

1. DL VII 49-50  
= LS 39 A

Scan from

2. SE M VIII 60

3. Aetius 4.23.1  
= LS 53 M

4. SE M VII  
228-231  
Σ 372-374

ἀδύναται τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθηθῆσως προτάτεται λόγον, καθὼς τὸ κριτήριον, ὃ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκειται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ, καὶ καθὼς ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος, ποσῶν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔνευ φαντασίας οὐκ ἔνευ φαντασίας. Ἄ) προγοῖται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητικῆ ὑπόθεσιν, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ. Ἄ) διαφέρει δὲ φαντασία καὶ φάντασμα: φάντασμα γὰρ ἐστὶ δόκησις διανοίας οἷα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, φαντασία δὲ ἐστὶ τῆσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ β' Περὶ ψυχῆς ὑφίσταται, οὗ γὰρ δεκτὸν τὴν τῶν ὕπνων οἰονεῖ τύπον οφθαλμοκινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἀνεύθεκτον ἐστὶ πρῶτον τύπου κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι.

πάντας οὖν ἐπινοίας προ-  
γέσθαι δεῖ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθηθῆσως περιττωσιν, καὶ  
διὰ τοῦτ' ἀναρρομῆσιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
συνναίεσθαι πᾶσα νόησις.

οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονητοῖς τόμοις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθηθῆσιν ἐν τῷ  
ἡγεμονικῷ.

φαιτωμαῖα οὖν ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοῦς τύποις ἐν ψυχῇ. πρὶ τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ διατηρήσεως. [Αἰσθηθῆσιν μὲν γὰρ ἦκουσε τὴν τῶν ὕπνων κατὰ εἰσὸν γὰρ τε καὶ ἐξὸν γὰρ, αὐτοῦ καὶ (τῆς) διὰ τῶν δεκτικῶν γινόμενης τοῦ κληροῦ τύπων, Χρύσιππος δὲ ἀποτοῦ ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτο, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ φησὶ, τῆς διανοίας δεήσει ὑπὸ ἐν ποτε τῶν γένων τι καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ οἶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον διαφέουσα ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶ οὐχίματα ἅμα τε τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περὶ φησὶ, ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἀποτοῦ. εἶτα πολλῶν ἅμα φαντασιῶν ὑποτακτικῶν ἐν ἡμῶν παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοῖς οὐχίματιοῦς ἔχει τὴν ψυχῇ, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου κείνου ἐστὶν, αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενοεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπινοήσεως, ὡστ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἐρε- ποίωσις ψυχῆς," μηκέτι ἀποτοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶμα ὑπὸ εἶνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πολλῶν περὶ ἡμῶν συστατικῶν φαντασιῶν παμπληθεῖς ἀνα- δέχεσθαι ἐπινοήσεως ἀποτοῦ γὰρ ὁ ἀπὸ ὅσων πολλοὶ φαντασιῶν, ἀμυθῆσιν ὑπὸ ἐν καὶ διαφερούσας ἀναδέχεσθαι πολλὰς εἰδήσιν πολλὰς ἰστέα καὶ τὰς ἐπινοήσεως, οὐτῶ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικῶν ποικίλων ἀναρρομῆσιν ὑφίσταται τὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν.

position to the account which deals with impression [phantasia] and sense-perception, in as much as the criterion which decides the truth of things is generically an impression, and in as much as the account which deals with assent and cognition and thinking, while it precedes the rest, is not composed without impression. (2) For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of utterance, expresses in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression. (3) An impression is different from a figment [phantasma]. A figment is the kind of fanciful thought which occurs in dreams, whereas an impression is a printing in the soul; i.e., an alteration, as Chrysippus suggests in his On soul; for the printing should not be taken to be like that of a signet-ring, since it is impossible for there to be many such prints at the same time affecting the same subject.

Every conception, then, must be preceded by experience through sense, and on this account if sensible are abolished all conceptual thought is necessarily abolished at the same time.

The Stoics say that [bodily] affections occur in the affected regions, but sensations in the commanding-faculty.

Presentation then, according to them, is an impression on the soul. But about this they at once began to quarrel; for whereas Cleanthes understood "impression" as involving cognition and depression, just as does the impression made in wax by signet-rings, Chrysippus regarded such a thing as absurd. For in the first place, he says, when the mind imagines at one and the same moment a triangular object and a quadrangular, the same body must needs be circumscribed by different forms at the same time and become simultaneously both triangular and quadrangular, or even circular, which is absurd; and further, when many presentations occur in us simultaneously, the soul will also receive innumerable formations, which result is worse than the former. He himself, therefore, suspected that the term "impression" was used by Zeno in the sense of "alteration," so that the definition runs like this—"presentation is an alteration of the soul"; for it is no longer absurd that, when many presentations co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body should admit of innumerable alterations; for just as the air, when many people are speaking simultaneously, receives in a single moment numberless and different impacts and at once undergoes many alterations also, so too when the regent part is the subject of a variety of images it will experience some-

= LS 39 B

(1) Χρύσιππος διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων φησι τέτταρα ταῦτα. (2) φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἔστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γυγνώμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· οὐκ ἐπείδεν δι' αἴθεως θεωρηθῆναι τὸ λεκόν, ἔστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγεννημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ (κατὰ) τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι ὑπόκειται λεκόν κινῶν ἡμᾶς· ὁμοίως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀόψης καὶ τῆς ἀσφρήσεως. (3) εἴρηται δὲ ἡ φαντασία ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός· καὶ ἄλλοι γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὐτὸ δέκνουσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δέκνουσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ λεκόν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τῆν φαντασίαν· οὐκ ἐπὶ φανταστών. (4) φανταστών δὲ τὸ διακένος ἔλκυστος τῆν ψυχῇ, τοῦτ' ἐπὶ φανταστών. (5) φανταστικὸν δὲ ἔστι καὶ ἄλλοις ἔλκυστος, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς φανταστού γινώμενον καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φανταστών, τῶν δὲ φανταστικῶν οὐδέν. (6) φανταστικὰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἐφ' ὃ ἔλκυστος κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διακένος ἔλκυστος· ταῦτα δὲ γίνονται ἐπὶ τῶν μεταχολώντων καὶ μεληνόντων.

