο]υδέποτε[ε τ]ηροῦσι: the demons in question are the Erinyes (see Hom. *Il.* 19.259-260, A. *Eum.* 115), here probably conceived of as souls of certain dead and equated with the Eumenides (see above on col. II.4 and 7), or chthonic deities in general (see A. *Ch.* 475, *Pers.* 689, S. *Ant.* 451, *Aj.* 571, *El.* 292, E. *Alc.* 851). Tsantsanoglou suggests that the object of τηρεῖν could be σχολήν, ἀργίην or ὕπνον: the vengeful demons are ever watchful and vigilant (cf. previous note).

7 θεῶν ὑπηρέται: the demons mentioned in the previous line are the most probable subject. For the belief that those distinguished in life become servants of the gods after death see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 106; cf. Betegh (2004) 87.

8 εἰσὶν ὅπως περ ἄ[νδρες] ἄδικοι: if the demons mentioned in 6 are the subject of εἰσὶν, it is unlikely that they are compared to unjust men. What is expected here is a reference to the punishment the demons inflict on the souls of wrongdoers if not propitiated (cf. col. VI.1-4), and it is preferable to take ὅπως περ as a final conjunction, or as introducing an indirect question: “the demons see to it that wrongdoers receive their punishment”, or “the demons decide how wrongdoers receive their punishment”.

9 αἰτίην [τ' ἐ]χουσι: ‘are reputed to’, usually followed by infinitive (see e.g. Pl. *Grg.* 503b6-7, *Tht.* 169a4-5), or ‘bear the blame for’, with genitive or infinitive (see e.g. A. *Eum.* 579, S. *Ant.* 1312, Ar. *V.* 506, Pl. *Ap.* 38c2). The subject can be either the demons mentioned in 6, or the unjust men referred to in 8. If the former, the phrase most probably means ‘are reputed to’.

10 οἶουσ[ερ] ?

11 το]ὺς τ[?

COL. IV

1 θ]εῶν: if correct, it might depend on the participial phrase at the beginning of the following line, as Tsantsanoglou thinks. It can very well be the last word of the previous sentence, however. ἐὼν is equally plausible (for ἐὼν at the end of a sentence see col. XVII.6).

2 ὁ κείμε[ενα] μεταθ[ε: Tsantsanoglou suggests μεταθ[εῖς (cf. Tsantsanoglou [1997] 107). For κείμε[ενα] cf. Pl. *Lg.* 705d7 (τὰ τοιαῦτα νόμιμα κείμενα), *Plt.* 305b5 (πάνθ' ὅποσα κεῖται νόμιμα παρὰ νομοθέτου βασιλέως), [Pl.] *Min.* 317b3-4 (οὐδὲ μεταθήσονται ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα). The Derveni author seems to refer to an agent who changed an arrangement of law-like character (κείμενα).

Given the unambiguously cosmological context, the agent in question can be identified with Νοῦς, i.e. Mind. In the surviving parts of the text this entity makes its first appearance in col. XIV, but the casual reference to it there suggests that the author has introduced it earlier in a lost section of the work. Mind is nothing but air (the identification of Mind with air follows from col. XIV.7, XV.6-12 and XVII.1-6), and the Derveni author

believes that Zeus is nothing but an allegory of air/Mind invented by Orpheus, as also seems to be the case with all other gods/goddesses in the poem of Orpheus which the Derveni author interprets from col. VII onwards. Since it never came to be but exists always (see col. XVII.1-6), air/Mind is one of the preexisting and everlasting entities all else is made up of and comes to be from, i.e. the fundamental constituents of the universe (see col. XVI.2: ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται, col. XVI.7-8: τὰ ὄντα ὑπῆ[ρ]χεν ἀεὶ, τὰ δὲ | νῦν ἔόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γιν[ε]ται, and cf. Intro. V § 2). Air/Mind caused the transition of the universe to its present state, i.e. the generation of the stable large-scale structures in the universe that make it the cosmos we see now, and is ultimately responsible for the constant generation of transient entities that come to be in the cosmos from the basic entities; cf. below on col. XVI.10-11. The wisdom of air/Mind has determined how the derivative things that are and those that come to be in the universe at any time and those whose coming to be is future at that time must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.3-7; as turns out from col. IX.5-10, how the primordial universe became the cosmos was underpinned by the knowledge air/Mind possesses). This 'grand scheme' can be plausibly assumed to be object of Mind's all-encompassing knowledge and, if Mind would not be eternal without possessing eternally the wisdom that presumably makes it what it is, it did not come to possess this wisdom at any particular time in the past. Since air/Mind is said to have wanted the derivative entities to be and probably wanted them to be as is best for them to be (see col. XXV.3-12), a complete way that everything must be *for the best* seems to have been part of reality before air/Mind initiated the cosmogony, when all other basic entities were united in an amorphous fire-dominated mixture (col. IX.5-10), which perhaps churned about in air/Mind (see Intro. V § 16), and there was no coming to be (see below on col. XXI.13-14). Each ingredient in the mixture was probably divided up in small particles, which the action of the dominant fire-particles scattered among particles of all other ingredients and prevented from binding together to form coherent structures (see below on col. XVII.8, 9). By causing a sufficiently large amount of fire to separate from the primordial mixture, air/Mind reduced the dominant ingredient in the mixture to such low levels that the other basic entities could condense and form the stable large-scale structures in the universe as we see it today (col. IX.5-10). The action by means of which air/Mind might have brought about the breakup of the primordial mixture (see below on col. IX.7-8) seems to have been caused

by the knowledge-based volition of this basic entity to bring all derivative entities into existence.

In Tsantsanoglou's view, $\theta\epsilon\omega\nu[] | \acute{o} \kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha] \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\theta[ε\iotaς$ refers to Zeus, an Orphic allegory of air/Mind, as having changed the precosmic spatial arrangement of the other basic entities. However, if $\epsilon\omega\nu$ in 1 stands at the end of a sentence and the participial phrase at the beginning of the following sentence (see previous note), it is possible to supplement $\acute{o} \kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha] \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\theta[ε\iotaς$ Νοῦς or ἡήρ. See also next note.

2-3 $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota | \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda[ον \acute{\alpha}] \sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ [: Tsantsanoglou suggests $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron$ 'Ερινύσιν $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda[ον \acute{\alpha}] \sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ [τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φύλα], the subject of $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron$ being $\theta\epsilon\omega\nu \acute{o} \kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\theta\epsilon\iotaς$. Zeus, who caused the precosmic universe to evolve into the cosmos (see previous note), chose to hand over to the Erinyes the task of preventing any changes in the order of things that could prove harmful to humans (cf. the role of the Erinyes in the Heraclitus quotation below).

The Derveni author believes that air/Mind, the basic entity Orpheus calls by the name 'Zeus' among many others in the poem interpreted from col. VII onwards, turned the primordial universe into a cosmos designed, at least partly, for the benefit of humans. He thinks that farmers and seafarers could not be able to tell the season of the year and predict the weather without the Moon (col. XXIV.10-12), a probable reference to telling the time of the year and predicting the weather at that time with the help of the regular appearances and disappearances of the fixed stars around the year, phenomena which will fall within a given month of a well-regulated luni-solar calendar. It seems as if he attempts to provide what Socrates did not find in Anaxagoras' book, though he was led to expect it by the hypothesis that Mind sets everything in order and causes everything, namely an account of celestial bodies and the phenomena they exhibit in terms of what is best (Pl. *Phd.* 97b8-98b6). Air/Mind is said to be good in connection with the fact that Orpheus presents it as 'mother of the others' (col. XXVI.1-2), which means that all derivative entities, conceived of as parts of the cosmic order that includes air/Mind, come to be ultimately because of this one basic thing (cf. col. XXII.8). One is tempted to platonically associate goodness in this context with the goodness of all things that come to be as is best for them to be. Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 29d7-30a6 on the demiurge and see also Intro. VI § 16:

λέγωμεν δὴ δι' ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τὸδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τοῦτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅτι

μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριατάτην παρ' ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ' ἂν. βουλευθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον.

Whether the Derveni author would agree with Aristotle's strong thesis in *Pol.* 1256b10-26 that the cosmos constitutes a single goal-directed system designed for the sake of human beings cannot, of course, be determined. The nature of a change in the order of things that would prove not just harmful but fatal to humans and must thus be prevented can be inferred from the penultimate column.

According to col. XXV.9-12, air/Mind (here referred to as god; see Intro. VI § 16) would not have made the Sun of such a sort and of such a size as is explained at the beginning of the account if it had not wanted the derivative entities to exist (cf. col. XIII.10-11). The Sun seems to be made up of the fire that air/Mind forced to separate first from the other basic entities, which were originally united into a fire-dominated mixture, so as to cause the rest of the ingredients in the mixture to also separate out and clump forming the stable large-scale structures in the universe of the present epoch, i.e. the cosmos at the smaller scales of which all kinds of transient derivative entities come to be from the basic entities (see col. IX.5-10 and XV.1-4). The counterfactual in col. XXV.9-12 is part of an argument to the effect that the stars are necessarily kept scattered against their tendency to coalesce. If the stars did coalesce, matter of the same type as that which makes up the Sun (i.e. fire) would accrete to the Sun and clump together to form fireballs comparable in size to the Sun (col. XXV.3-9). However, since the Sun would not have been made of such a sort (i.e. unique) and of such a size as is explained in the beginning of the account if air/Mind had not wanted the derivative entities to exist, the stars must be kept scattered: the tacit assumption is that, if the stars coalesced, the Sun could not be any more of such a sort and of such a size as is explained at the beginning of the account, in which case the cosmic order would collapse. The Derveni author could allude here to an increase in the size of the Sun that would result from the accretion of the stars to the Sun, all the more so since after three lines he proceeds to quote Heraclitus' view that the size of the Sun is necessarily stable.

If so, at this point of his work the Derveni author must have first discussed air/Mind, its goodness and the formation of the Sun, i.e. the begin-

ning of the cosmogony (cf. Betegh [2004] 328); the size of the Sun was crucial in the cosmogony, provided that the Sun is the amount of fire air/Mind forced to separate first from the other basic entities, thereby allowing their primordial mixture to evolve into the rest of the large-scale structures observed in the cosmos (the Derveni author stresses in col. IX.5-10 that air/Mind caused as much fire to separate out as was required for the clumping of the other ingredients in the primordial mixture not to be prevented any more). It follows, moreover, that the beginning of the account mentioned in col. XXV.9-12 is col. IV, which means that not too many columns preceded col. IV.

That the Derveni author discussed in col. IV the catastrophic implications of an increase in the size of the Sun alongside the formation of this celestial body can be reasonably assumed, given the backreference in col. XXV and the Heraclitus quotation in col. IV, but we cannot know whether the engorgement of the Sun is prevented by the Erinyes or directly by air/Mind. One might be disinclined to assume the first, though it would have a neat parallel in the Heraclitus quotation, because, first, there is no evidence that the furniture of the Derveni author's cosmos includes the Erinyes, nor is there any reason to hold that Heraclitus believes in the existence of the Erinyes, or that the Derveni author thinks so, and, second, by quoting Heraclitus the Derveni author could back up the view that air/Mind is directly responsible for keeping the size of the Sun within certain limits (see below on 9). One can also supplement 2-3 as follows: ὁ κείμενα μεταφ[εῖς Νοῦς τὰλλα ἐθέλει ἐ]κδοῦναι | μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] σίνεται [τὰς συστάσεις, where ἀήρ can be substituted for Νοῦς and κείμενα refers to the precosmic arrangement of the other basic entities (τὰλλα, sc. ὄντα) that was changed by air/Mind when it replaced fire as the dominant causal agent in the universe (to be distinguished from the dominant basic entity at an epoch, the other basic entities are referred to as simply τὰλλα in col. IX.6-7). μᾶλλ[ον ἢ] is suggested by Tsantsanoglou (1997). ἐκδιδόναι, 'to give (a daughter) in marriage', could be used for air/Mind's having caused the other basic entities to 'marry', i.e. to combine into derivative entities, e.g. plants and animals, which could be referred to as συστάσεις (the noun might be plausibly restored in col. XVII.14, where it could refer to the accretion of the basic entities into the large-scale structures of the present universe); cf. below on col. XXI.9-10 and 11-12. The verb is used in a similar manner by Plato (*Sph.* 242c8-d4), though its subject is the author of a cosmological theory that posits the combination of the elements, not a causal principle responsible for the combination according to the theory:

Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρίς τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλους ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅτα πη, τότε δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἑτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι.

Mind, the basic entity which caused the precosmic arrangement of the other basic entities to change, wants to bring about their combination into derivative entities (cf. τὰ νῦν ἔοντα | ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ᾗθελεν εἶναι in col. XXV.9-10) rather than harms these complexes, to which a change contrasted with the cosmogonic change brought about by air/Mind, probably the increase in the size of the Sun, would be fatally harmful.

3-4] τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ] | οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μβάνει[ν]: for postponement of γάρ see GP 95-98. If Ζεὺς and τὰς Ἐρινύς are the subject and object of οὐκ εἴ[α] as Tsantsanoglou suggests, Zeus is said here not to have allowed the Erinyes to catch or find out those chance events in the cosmos (τὰ τῆς τύχης) that do not negatively affect humans; see previous note. We can also supplement διὰ] τὰ τῆς τύχης γὰ[ρ] | οὐκ εἴ[η λα]μβάνει[ν], where εἴ[η] is an impersonal potential optative without ἂν (cf. col. XXV.8). τὸν Νοῦν or τὸν ἀέρα and τὰς συστάσεις could very well be subject and object respectively of the infinitive; see previous note. It would have been impossible for air/Mind to obtain by chance the derivative complexes into which it wanted the other basic entities to unite. Unlike any change that would destroy the cosmos (cf. previous note), the transition of the universe from the precosmic to the cosmic state was not a chance occurrence: it was brought about by the knowledge-based volition of air/Mind.

τύχη, chance, is perhaps not the absence of any cause but rather physical processes necessitating complex effects which seem to be purposed as if designed by an agency. Aristotle hints that some attribute the formation of a cosmos to chance (*Ph.* 196a24-35 = Democr. DK 68 A 69), just as Empedocles attributes the formation of most animal parts to chance (*Ph.* 196a23-24), and his rejoinder to Empedocles makes clear that in this context chance stands for physical processes that lack purposiveness but necessitate complex effects as if they were purposively acting agents (*Ph.* 198b10-32). Cf. *Pl. Lg.* 889b1-c6 (= Emp. DK 31 A 48):

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνη δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγενέσθαι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀνύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἑκαστα ἐκαστων, ἣ συμπέπικκεν ἀρμόττοντα οἰκείως πας. θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρὰ, καὶ πάντα ὅποσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἁ-

νάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτη καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα κατ' οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῶα αὐτὰ καὶ φυτὰ σύμπαντα, ὥρων πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φακὶν, οὐδὲ διὰ τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ.

4 ἀρ' οὐ τὰ [ξιν ἔχει διὰ τό]γδε κόσμος; Sc. διὰ τὸν Νοῦν or τὸν ἀέρα, or διὰ τὸν Δία (see previous notes). Another possible supplement is ἀρ' οὐ τὰ [αἰεὶ ὄντα διὰ τό]γδε κόσμος;

5-6 κατὰ [ταῦτ]᾽ Ἡράκλειτος μα[ρτυρόμενος] τὰ κοινὰ | κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἰδ[ι]α: the scribe uses a *diatresis* over the first ι of τὰ ἰδ[ι]α. The earliest example of *trema* or *diatresis* noted in Turner (1987²) 10 dates to the second century BC (cf. Thraette vol. 1, 94ff.), but Aristotle already mentions marks used as punctuation signs in books (SE 177b6, Rb. 1407b13).

Since the contrast between what is ξυνόν (κοινόν), common, and what is ἴδιον, private, occurs in Heraclitus, it is reasonable to assume that τὰ κοινὰ and τὰ ἴδια in the Derveni text pun on Heraclitus' use of ξυνόν and ἴδιον. Cf. Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou (1988) 130. Heraclitus' ξυνόν is ὁ λόγος, the account, he sets out (DK 22 B 2). According to the opening of his book, this account is everlastingly true, but people fail to comprehend it: they are ἀξύνετοι, as Heraclitus puts it with a pun on ξυνόν (B 1). Since those who are to speak ξὺν νόῳ must put their trust firmly in what is ξυνόν πάντων (B 114), understanding and rational discourse are grounded in the common account (ξυνὸς λόγος), which in B 2 is sharply contrasted with the private intelligence (ἴδια φρόνησις) of uncomprehending people: being unable to understand the account in question, these people are cut off from what is common and for each one of them there is a private cosmos (ἴδιος κόσμος), as if they were sleeping dreamers, whereas for those who follow what is common there is one cosmos common to all (εἷς καὶ κοινὸς κόσμος), as is the case with those who are awake (B 89).

Heraclitus' λόγος is not simply his own everlastingly true account. As he makes clear at the beginning of his book, it is also that which is described by his true account, and according to which everything happens in the universe (cf. S.E. M. 7.133.6-7 = DK 22 A 16): by revealing this principle, Heraclitus distinguishes each thing according to its real nature (κατὰ φύσιν), and explains how each thing is constituted – this is what other people are oblivious to, though they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep after they wake up. Heraclitus' account is common, insofar as it picks out a cosmological principle, because the principle in question is obviously universal, a unifying plan by which all things are steered as a sin-

gle cosmos common to all, and which is the only object of knowledge (B 41). His λόγος is common, insofar as it denotes the account of this plan, not only because the account in question is of a universal principle or everlastingly true but also because all people can understand it, for understanding in common to them all (B 113) – the majority, though, believe their own false opinions (B 17), apparently the products of their private intelligence, so for each one of them there is a private cosmos. Heraclitus most probably thinks that, *qua* everlastingly true account, ὁ ξυνὸς λόγος comprises not only cosmological but also moral or political truths, for he declares that those who are to speak ξὺν νόῳ should put their trust in what is ξυνόν πάντων, just as a city puts its trust in the law, for all human laws are nourished by one divine law, apparently the universal plan itself (B 114). If τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια in the Derveni text echo Heraclitus' use of ξυνόν and ἴδιον, it can be plausibly assumed that τὰ κοινά are the truths revealed by Heraclitus' everlastingly true account (see KG vol. 1, 16 for the plural used instead of the singular in order to bring out the multiplicity comprised by what the singular denotes), whereas τὰ ἴδια are the false beliefs held by uncomprehending people.

Janko (2002) 9 understands τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια as shared and individual sensations respectively (cf. Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou [1988] 130), but if these substantival adjectives are indeed allusions to Heraclitus, there is no evidence that Heraclitus made such a distinction. According to Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 7.131.1-132.1 = DK 22 A 16), ὁ κοινὸς λόγος is Heraclitus' criterion of truth, and what appears commonly to all (τὸ κοινῇ πᾶσι φαινόμενον) is trustworthy, for it is grasped through κοινὸς λόγος, whereas that which strikes an individual is untrustworthy; this passage is cited by Jourdan (2003) 32, who in her commentary on col. IV renders τὰ ἴδια as “les sensations individuelles” and τὰ κοινά as “phénomènes dont nous partageons tous la perception” (in her translation of col. IV, though, she renders τὰ ἴδια as “idées individuelles” and τὰ κοινά as “idées communes”). Sextus, however, does not attribute to Heraclitus a distinction between common and private sensations: as a Pyrrhonist term, ‘what appears’ (τὸ φαινόμενον) denotes not a sensation (a concrete sensory event) but rather what appears to be the case to someone and is reported by a that-clause. Although in Sextus' report this term is not used in the strict Pyrrhonist sense, there can be no doubt that here, too, it denotes truth-value bearers, not sensations. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 109 takes τὰ κοινά to mean ‘common and traditional beliefs’ and τὰ ἴδια ‘Heraclitus' own ideas’; cf. the interpretation of τὰ ἴδια as Heraclitus' own teaching in Betegh (2004) 347 who, though, simply translates τὰ

κοινά as “the common” without further comment. Given Heraclitus’ use of ξυνόν and ἴδιον, it is preferable to assume that τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια are respectively the truths revealed by Heraclitus’ everlastingly true account and the false beliefs held by the uncomprehending people.

κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἰδ[ι]α, “overthrows false beliefs”, would be an accurate description of what Heraclitus does by putting forth or “calling to witness”, μα[ρτυρό]μενος, his everlastingly true account. κατὰ [τὰν]τ[α]ῖα, “likewise”, (or κατὰ [τὰν]τ[α]ῖα, ‘accordingly’; see Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou [1988] 129) would signal that the Derveni author adduces Heraclitus’ authority in order to bolster what is emphasized by the rhetorical question in 4. This rhetorical question is perhaps meant to stress the dependence of the cosmic order on the agency of air/Mind. Heraclitus reveals a true account of the universal plan by which all things are steered as a single cosmos common to all. Since this unifying principle is the one divine law (B 114), and the one wise thing which is and is not willing to be called by the name of Zeus (B 32), for the Derveni author the importance of Heraclitus’ true account might lie in the association of the cosmic order with a wise entity conceived of as god. He draws attention to the fact that Heraclitus’ revelation of the truth overthrows the false beliefs of the uncomprehending many, perhaps because by stressing the dependence of the cosmic order on air/Mind, the wise entity Orpheus calls in his poem by the name of Zeus among many others, he criticizes uncomprehending people: ‘Orphic’ charlatans whose cultic practices are described in col. VI, and one of whom speaks in col. V trying to lure clients, the people ridiculed in col. XX. See also Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

7 “ἡλ[ι]ος ...]ου κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπ[ου] εὔρος ποδός [ἐστ]ι”: the *paragraphos* indicates that a quotation from Heraclitus follows, but whether the quotation ends in 9 or continued in the following lines is unclear. If there is the right-hand descending oblique of α, δ or λ before ου and what is faintly visible in a slightly transposed piece of papyrus is the right-hand part of a bottom horizontal, Tsantsanoglou suggests [κάδ]δου; if there is no trace of a bottom horizontal, [κύκ]λου. According to D.L. 9.9, Heraclitus believed that the celestial bodies are bowls in which collected fuel burns, producing light and heat. The term used in the doxographic report is σκάφη; it is unclear whether the word is Heraclitean, but σκάφη and κάδ(δ)ος could be used interchangeably, at least in the diminutive (cf. Phot. *Lexicon* s.v. σκάφιον). κύκλος could also refer to a vessel like a bowl (cf. Poll. 6.84).

This is in all probability the original wording of the text that gave rise to the Heraclitus entry in [Plu.] *Plac.* 890C10 (DK 22 B 3) under the head-

ing *Περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου*: 'Ἡράκλειτος εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπέου (sc. τὸν ἡλίον εἶναι). The quotation in the Derveni text puts paid to the suggestion by Kahn (1979) n. 193 and Robinson (1987) 77-78 that the reference to a human foot in pseudo-Plutarch and Aetius was not perhaps in the original text of Heraclitus, who said merely that the Sun is as large as it appears to be (cf. D.L. 9.7). It also makes clear that, *pace* Kahn (1979) 163, Heraclitus is not "exploiting, without endorsing or criticizing, the natural assumption that the Sun is just the size it appears". According to Aristotle, it is the apparent width of the Sun that measures one foot (*de An.* 428b3-4, *Insomn.* 458b29, 460b18-19). Since Heraclitus says that the Sun measures one foot in width *κατὰ φύσιν*, he thinks that the Sun really is one foot wide: Heraclitus describes himself as *κατὰ φύσιν διαίρων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει* (B 1) and, if to distinguish each thing *κατὰ φύσιν* means 'to distinguish each thing according to its real constitution', the Sun can be one foot wide *κατὰ φύσιν* only in the sense that it is one foot wide on account of its real constitution. Heraclitus' view that the Sun is really as large as it appears to be is in line with his empiricism and with his preference for the evidence furnished by sight (B 55, 101a). He is of course aware that sight can be deceptive (B 46), but apparently saw no reason to doubt its accuracy with regard to the size of the Sun and adopt a view similar to Anaximander's, according to whom the Sun and the surface of the Earth are of the same size (DK 12 A 21). The astronomical naivety of Heraclitus is typical of an early philosopher: Anaximander held the view, remarkable for his time, that the Sun is much larger than it appears to be, but thought that the fixed stars are closer to the Earth than the Sun is (A 11).

8-9 "τὸ μ[έγεθος] οὐχ ὑπερβάλλον εἰς[ότας οὐ]ρους ε[ὔρους] | [έου]": cf. the two versions of Heraclit. DK 22 B 94: (i) ἡλίος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα φησὶν ὁ 'Ἡράκλειτος· εἰ δὲ μή, 'Ερινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπικούροι ἐξευρήσουσιν (Plu. *Exil.* 604A9-B1); (ii) 'Ἡράκλειτος ... φησί ... ἡλίον ... μὴ ὑπερβήσεσθαι τοὺς προσήκοντας ὅρους· εἰ δὲ μή, γλώττας μιν Δίκης ἐπικούρους ἐξευρήσειν (Plu. *de Is. et Os.* 370D3-10; γλώττας is obviously corrupt).

9 "εἰ δὲ μ[ή], 'Ερινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου[σι, Δίκης ἐπικούροι]": in view of Heraclit. DK 22 B 94 (see previous note), this is the most probable supplement. On νιν (cf. col. XI.3) instead of Plutarch's μιν see Intro. I § 16, Tsantsanoglou and Parásoglou (1988) 133.

The Heraclitus quotation leaves no doubt that the Ephesian discussed the width of the Sun continuously with the role of the Erinyes as servants

of Dike responsible for catching the Sun in case it oversteps certain limits, though in the tradition the two topics became separated. The limits in question are limits of size – the duty of the Erinyes is to prevent the Sun from becoming wider than one foot, not from overstepping the temporal or spatial boundaries of its diurnal or annual motion in the sky, as is usually assumed; see Kahn (1979) 159-161 and Robinson (1987) 144 (Vlastos [1975] 9 understands the boundaries in B 94 as any unchanging property of the Sun, size included). Sider (1997) 142 has suggested that, according to Heraclitus, the Sun becomes wider than one foot at sunset and that the Erinyes punish it for this transgression by quenching it – in the morning there will be a new Sun as large as the old one. Heraclitus does think that the Sun is quenched (Pl. *R.* 498a6-b1) and that there is a new Sun every day (B 6), but an enlargement of the Sun is easily observed at both sunset and sunrise (cf. Cleom. *Caelestia* II.1.7-8 Todd). If Heraclitus assumed that the Erinyes punish the Sun at sunset because at that time this celestial object becomes excessively wide, it is difficult to see how he explained the obvious fact that the Erinyes tolerate the same transgression at sunrise. It would hardly befit the Erinyes in their role as servants of Dike to punish the Sun at sunset by quenching because this celestial body becomes wider than it ought to be, though the same infraction goes unpunished at sunrise; the assumption that at sunrise the corrective intervention of the Erinyes is somehow not required because the Sun will become one foot wide all by itself simply makes things worse.

Aristotle refers to Heraclitus' view that there is a new Sun every day in his critique of some anonymous Heracliteans, who follow their master in assuming that the fire of the Sun is fuelled by the wet like an ordinary fire (cf. [Arist.] *Pr.* 934b33-36), and explain the solstices on the hypothesis that the same regions cannot constantly supply the Sun with fresh fuel (*Mete.* 354b33-355a15): if the Sun is in need of fuel, Aristotle argues, there is absurdly a new Sun not every day as Heraclitus says but every moment, for the fire does not retain its identity over any time interval – at any given moment a new quantity of fuel is ignited and, as a consequence, a new quantity of fire comes about. The Heraclitean Cratylus had objected to Heraclitus that it is impossible to step into the same river not only twice but even once (Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a10-15), apparently because the water of the river does not retain its identity over any stretch of time, and Aristotle's critique of Heraclitus and the anonymous Heracliteans is obviously patterned on Cratylus' point: if Heraclitus and his followers are right and the Sun needs fuel, they wrongly assume that the Sun retains its identity

for a day (just as, according to Cratylus, Heraclitus wrongly assumes that a river retains its identity long enough for someone to step into it once) – there is a new Sun not every day, as they take it, but every moment. This critique, however, suggests that according to Heraclitus the Sun is new every day because its fire needs new fuel every day, which means that the Sun is quenched at sunset simply because its fire has exhausted the available fuel, not because the Erinyes punish it for having exceeded one foot in width.

In their role as servants of Dike Heraclitus' Erinyes need not be understood literally as divine agents charged with punishing a Sun prone to exceeding its assigned width. As Vlastos (1955) 358 has correctly pointed out, in Heraclitus there is no short-term or long-term excess on the part of the Sun to be punished by the Erinyes. The latter can be plausibly understood as a mythological personification of the inescapably strong way in which the Sun possesses a fixed width in accordance with its real constitution (see above on 7). For Heraclitus the real constitution of things involves both stability and change (the radical Heracliteanism of Cratylus does not seem to have been espoused by Heraclitus himself). To use Heraclitus' own celebrated example (see B 12), the identity of a river over time is due as much to the continuous and regular flow of water as to the stability of the river-bed. The real constitution of the Sun similarly lies as much in the continuous change of fuel into fire as in certain unchanging properties of the resultant fire: unless this fire has a certain diameter (one foot wide in Heraclitus' view) and follows a certain path in the sky, producing a stable flow of heat, it cannot be identified as the Sun, just as a flow of water cannot be identified as a certain river unless it possesses certain unchanging properties. If the Erinyes, who will catch the Sun in case it exceeds its width, personify the inescapably strong way in which the Sun has a stable diameter in accordance with its real constitution, they are not different from Parmenides' mighty Ananke, who keeps 'what is' within the bonds of limit (DK 28 B 8.31-32). Parmenides certainly is not afraid that 'what is' will break loose from the bonds of limit if Ananke does not keep it constantly constrained: by using the image of bonds, he stresses the inviolable stability of 'what is', mighty Ananke personifying the necessity of this stability.

A stable diameter is ineluctably imposed on the Sun by Dike, the principle of conflict in accordance with which all things happen (B 80). Since this is also the description of the universal principle revealed in Heraclitus' everlastingly true account, Dike is identical with this principle, the one di-

vine law that transcends all human laws (B 114), the one wise thing willing and not willing to be called by the name of Zeus (B 32), the helmsman of all things through all (B 41): it is the clash of two opposing factors in whose unity, or balanced interconnectedness, lies the real constitution of each thing and the sum total of things. A stable diameter is necessarily imposed on the Sun by Dike in the sense that, being identical with the real constitution of the Sun, Dike cannot but consist in two opposing components, one of which is a factor of stability: the nature of the Sun consists in the constant *change* of fuel into fire and the *stability* imposed on the resultant fire as regards its diameter, its path in the sky and the outflow of heat it produces. Since Heraclitus' Dike is the one wise thing willing and not willing to be called Zeus, by quoting Heraclitus the Derveni author probably attempts to shore up his view that ultimately responsible for the size of the Sun, an unchanging property of paramount importance for the preservation of cosmic order, is air/Mind, the wise entity Orpheus calls in his poem by the name of Zeus among many others. Cf. above on 2-3 and 5-6.

Assuming that for the Derveni author the soul shares in the nature of this wise entity and that the Erinyes mentioned in col. II are the souls of the dead, Betegh (2004) 346-347 attributes to the Derveni author a further reason for quoting Heraclitus, namely the wish to drive home the fact that at the cosmic level fire is not supreme – even Heraclitus himself unwittingly admits that much if his view that the fire of the Sun needs to be controlled by a higher entity, Dike, and its servants, the Erinyes, is understood in the light of the Derveni author's own cosmology (Betegh takes the phrase κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἡδ[ι]α in line 6 to mean '[Heraclitus] confutes his own teaching'). According to Betegh, the domination of fire by air/Mind at the cosmic level (see above on 2 and 2-3) has for the Derveni author not only cosmological but also, or rather primarily, eschatological significance and allows us to see the connection between the surviving relics of cols. I-III, where the Derveni author seems to discuss matters of eschatology alongside certain cultic practices related to the after-life, and col. IV, where he most probably turns to cosmology and quotes Heraclitus. As Betegh (2004) 347 takes it, the Derveni author's main tenet, which ties in neatly with the archaeological context of the Derveni papyrus (the tomb of a cremated person), is that knowledge of the cosmological truths encoded in the Orphic poem he interprets will help the participants in initiatory rituals, performed according to the poem in question and officiated by the author himself, cast off their fear of death (see also Intro. VI § 8):

Fire – the lightning in a thunderstorm, the burning flames of the pyre or the fire of Hades – can appear terrifying; but there is nothing to be feared. True, fire has an immense and possibly destructive power, yet it does not act on its own. On the contrary, it is the principal means through which divine justice and intervention can manifest themselves, both at the cosmic level and at the level of the individual souls. Fire, this tremendous force, is well under the control of the supreme divine intelligence, be it called air or Zeus. Just look at the heavenly bodies. That vast amount of fire concentrated in them could, in principle, destroy everything. For example, the stars, driven by the force of ‘like to like’, could collapse into each other and join the fiery mass of the sun, and thereby annihilate this cosmic order. But once fire is mastered and fashioned in a proper form by the cosmic intelligence, it becomes the source of all becoming. For fire is nothing but the device with the help of which the god, the intelligent air, keeps justice and governs the world. Thus, they who have no reason to be afraid of the divinity should not fear fire either. The fire of the pyre, or that of the thunderbolt, destroys only the corpse, but the (superior) soul is airy, thus fire has no power over it. Moreover, as far as the individual soul is assimilated to the cosmic intelligence and is thus airy, fire becomes its helper: by destroying something inferior, it promotes the birth of something superior.

See, however, Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

COL. V (fr. 473 Bernabé)

2 χρη[στη]ριαζομ[: middle form (-όμ[εθα, -όμ[ενοι] rather than active (-ομ[εν]). Cf. Janko (2002) 10.

3 χρησ[τ]ηριάζον[ται]: this is likelier than an active participle form (-ον[τες] etc). [...ι] at the end of the line is most probably the ending of a masculine middle participle in the nominative, governing the dative αὐτοῖς at the beginning of the next line.

4-5 αὐτοῖς πάρμεν [εἰς τὸ μα]γτεῖον ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες], | τῶν μαντευομένων [ἔν]εκεν: for παριέναι εἰς τὸ μαντεῖον cf. Hdt. 5.72.17-18 (ὃ ξεῖνε Λακεδαιμόνιε, πάλιν χώρεε μηδὲ ἔσθι ἐς τὸ ἱρόν· οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεῦσι παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα) and E. *Ion* 226-229 (εἰ μὲν ἐθύσατε πέλανον πρὸ δόμων | καὶ τι πυθέσθαι χρήζετε Φοῖβου, | πάριτ' ἐς θυμέλας· ἐπὶ δ' ἀσφόκτοις | μήλοισι δόμων μὴ πάριτ' ἐς μυχόν). Whether τὸ μα]γτεῖον is the Delphic oracle, the oracle *par excellence*, or any oracle is unclear. There is no difference between χρηστηριάζεσθαι (most probably used in 2 and 3) and μαντεύεσθαι (cf.

Hdt. 8.134.4-9). The dative αὐτοῖς probably denotes the same people as the genitive τῶν μαντευομένων. The prepositional phrase τῶν μαντευομένων [ἐν]εκεν means either 'for the sake of those who consult the oracle', in which case it is equivalent to μαντευόμενοι αὐτοῖς (the subject of the participle is the same as that of πόρμεν), or 'with regard to those who consult the oracle' (see LSJ s.v. ἐνεκα 2), in which case it is connected with the following indirect question and the repetition of the dative αὐτοῖς after θέμις or θεμιτῶν could be avoided. As turns out from the following lines, οἱ μαντευόμενοι do not believe that Hades has a horrendous fate in store for them, fail to understand dreams and certain other things, are overcome by pleasure and error, and wallow in ignorance. The question they address to the oracles is unclear (see next note), and their blitheness is indignantly castigated by someone who speaks in the first person plural and seems to visit oracles on their behalf (it is also unclear why these fellows do not consult the oracles directly, or on what terms they obtain the services of the middleman). There is no reason to assume that the speaker here is the Derveni author; see Intro. VI §§ 10-11.

5 εἰ θεμι[...].ηδᾶ: it can be reasonably assumed that this is the question addressed to the oracles by the employers of the individual who speaks in this column. Cf. οὐ σε θέμις κτείνειν οἴων ἐστὶ βέβαιον ... (no. 537 in Parke and Wormell [1956] vol. 2), the sole known occurrence of (οὐ) θέμις in an oracular response. If ηδᾶ is a relic of the infinitive depending on θέμις or θεμιτῶν, this infinitive can be only the present infinitive of πηδᾶν, compounded or not, or φληδᾶν (attested in Hsch. φ 604 Schmidt: φληδῶντα: ληροῦντα), but none of these verbs allows one to make sense of the question addressed to the oracles. That one would ask an oracle if it is right not to believe in the horrors of Hades (see next line and cf. Janko [2002] 10) seems unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out; no surviving oracle concerns the fate of the inquirer in the afterlife – the response to Amelius who asked ποῦ ἡ Πλωτίνου ψυχὴ κεχώρηκε (no. 473 in Parke and Wormell [1956] vol. 2) cannot be adduced as a parallel.

6 ἄρ' "Αἰδοῦ δεινὰ τί ἀπιστοῦσι; The logical connection between this rhetorical question and what has been said in the previous lines of this column is not evident. The speaker here might be pointing out that the faith of his employers in the oracles is inconsistent with their disbelief in the horrors of Hades; or that his employers believe what the oracles say in response to actually trifling questions, but paradoxically disbelieve what he reveals

to them about a matter of the utmost importance, their fate after death; or that they trust him when they send him to consult the oracles on their behalf, but not when he expounds the fate Hades has in store for them.

6-7 οὐ γινώσ[κοντες ἐ]γύπνια | οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων ἕκαστ[ον]: the employers of the speaker here do not know how to interpret dreams (cf. Hdt. 3.58.1-2: τοῦτον τὸν χρησμόν οὐκ οἶοί τε ἦσαν γνῶναι). These dreams reveal the fate in Hades, for it is clear from what comes next that they ought to make one believe in the horrors of the afterlife, provided of course that their import can be correctly understood. The speaker here might also be an interpreter of dreams, and he might believe that dreams about the afterlife originate from the realm of the dead: according to Alexander Polyhistor (D.L. 8.32 = DK 58 B 1a = *FGrHist* 273 F 93), the Pythagoreans believed that dreams and other omens are sent by the souls of the dead, which fill the air and are called demons and heroes (demons are also said to be the source of dreams in Pl. *Smp.* 202d8-203a4). τὰ πράγματα might be omens other than dreams that also hint at the horrors of Hades if properly interpreted. Such omens might have been referred to earlier on; see fr. F 18 + H 45 (ἕκαστα σημεῖα), fr. F 10 (τὰ σημεῖα).

7-8 διὰ ποίων ἂν | παραδειγμάτων π[ι]στεύοιεν; Dreams and other omens serve as παραδείγματα for those who can grasp their import, i.e. as warnings about the horrible fate awaiting them in Hades. Cf. Thuc. 3.39.3.17-20: παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὕτε αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραὶ ἐγένοντο, ὅσοι ἀποσπάντες ἤδη ἡμῶν ἐχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παρούσα εὐδαιμονία παρέσχευ ὄκνον μὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐς τὰ δεινά.

8-9 ὑπὸ [τε γάρ] ἁμαρτ(ι)ῆς | καὶ [τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νενικημέν[οι: Tsantsanoglou's τε γάρ fits exactly the available space (δὲ τῆς is longer), and his ἁμαρτ(ι)ῆς is preferable to ἁμαρτίης which, though, might have a parallel in the lexicon of Photius (α 1143 Theodoridis): ἁμαρτάς: ἀντί τοῦ ἁμαρτάδας Αἰσχύλος. Tsantsanoglou has emended the *hapax* ἁμαρτάς to ἁμαρτ(ι)ῆς in the light of Ag. 1197 (παλαιὰς τῶνδ' ἁμαρτίας δόμων), but ἁμαρτή, a primitive word formed by the addition of -η to a verb stem (cf. e.g. λαβή), would by no means be anomalous, and it is possible that Photius is explaining a word from one of Aeschylus' lost plays. Since there is no piece of secure evidence in favor of ἁμαρτίης, however, one should tentatively plump for ἁμαρτ(ι)ῆς here. ἁμαρτή, 'error', is evidently failure to understand the import of dreams that reveal the horrible fate awaiting the dreamer in Hades.

