
Mapping Schengenland: denaturalizing the border

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Abstract. In this paper I examine the reorganization of border controls associated with the Schengen process in the European Union and some of its close neighbours. Rather than asking the political science question of *why* states are committed to Schengen (or not, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland), I interpret Schengen as a political moment for genealogical reflection and analysis. The purpose is to contribute to a more historicized understanding of borders. Schengen is analyzed in terms of three trajectories, each of which allows us to denaturalize certain key aspects of the border, such as its identity, function, rationality, and contingency. Schengen is theorized in relation to the geopolitical border, the national border, and the biopolitical border. Other possibilities for genealogies of the border are also canvassed.

Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles, Potsdam, Maastricht ... if the history of Europe's formation as, and within, a space of territories, sovereignties, economies, and cultures can be evoked in terms of such symbolic place names then perhaps we can add to that series the name of Schengen. Meeting in this Luxembourg border hamlet in 1985, representatives of Germany (then West Germany), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed an agreement concerning the necessary measures to be taken in order to realize the goal of the free movement of persons across their territories. Five years later this agreement was fleshed out in the Implementing Convention, though such implementation would take several more years. The main aim of the Convention was to abolish checks on the movement of persons at 'internal' borders by transferring checks to 'external' frontiers. As part of this package there were to be 'flanking measures' entailing enhanced cooperation in such areas as asylum and immigration policy, policing, and the exchange of information. Schengen was agreed and implemented outside the framework of the EU. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam paved the way for its incorporation into the EC/EU system, fulfilling the perception of it as a 'laboratory' for making the EU a space of free movement (Monar, 2000).⁽¹⁾ All members of the EU are now members of Schengen, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Norway and Iceland are also formally within the Schengen area.

How might we understand this moment, this 'birth of Schengenland'? What are its implications for the history of territoriality and sovereignty? One answer is given by the recent literature on borders, immigration, and security. This has highlighted the double movement whereby the liberalization of trade and finance at regional and global levels is being accompanied by a new set of political anxieties about borders, crime, illegal migration, and terrorism, along with political demands and initiatives to reassert the power of the border (Andreas, 2000; Eskelinen et al, 1999; Geddes, 1999; Koslowski, 2001). The title of one contribution to this literature—*The Wall Around the West* (Andreas and Snyder, 2000)—illustrates this point dramatically. It serves as an

⁽¹⁾ Throughout the paper I use 'Schengen' loosely to refer to practices and concepts that emerged with the original Schengen system, even though, following the Treaty of Amsterdam, these may since have been incorporated into the European Union.

important corrective to some of the more breathless statements of globalization theorists concerning an emergent 'borderless world' which is effortlessly traversed by flows of capital *and* people. It also forces us to qualify more closely certain arguments about the demise of modern territoriality (for example, Ruggie, 1993).

But, as politically necessary as this response to global theory is, it limits the significance of Schengen to very contemporary events. My aim in this paper is somewhat different: to relate Schengen to a certain history of the political border. The use of history I have in mind is informed by Foucault's method of genealogy. The primary value of genealogy lies with its ability to unsettle the present. According to Dean, "Genealogy is the methodical problematization of the given, of the taken-for-granted" (1992, page 216). In order to do this it "aims at the construction of intelligible trajectories of events, discourses, and practices with neither a determinative source nor an unfolding toward finality" (page 217). Genealogy is, then, not an exhaustive or totalizing history but a very partial one. It does not reconstruct its objects in terms of epochs, or stages of societal evolution, but in terms of particular synthetic trajectories. The aim of these trajectories is to shed new light on particular features of the present by finding their antecedents in strange and unexpected places. It is to identify ruptures and contingent and quite sudden transformations where only evolutionary change had been posited. But it is also to find continuities with previous experiences and practices where only novelty had been assumed. Applied to the case of Schengen, genealogy can have a double effect. It can place Schengen in a wider and deeper historical context, revealing its continuities with earlier uses of the border as well as the ways in which it innovates. But it can also use Schengen to unsettle our received ideas about borders more generally, to denaturalize them.