(1) Chrysippus says that these four [i.e., impression (*phantasia*), impressor (*phantaston*), imagination (*phantastikon*), figment (*phantasma*)] are all different. (2) An impression is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which activates us. Likewise when we perceive through touch and smell. (3) The word 'impression' [*phantasia*] is derived from 'light' [*phōs*]; just as light reveals itself and whatever else it includes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause. (4) The cause of an impression is an impressor: e.g., something white or cold or everything capable of activating the soul. (5) Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the soul which arises from no impressor, as when someone shadow-boxes or strikes his hands against thin air; for an impression has some impressor as its object, but imagination has none. (6) A figment is that to which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination; it occurs in people who are melancholic and mad.

6. DL VII 51

= LS 39 A

(1) τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ' οὐ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δι' αἰσθητικῶν ἢ αἰσθητικῶν λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δ' αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας κληόμεναι τῶν ἀνοητέων καὶ τῶν ἀλλοῦ λόγου λαμβανόμεναι. (3) τῶν δ' αἰσθητικῶν (αἱ μὲν) ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων μετ' εἴσεως καὶ συγκαταβάσεως γίνονται, εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινώμεναι. (4) ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἀλογοὶ λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων, ἀλογοὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ μάλιστα εἰσὶν, αἱ δ' ἀλογοὶ οὐ τετυχημένοι ὄντισιν. (7) καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τεχνικαί, αἱ δὲ ἀτεχνοί· ἄλλως γοῦν θεωρεῖται ὑπὸ τεχνίτου εἰκῶν καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ ἀτέχνου.

(4) They divide impressions into those which are sensory and those which are not. Sensory impressions are ones obtained through one or more sense-organs, non-sensory are ones obtained through thought such as those of the incorporeals and of the other things acquired by reason. (5) Some sensory impressions arise from what is, and are accompanied by yielding and assent. But impressions also include appearances which are quasi-products of what is. (6) Furthermore, some impressions are rational, and others non-rational. Those of rational animals are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non-rational. Rational impressions are thought processes; irrational ones are nameless. (7) Also, some impressions are expert and others not: a work of art is viewed in one way by an expert and differently by a non-expert.

7. Aetius 4.11.1-4

= LS 39 E

(1) οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὡσπερ χάρτην εὐέρον εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἐκάστην τῶν ἐνοσιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. (2) πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. αἰσθηόμενοι γὰρ τινος ὄλου λεκόν ἀπειθόντος αὐτοῦ μνηστῆν ἔχουσι· ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδὲς πολλαὶ μνηστῆν γένηται, τότε φαιμέν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία γὰρ ἔστι τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος. (3) τῶν δὲ ἐνοσιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικῶς γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτηχεύτως, αἱ δὲ ἦδη δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμέλειας· αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐνοσιῶν καλοῦνται μύθων, ἐκείναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. (4) ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ' ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικὸν ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληρούμεναι λέγεται κατὰ τῆν πρῶτην ἐβδολογία.

(1) When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. (2) The first method of inscription is through the senses. For by perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, we then say we have experience. For the plurality of similar impressions is experience. (3) Some conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' only; the former are called 'preconceptions' as well. (4) Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years.

8. Stobaeus  
I 317, 21 f.  
= SVF I 149

9. Galen  
De Hipp. et Plat.  
5.3.4  
= LS 53 v

10. Cicero  
Academica 2.30  
= LS 40 N

11. DL VII 53  
= LS 39 D

12. Cicero  
Academica 2.21  
= LS 39 C

πάλιν τοῖσιν περὶ τοῦ σοῦ καὶ πρῶτον τῶν κριταίων δουλείων τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ μὲν Στωικαὶ λόγουσι μὴ εὐθὺς ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ συναρθεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθησέων καὶ παραταίῳ περὶ δεκτέσασα ἐστῆ.

μηνησέων ἵσως ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἱεροῦ τοῦ λόγου περιγραμμένων ἀν' αὐτοῖς ἀναλῆθες, ὡς ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὴν τιμῶν καὶ προλήψεων ἀβασίαια.

(1) mens enim ipsa, quae sensum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur. itaque alia visa sic accipit ut his statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur, cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur iudicia rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐπινοῶς tum προλήψεις vocant;

(1) κατὰ περιγραμμάτων μὲν οὐκ ἐπινοεῖται τὰ αἰσθητὰ. (2) καθ' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν παρεκκεμήτων, ὡς Στωικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκότος. (3) κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἀβέβαιος μὲν, (ὡς) ὁ Τίτυος καὶ Ἰσχυλῶς. μεταρτίως δέ, ὡς ὁ Πιγμαῖος. καὶ τὸ κέτρον δὲ τῆς γῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐπινοεῖται ἀπὸ τῶν μεταρτίων σφαιρῶν. (4) κατὰ μετάθεσιν δέ, ὅταν ἀβλαβῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ στήθους. (5) κατὰ ἀνθεσιν δὲ ἐπινοεῖται Ἱπποκένταυρος. (6) καὶ κατ' ἐπινοεῖσθαι θάνατος. (7) νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάθεσιν τιμῶν, ὡς τὰ χερτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. (8) φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δικαίον τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. (9) καὶ κατὰ ἀστέγηται, ὅταν ἀχειρ.

(1) atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus talia secuntur ea quae non sensibus percipi dicuntur sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: "Illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum", animo iam haec tenuius comprehensa non sensibus. (2) "Ille" deinceps "equus est, ille canis." (3) cetera series deinde sequitur maiora necens, ut haec quae quasi explicitam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: "si homo est, animal est mortale rationis particeps." (4) quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri (nec) disputari potest.

books On reason: Reason is a collection of certain conceptions and preconceptions.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] The mind itself, which is the source of the senses and is even identical with the senses, has a natural force which it applies to the things by which it is activated. So it seizes some impressions in order to make immediate use of them, others, which are the source of memory, it stores away so to speak, while all the rest it arranges by their likenesses, and thereby conceptions of things are produced, which the Greeks call sometimes ἐπινοῶς and at other times προλήψεις.