Those unable to understand the import of such dreams are overcome by pleasure. The point is perhaps that these people cannot experience any awe at, and thus cannot assent to, what their dreams reveal about their fate in the afterlife because the pleasures in which they indulge are so overpoweringly intense. They most probably wallow in bodily pleasures, which in early Greek thought are viewed with suspicion. Two of the *Maxims of the Seven Sages* (DK 10) urge us to control pleasure (Cleobulus) and to avoid pleasure which brings distress (Solon), whereas a third one warns that pleasures are mortal but virtues immortal (Periander). The characterization of bodily pleasures as transient, and the need to control them on account of their unpleasant consequences, entails not their outright condemnation but merely a measured attitude to them; see Gosling and Taylor (1982) 13. The Pythagoreans, however, condemn bodily pleasures as totally bad (see DK 58 C4, § 85; D 8 § 204), and so does perhaps the speaker here, since he seems to share with the Pythagoreans the fundamental concern about the fate of the individual after death. In Middle Comedy the harshly ascetic lifestyle of mendicant Pythagoreans is repeatedly mocked (for references to the relevant fragments see Burkert [1972] 198-199) and, as a fragment of Aristophon suggests (12 K-A), its goal was eschatological: by forswearing the pleasures of the body in this life, the Pythagoreans hoped to secure a favorable treatment in the afterlife. For relevant evidence on the ὀρφέα τελευτοῖαι see [Plu.] *Apophth. Lac.* 224E. The speaker here perhaps invites those who wish to avoid a horrendous fate in Hades to abjure bodily pleasures. This does not of course imply that they ought to adopt the severe asceticism of the Pythagoreans, who denied themselves even the simplest comforts. Antisthenes would go mad rather than feel pleasure (fr. 108 A-F, 109 B Caizzi), but he apparently condemns only the intense pleasures of a debauched lifestyle, not the pleasures of the simple life (fr. 113, 117 Caizzi).

9-10 οὐ] μαγθ[άνο]υσιν | [οὐδὲ] πιστεύουσι: Plato also associates disbelief and the pursuit of pleasure, here assumed to be the cause of disbelief, in an eschatological context. In the *Gorgias* (493a1-c3) Socrates reports to Callicles the views he has heard from a wise man, according to whom life is death and those who suffer most in Hades are the pleasure-seekers. As the anonymous wise man takes it, this is the point of a certain teller of myths from Sicily or Italy (493a5-6: μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἰταλικὸς), according to whom the wretched ones are doomed in Hades to carry water in a sieve and pour it into a leaky vessel: these people

are the uninitiated fools and the leaky vessel is the intemperate part of their souls that has insatiable desires, whereas the sieve stands for their souls that are incontinent or 'perforated', and thus insatiably keen on pleasure because of their disbelief and forgetfulness (493c3: δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην). This interpretation of the water-carriers myth treats the punishment in Hades as an allegory of the wretched life of those who are uninitiated and addicted to the pursuit of pleasure. Dodds (1959) 297 suggests that this anonymous teller of myths, whom Olympiodorus implausibly identifies with Empedocles (*in Grg.* 30.5 Westerink), authored a religious poem about the sufferings of the uninitiated in Hades, "a work of the same general type as the poem of which fragments are preserved on the so-called 'Orphic' gold plates". On disbelief and lack of knowledge, as well as on the pursuit of pleasure and lack of knowledge, see next note.

10-12 ἀ[πι]στή δὲ κάμα[θί] ταύτων κτλ: cf. Pl. *Grg.* 454c7-e4 (and *Men.* 97c6-98a8):

ΣΩ. "Ἰθὶ δὴ καὶ τὸδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι; — ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ. — ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι; — ΓΟΡ. Ἐγῶγε. — ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταύτων δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; — ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως. — ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶει· γνώση δὲ ἐνθύνδε. εἰ γὰρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· "Ἄρ' ἔστιν τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;" φαῖς ἂν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. — ΓΟΡ. Ναί. — ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; — ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. — ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρ' αὐτὸ ὅτι ταύτων ἐστίν. — ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. — ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. — ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. — ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θάμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην; — ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

Those who fail to grasp the import of their eschatological nightmares and succumb to pleasure do not believe that the lot of the dead is terrible, and thus do not know their fate in the afterlife. As it is, giving in to pleasure causes not only disbelief but also lack of knowledge. Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 357e2: τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη. Assuming that the good is maximal pleasure in the longer term, Plato argues that ignorance of the ultimate consequences of one's actions in terms of pleasure and pain causes, and thus explains, the pursuit of immediate pleasure, whereas in the Derveni text the pursuit of pleasure is responsible for ignorance. There is no evidence that maximal pleasure in the afterlife is the ultimate good according to the speaker here but those who, oblivious to the horrendous fate waiting them in Hades, pursue pleasure in this life cannot but lack knowledge of the ultimate consequences of their actions in terms

of pleasure and pain, as is the case with those who are overcome by pleasure in the *Protagoras*.

COL. VI (fr. 471 Bernabé)

1 εὐ[χαὶ καὶ θυσ[ί]αι μ[ε]ιλ[ί]σσοῦσι τὰ[ς ψυχάς]: the gap at the beginning of the line might have contained a reference to *χοαί* (Tsantsanoglou [1997] 110). “Except in technical philosophical parlance, the plural *ψυχαί* refers ordinarily to the dead and their peculiar condition” (Henrichs [1984] 262). *εὐχαί* and *θυσαί* often occur together in religious contexts; cf. e.g. Thuc. 8.70.1.6, Lys. 6.4, Pl. R. 461a6, Lg. 885b8-9 and see Casabona (1966) 130. It is likely that the prayers and the sacrifices mentioned here are offered by the *μάγοι* whose *ἐπ[ωιδή]*, ‘incantation’, is said in the next two lines to be able to put out of the way obstructing demons (on the supplement at the beginning of 4, these beings stand in the way of souls). In Greek the term *μάγος* denotes either a member of the Persian priesthood or a charlatan purportedly able to wield sorcery; see Graf (1994) 31-45 and Burkert (2003) 115-117. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 110 assumes that the ritual practices described here are those of the Persian priests, for *μάγος* is not said of a Greek religious practitioner in a non-pejorative sense, and that these ritual practices will be compared next to those of Greek initiates (*μύσται*) who are said to perform preliminary sacrifices to the Eumenides “in the same manner as the magi do” (the reference is to the offer of sacrificial cakes by the magi) because the Eumenides are souls; in Tsantsanoglou’s view (see Intro. VI §§ 1-2), these initiates are led by the Derveni author (cf. Burkert [2003] 128, who in the last chapter of his book builds heavily on the mention of magi in the Derveni text, a work undoubtedly ‘Presocratic’ in spirit, and the supplement τὰ[ς ψυχάς] in order to delineate the Persian influence on Presocratic thought).

The mention of *εὐχαί* and *θυσαί* by Diogenes Laertius (1.6) in connection with the Persian magi (adduced by Burkert [2003] 130) and the characterization of the theogony sung by Persian magi over sacrifices as *ἐπαιοιδή* in Hdt. 1.132.3 (adduced by Tsantsanoglou [1997] 111, Burkert [2003] 127) do not in themselves support the identification of the magi with Persian religious professionals (cf. X. Cyr. 8.3.11 and E. Or. 1497b) – one would expect these terms to occur in religious contexts. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 110 suggests that the souls propitiated by the prayers and sacrifices of the magi are those of ancestors: “The Persian word for these souls is *ar-*

tavan, which passed into Greek in the form ἀρταῖοι or ἀρτάδες. They were the equivalent of the Greek ‘blessed ones’, the δίκαιοι or the ἥρωες”. For references in Greek sources to hero worship by the Persian magi see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 111 n. 27. Tsantsanoglou thinks that the demons, who are put out of the way of souls by the incantations of the magi, are meant as the Persian counterparts of the Greek Erinyes, the watchful and avenging spirits called *Fravashis*; see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 112-113 and cf. the remark in Burkert (2003) 129 concerning the Persian names of the souls and the demons mentioned in the first two surviving lines of this column. However, the recipients of the propitiating prayers and sacrifices offered by the magi might very well be the same beings to whom the magi address their incantations and, if the incantations are addressed to the *Fravashis* as Tsantsanoglou suggests, the recipients of the propitiating prayers and sacrifices could be referred to in Greek as the Erinyes/Eumenidés (for their probable equation see above on col. II.4), beings identified with souls below in this column, perhaps those of certain dead (see above on col. II.4; the Erinyes could be said to stand in the way of, or to impede, souls; see Tsantsanoglou [1997] 112 and cf. Betegh [2004] 88-89). It is conceivable, in other words, that the papyrus had not τὰς ψυχὰς (a questionable supplement, as its author himself admits; see Tsantsanoglou [1997] 110) but τὰς Ἐρινῶς (τὰς Εὐμενίδας is too long to be substituted for τὰς ψυχὰς), though both terms would pick out the same entities.

Be that as it may, there is no compelling reason to see in the magi and their cultic practices a reference to Persian priests and their cultic practices: Betegh (2004) 78-83 (see Intro. VI § 8) assumes that the Derveni author applies the term ‘magi’ to the group to which he himself belongs (without, of course, any negative connotation), that the magi are Greek religious professionals leading the initiates, and that col. VI speaks about the parallel actions of both groups within the same cult (Tsantsanoglou, who also thinks that the Derveni author is a religious professional, suggests that the author puts forward the Persian magi as venerable paradigms of piety and wisdom to lend antiquity and authority to the ritual practices of those who are initiated by him; if Betegh is right, the same purpose could account for the adoption of the name ‘magi’ by a group of Greek religious professionals to which the Derveni author belongs). Again, however, there is no compelling reason to hold that the Derveni author himself is one of the magi, and so cannot but take a positive view of this class, and that he is a religious professional leading initiates – he might very well use the term ‘magi’ to denounce such religious professionals as charlatans. If these pro-

professionals call themselves ‘magi’ after the Persian priests, whom they invoke as solemn paradigms of piety and wisdom, or if they simply invoke the Persian magi as such paradigms, the Derveni author might evoke the pejorative sense of the name in Greek (cf. Jourdan [2003] 37-38) to suggest that all these professionals are purveyors of, or all the Persian priests are venerable paradigms of, is in fact pure charlatantry. Cf. below on 5 and see Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

2-3 ἐπ[ωιδῇ δ]ὲ μάγων δύν[α]ται δαίμονας ἐμ[ποδῶν] | γι[νομένο]υς μεθιστάγει: see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 111 for the possibility of supplementing ἐγ[τομα, ‘sacrificial victims offered to the dead’, instead of ἐπ[ωιδῇ. The alternative supplement is consistent with the hypothesis that the ritual practices described here are those of the Persian magi; see previous note. The demons standing in the way of souls (see next line) might be the same entities as those souls that are said in 1 to be appeased through prayers and sacrifices (getting these cantankerous beings out of the way can be understood as a result of their being appeased), i.e. the Eumenides/Erinyes who are said below in 8-10 to receive sacrificial offerings and are identified with souls (see above on col. II.4 and cf. previous note). Perhaps the entities in question are the servants of gods that col. III.7 mentions in close proximity to demons, unjust men and bearing responsibility or blame. See also Intro. VI § 5.

4 ψ[υχᾷς ἐχθ]ροί: “instead of ψυχᾷς ἐχθροί it is possible to reconstruct ψυχῶν φρουροί (with the letters slightly compressed) or ψυχᾷ τιμωροί. But the sense remains much the same” (Tsantsanoglou [1997] 113). If ψ[υχᾷς ἐχθ]ροί or ψ[υχῶν φρου]ροί, the souls in question can be understood as those of the unjust men mentioned earlier on (col. III.8) in close proximity to demons, servants of gods and bearing responsibility or blame; if ψ[υχᾷ τιμω]ροί, the souls in question are identified with the demons mentioned in 2-3 (cf. above on 1), beings probably identical with the Eumenides, who are explicitly equated with souls in 9-10, possibly those of certain dead, and ought perhaps not to be distinguished from the Erinyes mentioned in cols. I-II (see above on col. II.4).

4-5 τὴν θυσ[ία]ν τούτου ἔνεκε[ν] π[οιοῦσ]ι[ν] | οἱ μᾶ[γο]ι: the following participle explains τούτου ἔνεκεν.

5 ὥσπερ εἰ ποινὴν ἀποδιδόντες: the original sense of ποινή is ‘blood money’ (cf. *Il.* 18.498-499). Tsantsanoglou (1997) 113 suggests that here the noun

means “retribution or ransom for the rescue of the souls”; cf. Jourdan (2003) 38. Most (1997) 131-132 suggests that it means ‘penalty’ that must be paid on account of unjust deeds; see also Intro. VI § 5. If the ‘retribution’ or ‘ransom’ is paid ritually through a sacrifice, the offering can be thought of as a surrogate penalty. The begging priests and diviners in Pl. R. 364b5-365a3, the religious professionals whose ranks include the Derveni author in Tsantsanoglou’s and Betegh’s view (cf. above on 1 and see Intro. VI §§ 1-2 and 8), tout their ability to cleanse the wrongdoings of both the living and the dead through sacrifices, claiming that participation in initiatory rituals performed according to books of Orpheus and officiated by themselves ensures an afterlife free of horror; unless one takes part in these rituals, a dreadful fate awaits him or her after death (see above on 2-3 and 4). According to Jourdan, ὥσπερ might suggest that the Derveni author considers it impossible to avert a horrible fate after death through sacrifices (see also Intro. n. 206); if so, the author rejects as outright imposture the cultic practices of the religious professionals called *magi*, a term used in the sense ‘charlatans’, though Jourdan allows that the other sense of the term, ‘Persian religious specialist’ (see above on 1), might be evoked by the Derveni author (there is no reason why the two senses of the term cannot be co-present; cf. above on 1). Jourdan suggests that from 10 onwards the Derveni author might describe another set of cultic practices, presumably Orphic, which, in contrast to those of the charlatans, he takes to be legitimate (in p. XIV of her introduction Jourdan suggests that, alternatively, the two sets of cultic practices might be described in col. VI simultaneously, which is less likely). Nothing, however, indicates that in 10 the Derveni author ends his description of cultic impostures and their explanation, probably given by the impostors themselves, to begin a new section about another set of cultic practices he approves of. If no such new section begins in 10, ὥσπερ would suggest that the Derveni author rejects cultic practices *tout court* as charlatanry based on the false belief in divinities subject to the whim of humans, irrespective of whether the experts in these practices solemnly called themselves *magi* after the real Persian *magi*, or invoked the Persian *magi* as venerable paradigms of religious expertise, or are simply branded *magi*, ‘charlatans’, by the Derveni author himself; see also above on 1 and cf. Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

5-7 τοῖς) δὲ | ἱεροῖς] ἐπισπένδουσιν ὕδωρ καὶ γάλα, ἐξ ὧν περ καὶ τὰς | χοᾶς ποιοῦσι: τὰ ἱερά are τὰ πόπανα mentioned next in 7, cakes serving as preliminary sacrificial offerings (προθύματα, cf. προθύουσι in 9), but also

the poultry probably mentioned in 11. For the difference between σπονδαί and χοαί see Henrichs (1984) 259; in the final section of his article he tentatively connects the wineless χοαί and the preliminary sacrificial offerings mentioned in the Derveni papyrus with the πλημοχόαι, a ritual which took place at the last day of the Eleusinian mysteries and probably aimed at appeasing chthonic powers, including the dead, in order to secure the fertility of the earth. As Tsantsanoglou (1997) 115 observes, though, both χοαί and preliminary sacrificial offerings are common in numerous cults, mystic or not.

7-8 ἀνάριθμα [κα]ὶ πολυόμφαλα τὰ πόπανα | θύουσιν: for the use of θύειν with τὰ πόπανα, ‘sacrificial cakes’, see e.g. *Ar. Th.* 284-285: ἐξέλε | τὸ πόπανον, ὅπως λαβοῦσα θύσω τοῖν θεοῖν. Knob-like protuberances on the cakes were called ὀμφοαῖοι. On πόπανα see Henrichs (1984) 260-261 with relevant literature in n. 20. On sacrificial cakes in Persian cult see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 114.

8 ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀνἀρίθμοι εἰσι: the belief that the souls of the dead are countless and move in swarms is attested in literature. See Henrichs (1984) 262 n. 30 who quotes Rohde’s description of the Erinyes as “von Anfang an unbegrenzt, wie die Zahl individueller Seelengeister, deren jeder eine Erinyes werden kann” (Rohde [1901] vol. 2, 240f.). Diogenes Laertius (1.7) attributes to the Persian magi the belief that the air is full of (apparently countless) εἰδῶλα, where εἰδῶλα should be understood as the souls of the dead; see Betegh (2004) 79. Alexander Polyhistor, *apud* Diogenes Laertius, attributes the same view to the Pythagoreans; see above on col. III.4 and cf. Burkert (2003) 129ff. For the related notion of the Milky Way, a celestial belt of countless bright spots, as the avenue of the souls see Gundel *RE* 7.1.1563-6; the formula εἰς γάλα ἔπεσον/ἔθορον, which occurs in the ‘Orphic’ gold leaves (see Graf [1993] 241) and is supposed to be uttered by the soul of the deceased, might imply the passage of the soul to the Milky Way (see Dieterich [1891] 37-38 = [1911] 97-98).

8-9 μύσται | Εὐμεγίστι προθύουσιν κατὰ τὰ ἀνὰ μάγοις: see above on 1 and 5. On the possibility that the initiates are those of the Eleusinian mysteries (Henrichs [1984] 267; cf. above on 5-7) see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 115-117.

9-10 Εὐμενίδες γὰρ | ψυχαί εἰσιν: see above on col. II.4.

10-11 ὃν ἔνεκ[εν τὸν μέλλοντ]α θεοῖς θύειν | ὁ[ρ]γίθ[ε]ιον πρότερον: “on whose (the souls’) account, whoever intends to sacrifice to the gods must first make an offering of poultry to [...]” (Tsantsanoglou [1997] 98). Cf. Henrichs (1984) 257-258 and see above on col. II.6-7. On ὁρνίθειον see above on col. II.7.

COL. VII

2 ὕμνον[ι] καὶ θεμ[ι]τά λέγοντα: if ὕμνον has been correctly supplemented, the poem in question is most probably Orpheus’ poem. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 118-119 takes θεμ[ι]τά in the sense ‘allowed to be heard or read by non-initiated people’ and, assuming that καὶ functions inferentially, he suggests that the poem’s contents are allowed to be heard or read by non-initiated people because they are actually sound, [ὕγ]ιη: soundness is stressed because in Orpheus’ poem gods behave grotesquely, implausibly or unacceptably from a moral point of view (cf. Jourdan [2003] 39-40). There is no reason to read into θεμ[ι]τά a commitment to religion on the Derveni author’s part, however. Since in his view Orpheus actually encoded in his hymn a cosmology that posits as the first cause of motion and change in the cosmos an entity allegorically conceived of as god and called by the name of Zeus among many others, the contents of this poem could be sound, [ὕγ]ιη, and allowed to be read or listened to by the law of god itself, θεμ[ι]τά, in the sense that the poem is nothing but a true account of this very law, i.e. the workings of the cosmos as a system determined by a fundamental principle. See also Intro. VI § 16.

2-3 ἱερουργεῖτο γὰρ | [τῇ] ποιήσει: besides ἱερουργεῖτο, which can be personal (“he was performing a religious service by means of the poem”), with Orpheus as the most probable subject (cf. previous note), or impersonal (“a sacred rite was being performed by means of the poem”), Tsantsanoglou (1997) 119 considers ἡνίσσετο or ἡνίξετο. Both supplements are compatible with Tsantsanoglou’s interpretation of [ὕγ]ιη καὶ θεμ[ι]τά, but only ἡνίσσετο or ἡνίξετο will do if θεμ[ι]τά has no religious connotations (see previous note). Another possibility, adopted by Janko (2002), is ἱερολογεῖτο, which is also compatible with Tsantsanoglou’s interpretation of [ὕγ]ιη καὶ θεμ[ι]τά. The verb has been restored by Tsantsanoglou in 7. First found in Lucian (*Syr. D.* 26), it means ‘to recount a sacred story’ (ἱερὸς λόγος), i.e. a story about gods; see also Tsantsanoglou (1997) 123 with n. 56. For Lucian (*Astr.* 10) Orpheus’ ἱερολογία encodes astrological knowledge:

Ἕλληνες δὲ οὔτε παρ' Αἰθιοπῶν οὔτε παρ' Αἰγυπτίων ἀστρολογίης πέρι οὐδὲν ἤκουσαν, ἀλλὰ σφίσιν Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Οἰάγρου καὶ Καλλιόπης πρῶτος τάδε ἀπηγγέσατο, οὐ μάλα ἐμφανέως, οὐδὲ ἐς φάος τὸν λόγον προήνεγκεν, ἀλλ' ἐς γοητεῖν καὶ ἱερολογίην, οἷα διανοίη ἐκείνου. πηξάμενος γὰρ λύρην ὄργιά τε ἐποιέετο καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἥειδεν.

In view of Lucian's use of the cognate noun ἱερολογία, the verb ἱερολογεῖσθαι could mean 'to recount in verse a story about gods as a vehicle for communicating allegorically scientific knowledge'. ἱερολογεῖτο would thus be compatible with the alternative interpretation of θεμ[ι]τά suggested in the previous note (like Tsantsanoglou's ἱεουργεῖτο, it could be either personal, with Orpheus as subject, or impersonal).

3-4 [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἶόν τε τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων | [λύ]σιν καί[τοι] ῥηθέντα: the subject of εἰπεῖν is probably τινά or τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (cf. Tsantsanoglou [1997] 119), and ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων λύσις can mean only 'the interpretation of the words' in Orpheus' enigmatic poetry. The common use of λύειν and λύσις in ancient commentaries (see Erbse, vol. 6.398-399 s.v.) may have its origin in the language of the fifth/fourth century BC allegoric interpreters. In Orpheus' poem it is every single word that needs interpretation or presents an enigma to be 'solved'; see 7-8, ἱερ[ολογ]εῖται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου | [ἀεὶ] μέχρι οὗ [τελε]υταίου ῥήματος, and col. XIII.5-6, ὅτι μὲν πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων | αἰνίσκεται, κ[α]θ' ἑποσ ἑκαστον ἀνάγκη λέγειν. If there are really traces of a curve after καί, Tsantsanoglou's καί-τ[τοι] is the only possible supplement (in the readings τ[ὰ] ῥηθέντα and τ[ἀπο]ρρηθέντα the supplement is shorter and longer respectively than required; τ[ἀπο]ρρηθέντα, moreover, does not make sense in the given context). On the double ρ in the papyrus' ῥηθέντα (cf. τὸ ῥήμα in XXVI.8) see Schwyzler vol. 1, 310-311 and Thraette vol. 1, 519. The participle is in the nominative, constructed πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον (see KG vol. 2, 105ff.). It was not possible (before the Derveni author came along?) to put forth the solution to (the riddles posed by) the words in Orpheus' poetry, despite the fact that these words had been spoken, perhaps long ago, i.e. they had been out there for everybody to hear – the contrast is between hearing and understanding what is heard (cf. col. XX.2-3: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε | ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα).

4 ἔστι δὲ ξ[ένη τις ἡ] πόησις: Orpheus' poetry is strange, unusual. For the supplement see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 121.

5 [κ]αὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι[γμ]ατώδης: the Derveni author implicitly contrasts himself as Orpheus' interpreter with common people unable to understand

what the words in Orpheus' poetry really mean (cf. Tsantsanoglou [1997] 121).

5-6 [κε]ῖ [Ὀρφεὺς] αὐτ[ὸς] | [ἐ]ρίστ' αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐκ ἤθελε λέγειν: the restoration of Orpheus' name is very plausible, but by no means certain. The verbal adjective ἐριστός occurs *hapax* in S. *El.* 220. As Tsantsanoglou (1997) 121 remarks, ἐρίστ' αἰνίγματα, "riddles that are matter for dispute", is in this context more to the point than ἄριστ' αἰνίγματα, "the best riddles": Orpheus did not intend to pose riddles that would give rise to, presumably unworthy, disputes.

6-7 [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ[ι]ν δὲ | [μεγ]άλα: Orpheus discourses on matters of paramount importance (cf. above on 2) through riddles. The emphasis is not on the riddles Orpheus' poetry poses, but on what these riddles reveal to anyone able to solve them (see also previous note). Tsantsanoglou (1997) 121 compares Pl. *Phd.* 62b2-6: ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ... μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥάδιος διιδεῖν.

7 ἱερ[ολογ]εῖται μὲν οὖν: the verb (see above on 2-3) can be either in the middle voice and personal, with Orpheus as subject, or in the passive voice and impersonal. Tsantsanoglou (1997) 122 opts for the first.

7-8 καὶ ἄ[πὸ το]ῦ πρώτου | [ἀεὶ] μέχρι οὗ [τελε]υτῶν ῥήματος: cf. above on 3-4. On μέχρι οὗ see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 123.

8-9 φ[ς δηλοῖ] καὶ ἐν τῷ | [εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι] ἔπει: the subject of δηλοῖ is evidently Orpheus. For a defense of the supplement [εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι] see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 123-124, who argues that the adjective means not 'easy to understand' but 'easy to recognize', and that the Derveni author does not quote the verse or verses (ἔπος) here referred to evasively as 'easy to recognize' because the text must have been ἀπόρητον, though in observance of the letter rather than the spirit of the injunction not to recite it he will proceed to reveal its content. It is, however, clear from what follows that the Derveni author does not think of the passage in question as presenting a riddle that must be solved (perhaps this is why he does not quote this passage), and, since in the preceding lines he dwells on the enigmatic character of Orpheus' poem, he might very well use the adjective εὐκρίνητος in the sense 'easy to understand' to contrast the passage he had in mind with the rest of the poem, where each and every word is an enigma unsolvable by common people.

9-10 “θύρας” γὰρ “ἐπιθέ[σθαι]” κελεύσας τοῖ[ς] | [“ὡσί]ν” αὐτ[ούς]: fr. 3 Bernabé. As is clear from what comes next, αὐτούς = τοὺς πολλούς. Cf. Pl. *Smp.* 218b5-7, the oldest allusion to the second part of a hexameter abundantly attested (θύρας δ’ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι): οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας πάνυ μεγάλας τοῖς ὥσιν ἐπίθεσθε. Here the Derveni author probably paraphrases (a verse from) the beginning of Orpheus’ poem, whose enigmas he will solve in the remaining columns of the papyrus; see the *exempli gratia* reconstruction of the poem in West (1983) 114-115, line 1, and Tsantsanoglou (1997) 124-128. There is no reason to assume that, for the Derveni author, the terms οἱ πολλοί, a probable rendering of Orpheus’ οἱ βέβηλοι, and οἱ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀγνεύοντες in 11 (if correctly supplemented) carry religious connotations; see the conclusion of the note on col. XX. 7-8.

10 οὐτι νομο]θετεῖν φη[σιν τοῖς] πολλοῖς: on νομοθετεῖν see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 128.

11 τῇ]ν ἀκοὴν [ἀγνεύο]ντας κατ[ά]: Tsantsanoglou (1997) 128 observes that “the change of the case from the dative (τοῖς πολλοῖς) to accusative (ἀγνεύο]ντας) shows that a new verb was introduced in 11: possibly διδάσκειν, or, more commensurate with the size of the gap, ἐκδιδάσκειν; e.g. ἀλλ’ ἐκδιδάσκειν τοὺς κτλ. Cf. above on 9-10.

14 ἐν δ]ὲ τῷ ἐχομ[έ]νῳ: sc. ἔπει. This is the typical phrase introducing the quotation of a verse from Orpheus’ poem in the rest of the papyrus (cf. col. XII.1, XV.5, XVI.12, XXIII.10). If the supplement and the placing of fr. H 65 + H 64 (lines 13-15) are correct, one or two verses from Orpheus’ poem must have been quoted in 12-13 and another one in 15; see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 128.

COL. VIII

1 ἐδήλω[σεν ἐν τῷ]δε τῷ ἔπ[ει]: since Orpheus is undoubtedly the subject of the verb, ἐδήλωσεν is preferable to the perfect δεδύλωται; cf. col. XI. 11 (ἐδήλωσεν), V.1 (ἐπόησεν) and 13 (ἔφη), XIII.8 (ἐχρήσατο). δεδύλωται is used three times in the extant parts of the Derveni papyrus (col. XIII.2, XVI.1, XVII.4) for what has already been explained by the author, not for what Orpheus says.

2 “[ο]ἱ Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο [ὑπερμεν]έος βασιλῆος”: fr. 4 Bernabé. οἱ Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο occurs in Hom. *Il.* 5.637 (cf. *Orac. Chald.* 218.5 des Places, Hes. *Th.* 46). For ὑπερμενέος βασιλῆος cf. ὑπερμενέων βασιλῆων (Hom. *Il.* 8.236, *Od.* 13.205, 20.222), ὑπερμενέος Κρονίωνος (Hes. fr. 150.16 M-W, *OF* 168.20), ὑπερμενεί Κρονίονι (Hom. *Il.* 2.403, Hes. *Th.* 534, fr. 141.11 M-W), ὑπερμενέα Κρονίωνα (Hom. *Il.* 2.350). [ἐρ]ισθενέος (cf. ἐρισθενέος Κρονίωνος in Hom. *Od.* 8.289, Hes. *Th.* 4) is slightly shorter than required by the available space. Since the Derveni author explains in cols. XXI-XXIII what Orpheus means by the generation of various goddesses and gods from Zeus, in the poem this relative clause might have qualified the gods/goddesses referred to in (one of) the preceding hexameter(s), where Orpheus perhaps declared his intention – to sing of the gods “who were born from Zeus the mighty king”: cf. Hes. *Th.* 43-46 and 105-107.

3 ὅπως δ' ἄρχεται ἐν τῷ[ιδε δη]λοῖ: sc. ἔπει. ἐν τῷιδε (ἔπει) refers to a couplet also in col. XXVI.5. The subject of δηλοῖ is Orpheus, that of ἄρχεται most probably τὰ νῦν ἑόντα, here the stable structures into which the universe is now organized on the large scale (cf. below on col. XVI.1-2). In the couplet quoted next Orpheus commences his explanation of how air/Mind, which he calls allegorically Zeus, initiated the formation of the cosmos from a primordial fire-dominated mixture of all other fundamental constituents of reality. For a précis of the Derveni author's cosmology see the note on col. IV.2; for detailed discussion see Intro. V.

4-5 “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πα[τρός ἐο]ῦ πάρα θε[σ]φατον ἀρχὴν
[ἀ]λκὴν τ' ἐν χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[εν κ]α[ὶ] δαίμον[α] κυδρόν”:

fr. 5 Bernabé. For the text see Intro. IV §§ 1-3.

6 ὑπερβατά: for another early application of this adjective to words see Pl. *Prt.* 343e3. Cf. [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 1435a37, 1438a28.

9-10 [οὔτω] δ' ἔχοντα οὐκ ἀκούειν τὸν Ζᾶ[να ἐπικρα]τεῖ | [τοῦ πατρ]ῆος: for the accusative absolute cf. Pl. *Ti.* 69b3-4 (ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἐκάστω τε αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίας ἐνεποίησεν). Supplementing [χρὴ ὧ]δ' and ὅπως κρα]τεῖ, Janko (2002) 16 takes ἀκούειν in the sense ‘to understand’ (LSJ s.v. IV), but the verb is used in this sense only by late scholiasts and after χρὴ the negation should be μή, not οὐκ. For Tsantsanoglou's ἐπικρα]τεῖ cf. the construction of this verb in Thuc.

5.46.4.11-12 and 6.74.1.14 with an infinitive of result denoting a view which is put forth by the subject of the verb and prevails over another view: “if the words are taken in this order, the prevailing sense is not that Zeus hears his father”. See also Intro. IV §§ 1-2.

11-12 [ἄλλως δ’ ἔ]χοντα παρὰ θέσφατα δ[όξειεν ἂν λαβεῖ]ν | [τὴν ἀλήνην: if the verse in 4 is a misquotation of that in col. XIII.1 (see Intro. IV §§ 1-3), by assuming that παρὰ is in anastrophe and that its object is πατρὸς ἐοῦ, the Derveni author intends to avoid construing θέσφατα as the object of παρὰ. For, if θέσφατα were the object of παρὰ, Zeus would then seem to take the power παρὰ θέσφατα, an obviously undesirable reading which the Derveni author can be assumed to rule out here.

14 μαθών: this participle might belong to the Derveni author’s interpretation of θέσφατ’ ἀκούσας (col. XIII.1) which seems to have been misquoted as θέσφατον ἀρχὴν in 4 (see Intro. IV §§ 1-3). In col. XIII.2-3 the Derveni author says that he has already made clear in what sense ‘Zeus heard’ (οὔτε γὰρ το.ε ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ δεδιλωται ὅπως | ἤ[κουσεν]), and he might refer back to this point of his work. He seems to think that the couplet in 4-5 describes allegorically the beginning of the cosmogony, i.e. the critical transition of the universe from domination by fire to domination by air/Mind, the entity Orpheus calls allegorically by the name ‘Zeus’ among many others, and the consequent formation of the large-scale structures that characterize the universe at the present epoch (see below on col. IX.1-2 and 4). Since the account of the transition in col. IX.5-10 begins with an emphatic reference to the knowledge air/Mind had and because of which the transition ultimately occurred, the author might render ἀκούσας as μαθών in pointing out this: air/Mind triggered the cosmogony not *when* it came to know the future from some source of oracular knowledge by hearing, but rather *because* it knows at all times how the things that are and those that come to be in the universe at any time, as well as those whose coming to be is future at that time, must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.3-7). See also below on col. X.11 and XIII.2-3.

COL. IX

1-2 εἶναι τῇ[ν ἀρ]χὴν οὖν τοῦ ἰσχυρ[ο]τάτου ἐπόη[σεν] | εἶναι ὡς[περ]εἰ παῖδα πατρός: the subject of ἐπόησεν εἶναι is Orpheus (cf. Hdt. 2.156.24-25:

ἐποίησε γὰρ Ἀρτεμιν εἶναι θυγατέρα Διήμητρος). The object is most probably in the heavily damaged beginning of 1, which Tsantsanoglou has reconstructed as εἰργαί: τῇ[ν ἀρχήν οὖν. If the Derveni author is explaining here what Orpheus presents in the above quoted couplet (col. VIII.4-5) as son of a most powerful father dethroned by his own son, ὡς[περ]εὶ παῖδα cannot but be predicated of the object of ἐποίησεν. Commenting on the Orphic verse in col. XV.6, the Derveni author points out that Zeus' succession of Cronus, whose name is assumed to pick out air/Mind as cause of certain effects that characterized the cosmogony, actually stands for the fact that ἡδε ἀρχή, i.e. air/Mind which dominates the universe at the present epoch and is thus called (Zeus) the king of all by Orpheus (col. XVI.14-15), is sovereign ever since it triggered the cosmogony (col. XV.7-8). The author could thus claim here that Orpheus presented as the son of a most powerful father τὴν ἀρχήν, i.e. the dominant entity in the universe at the present epoch (for the implicit characterization of air/Mind as ἀρχή see also col. XIX.10-13).

Interpreting the couplet in col. VIII.4-5, the Derveni author explains (5-10) that fire dominated the primordial universe. It agitated the other basic entities (for the distinction between basic and derivative entities see Intro. V § 2), with the possible exception of air/Mind, and kept them combined into a hot mixture until air/Mind, perhaps conceived of as 'container' for physical objects in which they move and rest (see Intro. V § 16), caused a sufficiently large amount of fire to separate out and become the Sun. With the fire content of the primordial mixture having dropped to a sufficiently low level, air/Mind wrested control of the universe away from fire and caused the other basic entities to clump into the large-scale structures that make the universe the cosmos we see now (see Intro. V § 13). Air/Mind put an end to the domination of the universe by fire, as if it were a son who πατρός εοῦ πάρα ... | ἄλκην τ' ἐν χεῖρεσσι ἔλαβεν in a dynastic succession and fire were his most powerful father whom he dethroned ('the father' cannot be understood as Cronus is in col. XV.7-8; see also below on col. XIV.7).

3 τὰ λεγόμενα: the couplet quoted in col. VIII.4-5.

4 [τὴν] ἄλκην τε καὶ τὸν δαίμονα: the power (ἄλκη) Zeus took from his father in Orpheus' poem (col. VIII.4-5) might be understood by the Derveni author as the power to dominate the universe. Originally fire dominated the universe; see above on 1-2. When air/Mind put an end to the

domination of fire, it stopped the power of fire to dominate the universe from being exercised. The demon Zeus is said in Orpheus' poem to have taken from his father is probably understood by the Derveni author as the amount of fire that air/Mind caused to separate from all other basic entities so as to wrest control of the universe away from fire.

5 γνώσκ[ω]ν: the subject is not Zeus, but what he stands for, namely air/Mind. See above on col. VIII.14.

5-6 τὸ πᾶρ ἀγαμμευγμένον τοῖς | ἄλλοις: sc. οὖσι, the everlasting basic entities everything is made up of, from the stable structures in the universe as we see it today on the large scale to transient entities such as animals (for the distinction between basic and derivative entities see Intro. V § 2). The Derveni author begins to describe the primordial universe, a fire-dominated and presumably amorphous mixture of all basic entities, possibly apart from air/Mind which might have been the 'container' of the primordial mixture (see Intro. V § 16), and the initiation of the cosmogony, i.e. the transition of the universe to its present state (the cosmos). He is most probably interpreting the couplet in col. VIII.4-5, which is read literally by those unable to comprehend the real import of Orpheus' words (3-4). See above on 1-2 and 4.

6-7 ὅτι ταραύσσοι καὶ κ[ωλ]ύοι τὰ ὄντα συνίστασθαι | διὰ τὴν θάλασιν: fire agitated, i.e. stirred or churned, the other basic entities with which it was mixed. It kept their particles jumbled together, preventing them from sorting like to like and assembling into coherent structures (since col. XXI.1-5 undoubtedly mentions the cosmogonical separating out of basic entities into small particles, basic entities can be plausibly assumed to mix in the same manner in which they separated during the cosmogony, i.e. in particles). Cf. Aristotle's reference in *Metaph.* 984b5-8 to cosmologists who assume that fire has κίνητικὴ φύσις in contrast to water, earth and the like. He might have Empedocles in mind; cf. *GC* 330b20-21, *Metaph.* 985a29-b3, and see Wright (1981) 24-25. In a similar vein, Leucippus and Democritus attribute to the atoms in fire the power to move all the rest and, what is particularly interesting in light of the role fire played before the cosmogony according to the Derveni author, to prevent their sorting out by likeness; see below on col. XVII.9.

For συνίστασθαι cf. σύστημα in the account of the atomist cosmogony (Leucipp. DK 67 A 1), the coherent structure into which an original

‘cloud’ of atoms of all kinds evolves as the random motions of the atoms somehow self-organize into a collective rotary motion and, under the action of the ensuing vortex, the atoms separate by likeness shaping the outline of a cosmos, just as similar grains or similar pebbles on the sea-shore sort together under the action of a sieve or the waves respectively, similarity in things being by nature attractive (Democr. DK 68 B 164). The use of συνίστασθαι for the clumping of the basic entities is similar to that of συγχωρεῖν by Anaxagoras for the cosmogonic clumping of basic entities (*chremata*) that resulted from the breakup of their primordial mixture under the action of Mind, the only basic entity that is not mixed with any other (DK 59 B 15; for the text see Sider [1981] 115):

τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν καὶ (τὸ) διερὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζοφερὸν ἐνθάδε συνεχώρησεν, ἔνθα νῦν (ἡ) γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ (τὸ λαμπρὸν) ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ αἰθέρος.

Anaxagoras also speaks of condensing instead of accreting (B 16):

ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποκρινόμενων συμπήγνυται γῆ· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν ὕδωρ ἀποκρίνεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς γῆς λίθοι συμπήγνυνται ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, οὗτοι δὲ ἐκχωρέουσι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος.

7-8 ἐξαλλάσ[σει ὅσ]ον τε ἱκανὸν ἐστίν | ἐξαλλαχθὲν μὴ καλύ[ειν τὰ] ὄντα συμπαῖναι: cf. Anaxagoras’ use of συμπήγνυσθαι in DK 59 B 16 (see previous note). The implicit object of ἐξαλλάσσει can only be πῦρ. For ἐξαλλάσσει (πῦρ) ὅσον τε ἱκανὸν ἐστίν cf. Hdt. 2.73.12: φὸν πλάσσειν ὅσον τε δυνατός ἐστι φέρειν (here, though, τε is not beyond doubt). The verb ἐξαλλάσσειν might mean ‘to change’, ‘to alter’; see Laks and Most (1997) 13, Janko (2002) 19. It can also mean ‘to remove’ (see Thuc. 5.71.1.15-16: προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν). This must be the sense in which the Derveni author uses the verb here (cf. Betegh [2004] 233). Air/Mind did not cause any change in fire so that all other basic things could clump (cf. below on col. XV.9-10). At the beginning of the cosmogony fire did change insofar as it stopped preventing each of the other basic things with which it was mixed from clumping, but this is the effect of air’s/Mind’s action, and it is this action, not its effect, that seems to occupy the Derveni author’s attention here. What air/Mind did was rather to decrease the fire that was mixed with the other basic things: it caused a sufficiently large quantity of fire to separate out from the primordial mixture so as to wrest control of the other ingredients away from fire and force them to also separate out and condense. If this event

triggered the cosmogony, it stands to reason that the Sun is the amount of fire air/Mind caused to separate out first from the primordial mixture, for the Derveni author thinks that the cosmos could not have existed in case air/Mind had not made the Sun of a certain sort and size (col. XXV.9-12).