In this paper I will investigate Schengen in terms of three 'trajectories'. First, I will investigate it in terms of the *geopolitical* border. While the concept of geopolitics is alive and well today, thanks in part to the burgeoning literature of 'critical geopolitics' (Ó Tuathail, 1996), here I employ the term in a quite restricted way. I am interested in the way that borders were understood by 'classical' political geographers like Ratzel and Curzon. This enables me to specify the rationality of Schengen by exploring what it is not. Unlike the border politics which have followed, and sometimes precipitated major wars, Schengen does not appear to be connected with a politics of war and peace, of geographical territory understood as a power resource. Second, I will explore Schengen in terms of the *national* border. Here I explore the ways in which Schengen allows us to see the association of the border with the nation-state as an historical accomplishment rather than as a natural fact. But we can also see that, although Schengen prefigures a regional rather than a national border, it is still continuous with the national border inasmuch as it still encloses political space. Third, I suggest that we can also analyze Schengen under the rubric of a *biopolitical* border. The concept of a biopolitical border tries to capture the relationship of borders, understood as regulatory instruments, to populations—their movement, security, wealth, and health. Much of the contemporary literature on borders takes the association between borders, immigration, and 'global flows' of population as though this were the essence of the border. I argue that the deployment of the border as a site of biopolitical management is relatively recent. Moreover, Schengen can be associated with certain shifts in the way such biopolitical interventions are effected.

Genealogies are always partial. These three analytics, and the trajectories of practices and rationalities they trace, in no way exhaust the field of intelligibility of Schengen or of the modern border. We could historicize and denaturalize the border by tracing many other trajectories. For instance, further research might explore the shifting location of the border with regard to economic life. Here one could compare

the mercantilist border with the (neo)liberal border. With the mercantilist border we might find the border understood as an instrument to police the national economy, whereas the (neo)liberal border is deemed a distortion within a global economic field, and an obstacle to commerce. Further investigations might also consider how far the EU's eastern border resembles an *imperial* frontier (Hardt and Negri, 2000, page xiv)—a space where contradictory processes of assimilation and exclusion, integration and disintegration, cultural openness and anxiety are at work. Pertinent in this latter case is the adoption by many Central and East European countries of the Schengen *acquis* on border control, in the context of their eventual accession into the EU, and their constitution as 'safe third countries' for asylum seekers and refugees rejected by the current EU member states (Lavenex, 2000). As O'Dowd and Wilson (1996, page 13) note, as the Oder–Neisse line and Austro-Hungarian border become more open, the EU is acquiring informal borders or, more accurately, frontiers on Poland's eastern front or the Hungarian–Romanian border. These borders are fortified with EU assistance.

Geopolitical borders

"Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death of nations ... Just as the protection of the home is the most vital care of the private citizen, so the integrity of her borders is the condition of existence of the State."

Curzon (1908, page 7)

Lord Curzon was a prominent British authority on borders, and partook in the making of borders in relation to British colonialism in Asia and in Europe after World War 1 (van Dijk, 1999). He articulates what was perhaps the dominant conception of the border in Europe from the latter part of the 19th century, until well into the 20th century. The border is a crucial factor of war and peace, a potential line of confrontation where armed forces are arrayed. This is a conception of the border that reflects a certain understanding and practice of political power, what Agnew terms a 'field of forces': "This is a geopolitical model of states as rigidly defined territorial units in which each state can gain power only at the expense of others and each has total control over its own territory" (Agnew, 1999, page 504). This is the political imagination of 19th-century geographers like Ratzel, for whom borders were dynamic, measuring and expressing a given state's power. Vigorous states would seek to expand spatially, and declining states would contract to more easily defensible land contours (Giddens, 1985; Paasi, 1999, page 12). But, if wars were to be fought to redraw borders, the border could also be invested with the desire of achieving peace and security. "To remove every subject of discord, every occasion for quarrel, one should mark with clarity and precision the limits of territories" (de Vattel, 1758; quoted in Prescott, 1987, page 58).