(1) It is by confrontation that we come to think of sense-objects. (2) By similarity, things based on thoughts of something related, like Socrates on the basis of a picture. (3) By analogy, sometimes by magnification, as in the case of Tityos and Cyclopes, sometimes by diminution, as in the case of the Pigmy; also the idea of the centre of the earth arose by analogy on the basis of smaller spheres. (4) By transposition, things like eyes on the chest. (5) By combination, Hippocentaur. (6) By opposition, death. (7) Some things are also conceived by transition, such as sayables and place. (8) The idea of something just and good is acquired naturally. (9) That of being without hands, for instance, by privation.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus in defence of Stoic epistemology] (1) Those characteristics which belong to the things we describe as being cognized by the senses are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be cognized not by the senses directly but by them in a certain respect, e.g., "That is white, this is sweet, that is melodious, this is fragrant, this is bitter." Our cognition of these is secured by the mind, not the senses. (2) Next, "That is a horse, that is a dog." (3) The rest of the series then follows, connective bigger items which virtually include complete cognition of things, like "If it is a human being, it is a mortal, rational animal." (4) From this class [i.e. mental perceptions in general] conceptions of things are imprinted on us, without which there can be no understanding or investigation or discussion of anything.



13. SE M VII 344-345

λαβείν τάληθές οὐ δυνατόν, καθὼς ἐμπροσθεν ἐπι-  
εδείξαμεν, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐπ' ἄλλων παραμυθησόμεθα.  
φύσει γὰρ εἶσιν ἀλογοί, καὶ πλείων τοῦ τυροδοβάει  
πρὸς τῶν φαντασῶν μὴ δύνασθαι παντάπασ-  
θεν καταστῆσαι πρὸς εἴδησιν τάληθους. οὐ γὰρ  
μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι τῷ  
εἰς φαντασίαν ὑπόθετον τοῦ τοιούτου πράγματος  
" τοῦτο λευκὸν ἔστι " καὶ " τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἔστιν. "  
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ  
πράγματι οὐκ ἐστὶ τῆς αἰσθησεως ἔργον ἔστιν ἐπι-  
βάλλειν χρωμα γὰρ μόνον καὶ χυμῶν καὶ φωνῆν  
λαμβάνειν πέφυκε, τὸ δὲ " τοῦτο λευκὸν ἔστιν "  
ἢ " τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἔστιν " οὔτε χροῶμα οὔτε χυμῶς  
τυγχάνου ἀναπόπτωτον ἔστιν αἰσθησεῖ. ] ψεύδονται

14. SE M VIII 11-12

= LS 33 B

(1) ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τοῖσιν διδασκῆς, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῷ  
σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῆ φωνῆ, οἱ  
δὲ περὶ τῆ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. (2) καὶ διή τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης  
προσεστήκασι οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωαῖ τρία φάμενοι συγγεῖν ἀλλήλοισ, τὸ τε  
σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαίνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὡν σημαίνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν  
φωνήν, ὅσων τὴν Δίω, σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς  
δηλούμενον καὶ οὐ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα τῆ ἡμετέρα παραφροσάμε-  
νου διανοίῃ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἔπαυσι καίτερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες.  
τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ὡσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίω. (3) τοῦτων δὲ εἶδη  
μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνήν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἀσώματων,  
ὡσπερ τὰ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτῶν, ὅσπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεσθαι ἢ  
ψεῦδος.

καὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, λογικῆν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν  
καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθῆν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστῆσαι.

λεκτῶν δὲ ὑπάρχειν

at scire negatis quicquam cum illam nisi sapientiam. (1) et hoc quidem Zeno gestis  
confitebatur. (2) nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat,  
"visum" inquitbat "inuis modis est"; (3) dein cum paulum digitorum  
contraxerat, "adscensus huius modi"; (4) tum cum plane compresserat  
pugnamque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat, qua ex similitudine  
etiam manum ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάδηλον imposuit; (5) cum  
autem laevam manum admoventi et illam pugnam arte vehementerque  
compresserat, scitioriam talem esse dicebat, cuius comprehensioni nisi sapientiam esse  
neminem.

Now he is not able to grasp the truth by the senses alone, as we have shown above, but shall now briefly rehearse. For they are by nature irrational, and having no further capacity beyond that of being impressed by the objects imaged, they are wholly disqualified for discovering the truth. For that which is to perceive what is true in the real objects must not only be moved by a whitish or sweetish feeling but also must be brought to have an impression regarding such an object that "this thing is white" and "this thing is sweet." And similarly with the rest of the senses. But to perceive an object of that kind is no longer the task of sense; for sense is of a nature to grasp only colour and flavour and sound, whereas the recognition that "this is white" or "this is sweet," being neither colour nor flavour, is incapable of being experienced by sense.

(1) There was another disagreement among philosophers concerning what is true: some took the sphere of what is true and false to be 'the signification', others 'utterance', and others 'the process that constitutes thought'. (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying that three things are linked together, 'the signification', 'the signifier', and 'the name-bearer'. The signifier is an utterance, for instance 'Dion'; the signification is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. (3) Of these, two are bodies - the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal - the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false.

They [the Stoics] say that a 'sayable' is what subsists in accordance with a rational impression, and a rational impression is one in which the content of the impression can be exhibited in language.

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) Zeno used to clench the wise man's sole possession of scientific knowledge with a gesture. (2) He would spread out the fingers of one hand and display its open palm, saying 'An impression is like this.' (3) Next he clenched his fingers a little and said, 'Assent is like this.' (4) Then, pressing his fingers quite together, he made a fist, and said that this was cognition (and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of *katadēlōpsis*, which it had not had before). (5) Then he brought his left hand against his right fist and gripped it tightly and forcefully, and said that scientific knowledge was like this and possessed by none except the wise man.

15. SE M VIII 70

= LS 33 C

= DL VII 63

= LS 33 F

16. Cicero

Academica 2.145

= LS 41 A

17. DL VII 46

= LS 40 C

καταληπτικῆν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον. (2) καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἢ κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινωσκτένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐπιταυφρησιγενέτην καὶ ἐπισημασιγενέτην. (3) ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὴ τραπῆ μὴδὲ ἔκτυπον.

(1) τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τῆν μὲν

(1) Of impressions, one kind is cognitive, the other incognitive. (2) The cognitive, which they [the Stoics] say is the criterion of things, is that which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. (3) The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or distinct.