If so, when later on the Derveni author says of air/Mind χωρ[ι]ζομένου γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ ἀπολαμβάνομένου | ἐν μέσσοι πύξας ἴσχει καὶ τάνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου | καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν (col. XV.3-4), he probably refers to the amount of fire that will become the Sun as separating out and being confined (ἀπολαμβάνομένου) due to compression in a small volume, compared to that over which this amount of fire was hitherto spread out. A reference to this event might be read also in col. XIV.1-2: [ἐ]κθόρηι τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον | χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ. Here the Derveni author is probably interpreting Orpheus' words ὃς αἰθέρα ἐκθορε πρῶτος (col. XIII.4); if so, the two superlatives are a substantival description of αἰθήρ used ablatively (cf. αἰθέρα in Orpheus' hemistich). The fragmentary statement might belong to a purpose clause in the author's explanation of how a quantity of fire came to be the Sun thanks to the goal-directed action of air/Mind on the sum total of fire in the early universe, the ether as Orpheus calls it poetically (cf. Arist. *Cael.* 270b24-25 on the identification of ether with fire by Anaxagoras): air/Mind acted as it did in order for the amount of fire that would become the Sun (τὸ πῦρ) to leap forth, [ἐ]κθόρηι, out of the very bright and hot ether in the primordial mixture, τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον (αἰθέρα), thereby separating from itself, χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ (the reflexive pronoun picks out the sameness of separated part and whole with respect to kind; for a parallel see below on col. XIV.1-2).

How air/Mind effected the formation of the Sun and triggered the cosmogony is unclear. In the physics of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the atomists the formation of the cosmos is powered by the mechanical action of a vortex; see Intro. V §§ 14, 17 and 20. This might be the case in the physics of the Derveni author too. Mind is air and vortices are regularly observed to form in air. The Derveni author might assume that air/Mind contains the primordial mixture of all the other basic things, and triggers the cosmogony when it begins a rapid rotation; fire separates first, presumably on account of its lightness and mobility, and is funneled by the goal-oriented rotation of air/Mind into a growing sphere, which will become the Sun; when the fire content of the mixture drops to a sufficiently low level, at which time the Sun reaches its allowable size for the cosmogony to continue, the rest of the ingredients in the mixture start clumping into the nascent cosmos. In Anaxagoras' view, the circular motions of the Sun

and the other celestial bodies are effects of the Mind-triggered cosmogonic rotation that still goes on in the universe (DK 59 B 12; see also Leucipp. DK 67 A 1 and Arist. *Cael.* 284a20-26 for Empedocles). It is perhaps not far-fetched to assume that the Derveni author agrees with him.

9-10 ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἄφθῃ ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ μίσγεται | τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις; things set on fire are dominated by fire and combine into a mixture (cf. Betegh [2004] 229-230). ὅσα δ' is obviously equivalent to ὅσα γάρ (cf. GP 169). For the syntactical incongruity between ὅσα δ' ἄν ἄφθῃ ἐπικρατεῖται and ἐπικρατηθὲν cf. E. *Herc.* 195-197: ὅσοι δὲ τόξοις χεῖρ' ἔχουσιν εὖστοχον, | ..., μυρίους οἰστούς ἀφείς | ἄλλοις τὸ σῶμα ρύεται μὴ καταναεῖν. Perhaps the Derveni author means that a number of things mix under the action of fire because the energetic fire-particles rush between the particles of each thing and, imparting to them a random motion stronger than their tendency to cohere, scatter them among the particles of the other things; see below on col. XVII.9. For ἐπικρατεῖν in connection with mixing see below on col. XIX.1-2.

10 ὅτι δ' "ἐν χεῖρ[εσσιν ἔλαβ]εν" ἡνίξετο: the subject of ἡνίξετο is Orpheus. The Derveni author turns now to the prepositional phrase ἐν χεῖρεσσιν in the Orphic verse quoted above (col. VIII.5). For ὅτι = 'with regard to the fact that' (LSJ s.v. A.IV) cf. col. XVI.1-2: ὅτι δὲ | ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται λέγει. For αἰνίξεσθαι = αἰνίσσεσθαι (cf. col. X.11, XIII.6 and XVII.13) see Suda s.v. αἰνίζω (αἰνίζω καὶ αἰνίσσω: τὸ ἐν παραβολαῖς λαλῶ).

11-12 ὥστε[ρ τ]ἄλλα τὰ π[ρὶν μὲν ἄδῃλα φαι]γόμεν[α, ἀλλ]ᾶ | [β]εβαιότατα νοηθ[έ]ντα: on Tsantsanoglou's reconstruction, the Derveni author proudly asserts his confidence in the correctness of the interpretation he will put forth. What Orpheus means by saying that Zeus took the power and the demon 'in his hands' (col. VIII.4-5) is no less of a riddle than the other words or phrases (τἄλλα) in the couplet. All of them seem obscure, presumably to those who read them literally (see 2-4), but their true import has been understood by the Derveni author with unshakable certainty.

12 ἰσχυρῶς: the adverb is most probably to be construed with the supplemented λαβεῖν in the next line. It seems to be the Derveni author's interpretation of the prepositional phrase ἐν χεῖρεσσιν (col. VIII.5). For ἐν χεῖρεσσιν in this sense cf. Hom. *Il.* 15.741, 16.630, Hes. *Op.* 192; for ἰσχυρῶς see Thuc. 1.69.3.12 (cf. κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρόν in Hdt. 1.76.14). Orpheus, the

Derveni author might think, alludes to the force of the vortex in air/Mind that sucked up a sufficiently large part of the fire in the primordial mixture and compressed it into a globe, the Sun of the embryonic cosmos; see above on 7-8. Anaxagoras lays particular emphasis on the force of the cosmogonic rotation (DK 59 B 9).

COL. X

1 καὶ λέγειν: perhaps τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται φωνεῖν τε] καὶ λέγειν (cf. 3). This is the second step in an argument whose conclusion is stated in 9-10. As turns out from the conclusion, in the first step the Derveni author must have stated that πανομφεύειν is the same, or has the same power, as πάντα φωνεῖν (see also below on 9-10). For ὁμῆ in the sense 'voice' see A. *Supp.* 808, E. *Med.* 175, S. OC 550 and 1351, Pi. N. 10.34. On 'being the same' and 'having the same power' see next note.

2 ἐνόμιζε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ φωνεῖν: sc. Ὀρφεύς. It is unclear in what sense, φωνεῖν, 'to produce vocal sound', and, λέγειν, 'to say', are the same or have the same power (see previous note). Perhaps all the Derveni author wants to say is that Orpheus uses the former in the sense of the latter. He cannot seriously hold, and attribute to Orpheus the view, that the two verbs are the same semantically, or that they have the same power in the sense that they have the same meaning. This cannot be justified on the ground he most probably invokes in the previous line, i.e. that producing vocal sound is necessary condition for saying something: [οὐδὲ γὰρ λέ[γ]ειν οἶόν τε μὴ φωνοῦντ[α].

3 λέγειν δὲ καὶ διδάσκειν τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται: the third step in the argument. On τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται see previous note.

3-5 οὐ γὰρ | οἶόν τε δι[δ]άσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ λέγειν ὅσα διὰ λόγων | διδάσκεται[ι]: saying is a necessary condition for teaching, at least when the subject matter requires giving an account. See above on 2.

5-6 νομίζεται δὲ τὸ διδάσκειν ἐν τῷ | λέγειν εἶν[αι]: ἐν τῷ λέγειν = τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ λέγειν is perhaps preferable to ἐν τῷ λέγειν.

6-7 οὐ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν διδάσκειν ἐκ τοῦ | λέγειν ἐχ[ωρί]σθη τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἐκ τοῦ φωνεῖν: the first part of the fourth and last step in the Derveni author's ar-

gument. One activity seems to be inseparable from another in that the former has the latter as necessary condition.

8 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ [δύνα]ται φωνεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διδάσ[κειν]: the second part of the fourth and last step in the Derveni author's argument presupposes the transitivity of the relation *having the same power*. Cf. above on 2.

9-10 οὕτως [οὐδὲν κωλ]ύει “πανομφεύουσαν” καὶ πᾶν[τα] | διδά[σκουσιν] τὸ αὐ]τὸ εἶναι: the conclusion of the argument leaves no doubt as to the *demonstrandum*. πανομφεύουσα, most probably a word from a hexameter which was quoted in the lost final part of the previous column (see below on 11), is used by Orpheus in the sense ‘teaching all things’ (cf. above on 2). One can only speculate as to why the Derveni author needs to establish that; see next note. The argument must have begun in the lost final part of the previous column with the interpretation of πανομφεύουσαν as πάντα φωνοῦσαν, perhaps on account of the fact that ὁμφή is used in the sense ‘voice’ (cf. above on 1). The verb πανομφεύειν is known only from the Derveni text and it probably means ‘to issue all divination’. In *Il.* 8.250 Zeus, who has just sent a portent to the Achaean camp, is characterized as πανομφαῖος (a Homeric *hapax*), ‘sender of all ominous voices’; for the connection of ὁμφή in the sense ‘voice of a god’ with divination see *H. Hom.* 4.543-545 and *Thgn.* 805-808. οὐδὲν κωλύει might suggest the Derveni author's unease with the logic of the argument he has just completed (cf. above on 2).

11 “τροφ[ὸν] δὲ λέγων αὐ]τὴν αἰνί[ζε]ται: sc. Orpheus. αὐτήν = τὴν νύκτα (cf. 12). In col. XI the Derveni author discusses two hexameters in which Night prophesies from an adytum to someone, and in col. XII he discusses a hexameter in which someone's ruling on Olympus is said to be a final cause. In the light of the much later *Orphic Rhapsodies*, where Night prophesied to Zeus that he was destined to depose his father Cronus and gave him instructions of cosmogonic import, it stands to reason that the prospective ruler of Olympus in col. XII is the same as the recipient of Night's prophecies in col. XI, that these prophecies promote the ascendance of their recipient to royal status on Olympus, and that they are τὰ θεόφαστα Zeus heard before he deposed his father (col. VIII.4-5); see Intro. IV §§ 1-4. The hexameter where Night received the characterization πανομφεύουσα, ‘issuing all prophecies’ (cf. previous note), probably formed a unit with the hexameters discussed in cols. XI-XII (fr. 6 Bernabé). In Orpheus' poem this passage can be assumed to have stood

after the proem, but before the couplet which the Derveni author quotes in col. VIII.4-5. Night was said to be τροφός and πανομφεύουσα perhaps in the same verse; e.g. — πανομφεύουσα θεῶν τροφός ἀμβροσίη Νύξ (fr. 6.2 Bernabé). Cf. *OF* 106: θεῶν γὰρ τροφός ἀμβροσίη λέγεται, sc. ἡ Νύξ.

In the last three surviving lines of this column the Derveni author probably explains that Orpheus characterizes Night as τροφός in order to hint at the effect night brings about (see next note). There can be no doubt that, by the author's lights, Orpheus cannot have intended the characterization of Night as issuing all prophecies to be taken literally. In Orpheus' poem Night is simply a personification of night, and 'issuing all prophecies' cannot plausibly be said of night, all the more so since the recipient of the prophecies in question is Zeus, but Zeus is a personification of air/Mind which does not need prophecies, for its wisdom has determined how the things that are and come to be at any time in the universe, as well as those whose coming to be is future at that time, must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.4-7). Perhaps the Derveni author's (rather lame) argument to the effect that nothing prevents 'issuing all prophecies' from being used by Orpheus in the sense 'teaching all things' is part of an attempt to guard against the impression, due to a literal understanding of Orpheus' diction, that air/Mind does not always have complete knowledge of reality across time; such an attempt seems to be presupposed by the comment in col. XIII.2-3 that Zeus did not literally hear, sc. prophecies, nor does night literally command, sc. Zeus through issuing prophecies (cf. above on col. VIII.14). The Derveni author can be assumed to think that night is air/Mind devoid of sunlight (see below on col. XI.3-4); he also thinks that Orpheus anthropomorphizes night, and that nothing prevents the characterization of the anthropomorphized night as issuing all prophecies, whose recipient is Zeus, from being used by Orpheus in the sense 'teaching Zeus all things'; Zeus, however, is a personification of air/Mind; thus, by characterizing the personification of night as issuing all prophecies, Orpheus suggests that air/Mind imparted to air/Mind complete knowledge of how reality evolves over time; but there is not another air/Mind to teach air/Mind (cf. col. XXIII.1-5), nor can air/Mind be said to have taught itself how reality evolves over time, for the wisdom on account of which the everlasting air is Mind cannot but be all-surveying and everlasting (see below on col. XVIII.9-10). It follows that, by characterizing the personification of night as issuing all prophecies, Orpheus can only be suggesting to those who understand his riddling words that air/Mind always surveys the sum total of reality.

11-13 [ἄ]σσα | ὁ ἥλι[ος θερμαίνων δι]αλύει ταῦτα ἢ νύξ ψυ[χουσα] | συ[ν-
 ἴσθησι: συ[μπήγγυσσι] is a plausible alternative to συ[νίστασθαι] (cf. συνίστασθαι
 and συμπαγῆναι in col. IX.6 and 8). Aristotle uses συνίστασθαι for the ag-
 gregation of atoms, the cause of coming to be, and διαλύεσθαι for the scat-
 tering of a composite thing's atoms, the cause of ceasing to be (GC 325a31-
 32 = Leucipp. DK 67 A 7): ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι),
 καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν. Cf. Anaxag. DK
 59 B 17, Emp. DK 31 B 8 and B 9. He also reports (GC 336a1-6) that,
 according to some anonymous thinkers who posit the motion of matter
 as the sole cause of coming to be (see 335b24-29), συνίστασθαι and διακρί-
 νεσθαι are effects of the cold and the hot, two powers of matter because of
 and through which everything else comes to be and ceases to be (in *Mete.*
 344b20-24 διακρίνεσθαι and διαλύεσθαι are apparently synonyms):

Ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόασιν τοῖς σώμασι, δι' ἃς γεννῶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς, ἀφαι-
 ροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὥς φασι, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν διακρί-
 νειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ
 τούτων λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα τὰλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ φθεῖρεσθαι.

If the passage has been correctly restored, it is conceivable that the Sun and night, which the Derveni author seems to conceive of as air/Mind devoid of solar light and heat (see below on col. XI.3-4), are causes of all substantial change in the present universe; cf. Betegh (2004) 252-253. Brought about by the diurnal motion of the Sun around the Earth, the succession of day and night causes the incessant evaporation and subsequent condensation of water. By analogy, the solar fire might be thought to heat up all other basic entities in air/Mind, causing them to evaporate and mix in many ways and to varying extents on very small scales, for on the largest scale they separated when the universe evolved into its present state; night, on the other hand, causes them to condense, and thus separate, to various degrees. The continuous and measured alteration of these two processes around the year, which repeat on a much smaller scale and with a much lesser intensity the primordial mixing of basic things and their cosmogonic separation on the large scale, could be assumed to power the constant substantial change observed in the cosmos, i.e. the combination of many basic entities at the microscopic level into derivative medium-sized entities (coming to be of derivative entities), and the separation of hitherto combined basic entities (ceasing to be of derivative entities). See also on col. XXI.9-10, 10-11, 11-12 and 13-14.

The Derveni author perhaps thinks that the characterization of Night as τροφός hints at the cosmological role of night as a cause of condensation

not only because night is a cause of coming to be, and thus can be aptly conceived of as a τροφός, 'rearing nurse', of derivative entities, but also because τροφός is the agent noun of τρέφειν: the verb means not only 'to nourish' but also 'to thicken', 'to congeal', and its agent noun can thus be easily assumed to hint at the condensing power of night.

COL. XI

1 [τ]ῆς Νυκτός. "ἐξ ἀ[δύτου]ο" δ' αὐτὴν [λέγει] "χρηῖσαι": the personal name Νυκτός is much more probable than νυκτός, for αὐτὴν can only refer to the personification of night, who is said by Orpheus to have furnished oracles (χρηῖσαι) from an adytum (fr. 6.3 Bernabé).

2-3 γνώμην ποιού[με]νος ἄδυτον εἶναι τὸ βάθος | τῆς νυκτός: the subject of the participle is the same as that of the restored λέγει in the previous line, sc. Orpheus. Perhaps not "holding the view that the depth of the night never sets" (the Derveni author assumes that the substantival adjective ἄδυτον, from α privative and the verb δύνω or δύω, is used by Orpheus in the sense 'that which cannot set', not 'that which cannot be entered'), but rather "meaning that the depth of the night never sets".

3-4 οὐ γ[ὰρ] δύνει ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ νιν | ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέ[νο]ν ἀνὰ κα-
τα[λ]αμβάνει: the depth of night is ἄδυτον because, unlike light, it does not set, but is immobile and brightness occupies it. The light which, unlike night, does set is the same as the brightness which occupies the immobile depth of night, evidently sunlight. What the Derveni author seems to be saying is that, although the bright light of the Sun constantly succeeds the darkness of the night, it is not the case that the Sun and the dark night are both in motion, one of them rising as the other sets. In Hesiod's *Theogony* (746-757) night and day are conceived of as two individuals, both of which wander over the Earth but never at the same time: when Day is out of the house they share and brings light, Night stays in, and she will get out covered in misty darkness when Day eventually returns – Day and Night cannot be simultaneously inside their house or outside it. In the Derveni author's view, such a conception of day and night is mistaken. As the Sun rises in the morning, what is called night does not set or retreat. It is immobile, and sunlight simply occupies its three-dimensional extension.

Empedocles is aware that night is caused when the Earth blocks the light of the Sun (DK 31 B 48), and that night is the darkness of the air around the Earth (DK 31 B 49): it is a reasonable assumption that the Derveni author, too, understands the cause of night, and identifies the immobile three-dimensional extension of what is called night when devoid of sunlight with that of air/Mind. Cf. Intro. V § 16.

5 χρῆσαι δὲ καὶ ἀρκέσαι τὸ [δύ]ναται: on 'having the same power' cf. above on col. X.2. It is clear from 8-9 that here ἀρκεῖν must be taken in the sense 'to assist'. According to the Derveni author, by saying that Night furnished oracular pronouncements to Zeus (cf. 1), Orpheus really means that Night assisted Zeus, i.e. that she furnished him with what was needful (χρᾶν in its general sense). The Derveni author does not proceed to elicit a cosmological truth from this. However, he takes Zeus to be a personification of air/Mind and, if the personification of night is another allegory of air/Mind (see previous note), he might think that Orpheus' point is that air/Mind assisted air/Mind, which can only mean that air/Mind assisted itself or furnished itself with what is needful, for there is not another air/Mind to assist air/Mind (cf. col. XXIII.1-5): now, since in Orpheus' poem Night prophesied to Zeus probably before Zeus took the power and the demon from his father (see above on col. X.11), an event understood by the Derveni author as an allusion to the transition of the early universe to its present state due to the agency of air/Mind (see above on col. IX.1-2 and 4), the author might read in what he probably takes to be Orpheus' point here a hint at the fact that in bringing about the cosmos we observe today, air/Mind was causally self-sufficient. See also below on col. XVI.10-11.

6-7 σκέψασθαι δὲ χρὴ ἐφ' ᾧ κεῖτα[ι τὸ] ἀρκέσαι | καὶ τὸ χρῆσαι: the Derveni author proceeds to justify the view he has just stated in the previous line, but the point he makes in the ἐφ' ᾧ clause is not immediately clear. If this clause is understood as an indirect question, and the pronoun picks out what the two verbs in the infinitive refer or apply to, in view of 8-9 this thing is perhaps a type of divine action, or any token of this type, and the Derveni author's point is that the relevant type, or any of its tokens, can be described with either verb, which by his lights means that χρᾶν, 'to furnish oracular pronouncements', has the same power as ἀρκεῖν, 'to offer assistance'. Reading σκέψασθαι δὲ χρὴ, ἐφ' ᾧ κεῖτα[ι τὸ] ἀρκέσαι, | καὶ τὸ χρῆσαι (i.e. ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κεῖσθαι), Janko (2002) 22-23 takes the pre-

positional phrase introducing the relative clause to denote the conditions under which the two verbs are used.

8-9 ‘χρᾶν τόνδε τὸν θεὸν νομίζοντες ἐρ[χονται | π[ευσόμενοι ἅσσα ποῶσι’: “because people think that a given god furnishes oracular pronouncements, they go to inquire (of this god) what they should do”, whence presumably it follows that χρᾶν, ‘to furnish oracular pronouncements’, has the same power as ἀρκεῖν, ‘to offer assistance’. For the use of the demonstrative pronoun in the expression τόνδε τὸν θεόν cf. e.g. Arist. *GA* 734a28, *EN* 1151a35. The statement is marked with a *paragraphos*, which here need not be assumed to introduce a quotation from another author, as in col. IV.7ff.; Janko (2002) 22 suggests in his critical apparatus on 8-9 that the Derveni author here quotes an otherwise unknown fragment of Heraclitus, but, as pointed out by Tsantsanoglou in Laks and Most (1997) 14 n. 21 (cf. Jourdan [2003] 11 n. 5), here the *paragraphos* may as well introduce an example of what people might say in everyday speech (cf. col. XV.7-8, XVIII.3-5, XIX.4-5, XXI.7-9, XXIII.7-10).

10 “[ἡ δὲ] ἔχρησεν ἅπαντα τὰ οἱ θε[μ]ις ἦν ἀνύσασ[θ]αι”: fr. 6.4 Bernabé. “She [Night] prophesied all that was right for him [Zeus] to accomplish”. For the *scriptio plena* see Intro. I § 34. ἦν ἀνύσασ[θ]αι or ἦν ἀνέσ[θ]αι, and ἐξανύσασ[θ]αι, or ἐξανέσ[θ]αι, are equally likely; the gap is quite wide, and at the end of a line the letters tend to be more crowded than usual.

11 [...]θεῖς ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ο.[...]]ε: the subject of ἐδήλωσεν is evidently Orpheus. The Derveni author begins the cosmological interpretation of the verse he has just quoted, but the second half of this line and the next two lines are, unfortunately, too badly damaged. Tsantsanoglou supplements διατι]θεῖς ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι οὐ [πάντα συνέστηκ]ε. What Orpheus means is that not all condensed; see the next two notes. For διατι]θεῖς, “arranging”, sc. the words appropriately, or “composing”, sc. the verse appropriately, cf. e.g. Pl. *Lg.* 834a5-6 and 658d7, *Chrm.* 162d3.

12-13 [.....]ι παρὰ τὰ ἐόντα .[.....]αι οἶόν τε[: Tsantsanoglou suggests [ἀλλ’ ἔστ]ι παρὰ τὰ ἐόντα κ[αὶ] ἄλλα νῦν ἄπερ οὐ] | [συνιέν]αι οἶόν τε[ε. The temporal adverb should be construed not only with ἔστι but also with τὰ ἐόντα. τὰ νῦν ἐόντα are to be understood as the structures we see today in the universe on the large scale, i.e. the large-scale clumps air/Mind

caused all other basic entities to form during the cosmogony. There are, however, amounts of all these entities (mere traces from a cosmic perspective) that cannot accrete to the clumps like to like; see also next note.

14 [...].φθαι συ.: Tsantsanoglou suggests τὸ δ' ἀν[ύ]φθαι συ[ν]ίστάναι σημαίνει. Orpheus hints that during the cosmogony air/Mind did not cause the entire amount of each of the other basic entities to clump – accretion progressed only to the extent that was right (see below on col. XII.12). The Sun, which air/Mind caused to form so as to trigger the cosmogony, and night, i.e. air/Mind devoid of sunlight (see above on 3-4), cause the remainders to continually mix and separate respectively, thereby powering the constant substantial change observed in the cosmos (see above on col. X.11-13).

COL. XII

1 τὸ δ' ἐχόμε[νον] ἔ[π]ρος ὧδ' ἔχει: in Orpheus' poem the following hexameter most probably stood immediately after the one quoted in col. XI.10.

2 “ὡς ἂν ἔ[λ]χοι κά[τα] καλὸν ἔδος νιφέντος 'Ολύμπου”: fr. 6.5 Bernabé. The subject is Zeus. Cf. *H. Hom.* 15.7-8: νῦν δ' ἤδη κατὰ καλὸν ἔδος νιφέντος 'Ολύμπου | ναίει (sc. 'Ηρακλῆς). For κατέχειν with tmesis and anastrophe cf. *Il.* 2.699 (τότε δ' ἤδη ἔχεν κάτα γαῖα μέλαινα), *Od.* 9.6 (ἢ ὅτ' εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχη κάτα δῆμον ἅπαντα). κατέχειν would be used here as in *S. Ant.* 608-610 (ἀγῆρως δὲ χρόνῳ δυνάστας | κατέχεις 'Ολύμπου | μαρμαρόεσσας αἰγλαν), *Ar. Nu.* 603-604 (Παρνασσίαν θ' ὧς κατέχων | πέτρων). Cf. *Hes. Th.* 113 (ἡδὲ καὶ ὧς τὰ πρῶτα πολύπτυχον ἔσχον 'Ολυμπον).

3 "Ολυμπ[ος καὶ χ]ρόνος τὸ αὐτόν: *pace* Tortorelli Ghidini (1991), in its equation with Olympus time has nothing to do with the figure of unaging Time, which plays a prominent role in the late *Orphic Rhapsodies*; see Intro. IV §§ 3, 5 and cf. Jourdan (2003) 12 n. 2.

3-5 οἱ δὲ δοκοῦντες | "Ολυμπ[ον καὶ] οὐρανὸν [τ]αὐτὸ εἶναι ἑξαμαρ[τάν]ου[σι]ν: the identification of Olympus with the sky is usually discussed in connection with Homeric passages such as *Od.* 6.41-47:

ἡ μὲν ἄρ' ὧς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
Οὐλυμπόνδ', ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ

ἔμμεναι· οὐτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρῳ
 δεύεται οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπίλνεται, ἀλλὰ μά' αἴθρη
 πέπταται ἀννέφελος, λευκή δ' ἐπιδέδρομεν αἴγλη·
 τῷ ἔνι τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἥματα πάντα.
 ἔνθ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις, ἐπεὶ διεπέφραδε κούρη.

See e.g. Garvie (1994) on *Od.* 6.41-42, Kirk (1990) on *Il.* 5.749-751. In Homer there seems to be no clear distinction between Olympus and the sky. In *Od.* 6.240 the gods are assumed to live in Olympus (οὐ πάντων ἀέκητι θεῶν, οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσι), but a few lines below they are said to live in the sky (243: νῦν δὲ θεοῖσιν ἔοικε, τοῖ οὐρανὸν εὐρύν ἔχουσιν); for the confusion of sky and Olympus see also *Il.* 5.748-751 and *Od.* 15.523. According to the sch. on *Il.* 3.364 (Erbse vol. 1, 422.28-29), Zenodotus changed the formula οὐρανὸν εὐρύν to οὐρανὸν αἰπύν, but Aristarchus objected that αἰπύς is appropriate for a mountain; cf. sch. on *Il.* 15.192 (Erbse vol. 4, 53.10-11). One can plausibly assume that Zenodotus altered the text in the light of his belief that the Homeric Olympus is the sky, or in the sky, whereas Aristarchus was certainly opposed to this view and was concerned to refute it; cf. sch. on *Il.* 15. 193 (Erbse vol. 4, 53.12-54.22). According to Stob. 1.22.2.2-3, Homer places the ether above the stratum of air, and the heavens, i.e. Olympus, above the ether, a view supported by a quotation of *Od.* 6. 42-45. On Olympus in the Homeric epic see Noussia (2002) and Montanari (2001).

Perhaps due to the lack of a clear distinction between Olympus and the sky in Homer, or to a pre-Zenodotean identification of the Homeric Olympus with the sky, in early Greek cosmology 'Olympus' comes to be a name for the heavens. In a report of Philolaus' views on the structure of the universe (DK 44 A 16), the highest part of what envelopes the universe is called Olympus; the five planets, the Sun and the Moon are located ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ὀλύμπου φoράν, which makes clear that Olympus is a name for the outermost part of the rotating heavens. Empedocles (DK 31 B 44) says of the Sun that "he shines back to Olympus with a fearless face", Olympus being the heavens from which the Sun draws fire particles to itself (the source of the heat and the light it transmits to the Earth; see Wright [1981] 201). Parmenides (DK 28 B 11) includes Olympus among the Earth and the Sun, the Moon and the ether, the Milky Way and the fiery stars; his characterization of Olympus as ἔσχατος suggests that 'Olympus' is a name for the outermost heavenly region. For the equation of Olympus with the cosmos and the heavens see also [Pl.] *Epin.* 977b1-5. Burkert (1972) 244 n. 31 suggests that the characterization of the heavens as 'Olympus

pus' is of Pythagorean origin. It is unclear whether in rejecting the identification of Olympus with the sky the Derveni author objects to the absence of a clear distinction between Olympus and the sky in Homer, to a pre-Zenodotean interpretation of the Homeric Olympus as the sky, or to the use of the noun 'Olympus' as a name for the outermost heavens in the natural philosophy of his day.

5-6 οὐ γινώσκοντες ὅτι οὐρανὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε | μακ[ρό]τερον ἢ εὐρύτε[ρο]ν εἶναι: those who identify Olympus with the sky are mistaken, for they do not understand that it is impossible for the sky to be long rather than wide; cf. Brisson (1997) 154.

6-7 χρόνον δὲ μακρὸν | εἴ τις [όνομα]ῖς οὐκ ἂν [έξ]μαρτάνοι: one cannot be mistaken in characterizing time as long.

7-9 ὁ δὲ ὅπου μὲν | 'οὐρανὸν' θέ[λοι λέγειν, τὴν] προσθήκην 'εὐρὺν' | ἐποιεῖτο: when Orpheus wanted to talk about the sky, he added to the noun 'sky' the adjective 'wide'.

9-10 ὅπου [δ' "Ὀλυμπον', το]ῦ γαντίον 'εὐρὺν' μὲν | οὐδέποτε, 'μα[κρὸν] δέ: when Orpheus wanted to talk about Olympus, he always added to the noun 'Olympus' the adjective 'long', not 'wide'. Although το]ῦ γαντίον readily suggests itself, the traces before γ possibly indicate τὸ] ἐγαντίον. The logic of the author's argument demands not ὅπου [δὲ χρόνον, το]ῦ γαντίον, a reading suggested by Parsons to Tsantsanoglou *per lit.* and adopted independently by Janko (2002), but ὅπου [δ' "Ὀλυμπον, το]ῦ γαντίον (cf. Jourdan [2003] 58, Betegh [2004] 250 n. 84). The conclusion that Olympus is not the sky but time follows from three premises, of which the first two are clearly that the sky can be plausibly characterized as wide but not as long, whereas time can be plausibly said to be long, and that in his poem Orpheus consistently characterizes the sky as wide. The third premise cannot but link Olympus and the characterization 'long', which in contrast to 'wide' applies to time, so that the desired dissociation of Olympus from the sky and its equation with time follows via the first premise: that Orpheus consistently characterizes Olympus as long is thus the required third premise and it calls for ὅπου [δ' "Ὀλυμπον, το]ῦ γαντίον.

10-11 "νιφὸ]εγνῶ" δὲ φήσας εἶναι | τῇ [δ]υνάμει ἐ[ικάζει χρόνον τῶ]ι νιφετώδει: sc. Orpheus. ἐ[ικάζει χρόνον τῶ]ι νιφετώδει is perhaps the best of the

three possible supplements suggested by Tsantsanoglou in Brisson (1997) 156-157, though one cannot be sure that νιφετώδες is used substantively in the sense 'the snowy', i.e. 'what is full of snow'. The other two are ε[ικάζει αὐτὸν ὅρε]ι νιφετώδει and ε[ικάζει αὐτὸν εἶδε]ι νιφετώδει, where αὐτόν = τὸν χρόνον (cf. col. XVII.8). The Derveni author uses εικάζειν two times in the surviving parts of the papyrus (col. XIII.9 and XIX.8) for Orpheus' portraying something in terms familiar from everyday experience. See also next note.

12 [τὸ δὲ] νιφετῶ[δες ψυχρόν τε καὶ λ]ευκόν ἐ[στι]: on the supplement proposed by Tsantsanoglou in Brisson (1997) 157, the Derveni author points out that something full of snow is cold and white, which perhaps means 'bright' (cf. λαμπ[ρ in the next line). If 'cold' and 'white'/'bright' each pick out a δύναμις, a causal power, of what is full of snow, and the Derveni author holds that, by calling time snowcapped, Orpheus assimilates it to what is snowy τῇ δυνάμει, "with regard to causal power(s)", the author perhaps means not that for Orpheus time is cold and white/bright, but that a certain period is assimilated to what is snowy, insofar as the powers characteristic of something full of snow are both at work in, and their combined operation is the chief characteristic of, that period. If so, the period in question is perhaps the one beginning after the formation of the cosmos, assuming that for the Derveni author it is the heating power of the bright Sun and the cooling power of the night that drive the constant substantial change observed in the cosmos (see above on col. X.11-13). If the Derveni author holds that Orpheus' καλὸν ἔδος νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου in the hexameter at issue stands for this epoch in the history of the universe, perhaps he construes this phrase with the preposition κατὰ to obtain an adverbial expression of time and takes ἄ[ν] ἐλ[χοι as intransitive in the sense 'would stay' or 'would hold fast' (the verb in this sense is often followed by κατὰ with accusative; see e.g. Hdt. 6.42.10, Ar. *Ra.* 793, *Pl.* 367). If he also assumes that the subject of this verb is not Zeus but ἅπαντα from the preceding hexameter, which is quoted in col. XI.10, the cosmological truth he sees concealed in these two hexameters (col. XI.10 and XII.2) is perhaps this: during the cosmogony, air/Mind caused all other contents of the universe to clump only to the extent that was right or necessary (see above on col. XI.11, 12-13 and 14) in order for them to hold fast, i.e. to form coherent structures, thereby providing the theater in which the antagonistic powers of the Sun and night operate after the end of the cosmogony (see above on col. X.11-13). In an alternative (and by no means less spec-

ulative) explanation of the cosmological point the Derveni author sees in the characterization of Olympus/time as snowcapped, Betegh (2004) 249-252 suggests that λευκόν refers to the matter of the Sun and the other celestial bodies, as is also the case with λαμπρ in the next line, and that the Derveni author foreshadows Plato's view of the celestial bodies as instruments of time (*Ti.* 41e5).

13 πολίων δ' ἀ[έρ]α: the brightness of air is perhaps due to the suffusing sunlight. πολίος, 'bright' or 'clear', describes αἰθήρ in *E. Or.* 1376, but αἰθέρα instead of ἀέρα is impossible here because it would cover the entire intercolumnar area. For πολίος as a qualification of αἴη see *A.R.* 3.275, *Q.S.* 2.554 and 6.229; cf. West (1978) on *Hes. Op.* 477.

COL. XIII

1 “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πατὴρ ἐοὺ πάρα [θ]έσσατ' ἀκούσα[ς]”: fr. 7 Bernabé. The *paragraphos* to mark a quotation is absent perhaps because this verse is not quoted here for the first time. See Intro. IV §§ 1-3.

2-3 οὔτε γὰρ το.ε ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ δεδήλωται ὅπως | ἤκουσεν: το.ε can be either τότε or τότε, and δεδήλωται, whose subject is the indirect question ὅπως ἤκουσεν, refers back to an earlier point in the author's discussion (cf. col. XVI.1 and XVII.4-5), where it has been explained in what sense (ὅπως) Zeus, a personification of air/Mind, 'heard oracles' issued by Night; see above on col. VIII.14 and X.11. One need not read τότε, for the Derveni author might want to point out that air/Mind, the entity Zeus personifies, did not really hear anything at any time, rather than that it did not hear something at a certain past time (before it triggered the cosmogony). τότε, moreover, need not be the object of ἤκουσεν, in which case it would refer collectively to Night's prophecies, though this is the most natural construal. The pronoun can very well be the subject of the verb: the Derveni author might refer to Zeus simply by the deanthropomorphizing neuter pronoun τότε, 'this (basic) thing', in order to remind the reader that Orpheus' Zeus is a personification of air/Mind, which lacks human attributes such as sex.

3 οὔτε ἡ νύξ κελεύει. ἀλλὰ δηλοῖ ὅδε λέγων: the subject of δηλοῖ is undoubtedly Orpheus (cf. col. VIII.1 and 3, XI.11, XVI.9 and XXI.1). The implicit object of δηλοῖ cannot be the indirect question ὅπως ἡ νύξ κελεύει (by

analogy with ὅπως ἤκουσεν, the subject of the impersonal δεδήλωται), for there seems to be no connection between the Derveni author's discussion of the Orphic verse he quotes next and the claim οὐτε ἡ νύξ κελεύει, which is trivially entailed by οὐτε τό.ε ἤκουσεν (if air/Mind did not actually hear anything from night at any time, night did not command air/Mind by prophesying).

4 “αἰδοῖον κατέπινεν, ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος”: fr. 8 Bernabé. See Intro. IV §§ 4, 6-7 and below on col. XIV.1-2.

5-6 ὅτι μὲν πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων | αἰνίζεται κ[α]θ' ἕπος ἑκάστον ἀνάγκη λέγειν: this is the only instance of μὲν *solitarium* in the surviving parts of the Derveni text. Perhaps it signals that a new section begins with the quotation of the Orphic verse in the previous line (see GP 382-384): the Derveni author seems to state a methodological principle, which is then applied to the Orphic verse, or rather to a single word in it (that a new section begins in 7, too, may be suggested by the *paragraphos*). ὅτι might introduce an object clause for λέγειν or a causal clause (cf. Anaximenes. DK 13 B 3: ἐγγύς ἐστιν ὁ ἀήρ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου· καὶ ὅτι κατ' ἑκροίαν τούτου γινόμεθα, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν καὶ ἄπειρον εἶναι καὶ πλούσιον διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκλείπειν). τὴν πόησιν should be understood as the object of αἰνίζεται, whose subject is Orpheus, rather than as an accusative of extent (cf. ... λόγον ... τὸν ὄνπερ ... αἰνίξατο in Pi. P. 8.38-40, and αἰνίσσεσθαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα in Hdt. 5.56.1). καθ' ἕπος ἑκάστον qualifies λέγειν, not αἰνίζεται or πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν; for the irregular aspiration see Schwyzler vol. 1, 305 (it might be due to the author's or the scribe's conflation of κατ' ἕπος ἑκάστον and καθ' ἑκάστον ἕπος). If ὅτι introduces a causal clause, λέγειν seems to be used in the unparalleled sense 'to discuss', or 'to analyze', and the phrase λέγειν καθ' ἕπος ἑκάστον seems to be a compressed way of saying λέγειν ἑκάστον ἕπος κατ' ἕπος, i.e. 'to analyze every word in turn', or 'to analyze every verse in turn', depending on whether ἕπος means 'word' (as in col. XVII.11 and XXVI.2), or 'verse' (as in col. VIII.1, XII.1, XV.5, XIX.1 and XXIV.4).

If one takes ἕπος to mean 'verse', the principle enunciated here concerns not the words in an Orphic verse but the verse itself, and thus it ought to be enunciated before the author makes a point about an Orphic verse in its entirety. In the following lines, however, the author pays attention to a single word in the Orphic verse he has just quoted, namely αἰδοῖον. If the principle put forth here is applied in the following lines, where the

Derveni author focuses on a single word in an Orphic verse, ἔπος must be understood to mean not ‘verse’ but ‘word’. Thus the principle in question is, depending on how ὅτι is understood, either that it is necessary to analyze every one of Orpheus’ words in its turn, for Orpheus composed his entire poem as an allusion to physical reality (περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων); or that it is necessary to say with regard to every one of Orpheus’ words that he composed his entire poem as an allusion to physical reality (if ἔπος is assumed to mean not ‘word’ but ‘verse’, either version of the methodological principle collapses onto the general interpretative principle of the author, but there is no reason why the reader or the audience would need to be reminded of it here). In the first case, the Derveni author might mean that, since Orpheus’ poem is in its entirety a cosmological allegory, one must seek the cosmological import of each word in it without paying attention to context and syntactical constraints; cf. Rusten (1985) 133 n. 26. In accordance with this principle, the Derveni author then proceeds to point out that the word αἰδοῖον in the Orphic verse he has just quoted, a masculine adjective meaning ‘reverend’, makes an implicit point about the Sun if one treats it as the neuter noun αἰδοῖον, a phonetically similar and semantically related word for a sexual organ (see below on 9). In the second case, every one of Orpheus’ words must turn out to support the claim that he composed his entire poem as an allusion to physical reality; this claim is then shown to be borne out by the word αἰδοῖον in the verse the Derveni author has just quoted from Orpheus’ poem. One should perhaps plump for the second version of the principle, and thus assume that ὅτι introduces an object clause of λέγειν, because it allows a more natural interpretation of the phrase λέγειν καθ’ ἔπος ἑκαστον.