Although the concept of the geopolitical border encourages us to see the border as a physical geographical line, demarcating the territories of sovereign states, we would be mistaken to reduce it in this way. It is more useful to understand this kind of border, and others, following Foucault, as an 'assemblage'—"an ensemble of heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive practices, and regimes of truth and conduct, which possesses an overall coherence without answering to any determinative principle or underlying logic" (Dean, 1992, page 245, note 2). There is a whole apparatus connected with the geopolitical border—not just a police and military system, but cartographic, diplomatic, legal, geological, and geographical knowledges and practices. This is evident in the relationship that borders have to treaties, peace conventions, and expert commissions.⁽²⁾ Although the famous treaties of the 17th century first produced the

⁽²⁾ Curzon (1908, page 50) cites as one of the earliest a commission of six English and Scottish representatives appointed in 1222 to mark—unsuccessfully—the limits of the two kingdoms.

political map of Europe in a form that we might recognize today, they apparently made no provision for demarcation practices. Only from the mid-18th century do treaties refer to commissioners, topographical inquiries, and surveys of engineers. It is from this point that geographical, topographical, and ethnological knowledge is brought to bear in order to “construct a tentative line for [the] respective Governments” (Curzon, 1908, page 51).

Curzon regarded this geopolitical demarcation of borders as an ‘art’, rather than a ‘science’ (1908, page 53). In this respect he anticipates one aspect of governmentality research which has highlighted how we might analyze political rule not primarily in a juridical or institutional language, but in terms of its various arts (Barry et al, 1996). If ‘bordering’ represents a particular ‘art of government’—indeed, an art of *international* government (Lui-Bright, 1997)—then this was an art that was to be honed not just in Europe, but in the much wider field of European colonialism. No more so than with Africa and the Berlin Conference do we see how the geopolitical border and its assemblage will be a political technology not just in the construction of a European state system, but in the division and allocation of territory on a global basis (Fieldhouse, 1966; Hertslet, 1967).

What relation does the geopolitical border have to Schengen? I raise the question of the geopolitical border mainly to highlight its apparent absence from the politics surrounding Schengen. Schengen does not seem to inhabit the terrain of classical geopolitics, of state versus state, and of war and peace. Most academic commentaries on Schengen take this for granted, yet it is a useful exercise to note what Schengen is not, as much as what it is. The conferences of Vienna (1815), Berlin (1878), Versailles, and Potsdam were all events in which major wars were followed by a process of victorious coalitions of allies redrawing Europe’s borders. As Prescott (1987, page 177) observes, war simplified the process of territorial adjustment. Schengen is not about political power understood as confrontations between territorial power containers. It does not draw lines, allocate territories, or inscribe a new order of nations (O’Dowd and Wilson, 1996, page 2; Rupnik, 1994). If the context for the geopolitical border is a field of political power organized like a ‘field of forces’, the moment of Schengen is about accommodating political borders to a political spatiality, which Agnew calls the “hierarchical network”, in which territories are traversed by flows of goods, people, and investment (1999, page 506).

By interrogating Schengen in terms of this geopolitical border we can specify its rationality more clearly, and understand its conditions of existence. The geopolitical border is implicated in questions of sovereignty and high politics. It is a sacred, politically charged institution. Schengen is made possible by a prior process of demilitarization of Western European borders. A first and major factor in this was of course the Cold War and the formation of NATO as a regional security alliance. This reconstructed the interstate geopolitical border as an ‘iron curtain’ between the political, ideological, and economic regional blocs. A second and related factor was regional economic integration, which first took institutional shape in such organizations as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). As O’Dowd and Wilson (1996, page 9) note, “the rationality of economic principles was precisely the means employed by the founders of the EU to desacralise the historically volatile pattern of European national borders”. From the point of view of economic interconnection, the border becomes an irrational anachronism, obstructing the realization of a greater ‘European’ economy. This is no more clear than with the politically and historically contested area of the Ruhr, to which the ECSC provided a political and a technical solution. Consider the point of view of Jean Monnet, principal architect of the ECSC. The Ruhr was a ‘triangular area’ where the

coal and steel resources of France and Germany were “artificially divided by historical frontiers” as a result of the coincidence of the industrial revolution and the “rise of doctrinal nationalism” (Monnet, 1978, page 293). In brief, through security and economic integration there occurred a ‘dedramatization’ of the question of Western Europe’s ‘internal’ borders.