18. SE M VII

247-248

= LS 40 E

(1) τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν αἰ μὲν εἶσι καταληπτικαὶ αἰ δὲ οὐ, (2) οὐ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἰ προσπίπτουσαι τοῖσι κατὰ πάθος· μὴταὶ γὰρ φρενιζόντες καὶ μεταχολώντες ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔκκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσούσας, ὅθεν οὐδὲ διαββαδιόνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ συγκαταπέθεται αὐτῆ· ἄλλ' καταληπτικῆ δὲ ἔσται ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐπισημασιγενέτη καὶ ἐπιταυφρησιγενέτη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἀκριβος γὰρ ποιοῦμενοι ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τῆνδε τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς ἰδιώματα ἀνεπισημασιγενέτην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν ἔχειν συμβεβηκός. §

(1) Of true impressions, some are cognitive, others not. (2) Non-cognitive are ones people experience when they are in abnormal states. For very large numbers of people who are deranged or melancholic take in an impression which is true but non-cognitive, and arises purely externally and fortuitously, so that they often do not respond to it positively and do not assent to it. (3) A cognitive impression is one which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is, of such a kind as could not arise from what is not. Since they [the Stoics] hold that this impression is capable of precisely grasping objects, and is stamped with all their peculiarities in a craftsmanlike way, they say that it has each one of these as an attribute. ( )

19. SE M VII 424

= LS 40 L

ἵνα γε μὴν αἰσθητικῆ γένηται φαντασία κατ' αὐτοῦς, ὅταν ὁρατικῆ, δεῖ πέντε συνδραμεῖν, τό τε αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πῶς καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐὰν τῶν ἄλλων παρόντων ἐν μόνον ἀπῆ, καθάπερ διάνοια παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, οὐ σωθίσεταί, φασί, ἢ ἀντιλήψις· ἔσθην καὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔλεγον τινες μὴ κοινῶς εἶναι κριτήριον, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὴδὲν ἔχη κατὰ (τούτων) τὸν τρόπον ἐπιστήμα.

For a [cognitive] sense-impression to occur, e.g. one of sight, five factors in their [the Stoics'] view must concur: the sense-organ, the sense-object, the place, the manner and the mind; since if all of these but one are present (e.g. if the mind is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be secured. For this reason some said that the cognitive impression is not a criterion universally, but when it has no such impediment.

20. DL VII 54

= LS 40 A

Χ) κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τούτοισι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρος. (2) ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἰδῆσθαι κριτήρια πλείονα ἀποδέχεται, νοῦν καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμη· (3) ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγων κριτήριά φησιν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἕνωσα φύσις τῶν καθόλου. (4) ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιωτέρων Στωικῶν τῶν ὁρθῶν λόγων κριτήριον ἀποδέχονται, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησὶ.

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the cognitive impression is the criterion of truth, i.e. the impression arising from what is. This is what Chrysippus says in the second book of his *Physics*, and also Antipater and Apollodorus. (2) Boethius admits a number of criteria – intellect, sense-perception, desire and scientific knowledge. (3) And Chrysippus, at variance with himself, says in the first of his books *On Reason* that sense-perception and preconception are the criteria; preconception is a natural conception of universals. (4) Some of the older Stoics admit right reason as a criterion, as Posidonius says in his book *On the criterion*.

= LS 41 B

quod autem erat sensu comprehensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter iustitiam nominabat; ex qua existeret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitque communis. sed inter scientiam et incertam inprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, canque neque in rectis neque in pravus numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. et quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum sed hactenus quaeliam ad rationem inventendam vias reperirunt. (4) errorum autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinionem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmatae et constantis assensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat.

22. SE M vii 151-152

= LS 41 C

γὰρ εἶναι φασιν ἔκτεινοι τὰ συζυγοῦντα ἀλλήλοισ, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίῳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν, (2) ἂν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμεταβλητόν ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, (3) δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατάθεσιν, (4) κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων, ἥτις ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· καταληπτικῆ δὲ φαντασία κατὰ τοῦτους ἐτύχωνεν ἢ ἀληθῆς καὶ τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδοῦς. (5) ἂν τὴν (μὲν) ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις τῆίστασθαι λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φασίλοισ, τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινῆν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι.

23. Stobaeus

II 111, 18 -

112, 8

= LS 41 G

(1) ψεύδος δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτε φασὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκατάληπτον τινὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτὸν μηδ' ἀγνοεῖν μηδέν. (2) τὴν γὰρ ἀγνοίαν μεταπτώτην εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ. (3) μηδὲν δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀβελῆως, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀσφαλῆως καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. (4) δισταξ γὰρ εἶναι δόξαν, τὴν μὲν ἀκατάληπτον συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας (8) ἀλλοτριῶς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως. (5) δὲ ὁ καὶ τὸ προσηπτεῖν πρὸ καταλήψεως (καὶ) συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προσηπτεῖν φασίλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πῖπτεν εἰς τὸν εὐθύην καὶ τέλειον ἀνδρα καὶ σπουδαίου.

[Speaker: the Antiochean Varro] What was grasped by sense-perception Zeno called itself a sense-perception, and if it had been so grasped that it could not be disrupted by reason, he called it scientific knowledge; but if it were otherwise, he called it ignorance, taking this to be the source of opinion as well, which was something weak and related to what was false and incognitive. That cognition I mentioned above [40B 3] he placed between scientific knowledge and ignorance, counting it neither as good nor as bad, but said that it was to be trusted on its own. Accordingly, he also attached reliability to the senses, because, as I said above, he regarded cognition effected by them as both true and reliable; not because it grasped all of a thing's properties, but because it left out nothing capable of confronting it, and also because nature had given it as the standard of scientific knowledge and as the natural foundation for the subsequent impression of conceptions of things upon the mind, which give rise not just to the starting-points but to certain broader routes for discovering reason. (4) But from virtue and wisdom Zeno removed error, rashness, ignorance, opinion, conjecture, and in a word, every-thing foreign to firm and consistent assent.

(1) The Stoics say there are three things which are linked together, scientific knowledge [epistēmē], opinion [doxa] and cognition [katalepsis] stationed between them. (2) Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure and firm and unchangeable by reason. (3) Opinion is weak and false assent. (4) Cognition in between these is assent belonging to a cognitive impression; and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is one which is true and of such a kind that it could not turn out false. (5) Of these they say that scientific knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in the inferior, but cognition is common to them both, and it is the criterion of truth.

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the wise man never makes a false supposition, and that he does not assent at all to anything incognitive, owing to his not opining and his being ignorant of nothing. (2) For ignorance is changeable and weak assent. (3) But the wise man supposes nothing weakly, but rather, securely and firmly; and so he does not opine either. (4) For there are two kinds of opinion, assent to the incognitive, and weak supposition, and these are alien to the wise man's disposition, and weak supposition and assent in advance of cognition are attributes of the precipitate inferior man, whereas they do not befall the man who is well-natured and perfect and virtuous.