7-8 ἐν τοῖς αἰδοίοις ὁρῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπου[ς] | νομίζον[τας εἶ]ναι τούτῳ ἐχρήσατο: seeing that people think of generation as dependent on the genitals, Orpheus used this word (τούτῳ = τῷ ἔπει), sc. αἰδοῖον.

8-9 ἀνευ δὲ τῶν | αἰδοίων [οὐ γίν]εσθαι: this phrase ought to be before τούτῳ ἐχρήσατο. It might have been a marginal entry in the text of the scribe’s exemplar that was inserted in the wrong place during copying. Alternatively, it might have been added in the wrong place by the author himself, when he realized, as soon as he wrote τούτῳ ἐχρήσατο, that his justification of this claim is incomplete, and proceeded to immediately supply the missing step in his argument without regard for the natural word order.

9 αἰδοῖαι εἰκάσας τὸν ἥλιο[v]: according to the Derveni author, Orpheus employed the word αἰδοῖον, thereby likening the Sun to a sexual organ, because of the popular belief that the generation of animals depends indispensably on the genitals; for the author's appeal to common beliefs in order to justify his explanation of a word Orpheus employs in his poem cf. col. XI.5-9. As argued in Intro. IV §§ 6-7, it is likely that in this poem the verse with the word αἰδοῖον stood immediately after the one quoted in col. VIII.5: thus αἰδοῖον is not the accusative singular of the noun meaning 'sexual organ' but the accusative singular of the masculine adjective 'reverend', and qualifies δαίμονα in the antecedent verse. There is no reason to assume that the Derveni author intentionally misinterprets αἰδοῖον as the accusative singular of the noun for sexual organ in order to posit the parallel between the Sun and a sexual organ. In the characterization of the demon as αἰδοῖος the Derveni author sees an allusive parallel between the Sun and a sexual organ, which is called αἰδοῖον, a noun phonetically similar and semantically related to the adjective αἰδοῖος, because he conceives of the demon in question as a personification of the Sun. He explains why Orpheus employed this characterization, i.e. on what grounds Orpheus implicitly likened the Sun to a sexual organ, with an argument of two premises, one pertaining to the genitals and the other to the Sun. It is a common belief that the generation of living things depends indispensably on the genitals; similarly, the transition of the early universe to its present state, i.e. the generation of the cosmos, depended indispensably on the Sun (see next note). In other words, as the Sun is to the generation of the cosmos, so are the genitals to the generation of living things; this analogy licenses Orpheus' implicit parallel between the Sun and a sexual organ, αἰδοῖον, through the characterization of the demon, who is an allegory of the Sun, as αἰδοῖος.

10-11 ἀνεῖ[γὰρ τοῦ ἡλ[ί]ου] τὰ ὄντα τοιαῦτα οὐχ οἶόν[τε] | γίν[εσθαι]: cf. τὰ νῦν ἔοντα | ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ᾗθελεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον (col. XXV.9-10). In view of ἡρε[μεῖν in 12, however, τὰ ὄντα here are not τὰ νῦν ὄντα, i.e. the large-scale structures in the universe as we see it today (the cosmos), and all transient entities existing in it on much smaller scales at any moment of the present epoch, but rather τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, i.e. the everlasting and basic entities everything else in the present universe (τὰ νῦν ὄντα) is made up of (for the distinction between the two ontological categories see Intro. V § 2). If so, τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι picks out the passing of basic entities from one state into another, not the generation of qualitatively determined

derivative entities made up of basic entities. Unless air/Mind had caused the Sun to be born, the universe, originally an amorphous fire-dominated mixture of all other basic entities (col. IX.5-10), could not have made the transition to its present state.

11]ένων τῶν ἐόντων: a genitive absolute referring to the condition of the universe before air/Mind formed the Sun and triggered the cosmogony, specifically to the thermal agitation of the other basic entities in their fire-dominated mixture? See also previous note.

12 ἡρε[μεῖν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον] πάντα ὁμ[οίως: the infinitive could depend on οἷον τε or similar in 11, which was linked with οἷον [τε] in 10 through οὐδέ: before air/Mind triggered the cosmogony by causing the formation of the Sun, the other basic entities could not come to rest, for their particles were agitated by those of the energetic fire and prevented from clumping into coherent structures. Next the Derveni author perhaps says that, after air/Mind initiated the cosmogony, all other contents of the universe came to rest, i.e. settled into the large-scale structures characteristic of the present universe (the cosmos). See also the two previous notes.

14] περιέχει [: perhaps περιέχει κ[. This might be the Derveni author's interpretation of Orpheus' κατέπινεν in 4. See Proclus in *Tim.* ii.93.18-19 Diehl: αἱ γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς θεολόγοις καταπόσεις περιοχαὶ τινές εἰσιν. If the Derveni author understands the swallowing of the reverend demon by Zeus as the formation of the Sun, he might interpret καταπίνειν, 'to swallow', as περιέχειν, 'to shut in', which in this context could only mean 'to confine in a spherical volume of small radius the amount of fire that separated first from the early amorphous universe to form the Sun'. See below on col. XV.3.

COL. XIV

1-2 [ἐ]κθόρηι τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον | χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ: for [ἐ]κθόρηι cf. ὥς τις τε βόεσσι κατ' οὖρεα μακρὰ λείαινα | ἐνθόρηι αἵξασα βαθυσκοπέλου διὰ βήσσης (Q.S. 1.315-316). If the subjunctive is the verb of a result or purpose clause, which paraphrases interpretively the Orphic hemistich ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε πρῶτος (col. XIII.4), τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον is a substantival description of αἰθήρ, and in his paraphrase

the author follows the syntax of the Orphic verse (the construction of a verb of motion with an accusative of origin is found in prose: cf. Hdt. 5.104.9, ἐξελθόντα τὸ ἄστυ τὸ Σαλαμινίων, 6.134.14-15, καταθρόσκοντα δὲ τὴν αἵμασίην, and 7.29.3, ἐξήλθον τὴν Περσίδα χώραν). The subject of the verb and the participle is the Derveni author's interpretation of the pronoun ὅς in the Orphic verse: if the pronoun refers to the reverend one (αἰδοῖον) Zeus swallowed, i.e. the glorious demon (col. VIII.5), and the Derveni author understands the swallowing of this demon by Zeus as the formation of the Sun due to the action of air/Mind on the fire-dominated mixture of all other basic entities, the subject of ἐκθόρηι is most probably τὸ πῦρ that became the Sun (the Sun is the amount of fire air/Mind caused to separate out from the primordial mixture at the beginning of the cosmogony, so as to make it possible for the other ingredients to also separate out and condense into the rest of the cosmos). The main verb modified by the adverbial [ἐ]κθόρηι clause would thus denote the action that resulted in a sufficiently large mass of fire forcefully 'leaping forth' out of the primordial mixture to form the Sun and being confined in a small volume (by comparison to that over which it was hitherto spread out). See above on col. IX.7-8 and XIII.14.

If τὸν λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό[τ]ατον is a substantival description of αἰθέρα in col. XIII.4, ὁ αἰθήρ is fire as in Anaxagoras (Arist. *Cael.* 270b24-25), not air as in Empedocles (Arist. *Ph.* 196a20-23 and *GC* 334a1-6) and Plato (*Ti.* 58d1-4), specifically the sum total of fire in the primordial universe: the mass of fire that would become the Sun leapt forth out of the intensely bright and hot ether, separating from itself (χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ). The reflexive pronoun denotes the sameness of what separated and that from which it separated with respect to kind: in a similar manner Empedocles says that the Sun, landmasses, sky and sea, i.e. all large concentrations of the four roots in the cosmos, are one with the parts of themselves in mortal things (DK 31 B 22.1-3: ἄρθμια μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν πάντα μέρεσσιν, | ἡλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα, | ὅσσα φιν ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἀποπλαχθέντα πέφυκεν).

Brisson (2003) 25-26, followed by Jourdan (2003) 64-65, reads λεγκό[τ]ατον instead of θε[ρμό]τ[α]τον, and understands the two adjectives as qualifications of the bright upper air (αἰθέρα), into which the severed αἰδοῖον of the castrated Uranus, the subject of [ἐ]κθόρηι, was flung after its separation from Uranus himself (χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ); cf. Intro. IV §§ 6-7. By their lights, the clause governed by [ἐ]κθόρηι is an interpretive paraphrase not of the relative clause ὅς αἰθέρα ἐκθορε πρῶτος in col. XIII.4 but of a lost

Orphic verse about the castration of Uranus. It might seem plausible to take Uranus' αἰδοῖον as the subject of ἐκθόρηι because of what we read after the [ἐ]κθόρηι clause: τοῦτον οὖν τὸν Κρόνον | γενέσθαι φησὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἥλιου τῇ Γῇ. Since it is rather unlikely that the Sun (not Uranus) was the father of Cronus in the Orphic poem, one might be led to the conclusion that the Derveni author equates the Sun with Uranus' severed αἰδοῖον, the subject of ἐκθόρηι, from which Cronus sprang; this is why the Sun appears next to Ge, Cronus' mother, as if Cronus were sired by the Sun. Although the ἐκθόρηι clause might belong to the interpretation of an Orphic verse that alluded to the castration of Uranus by Cronus, there is no need to posit that in this verse, or in the preceding one, there was a mention of Uranus' severed αἰδοῖον in order to explain why the Derveni author seems to regard the Sun as the 'father' of Cronus; see the next two notes.

2-3 τοῦτον οὖν τὸν Κρόνον | γενέσθαι φησὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἥλιου τῇ Γῇ: sc. Orpheus. Perhaps one should opt for τοῦ ἡλίου and τῇ γῇ; see also next note. This must be a paraphrase of an Orphic verse, in which Cronus was said to have been born to Ge (fr. 9 Bernabé). δς μέγ' ἔρεξεν (fr. 10.1 Bernabé) in 5 is the end of the Orphic verse that most probably stood before the one quoted in 6, Οὐρανὸς Εὐφρονίδης, δς πρῶτιστος βασιλευσεν (fr. 10.2 Bernabé); one should read Οὐρανὸν Εὐφρονίδην to obtain the object of ἔρεξεν (this is also suggested by the paraphrase of δς μέγ' ἔρεξεν in 7-9). Cronus is of course δς μέγ' ἔρεξεν | Οὐρανὸν Εὐφρονίδην, an allusion to Uranus' deposal by his son Cronus (see 7-9), or to the fact that Cronus castrated his father, thereby deposing him (μέγ' ἔρεξεν refers to an abominable act, in this case not simply the deposal of Uranus but rather his castration by his son Cronus, as in *Od.* 11.271-273: μητέρα τ' Οἰδιπόδαο ἴδον, καλὴν Ἐπικάστην, | ἣ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεξεν αἰδρεῖται νόοιο | γηγαμένη φ' οὐτῇ). Cronus must have been mentioned before the relative clause, in the lost part of the verse, and it is most probably in this verse that he was said to have been born to Ge, for nothing indicates a change of verse between the mention of Cronus' birth and δς μέγ' ἔρεξε – in 1-5 the Derveni author seems to discuss a single verse, which stood immediately before the one he quotes in 6 and was quoted in the lost final section of the previous column (cf. Janko [2002] 28, critical apparatus on 2-3, who suggests that fr. 9 and 10.1 Bernabé are one and the same).

West (1983) 114, lines 15-16, assumes that the verse in question came after the one in col. XIII.4, and that between these two verses stood another one, in which Orpheus identified the father of Ge and Uranus: [κεῖ-

νος μὲν Γαῖάν τε καὶ] Οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν [ἔτικτεν·] | [τῷ δὲ πελώρῃ Γαῖα τέκε Κρόνον,] ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξε. On West's reconstruction, κεῖνος (the father of Ge and Uranus) is the glorious and reverend demon whom Zeus swallowed (the Orphic verses in col. VIII.5 and XIII.4 are assumed to form a couplet; see Intro. IV §§ 6-7), and τῷ refers to Uranus; the Derveni author paraphrases τῷ with the prepositional phrase ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου because he thinks mistakenly that τῷ refers not to Uranus but to the same individual as κεῖνος, the demon assumed to be an allegory of the Sun; see West (1983) 88. It is, however, rather unlikely that the Derveni author would be so misled by ambiguous pronouns as to lose sight of an elementary genealogical fact.

In col. XV. 5-6 we read ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος· | “ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Κρόνος αὐτίς, ἔπειτα δὲ μητίετα Ζεὺς” (fr. 10.3 Bernabé). If the Derveni author had not quoted any verse in the lost final part of this column, ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος suggests that the following Orphic verse stood immediately after the one quoted in 6 of this column (in which case Κρόνος and Ζεὺς are subjects of the implicit ἐβασίλευσεν). One can further assume that the first verse in the couplet about the deposal or castration of Uranus by Cronus also began with ἐκ τοῦ: [ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Γαίῃ γένετο Κρόνος,] ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξε (Tsantsanoglou's suggestion). On this reconstruction of the Orphic verse paraphrased here, it is ἐκ τοῦ that the Derveni author renders by ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου, and there is no reason to posit in the preceding verse a mention of Uranus' severed αἰδοῖον, the referent of τοῦ which the Derveni author identifies with the Sun (see previous note). In col. XV.6 ἐκ τοῦ seems to be used in a temporal sense. According to the Derveni author, ἐκ τοῦ opens a verse in which Orpheus says “from that time”, i.e. from the time which Orpheus presents allegorically as the reign of Cronus, “there begins the period in which this rule is sovereign”, i.e. the era in which air/Mind dominates the universe: ἐκ τοῦδε [ἀ]ρχὴ ἐστίν, ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἦδε | ἀρχή (col. XV.7-8, where ἐξ ὅσου is apparently equivalent to ἐξ ὅτου). If the Derveni author is correct in taking ἐκ τοῦ in the temporal sense ‘afterwards’, it is likely that ἐκ τοῦ was used temporally also in the verse paraphrased here.

After what time was Cronus born? Perhaps after the glorious and reverend demon, who was eventually swallowed by Zeus, leapt forth out of the ether. If the Orphic verse paraphrased here stood immediately after the one quoted in col. XIII.4, one can easily explain why the Derveni author paraphrases ἐκ τοῦ by ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου. Apart from ‘thereafter’, ἐκ τοῦ can mean either ‘from him’, or ‘because of him’, the pronoun referring to a masculine noun in the preceding verse. The masculine noun in the

preceding verse is the demon who was the first to leap forth out of the ether, but the Derveni author understands this demon as an allegory of the Sun: thus he can take ἐκ τοῦ to mean not 'thereafter' but 'from him', or 'because of him', i.e. from or because of the male individual referred to in the previous verse, and, since this individual stands for the Sun, in his paraphrase the Derveni author can translate ἐκ τοῦ by ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου. If this is so, however, he need not lose sight of the fact that ἐκ τοῦ means 'thereafter'; see next note.

3-4 ὅτι αἰτίαν ἔσχε | διὰ τὸν ἡλίον κρούεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα: as turns out from col. XV.1-2 (cf. 8), the subject of κρούεσθαι is τὰ ἐόντα, not τὰ νῦν ἐόντα, i.e. the large-scale structures in the universe at the present epoch and all transient entities that exist in it on much smaller scales at any moment of this epoch, but rather τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, i.e. the everlasting and basic entities that make up all other entities in the present universe (for the distinction between the two types of entities see Intro. V § 2). Before air/Mind caused the Sun to form, triggering the cosmogony, all other basic entities were combined into an amorphous mixture, which was dominated by fire, and could not separate out to form coherent structures (col. IX.5-10). When air/Mind caused a sufficiently large quantity of fire to separate out and be confined within a spherical volume of small radius to form the Sun (col. XV.3), the other basic entities began to also separate out and stand apart from one another (col. XV.1-2), forming the large-scale structures in the universe as we see it today. They were divided up in small particles, which kept on moving by leaps within air/Mind until each came to its like, with which it was placed side by side (col. XXI.1-5). As the primordial mixture was breaking up, the corpuscles of its ingredients were moving by leaps, i.e. discontinuously, perhaps because corpuscles tending in different directions were colliding with one another; cf. the collisions of atoms that occur in the initial stages of Leucippus' cosmogony as like atoms are drawn together under the separating action of a vortex, in which atoms of all kinds swirl (DK 67 A 1; the verb προσκρούειν used in this report as well as in A 10 for the event of collision is perhaps an atomist *terminus technicus*). The Sun is proximately responsible for these collisions in the sense that, at the beginning of the cosmogony, air/Mind caused an amount of fire to separate out and form the Sun so as to free the other ingredients in the primordial mixture from fire's domination and allow them to also separate out, a process accompanied by collisions of their particles.

The ultimate cause of these collisions is thus air/Mind, and the Derveni author thinks that 'Cronus' is the name Orpheus gave to air/Mind insofar as it caused them. Deriving the name Κρόνος from ὁ κρούων Νοῦς, 'the collision-causing Mind' (see 7-8), he understands the reign of Cronus as the time of the cosmogony, the first phase of the air/Mind era in the history of the universe (when air/Mind dominates all other basic entities); the second phase of that era, from the formation of the cosmos down to the present and beyond, is the reign of Zeus, another name for air/Mind (see col. XV.7-8 and XVII.1-9). Thus Mind became collision-causing, i.e. Cronus was born as Orpheus puts it, after the Sun formed, and the Derveni author could read this temporal sequence of events in the Orphic verse which might have stood immediately after the one quoted in col. XIII.4 and is paraphrased in 2-3 (see previous note): "thereafter", i.e. after the reverend demon who stands for the Sun had leapt out of the ether, "Cronus was born to Ge, he who did a great deed", i.e. air/Mind came to be collision-causing (in the 'great deed' of Cronus, be it only the deposal of Uranus or his castration that signaled his deposal, the Derveni author detects an allusion to the collisions air/Mind caused; see 3-5). Air/Mind, however, became collision-causing not only after the birth of the Sun but also through the Sun, or because it caused the Sun to form. From a cosmological point of view, in other words, the sequence of events in the Orphic verse paraphrased in 2-3 could be read either temporally or causally. To read it causally, the Derveni author would simply take ἐκ τοῦ at the beginning of this verse as reconstructed above to denote not time but cause, the reverend demon in the previous verse being the referent of τοῦ: since he thinks that this demon is an allegory of the Sun, he could paraphrase ἐκ τοῦ by ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου, as if he were treating of a verse in which Orpheus said that the Sun was the father of Cronus, who was born to Ge.

It is possible that the Derveni author de-anthropomorphized Orpheus' Ge, and understood this figure as an allegory of the Earth, in which case one should read τῇ γῇ in 3, not τῇ Γῇ. If so, this dative is understood as a dative of advantage: air/Mind became collision-causing through the Sun, or because it caused the Sun to form, for the sake of the Earth, i.e. in order for the Earth to form along with the rest of the cosmos; in other words, τῇ γῇ partially denotes the final end of the process air/Mind initiated when it brought about the formation of the Sun so as to dominate the universe, thereby causing the cosmogonic collisions between the particles of the other basic entities.

5 διὰ τοῦτο λέγει “ὃς μέγ’ ἔρεξεν”: fr. 10.1 Bernabé. See above on 2-3.

6 “Οὐρανὸς Εὐφρονίδης, ὃς πρώτιστος βασιλεύσεν”: fr. 10.2 Bernabé. See above on 2-3.

7 κρούοντα τὸν Νοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλ[α] Κρόνον ὀνομάσας; sc. Orpheus. For the Derveni author’s derivation of the name Κρόνος from ὁ κρούων Νοῦς cf. Pl. *Cra.* 396b3-7 (the god’s name denotes τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκίρατον τοῦ νοῦ). On the object of the participle (τὰ ἐόντα) see above on 3-4. If the Mind-triggered collisions occurred during the cosmogony, the Derveni author understands the reign of Cronus as the first phase of the air/Mind era in the history of the universe; the reign of Zeus, another name for air/Mind, is thus the second phase of this era, from the formation of the cosmos down to the present and beyond (see col. XV.7-8 and XVII.1-9). Note that the succession of Cronus by Zeus is probably understood differently in col. IX.1-2, namely as the transition of the universe from domination by fire to domination by air/Mind, i.e. from the fire era to the air/Mind era. If so, in col. IX.1-2 ‘Zeus’ picks out air/Mind as the basic entity that dominates the universe at the present era of its history, whereas here ‘Zeus’ designates air/Mind as cause of certain effects characterizing a period of the air/Mind era (the onomatopoeic principle applied here is explained in 9-10); the nature of these effects is unclear, for in the surviving parts of the papyrus there is no evidence as to how the Derveni author etymologized the name ‘Zeus’ (on ‘Uranus’ see below on 12-13). The incongruity might be somewhat mitigated because the couplet discussed in col. IX.1-2 says simply that Zeus took the power from his father (see col. VIII.4-5): the Derveni author might assume that Orpheus does not mean the same thing when he refers to Zeus’ succession of his *father*, and when he talks of Zeus’ succession of *Cronus*.

8-9 μέγα ῥέξαι φησὶ τὸν Οὐρανόν· ἀφ[αι]ρεθῆναι γὰρ | τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτόν: cf. previous note. The reign of Uranus, from whom Cronus took the kingship, can only stand for the fire era in the history of the universe. If so, the Derveni author perhaps thinks that Orpheus describes the fire era, when air/Mind had not yet dominated the universe, as both the reign of Uranus and the domination by Zeus’ father; see previous note. The second description might hint at the basic thing dominating the universe in that era; for the first see below on 12-13.

9-10 Κρόνον δὲ φγόμασεν ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἔ[ρ]γου αὐτόν καὶ τάλλα κατὰ τ[ὸν αὐτόν λ]όγον: Orpheus named air/Mind (αὐτόν) ‘Cronus’ on account of the effects (ἔργον) it brought about (see above on 3-4), as is also the case with all other names (τάλλα) he gave to air/Mind, sc. ‘Uranus’ (see below on 12-13), and perhaps ‘Zeus’ (we do not know how the Derveni author etymologized this name).

11 [τῶν ἐ]όντων γὰρ ἀπάντων [οὕτω κρουομέ]νων: Tsantsanoglou’s alternatives, [συμμεμειγμέ]νων and [ἀναμειγμέ]νων, are equally plausible.

12-13 [ὁ Νοῦ]ς ὡς ὁρ[ίζω]ν φύσιν [τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχε]ν | [Οὐρανός]ς: on Tsantsanoglou’s reconstruction, the Derveni author derives the name Οὐρανός from ὁ ὀρίζων φύσιν Νοῦς, perhaps ‘Mind that determines coming to be’, just as he derives the name Κρόνος from ὁ κρούων Νοῦς (cf. 9-10; for other ‘etymologies’ of the name ‘Uranus’ see [Arist.] *Mu.* 400a6-7 and Pl. *Cra.* 396b8-c3). Uranus’ reign must stand for a chapter in the history of the universe before the time which the reign of Cronus stands for. If so, it can only be considered as an allegory of the fire era, when air/Mind had not yet wrested control of the universe away from fire, and the other basic entities were united into an amorphous mixture dominated by fire. If the Derveni author did take the name ‘Uranus’ to mean ‘Mind that determines coming to be’, the name most probably hints at what is true of air/Mind at all times: in the fire era air/Mind had not yet caused any substantial change, but it is unlikely that there was any time when the wisdom of everlasting air/Mind lacked a bird’s eye view of how all things that would ever be must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.3-7).

13-14 ἀφαιρ[εῖ]σθαι δ’ αὐ[τόν] φησι τὴν βασιλ[ε]ϊαν | [κρουο]μένων τ[ῶν] ἐ[ό]ντ[ων]: sc. Orpheus. Cronus’ depriving Uranus (αὐτόν) of his kingship is an allegory of the transition from the fire era, when it was true that air/Mind determines coming to be, though this entity had not yet dominated the universe (see previous note), to the first phase of the next era, when air/Mind caused collisions between particles of other basic entities as it came to wrest control of the universe away from fire.

COL. XV

1 κρούε(ι)ν αὐτὰ πρὸ[ς] ἄλ[λη]λα: as is clear from 2, αὐτά = τὰ ἐόντα (see above on col. XIV.3-4). The following conjunction seems to connect ποῖ-

σηι with another subjunctive, on which the infinitive κρούε(ι)ν depended, and not with the imperfect ἔκρουεν, whose augment is lost with the preceding line, or with the unaugmented imperfect κρούεν. For κρούεν instead of κρούειν cf. ἐπανερόμενοι and [οἰ]κτέρεσθαι in col. XX.7 and 8, ἐρήσθαι in col. XXIV.4; cf. Rusten (1985) 137 n. 34. If ε is the old spelling of ει and ι is not simply omitted by the scribe, it is interesting to note that the last certain examples of ε for ει in Attic inscriptions are dated to the third quarter of the fourth century; see Threatte vol. 1, 189-190. Since in col. XIV.7 the Derveni author derives the name Κρόνος from ὁ κρούων Νοῦς, the infinitive κρούε(ι)ν is in all probability final. It complements the third person singular aorist subjunctive of a causative verb, with air/Mind as subject.

1-2 κα[ι] ποιήσῃ τὸ [πρῶτ]ον | χωρισθέντα διαστήναι δίχ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐόντα: for the subject of the subjunctive see previous note. ποιήσῃ, and the subjunctive on which the infinitive κρούε(ι)ν depended, are probably verbs of purpose clauses detailing the final end of the action by which air/Mind came to dominate the universe; see above on col. XIV.3-4. Once separated by air/Mind, the other basic entities stood apart in the sense that the greatest mass of each clumped in a particular place; see above on col. IX.6-7 and Intro. V § 13. For the Derveni author's use of διύστασθαι cf. Heraclitus' use of the same verb for the separation of a mixed drink into its ingredients (DK 22 B 125: καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν διύσταται (μὴ) κινούμενος), and Empedocles' use of διαφύεσθαι for the emergence of the four roots from the Love-dominated Sphere, a perfect mixture of the four roots, under the action of Strife on it (DK 31 B 17.17); Aristotle uses διυστάναι and διύστασθαι for the Strife-effected separation of the Empedoclean roots (*Cael.* 295a30, *Metaph.* 985a25), and the noun διάστασις for the division of the cosmos into the natural places of the elements (*Cael.* 300b25, variant reading διάταξις).

3 χωρ[ι]ζομένου γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ ἀπολαμβανομένου: here the Sun probably stands for the mass of fire that separated first from the other basic entities under the action of air/Mind. It seems plausible that this mass is assumed by the Derveni author to have formed the Sun by suffering compression so as to occupy a small volume, compared to that over which it was spread out before air/Mind forced it to separate. For ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι in the sense 'to be shut in' cf. [Arist.] *Pr.* 868b26-28: διὸ καὶ αἱ φλέβες διατείνονται τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὐ δυναμένου ἐξιέναι. ἀπολαμβάνόμενον δ' ἄθρόον τὸ ὑγρόν, ὅταν ἀνεθῇ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἄθρόον ἐξέρχεται.

4-5 ἐν μέσῳ πῆξας ἴσχει καὶ ἄνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου | καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν: sc. air/Mind. Laks and Most (1997) 16, Janko (2002) 31 and Jourdan (2003) 15 take ἐν μέσῳ with ἀπολαμβανόμενου and understand ἄνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν as the object of πῆξας. Construing, however, ἐν μέσῳ with πῆξας and taking τὸν ἥλιον as the implicit object of πῆξας is, perhaps, preferable. ἐν μέσῳ πῆξας τὸν ἥλιον would pick out in a particularly strong and direct way the fixity of Sun's position in the cosmos. The Derveni author attaches great importance to the Sun's stable size. He thinks that air/Mind would not have made the Sun, if it had not wanted the cosmos to come into being, and that it made the Sun of a certain sort and of a certain size (col. XXV.9-12). This presumably means that, had air/Mind not wanted the cosmos to come into being, it would not have made the Sun as large as it is. It is quite probable that, in order for the cosmos to come into being, air/Mind fixed not only the size of the Sun but also the position of this celestial body in the universe, and that the Sun is of a certain sort in virtue of its having this position, as well as on account of all other properties it might have apart from size. If so, it is preferable to construe ἐν μέσῳ with πῆξας and take τὸν ἥλιον as the implicit object of the participle, thereby obtaining a direct reference to the fixed position of the Sun in the cosmos.

The Sun holds the middle of the cosmos perhaps in the sense that the distances from the Sun to the center, which is presumably held by Earth, and from the Sun to the outermost (spherical?) boundary, perhaps the (sphere of the) fixed stars, are always equal (it should be kept in mind that we are totally in the dark as to how the Derveni author imagines the cosmos and that the attribution to him of a geocentric finitistic model is speculative; see also Betegh [2004] 235-243). If so, ἄνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν are the two regions into which the cosmos is divided by (the annual path of) the Sun, and air/Mind holds (ἴσχει) these regions perhaps in the sense that it dominates them. According to Theon of Smyrna (139.9-18 Hiller), certain Pythagoreans placed the Sun in the middle of the planets, for the Sun is the commanding faculty or the 'heart' of the universe, and arranged them in this order: Moon (the celestial body closest to Earth at the center of the cosmos), Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* 2.12-13) reports the same view without attributing it to Pythagoreans. One might be tempted to assume in the light of these reports that ἄνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν are not simply what could be called the super-solar and the sub-solar region of the universe but rather the celestial bodies contained in these regions, the planets above and below

the Sun respectively. In the surviving parts of the Derveni text, however, there is no evidence that the Derveni author is aware of the existence of the planets, and one can plausibly assume that knowledge of their existence was not widespread even in the fourth century (see Pl. *Lg.* 821b8-c5); for Greek knowledge of the planets in the fifth and fourth century see Vlastos (1975) 43-49. Since there is no point in speculating about the extent of the Derveni author's astronomical knowledge, it is perhaps preferable to take τᾶνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν as simply the two regions into which the cosmos is divided by the annual path of the Sun.

If the Derveni author regards the division into a super-solar and a sub-solar region as the most fundamental structural aspect of the present universe, he might be interested in the domination of the two regions by air/Mind not after but during the transition of the universe to its present state. His point is perhaps that, when air/Mind caused the primordial mixture of the other basic entities to break up by forcing a sufficiently large mass of fire to separate out first and become the Sun, the rest of the ingredients in the mixture began to clump because air/Mind positioned the Sun at equal distances from the center and the periphery of the universe, thereby coming to dominate the two regions determined by the annual path of the Sun, i.e. the entire universe: "For, after (the fire that became) the Sun separated out and was confined (within a small volume), air/Mind fixed (the annual path of) the Sun in the middle of the universe and holds sway over both the super-solar and the sub-solar region".

If the Derveni author thinks that the heat of the Sun causes matter to scatter (see above on col. X.11-13), he perhaps assumes that the first small clumps of matter formed quite far from the new-born Sun and constantly gained material from their surroundings as they moved towards, or away from, the center of the universe, perhaps the focal point around which the nascent cosmos was developing. Sufficiently large clumps moving close to the Sun could withstand heating without great loss of mass, and the regular motion of the Sun is perhaps assumed by the Derveni author to have allowed, over a long period of time, the uniform breakup of the primordial mixture in the vicinity of the annual path of the Sun, where heating is most intense. Those of the basic entities that tended to collect nearer to, or further away from, the center of the universe displaced others outwards or inwards respectively, until all basic entities became coherently arranged on the largest scale as now observed. It is conceivable that the position of the Sun at equal distances from the center and the periphery of the universe was crucial in this process because heating antagonizes clumping:

had the Sun not moved uniformly in a path equally distanced from both the center and the periphery of the universe, air/Mind could not have effected the spatially uniform condensation of the other basic entities on the large scale, in other words it could not have come to dominate the universe completely.

5-6 ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος: | “ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Κρόνος αὐτίς, ἔπειτα δὲ μητίετα Ζεὺς”: fr. 10.3 Bernabé. Since ἐκ τοῦδε in 7 interprets ἐκ τοῦ and denotes not origin but time, ἐκ τοῦ should be understood as a prepositional phrase of time (that the Derveni author intentionally misinterprets ἐκ τοῦ need not be assumed on the ground that it cannot be ruled out). In the Orphic poem this hexameter seems to have stood immediately after the one quoted in the previous column (this is suggested by ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος and the fact that there seems to be no significant change of topic between the first surviving lines of the present column and the last surviving lines of the previous one). If so, (ἐ)βασίλευσεν is the implicit verb, and the verse should be translated as “thereafter Cronus reigned in turn, and next wise Zeus”, where ‘thereafter’ means ‘after the reign of Uranus’, not as “from him in turn came Cronus, and next contriving Zeus”, where ‘from him’ means ‘from Uranus as father’ (Janko [2002] 31; cf. Jourdan [2003] 15, Laks and Most [1997] 16, Betegh [2004] 33). See also above on col. XIV.2-3.

7 λέγει τι: sc. Orpheus. In the papyrus there is a smudge between the two words, but it cannot be identified as ο, nor is the space between ι and τ wide enough, though it is certainly wider than usual, to accommodate this letter. The smudge actually extends over the letters γειτιεκτ, which are all spaced more widely than usual; they are also thicker than one would expect, and seem to have been added to the papyrus after the scribe erased what he had originally written, thus causing the smudge. Perhaps he wrote λέγει οτι, but then corrected it to λέγει τι after he erased not only ο but also the adjacent letters so that he could rewrite them without leaving any gap; he was forced, though, to leave between the letters wider spaces than usual. λέγει τι should be taken in the sense ‘he says something to this effect’, or ‘he means something of this sort’, τι being equivalent to the particle που as used in e.g. Pl. *Lg.* 710b2: ἔχετε γὰρ ὃ λέγω που. Cf. Hdt. 5.1.14-16: οἱ Παιόνες ... εἰπὼν κου παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι· Νῦν ἂν εἴη ὁ χρησμός ἐπιτελέομενος ἡμῖν, νῦν ἡμέτερον τὸ ἔργον. The quotation after εἰπὼν κου is directly parallel to the quotation that follows λέγει τι in the Derveni papyrus. τι is perhaps substituted for που under the influence of the expression λέγειν τι

τοιούτον, ‘to mean something like this’. See e.g. [Pl.] *Amat.* 135c3: ἄρα μή τι τοιούτον λέγεις;

7-8 ‘ἐκ τοῦδε [ἀ]ρχή ἐστιν, ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἥδε | ἀρχή’: Janko (2002) 30 puts a full stop after βασιλεύει and, reading τοῦδ’ ἢ instead of τοῦδε, translates ἐκ τοῦδ’ ἢ [ἀ]ρχή ἐστιν, ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει as “his rule has existed since (Mind) became king”. Jourdan (2003) 15, who prints Janko’s text, translates it as “c’est de celui-ci que vient le pouvoir qui seul lui permet d’être roi”, but this sense cannot be extracted from the Greek. There is no reason to change τοῦδε into τοῦδ’ ἢ and good reason not to punctuate with a full stop after βασιλεύει – one should rather punctuate after ἥδε ἀρχή and take this as the subject of βασιλεύει (Tsantsanoglou’s suggestion; see Laks and Most [1997] 16 n. 37). Janko reads ἡ δὲ ἀρχή instead of ἥδε ἀρχή and, taking it as the subject of διηγείται in 8, supplements ὃ[τι after this verb; cf. Burkert (1997) 168. This supplement is ruled out by the paleographical evidence, however. The high trace of a vertical joined to a descending oblique after διηγείται suggests that ι was followed by ν, and in this context Tsantsanoglou’s ν[οῦς is the only conceivable supplement, as is suggested by τ]ὰ ὄντα κρούων πρὸς ἄλληλα (cf. κρούοντα τὸν Νοῦν πρὸς ἄλληλα, col. XIV.7). If this is so, διηγείται is passive (cf. col. XXV.12), and its subject is Νοῦς; its complement, an infinitive, must have been in the lost part of 10. It is thus impossible to punctuate with a full stop after βασιλεύει, or to read ἡ δὲ ἀρχή instead of ἥδε ἀρχή, which can only be the subject of βασιλεύει. ἐκ τοῦδε [ἀ]ρχή ἐστιν, ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἥδε ἀρχή makes satisfactory sense if [ἀ]ρχή in the main clause means simply ‘beginning’, and the temporal clause ἐξ ὅσου βασιλεύει ἥδε ἀρχή denotes what this beginning is a beginning of – it is the beginning of a time interval that is characterized by the sovereignty of this rule (ἥδε ἀρχή) and, as is shown by βασιλεύει, extends down to the present: “after that there begins the epoch at which this rule is sovereign” (for ἐξ ὅσου cf. e.g. Hdt. 2.98.3-4: τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἐξ ὅσου ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι ἐστὶ Αἴγυπτος).

The ‘reign of Uranus’ is the fire era in the history of the universe, when air/Mind was causally inert and all other basic entities were mixed together under the action of the highly energetic fire on them (see above on col. XIV.12-13, 13-14). After the ‘reign of Uranus’ comes ‘the reign of Cronus’, a time in the history of the universe characterized by the collisions that took place when air/Mind caused the constituents of the primordial mixture to separate on the large scale and condense around a focal point of the nascent cosmos, their particles moving in different directions and

bumping on one another as they were sorting like to like; air/Mind is called Cronus because, having caused the breakup of the primordial mixture, it also caused these collisional events. Thus, after the 'reign of Uranus' there begins the 'reign of Cronus', the time since which the rule of air/Mind, "this rule" as the Derveni author puts it, is sovereign in the universe. By the Derveni author's lights, the 'reign of Cronus' (the cosmogony) is evidently the first part of the air/Mind era in the history of the universe; if so, the 'reign of Zeus', the last and permanent king of the world in the succession myth which the Derveni author interprets as an allegory of the evolution of the universe, stands for the entire air/Mind era.

It might be objected that in the lines under discussion the Derveni author focuses only on the first hemistich of the Orphic verse he quotes in 6, for in 11 he quotes the second hemistich and then proceeds to identify Zeus with Mind; this seems to suggest that the equation of Zeus with Mind has not been introduced earlier on; if so, this equation should not be assumed in the interpretation of any line(s) before that point. That 'Zeus' is a name of Mind, however, follows easily from what one has read before the explicit identification of Zeus with Mind in the extant parts of the papyrus, and there is no reason to think that, even if the identification had not been made earlier on somewhere in the lost sections of the papyrus, the Derveni author would scrupulously avoid building on the self-evident implications of his thought before he brings them out formally. In col. XIV.9-10 he has explained that 'Cronus' designates Mind *qua* cause of collisional events; by implication, the 'reign of Cronus' is the period in the history of the universe that is characterized by these events. He also hints that other names, too, pick out Mind *qua* cause of certain effects, and the audience or a reader would have no trouble identifying 'Zeus' as one of these names, even if Zeus has not yet been explicitly equated with Mind.

In cols. XIV-XV the Derveni author contends that Mind is called Cronus because, when it caused the primordial mixture of all other basic entities to break up, it also caused their particles to collide. However, the breakup of the primordial mixture has already been introduced in col. IX as an effect caused by Zeus: that 'Zeus' is another name of Mind can, therefore, be easily inferred before the explicit identification of Zeus with Mind in the extant parts of the papyrus. The Derveni author's principle of onomatopoeia in col. XIV.9-10 leaves no doubt that the name 'Zeus', if applied strictly, designates Mind *qua* cause of certain effects which must be temporally posterior to those Mind caused *qua* Cronus, for in Orpheus' poem Zeus succeeded Cronus. Thus the 'reign of Zeus'

can only be the period of the Mind era in the history of the universe that comes after the ‘reign of Cronus’; as the Derveni author explains in col. XVII, with the name ‘Zeus’ Orpheus designates air/Mind after the transition of the universe to its present state. If his interpretation of the verse in 6 treats the ‘reign of Zeus’ as the entire air/Mind era, this is so perhaps because he assumes that in this verse Orpheus uses the name ‘Zeus’ loosely, as he himself uses it in e.g. col. IX (see above on col. XIV.7).

8 διηγείται Ν[οῦς: see previous note. For διηγείται cf. col. XXV.12. The exemplar must have had ΔΙΗΓΕΤΑΙ or ΔΙΕΓΕΤΑΙ, depending on whether it was written in the Ionic script or not, most probably passive perfect (cf. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν διήγεται in Antipho 1.31, ἀπήγηταί μοι in Hdt. 5.62.3, τοῦ ἀπηγημένου in Hdt. 1.207.21 and 9.26.33), which got transcribed as the non-idiomatic passive present. The same confusion between εἰ and η, but the other way around, might be found in col. XVI.6, where κατακί-αται could be an erroneous transcription of ΚΑΤΑΚΕΑΤΑΙ instead of κατα-κείται.