One can certainly learn a great deal about Schengen by studying the political anxieties about migration, crime, and terrorism that circulate around it, invest it, and construct it (den Boer, 1995; Huysmans, 2000). However, without some appreciation of the wider field of developments in which it is situated, we fail to grasp the conditions under which these particular concerns and their solutions can become thinkable.

National borders

If we have gained some critical purchase on Schengen by examining its distance from the geopolitical border, we can now interrogate its rationality more fully in relation to the second of my chosen analytics—the national border. We have come to understand political borders as being natural and necessary attributes of nation-states. However, a more critical perspective suggests that the relationship between the border and the state is not a natural or eternal but a political and historical one. Once we break the commonsense association of borders with nation-states and national sovereignty we can begin to see how Schengen might point towards a new type of border, one with certain postnational and regional aspects.

Nationalizing the border

Borders have not always enclosed national territories. In medieval times a border could be a barrier or a wall, like Offa’s Dyke. This was a huge earthwork constructed by the Mercian King to serve as a frontier with the Welsh (Curzon, 1908, page 23).⁽³⁾ But more common, perhaps, was the separation of territories and people by the *march*—“a neutral strip or belt of severance” (page 28). These were not finite lines but zones. Taking the cases of the Anglo-Gaelic and Anglo-Welsh marches, Ellis (1995, page 18) describes these as regions where “English settlements were often interspersed with native areas, so creating multiple, localized frontiers which were fragmented and fluid, rather than consolidated blocs. Both were zones of interaction and assimilation between peoples of very different cultures.”⁽⁴⁾ Pounds (1951, page 148) likens the march to a belt “without inhabitants or value, awaiting settlement and apportionment to one side or the other.”

Unlike the march, the modern border was to be a continuous structure enclosing a political territory. As the German political geographer, Friedrich Ratzel, put it: if the state was a body then the border was its skin (van Dijk, 1999, page 28). The advent of this national border saw the removal of the many discontinuities and enclaves that were still common to countries like France at the end of the 18th century. These included provinces like Alsace that had the status of *‘étranger effectif’*, meaning that they were able to trade with their German neighbours unhindered by French customs. An enduring example of *‘étranger effectif’* was the Count of Nice’s relationship

⁽³⁾ The West Saxon kingdom of Mercia is etymologically derived from ‘March’. This is a result of the many centuries during which it was a bloody ground of confrontation between those delegates of the English Kings, the Marcher Lords (hence the title ‘Marquis’), and Welsh inhabitants (Curzon, 1908, page 27).

⁽⁴⁾ Inasmuch as the march could be a zone of interaction and assimilation, there are echoes of the march in Europe today. This is where, under conditions of integration, borderlines are being refigured as zones of regional development and cross-border cooperation (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000). Through programmes like INTERREG the EU has lent its support to many cross-border initiatives in order to redress the negative economic, social, and cultural imprints of historical borders.

to Piedmont (Bottin, 1996, page 21n). The national border was used to remove such 'irregularities', in a sense plugging gaps and sealing the nation.

Connected with this process of homogenizing the state's frontier was the simplification and standardization of internal space. This development took centuries, and entailed protracted struggles with local authorities. In France its architects included Colbert and Vauban, but the French Revolution further advanced it. "Nation and territory, currency and market, were the end products of this typical political 'homogenizing' process, with the same spatial areas" (Foucher, 1998, page 238). Gradually, 'internal' borders (city walls and limits, parishes, provinces, duchies, etc), all of which were typically more significant than state borders under medievalism, became less important, as far as the regulation of the poor, the collection of tariffs and taxes, or the defense of the population were concerned. At the same time, the state border became preeminent as a single, "distinct, marked and sometimes fortified line in the landscape" (Langer, 1999, page 35).