24. Stobaeus

II 73, 16 - 74, 3

= LS 41 H

ὅτι εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάσταντον ὑπὲρ λόγου. ἅ ἐστὶν οὗτος δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύνταγμα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικῆ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπόχρυσον. ἅ ἄλλην δὲ σύνταγμα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον, ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἔργα. (4) ἄλλην δὲ ἐν φαντασίῳ δεκτικὴν ἀμετάσταντον ὑπὲρ λόγου, ἣν τῶν φασιν ἐν τῶν καὶ δυνατόν κείσθαι.

[The Stoics say] (1) Scientific knowledge [epistēmē] is a cognition [katalepsis] which is secure and unchangeable by reason. (2) It is secondly a system of such epistēmata, like the rational cognition of particulars which exists in the virtuous man. (3) It [scientific knowledge here = science] is thirdly a system of expert epistēmata, which has intrinsic stability, just as the virtues do. (4) Fourthly, it is a tenor for the reception of impressions which is unchangeable by reason, and consisting, they say, in tension and power.

25. Olympiodorus

O. Platōs Gorgias

12.1

= LS 42 A

ἅ Κλεάνθης τοῦτον λέγει ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἐξὶς ὁδῶν πάντα διανοῦσα." ἅ ἀρετῆς δ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ ὅρος, καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐξὶς τὴν ὁδῶν πάντα ποιοῦσα. ἅ ἄλλου δ' Χρύσιππος προσθεῖς τὸ "μετὰ φαντασιῶν" εἶπεν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἐξὶς ὁδῶν ποιοῦσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν". . . ἅ Ζήνων δὲ φησὶν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶ σύνταγμα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγενημένων πρὸς τὴν τέχνας εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ."

(1) Cleanthes says that expertise is a tenor which achieves everything methodically. (2) This definition is incomplete. After all, nature also is a tenor which does everything methodically. (3) That is why Chrysippus added 'with impressions', and said that expertise is a tenor which advances methodically with impressions. . . (4) Zeno says that an expertise is a systematic collection of cognitions unified by practice for some goal advantageous in life.

26. Cicero

De divinatione

I. 127

= LS 550

praeterea, cum facta omnia fiunt (id quod alio loco ostendetur), si quis mortalis possit esse qui configurationem causarum omnium perspicat animo, nihil cum profecto fallat. qui enim tenet causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia tenet quae futura sint. quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentia. non enim illa quae futura sunt, subito existant, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis.

[Speaker: Quintus Cicero in defence of Stoic theory of divination] Besides, since all things happen by fate, as will be shown elsewhere, there were some human being who could see with his mind the connexion of all causes, he would certainly never be deceived. For whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be. But since no one but god can do this, man must be left to gain his foreknowledge from various signs which announce what is to come. For things which will be do not spring up spontaneously. The passage of time is like the unwinding of a rope, bringing about nothing new and unrolling each stage in its turn.

27. Cicero

De divinatione

I. 117 - 118

= LS 42 E

haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non videntur posse convelli, profecto hominibus a dis futura significari necesse est, sed distinguendum videtur, quoniam modo, nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praefurissent, alia in exitu, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus, ca quibus bene percepta sunt, si non saepe falluntur, male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia.

[Speaker: Quintus Cicero, in defence of Stoic theory of divination] If we accept this [divine providence] – and I for one do not see how it can be confuted – it must indeed be the case that the gods give men signs of future events. But clearly we must specify how. For it is not a Stoic doctrine that the gods concern themselves with individual cracks in the liver or individual bird-songs. That is unbecoming, unworthy of the gods, and quite impossible. Their view is that the world was from its beginning set up in such a way that certain things should be preceded by certain signs, some in entrails, others in birds, others in lightning, others in portents, others in stars, others in dream impressions, others in frenzied utterances. Those who properly perceive these are rarely deceived. The falsehood of bad conjectures and bad interpretations is due, not to any fault in the world, but to the scientific ignorance of the interpreters.

28. Cicero

De divinatione

I. 34

= LS 42 C

(1) his igitur advenit, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum quod patiens esset artis, alterum quod arte careret. est enim ars in his qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. (2) carere autem arte ii qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed coniectatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentium, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non nunquam vaticinantibus per furorem.

[Speaker: Quintus Cicero, in defence of Stoic theory of divination] Hence I follow those who have said that there are two kinds of divination, one involving expertise, the other not. The diviners who have expertise are those who pursue new data by conjecture, having learnt their old data by observation. (2) Those who lack expertise are the ones who foretell the future not by reason or conjecture through empirical observation of signs, but by either stimulating or relaxing the mind, as has often happened to dreamers, and sometimes to those who prophesy in a frenzy.

29. Cicero

De divinatione

I. 62-83

= LS 42 D

(1) quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: (2) "si sunt di, neque ante deciderant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae dignitatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt; neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae eventura sint (erimus enim cautores, si sciemus), neque hoc alicuium dicunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscere. non igitur sunt di nec significant futura. sunt autem di; significant ergo. (3) et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent); nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio; est igitur divinatio." (4) hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur.

[Speaker: Quintus Cicero, in defence of Stoic theory of divination] (1) That there really is divination is inferred with the following argument of the Stoics. (2) 'If there are gods but they do not indicate future events to men in advance, either they do not love men, or they are ignorant of what will happen, or they think it is not in men's interests to know the future, or they think it beneath their dignity to give signs of future events to men in advance, or even the gods are unable to give signs of them. But neither do the gods not love us (for they are beneficent and friendly to mankind); nor are they ignorant of what they themselves have set up and ordained; nor is it not in our interests to know future events (for we will be more careful if we know); nor do they think it foreign to their dignity (for nothing is more honourable than beneficence); nor are they unable to foreknow future events. Therefore it is not the case that there are gods but that they do not give signs of future events. But there are gods. Therefore they do give signs of future events. (3) And it is not the case that if they give signs they give us no routes to scientific knowledge of sign-inference (for in that case their giving signs would be pointless). And if they give us the routes, it is not the case that divination does not exist. Therefore divination exists.' (4) This argument is used by Chrysippus, Diogenes [of Babylon] and Antipater.