8-9 τ]ᾶ ὄντα κρούων πρὸς ἀλλήλα | διαστήσας τε [πρὸς τῇ]γ νῦν μετάστασιν: ἡ νῦν μετάστασις is not a change that is under way now but rather a state that exists now, after a change has been completed (cf. Thuc. 4.74.4.1-3: καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ’ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέ-μεινεν): it is the state of the universe as we see it now, i.e. the state to which air/Mind caused all other basic entities to pass from their original condition as a fire-dominated mixture. The participles describe how air/Mind effected the transition. See above on 1-2, col. XIV.3-4.

9-10 οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρ[ων] | ἕτερ’ ἀλλ’ ἐτε[ρ]: when air/Mind initiated the transition of the universe to its present state, it did not cause the other basic entities to undergo any qualitative change – it caused them to undergo a spatial rearrangement (cf. διαστήσας in 9), which was most probably referred to by the complement of διηγείται in the lacuna at the end of 10 (a probable supplement is ἀλλ’ ἐτέ[ρως κοσμεῖν], sc. τὰ ὄντα, though ἐξ ἐτέρ[ων] ἕτερ’ calls for ποιεῖν or ποιεῖν, which perhaps could be omitted after this phrase as easily implied; Melissus, DK 30 B 7, uses the verb μετακοσμεῖσθαι for the spatial rearrangement of things that are, τὰ ὄντα, and thus cannot change qualitatively in any respect). The different characters that the other basic entities would have had prior to and after a qualitative change, in case they had undergone such a change, are picked out by ἐξ ἐτέρ[ων]

and ἔτερα respectively; cf. [Arist.] *Col.* 795b25, ἐξ ἐτέρων εἰς ἔτερα μεταβάλλουσιν, Arist. *GA* 738b33-34, ἐξ ἐτέρων ἔτερα γιγνόμενα τέλος ἀποβαίνει κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ τὴν μορφήν, and Meliss. *DK* 30 B 7, εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὼν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐὼν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὼν γίνεσθαι. Thus, in 8-10 the Derveni author says: “By forcing the (particles of the) basic entities to collide with one another and then stand apart so as to be in their present state, Mind is said not to make them change from what they originally were to something different but only to make them differently arranged”.

11-12 τὸ δ' “ἔπειτα [δὲ μητίετα Ζε]ύς”· ὅτι μὲν οὐχ ἕτερ[ος] | ἀλλὰ ὁ αὐ[τὸς] δῆλον: turning to the second hemistich of the verse in 6, the Derveni author most probably points out that Zeus and Mind, the entity called Cronus in the first hemistich, are one and the same. This identification is probably assumed in 7-8, where this hexameter is interpreted, but now is made explicit, apparently in order to be backed up; see above on 7-8.

12 σημαίν]ει δὲ [τ]όδε: it can be plausibly assumed that the pronoun refers to the following quotation (fr. 11 Bernabé). The absence of a *paragraphos* after 13 and 14 suggests that the fragmentary hexameter in 13 was most probably followed by at least two more (in col. VIII.3 and XXVI.5 τόδε refers to a couplet). If so, the pronoun is the subject of the verb, and what the group of hexameters in 13ff. shows (i.e. the implicit object of the verb) can only be that Zeus and Mind are one and the same. The second hemistich of the hexameter in 6 characterizes Zeus as μητίετα, and the fragmentary hexameter in 13 begins with μῆτιν or Μῆτιν, the abstract noun for the property that makes Zeus μητίετα or the mythological personification of this property. The quotation in support of the author's view that Zeus is Mind explains why Zeus is called μητίετα, either because it plainly ascribed to Zeus the property that makes him μητίετα, or because it referred to an event involving Zeus and the mythological personification of the property in question, an allegorical etiology of his possessing this property. See also next note.

13 “μῆτιν κα.[c. 13]εν βασιληίδα τιμ[ήν]”: fr. 11.1 Bernabé. The proper name Μῆτιν is equally probable. There is no evidence that the verses in 13-15 should be placed after the verse in 6 – the quotation might not even come from the poem the Derveni author interprets, or from the same part of this poem as the verse in 6; cf. col. XXVI.4 and 6-7, where the

author quotes from the *Odyssey* (8.335) and the *Iliad* (24.527-528) to interpret Orpheus' words (even if the hexameters in question come from the Orphic poem the Derveni author interprets, it is hard to believe that they belong to the same context as the one he elucidates with their help).

In Hesiod's *Theogony* (886-900) Zeus swallows Metis, his first wife, after he deposes Cronus; he keeps her in his belly so that the goddess can take counsel with him about good and bad, instead of giving birth to progeny who would depose Zeus and have βασιληίδα τιμήν (892). In the much later *Orphic Rhapsodies* Metis is another name of Protogonos, whom Zeus swallowed (OF 168.9, 169.4, 170; see Intro. IV § 3). The swallowing of Metis by Zeus is an allegorical etiology of Zeus' possessing μήτιν, but the fragmentary state of the verse quoted here can only compel one to suspend judgment as to whether this verse referred directly, or alluded, to this event. It is quite probable that Zeus swallowed Protogonos also in the poem the Derveni author interprets (see Intro. IV, esp. § 7), but there is no reason to assume that in this poem Protogonos was also called Metis (or that he received this name in another poem, from which the Derveni author might quote here), and that the hexameter quoted here detailed, or alluded to, the swallowing of Metis by Zeus; this view is adopted by Jourdan (2003) 73 but rejected by Bernabé (2002) 114 on the ground that Protogonos did not appear in the poem which the Derveni author interprets. The swallowing of Metis by Zeus could certainly allow the author to identify first Zeus with Metis, and then Metis with Mind (Νοῦς); Empedocles seems to treat μήτις and νοῦς as synonyms (DK 31 B 2.7-9).

On the other hand, the mere occurrence of the phrase βασιληίδα τιμήν in the quotation cannot be evidence that the hexameter referred or alluded to the *Theogony* story, in which case the Derveni author could again easily identify Zeus with Mind by the same reasoning. Even if this hexameter simply attributed to Zeus μήτιν, the Derveni author could easily identify Zeus with Mind if Zeus' μήτις were said in the following hexameters to have unsurpassed knowledge, as is the case with Metis in Hesiod's *Theogony* (887), and conclude that Zeus is Mind, for only Mind's wisdom is unsurpassed (cf. col. XIX.4-7).

COL. XVI

1 [αἰδοῦ]ον τὸν ἥλιον ἔφ[η]σεν εἶναι δε[δῆλ]φται: given ὅτι δέ at the end of the line, the last line of the previous column ended with ὅτι μὲν. The sub-

ject of ἔφησεν is clearly Orpheus. Here the Derveni author can be plausibly assumed to comment on the genitives Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου, which open the extended quotation in 3-6 (fr. 12 Bernabé), by referring back to his discussion in col. XIII; for the meaning of αἰδοίου see Intro. IV § 7. The genitives, and perhaps at least one hexameter, that which preceded the hexameters in 3-6 and contained the word on which the genitives depended, seem to have been quoted in the lower part of the previous column (this group of verses could be placed either after the verse in col. XV.6, or after those in col. XV.13-15, if the latter did come after the verse in col. XV.6; see on col. XV.13).

1-2 ὅτι δὲ | ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται λέγει: sc. Orpheus. See above on col. IX.10 for ὅτι, and cf. D. 18.37: ὅτι δ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει, λέγε μοι τό τε τοῦ Καλλισθένους ψήφισμα καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου. The Derveni author sees this cosmological principle in the main part of the following quotation from Orpheus' poem (from τῶι δ' ἄρα πάντες in the first verse to the first hemistich of the fourth). This passage can be assumed to describe the absorption in Zeus of the cosmos Protogonos had created: Zeus swallowed this cosmos and its creator, absorbed everything, but then regurgitated all that had been absorbed in him, thereby bringing about the present cosmos he dominates (see Intro. IV). What Zeus regurgitated is an allegory of τὰ νῦν ὄντα, i.e. the present universe as cosmos, from the stable structures on the large scale to each transient entity that exists on much smaller scales at any moment of the present epoch. Zeus himself and what he absorbed stand for τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, the everlasting entities that constitute the universe at the fundamental level; everything else in the universe is made up of, and comes to be from, these entities (absorption in Zeus, who is a personification of air/Mind, the basic entity that caused the cosmogony, perhaps stands for the domination of the primordial universe by air/Mind as sufficient condition for the cosmogony; regurgitation by Zeus might stand for the cosmogony itself and all substantial change in the cosmos). ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων means ἐκ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων ὄντων (cf. 7-8, where the principle is restated as τὰ ὄντα ὑπ[ε]ρχεν αἰεὶ, τὰ δὲ | νῦν ἔόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται). For the two ontological categories see Intro. V §§ 1-2, and cf. Aristotle's note in *Ph.* 187a32-b1 (he has Empedocles and Anaxagoras in mind):

εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως), τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν, ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ μικρότητα δὲ τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναίσθητων ἡμῖν.

For τὰ νῦν ὄντα cf. Diog. Apoll. DK 64 B 2: ... τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἑόντα νῦν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἑόντα ... (Diogenes assumes that all these come from air, the only ὑπάρχον in the Derveni author's parlance). See also Anaxag. DK 59 B 9 on the speed of the vortex: οὐδενὶ ἔοικε χρήματι τὴν ταχυτῆτα τῶν νῦν ἑόντων χρημάτων ἐν ἀνθρώποις. For the use of the adverb νῦν in phrases that denote the stable large-scale structures in the present universe and the many transient things that come to be in it see also Emp. DK 31 B 38 (τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα), B 71 (ὅσα νῦν γεγάσι).

The verb ὑπάρχειν is used by Philolaus as in the Derveni text, i.e. to denote the fact that the principles or ἀρχαί of the cosmos and everything in it existed before the cosmos came to be from them. According to Philolaus (DK 44 B 6), ἁ ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων is eternal and admits of divine but not human knowledge, which is restricted only to this fact:

οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν οὐθὲν τῶν ἑόντων καὶ γιγνωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἀμῶν γὰ γενέσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τᾶς ἐστούς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον ... ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο ῥητιῶν ἅδε τρόπον ἐγένετο.

Here τὰ ἑόντα are clearly what the Derveni author calls τὰ νῦν ἑόντα, for they are subject to coming to be, whereas in B 2 the same term is used in the sense of the Derveni author's τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, for the 'limiters' and the 'unlimiteds'.

3-6 "Πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου· τῷ δ' ἄρα πάντες
ἀθάνατοι προσέφυν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ θέαιναι
καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ κρήναι ἐπήρατοι ἄλλα τε πάντα,
ἥσσα τότε ἦν γεγαῶν', αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο":

fr. 12 Bernabé. In view of the much later *Orphic Rhapsodies*, this quotation from the Orphic poem can be assumed to describe the absorption in Zeus of the cosmos Protogonos had created; see Intro. IV § 3.

Cf. *OF* 167a:

ὥς τότε Πρωτογόνοιο χανὼν μένος Ἥρικεπαίου
τῶν πάντων δέμας εἶχεν ἐῆ ἐνὶ γαστέρι κοίλῃ,
μεῖξε δ' ἐοῖς μελέεσσι θεοῦ δύναμιν τε καὶ ἀλκήν,
τοῦνεκα σὺν τῷ πάντα Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη.

For προσέφυν, which is directly parallel to Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη in *OF* 167a, cf. [Arist.] *Pr.* 927a17-20:

Διὰ τί ἡ ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ τροφή μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς σώμασι καὶ μᾶλλον τρόφιμος ἢ ἡ ἐκ τῶν κριθῶν; ἡ διότι μετρίαν ἔχει γλίσχρότητα; δεῖ δὲ τὴν τροφήν ἔχειν τοῦτο· προσφύναι γὰρ δεῖ καὶ προσκολληθῆναι τῷ σώματι.

The verses quoted by the Derveni author bear a marked similarity to *OF* 167b4-6, a description of what was contained in Zeus' belly after he swallowed Protogonos:

καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος ἄλλα τε πάντα
πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ θέαινας,
ὅσσα τ' ἔην γεγαῶτα καὶ ὕσπερον ὀππὸς' ἔμελλεν,
ἐγγέμετο, Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύρρα πεφύκει.

7-8 τὰ ὄντα ὑπῆ[ρ]χεν αἰεὶ, τὰ δὲ | νῦν ἐόντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται: a restatement of the cosmological principle in 1-2.

8-9 τὸ δὲ | “[αὐ]τὸς δὲ ἄρα μόνος ἔγεντο”· τοῦτο δὲ [λ]έγων δηλοῖ: for the *scriptio plena* see Intro. I § 34. In 7-8 the Derveni author repeats the cosmological principle he reads in the main part of the quotation in 3-6, from τῷ δ' ἄρα πάντες in the first verse to the first hemistich of the fourth one. He now takes up the second hemistich of the fourth verse. When Zeus absorbed all Protogonos had created, he was alone (μόνος), for everything else was inside him.

10-11 [αἰεὶ] τὸν Νοῦν πάντων ἄξιον εἶναι μόν[ο]ν ἐόντα, | [ὥσπερ]εἰ μηδὲν τάλλα εἴη: in view of 7-8, τάλλα, apparently the same entities as those picked out by πάντων, can only be τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. See Intro. V § 3.

11-12 οὐ γὰρ [οἷόν τε δι' α]ὐτὰ εἶναι | [τὰ νῦν] ἐόντα ἄν[ε]ν τοῦ Νοῦ: δι' αὐτά = διὰ τάλλα just mentioned = διὰ τάλλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα (see previous note). οἷόν τε = οἷόν τ' ἂν ἦν (cf. ἐξῆν for ἂν ἐξῆν in col. XXVI.11). Janko (2002) 32, followed by Betegh (2004) 34, prints οὐ γὰρ [οἷόν τε τα]ὐτὰ εἶναι [τὰ ὑπάρχ]οντα ἄν[ε]ν τοῦ Νοῦ and translates “for it is impossible for these things that exist to exist without Mind”, but if τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are understood in accordance with the author's usage, there is no reason to assume that for the Derveni author Mind is the one member of this class on which the existence of all other members somehow depends (all members of the class in question are as ontologically fundamental as they are coeval, unlike τὰ νῦν ἐόντα, which ontologically depend on them: air/Mind can be plausibly assumed to differ from the rest with regard to causal efficacy, not ontological

primacy). Jourdan (2003) 16 suggests οὐ γὰρ [οἶόν τε τα]ῦτα εἶναι [τὰ νῦν ἐ]όντα ἄν[ε]υ τοῦ Νοῦ and translates “... il n’est <pas possible> que ces choses soient des <réalités actuelles> sans l’Intellect”. If so, the Derveni author explains why Mind alone is worth all derivative entities. By the author’s lights, however, Orpheus means that Mind alone is worth ‘all other things’ when he says that Zeus was alone after all Protogonos had created became absorbed in Zeus, for everything else was inside Zeus. If Zeus and all he had absorbed stand for the basic entities (see above on 1-2), that Zeus was alone after he swallowed everything else means that air/Mind alone is worth all other basic entities. Thus one would not expect the Derveni author to go on and explain why air/Mind alone is worth all derivative entities, instead of all other basic entities.

12-13 [ἐπὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐχ]ομένῳ | [ἔπει τοῦτ]ου ἄξιον πάντων [τὸν Νοῦν ἔφησεν εἶ]ναι: having explained the second hemistich of the Orphic verse in 6 (τούτου), the Derveni author proceeds to the next hexameter in the poem (τὸ ἐχόμενον ἔπος), where in his view Orpheus repeats the same point.

14 “[νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ]ν βασιλεὺς πάντ[ων καὶ τ’ ἔσσειτ’ ἐπ]εῖτα”: fr. 13 Bernabé. As supplemented by West (1983) 114, line 25, the Orphic verse declares that Zeus “is now king of all and shall be in the future”.

15 [δῆλον ὅτι] Νοῦς καὶ π[άντων βασιλεὺς ἐστὶ τα]ῦτόν: if the Derveni author identifies ‘the king of all’ with Mind, he most probably thinks that in the verse at issue Orpheus implies that air/Mind is worth all other basic entities (see above on 10-11) because he calls Zeus, the personification of air/Mind, king of all. Cf. col. XIX.10-13.

COL. XVII

1 π[ρ]ότερον ἦν πρ[ὶν ὄν]ομασθῆναι, ἔπ[ει]τα ὠνομάσθη: subjects and predicates are easily supplied from the following lines – air, which the Derveni author must have identified with Mind in the lower part of the previous column if not earlier, and Zeus. The name-giver is evidently Orpheus (cf. col. XIV.7-10). For ἔπειτα without connecting particle cf. e.g. Hdt. 4.73.6-7: ἡμέρας δὲ τεσσαράκοντα οὕτω οἱ ἰδιῶται περιάγονται, ἔπειτα θάπτονται. See also next note.

2-3 ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρόσθεν ὦν ἢ τὰ νῦν ἐόντα συσταθῆναι | ἀήρ καὶ ἔσται ἀεὶ: ὦν, [ὑπάρχ]ων and [ἐ]ὼν are equally possible (if [ἐ]ὼν, the *supra lineam* addition begins immediately after πρόσθεν, where one would expect it). For ἦν ... ὦν or ἦν ... ἐὼν cf. Parmenides DK 28 B 6.1 (χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐδὸν ἔμμεναι), B 7.1 (οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα).

πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ νῦν ἐόντα συσταθῆναι takes up the temporal specification πρὶν ὀνομασθῆναι in the previous line. It makes clear the terminus (denoted by ἔπειτα in 1) after which air/Mind is called Zeus in Orpheus' poem, namely the transition of the universe to its present state, i.e. the cosmogony (during the cosmogony, air/Mind is called Cronus and, before the cosmogony, Uranus). Air/Mind, a basic entity, is everlasting. Thus, it never came to be, unlike the present arrangement of the universe.

3 οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ἦν: the denial that air/Mind came to be is phrased in a way reminiscent of Melissus' conclusion from the fact that τὸ ἐὼν does not come to be (DK 30 B 2): ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται.

3-4 δι' ὃ τι δὲ | ἀήρ ἐκλήθη δεδήλωται ἐν τοῖς προτέροις: why the basic entity called ἀήρ is referred to by this name was explained in a lost section of the text. Given the etymology of the name Κρόνος in col. XIV.7, it is a natural assumption that the author's explanation consisted in a fanciful etymology of the noun ἀήρ. This noun is not a divine name, so the Derveni author might not think that it is coined by Orpheus, assuming that in the author's view Orpheus not only used allegorically divine names to denote air/Mind at different stages in the history of the universe but also coined them, as is suggested by the fact that at least some of these names (e.g. Κρόνος) hint at cosmological truths known to Orpheus but inaccessible to common people. In the next column (2-6), the Derveni author says that the wisdom of god, sc. air/Mind, is called by Orpheus not only Zeus but also Fate, a word commonly used by people who do not know what Fate really is but also employed by Orpheus as a name for god's wisdom. The noun ἀήρ is probably assumed to be a word of everyday language like Fate, not Orpheus' coinage, but if the Derveni author etymologized it, its etymology was probably dictated by a cosmological role of the entity it picks out. If so, there is no reason to assume that he also bothered to explain how the etymology of a common word happens to suggest a role of the entity this word picks out in a cosmology unknown to most native speakers of Greek.

The Derveni author might derive ἀήρ from the verb αἰωρεῖσθαι; see Jourdan (2003) 17 n. 4 and Betegh (2004) 269. A comparable derivation occurs in Pl. *Cra.* 410b1-2: ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀήρ ἄρά γε, ὃ Ἑρμόγενης, ὅτι αἶρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, “ἀήρ” κέκληται; ἢ ὅτι αἰεῖ ρεῖ; The Derveni author seems to assume that in the fire era the particles of all other fundamental entities were oscillating, ἠωρεῖτο, within air/Mind: if he derived ἀήρ from αἰωρεῖσθαι, he could take ἀήρ to mean ‘that within which the other fundamental entities were oscillating’ before the cosmogony (see below on 9). That he would derive ἀήρ from αἰεῖ ρεῖν is unlikely: if he assumes that air/Mind triggered the cosmogony by setting itself in motion (see above on col. IX.7-8), he probably thinks that air/Mind was quiescent in the fire era. However, he could very well adopt the third derivation of ἀήρ in Plato’s *Cratylus* (410b2-5), namely from ἀητόρρουν where ἀήτης = πνεῦμα: ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέοντος. See below on col. XVIII.1-2.

4-6 γενέσθαι δὲ | ἐνομίσθη ἐπεὶτ’ ὠνομάσθη Ζεὺς, ὥσπερ εἰ πρότερον | μὴ ἐών: sc. ἀήρ, but Νοῦς would also do. Orpheus’ use of the name ‘Zeus’ to designate one of the fundamental entities after a certain point in the history of the universe is erroneously thought to entail the emergence of a new entity, a god, called by that name. Those who make this mistake are people who fail to grasp the meaning of Orpheus’ words. Cf. col. XVIII.9-15 and see next note.

Air is perhaps implicitly identified with Zeus in Democr. DK 68 B 30:

τῶν λογίων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγοι ἀνατείναντες τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, ὃν νῦν ἡέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες: “πάντα, (εἴπαν), Ζεὺς μυθέεται καὶ πάνθ’ οὗτος οἶδε καὶ διδοῖ καὶ ἀφαιρείται καὶ βασιλεὺς οὗτος τῶν πάντων”.

The identification of air with Zeus is said to have been explicitly attributed to Homer by Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64 A 8):

Διογένης ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς οὐ μυθικῶς ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ διειλεγμένον. τὸν ἀέρα γὰρ αὐτὸν Δία νομίζειν φησίν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν εἰδέναι τὸν Δία λέγει.

6 καὶ “ὕστατον” ἔφησεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον: sc. τὸν ἀέρα or τὸν Νοῦν. The adjective ὕστατος can be plausibly assumed to come from an Orphic verse which was quoted in the lower part of the previous column: Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀργικέραυνος (fr. 14.1 Bernabé). In Orpheus’ poem, this hexameter might have stood immediately after the one in col. XVI.14. In later sources, it precedes the verse quoted below in 12 and opens an Orphic hymn to Zeus (see [Arist.] *Mu.* 401a28 = fr. 31.1 Ber-

nabé, Eus. PE 3.9.2.1 = fr. 243.1 Bernabé). In the next column, moreover, the Derveni author recapitulates the point he makes in the preceding part of this column, quotes the first part of the hexameter in question, which at first glance contradicts him, and in all probability goes on to explain that Orpheus' words are misunderstood (col. XVIII.9-15). It is natural to assume that in the first part of the present column the discussion of *Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο* carries over from the lost final section of the previous column, where the Derveni author quoted the full hexameter, and that in the next column he quotes these words to remind the reader of their true import.

If so, the Derveni author perhaps explained in the lost final section of col. XVI that, properly understood, the statement *Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο* simply repeats what Orpheus hints at about air/Mind by saying of Zeus αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο (see above on col. XVI.10-11), and [νῦν δ' ἐστὶν] βασιλεὺς πάντ[ων καὶ τ' ἔσσει' ἐπ]εῖτα (col. XVI.14). *Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο* is very similar to αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο, and the Derveni author could easily take *πρῶτος* to mean 'of the highest rank', sc. βασιλεὺς πάντων, a characterization which, by the author's lights, Orpheus uses in the same sense as αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μοῦνος ἔγεντο (col. XVI.12-13).

In the first part of this column the Derveni author explains why Orpheus' statement does not mean, as the ignorant think, that Zeus was the first god to come into existence (cf. col. XVIII.14-15; in the Orphic poem Zeus was said to have been born first probably because the present cosmos and the rest of its pantheon arose from him). He now proceeds to explain why Orpheus says *Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀργικέραυνος* (sc. *γένετο*; in the Orphic myth Zeus became last probably in the sense that with him ended the dynastic succession started by Protogonos). He clearly thinks that this is a statement about the future.

6-7 ἐπεὶτ' | ὠνομάσθη Ζεὺς: it is uncertain whether a letter was written after *επειτ*. If so, the letter must have been α. The correct reading is certainly ἐπεὶτ(ε), and if *ἔπειτα* was written, the scribe was probably misled by *ἐπειτα* ὠνομάσθη in 1.

7 καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῷ διατελεῖ ὄνομα ὄν: sc. τῷ ἀέρι or τῷ Νῶι. *διατελεῖ* must be future; even if it is present, it is most probably present for future, not historical present. According to the Derveni author, that Zeus will be last (*ὕστατος*) means that air/Mind will continue (*διατελεῖ*) to be called Zeus, evidently not by Orpheus himself but by ordinary people, until a certain

time (see next line): since air/Mind is said in 2-3 to have existed before it was called Zeus, when the universe had not yet become the cosmos we see today and there was no one to call anything by any name, it seems reasonable to assume that air/Mind will continue to be called Zeus until the end of the cosmos, after which there will be no one to call anything by any name. In other words, air/Mind will be last in the sense that, considered as a part of the cosmos, it will be the last part of the whole left in existence. See also next note.

8 μέχρι εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τὰ νῦν ἑόντα συνεστάθη: cf. πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ νῦν ἑόντα συσταθῆναι in 2. At issue here, however, is not the transition of the universe to its present state, i.e. the cosmogony. In 2 the Derveni author refers to that point in time before which air/Mind existed but was not called Zeus, and after which it is called Zeus in Orpheus' poem, though the ignorant think that Orpheus' Zeus is a god born in the distant past. Here the temporal clause refers to the time until which air/Mind will continue to be called Zeus by the people who do not really know the true referent of this name (see previous note). However, if in 2 the Derveni author thinks that in his poem Orpheus refers to air/Mind as Zeus after the formation of the cosmos, then he cannot say here that air/Mind will continue to be called Zeus by the ignorant until the formation of the cosmos. What he might be plausibly assumed to say is that air/Mind will continue to be called Zeus by the ignorant until the cosmos has been put together into a different form (εἶδος), i.e. until the current configuration of the cosmos has changed to that in which the cosmos was 'earlier on' (cf. ἐν ᾧπερ [sc. εἶδει] πρόσθεν ἑόντα ... in the following line), sc. before it became configured as it currently is.

However, if the specification 'earlier on' (πρόσθεν) picks out a time before 'now', i.e. before the era in the history of the universe that begins after the formation of the cosmos, the persisting subject of the change denoted by συνεστάθη obviously cannot be the cosmos, for the current configuration of the cosmos cannot be replaced by the configuration in which the cosmos was before it began to exist: saying that something becomes arranged as it was before it came to be can only mean that something ceases to be. Plato uses the verb συνίστασθαι with the prepositional phrase εἰς εἶδος or εἰς ἰδέαν to describe the ceasing to exist of the grammatical subject of the verb, and at the same time a non-substantial change in which persisting subjects are merely reconfigured in space: these are the component parts of what ceases to exist and is conceived of as a temporary spatial arrangement of persisting entities, its component parts for which it appar-

ently stands *qua* grammatical subject of συνίστασθαι. There is no reason why this is not the case here, too. See *Ti.* 56e5: δύο πυρὸς σώματα εἰς ἓν συνίστασθον εἶδος ἀέρος. If two fire particles are put together into the form of an air particle, the fire particles cease to be, and the air particle comes to be: what are being put together into the form of the air particle are not the two particles of fire, which do not survive the change, but the elementary planes, which in Plato's physics can be spatially arranged either as two fire particles or as an air particle. Cf. also *Ti.* 57a7-b3 (the fate of a few small-sized particles of fire and air, when they are overwhelmed by many large-sized particles of air and water respectively):

τά τε αὖ μικρότερα ὅταν ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν πολλοῖς περιλαμβανόμενα ὀλίγα διαθρανόμενα κατασβεννύηται, συνίστασθαι μὲν ἐθέλοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἰδέαν πέπνυται κατασβεννύμενα γίγνεται τε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀήρ, ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ.

In light of the above, συνεστήθη must be aorist for future vividly representing a future event as having actually occurred, the dissolution of the cosmos conceived of as temporary configuration of everlasting component parts that eventually will be put together once again as they were before the cosmogony. Thus in 6-8 the Derveni author explains that air/Mind will be last (ῥυστατος) in the sense that this entity was called Zeus by Orpheus, and ignorant people will continue to designate it so (without knowing what they actually refer to) until all things that are now cease to exist, i.e. until the cosmos dissolves, whereas air/Mind, the governing principle of the cosmos that was, continues to exist and is thus the last part of the cosmos left in existence, for it is a basic and thus everlasting entity (see also previous note). Whether the Derveni author posits an ever repeating cycle of cosmic birth and death (as Betegh [2004] 259 assumes) cannot be determined.

Air/Mind triggered the cosmogony by causing an originally structureless mixture of the other everlasting constituents of the universe to break up – it forced a sufficiently large quantity of fire, whose heat was responsible for the original condition of the universe, to separate out first and form the Sun, thereby allowing the rest of the ingredients to also separate out (col. XV.1-2, cf. 8-9) and be put together (col. IX.5-10). 'Being put together' in this context is the composition of the hitherto scattered parts of each ingredient as it clumps, separating from the rest, where it will preponderate in the nascent cosmos: the finely divided parts of the cold etc. kept on moving within air discontinuously, until each of them came to its like, with which it was put together side by side (col. XXI.1-5). If the building blocks of the cosmos will eventually become put together as

they were before the cosmogony, in all probability they will form once again a fire-dominated mixture (there is no reason to think with Betegh [2004] 257-259 that they will revert to a hypothetical state that preceded the mixture). The ingredients in this mixture probably will not fuse together but will be laid alongside one another in small particles: every particle of each ingredient will be placed side by side with particles of all other ingredients, not only with its like. A homely illustration would be a mixture of barley and wheat, in which each grain of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat (for the example see Arist. *GC* 327b31-328a18; the picture, however, seems to be more complicated – see next note). If so, in his implicit conception of mixing the Derveni author is akin to Empedocles and the atomists.

Anaxagorean stuffs mix by blending into, or being distributed continuously throughout, one another so that on any scale, no matter how microscopic, anyone of them is present. A mixture of the Empedoclean roots, on the other hand, is analogous to a wall – the roots are alongside one another in tiny particles, like bricks in a wall, so that only one of them is present on a certain microscopic scale determined by the dimensions of the particles. See Arist. *GC* 334a26-31 = Emp. DK 31 A 43 (Aristotle raises the question of how the elements can give rise to any substance if they mix as Empedocles assumes):

ἐκείνοις τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἔσται τρόπος; ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐξ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μίγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ' ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. Οὕτω δὲ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον.

Cf. Empedocles' use of συνίστασθαι in B 35.3-7 (particles of the four roots bind together into compound entities):

... ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος
δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,
ἐν τῇ δὴ τότε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν μόνον εἶναι,
οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θελημὰ συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.
τῶν δὲ τε μισγομένων χεῖρ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν.

A similar view is attributed to Democritus by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Mixt.* 214.18-21 Bruns = Democr. DK 68 A 64):

Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν ἡγούμενος τὴν λεγομένην κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι κατὰ παράθεσιν σωμάτων, διαιρουμένων τῶν κίρναμένων εἰς μικρὰ καὶ τῇ παρ' ἄλληλα θέσει τὴν μίξιν ποιουμένων, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν φησιν εἶναι πρὸς ἀλήθειάν τινα κεκραμένα.

9 ἐν ᾧπερ πρόσθεν ἔοντα ἡωρεῖτο: the interpretation of this clause is inextricably linked to that of the preceding temporal clause, which contains the antecedent of the relative pronoun; see previous note. If the ingredients in the primordial mixture were placed alongside one another in minute particles, these particles were not stationary but oscillated. ἡωρεῖτο cannot suggest that the particles were immovably suspended, for fire is said to have agitated the other ingredients in the primordial mixture (col. IX.5-10); for the use of αἰωρεῖσθαι in the sense 'to oscillate' cf. Pl. *Phd.* 112b3.

When air/Mind came to dominate the primordial universe, the finely divided parts of the cold etc. kept on moving discontinuously within air/Mind, until each of them came to like, with which it was put together side by side (col. XXI.1-5). Air/Mind is most probably the medium in which these particles oscillated before the cosmogony, the 'container' of the primordial mixture (cf. Intro. V § 16). Oscillation is perhaps to be understood as the random motion a particle undergoes in confined surroundings as it ricochets off neighboring particles. The Derveni author might assume that the particles of fire are constantly in random motion and much more energetic than the particles of the other basic things (cf. the conception of fire as the fastest moving and most penetrative substance in Pl. *Cra.* 412d1-8): in the primordial mixture, the extremely energetic fire particles collided constantly from all directions with the particles of the other ingredients, whose tendency to move toward like was cancelled by the continuous collisions. Such an account of the conditions in the primordial mixture would have a parallel in the atomist explanation of how the soul impedes the natural tendency of the body to dissolve.

According to Aristotle's testimony, Democritus (perhaps Leucippus too) conceives of both fire and soul as being composed of very microscopic and mobile atoms. The 'fire' or 'soul' atoms are constantly in random motion and spherical in shape, for the spherical shape is the most mobile of all shapes. Being microscopic and mobile, they can slip through any gaps between the other atoms in the body of an animal and impart motion to it. The environment, however, tends to squeeze the 'soul' atoms out of the body, for it forces all atomic constituents of the animal to move in different directions, sorting like to like (cf. DK 68 A 61, B 164): breathing provides a constant supply of 'soul' atoms, which act in concert so as to counterbalance aggregating tendencies and prevent the destruction of the body (see Arist. *de An.* 403b31-404a16 = Leucipp. DK 67 A 28; cf. 405a5-13 = Democr. DK 68 A 101, *Cael.* 303a3-16 = Leucipp. DK 67 A 15 and 306b29-307a3). Animals are thus highly structured assemblies of

diverse atoms, and continuously replenished ‘fire’ atoms prevent the other ingredients from exercising their tendency to sort by likeness. Given his explanation of why heavy objects sometimes float (Arist. *Cael.* 313a21-b2 = Democr. DK 68 A 62), Democritus perhaps assumes that in a body ‘fire’ atoms move randomly between the other much less mobile atoms that make up the body, colliding constantly with them from everywhere: the net effect of these collisions is that sluggish atoms are prevented from moving toward like and are, therefore, kept organized into a coherent structure.

9-10 τὰ δ' ἔοντα δ[ηλοῖ] | γενέσθαι τοιαῦτ[α] διὰ τοῦτον: for δηλοῖ (sc. Orpheus) cf. e.g. XIII.3, XVI.9. διὰ τοῦτον = διὰ τὸν ἀέρα or, equivalently, διὰ τὸν Νοῦν. Cf. col. XIII.10-11, ἀνεῦ [γὰρ τοῦ ἡ]λ[ιο]υ τὰ ὄντα τοιαῦτα οὐχ οἶόν [τε] | γίν[εσθαι], and see *ad loc.*

10-11 καὶ γενόμενα π[άλιν] | ἐν τούτῳ [: perhaps ἄψεσθαι. Cf. col. IX.9-10: ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἄφθῃ ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ μίσγεται | τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις. See above on 6-7, 8, 9.

11 ση[μαίνει] δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι το[ῖσδε]: since the Derveni author quotes only one hexameter in the following line, ἔπη here means ‘words’; cf. col. VIII.6 and XXVI.2.

12 “Ζεὺς κεφα[λή, Ζεὺς μέσ]σα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ [π]άντα τέτ[υκται]”: fr. 14.2 Bernabé. See above on 6.

13-14 Tsantsanoglou suggests κεφαλήν [λέγων τὸν ἀέρα τὰ ὄ]ντ' αἰγ[ί]ζεται ο[ἰαπερ] | κεφαλή[ν ἔχοντα· οὗτος γὰρ] ἀρχὴ γίνεται συ[στάσεως κτλ. (cf. Laks and Most [1997] 17 n. 45). σύστασις would be the accretion of the finely divided parts of the cold etc., which kept on moving discontinuously within air during the cosmogony, until each of them joined its like, with which it was put together side by side (col. XXI.1-5). Orpheus could be assumed to call air/Mind ‘head’ because this entity caused the cosmogonic accretion of the other basic entities, τὰ ὄντα, from their primordial mixture: being organized into the cosmos at the present epoch in the history of the universe, they could be thought of as parallel to the body perhaps because the head/brain is considered the seat of the mind that dominates the body, just as air/Mind dominates all other basic entities ever since it triggered the transition of the universe to its present state.

The Orphic verse interpreted here by the Derveni author is alluded to in Pl. *Lg.* 715e7-716a2 according to the scholiast (p. 317 Greene) who, though, quotes the verse with ἀρχή instead of κεφαλή (*OF* 21). If this is a variant of the verse in the Orphic text of the Derveni author, the latter might be influenced by this variant in his interpretation of κεφαλή, which he most likely understands as an allegorical stand-in for ἀρχή. If Plato does allude to the Orphic verse at issue, he does so in an ethical context, but the view he sees in this verse is couched in unmistakably cosmological terms:

ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐθεία περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος.

The cosmological import of the Orphic verse Plato purportedly alludes to is brought out by the scholiast in a manner reminiscent of the Derveni author. The scholiast takes ἀρχή to be what the Derveni author probably takes κεφαλή to be, i.e. the efficient cause of the cosmogony (this is suggested by the scholiast's characterization of god as demiurge):

θεὸν μὲν τὸν δημιουργὸν σαφῶς, παλαιὸν δὲ λόγον λέγει τὸν 'Ορφικόν, ὅς ἐστιν οὗτος:
Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·

Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.

καὶ ἀρχή μὲν οὗτος ὡς ποιητικὸν αἴτιον, τελευτή δὲ ὡς τελικόν, μέσα δὲ ὡς ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσι παρῶν, κἂν πάντα διαφόρως αὐτοῦ μετέχη. εὐθεία δὲ τὸ κατὰ δίκην σημαίνει καὶ ἀξίαν, καὶ ἀπαρεγκλίτως, καὶ οἰονεὶ κανόνι ἐνί. τὸ δὲ περιπορευόμενος τὸ αἰωνίως, τὸ αἰεὶ ὡς αὐτως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά· ἡ γὰρ περιφορὰ τοῦτο ἔχει ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς.

COL. XVIII

1 καὶ τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα: perhaps finely divided parts of the cold and other basic entities, being sorted like to like within air/Mind when the large-scale structures of the present universe were forming (col. XXI.1-5); see also above on col. IX.6-7.

1 '[τὴν δὲ "Μοῖρα]ν" φάμενος [δηλοῖ]': sc. Orpheus. For φάμενος [δηλοῖ] cf. τοῦτο δὲ [λ]έγων δηλοῖ κτλ in col. XVI.9 (τοῦτο refers to Orpheus' words), and "θόρ[ν]η" δὲ λέγ[ων] δηλοῖ κτλ in col. XXI.1, which suggest that]ν must be the accusative ending of the Orphic word explained here; given the conclusion in 2-3, τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα 'Ορφεὺς | ὠνόμασεν Μοῖραν, the most probable supplement is [τὴν δὲ Μοῖρα]ν. If we read τήνδε γῆν after the supralinear addition, the words in the latter were omitted due to homoiarcton.

The Derveni author's view on what Orpheus means by referring to Fate must be the free interpretation of a lost Orphic verse, which was quoted in the lower part of the previous column and perhaps stood immediately after the one quoted in col. XVII.12 (see, though, Betegh [2004] 126 and 200-202). A quite plausible but, of course, entirely hypothetical reconstruction of this verse has been suggested by Merkelbach (1967) 24: [Ζεὺς πνοὴ πάντων, Ζεὺς πάντων ἔπλετο] μοῖρα (fr. 14.3 Bernabé; see note *ad loc.*). The Derveni author seems to treat μοῖρα as a proper name like 'Zeus'; Janko (2002) 34, followed by Jourdan (2003) 17, adopts Merkelbach's reconstruction but prints Μοῖρα, which is rather unlikely in view of the genitive πάντων.

1-2 τήνδ[ε γῆν] καὶ ἄλλα πάν[τ]α εἶναι | ἐν τῷ ἀέρι [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν: given τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα in 1, it makes good sense to supplement τήνδ[ε γῆν], imply ὄντα after ἄλλα, and take earth to be one of the everlasting basic entities, whose finely divided parts were being sorted like to like within air/Mind as the universe was making the transition to its present state (see col. XXI.1-5). The Derveni author might assume that air/Mind caused the primordial mixture of the other basic entities to break up when it started to whirl (see above on col. IX.7-8); if so, πνεῦμα can very well be this whirling motion of air/Mind. Burkert's and Janko's τήν δ[ίην] instead of τήνδ[ε γῆν] is, however, unlikely; see Betegh (2004) 377-378.