But this nationalization of the border also involved a concerted effort to naturalize the border. If the 19th century saw the rise of national history, with its dissemination of the idea of national peoples possessing ancient roots, it also saw a role for geographical instruction. One of its tasks would be the marshaling of scientific arguments to ground the border in terms of geology, geography, and culture. "For many geographers the landscape was an important element to prove the unity of the nation and its boundaries. Boundaries must be natural, that meant they must be proved by the geological and geographical circumstances. In practice natural meant also defensible" (van Dijk, 1999, page 25). This type of reasoning was exemplified by the German writer on geopolitics, Karl Haushofer. He argued that the Rhine was a German stream as it sprang from a German source. As such, France could have no claim on its western side (van Dijk, 1999, page 27). In their critique of German geopolitics, with its obsession to delimit territory, Demageon and Febvre advanced a different conception of the border: not as a strict line but as a zone of transition: "the Rhine was not a controversial border between two countries, but an area in which ancient cultural and trade contacts existed" (van Dijk, 1999, page 32).

Schengenland: towards an EU-regional border?

The Schengen process accorded the borders between Schengen and non-Schengen states the official status of an 'external frontier'. The incorporation of Schengen under the Amsterdam Treaty means that the EU now officially has an external border. There are continuities and discontinuities in this process of bordering when compared with the construction of national borders which our historical perspective makes thinkable. The continuities can be stated simply. First, Schengen involves a downgrading and deprivileging of the status and function of existing borders. Just as city walls and parish boundaries became secondary to new national-state borders, then state borders within the EU (its 'common frontiers') are having many of their important social and economic functions preempted by the new external border. That said, the Schengen process of subsuming state frontiers within a greater border has stronger affinities with some national experiences than others. It is continuous with the state formation patterns of countries like Germany and Italy that were not politically unified for much of the 19th century. There, nation-state formation "involved the destruction of existing state frontiers and the construction of new, larger nation-state frontiers" (Breuille, 1998, page 37). In politically unified countries like Spain, Britain, and France, it only involved "'nationalizing' the frontiers of the existing state". There are many contemporary factors concerning Germany's keen support for Schengen. But its historical

experience and cultural understanding of borders are historical factors that deserve further consideration.

Second, analogous to the nationalization of the border, Schengen is associated with the task of institutionalizing wider spaces of economic and social activity—now regional rather than national. Of course, the creation of the Europe as a space of freer social and economic activity dates at least to the reconstruction of the continent under US auspices after World War 2, and is then entrenched by such accomplishments as the ‘common’ and then the ‘single’ market. Schengen did not begin this process. But Schengen does deepen it by problematizing border controls as ‘obstacles’ to human mobility, and removing these from Europe’s ‘inside’. Third, like the national border, Schengen is a continuous, encompassing structure. It will uniformly enclose the EU’s emerging ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. This is not to suggest that all points on this new border are actually policed with equal vigour or efficiency. Patently they are not. Indeed, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain were not allowed to join ‘Schengenland’ until they had satisfied the original members that their standards of border control were sufficiently rigorous (Dinan, 1999, page 441). And satisfactory border control standards are significant features of the accession process for future EU members—especially those like Poland and the Czech Republic who will become the sites of the EU’s future ‘eastern frontier’. The point is, however, that political and technical norms have now been established—and embedded as EU *acquis*—which operate on the assumption that the EU should have an all-encompassing, continuous external border. It is in terms of these norms that strategic ‘weak spots’ are periodically identified and targeted for improvement.

However, despite these various parallels, it is important that we do not merely extrapolate from the national experience. There are important ways in which the new external border is not analogous to the national one. There are aspects of it that we will miss if we view it exclusively through the conceptual lens of the nation-state. Just as we need nonstatist concepts to understand the emergent political properties of the ‘Euro-polity’ (Schmitter, 1996), then we need conceptual flexibility in the way we think about its emergent border(s). How is the Schengen border different from the national border?