30. DL VII 71

= LS 35 A

(1) τῶν δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀδείματων συνημμένων μὲν ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ ἀναστῆναι διὰ τοῦ "ἐἶ" ἀναρτικῶς συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ ἀνδέσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δευτέρου τῶν πρώτων, ὅταν "εἶ ἡμέρα ἔσται, φῶς ἔσται". (2) παρασυνημμένων δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρούσιος φησὶ ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀδείματα ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἐπεί" συνδέσμου παρασυνημμένα ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀδείματος καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ἀδείματι, ὅταν "ἐπει ἡμέρα ἔσται, φῶς ἔσται". ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ ἀνδέσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δευτέρου τῶν πρώτων καὶ τὸ πρώτον ὑπερτάτως.

(1) Of non-simple propositions, a conditional is, as Chrysippus says in his *Dialectical treatises* and Diogenes [of Babylon] in his *Dialectical handbook*, one linked by the conditional connective 'if'. This connective declares that the second follows from the first. For example, 'If it is day, it is light.' (2) A subconditional is, as Crinis says in his *Dialectical handbook*, a proposition joined subconditionally by the connective 'since', with an antecedent proposition and a consequent proposition. For example, 'Since it is day it is light.' This connective declares both that the second follows from the first, and that the first is the case.





= LS 35 B

καὶ οἱ δὲ τῆν συνάπτειν εἰσαγωγὴν οὐκ εἶναι φάσι συναπτόμενον, ὅταν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγων ἄλλοι μὲν γίνωνται ἐν αὐτῷ ἠγουμένῳ καθ' οὗς τὰ μὲν εἰρημμένα συναπτόμενα ἔσται μοχθηρὰ, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔσται, ἡμέρα ἔσται".

34. Philodemus

De signis I. 2ff

= LS 42 G

(1) καὶ μὴν δὲ οὐδὲν ἔργον κοινὸν ἔσται ἢ διότι | καὶ οὗτος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μὴ ὄλιγος ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο δύναται. | τὸν γέ τοι νομίζοντα [αὐ]ς Χρηστὰς | ὁδε τίς ἔσται ἀβρωπος ἔνεκα | τοῦ πλουτεῖν μοχθηρῶς φάσεν | καὶ κοινῶν χρησθῶν σήμερι διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν παλοῦντας | ἀσπ- οὺς εὐρίσκεσθαι [πλο]λοῦσι | δὲ χρηστούς· ὡσπ[η]τε τὸ ἴδιον εἴπερ | ἀναγ- καστικὸν ἀδυνατεῖν ἀλλ[η]λως ὑπάρχειν ἢ οὐκ τῶν ὁ λέγει [μ]εν αὐτὸν καθ' ἀνάγκην εἶναι. | τ[ι]δανές, οὐ γρημκείον εἴσ[η]ρι, μ[η]ν | εἰ. | [σ]δ[ε]μ[η]ν | ... | ἀδελφον. ὁ γίνετα[ι] τῶν κα[τ]ε[λ]ειν κα[τ]ε[λ]ειν τ[ρ]όπω | τ[η]ς ση[μ]ειώσεως |

35. SE PH II

140 - 143

= LS 36 B

πάντων δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀποδεικτικοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μὲν οἱ διὰ προδηλῶν ἀδηλῶν τι συναγο- ρεσι, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος λόγος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔσται, φῶς ἔσται" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔσται· φῶς δὲ ἔσται" οὐκ ἔσται ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἔσται αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, προδηλῶν ἔσται. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἰδῶντες πέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐμφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἰδῶντες πέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐμφανείας" εἰσὶ δὲ ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι" ἀποδεικτικός ἔσται, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ἀδηλῶν, τὸ "εἰσὶ δὲ ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι". (8) τῶν δὲ ἀδηλῶν τι συναγομένων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἀγνοοῦν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν ἀληθειῶν ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς αἴμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. (9) οἷον ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρηθῆναι δοκοῦντες, οἷος ἔσται ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τίς σοι [βραῦν] εἴπῃ ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος, πλουτήσει οὗτος" οὗτοι δὲ ὁ θεός (δεικνύει δὲ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) εἴπῃ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος· πλουτήσει ἄρα οὗτος". οὐγκατατιθέμεθα γὰρ τῷ συμπέρασματι οὐκ οὗτος διὰ τῆν τῶν ἀληθειῶν ἀνάγκην ὡς πιστεύοντες τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει. (10) οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἀγνοοῦν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ πέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐμφανείας ἰδῶντες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι, ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον" τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα" τὸ γὰρ βεῖν τοῦς ἰδῶντας ἐκκαλυπτικῶν ἔσται τοῦ πόρου εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προεληθῆναι ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι. (11) ἢ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι φέρεται καὶ συναπτικός καὶ ἀληθής καὶ ἀδελφον ἔχειν συμπέρασμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶν ὑπὸ τῆς δυνατέως τῶν ἀληθειῶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων ἀληθειῶν κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἰδῶντων.

who introduce 'cohesion' say that a conditional is sound whenever the contradictory of its consequent conflicts with its antecedent. On their view the aforementioned conditionals will be unsound, but the following one true: 'If it is day, it is day.'

(1) It is a 'common' sign for no other reason than that this can exist whether or not the non-evident thing exists. When someone considers that such and such a man is good because he is rich, we say that he is using an unsound and common sign, since many dreadful rich men are found, as well as many good ones. Consequently the peculiar sign, if it is to be cogent, is incapable of existing except in conjunction with the thing which we say necessarily belongs to it, the non-apparent thing whose sign it is... And this is done through the Elimination Method of sign-inference.

Again, of true arguments some are demonstrative, others non-demonstrative. Demonstrative are those which by means of things pre-evident deduce something non-evident. Non-demonstrative are those not of this kind. For example, an argument like 'If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Therefore it is light' is non-demonstrative. For its conclusion, that it is light, is pre-evident. But one like 'If sweat flows through the surface, there are ducts discoverable by thought. But sweat flows through the surface. Therefore there are ducts discoverable by thought' is demonstrative, having the non-evident conclusion. Therefore there are ducts discoverable by thought. (8) Of those which deduce something non-evident, some lead us by means of the premises to the conclusion in a merely progressive way, others in a both progressive and revelatory way. (9) Those which lead us in a merely progressive way are the ones which seem to depend on trust and memory, such as 'If some god has told you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich. But this god' (I refer demonstratively to, say, Zeus) has told you that this man will be rich. Therefore this man will be rich.' For we assent to the conclusion less because of the cogency of the premises than because we trust the god's statement. (10) Those which lead us to the conclusion in a not only progressive but also revelatory way are ones like this: 'If sweat flows through the surface, there are ducts discoverable by thought. But the first. Therefore the second.' For the proposition that sweat flows is revelatory of the proposition that there are ducts, thanks to our preconception that liquid cannot penetrate a solid body. (11) Thus a demonstration must be an argument, and deductive, and true, and with a conclusion which is non-evident and revealed by the force of the premises. That is why a demonstration is said to be an argument which through agreed premises by means of deduction reveals a non-evident conclusion.