For [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν Janko (2002) 36 suggests [πνε]ῦμα(τι) ἐόν(τι), and Jourdan (2003) 18 proposes [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν, 'the breath of air', with which all other basic entities in the universe are identical. [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν, however, makes good sense if it is in apposition to τήνδ[ε γῆν] καὶ ἄλλα πάντα. We need not read ἐόν(τα) for ἐόν because, having as subject a feminine singular and a neuter plural, a participle can very well be neuter but need not be in the plural. Cf. col. IX.9-10: ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἀφθῆι ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθέν δὲ μίσγεται | τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις (here, too, there is no need to read ἐπικρατηθέν(τα); see *ad loc.*). The other basic entities are the whirling motion of air/Mind, the medium in which their finely divided parts are being sorted like to like during the cosmogony, in the sense that the motion of air/Mind dominates them, i.e. determines their behavior: the causal power of air/Mind is manifested in the parts of the other basic entities as they come to sort like to like thanks to the motion of air/Mind. Cf. the end of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*: κοῦδὲν τούτων ὃ τι μὴ Ζεὺς.

2-3 τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα 'Ορφεὺς | ὠνόμασεν Μοῖραν: see below on col. XIX.7 and cf. Intro. V §§ 20-21.

3 κατὰ φάτιν: “in their speech”; cf. col. XXI.8-9.

3-4 Μοῖραν | ἐπικλώσαι φασί[v] ‘σφίσιν’: the meaning of the expression “Fate spun” is explained in the following column (4-7).

6-7 Ὀρφεὺς γὰρ | τὴν φρόνησ[ι]ν Μοῖραν ἐκάλεσεν: see below on 9-10.

8 προσφερέστατον: “most suitable” rather than “most resembling”. The usual meaning of προσφερής is ‘similar’ (cf. ἐμφερής and προσεμφερής), but here the adjective is apparently used as equivalent to πρόσφορος, ‘suitable’ or ‘fitting’; cf. the use of the verb προσφέρειν at col. XIX.8-9. It is not difficult to see how ‘resembling’ came to mean ‘fitting’.

9 πρὶν μὲν γὰρ κληθῆναι Ζῆνα: sc. τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.

9-10 ἦν Μοῖρα | φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ αἰεὶ τε καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός: the entity referred to as god is undoubtedly air/Mind (cf. Intro. VI § 16), and a comparison of 9-12 with col. XVII.1-6 makes clear that the Derveni author does not distinguish this entity from the wisdom it possesses, perhaps because he thinks that possessing this wisdom at all times is what it is for the everlasting air to be Mind. Just as air/Mind is everlasting, so is the wisdom it has, which can only mean that this wisdom never came to be obtained by any means, or from any source. Although διὰ παντός is usually equivalent to αἰεὶ (cf. Hdt. 1.122.10-11 and 9.13.6), here this prepositional phrase might be used spatially for the ubiquity of air/Mind in the universe, and for the scope of its wisdom: the latter surveys the sum total of reality, from the workings of the natural mechanisms in the primordial universe (col. IX.5-10) to how the things that are and come to be in the cosmos at any time, as well as those whose coming to be is future at that time, must come to be and be and cease to be (col. XIX.4-7). The Derveni author’s view that Orpheus called Fate not only the eternal and all-encompassing wisdom of air/Mind but also the whirling motion of air/Mind that triggered the transition of the universe to its present state need not be incoherent; see below on col. XIX. 7.

The emphasis on the omnipresence of air/Mind would have a direct parallel in Anaxagoras (DK 59 B 14): ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς αἰεὶ ἐστὶ, τὸ κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῷ πολλῷ περιέχοντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς προσκριθεῖσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις (τὸ κάρτα is an emendation by Diels). Anaxagoras stresses the ubiquity of Mind probably in connection with the

fact that Mind dominates and has arranged all things (B 12). See Pl. *Cra.* 413c5-7: αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν νοῦν) ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον πάντα φησὶν (sc. ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας) αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. It is difficult to see how Anaxagoras can conceive of Mind as permeating reality throughout and at the same time as being the only unmixed basic entity (B 12), given that his universe is a plenum, in which all other basic entities are mixed through and through in varying concentrations. Diogenes of Apollonia, who also assumes the ubiquity of air, seems to correct Anaxagoras on this point (DK 64 B 5): αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου.

10-11 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκλήθη | Ζεὺς: the expected object is τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦ θεοῦ, but the Derveni author evidently has τὸν θεόν in mind. See previous note.

11-12 γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθ]η, ὄντα μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν | [ὁ]νομαζόμε[ε]νον δ' ο[ὗ]: see above on col. XVII.4-6.

12-13 διὰ τοῦτο λέ[γ]ει “Ζεὺς πρῶτος | [γέν]ετο”: see above on col. XVII.6.

13-14 πρ[ὸ]τον γὰρ ἦν Μοῖρα φρόνησις], ἔπειτα δ' ἱερεύθη | [Ζεὺς] ὢν: the use of ἱερεύεσθαι in the sense ‘to be deified’ has no parallel (ιερώθη is precluded by the traces after ρ which cannot belong to ω). Cf. Plutarch’s use of καθιέρειν in *de Is. et Osir.* 380D9.

COL. XIX

1-2 ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ὲ τὰ ἐόντα ἐν [ἐκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ | ἐπικρατοῦντος: if correct, ἐκ τοῦ is equivalent to ἐξ οὗ, ‘since’. It introduces a causal clause stating a general principle that explains why all ἐόντα have been called Zeus, given that air/Mind ἐπικρατεῖ πάντων, sc. τῶν ἐόντων (2-4). Assuming that the application of this principle is part of the explanation of the common expression “Fate has spun” in 4-7, τὰ ἐόντα are τὰ νῦν ἐόντα, derivative entities made up of everlasting basic entities and subject to substantial change. τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν is a basic entity such as air/Mind. Air/Mind, moreover, dominates all derivative things in the sense that it or its wisdom, which Orpheus calls Fate (col. XVIII. 6-7 and 9-10), has determined (‘spun’) how all derivative entities that are and come to be at any time,

as well as those whose coming to be is future at that time, must come to be and be and cease to be (3-7). If so, in the principle laid out here a basic thing is perhaps assumed to dominate a derivative thing in the restricted sense that it determines how this derivative thing is, i.e. what this thing is, insofar as it predominates quantitatively in the derivative thing, and its causal powers blot those of the other constituents out. As a result, the derivative compound is said to be the basic entity that dominates it (just as a mixture of a little water with much wine is called wine). However, if air/Mind is the basic entity which both permeates reality throughout (see above on col. XVIII.9-10) and dominates all derivative entities in the sense that it has *ultimately* determined how each of them must be, i.e. which of the other basic entities will predominate quantitatively in each derivative entity (see below on 7), all derivative compound entities are said to be air/Mind, though it need not be assumed that they consist mainly of air/Mind (see also next note).

For the principle cf. Simplicius on Anaxagoras (*in Ph.* 26.31-27.11 Diels = DK 59 A 41):

πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ ὡς ὅσα ἢ πῦρ ἢ χρυσὸν ἀγέννητα μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτα (sc. λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας), φαίνεσθαι δὲ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, πάντων μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐνόντων, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζομένου. χρυσὸς γὰρ φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ πολὺ χρυσοῦ ἐνὶ καίτοι πάντων ἐνόντων.

Simplicius' report is based on Theophrastus and expands on the final part of Anaxagoras' elaborate account of Mind (B 12): ὅτων πλεῖστα ἐνὶ, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἦν. Anaxagoras takes all observable stuffs, properties included, to be everlasting basic things. Their cosmogonic separation under the action of Mind is not complete, and all of them are everywhere present, though the vast majority of them in such low concentrations that they are unobservable. τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν is one of those ingredients in a piece of matter which are so abundant that their causal powers are manifested on the scale of material structure accessible to human perception (it is likely that Anaxagoras himself would use the present participle of κατέχειν; see his description of the primordial condition in B 1 and cf. KRS 359). A thing is said to be earth or fire or cold etc. because earth or fire or cold is an ingredient in it that predominates quantitatively at the level of material structure within the range of our perception, thereby determining the nature of the thing for us. Cf. the reference to Anaxagoras in Arist. *Ph.* 187b1-7:

διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐώρων γιγνόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθ' ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὅσوتιν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

According to Theophrastus, Democritus put forth a similar view in his account of taste (*Sens.* 67 = DK 68 A 135): οὐ δ' ἂν ἐντὶ πλεῖστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρὸς τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.

In Arist. *GC* 321a34-b2 (cf. *Cael.* 268b26-269a2 and [Arist.] *Col.* 793b21-30), τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν is that ingredient in a mixture which gives its name to the mixture on account of the fact that the mixture produces the effects of the ingredient in question, not those of the other ingredients (as turns out from 328a23-28, a large quantity of the dominant ingredient has been mixed with small quantities of the other ingredients):

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀυξάνομενον, πότερον ᾧ προστίθεται π, οἷον εἰ τὴν κνήμην αὐξάνει, αὕτη μείζων, ᾧ δὲ αὐξάνει, ἡ τροφή, οὐ. διὰ τί δὴ οὖν οὐκ ἄμφω ἠύξηται; μεῖζον γὰρ καὶ ὁ καὶ ᾧ, ὥσπερ ὅταν μίξης οἶνον ὕδατι· ὁμοίως γὰρ πλεῖον ἐκάτερον. ἢ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν μένει ἡ οὐσία, τοῦ δ' οὐ, οἷον τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, οἷον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ συνόλον μίγμα.

See also Intro. V §§ 11-12.

2-3 Ζεὺς[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν | λόγον ἐκλήθη: on the principle (λόγος) in question see previous note. Cf. *S. Tr.* 1278: κοῦδὲν τούτων ὃ τι μὴ Ζεὺς.

3-4 πάντων γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐπικρατεῖ | τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται: see above on 1-2 and cf. Heraclit. DK 22 B 14: τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνός τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

4-5 'Μοῖραν' δ' 'ἐπικλῶσαι' | λέγοντες: sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Cf. col. XVIII.3-6.

5-6 τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι | λέγουσιν: for Fate as the wisdom of air/Mind, the basic entity Orpheus calls by the name of god Zeus among many others, see col. XVIII.6-10.

6 τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα: τὰ ἐόντα are undoubtedly νῦν ἐόντα (see above on col. XVI.1-2). νῦν picks out the epoch that begins with

the transition of the universe to its present state, or any moment in it. There is no reason to emend γινόμενα to γενόμενα. If τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα are the derivative things that are and come to be in the cosmos at any given time, and τὰ μέλλοντα are those things whose coming to be and being are future at that time, a reference to the things whose coming to be and being are past at that time is implicit in the text as it stands.

7 ὅπως χρή γενέσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ὶ] παύσασθαι: the wisdom of air/Mind has determined how the derivative things that are and come to be in the cosmos at any time, as well as those whose coming to be is future at that time, must come to be and be and cease to be (see also previous note). This wisdom is said in col. IX.5-10 to have underpinned the cosmogony, and is evidently assumed to determine all coming to be and ceasing to be. Air/Mind is perhaps the ultimate link in any chain of causally related events leading to the generation or compounding of a transient derivative entity from basic immutable entities, and thus to this derivative entity's being how it is, i.e. its having a certain nature, as well as to its eventual ceasing to be, i.e. its breaking up into the basic component parts. In all probability, the configuration of the basic entities and their interactions at the microscopic level ultimately determine how all derivative entities are at any time, and also bring about all changes involving derivative entities. If the state of the universe on the microscopic scale at a time is necessitated by an earlier state, which is in turn necessitated by a still earlier one and so on, causation is traced back to the cosmogonic motion of air/Mind, the basic entity that caused the universe to pass from its primordial state to all its causally linked subsequent states and is, on this account, called Fate (col. XVIII.2-3; cf. above on col. IX.7-8). If so, the wisdom of the everlasting air/Mind is also called Fate probably because it surveys at all times the entire web of causal connections across space and time; see above on col. XVIII.9-10 and Intro. V §§ 20-23.

Anaxagoras' Mind is equally deterministic (DK 59 B 12): καὶ ὅποια ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. Cf. also Emp. DK 31 B 21.9: ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται (the demonstrative pronoun refers as much to the four roots as to Love and Strife, which answer to Anaxagoras' Mind and to the Derveni author's air/Mind).

8 βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει: sc. τὸν ἀέρα or τὸν Νοῦν. The subject of εἰκάζει is Orpheus.

8-9 τοῦτο γάρ οἱ προσφέρειν | ἐφα[ί]νετο ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων: sc. τῷ Ὀρφεῖ. Cf. προσφερέστατον in col. XVIII.8.

10 “Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρχὸς πάντων ἀργικέρανος”: fr. 14.4 Bernabé. This hexameter is known independently of the Derveni papyrus without δ; see [Arist.] *Mu.* 401b5 (fr. 31.7 Bernabé). Some manuscripts give ἀρχικέρανος instead of ἀργικέρανος.

11-13 [βασιλέ]α ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶ[ν τῶν ἀρ]χῶν μία | [πασῶν κ]ρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [ἄπερ θνη]τῶν οὐδενὶ | [ἄλλωι ἐξεσ]τιν τε[λ]έσαι: the Derveni author explains why Orpheus likened air/Mind to a king. Though there are many offices, the royal office is by far superior to all others and does what no other mortal, apparently a holder of a lesser office, can do. The author draws an implicit parallel between the decision-making and executive powers of a king, on the one hand, and the causal power of air/Mind as the supreme efficient cause, on the other. A state is run by the king through a network of officials charged with implementing his decisions. Each of these officials is a causal agent who, though, cannot do anything on his own, unless it has been decided upon by his superiors, and ultimately by the king himself in one way or the other. Just as in the running of a state causation is traced through the network of officialdom back to the king, who is ultimately responsible of any proceedings, similarly all causation in the cosmos can be traced back to the agency and wisdom of air/Mind (see above on 7). The analogues of lesser office-holders in a state, ontological items that play causal roles in the cosmos only if involved in events whose causal history is traceable back through prior events to the agency of air/Mind, are most probably the other basic entities; see above on col. XVI.10-11.

COL. XX (fr. 470 Bernabé)

1-2 ἀνθρώπω[ν ἐν] πόλεσιν ἐπιτελέσαντες [τὰ ἱερά] εἶδον, | ἔλασσόν σφας θαυμάζω μὴ γινώσκειν: τὰ ἱερά should be construed with both ἐπιτελέσαντες and εἶδον (cf. πρὶν μὲν τὰ [ἱερά] ἐπιτελέσαι ἐλπίζον[τε]ς εἰδήσειν in 11). ὁρᾶν τὰ ἱερά means ‘to be initiated’; see Burkert (1972) 275 n. 3, (1982) 5. τὰ ἱερά need not be only sacred objects displayed at a certain stage of the initiation, such as those brought out from the *cista mystica* in the Eleusinian mysteries. The term might denote all aspects of the initia-

tion rites one participates in or performs (ἐπιτελεῖν); in the phrase ὁρᾶν τὰ ἱερά the verb means not 'to see' but 'to acquire experiential knowledge'. Those who perform sacred rites in the cities are evidently the same as those referred to by the pronoun σφας, the subject of γινώσκειν; the object of γινώσκειν is τὰ ἱερά, but the following γάρ clause leaves no doubt that the Derveni author is primarily concerned with one component of the rites, namely, τὰ λεγόμενα (in 8, though, his scope broadens to include all aspects).

This group of initiates is contrasted with another group of people characterized in 3-4: ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ | τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά, sc. δοκοῦσιν or ἐλπίζουσιν εἰδήσειν τὰ λεγόμενα (see δοκοῦντες ... εἰδήσειν in 5-6, ἐλπίζου[τε]ς εἰδήσειν in 11). The members of the second group expect or hope to acquire knowledge of the *legomena* in question from people whom the Derveni author might regard as impostors: advertisers of sacred rites as an area of expertise in which they excel (see below on 3-4). They perform sacred rites (see ἐπιτελέσαι in 6 and ἐπιτελέσαντες in 6-7), apparently under the guidance of the self-appointed experts in sacred rites, and are thus initiates like the members of the first group. These people spend money, most probably to hire the experts in sacred rites (see οὐκ ἄρκεῖ σφιν τὴν δαπάνην προανηλώσθαι in 9). As initiands, they hope to acquire in their initiation knowledge of the *legomena* at issue but, after the ceremony, just go away without having attempted to acquire any knowledge, and do not insistently address questions, apparently to the experts in sacred rites they have hired, blithely believing that they understand what they saw or heard or experienced in their initiation (see 5-8). The Derveni author apparently holds that to know something means to have satisfactory answers to various questions about it – one cannot acquire knowledge of something without raising questions about the purported object of knowledge and attempting to get satisfactory answers. The initiates of the first group deserve to be marveled at less than those of the second for not even attempting to understand the *legomena* in question because, as the Derveni author proceeds to explain (2-3), it is impossible to hear and at the same time understand the *legomena* (the members of the first group, like those of the second, most probably hope before their initiation to acquire in the ceremony knowledge of the *legomena* but, after the initiation, are under the illusion that they have understood the *legomena*).

In Pausanias (2.37.2) the *legomena* are what was said in the mystery rites performed at Phlya (τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ἐπὶ τοῖς δραμένοις δῆλ' ἔστιν οὐκ ὄντα ἀρχαῖα). In col. IX.2-3, however, οἱ οὐ γινώσκοντες τὰ λεγόμενα

are those unable to understand what Orpheus really says in the poem the Derveni author interprets (cf. col. XVIII.14). It is reasonable to assume that here, too, the Derveni author talks about people who do not grasp the hidden import of the enigmatic words in this poem. If so, the members of his two contrasted groups become initiated hoping that, after the initiation, they will know what Orpheus really says in this poem, or in some version of it (West [1983] 108-113 suggests that the Derveni author interprets a secondary redaction of an original poem transmitted among cultic circles perhaps in several versions); in the initiation they listen to this poem without even attempting to understand it. The two groups of initiates can be further characterized with the help of a well-known passage from Plato's *Republic* (364b5-365a3):

ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντιες ἐπὶ πλουσιῶν θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὥς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπωδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκείσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει ἐπαγωγᾷς τισιν καὶ καταδέσμοις, τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν ... βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ' ἃς θηηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὥς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἐπὶ ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

Plato rails against beggar priests and seers who prey on the rich and persuade whole cities and individuals alike that, through purifications and initiations (τελεταί) performed according to the books of Orpheus, they are able not only to harm their clients' enemies but also to secure for their clients liberation from guilt and a better fate in the afterlife (cf. *R.* 366a7-b2). In the light of Plato's testimony, the initiates said by the Derveni author to perform the sacred rites in cities take part in public initiation rituals (probably gratis) performed under the aegis of their cities and conducted according to poems of Orpheus by beggar priests and seers, religious professionals presumably like those whom the Derveni author might regard as fraudulent claimants to expertise in sacred rites. An expert in sacred rites would perhaps claim to be able not only to conduct such rites according to a poem by Orpheus but also to explain the poem, just as an excellent rhapsode is able not only to recite poetry but also to understand what the poet says and interpret the thought of the poet to an audience (see *Pl. Ion* 530b5-d3 and cf. Obbink [1997] 51 n. 20; Brisson [1997] 165 draws an analogy between the ideal rhapsode as described in Plato's *Ion* and the Derveni author himself). It is also quite probable

that at least some of the self-styled experts in sacred rites took care, or at least claimed to be able, to explain their practices; see below on 3-8. However, no participant in a public initiation ritual could reasonably hope, let alone demand, to receive an account of, and thus attempt to understand, what he or she has heard in the ceremony. By contrast, one rich enough to afford the exclusive services of an expert in sacred rites can, at least in theory, not only expect but also demand to receive from the expert an account of what he or she has heard in the initiation and paid dearly for.

The bulk of the ὅσοι μὲν relative clause that preceded the ὅσοι δέ clause in 3-4 is evidently contained in 1. Tsantsanoglou supplements [ὅσοι μὲν ἀκοῇ δοκοῦντες μαθεῖν μετ' ἄλλων] | ἀνθρώπων κτλ (the implicit object of μαθεῖν would be τὰ λεγόμενα). Equally plausible is ἐλπίζοντες instead of δοκοῦντες (see δοκοῦντες ... εἰδήσειν in 5-6, ἐλπίζον[τε]ς εἰδήσειν in 11), and μετὰ πολλῶν instead of μετ' ἄλλων. The prepositional phrase μετὰ πολλῶν, or μετ' ἄλλων, ἀνθρώπων would make clear that the participants in public initiation rituals are initiated as members of a large group, believing or hoping that they will understand what Orpheus says merely by listening (ἀκοῇ), sc. to Orpheus' words in the public ceremony.

2-3 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε | ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα: see previous note. For the contrast between hearing and understanding what is being heard cf. Heraclit. DK 22 B 107.

3-4 ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ | τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά: sc. δοκοῦσιν or ἐλπίζουσιν εἰδήσειν τὰ λεγόμενα (see δοκοῦντες ... εἰδήσειν in 5-6, ἐλπίζον[τε]ς εἰδήσειν in 11, and μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα in 3). The description ὁ τέχνην ποιούμενος τὰ ἱερά can only be a collective singular, probably referring to religious professionals of the same type as the beggar priests and seers Plato scorns in the *Republic* (see above on 1-2), the so-called *orpheotelestai* (see Thphr. *Char.* 16.11, [Plu.] *Apophth. Lac.* 224E). The term τέχνη might be used in the pejorative sense 'trick' or 'deceit' to stigmatize τὰ ἱερά in question, all the more since those who peddle them for a living profit, but their clients do not benefit, as the Derveni author takes it (see 9-12). The expression τέχνην ποιεῖσθαι means 'to devise a trick'. Aristophanes uses it in *Eq.* 63 for the chicanery Paphlagon comes up with, whereas Euripides uses the similar expression τέχνην τίθεσθαι in *IT* 712 for what Orestes takes to be a trick of Apollo's designed to bring about his end; Demosthenes (37.53) characterizes those who are justly hated on account of money-lending as τέχνην τὸ πρῶγμα (sc. τὸ δανεῖζειν) πεποιημένοι. The Derveni author, how-

ever, can be plausibly assumed to use here the term τέχνη in the positive sense ‘art’ or ‘systematic body of knowledge’ as well. οἱ τέχνην ποιούμενοι τὰ ἱερά can mean not only ‘those who devise the sacred rites as a cunning deceit’ but also ‘those who deceitfully make an art out of the sacred rites’, or ‘those who advertise deceitfully the sacred rites as a field of expertise’, in which they excel.

Cf. the opening of the Hippocratic treatise *de Arte*:

Εἰσὶ τινες οἱ τέχνην πεποιήνται τὸ τὰς τέχνας αἰσχροπεῖν, ὥς μὲν οἴονται οἱ τοῦτο δια-
πρησόμενοι, οὐχ ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἱστορίας οἰκείης ἐπιδείξιν ποιούμενοι.

The opponents of the Hippocratic author claim to make displays of knowledge obtained through their own inquiries (ἱστορίη), but the author thinks that they only vilify established arts such as medicine, an endeavor which is not an art but rather artlessness, itself neither adding to nor improving on the discoveries of real experts. He goes on to say:

Ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν τι τῶν μὴ εὐρημένων ἐξευρίσκειν, ὃ τι καὶ εὐρεθὲν κρέσσον ἢ ἡ ἀνεξ-
εὔρετον, ξυνέσιος δοκεῖ ἐπιθύμημά τε καὶ ἔργον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἡμίεργα ἐς τέλος ἐξ-
εργάζεσθαι ὡσαύτως· τὸ δὲ λόγων οὐ καλῶν τέχνη τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένα αἰσχύνειν
προθυμέεσθαι, ἐπανορθοῦντα μὲν μηδὲν, διαβάλλοντα δὲ τὰ τῶν εἰδότην πρὸς τοὺς μὴ
εἰδότας ἐξευρήματα, οὐκ ἐτι δοκεῖ ξυνέσιος ἐπιθύμημά τε καὶ ἔργον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κακαγ-
γελίη μᾶλλον φύσιος ἢ ἀτεχνίη· μούνοισι γὰρ τοῖσιν ἀτέχνουσιν ἡ ἐργασίη αὕτη ἀρμόζει.

The opponents of the Hippocratic author evidently claim to possess expert knowledge obtained via personal inquiry, but the author is keen on rebutting their pretensions to expertise in a τέχνη, i.e. in a genuine field of specialist knowledge, and denouncing them as frauds. Thus, in the characterization of his opponents as men οἱ τέχνην πεποιήνται τὸ τὰς τέχνας αἰσχροπεῖν, the Hippocratic author uses the singular τέχνην in two senses: the noun means both an art, or a systematic body of genuine knowledge (the plural τέχνας is used only in this sense), namely that which the opponents of the Hippocratic author claim to make out of vilifying all legitimate fields of expertise, and a deceitful device, namely that which the vilification of all established fields of real knowledge amounts to by the Hippocratic author’s lights – what his opponents advertise as τέχνη in the positive sense of the term (‘art’) is actually a τέχνη in the negative sense (‘artful device’).

As is clear from the preface to the Hippocratic treatise *de Arte*, in the Derveni author’s description ὁ τέχνην ποιούμενος τὰ ἱερά, the term τέχνη can very well be used in both the pejorative and the positive sense. If so, the phrase reports the claim of the author’s opponents that sacred rites

do constitute a genuine field of systematic knowledge, in which they are experts (Ὀρφικαὶ τέχναι are disapprovingly referred to by Strabo, 10.3.23), and at the same time encapsulates the author's scornful retort that touting expert knowledge of sacred rites is actually a sham, for there is no such field of expertise as sacred rites. He denounces as outright quackery the 'art' of sacred rites and the 'knowledge' of the poetry of Orpheus it involves (see above on 1-2) in order to assert his own expert authority on the poetry of Orpheus. He does compete over authority, but not against fellow members of the *orpheotelestai* guild, just as the author of the Hippocratic treatise *de Arte* does not compete against fellow medical experts – he rather defends the subject of his expertise, the poetry of Orpheus, from being encroached upon by the art of the *orpheotelestai*, which he denigrates as a pseudo-discipline. See also Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

7-8 οὐδ' ἐπανερόμενοι ὥσπερ | ὥς εἰδότες τῶν εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσαν ἢ ἔμαθον: the Ionic interrogative pronoun here introduces an indirect question. If ἐπανερόμενοι stands for ἐπανειρόμενοι, it is remarkable that the scribe used the old spelling in two successive lines. The use of ὥσπερ with ὥς + participle, assuming that one of the two words is not a scribal error, or an alternative by the author that somehow found its way to this copy of the text (cf. below on 10), is most probably similar to the use of δῆθεν with ὥς + participle; see Hdt. 1.73.22-23, 3.74.16-17, E. *Herc.* 949, *Or.* 1119. For εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσαν ἢ ἔμαθον cf. Heraclit. DK 22 B 55: ὅσων ὄντις ἀκοή μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμῶ. Whereas in 3 μανθάνειν is equivalent to γινώσκειν in 2 and means 'to understand', here it evidently means 'to (encounter in) experience', or 'to perceive' something without necessarily understanding it. Cf. Heraclit. B 17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἐαυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι. The contrast between γινώσκειν and μανθάνειν in Heraclitus' fragment parallels that between εἰδέναι and μανθάνειν here.

In 3-12 the Derveni author can be assumed to criticize people initiated in private by *orpheotelestai*, who claim that sacred rites performed according to the poems of Orpheus constitute a technical field, in which they are experts; see above on 1-2, 3-4. These people are to be wondered at and at the same time pitied. They are to be wondered at because, although before the initiation they expected to learn in it what Orpheus says (see above on 1-2), after the ceremony they just walk away before they have attempted to obtain the knowledge they sought and without asking questions, as though they understood anything of what they saw or heard or experienced in

their initiation. This ritual is assumed to involve seeing, hearing and experiencing certain things. Cf. Plut. *de Is. et Osir.* 352C on the mystery cult of Isis (and the Pausanias passage quoted above on 1-2, where λεγόμενα and δρώμενα are referred to as 'parts' of the mysteries at Phlya):

ἀλλ' Ἰσιακός ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ ὅτα δεικνύμενα καὶ δρώμενα περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τούτους, ὅταν νόμῳ παραλάβῃ, λόγῳ ζητῶν καὶ φιλοσοφῶν περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

The Derveni author accuses those who have been privately initiated of being under the illusion that they understand what they saw or heard or experienced in the initiation, and of failing to demand that the *orpheotelestai*, who conducted the initiation, account for all aspects of the ritual. To paraphrase the Goddess' warning to Parmenides (DK 28 B 7), these people did not judge by reason anything they saw or heard or experienced in their initiation, where they plied an aimless eye, and had an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sound.

Interestingly, Plato suggests in the *Meno* that some *orpheotelestai* are concerned to be able to account for their practices; the relevant passage is often adduced in attempts to characterize the Derveni author as one of those religious professionals. In *Men.* 81a10-b2 Socrates introduces to Meno the doctrine of metempsychosis, on which the so-called 'theory of recollection' supposedly rests, as a true and beautiful story he has heard from certain priests and priestesses, probably *orpheotelestai*, and from divine poets such as Pindar (for further comments see Intro. VI § 3):

οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷσις τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεοὶ εἰσιν.

Of particular interest is the use of the verb μεταχειρίζεσθαι, 'to practice', in the characterization of what the priests and priestesses Socrates has in mind are concerned to be capable of accounting for. In Plato the object of this verb is often a field of technical knowledge (see *Plt.* 268b5, *Phdr.* 277c4-5, *Prt.* 316d4-5, *R.* 497d8, 498b4, 527a1-4, 529a6-7, *Lg.* 857c8-d1), or what falls within the scope of such a field (see *Lg.* 967a1-5 and cf. [Pl.] *Epin.* 992a2). It is thus quite likely that the *orpheotelestai* Socrates refers to are concerned to be able to give a rational account of their practices *qua* techniques of a field in which they are experts. In view of *Grg.* 465a2-6, Socrates perhaps assumes that such concern on the part of the *orpheotelestai* is motivated by the desire to bolster their pretensions to expertise:

τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὅποι' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾗ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα.

That some *orpheotelestai* were indeed concerned to be able to account for their practices in order to back up their pretensions to expertise cannot, of course, be self-evidently assumed on the basis of what Socrates is made to say in a Platonic passage. But, if the Derveni author first vilifies as fraud the claims of the *orpheotelestai* that the sacred rites they peddle constitute a field of technical knowledge in which they are experts (see on 3-4), and then in effect laments that these self-appointed experts are not asked to explain their practices by the pitiful souls who pay dearly for their exclusive services, he might very well presuppose that at least some *orpheotelestai* do found their pretensions to expertise on their ability to give a rational account of their practices. In his view, however, they would certainly fail to exhibit such ability, and their vaunted expertise would thus be unmasked for the pure charlatanry it is, if only the individuals employing them were intelligent enough to subject their employees to rigorous critical scrutiny, and demand a rational account of what was seen or heard or experienced in the initiation.

If so, the Derveni author probably thinks that the *orpheotelestai* are unable to answer demands for a convincing justification of outright bizarre, grotesque or ridiculous ritual practices, similar in their apparent illogicality to those manifestations of conventional religiosity against which Heraclitus rails (DK 22 B 5):

καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλω αἵματι μαινόμενοι οἷον εἰ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο. μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκοίη, εἰ τις αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιο οὕτω ποιέοντα. καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασι δὲ τουτέοισιν εὐχονται, ὁκοῖον εἰ τις δόμοισι λεσχηνεύοιτο, οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσι.

Such practices and the initiation rites involving them are thus to be rejected as utterly foolish on the ground that they cannot possibly admit of rational explanation or be understandable. As for the puzzling poetry of Orpheus, according to which the *orpheotelestai* perform their ritualistic hocus-pocus, the Derveni author can be safely assumed to think that these 'experts' cannot provide a detailed and cogent interpretation of Orpheus' poem line by line, or account rationally for the choice of individual words, and explain convincingly the meaning of the various divine names Orpheus uses.

Had the employers of *orpheotelestai* been intelligent, they would not have fallen victim to the *orpheotelestai* in the first place, nor would they

have sought to learn what Orpheus really says from such suspicious types for dubious ends (cf. the *Republic* passage quoted above on 1-2). By implication, the Derveni author addresses people who are intelligent and bent on understanding, just as he is able to withstand critical scrutiny and give a satisfying rational account to anyone demanding it. See also Intro. VI §§ 10-16.

10 τῆς γνώμης στερόμενοι: γνώμη is rendered as ἐλπίς, 'hope', in 11-12 where the Derveni author rephrases 10, a passage that looks like a shortened version of 5-10. πρὶν μὲν τὰ [ι]ερὰ ἐπιτελέσαι ἐλπίζου[τε]ς εἰδήσειν in 11 evidently harks back to δοκοῦντες | πρότερον ἢ ἐπιτελέσαι εἰδήσειν in 5-6. The complement of the verb δοκεῖν in the sense 'to have an opinion' can be referred to as γνώμη, 'opinion', but since here the verb clearly means 'to expect', and γνώμη is rendered with ἐλπίς, γνώμη should be taken in the sense closest to 'hope' or 'expectation', i.e. 'intent' or 'purpose'; see also Jourdan (2003) 20 n. 8. γνώμη is not a particularly successful choice of word in this context, and it is probably the Derveni author's desire for greater precision that necessitates the rephrasing of 10 in 11-12, where he substitutes ἐλπίς for γνώμη. However, the lack of syntactic coherence between 10 and 11-12, together with the fact that 11-12 looks like a jejune equivalent to 5-10, might suggest that in 11-12 we have the author's first stab at expressing the thought he then conveyed much more elaborately in 5-10, though it is difficult to see how the first draft could have remained in the original exemplar, and then found its way to the copies (other possible cases of authorial alternatives that got into this copy are ὥσπερ with ὥς + participle in 7-8 and the two asyndetically juxtaposed relative clauses in col. XXII.4-5).

Those who are initiated privately by self-styled experts in sacred rites performed according to Orpheus' poems hope or expect before the initiation that, after the ritual, they will know what Orpheus says in his poetry (see above on 1-2); they become initiated intending to acquire this knowledge. In the Derveni author's view, however, they just walk away from the initiation before they have attempted to acquire the knowledge they desire, and do not persistently demand from the experts in sacred rites an explanatory account of what they saw or heard or experienced in the ceremony, as though they understood any of these things (5-8). The Derveni author perhaps implies that, had the initiates been intelligent and had they subjected the experts to rigorous questioning, they would have gotten no convincing and coherent answers to their questions; they would have realized that there is no genuine knowledge or understanding to be acquired in the

sacred rites, or from the self-styled experts who peddle these rites as a field of technical knowledge, and thus that there is no such field (see previous note). Presumably the initiates would have then continued to seek the knowledge they desired before their initiation, but since in actuality they believe that they have obtained this knowledge from the ‘experts’ in sacred rites, they will not seek what they think they already possess. As it is, they are to be pitied for being robbed not only of the money they paid to the ‘experts’ in sacred rites but also of all hope that they will ever get to know what Orpheus says in his poetry, or of their intent to acquire this knowledge.

Rusten (1985) 138-139 has argued that the *paragraphos* between 10 and 11 marks the end of a long quotation (1-10) from a prose author; see, however, Obbink (1997) 43-45. Since 10 and 12 end with ἀπέρχονται, it is conceivable that the *paragraphos*, which was originally intended to mark the end of the digression in 1-12 and signal the imminent return to the interpretation of Orpheus’ poem, was misplaced after 10 during copying; alternatively, it might signal that 11-12 is a version of 5-10.

13 The line, too fragmentary to be restored, does not seem to be a verse.

14 τῇ ἐαντοῦ ο..[μ]ητρί μὲν: it seems that here the Derveni author refers to Zeus’ desire to copulate with his mother, which is dealt with in the last surviving column of the papyrus (XXVI), and thus was most probably referred to in the lacunose hexameters at the end of the penultimate surviving column (XXV). Given the extremely damaged state of 14-15, it is impossible to determine why this topic comes up at this point.

15 ὁδελη[]: perhaps a remnant from a statement presupposing the Derveni author’s assumption that the names Orpheus employs for Zeus’ mother and sister, ‘Rhea’ and ‘Hera’ respectively, denote the same entity as does ‘Zeus’ (see col. XXII.7), namely air/Mind (see col. XXVI.1).

COL. XXI

1 οὕτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῷ ψυχρῷ: in the complete sentence the Derveni author seems to have said something to the effect that, before the cosmogony, neither (particles of) *a* could have accreted to (other particles of) *a*, nor (particles of) *b* to (other particles of) *b*, nor (particles of) the cold to (other

particles of) the cold. The cold, *a* and *b* are basic and everlasting constituents of the universe (see Intro. V § 2), which originally lacked any structure. It evolved into the cosmos when air/Mind wrested control of it away from fire, and caused the other fundamental entities to condense out of their fire-dominated mixture, their particles sorting like to like (see above on col. IX.6-7 and cf. below on 3). It is unclear whether the Derveni author has in mind cold basic things, in which case τὸ ψυχρόν would refer collectively to stuffs having the property of *being cold*, or to this property conceived of as stuff present in any cold basic thing and accounting for its being cold. See also Intro. V §§ 9-10.

1-2 “θόρ[υ]η” δὲ λέγ[ων] δηλοῖ | ὅτι: sc. Orpheus. This unattested word θορνη evidently comes from an Orphic verse which was quoted in the lost final part of the previous column (fr. 15.1 Bernabé). Tsantsanoglou, in Laks and Most (1997) 19 n. 53, suggests that it is a scribal error for θόρη, third person singular aorist subjunctive of θρώσκειν-θόρνυσθαι (cf. ἐκθόρη at col. XIV.1). If so, the subject of this verb can only be guessed at. The goddesses Aphrodite, Peitho and Harmonia are named in 5-7 after the interpretation of θόρ[υ]η, and the Derveni author most probably proceeds to explain how Orpheus’ reference to the birth of the three goddesses should be understood in view of the fact that ‘Aphrodite’, ‘Peitho’ and ‘Harmonia’ are actually names of Mind, a basic thing which never came to be but is always. In the *Orphic Rhapsodies* Aphrodite was born for the first time, before Zeus swallowed the Protogonos-made cosmos and all other divine beings, as in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, i.e. from the foam around the severed genitals of Uranus (for an outline of the *Orphic Rhapsodies* see Intro. IV § 3); her birth was attended by Zelos and Apate (OF 127). The goddess was reborn not by being regurgitated along with everything else Zeus had swallowed but when Zeus’ semen leapt forth, apparently as he was trying to rape Dione, and fell into the sea (OF 183). If this account of Aphrodite’s second birth was already present in the Orphic poem the Derveni author interprets, it is conceivable that θόρ[υ]η occurred in a hexameter describing the second birth of Aphrodite, and that it refers either to the spurting of Zeus’ semen or to his attempt to mount Dione. West (1983) 91, followed by Bernabé (2002) 119, suggests that Peitho and Harmonia attended the second birth of Aphrodite, just as Zelos and Apate attended her first birth in the *Orphic Rhapsodies*, but in his reconstruction of the Orphic poem he assumes that Peitho and Harmonia were born simultaneously with Aphrodite (see West [1983] 115, line 34).

The above hypothesis as to the manner of Aphrodite's second birth in the Orphic poem of the Derveni author is compatible with the assumption that $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ is a scribal error not for $\theta\acute{o}\rho\eta$ but for $\theta\omicron\rho\nu(\acute{\upsilon})\eta$ (Janko [1997] 64 and [2001] 28 n. 164), third person singular present subjunctive of $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\nu}\alpha\iota$ - $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\nu}\epsilon\iota\upsilon$, or that $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ is a dative singular of the unattested noun $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\eta}$, 'semen' (in the LSJ Supplement this hypothetical noun appears as $\theta\acute{o}\rho\nu\eta$, 'mating'); alternatively, one might take $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ as a scribal error for the dative singular of $\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$, an attested noun which means 'semen'. The rare verb $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\nu}\alpha\iota$ - $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\nu}\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ occurs only once in Nicander, where it means 'to mate' (*Ther.* 99); $\theta\omicron\rho\nu(\acute{\upsilon})\eta$ could come from a line describing Zeus' intention to mate with Dione, if the verb were used in the Orphic poem as in Nicander, or Zeus' ejaculation, if in the Orphic poem the verb meant simply 'to leap' (the much commoner $\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$ - $\theta\acute{o}\rho\nu\nu\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ is used in both senses). West (1983) 90-91 suggests that the formation of the hypothetical noun $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\eta}$ from the attested $\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ may have been influenced by the sound of the synonymous $\gamma\omicron\nu\acute{\eta}$ and that $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\eta}$ picks out the mode of Aphrodite's rebirth – Aphrodite was born for a second time 'from (Zeus') seed' or 'by (Zeus') ejaculation'; for other renderings of the hypothetical noun $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\acute{\eta}$ see Bernabé on fr. 15.1 (cf. Bernabé [2002] 118 n. 132).

