

### 1. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.135; trans. C.C.W. Taylor

Δημόκριτος δὲ ὅτε μὲν ἀναίρει τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν· 'νόμῳ' γὰρ φησι 'γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροίη· ἔτεῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.' (ὑπερ <ἔστι>· νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν).

In some places Democritus does away with the sensory appearances, and says that none of them appear in reality but only in opinion, and that what is real in things is that there are atoms and void. For he says 'By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but in reality atoms and void.' That is to say, the sensible qualities are conventionally considered and thought to exist, but in reality they do not exist, but only atoms and the void.

### 2. GALEN, *On the Elements according to Hippocrates* 1.2, 1.417.9-418.7K; trans. C.C.W. Taylor

'Νόμῳ γὰρ χροίη νόμῳ γλυκὺ νόμῳ πικρὸν, ἔτεῃ δ' ἄτομα καὶ κενόν' ὁ Δημόκριτος φησιν ἐκ τῆς συνόδου τῶν ἀτόμων γίνεσθαι νομίζων ἀπάσας τὰς αἰσθητὰς ποιότητας ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους αὐτῶν, φύσει δ' οὐδὲν εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ ξανθὸν ἢ ἐρυθρὸν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν. τὸ γὰρ δὴ νόμῳ ταῦτ' οὕτως βούλεται τῷ οἴῳ νομιστὶ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ κατ' αὐτὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν φύσιν. [ὑπερ δ' αὖ πάλιν ἔτεῃ καλεῖται παρὰ τὸ ἔτερον, ὑπερ ἀληθὲς δηλοῖ, ποιήσας τὸ ὄνομα.] καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ σύμπαρ νοῦς αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου τοιόσδε· νομίζεται μὲν τι παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔν τε καὶ μηδὲν ἔστι τὰ πάντα. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηκεν αὐτὸς ἔν τε μὲν τὰς ἀτόμους ὀνομάζων, μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν.

'For by convention colour, by convention sweet, by convention bitter, but in reality atoms and the void' says Democritus, who thinks that all the perceptible qualities are brought into being, relative to us who perceive them, by the combination of atoms, but by nature nothing is white or black or yellow or red or bitter or sweet. By the expression 'by convention' he means 'conventionally' and 'relative to us', not according to the nature of things themselves, which he calls by contrast 'reality,' forming the term from 'real' which means 'true'. The whole substance of this theory is as follows. People think of things as being white and black and sweet and bitter and all the other qualities of that kind, but in truth 'thing' and 'nothing' is all there is. That too is something he himself said, 'thing' being his name for the atoms and 'nothing' for the void.

### 3. PLUTARCH, *Against Colotes* 1110E-1111A; trans. C.C.W. Taylor

τὸ γὰρ νόμῳ χροίη εἶναι καὶ νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ σύγκρισιν <ἄπασαν, ἔτεῃ δὲ τὸ κενόν καὶ> τὰς ἀτόμους εἰρημένον φησιν ὑπὸ Δημοκρίτου <μάχεσθαι> ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ τὸν ἐμμένοντα τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καὶ χρώμενον οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς <ἄνθρωπος> ἔστιν ἢ ζῆ διανοηθῆναι... τί γὰρ λέγει Δημόκριτος; οὐσίας ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος ἀτόμους τε καὶ ἀδιαφθόρους, ἔτι δ' ἀποίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι διεσπαρμένας· ὅταν δὲ πελάσωσιν ἀλλήλαις ἢ συμπέσωσιν ἢ περιπλακῶσι, φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἀθροισμένων τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπον, εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους, ἰδέας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ εἶναι γένεσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὄντων μηδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι τῷ μήτε πάσχειν μήτε μεταβάλλειν τὰς ἀτόμους ὑπὸ στερότητας· ὅθεν οὔτε χροῖαν ἐξ ἀχρώστων οὔτε φύσιν ἢ ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀποίων καὶ <ἀψύχων> ὑπάρχειν.

For he says that Democritus' statements that colour and sweetness and the compound and the rest are by convention, but the void and the atoms in reality contradict the senses, and that someone who abides by this theory and applies it would not consider that he is a man or that he is alive... For what does Democritus say? That an infinite number of atomic, undifferentiated substances, incapable of affecting or being affected, travel about, scattered in the void. And whenever they approach one another, come together or get entangled with one another, these collections appear as water, fire, a plant, or a man. Everything consists of the atoms, which he calls 'forms,' and there is nothing else. For there is no coming to be from what is not, and nothing could come to be from what is, since, because of their solidity, the atoms neither are affected nor change. Hence no colour comes into being from colourless things, nor any nature or soul from things which can neither affect nor be affected.