C Carneades says that he will concede the rest of it to the Stoics, but not the clause 'of such a kind as could not arise from what is not'. For impressions arise from what is not as well as from what is. (2) The fact that they are found to be equally self-evident and striking is an indication of the indiscernibility, and an indication of their being equally self-evident and striking is the fact that the consequential actions are linked to [both kinds of impression]. Just as in waking states a thirsty man gets pleasure from drinking and someone who flees from a wild beast or any other terror shouts and screams, so too in dreams people satisfy their thirst and think they are drinking from a spring, and it is just the same with the fear of those who have nightmares. . . . Just as in normal states too we believe and assent to very clear appearances, behaving towards Dion, for instance, as if Dion and towards Theon as if Theon, so too in madness some people have the similar experience. When Heracles was deranged, he got an impression from his own children as though they were those of Eurystheus, and he attached the consequential action to this impression which was to kill his enemy's children, as he did. (3) If then impressions are cognitive in so far as they induce us to assent and to attach to them a consequential action, since false impressions are plainly of this kind too, we must say that incognitive ones are indiscernible from the cognitive. (4) The Academics are no less effective in proving indiscernibility with respect to stamp and impression. They confront the Stoics with appearances. In the case of things which are similar in shape but differ objectively it is impossible to distinguish the cognitive impression from that which is false and incognitive. E.g. if I give the Stoic first one and then another of two exactly similar eggs to discriminate, will the wise man, by focusing on them, be able to say infallibly that the one egg he is being shown is this one rather than that one? The same argument applies in the case of twins. For the virtuous man will get a false impression albeit one from what is and imprinted and stamped exactly in accordance with what is, if the impression he gets from Castor is one of Polydeuces.

b. Cicero, Academica II 77-8

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) We may take him [Arcesilaus] to have asked Zeno what would happen if the wise man could not cognize anything and it was the mark of the wise man not to opine. (2) Zeno, I imagine, replied that the wise man would not opine since there was something cognitive. (3) What then was this? Zeno, I suppose, said: an impression. (4) What kind of impression? Zeno then defined it as an impression stamped and reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is. (5) Arcesilaus next asked whether this was still valid if a true impression was just like a false one. (6) At this point Zeno was sharp enough to see that if an impression from what is were such that an impression from what is not could be just like it, there was no cognitive impression. (7) Arcesilaus agreed that it was right to add this to the definition, since neither a false impression nor a true one would be cognitive if the latter were just such as even a false one could be. (8) But he applied all his force to this point of the argument, in order to show that no impression arising from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it. (9) This is the one controversial issue which has lasted up to the present. [continued at 69H]

c. Diogenes Laertius VII  
d. & e. Sextus Empiricus M VII

c. A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind. The latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear and distinct.

d.

And of the apparently true kind of presentation one sort is obscure—the sort, for instance, that is found in the case of those who have a perception that is confused and not distinct owing to the smallness of the object viewed or owing to the extent of the interval or even owing to the weakness of the sense of sight,—while the other sort, in addition to being apparently true, possesses this appearance of truth to an intense degree. And of these, again, the presentation which is obscure and vague will not be the criterion; for because of its not indicating clearly either itself or that which caused it, it is not of such a nature as to persuade us or to induce us to assent.

e. Hence the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but only when it has no obstacle. For in this latter case it being plainly evident and striking, lays hold of us almost by the very hair, as they say, and drags us off to assent, needing nothing else to help it to be thus impressive or to suggest its superiority over all others. For this reason, too, every man, when he is anxious to apprehend any object exactly, appears of himself to pursue after a presentation of this kind—as for instance, in the case of visible things, when he receives a dim presentation of the real object. For he intensifies his gaze and draws close to the object of sight so as not to go wholly astray, and rubs his eyes and in general uses every means until he can receive a clear and striking presentation of the thing under inspection, as though he considered that the credibility of the apprehension depended upon that.



Ἦστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντικεινὴ φαινόμενων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' ὅσον δύνωτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐκχόμεθα διὰ τῆν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικεινέμοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένεται τὸ μὲν ἡγῶν εἰς ἔνοχόν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀραροζίαν.

ΕΥΣΕΒΙΟΣ Εὐαγγελικὴ ἡροναρκευή XIV, 18 758

ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὖσα ἐν ἡροσφῇ καταχέρονται, ὃ δὲ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δὲν τὸν μέγιστον εὐδαμονήσασιν εἰς πρία ταῦτα βέβαιον ἢ ἡγῶν μὲν, ὅσα νύκτωρ τὰ πράγματα. δεύτερον δὲ, τί νεκρότατον ἡγῶν ἡγῶν αὐτὰ διακρίσθαι. τελευτῶν δὲ, τί νεκρότατον τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα φησὶ αὐτὸν ἀνογαίνεσθαι ἐν ἴσῃ δίδασκα καὶ ἀσπίδων καὶ ἀνεπίκοιτα, διὰ τοῦτο μῆτε τὰς ἀισθηθείας ἡγῶν μῆτε τὰς δόξας ἀγνοεῖσθαι ἢ περὶ δόξας. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μῆτε πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δὲν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκαχεῖς καὶ ἀκαροδάντους εἶναι, νεκρὸν ἕως ἑαυτοῦ γέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν. τοῖς μέμοι γε διακρίνέμοις οὕτως περὶ σέσθαι Τίμων φησὶ ἡγῶν μὲν ἀραροζίαν, ἔνεστα δ' ἀραροζίαν

Σκεπτικισμός είναι η ικανότητα να βρισκεί κανείς με οποιοδήποτε τρόπο ἀντιθέσεις ἀνάμεσα στα φαινόμενα καὶ στις κρίσεις : με τὸ Σκεπτικισμὸ, ἐξάρτιας τῆς αἰσοδομίας ἢ που χαρμηλοποιεῖ ἀντίθετα μεταξύ τους πράγματα καὶ ἐνικεινήματα, φράσεται ἡγῶν καὶ ἀνο ἐκεῖ στην αἰσθητικὴ ἡγεσία » (μτφ. Σ. Δημόπουλος - Μ. Δοκίμια. Μονάχου)