If one is reluctant to solve the problem $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ poses by taking this word as an unattested noun, whose formation must then be explained, or by emending $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ to obtain a subjunctive of a hapax attested verb in a much later author, one must then consider $\theta\omicron\rho\nu\eta$ a scribal error for $\theta\acute{o}\rho\eta$ or $\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ with as much confidence as this type of argument allows. It is, of course, impossible to know how Aphrodite was born for the second time in the poem the Derveni author interprets, but there is no reason to assume on the basis of nothing more than one word that in this poem the manner of her second birth was the same as that in the *Orphic Rhapsodies*; cf. Brisson (1997) 149-150. According to Jourdan (2003) 90, the characterization of Aphrodite as Οὐρανία in 5 might point to the fact that, after Zeus engulfed Aphrodite along with the entire Protogonos-made cosmos, the goddess was reborn with all the attributes she had earlier as a product of Uranus' (severed) genitals, and thus in a manner similar to that of her first birth, i.e. not by regurgitation but from the genitals of Zeus (through his ejaculation). That Aphrodite was born for the second time with all attributes she had in her previous existence, however, cannot suggest that her first and second birth were similar in any respect, and thus preclude simple regurgitation by Zeus as the mode of her second birth.

If in col. XIII.4 ἐκθορε, ‘leapt forth’, describes the coming into being of Protogonos, whom Zeus eventually swallowed along with the entire cosmos the first-born king had created and all other gods and goddesses in it, θόρ(ν)ηι might have occurred in an Orphic verse describing the subsequent regurgitation of all (πάντα) Zeus had swallowed, their ‘leaping forth’ out of Zeus or, in other words, the regeneration of the cosmos and the rebirth of the other divine beings. If so, this hexameter was perhaps followed by one or more referring to the rebirth of the goddesses Aphrodite, Peitho and Harmonia, who are named in 5-7 after the interpretation of θόρ(ν)ηι. See also below on 5-7.

2 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα ἐκινεῖτο: the implicit subject, which is modified by the phrase κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα, is probably τὰ μόρια τοῦ ψυχροῦ etc., i.e. τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων or ἐόντων (cf. above on 1). For κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα τὰ μόρια ἐκινεῖτο cf. διηρημένα τὰ μόρια, sc. τῆς γῆς, συνίχθη in Arist. *Cael.* 297a12-27, a hypothetical account of the formation of the Earth from a primordial mixture of the elements. When the mixture breaks up, throughout the universe earth separates out in particles, which are forced to move toward the center and clump there into a spherical structure:

δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τὸ λεγόμενον ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ γιγνομένης τὸν τρόπον ὃν καὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων λέγουσι τινες γενέσθαι. πλὴν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν βίαν αἰτιῶνται τῆς κάτω φορᾶς· βέλτιον δὲ τιθέναι ἀλληθές, καὶ φάναι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν φέρεσθαι τὸ βάρος ἔχον πρὸς τὸ μέσον. ἐν δυνάμει οὖν ὄντος τοῦ μίγματος τὰ διακρινόμενα ἐφέρετο ὁμοίως πάντοθεν πρὸς τὸ μέσον. εἴτε οὖν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων διηρημένα τὰ μόρια συνίχθη πρὸς τὸ μέσον, εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα, ποιήσει ταυτόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως γε πανταχόθεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων φερομένων πρὸς ἓν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι πάντη τὸν ὄγκον, φανερόν· ἴσου γὰρ πάντη προστιθεμένου ἴσον ἀνάγκη ἀπέχειν τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἔσχατον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σχῆμα σφαῖρας ἐστίν. οὐδὲν δὲ διοίσει πρὸς τὸν λόγον, οὐδ’ εἰ μὴ πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως συνέθει πρὸς τὸ μέσον τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς.

3 καὶ ἐθόρνυστο: the Derveni author’s rendering of θόρ(ν)ηι in 1. If in Orpheus’ poem θόρ(ν)ηι described the regurgitation of all things Zeus had absorbed when he swallowed Protogonos (see above on 1-2), θόρνυσθαι would describe how particles of other fundamental entities were moving within air/Mind and sorting like to like at the beginning of the cosmogony; cf. ἐκινεῖτο in 2 and see above on col. XIV.3-4, XVIII.1-2.

Since θόρνυσθαι usually means ‘to mount’ or ‘to impregnate’ and occurs next to ἀφροδισιάζειν in 6, it seems reasonable to assume that the Derveni author (rather extravagantly) assimilates this manner of motion to sex-

ual motion – during the transition of the universe to its present state, particles of the other basic things ‘mated’ or ‘mounted’ within air/Mind; see the translation of ἐθόρνυντο in Betegh (2004) 45 and Janko (2002) 43 respectively. According to Betegh (2004) 256, the motion described by θόρνυσθαι results from collisions between particles of basic things, and makes it possible for clumps of matter to meet each other, rendering the force of ‘like to like’ effective. If the motion described as ‘mating’ is indeed a result of collisions between particles of basic things sorting like to like in different places of the nascent cosmos, it is a discontinuous motion that can be plausibly described by a verb meaning ‘to leap’ or ‘to jump’. Several scholars have indeed assumed that here the Derveni author uses the verb θόρνυσθαι in the sense ‘to jump’; see the translation of ἐθόρνυντο in Laks and Most (1997) 19 (who admit that the verb might have a sexual *double entendre*), Bernabé (2002) 118, Jourdan (2003) 21 and Janko (1997) 65. This sense of the verb is attested in Nicom. *Theol. arithm.* 61.5 De Falco. There is no reason why the Derveni author cannot use θόρνυσθαι here in the sense ‘to leap’, which is evidently primary, to describe the jerky motion of colliding particles without any sexual *double entendre* (such poetic flourishes are uncharacteristic of him), but a few lines below in the secondary sense ‘to mate’, i.e. as a synonym of ἀφροδισιάζειν.

3-4 θορνύμενα δ' ἕκα(σ)τα συνεστάθη | πρὸς ἄλληλα: this is preferable to θορνύμενα δὲ κατασυνεστάθη πρὸς ἄλληλα, which Jourdan (2003) 21 translates as “et qu'en jaillissant, elles entrèrent en relation les unes avec les autres [πρὸς ἄλληλα] pour se constituer”. κατασυνίστασθαι would be an unlikely compound. The prepositions κατά and σύν do not usually combine in this order (the only classical example of such combination listed in LSJ is κατασυλλογίζεσθαι, Arist. *APr.* 66a25). For συνεστάθη πρὸς ἄλληλα cf. Arist. *HA* 515b11-12: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὁσῶ, ὅσα ἀπτόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα σύγκεινται, συνδέδενται νεύροις.

4-5 μέχρι δὲ τούτου ἐθόρνυντο, μέχρι | ἕκαστον ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σύνηθες: Empedocles uses the noun ἦθος for the essential character of each root (DK 31 B 17.27-28). Likeness of character between particles of the same basic thing might be grounded in their (causal) powers – all of them possess the same powers which constitute their peculiar character. See col. XXV.8-9: συνέλθοι (ἄν) ἀλέα ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν | δύναμιν ἔχει (the stars, particles or concentrations of fire left over from the cosmogony to float within air/Mind apart from one another). Parmenides attributes specific powers (δυνάμεις) to

his two fundamental ‘forms’, light and night (DK 28 B 9). See also Intro. V §§ 15, 20.

5-7 Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία | καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ θόρνυσθαι καὶ Πειθῶ | καὶ Ἀρμονία τῷ αὐτῷ θεῷ ὄνομα κεῖται: fr. 15.2-3 Bernabé. As Tsantsanoglou suggests, the names of the three goddesses can form a complete hexameter: Πειθῶ θ’ Ἀρμονίην τε καὶ Οὐρανίην Ἀφροδίτην, or Ἀρμονίην Πειθῶ τε καὶ Οὐρανίην Ἀφροδίτην. It is likely that the name of Zeus appeared in the preceding verse as the subject of the verb γείνατο, on which the names of the goddesses depended as objects, and that the couplet was quoted in the lower part of the previous column after the hexameter in which θόρ(ν)ηι occurred, and which perhaps preceded the couplet also in the Orphic poem.

In this poem Aphrodite, Peitho and Harmonia probably belonged to the pantheon of the Protogonos-made cosmos, which Zeus swallowed along with its creator and all other divine beings; Zeus brought the three goddesses into being (γείνατο) for a second time, when he regurgitated all he had absorbed. For an alternative reconstruction of the verse with the names of the three goddesses see Merkelbach (1967) 26, who assumes that in the poem interpreted by the Derveni author Aphrodite was born from the semen of Zeus (see above on 1): θόρνῃ δ’ Ἀφροδίτῃ | Οὐρανία ~ ~ ~ καὶ Πειθῶ θ’ Ἀρμονίῃ τε. Cf. Janko (2002) 40, who suspends judgment as to which syllable of θορνῇ is accented and translates the hypothetical noun as “mounting up”: Ζεὺς γείνατο θορνῇ | Πειθῶ θ’ Ἀρμονίην τε καὶ Οὐρανίην Ἀφροδίτην. For a more elaborate proposal in the same vein see West (1983) 115, lines 32-34: [ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα θεῶν χρυσὴν] Ἀφροδίτην | Οὐρανίην [ἐρόεσσαν ἔηι μητίσαστο] θορνῇ· | [τῇ δ’ ἄρ’ ἅμ’] Ἀρμονίῃ τ’ [ἐπατῇ] Πειθῶ τ’ [ἐγένοντο].

As the Derveni author takes it, the three feminine names ‘Aphrodite’, ‘Peitho’ and ‘Harmonia’ pick out not female divinities generated by Zeus but the same divine being as does the name ‘Zeus’, namely air/Mind. According to col. XIV.9-10, in Orpheus’ poem air/Mind receives many names after the various effects it causes. Here the effects in question are the mixing of τὰ νῦν ἑόντα, the yielding of τὰ ἑόντα to one another, or their being ‘prevailed upon’ to do so, and the concordant union of each of τὰ ἑόντα with many others. As the Derveni author explains next, the names of the three goddesses derive from the verbs used in the description of these three effects. μίγεσθαι, ‘to mix’, also means ‘to copulate’, i.e. ἀφροδισιάζειν in common usage, whence the proper name ‘Aphrodite’ derives (7-

10); from πείθειν, ‘to persuade’, comes ‘Peitho’, and from ἀμύζειν, ‘to put together’ (10-11), comes ‘Harmonia’ (11-12). Aphrodite must thus be assumed to be an allegorical personification of the agent that caused τὰ νῦν ἑόντα to mix together, Peitho of the agent that caused τὰ ἑόντα to yield to one another, and Harmonia of the agent that brought about the concordant union of each of τὰ ἑόντα with many others. By the Derveni author’s lights, the generation of these three goddesses from Zeus is Orpheus’ way of saying that at a certain time air/Mind became the causal agent each of the three goddesses personifies allegorically: the assumption of new causal roles by the same agent, or the same agent’s bringing about new effects, is presented as the generation of offspring, and the causal agent as the offspring’s parent.

One is surprised to find in 6 the infinitives ἀφροδισιάζειν and θόρνυσθαι connected with the names ‘Aphrodite’ and ‘Zeus’, as if they were just two other names of air/Mind. Merkelbach (1967) 26 suggests that καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ θόρνυσθαι is an incomplete sentence that originally occurred in 9 after κατὰ φάνιν, but got misplaced in its present position by a scribal mistake. Ricciardelli Apicella (1980) 123 shifts καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ θόρνυσθαι before ἀνὴρ in 7, and regards it as a lemma which is explained by the following sentence. Janko (2002) 42, followed by Jourdan (2003) 21, regards ἀφροδισιάζειν καὶ θόρνυσθαι καὶ in 6 as a scribal mistake, but places καὶ θόρνυσθαι after the second ἀφροδισιάζειν in 8, which makes good sense, all the more so since θόρνυσθαι has problems of its own (see below). According to Betegh (2004) 192, “unusual though it may sound, it seems better to accept the text as it is, and allow that, for the Derveni author, verbs could figure among other names of the god”. To support his view Betegh points out that at the time of the Derveni author there was no explicit distinction between verbs and nouns (whether this is so or not depends, of course, on the date of the Derveni author one adopts – Betegh bolsters his point by referring to the situation in Plato’s *Cratylus* concerning the use of the terms ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, but it should be noted that verbs are explicitly distinguished from nouns in *Sph.* 261e4-262e1); that etymology as practiced on the names of gods is grounded in the belief that proper names have descriptive content; finally, that the etymologies of names in the Derveni papyrus are based on verbal, as opposed to nominal, forms – as Betegh puts it, “the proper names themselves are explained as captions indicating different actions or cosmic functions of the god”, a reference to the principle of onomatopoeia in col. XIV.9-10. However, that air/Mind has been given the name ‘Aphrodite’ from ἀφροδισιάζειν, a verb describing met-

aphorically an effect brought about by air/Mind, does not mean that this verb picks out air/Mind. Nor does the belief that proper names have descriptive content allow one to hold that the verb which is used in expressing the descriptive content of a proper name, and from which the proper name derives, applies to the bearer of the proper name in the same manner as the proper name itself. Betegh admits that the lack of an explicit distinction between verbs and nouns does not mean that one would simply mix the two. It is, of course, conceivable that the Derveni author did mix the two exactly on the grounds Betegh suggests, but if this is so, he certainly did not have any good reasons for this curious move, and thus one cannot appeal convincingly to such reasons in order to accept the text as it is.

The presence of θόρνυσθαι next to ἀφροδισιάζειν is as problematic as is the presence of two infinitives among proper names of air/Mind. One would expect that a proper name of air/Mind derives from θόρνυσθαι, just as 'Aphrodite' derives from ἀφροδισιάζειν, but this is not the case – the two other names of air/Mind explained here by the Derveni author, 'Peitho' and 'Harmonia', have nothing to do with θόρνυσθαι. It is true that in 1-5 the Derveni author interprets θόρ(ν)ηι, perhaps a form of θόρνυσθαι, as describing a physical effect ultimately brought about by air/Mind (see above on 3). However, by coupling θόρνυσθαι with ἀφροδισιάζειν in 6 he cannot plausibly refer back to θόρ(ν)ηι in 1 as another name of air/Mind, even if one allows that for the Derveni author verbs can figure among the names of Mind, because no proper name derives from θόρνυσθαι. Nor can θόρνυσθαι justify the readings θόρνηι, θορνῆι or θορ(ν)ῆι instead of θόρ(ν)ηι because, no matter whether the supposed dative is of the noun θόρνη or θορνῆ or θορή, it is unlikely that the Derveni author would think of this noun as a name of air/Mind, and that he would then include θόρνυσθαι, from which this noun derives, among the other names of air/Mind. Perhaps one should seriously consider adopting Janko's emendation of the text and place καὶ θόρνυσθαι after the second ἀφροδισιάζειν in 8; θόρνυσθαι would then become a mere synonym of ἀφροδισιάζειν, and would have thus nothing to do with Orpheus' naming of air/Mind.

9-10 τῶν γὰρ νῦν ἐόντων μιχθέντων ἀλλ[ή]λοις | Ἀφροδίτῃ ὠνομάσθη: Orpheus called air/Mind by the name 'Aphrodite' because it caused the mixing of τὰ νῦν ἐόντα (in Orpheus' poem Mind is named after the effects it causes; see col. XIV.9-10). The conception of the agent responsible for the cosmogony as a goddess presiding over sexual union and procreation goes back to Parmenides. According to him, the mixing of light and dark-

ness, the two basic entities whose combination results in the generation of all things, is caused by a goddess who governs hateful birth and sexual intercourse from the center of the universe, sending female to mix with male and vice versa (DK 28 B 12; cf. B 13). Following in Parmenides' footsteps, Empedocles calls Love by the name of the goddess Aphrodite. Love mixes the four roots in various proportions, and populates the cosmos with an immense range of ephemeral compound beings, such as animals and plants. This happens after Love's antagonist, Strife, has caused the Love-dominated mixture of the four roots to break up, and its ingredients to largely separate into the large-scale structures of the present universe. See DK 31 B 71 (cf. B 73 and 75):

εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις,
 πῶς ὕδατος γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἡελίου τε
 κίρναμένων εἶδη τε γενοῖατο χροῖά τε θνητῶν
 τόσσ', ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτῃ.

The mixing of τὰ νῦν ἔοντα is perhaps to be understood as the emergence of what Empedocles calls 'mortal things'. Whereas in the first stage of the cosmogony air/Mind caused the particles of the other basic things to sort like to like, shaping the universe at it is now at its largest size scale (see 1-5), in the second stage it caused particles of unlike basic things to combine and, as a result, the newly born cosmos became populated with structurally complex entities such as plants and animals; air/Mind, the agent ultimately responsible for the combination of unlike basic things into transient entities, is called by the name of Aphrodite, the goddess of sexual union in which unlikes unite, just as the cause of the same effect is called by that name in Empedocles (that air/Mind triggered the zoogony is evident from col. XXII.14-15). If so, here τὰ νῦν ἔοντα are fundamental and everlasting constituents of the universe (τὰ ὄντα or τὰ ὑπάρχοντα) *qua* structures of the present universe at its largest scale, not *qua* elements: they are clumps of basic entities that formed when air/Mind caused the transition of the universe to its present state, i.e. the breakup of the original mixture of all other basic entities and their condensation, just as τὰ νῦν ἑσορῶμεν ἅπαντα in Emp. B 38 are the visible concentrations of the four roots in the cosmos (cf. Wright [1981] 196-197). The Derveni author does not, of course, imply that the large-scale clumps of basic things in the present universe combined wholesale – at any given time only tiny amounts of basic things can be plausibly assumed to be bound in the biosphere. Cf. GC 337a7-15, where Aristotle's point is not that the entire quantity of a sub-

lunary element in the universe is constantly subject to transformation into another element and change of place – he actually speaks of minute, from a cosmic perspective, quantities of each sublunary element:

ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτινες ἀποροῦσιν, διὰ τί ἐκάστου τῶν σωμάτων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φερομένου χώραν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ οὐ διεσπᾶσι τὰ σώματα. αἵτιον γάρ τούτου ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις· εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἔμενεν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ μετέβαλλεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλησίον, ἥδη ἂν διεσπῆκεσαν. μεταβάλλει μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν φορὰν διπλὴν οὖσαν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μένειν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ χώρᾳ τεταγμένη.

For a suggestion on how Mind might cause unlike basic things to combine into the many ephemeral things populating the cosmos see above on col. X.11-13.

10-11 Πειθῷ δ' ὅτι εἶξεν τὰ ἐόντα | ἀλλήλ[οι]σι: air/Mind is called by the name of Peitho because it caused τὰ ἐόντα to yield to one another, most probably the same effect as the combination of unlike basic things, on account of which Mind is called by the name of Aphrodite; see previous note. The 'yielding to one another' of unlike basic things marks the second stage of the cosmogony by way of contrast with what happened in the first, when air/Mind caused the particles of the other basic things to sort like to like, shaping the cosmos.

11 εἵκειν δὲ καὶ πείθειν τὸ αὐτόγ: the Derveni author explains why Orpheus called air/Mind by the name of Peitho, a female divinity personifying persuasion, if this name actually picks out air/Mind as the agent whose causal power made unlike basic things yield to one another in the second phase of the cosmogony. The explanation is needed because the name of the divinity in question does not derive from the verb εἵκειν, 'to yield', that describes the effect air/Mind brought about, and on account of which air/Mind is called by that name. What the Derveni author should have said is that, insofar as Mind caused other basic things to yield to one another despite their unlikeness (see also next note), it is called Peitho by Orpheus because yielding is an effect of being persuaded or prevailed upon, πείθεσθαι, not because yielding and prevailing upon are the same thing.

11-12 Ἄρμον' ἵα δὲ | ὅτι πο[λλὰή]ρμοσε τῶν ἐόντων ἐκάστω[ι]: as the text stands, τῶν ἐόντων can be construed with both πο[λλὰ and ἐκάστω[ι]. Orpheus called Mind by the name of Harmonia, a female divinity personifying the harmonious arrangement of component parts into a co-

herent structure, because it caused many *έόντα* to fit in with each of *τά έόντα*. The meaning does not change if one supplements *όντα* or *άλλα* after *πολλά*, or if one thinks instead that the verb is compounded with *σύν* or *πρός*. *άρμόζεσθαι* and *συναρμόζεσθαι* are used by Empedocles for the combination of the four roots into the many complex substances that come to be in the cosmos, and then pass away as their component parts separate; see DK 31 B 107.1 and B 71.4. In B 71.4 Empedocles calls Love, the power that effects the formation of complex composite substances from parts of the four roots, by the name of the goddess Aphrodite, and elsewhere he fittingly calls Love *άρμονία* (B 96.4; cf. 23.4, 27.2), for the compounding action of Love is described by the verbs *άρμόζειν* and *συναρμόζειν*. It can be plausibly assumed that the Derveni author's use of *άρμόζειν* is parallel to Empedocles' use of *άρμόζεσθαι/συναρμόζεσθαι*, and that air/Mind is called by the name 'Harmonia' because it effected the formation of complex composite substances such as plants and animals (see also above on 9-10). If so, *τά έόντα* that air/Mind caused to fit in with one another are the analogues of the four Empedoclean roots in the Derveni author's cosmology, i.e. the other fundamental constituents of the universe (*τά ύπάρχοντα*), and air/Mind is called Harmonia by Orpheus because it caused many particles of unlike basic entities to combine with one another into derivative but structurally unified entities despite their unlikeness. Cf. the cosmological role Philolaus accords to *άρμονία* (DK 44 B 6):

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρμονία ἐπεγένετο ὥτινῶν ἄδε τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἄρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μὴδὲ ὁμόφυλα μὴδὲ ἰσοταγῇ ἀνάγκα τὰ τῷαυτὰ ἄρμονίᾳ συγκεκλειῆσθαι, αἱ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

13-14 ἦν μὲν γ[ὰρ καὶ π]ρόσθεν, ὠνομάσθη δὲ γενέσθ[αι] ἐπεὶ | διεκρίθ[η; Janko (2002) 43 corrects ὠνομάσθη to ἐνομίσθη, apparently in the light of col. XVIII.10-12, but ὠνομάσθη γενέσθαι is not in need of emendation; cf. εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει and εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν in Pl. *Tht.* 160b8-9 and 166c6 respectively. Nor is there any reason to assume with Janko that ἦν and διεκρίθη have different subjects ('he' and 'they' respectively in Janko's translation, presumably Zeus, i.e. air/Mind, and *τά έόντα* from 12). The many different *έόντα* air/Mind caused to fit in with one another so as for derivative composite entities to come into being were preexisting (*ἦν μὲν γ[ὰρ καὶ π]ρόσθεν*); for, like air/Mind, they are basic and everlasting constituents of the universe. The expression 'to come into existence' is said after air/Mind caused the other basic entities to separate on the large

scale (ὠγομάσθη δὲ γενέσθ[αι] ἐπεὶ | διεκρίθ[η, sc. τὰ ἐόντα]), when their particles began to combine at the scale of medium-sized objects into the derivative composite entities which populate this size scale, and of which ‘to come into existence’ is properly said.

COL. XXII

1 πάν[τ’ οὖ]ν ὁμοίω[ς ὠ]νόμασεν ὡς κάλλιστα ἡ[δύ]γατο: sc. Orpheus. πάντα should perhaps be translated as “all names”, not “all things”. Cf. Pl. *Cra.* 406a3-5: τὰς δὲ “Μούσας” τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπωνόμασεν.

4-5 λέγουσι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῶν ἐκάστωι | ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἔλθῃ, ἅπερ ἂν θέλοντες τυγχάνωσι: for the syntactical incongruity cf. ὅσα δ’ ἂ[ν] ἀφθῇ ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ μίσγεται | τοῖς ἀλ[λ]οῖς (col. IX.9-10).

6 οὐδαμὰ ταυτά, ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀμαθίας: οὐδαμά is an Ionic word used in poetry, but also by Herodotus (e.g. 1.5.17, 2.168.6) and Melissus (DK 30 B 1). For τὰ δὲ without preceding τὰ μὲν see GP 166. ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας is logically connected with κρατιστεύοντες in 4. τὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀμαθίας was added as an afterthought, when the author realized that power and greed are not the only reasons for the arbitrary use of language.

7 Γῇ δὲ καὶ Μήτηρ καὶ Ῥέα καὶ Ἥρη ἡ αὐτή: one or more of these goddesses, whose names can only refer to air/Mind in the Derveni author’s view, must have appeared in one or more Orphic verses, now lost with the final part of the previous column, referring to the generation of the goddess(es) from Zeus. In his reconstruction of the Orphic poem West (1983) 115, line 35, assumes that only Ge was named.

7-8 ἐκλήθη δὲ | Γῇ μὲν νόμῳ: air/Mind is named Ge by convention, i.e. through stipulation that a certain combination of sounds refer to air/Mind, apparently because the Derveni author is unable to give a cosmological explanation of the name ‘Ge’. Cf. the explanation of the name ‘Gaia’ as a dialectical variation of ‘Ge’ in 9 (Γῇ καὶ Γαῖα κατὰ [γ]λῶσσαν ἐκάστοις). This appeal to convention as a convenient explanation of Orpheus’ name-giving is probably suggested by ὡς κάλλιστα ἡ[δύ]γατο in 1.

8 Μήτηρ δ' ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης πάντα γ[ίν]εται: air/Mind is called Μήτηρ, i.e. Mother, because all things come to be from it, apparently in the sense that the cause of a derivative entity's generation is traceable back, though a causal chain of prior events, to the cosmogonic action of air/Mind (see above on col. XIX.7). One can plausibly assume in the light of 14-15 that the derivative entities in question are living things.

9-10 Δημήτηρ [δὲ] | ὀνομάσθη ὥσπερ ἡ Γῆ Μήτηρ, ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἐ[ν] ὄνομα: cf. Γῆ μήτηρ πάντων, Δημήτηρ πλουτοδότρια (OF 302).

11 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕμνοις εἰρ[η]μένον: cf. the possible reference to a hymn in col. VII.2. If this hymn is the Orphic poem the Derveni author interprets, the hymns mentioned here are in all probability other Orphic poems. Hymns attributed to Orpheus are mentioned by Plato (Lg. 829e1) and Pausanias (in connection with the mysteries at Phlya; 9.27.2, 30.12). P. Gurôb 1 (OF 31), a papyrus of the late third century BC concerned with a mystery rite, contains two short poems (i.4-11, 18-23) that might be called hymns, given the characterization of the second as [?] θεῶν μεγ[άλων] εὐχή (cf. Pl. Lg. 700b1-2: καὶ τι ἦν εἶδος ᾧδης εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεοῦς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο). The third verse of the first hymn (line 6 of the papyrus) opens with the words Δήμητερ τε Πέα (Kern printed Δημήτηρ, but the ε is clear in the papyrus).

The function of the preceding midline *paragraphos* is unclear (another midline *paragraphos* is found in col. XXIII.7). It cannot separate the quotation that follows in 12 from the main text, for there is no *paragraphos* after the quotation and the main text resumes in 12. The *paragraphos* at the left margin between 11 and 12 is conventionally placed where punctuation occurs, usually a dicolon or a blank space, used in dramatic texts to mark a change of speaker and in prose texts to mark the end of a section; see Turner (1987²) 8f., 12f.

12 “Δημήτηρ [Π]έα Γῆ Μήτηρ Ἑστία Δηιώ”: Obbink (1994) 123 n. 43 and Janko (2002) 44 emend this “not very metrical verse” (West [1983] 81) to Δήμητερ [Π]έα Γῆ Μήτηρ (τε καὶ) Ἑστία Δηιώ. The ι in Ἑστία is long, however; see West (1966) on Hes. *Th.* 454. [Π]έα cannot be an instance of old spelling (cf. col. XV.1, XX.7 and 8), as suggested by Rusten (1985) 137 n. 34; even if the form Πέα existed (see Hes. *Th.* 135 with West's note), Ἑστία would not scan. It can be plausibly assumed that [Π]έα is in synizesis (cf. *Il.* 15.187), and that the verse is composed entirely of long syllables.

Such holospondaic verses were used in prayers sung in libations (σπονδαί, whence σπονδεῖος); see West (1982) 55-56. The surviving specimens are shorter (decasyllables), but Ion of Chios used this rhythm in an elegiac couplet (fr. 27.5-6 W). The verse can very well be a decasyllable if Δηιώ originally belonged to the next verse. Cf. *PMG* 698, a pair of decasyllables ascribed to Terpander: Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχά, πάντων ἀγήτωρ, | Ζεῦ σοι πέμπω ταύ-
ταν ὕμνων ἀρχάν.

In view of Δηιώ in the next line, Δηιώ should be considered a scribal error (for nominatives in -ώι see Schwyzler vol. 1, 478). Δηιώ is mentioned by Herodian, 3.2.420.4ff. Lentz, as an alternative form of Δηώ, a name of Demeter in *H. Hom.* 2.47, 211 and 492.

Obbink (1994) relies on this verse and the quotation of Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 185) in Philodemus, *Piet.* pp. 63+23 Gomperz, to argue that Philochorus knew the work of the Derveni author; cf. Obbink (1997) 49 n. 16 and Burkert (1997) 174 n. 32. According to Philodemus, κάν] | τοῖς ὕμνοις δ' Ὀρφ[εὺς | π]αρά Φιλοχόρῳ Γῆν [κ]αὶ Δήμητρα τὴν || αὐτὴν Ἔστιαι. See, however, Betegh (2004) 99 n. 20.

12-13 καλε[ῖτ]αι γὰρ[ρ] | καὶ Δηιώ ὅτι ἐδῆ[ι]ώθη ἐν τῇ μείξει: it is likely that μεῖξις here means not 'copulation' but 'child-bearing' or 'parturition' (cf. ἐν τῇ τῶν παίδων μεῖξις in *Pl. Lg.* 773d4). The name Δηιώ, which is assumed to derive from δηϊοῦσθαι, suggests that its bearer is rent in parturition. A similar etymology of the name Δηιώ is mentioned by Herodian, 3.2.420.9-10 Lentz: παρὰ τὸ δαίω τὸ κόπτω κατὰ τροπὴν Ἰωνικὴν τοῦ α εἰς η· καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημήτηρ γῆ ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ γῆ διακόπτεται ἐν τῷ ἀροτριοῦσθαι.

13-14 δηλώσει δὲ [λί]αν | κατὰ τὰ ἔπη γεγ[νῶν]: the Derveni author justifies the etymology he has just put forth. Orpheus will make clear in the poem that she, i.e. Δηιώ, gives birth profusely, and this is why her body is cleaved. Air/Mind is called Mother because all living things come into existence from it (8 and 14-15), as if it were a female bringing forth abundant offspring; air/Mind is also called Δηιώ, rather grotesquely, as if it were a female whose body is rent by incessant parturition.

14-15 Ῥέα δ' ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ πο[ι]κ[ί]α | ζῶια ἔφω [ἐκρεύσαντα] ἔξ αὐτῆς: perhaps παγ[τοῖα] is preferable to πο[ι]κ[ί]α. Cf. Anaxagoras' possible reference to the denizens of other worlds (*DK* 59 B 4): καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλὰ τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὄνῃστα συνενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἰκη-
σιν χρῶνται. For the etymology of the name 'Rhea' from ρεῖν see e.g. *Pl. Cra.* 402b1-4.

15-16 Ῥέα καὶ [Ῥεῖη] | κατ[ὰ γλῶσσαν ἐκάστοις. Ἡ]ρη δ' ἐκ[λήθη ὅτι: the Derveni author perhaps derived the name 'Hera' from ἀήρ (cf. Pl. *Cra.* 404c2-4). The etymology would serve as a bridge to the discussion in the next column, where Zeus and Oceanus are identified with air/Mind.

COL. XXIII

1 τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γωγὸν πεπόηται: τὸ ἔπος, a verse quoted in the lost lower part of the previous column, has been plausibly reconstructed by West (1983) 115, line 36, in the light of 3-6: μήσατο δ' Ὀκεανοῖο μέγα σθένος εὐρὺ ρέοντος (fr. 16.2 Bernabé). In the Orphic poem this hexameter most probably followed the one that occasions the discussion in the preceding column: continuing the creation of a new cosmos under his control and the regeneration of all other divine beings he had absorbed, Zeus contrived the great strength of the widely flowing Okeanos.

παράγωγόν means 'misleading'; cf. LSJ s.v. 1. All senses of the proparoxytone form of the word listed in LSJ s.v. II are obviously inapplicable here. For the last one, 'formed in parody', there is a sole reference to Numenius, *apud* Eusebius, *PE* 14.5.13.2 (fr. 25 des Places): ἔπος παράγωγον καὶ ὕβριστικόν (a description of the hexameter, based on *Il.* 6.181, with which Ariston of Chios ridiculed Arcesilaus' philosophical stance; see Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.235). This reading is from the 1903 edition of *PE* by Gifford, but Mras and des Places (1982-3²) read ἔπος παραγωγόν instead.

By saying that Orpheus has composed the line in question so as to be misleading, the Derveni author does not accuse Orpheus of obscurity. He simply points out once again that Orpheus speaks in riddles; cf. Burkert (1968) 95 n. 4 and Betegh (2004) 194.

3 “Ὀκεανός” ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ: Betegh (2004) 198 adduces an interesting parallel from Hesychius (ω 108-109 Schmidt): Ὀκεανοῖο πόρον· τὸν ἀέρα, εἰς ὃν αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν τελευτῶντων ἀποχωροῦσιν. Ὀκεανός· ἀήρ. θάλασσα, καὶ ποταμὸς ὑπερμεγέθης. φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὁμώνυμον αὐτοῦ ἐν Κρήτῃ. It is unclear on what grounds, if any, the Derveni author identifies Okeanos with air. The name of the waters that flow around the Earth might be assumed to actually denote the substance that envelops not only the Earth but also the entire universe, all the more since air can be plausibly conceived of as a very subtle liquid. In *Metaph.* 983b27-31 Aristotle notes that according to some, most probably Hippias, the oldest theologians anticipated Thales in positing

water as the origin or principle of all things because in their poetry they represented Okeanos and Tethys as ‘fathers of generation’ (Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας); cf. *Il.* 14.200-201 and 14.244-246. It is conceivable that such passages also led the Derveni author to identify Okeanos with αἶρ; for in his cosmology it is air that brings about the generation of all things.

4-5 οὐκουν “ἐμήσατο” τὸν Ζῆνα ἕτερος Ζεὺς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς | αὐτῷ “σθένος μέγα”: if Okeanos is air and air is Zeus, by saying that Zeus contrived the great strength of the widely flowing Okeanos (see above on 1) Orpheus does not mean that another Zeus contrived Zeus but that Zeus contrived for himself great strength.

5-7 οἱ δ’ οὐ γινώσκοντες τὸν | Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ὅτι “εὐρὺ ρέοντα” | προσέθηκεν: sc. Orpheus. To those who understand Orpheus correctly it is clear that Okeanos is air and air is Zeus, but those who lack understanding think that Okeanos is a river because Orpheus added the characterization of Okeanos as widely flowing.

7 ὁ δὲ σημαίνει τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην: cf. previous note. Orpheus in fact indicates that Zeus contrived for himself great strength (this is Orpheus’ γνώμη). The preceding midline *paragraphos*, which is repeated in its proper place below the line to the left (cf. col. XXII.11), can be easily explained: ὁ δὲ σημαίνει gave to the scribe, or to the scribe of the exemplar from which the text of the papyrus was copied, the impression that a new point begins here.

8 ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ο]ις καὶ νομιζομένοις ῥήμασι: Orpheus indicates that Zeus contrived for himself great strength by using expressions of everyday speech. As the Derveni author will explain next, Okeanos is not a river, despite the fact that he is characterized by Orpheus as widely flowing, for Orpheus actually intended the characterization in question to be taken in the sense ‘flowing great’: ‘to flow great’ is said of powerful men and has nothing to do with rivers.

9 τῶν ἀν[θ]ρώπων τοὺς μέγα δυνατ[οῦ]ντας: it is impossible to supplement δυνατ[οὺς ὄ]ντας. One would expect μέγα δυναμένους, a common expression from Homer onwards (*Od.* 1.276, 11.414). This is the earliest known occurrence of δυνατεῖν as synonym of δύναμαι. After the Derveni text it

occurs in Phld. *Sign.* I.13, XI.7 De Lacy. Cf. δυνατεῖ ὁ Κύριος (ὁ Θεός, ὁ Χριστός) with inf. or ἐν ὑμῖν in *Ep. Rom.* 14.4, *Ep. Cor.* 2.9.8 and 13.3. The formation of δυνατεῖν is explained by analogy with ἀδυνατεῖν; see Blass (1921⁵) 65, Moulton and Howard (1976) 390.

10 ‘μεγάλους’ φασὶ ‘ῥύηται’: cf. (ποταμός) μέγας ἐρρύη in Hdt. 8.138.7-8 and ρεῖ πολὺς (ὅδε λεώς) in A. *ScT* 80, which are of course irrelevant. The closest parallels are perhaps expressions such as Κύπρις ... ἦν πολλὴ ῥύη (*E. Hipp.* 443), πολλάκι ... γίνεται εὐ ρεῖν ἔργ’ ἀνδρῶν (*Thgn.* 639-640), ὅταν δ’ ὁ δαίμων εὐροῇ (*A. Pers.* 601) and ῥοαὶ δ’ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλαι ... ἐς ἄνδρας ἔβαν (*Pi. O.* 2.33-34).

11 “ἵνας δ’ ἐγκατ[έλε]ξ’ Ἀχελωῖου ἀργυ[ρ]οδινε[ω]”: fr. 16.3 Bernabé. Cf. P.Oxy. 221 (Scholia in *Il.* Φ 1-516) col. ix.1f., originally read by Grenfell and Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 2 (1899) 63:]παρ[...]]κατέλεξα | αχελω[ιου]αργυροδ[ι]νεω. In *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 4 (1904) 261 Grenfell and Hunt corrected the opening of the verse to]ναρ[. ν is written above the line before κατέλεξα apparently to replace a letter deleted by the scribe. It is likely that the deleted letter is γ (the microscope shows κ, according to Janko [2002] 46), and that ν was substituted for it to make clear the adverbial use of ἐν. In the P.Oxy. verse the verb is in the first person, but the scribe might have supplied the elided letter at the end of the line from the initial vowel of the following word (Ἀχελωῖου).

Reading παρ[ων ὧ]ν κατέλεξ(α) | Ἀχελω[ιου] ἀργυροδ[ι]νεω, Allen (1900) 17 ascribed the P.Oxy. verse to Xenophanes, who thinks that the sea is the source of clouds, winds and rivers (*DK* 21 B 30). Xenophanes’ view on the source of clouds, winds and rivers is known from the scholia on *Il.* 21.196-197 (Erbse vol. 5, 169.32-170.37) and, though the P.Oxy. verse comes from the comments on *Il.* 21.195-196, it cannot be ascribed to Xenophanes on such flimsy evidence. It has also been published as Epic. adesp. fr. 5 by Powell (*Coll. Alex.* 79), according to whom it comes from a “Κατάλογος, ut videtur, fluminum aut marium”, a view informed by the reading κατέλεξα.

It is very likely that in the Orphic poem the hexameter quoted here stood immediately after μήσατο δ’ Ὀκεανοῖο μέγα σθένος εὐρὺ ρέοντος (fr. 16.2 Bernabé). This verse does not fit the traces preceding the P.Oxy. verse in the papyrus; they come from the prose text of the commentator that introduced the quotation of the verse, or the quotation is not from the poem interpreted by the Derveni author. The P.Oxy. verse is followed

by ἐξ οὗ πᾶσα θάλασ[σα] (fr. 16.4 Bernabé), which could have stood right after the same verse in the poem of the Derveni author.

For ἵνες Ἀχελωΐου cf. ἱς Ἀχελωΐου (Pi. fr. 70 + *249b S-M from P.Oxy. 221 col. ix. 14ff.), ἱς ποταμοῖο (*Il.* 21.356), and ἀλκὸν Ἀχελωΐου (Pi. fr. 52.9 S-M). It is conceivable that ἱς Ἀχελωΐου is in the plural because Ἀχελῶος stands for the water of all springs and rivers (see next note), whose ‘strengths’ (ἵνας) Zeus placed within Okeanos (ἐγκατέλεξε), as he was regenerating the cosmos, in the sense that all streams of water derive their strength from Okeanos, the source of all flowing water; on Acheloios and Okeanos see D’Alessio (2004). Reading ἐγκατ[έλασ]σ’ (“fastened in”) instead of ἐγκατ[έλε]ξ’, West (1983) 92 understands ἵνες Ἀχελωΐου as “the sinews of Acheloios” (cf. Laks and Most [1997] 20, Janko [2002] 47, Jourdan [2003] 23 and 97, Betegh [2004] 49), the network of all fresh-water streams, which is like the network of a body’s sinews; he adduces as a parallel the phrase γῆς φλέβες, a metaphor for rivers used by the tragedian Choerilus (*TrGF* I 2 F 3). The traces after the first gap in the line are compatible with both ξ and c, but the supplement ἐγκατ[έ-λασ]σ’ was based on an old erroneous assessment of the gap’s length (four letters instead of three). ἐγκατ[έλε]ξ’ naturally suggests itself, but to say that Zeus placed “the sinews of Acheloios”, the network of all fresh-water streams, within Okeanos would be rather bizarre.