... ὁ μαθητὴς του Τίμων φησὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρώπος που θέλει να εἶναι εὐδαμονήσας ἡγῶν να γέβει ὑπόψη του τα ἐξῆς τρία πράγματα : πρῶτον, τί εἶναι ὁ μὲν ἡγῶν ἀντικεινὴ ἀντικεινὴ ἀντικεινὴ πράγματα. δεύτερον, ποια κρίση θα ἡγῶν να ὑποβασίσουμε ἀνέναντί τους. καὶ τρίτον, τί θα ἡγῶν ἀνο ἡμῶν τέτοια κρίση. ἀντικεινὴ με τὸν Τίμων, ὁ Τίμων φησὶ ὅτι εἶναι ἔξῃσθαι ἀδύνατον να διακρίνουμε, να μετρίσουμε καὶ να κρίνουμε τα πράγματα. Τὸ αὐτὸν τὸν φησὶ οὔτε τα δέδογμένα τῶν ἀισθηθείων ἡμῶν οὔτε οἱ κρίσεις ἡμῶν εἶναι ἀγνοεῖσθαι ἢ περὶ δόξας. Δὲ ἡγῶν σκεπτικὴ να σκεπτικισμὸς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἡγῶν ἡγῶν να ἀνογεῖσθαι να διακρίνουμε κρίσεις, να μὲν κρίνουμε ἡγῶν τῆν ἡγῶν ἀνογῶν, καὶ να εἶναι καμνηροηγητοῦ, ἡγῶν να ἡγῶν ἐνικεινὴ ἡγῶν ὅτι εἶναι ὅτι περὶ σέσθαι ἀνο ὅτι δὲ εἶναι ἡγῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ δὲ εἶναι ἢ ὅτι οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε δὲ εἶναι ...

(μτφ. Σ. Δημόπουλος)

the weakness of their vision; the other kind, along with appearing true, is additionally characterized by the intensity of its appearing true. Of these again, the dim and feeble impression could not be a criterion; for since it does not clearly indicate either itself or its cause, it is not of a nature to convince us or to pull us to assent. But the impression which appears true and fully manifests itself is the criterion of truth according to Carneades and his followers. (5) As the criterion, it has a considerable breadth; and by admitting of degrees, it includes some impressions which are more convincing and striking in their form than others. Convincingness, for our present purpose, has three senses: first, what both is and appears true; secondly, what is actually false but appears true; and thirdly, <what appears> true, <which is> common to them both. Hence the criterion will be the impression which appears true – also called ‘convincing’ by the Academics – but there are times when it actually turns out false, so that it is necessary actually to use the impression which is common on occasion to truth and falsehood. Yet the rare occurrence of this one, I mean the impression which counterfeits the truth [i.e. the second], is not a reason for distrusting the impression [i.e. the third] which tells the truth for the most part. For both judgements and actions, as it turns out, are regulated by what holds for the most part.

E Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.176–84

(1) Such then [i.e. D] is the first and general criterion of Carneades and his followers. But since an impression never stands in isolation but one depends on another like links in a chain, a second criterion will be added which is simultaneously convincing and undiverted. E.g. someone who takes in an impression of a man necessarily also gets an impression of things to do with the man and with the extraneous circumstances – things to do with him like his colour, size, shape, motion, conversation, dress, foot-wear; and external circumstances like atmosphere, light, day, sky, earth, friends and everything else. So whenever none of these impressions diverts us by appearing false, but all with one accord appear true, our belief is all the greater. For we believe that this is Socrates from his having all his usual features – colour, size, shape, conversation, cloak, and his being in a place where there is no one indiscernible from him. . . . (2) When Menelaus left the image of Helen (which he brought from Troy as Helen) on his ship, and disembarked on the island of Pharos, he saw the true Helen; but though he took in a true impression from her, he still did not believe an impression of that kind since he was diverted by another one, in virtue of which he *knew* he had left Helen on the ship. That is what the undiverted impression is like; and it too seems to have breadth, since one such impression is found to be more undiverted than another. (3) Still more credible than the undiverted impression, and the one which

makes judgement most perfect, is the impression which combines being undiverted with also being thoroughly explored. Its features must next be explained. In the case of the undiverted impression, it is merely required that none of the impressions in the concurrence should divert us by appearing false but all should be ones which appear true and are not unconvincing. But in the case of the concurrence which involves the thoroughly explored impression, we meticulously examine each impression in the concurrence, in the way that happens at government assemblies, when the people cross-examine every candidate for political office or the judiciary, to see whether he is worthy to be entrusted with the office or the position of judge. (4) Thus . . . we make judgements about the properties of each of the items pertaining to the place of the judgement: the subject judging, in case his vision is faint . . . ; the object judged, in case it is too small; the medium of the judgement, in case the atmosphere is murky; the distance, in case it is too far . . . ; the place, in case it is too vast; the time, in case it is too short; the character, in case it is observed to be insane; and the activity, in case it is unacceptable. (5) For all of these in turn become the criterion – the convincing impression, and the one which is simultaneously convincing and undiverted, and in addition the one which is simultaneously convincing and undiverted and thoroughly explored. For this reason, as in everyday life when we are investigating a small matter we question a single witness, but in the case of a larger one several, and in a still more crucial matter we cross-question each of the witnesses from the mutual corroboration provided by the others – so, say Carneades and his followers, in matters of no importance we make use of the merely convincing impression, but in weightier matters the undiverted impression as a criterion, and in matters which contribute to happiness the thoroughly explored impression.

F Cicero, *Academica* 2.59

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) It is utterly absurd of you [Academics] to say that you follow what is convincing, if you are diverted by nothing. First, how can you not be diverted when [as you claim] there is no difference between true and false impressions? Secondly, what criterion of a true impression is there, when [as you claim] the criterion is common to what is false? (2) These claims necessarily engendered that suspension of judgement . . . in which Arcesilaus was the more consistent with himself, if some people’s assessments of Carneades are true. For if nothing is cognitive, which was the view of them both, assent must be abolished; for what is as futile as accepting anything not cognized? (3) But even yesterday we kept being told that Carneades was also in the habit of lapsing from time to time into saying that the wise man will opine, that is, do wrong.