12 τῶ[ι] ὕδα[τι]...[.....].ι Ἀχελῶιον ὄνομ[α: τίθη]σι (cf. Pl. *Spb.* 244d3) or ἐπιτίθη]σι (cf. Pl. *Smp.* 205b5) is too short, and παρατίθη]σι is unlikely in view of the fact that the only parallel would be the late τὸ ὄνομα παραθέμενος (Paus. 2.14.4). The Derveni author, moreover, avoids using a connective particle at the beginning of his comments after a quotation. Perhaps τῶ[ι] ὕδα[τι] ὅλ[ως] τίθη]σι (the adverb qualifies the noun). Cf. Tsantsanoglou, in Laks and Most (1997) 20 n. 59, and Ephor. *FGrHist* 70 F 20a: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ ὅλως, ὅπερ ἐστὶν κοινὸν ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐκείνου προσηγορίας Ἀχελῶιον καλοῦμεν. The traces fit ολ. On evidence for Acheloios as a name of water in general (ὅλως) see scholia on *Il.* 21.194-197 (Erbse vol. 4, 166.82-87), and Isler (1970) 109 ff. The Derveni author thus credits Orpheus (the subject of τίθη]σι) with the use of the river-name ‘Acheloios’ to denote water. Cf. Serv. in *Verg. Georg.* 1.8 (iii.131.20 Thilo-Hagen): sicut Orpheus docet, generaliter aquam Acheloum vocabant. Against the view that according to the Derveni author Orpheus calls water by the river-name ‘Acheloios’ see Betegh (2004) 215-217, who suggests τῶ[ι] ὕδα[τι] οὐ τίθη]σι. This is, however, too short to fill the gap, as is also the case with

τω[ι] ὕδα[τι ὡς (vel ὅτι) τίθη]σι suggested by Janko (2002) 46, who reads δ]ηλ[ο]ν after ὄνομα.

Placing fr. I 65 here is strongly supported by the shape of the fragment; cf. frr. I 37 (col. XVIII), I 40 (col. XIX), I 64 and 61 (col. XX), I 48 (col. XX). There is also a thick vertical fiber that seems to continue from fr. D 11.

12-13 ὅ]τι δὲ | τα[ς]δινα[ς]ξσαι ἐστ[ι...]δε ἐγκατ[...].αι: ἵνα[ς is perhaps preferable to δίνα[ς, and τά[ς]δ' to τὰ[ς] δ'. ἐγκαταλ]έξσαι fills nicely the first gap; for ξσ see Threatte vol. 1, 574, Mayser 185 with further literature. ἐστ[ι](ν) is obvious but the following word is uncertain; perhaps τάς]δε, sc. ἵνας. What comes next is in all likelihood an infinitive. In view of the traces after ἐγκατ, the infinitive in question can only be ἐγκατῶσαι. ἐγκατωθεῖν is not attested elsewhere, but the aorist of κατωθεῖν occurs in tmesis at *Il.* 13.138 and 16.410. Since ἐγκατῶσαι is the Derveni author's interpretation of Orpheus' ἐγκαταλέξαι, it is conceivable that he added the preposition ἐν to κατῶσαι in order to bring this infinitive more into line with ἐγκαταλέξαι. Cf. col. XIX.4-5, where the preposition in ἐπικυρῶσαι seems to merely echo the first component of ἐπικλῶσαι, the word interpreted by the Derveni author as (ἐπ)κυρῶσαι. The main verb is perhaps omitted due to a scribal mistake: e.g. ὅ]τι δὲ | τά[ς]δ' ἵνα[ς ἐγκαταλ]έξσαι ἐστ[ι] τάς]δε ἐγκατῶ[ς]αι (δῆλον). It is also conceivable that this line is an elliptical statement introducing the full explanation of ἐγκαταλέξαι / ἐγκατῶσαι in the following lines, and that ὅτι has the same meaning as in col. IX.10, XVI.1. (ἐγ)κατωθεῖν perhaps refers to the downward motion air/Mind imparted to water when it triggered the transition of the universe to its present state, causing the particles of all other basic entities to sort like to like (col. XXI.1-5): the water moved toward the center of the universe, where the earth also collected as the cosmos was taking shape, and eventually formed all hydrographical features of the Earth's surface (perhaps as it bubbled up on account of its lightness relative to earth).

COL. XXIV

1 ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ [μέ]σου μετρούμενα: as is clear from what comes next, this concludes the Derveni author's explanation of ἰσομελῆ. The missing subject is perhaps not τὰ κυκλοειδέα, as assumed by Janko (2002) 46 and others who think that for the Derveni author ἰσομελής means κυ-

κλειδής (see Janko's critical apparatus *ad loc.*), but τὰ ἰσομελῇ. See next note.

1-2 ὅσα δ[ὲ μ]ῇ | κυκλοειδέα οὐχ οἶόν τε ἰσομελῇ εἶναι: the adjective ἰσομελής, 'equal-limbed', is not attested elsewhere, and most probably occurred as a characterization of the Moon in a hexameter which was quoted in the lower part of the previous column (fr. 17.1 Bernabé). In the Orphic poem this verse was perhaps followed by the one quoted below in 3. The couplet seems to come from a part of the poem concerned with the generation of the heavenly bodies, beginning with the Moon (the Derveni author deals with the Sun and the stars in the following column); whether the formation of the heavenly bodies was assumed to have taken place simultaneously with, or after, the formation of Okeanos and all waters on the Earth's surface is impossible to tell. For a reconstruction of this part of the poem see West (1983) 115, lines 38-45. Followed by Janko (2002) 46, he suggests that the Moon was said to be μεσσόθεν ἰσομελής πάντη, just as Parmenides describes 'what is' as μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη (DK 28 B 8.44), and that in the Orphic poem this characterization of the Moon followed three verses known from the so-called *Orphic Rhapsodies* (OF 91):

μήσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπείριτον, ἣν τε Σελήνην
 ἀθάνατοι κληζουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δέ τε Μῆνην,
 ἣ πόλλ' οὐρε' ἔχει, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

Betegh (2004) 247-248, who assumes that the Derveni author interprets ἰσομελής as 'circular', argues that in the Orphic poem this adjective could not have meant 'circular' because all -μελής compounds apply to beings with projecting members and "a circular or spherical being would be more aptly described by saying that it has no limbs at all"; he, therefore, suggests that in the Orphic poem ἰσομελής referred to the equal horns of the new Moon (which for the Greeks came a day or two after true conjunction). However, the argument from the meaning of -μελής compounds is not convincing because, as Betegh himself acknowledges (see 248 n. 75), Empedocles' σφαῖρος does have μέλη (DK 31 B 30.1) or γυῖα (B 31), though it lacks any projecting members such as arms, legs or genitals (B 29). By saying, moreover, that it is impossible for things which are not round-shaped to be equal-limbed, the Derveni author probably does not mean that the characterization 'equal-limbed' is used in the Orphic poem instead of 'round-shaped'. His point seems rather to be that equal-limbed things like the Moon are round-shaped (cf. previous note) in the sense that being

round-shaped is a necessary condition of being equal-limbed. How the Derveni author interprets 'equal-limbed' can be gleaned from his reading of the verse he quotes in 3 to bolster his interpretation of this attribute: ἢ (sc. ἡ σελήνη) πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεςσι ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

This verse, the Derveni author notes, might be understood differently, i.e. in a way that does not support his explanation of what Orpheus intends by describing the Moon as equal-limbed (4-6): it might be taken to mean that, when the Moon is in excess (ὑπερβάλλει), things are seen to a greater extent than before it is in excess (he assumes tacitly that φαίνειν means 'make to appear' or 'show', not 'give light'). By the Derveni author's lights, however, Orpheus does not mean this, i.e. that the Moon shows things to a greater extent (6). Had Orpheus meant this, he would have said that the Moon shows not "for many" (πολλοῖς) people but "for all" people (πᾶσιν), including those who work the land and sail (and for whom, as Orpheus actually suggests in his verse, the Moon shows), when it is the right time to take to the sea: for, had there been no Moon, people could not have found the numbers of seasons or winds (7-12). The reasoning is rather garbled but its import clear. By saying "the Moon shows for *many people* on the limitless Earth", Orpheus means that the Moon shows for the benefit of many a farmer and sailor when it is the right time to sail and engage in various agricultural activities; since he does not say "the Moon shows for *all people* on the limitless Earth", he cannot mean that the Moon shows things more clearly for the benefit of all people, in which case he would have referred to the Moon when it is in excess.

If the Moon is in excess when it is full, i.e. when its entire hemisphere that faces the Earth is illuminated by the Sun and night vision is good, the Derveni author argues that in the verse he quotes in 3 Orpheus does not refer to the full Moon, the only phase in which the Moon appears as a luminous circle; but this verse is adduced to bolster the Derveni author's interpretation of 'equal-limbed', and thus he can only think that by characterizing the Moon as equal-limbed Orpheus does not refer to the full Moon, i.e. to the Moon as a luminous circle, or as a sphere half of which is illuminated. The contradictory can very well be the interpretation of 'equal-limbed' the Derveni author explicitly rejected in the lower part of the previous column, where he also expounded his own reading of this description. Moreover, since the Derveni author thinks that the verse he quotes to support his interpretation of 'equal-limbed' refers to the Moon in connection with those to whom time-keeping is of particular importance, he can only think that Orpheus' description of the Moon as

equal-limbed picks out a lunar property essential to time-keeping. Exhibiting phases is such a property, in virtue of which the Moon can be plausibly called equal-limbed: the illuminated portions (μέλη) of the spherical face of the Moon that are seen in the phases from new Moon (conjunction) to full Moon (opposition) are equal in reverse order to those that are seen in the phases from full Moon to new Moon.

If this is how the Derveni author understands Orpheus' characterization of the Moon as equal-limbed, by saying that it is impossible for not round-shaped things to be equal-limbed, he must mean that, had a body like the Moon not been round-shaped or spherical, it could not have been equal-limbed in the sense explained above, which means that it could not have exhibited phases (thus κυκλοειδής does not mean 'circular', as at Euc. *Opt.* 36.1, but 'spherical'; cf. Stob. 1.21.9.17-18). For this argument see Arist. *Cael.* 291b18-21.

2 δηλοῖ δὲ τόδε: sc. τὸ ἔπος (cf. 4). What is made clear by the Orphic verse quoted next is most probably the Derveni author's explanation of ἰσομελής, a characterization of the Moon in Orpheus' poem, not the fact that τὰ ἰσομελῆ cannot but be κυκλοειδέα. The Derveni author seems to argue in the following lines that the Orphic verse refers not to the luminous circle of the full Moon but to the Moon as an instrument for time-keeping. From this he perhaps infers implicitly that in his poem Orpheus is interested in the time-keeping function of the Moon, and that Orpheus' description of the Moon as equal-limbed, which might very well have occurred in the previous verse, ought to be understood in the light of the fact that the Moon makes time-keeping possible. If so, by the Derveni author's lights 'equal-limbed' picks out a property of the Moon essential to time-keeping: exhibiting phases is such a property, and the description of the Moon as equal-limbed might very well pick it out. See previous note.

3 “ἡ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσι ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν”: fr. 17.2 Bernabé. ἡ = ἡ σελήνη.

4 τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος δόξειεν ἂν τις ἄλλως ἐρῆσθαι: “one might think that the verse just quoted has been intended differently” (cf. Laks and Most [1997] 21 and Janko [2002] 49), i.e. that it does not support the Derveni author's explanation of what Orpheus means by calling the Moon equal-limbed.

4-6 ὅτι, | ἦν ὑπερβάληι, μᾶλλον τὰ ἐόντα φαίγεται ἢ πρὶν | ὑπερβάλλειν: sc. ἡ σελήνη. The Orphic verse in 3 might be thought to mean that, when the

Moon is in excess (ὑπερβάλῃ), things (τὰ ἔόντα) are shown to a greater extent; the Derveni author assumes tacitly that φαίνειν in the verse at issue here means ‘make to appear’ or ‘show’, not ‘give light’. On this reading, which the Derveni author will next reject, Orpheus refers to the time of the full Moon, when there is plenty of moonlight and the Moon shows things more clearly than at any other time of the month. The intransitive verb ὑπερβάλλειν can only pick out the fact that the illuminated portion of the Moon’s surface facing the Earth is larger at full Moon than at any other lunar phase. ὑπερβάλλειν is said of the Moon in *E. Hel.* 1367 and of the Sun in *Hdt.* 4.184.2, but the first passage is corrupt and in the second the verb might refer to the noon altitude of the Sun, to the Sun’s scorching heat on the hottest summer days, or to its noon altitude on these days.

6 ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, φαίνειν αὐτήν: ὁ δὲ = ὁ Ὀρφεύς. The statement is elliptical: ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, μᾶλλον τὰ ἔόντα φαίνειν αὐτήν (sc. τὴν σελήνην) ἢν ὑπερβάλῃ ἢ πρὶν ὑπερβάλλειν.

7-8 εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγε, οὐκ ἂν “πολλοῖς” ἔφη φαίνειν αὐτήν, | ἀλλὰ ‘πᾶσιν’: had Orpheus meant that the Moon shows things more clearly when full, he would have said that the Moon shows things not “to many” people but ‘to all’ people, or not “for the benefit of many” people but “for the benefit of all” people (as turns out from 10-12, the Moon is for the benefit of humans, so the datives are as much indirect objects of φαίνειν as datives of advantage). Aristophanes estimates that the Moon allows the average Athenian to cut lighting expenses by one drachma each month (*Nu.* 610-614).

8-9 ἅμα τοῖς τε τὴν γῆν ἐργαζομένοις | καὶ τοῖς ναυτιλλομένοις: had Orpheus meant that the Moon shows things more clearly when it is full, he would have said “(when full) the Moon shows (things more clearly) to all people”, including farmers and sailors. Farmers and sailors are evidently the people to whom Orpheus actually refers with πολλοῖς, as the Derveni author takes it. What the Moon shows to farmers and sailors will turn out not to be what the full Moon shows to all people, i.e. things at night; nor does the Moon show what it does to farmers and sailors only when it is full (see below on 10-12).

9-10 ὅποτε χρὴ πλεῖν τούτοις | τὴν ὥραν: an indirect question depending on φαίνειν in an omitted relative clause modifying ναυτιλλομένοις (a similar in-

direct question concerning farmers is evidently omitted): οἷς λέγει ὁ Ὀρφεὺς φαίνειν τὴν σελήνην. The Moon shows seamen when it is the right time for them to sail (τὴν ὥραν is used adverbially, as in Hdt. 2.2.11 and X. *Oec.* 20.16.3).

10-12 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν σελήνη, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηύρ[ι]σκον | οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὔτε τῶν ὥρέων οὔτε τῶν | ἀνέμων[ν: in view of the preceding indirect question, it is perhaps preferable to assume that ὥρη means not only 'season' but also 'right moment for something', and to take ἀριθμός in the sense 'time'; cf. Arist. *Ph.* 219b5 (ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος), and Pl. *Ti.* 37d6-7 (μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν). It was, of course, by the fixed stars phases that one could tell the time of seasonal changes, the right time for e.g. sowing or taking to the sea, and the prevailing weather conditions on a given day; on the fixed star phases see Evans (1998) 190-198. According to Hesiod, the morning rising of the Pleiades signaled the time to harvest the wheat, their morning setting the time to plow the land (*Op.* 383-384); the evening rising of Arcturus signaled the return of spring (*Op.* 564-569), and the hottest days of summer came with the morning rising of Sirius (*Op.* 582-588); the morning setting of the Pleiades and Orion signaled the end of good conditions for sailing, and the onset of stormy winds (*Op.* 618-622). By the fifth century BC this body of empirical knowledge was systematized into a παράπηγμα, a 'star calendar', in which the morning risings and settings of important stars and constellations were listed in order of appearance as the Sun moves through the zodiacal signs in its annual course, each entry being usually accompanied by weather predictions, so that one could tell the time of the year and the weather by the fixed star phases; on star calendars see Evans (1998) 199-203 and A. Rehm, 'Parapegma' in *RE*. Geminus (*Isag.* 17.7-10 Aujac) suggests that weather conditions usually prevailing when the Sun is in a certain sign became associated with the fixed star phases, which then came to be erroneously regarded as the causes of the weather phenomena, because the chaotic state of Greek civil calendars made it impossible to associate weather conditions, days and months. But the fixed star phases, which tell sailors and farmers the right time of the year for various activities and allow them to predict the weather, will fall within certain lunar months of a luni-solar calendar, provided that it is well-regulated. Since the phases of the Moon demarcate and measure the months, the Moon insofar as it exhibits phases makes it possible for sailors or farmers to predict the weather and find out when it is the right time for their activities. If this

is what the Derveni author means here, the Moon shows the time indirectly, for the celestial time-teller proper is not e.g. the new Moon, with which a lunar month of interest to a farmer or a sailor begins, but a fixed star phase that will occur in the given month.

COL. XXV

1 καὶ λαμπρό[τ]ητα: Burkert (1997) 168 suggests τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη, ὑπερβάλλοντά ἐστιν θερμότητα for the missing part of the sentence, a plausible supplement in view of what the Derveni author proceeds to say about the matter of the Moon (he is still in the part of the poem dealing with the generation of the heavenly bodies!); Janko (2002) 48 reads λαμπρό[τ]ητα instead of λαμπρό[τ]ητα, supplementing accordingly τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη θερμά ἐστι. On λαμπρότης and the hypothetical but plausible θερμότης see Intro. V § 9.

1-2 τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡ σελήνη [λ]ευκότατα μὲν | τῶν ἄλλων: see Intro. V § 10. Beegh (2004) 246 argues that λευκός here means neither 'bright', 'brilliant' nor 'pale', 'wan' but simply 'white', and that the adjective describes the Moon as the whitest among the heavenly bodies (τὰ ἄλλα) in agreement with our visual experience. If so, the Derveni author contrasts the Moon, the whitest celestial body, with the Sun, the brightest celestial body (see previous note), just as in *R.* 616e8-617a4 Plato singles out Jupiter as the whitest celestial body and the Sun as the brightest. Empedocles, however, says that the Sun is λευκός (*DK* 31 B 21.3, cf. *Arist. Mete.* 341a35-36) and, even if by λευκός he means not both 'white and brilliant' but only 'brilliant', it is conceivable that the Derveni author does not intend to deny the most intense whiteness to the extremely bright Sun, in order to attribute this property to the considerably less bright Moon. Perhaps he takes lunar matter to be extremely white not in the sense in which the Sun can be plausibly said to be extremely white on account of its brightness. Burkert (1997) 169 suggests that, if the Derveni author was aware that the Moon shines with reflected sunlight, he might have thought that the Moon must be white and not dark in order to function as a mirror. If the Derveni author does know the real source of moonlight, however, perhaps he thinks of lunar whiteness as effect of 'reflectiveness' or, anachronistically speaking, 'albedo' (for whiteness as effect of reflectiveness see [*Arist.*] *Pr.* 932a21-38), and of solar whiteness as effect of intrinsic brightness:

he may say that the matter of the Moon is the whitest, instead of most reflective, because he lacks an appropriate term for 'reflective', and he may think of lunar matter as the most reflective of all kinds of matter because the sunlight which is mirrored by the Moon is clearly visible on the distant Earth.

2 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεμερισμένα: Betegh (2004) 53 translates "divided according to the same principle (*or*: measure)". Laks and Most (1997) 21, Janko (2002) 51 and Jourdan (2003) 25 take λόγος in the sense 'principle'. It might as well be used in the sense 'ratio'. Cf. Arist. *Ph.* 233a3-4: τοῦτου δὲ διαιρουμένου καὶ τὸ ΓΚ μέγεθος διαιρεθήσεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (at issue here are successive divisions of time and distance, which are in the same ratio, as is clear from the conclusion of the argument in 233a11-12: δῆλον καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἅπαν ἐστὶ συνεχές· τὰς αὐτὰς γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἴσας διαγρέσεις ὁ χρόνος διαιρεῖται καὶ τὸ μέγεθος). Since the context is a contrast of the Sun with the Moon in terms of their composition, the Derveni author might compare the fine particulate structure of the lunar and solar matter (cf. col. XXI.2): τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡ σελήνη ... κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεμερισμένα τοῖς ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος. If so, what he is saying is most probably that lunar matter is divided to the same extent as solar matter, i.e. that their particles are of the same size. Perhaps he implies that the particles of solar and lunar matter are equally minute because they are mostly found in the outer reaches of the present universe, whereas all other kinds of matter that are divided up in larger particles are found mostly around the center; cf. the peripheral position of fine atoms in Leucippus' cosmogony (DK 67 A 1) and the atomist conception of fire as composed of the most minute atoms (see above on col. XVII.9). Alternatively, the Derveni author might refer to the lunar and solar matter on the large scale, in which case his point is not that the particles of lunar matter are of the same size as those of solar matter but that the masses of the Sun and Moon are equal, as one might perhaps infer from the equal apparent sizes of these celestial bodies: the masses of solar and lunar matter have been divided, i.e. from the rest of the universe, according to the same ratio, which means that they are each the same portion of all matter. Cf. Betegh (2004) 245.

3 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νῦν: Burkert (1997) 169-170 proposes that the Derveni author has the Milky Way in mind but, as Betegh (2004) 301-302 correctly points out, the evidence in support of this suggestion is extremely weak. It is evidently the stars that the Derveni author has in mind here.

3-4 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἑκάς | ἀλλήλων α[ι]ωρούμεν': the floating of the stars within air/Mind might be nothing but their scintillation, conceived of as a rapid oscillatory motion within very confined limits (for the use of αἰωρεῖσθαι in the sense 'to oscillate' cf. Pl. *Phd.* 112b3). This conception of scintillation is alluded to by Aristotle in *Cael.* 290a18-24, where he argues that scintillation is the trembling or wavering not of a star itself but rather of our sight, as it extends from the eye to the very distant star. Since in 7-9 the Derveni author assumes that the stars are prevented from aggregating, perhaps he thinks that they scintillate, i.e. oscillate rapidly, because they constantly strive to come together and, being almost immediately prevented from moving in one direction, tend vainly to move in another.

7 αἰωρεῖται δ' αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκῃ: as Betegh (2004) 268-269 plausibly suggests, necessity might be identified with air/Mind, in which the stars float, or its agency.

7-8 ὡς ἂν μὴ συνίη | πρὸς ἄλληλα: pieces of the same kind of matter have the tendency to come together (see 8-9 and cf. col. XXI.1-5). Responsible for keeping the stars scattered is evidently the agency or air/Mind, in which they float.

8 εἰ γὰρ μή: sc. ἡωρεῖτο αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκῃ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι.

8-9 συνέλθοι (ἂν) ἀλέα ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν | δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη: had the stars not been prevented from clumping, pieces of matter with the same power as the constituents of the Sun would have drawn together; the stars are thus masses of fire. The adjective ἀλέα recalls Empedocles' implicit reference to the Sun as an agglomeration of fire (DK 31 B 41): ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀλίσθεϊς μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφοτελεί (cf. the comment on this fragment in Macr. *Sat.* 1.17.46 and see also D.L. 8.77). δύναμις is perhaps the brightness and hotness of fire. Cf. [Hp.] *VM* 15: ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ θερμὰ καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς δυνάμεις ὑπεναντίας ἐωντοῖσιν ἔχοντα.

9-10 τὰ νῦν ἑόντα | ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ἤθελεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν ἥλιον: the counterfactual is evidently intended as the first step in a rather elliptical explanation of why the stars must be kept scattered, so that pieces of matter with the same power as the constituents of the Sun cannot come together. For the second step see next note.

10-11 ἐποίησε δὲ | τοιοῦτον καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον: sc. τὸν ἥλιον. God, i.e. air/Mind (see Intro. VI § 16), made the Sun of a particular sort and size. τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον are to be supplied in the apodosis of the preceding counterfactual. Air/Mind must keep the stars scattered, in order for pieces of matter with the same power as the constituents of the Sun not to come together, for it would not have made the Sun of a particular sort and size if it had not wanted the cosmos (τὰ νῦν ἑόντα) to exist. The Derveni author argues that, were the stars to clump, and so pieces of matter with the same power as the constituents of the Sun to glom together, the Sun would cease to be of its present sort and size; but Mind made the Sun of this particular sort and size because it wanted the cosmos to exist; that the Sun would fail to be of the present sort and size is thus impossible, for in that case the cosmos would cease to exist.

According to Burkert (1997) 170, what the Derveni author is saying is that the stars (or the Milky Way, as Burkert takes it) would coalesce to form a second Sun of a rival cosmos, which could threaten ours. According to Betegh (2004) 302-303, the Derveni author envisages a cosmic catastrophe, in case the scattered fire of the stars came together, because this fire would accrete to the Sun, whose inflation would make the cosmic order collapse. The formation of another Sun also could be assumed to entail the destruction of the cosmic order. Cf. Alexander's answer to Darius' proposals before the battle at Arbela in D.S. 17.54.5.2-6.1:

καθόλου δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις μεγαλοῦχοις λόγοις χρησάμενος καὶ τοὺς μὲν λόγους τῶν Περσῶν ἀποδοκιμάσας, προτιμήσας δὲ τὴν εὐδοξίαν τῶν προτεινομένων δωρεῶν τοῖς μὲν πρέσβεσιν ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκεν ὡς οὕθ' ὁ κόσμος дуεῖν ἡλίω ὄντων τηρῆσαι δύναιτ' ἂν τὴν ἰδίαν διακόσμησιν τε καὶ τάξιν οὕθ' ἡ οἰκουμένη δύο βασιλέων ἐχόντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀταράχως καὶ ἀστασιάστως διαμένειν ἂν δύναιτο.

By arguing that the Sun would cease to be as large as it is now (τοσοῦτος) if the stars came together, the Derveni author can only presuppose that the cosmic order would collapse, in case the stars ceased to be scattered, because they would accrete to the Sun, causing it to balloon up. However, that the Sun would also fail to be of the present sort (τοιοῦτος) can very well mean that the Sun would no longer be μονογενής (for the adjective see Parm. DK 28 B 8.4, Pl. *Ti.* 313b3). The Derveni author might think that, if the stars were not kept scattered, many would accrete to the Sun, which would inflate as a result, but many would coalesce into other massive globes of fire, and that the cosmic order would be destroyed by the inflation of the Sun, as well as by the emergence of other fireballs comparable

in size to the Sun. Nothing in the Derveni author's cosmology suggests that, after air/Mind caused the Sun to form, the remaining fire in the universe would concentrate around a single point, the center of the Sun, if left unhindered.

11-12 οἶος ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου | διηγείται: cf. Pl. *Tht.* 144c6, οἶον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγῇ. Here διηγείται is passive, as in col. XV.8; see *ad loc.* Tsantsanoglou and Parássoglou (1988) 126 suggest that the Derveni author refers back to col. IV, where he quotes Heraclitus on the stable size of the Sun; if Heraclitus is quoted there in connection with the preservation of cosmic order (cf. col. IV.3-4), a reference to col. IV is appropriate here in view of the author's point in the preceding lines. ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου thus means 'at the beginning of the treatise', which entails that before col. IV there were only a few columns. According to Betegh (2004) 327-329, in col. IV the Derveni author quotes Heraclitus most probably to back up his view that the cosmic order could not have arisen by chance, and is preserved because air/Mind constrains the size of the Sun. Here, though, he refers back to the Orphic couplet in col. VIII.4-5 as interpreted in col. IX, not to col. IV; in Betegh's view ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου means 'at the beginning of Orpheus' poem', which entails that the couplet in col. VIII.4-5 comes from the beginning of the poem. As interpreted by the Derveni author, this couplet does hint that air/Mind purposefully turned only a sufficiently large amount of fire into the Sun, i.e. that it made the Sun of a certain size, when it initiated the transition of the universe to its present state; what is emphasized in the surviving part of col. IX, however, is the importance of this fact for the rest of the cosmogony, not for the preservation of the cosmos.

12 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπίπροσθε π[ο]ιεῖται: for the expression ἐπίπροσθε(v) ποιεῖσθαι τι, 'place before one as a screen', see LSJ s.v. ἐπίπροσθεν.

13 ἐν δὲ [τ]ῶδε σημαί[ν]ε[ι]: it is unclear whether this formula introduces the following quotation as evidence of what the Derveni author has just said, or merely as another Orphic verse to be interpreted next.

14 "[αὐτ]ᾶρ [ἐ]πεὶ δ[ὲ] πάν]τα Διό[ς] φρὴν μ[ὴ]σατ[ο] ἔργα": fr. 18.1 Bernabé, as supplemented by Tsantsanoglou. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 10.45 and Hes. *Th.* 172. The Derveni author has reached the completion of the cosmogony in Orpheus' poem. Zeus has brought forth the cosmos anew from within himself and, as is made clear in the next and final column of the papyrus, conceives a desire to copulate with his own mother. It is unclear who Zeus'

mother is, and which events (if any) followed his yearning to couple with her (see Intro. IV §§ 4-5). Tsantsanoglou suggests that the discussion in the next column presupposes the hexameter μητρὸς ἕως (ἐοῖ') ἔθελεν μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότῃ, which in the poem followed the one quoted here; the Derveni author must have quoted this verse in the lost final section of the present column. West (1983) 115, line 47, proposes ἤθελε μητρὸς ἕως μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότῃ (fr. 18.2 Bernabé), and Merkelbach (1967) 31 ὁ δ' ἤθελεν ἐν φιλότῃ | μητρὸς ἕως — μιχθήμεναι. The Derveni author, however, argues in col. XXVI.9-12 that, if Orpheus had wished to show Zeus conceiving a desire to copulate with his own mother, he could have said ἐοῖο instead of ἕως, which suggests that in the Orphic verse at issue ἕως and ἐοῖο were interchangeable. The surviving section of the next column is almost entirely devoted to the interpretation of ἕως. Which cosmological truth the Derveni author extracts from μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότῃ cannot be determined.

COL. XXVI

1 “μη[τρ]ὸς” μὲν ὅτι μήτηρ ὁ Νοῦς ἐστὶν τῶν ἄλλων: for the verse presupposed in this column see above on col. XXV.14. After τῶν ἄλλων understand ἐόντων, specifically νῦν ἐόντων, i.e. all non-fundamental contents of the present universe on all scales, in other words the system called cosmos that includes air/Mind as its supreme principle (see Intro. V § 2). ὑπαρχόντων will not do, although air/Mind is one of them, for the other basic entities never came into existence, and cannot be plausibly said to have been ‘born’ from air/Mind. See also above on col. XXII.8.

2 “ἕως” δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθός: for ἐός = ἀγαθός see Apollonius Dyskolus, *Synt.* 213.7-8 Uhlig, on *Il.* 24.292 (αἶται δ' οἰωνὸν ἐὸν ἄγγελον): νῦν γὰρ φασιν οὐκ ἀντωνυμικῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ ἐόν ἀλλ' ἐπιθετικῶς, σημαίνον τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cf. *Prom.* 48.3-5 Schneider, Scholia in *Il.* 24.292 (Erbse vol. 5, 572.94), *EM* 307.33-35 and 318.1-5. ἐός in the sense ἀγαθός should take the smooth breathing; see, however, Hainsworth on *Od.* 8.325 (Heubeck, West and Hainsworth [1988] 369). Goodness is implicitly attributed to air/Mind, perhaps on account of the fact that air/Mind brought about the cosmos for the best, as is clear from col. XXIV.10-12 and col. XXV. Air/Mind, the cause of the cosmogony and the highest principle of the cosmos, is perhaps also conceived of as the cause of good in the cosmos. In *Metaph.* 984b32-985a10 Aristotle attributes to Empedocles an inchoate conception of Love as the cause of good and argues that for Empedocles Love is in

effect identical with the good (since the cause of good cannot but be the good itself); this identification is extended to Anaxagoras' Mind in *Metaph.* 1075b1-8. See also above on col. IV.2-3.

2-3 δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν | ὅτι ἀγαθὴν σημαίνει: here, as in 5, δηλοῖ is perhaps used impersonally (cf. δεδήλωται in col. XIII.2). There is no reason to assume with Obbink (1997) 41 n. 4 that the Derveni author seems to attribute *Od.* 8.335 and *Il.* 24.527-528, which he quotes next, to Orpheus, and that in the author's view Homer borrowed these verses from Orpheus' poem. The subject of σημαίνει is evidently the word (τὸ ῥῆμα) ἐᾶς.

4 "Ἑρμῇ Μαιάδος υἱὲ διάκτορε δῶτορ ἐάων": *Od.* 8.335, transmitted as Ἑρμεῖα Διὸς υἱὲ διάκτορε δῶτορ ἐάων. The formula Μαιάδος υἱός/υἱεῖ/υἱόν/υἱέ occurs in the *Homeric Hymns* (4.1, 73, 408, 424, 430, 439, 498, 514, 521, 567, 574), and is often expanded to Διὸς καὶ Μ. υἱ. (4.235, 301, 446, 579, 18.10, 29.7). The contracted forms Ἑρμῆς/ῆν etc. occur in the epic, but the vocative Ἑρμῇ is first found in *H. Hom.* 18.12.

6-7 "δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακίηται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
δῶρων, οἷα διδοῦσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δέ τ' ἐάων":

Il. 24.527-528, a famous distich from Achilles' speech to Priam. κατακίηται is erroneously substituted for κατακείαται, apparently in view of perfects such as πεποτήταται, κεκλήατο etc.; see also on col. XV.8. διδοῦσι, also found in the scholia to *Pi. P.* 3.141, is probably an error for the reading δίδωσι, which is attested in all manuscripts, perhaps due to θεοί, the subject in the previous sentence; it is Zeus, however, who dispenses good and evil gifts to mortals, as is clear from the next verse (24.529): ᾧ μὲν κ' ἄμμι-ξας δῶη Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος. Bentley had conjectured ἕτερος δέ τ' ἐάων instead of the MSS reading ἕτερος δέ ἐάων, the only evidence of an initial digamma in ἐᾶς. Richardson (1993) 331 notes that "there is no obvious reason why the τε should have been lost in all other texts, and it is more likely to be due to a conjecture".

8-9 οἱ δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα οὐ γινώσκοντες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι | 'μητρὸς ἐαντοῦ': τὸ ῥῆμα is either ἐᾶς or μητρὸς ἐᾶς.

11-12 ἐξῆν αὐτῶι γράμματα παρακλίναντα | 'μητρὸς ἐοῖο' εἶπε[τ]ιν: sc. τῶι Ὀρφεῖ. For the use of παρακλίνειν in this context cf. *Pl. Cra.* 400b11-c2 and 410a1-5.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

BERNABÉ	A. BERNABÉ, <i>Poetae Epici Graeci: Testimonia et Fragmenta, Pars II: Orphicorum et Orphicis Similium Testimonia et Fragmenta</i> , 2 vols., Munich and Leipzig, Saur 2004-2005.
BKT	<i>Berliner Klassikertexte</i> , herausgegeben von der Generalverwaltung der kgl. Museen zu Berlin, Berlin, Weidmann 1904 –.
DK	H. DIELS, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 3 vols., 6 th edition, revised by W. KRANZ, Berlin, Weidmann 1952.
ERBSE	H. ERBSE, <i>Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (scholia vetera)</i> , 7 vols., Berlin, de Gruyter 1969-1988.
GP	J.D. DENNISTON, <i>The Greek Particles</i> , Oxford, Clarendon Press 1954 ² .
KG	R. KÜHNER and B. GERTH, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, 2. Teil: Satzlehre</i> , 2 vols., Hanover, Hahnsche Buchhandlung 1966 (reprint of 3 rd edition, 1898).
KRS	G.S. KIRK, J.E. RAVEN and M. SCHOFIELD, <i>The Presocratic Philosophers</i> , Cambridge, University Press 1983 ² .
LM	A. LAKS and G.W. MOST (eds.), <i>Studies on the Derveni Papyrus</i> , Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997.
LSJ	H.G. LIDDELL and R. SCOTT, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9 th edition, revised by H. STUART JONES and R. MCKENZIE, with Supplement edited by P.G.W. GLARE, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1996.
MAYSER	E. MAYSER, <i>Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit, Bd. 1.1: Laut- und Wortlehre</i> , Bearb. von H. SCHMOLL, Berlin, de Gruyter 1970 ² .
MEISTERHANS	K. MEISTERHANS, <i>Grammatik der attischen Inschriften</i> , Berlin, Weidmann 1900 ³ .
OF	<i>Orphicorum Fragmenta</i> , collegit O. KERN, Berlin, Weidmann 1922.
SCHWYZER	E. SCHWYZER, <i>Griechische Grammatik</i> , 3 vols., Munich, Beck 1968 (= <i>HbAW</i> : Abt. 2, T. 1).
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
fr. 18.2: XXVI. 1, 2, 9, 10

fr. 398: XXII. 12

PLATES

(Reconstruction of the Roll by
G.M. Parássoglou and K. Tsantsanoglou)

PLATE 1
The Roll. — *Column I.*



G 17

G 8

End of Col. I and beginning of Col. II

The two larger pieces of the roll before separation of the layers.
Visible are what are now fragments B 12 (Col. XXII) and G 1 (Col. V).



The same scale (1.25:1) applies to all plates.

PLATE 2
Column II.






PLATE 3
Column III.




F7




G 5a

(G 5)



G 11




F8



F9

PLATE 4
Column IV.

H 46




G 4



H 8

G 13



F 7



PLATE 5
Column V.




G12



G1



H2



F13

F5a

F11

F12




G3

$\downarrow k_2$



G10

PLATE 6
Column VI.



H 18

H 28

(F 5a)

(F 5a)

F6

(F 3a)

159

 $\uparrow k_f$

FS

F3

185

H65 H64

C2

PLATE 8
Column VIII.




PLATE 9
Column IX.




PLATE 11
Column XI.

↓ k₆

IN C N A M H N I O I O
 T H X I T T K O K O Y I
 E N T O I A Y T O M E
 X P H Z A I A E K A I A
 K R E Y A X O A J A E
 I T O X P H Z A I
 X P A N T O N A E Y O T
 P E T K O M E N O I A S
 E S P H Z E A S
 T O I X E A S
 I C A P A
 H O I O N
 T T O A I X Y

C4


↑ k₆

E4

C P H Z A I
 N A I T E R A D O X
 I O I T E A N A A M
 A M M A N E I
 E A T A I
 I P H O S A I
 E S T A I
 C I P I
 K I T O
 O Y A
 I N

C3

PLATE 12
Column XII.



I k8

I 63

I 11

H 52

H 34

PLATE 15
Column XV.



C9

H 52



C8

H 56

PLATE 16
Column XVI.





PLATE 17
Column XVII.



B 4a

[illegible]

B3

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B 2

STAYED D2

D 2

H 30

[illegible]

(D 2a)

STAYED D2

Column XIX.

 $\downarrow k_{II}$

B1

B1

D3

H 39

B7

B7

B7


D2

[illegible]

H 43

05 H

PLATE 21
Column XXI.



(D 6a)

B 11
↑ k₁₃

D 8

H 38
↑ k₁₃

D 9

H 37

B 12

I 10

A 1

I 60

A 9

H 19

H 37

H 38

$\downarrow k_{14}$

173

165

A 3

 $\uparrow k_{14}$

HH 26


PLATE 24

Column XXIV.

D 12

D 13

↓ k₁₅



I 20

(A 4a, behind I 20)

A 4

H 6

A 3

A 4

A 4a

A 4b

A 4c

A 4d

A 4e

A 4f

A 4g

A 4h

A 4i

A 4j

A 4k

A 4l

A 4m

A 4n

A 4o

A 4p

A 4q

A 4r

A 4s

A 4t

A 4u

A 4v

A 4w

A 4x

A 4y

A 4z

H 9

H 15

PLATE 25

Column XXV.




PLATE 26
Column XXVI.




PLATE 27
Unplaced fragments in glasses F and G.




PLATE 28
Unplaced fragments in glass H.



H1



H4



H10



H11



H12



H13



H16



H17



H21



H22



H24



H29



H32



H40



H41



H47



H48



H57



H58



H68



H59



H62



H63



H66



H67

For H 45 see Plate 27.

PLATE 29
Unplaced fragments in glass I.



11



13



14



16



17



18



111



112



114



115



116



117



118



119



123



124



125



127



128



129



131



132



136



138




142



143

PLATE 30

Unplaced fragments in glass I.



144



145



146



147



150



151




152



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
188



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191-92



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