The first discontinuity derives from what observers see as the EU’s ‘variable geometry’. In recent years the integration process seems to have lost its symmetrical quality. The model of integration is no longer the one envisaged by Monnet and others—of a given number of states all equally integrated across the same policy-areas and functions. States can opt out of agreements in areas like borders policy, social policy, foreign policy, and monetary policy. Then there are the opt-ins, arrangements that have, for example, brought Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein into the single market. Meanwhile, the Amsterdam Treaty has allowed for ‘flexible integration’. Amsterdam furnishes a legal mechanism to allow groups of member states to move faster and/or more intensively towards integration than the EU as a whole. Finally, accession agreements with candidate countries mean that EU norms and policies extend well beyond its EU member states. The upshot of all this is that there is no single border to the EU complex that might be said to delimit a single administrative space. “The walls around the alleged ‘Fortress Europe’ are not drawn around one particular space, defining at one stroke population, territory and *raison d’être* of the polity. Instead, membership and space which are defined by different policies overlap. The walls ‘erected’ by individual policies intersect” (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000, page 74). The placing of such developments under the rubric of a ‘new medievalism’ is problematic because it tends to understate the profound political and conceptual differences between the medieval and modern worlds [see Pounds (1951, pages 150–151) for a

discussion of the complexities of the medieval frontier]. Nevertheless, it does highlight how European integration is producing a situation where no single boundary is capable of enclosing the different scales and sites of political authority and community.

The second discontinuity that concerns me pertains to the governance of the new external border, and the space(s) that it encloses. Unlike the national border, the new external border, and the space of 'internal' security that it creates, is not the object of a single, overarching political centre. Decisionmaking with regard to such issues as immigration, asylum, policing, judicial cooperation, and crime prevention is located not in a new European state, per se, but in the intersection of intergovernmental and supranational institutions and their dynamics, mostly now housed within the EU (Stetter, 2000). Some commentators regard this growth of supranational and regional influence in border control and immigration policy as one aspect of a wider "loss of sovereignty" for the state under globalizing conditions (Sassen, 1996, pages 11–12). From the perspective of any given state we might well speak of a certain loss of sovereignty. But this should not be confused with a diminution of sovereign power more generally. If we can accept that sovereignty is not necessarily but rather historically bound up with statehood then what is at stake seems to be a mutation in the form that sovereignty is taking (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pages xi–xii). The fact that borders are still valued by political authorities, if nothing else, suggests that we are far from departing the logics of sovereignty.

A fuller discussion of the nature of the kind of sovereignty embodied in and accorded to international organizations like the EU is, however, beyond the scope of this essay (see, inter alia, Dean, 1999; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Instead, what I want to explore here, returning to the theme of the national border and the EU border and their discontinuities, is the question of how government is practised at a more routine, operational level. The creation of national borders, the location of multiple functions of control there, and the consolidation of uniform national territories within them required significant accomplishments in terms of building new administrative capacities. More specifically, it was accomplished over several centuries through the creation of powerful, hierarchical, national bureaucracies to police customs, immigration, health, etc. It is possible that over the long term a similar process could be repeated at a European level. Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, for instance, has recently identified the need for a pan-European police force and a European public prosecutor's office (*The Guardian* 2001). However, it seems unlikely that new European superbureaucracies will soon take over the tasks of immigration control or customs in the way that national agencies supplanted or subsumed local and voluntary agencies previously. If we are to go by the past experience of European integration, then a different formula of government is in operation. Rather than replacing national systems, the tactic is one of finding ways of linking them, of 'harmonizing' their operations and rules. One place this is expressed is in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), where the project of making the EU into an 'area of freedom, security, and justice' is outlined legally and conceptually. It is tempting to regard this 'area' as an emergent EU territory. However, rather than reduce this 'area' to existing, statist political concepts, we should strive to capture its novelty. The 'action plan' adopted to actualize this concept offers some clues in this respect. The idea of the Amsterdam Treaty

"is not to create a European security area in the sense of a common territory where uniform detection and investigation procedures would be applicable to all law enforcement agencies in Europe in the handling of security matters. Nor do the new provisions affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent on Member States to maintain law and order and safeguard internal security" (Council of the European Union and European Commission, 1999, page 3).

Instead, the Treaty provides an institutional framework to develop “common action” at the “appropriate level” in security matters among the member states’ security agencies (Council of the European Union and European Commission, 1999, page 3). Barry (1993; 1994) has suggested that we see technical harmonization as a ‘European art of government’ as it enables government to be exercised across a European space despite the continued existence of different national economic and social systems. With the question of border control, it seems this art is migrating from economic and technical areas, where it was first elaborated, to new fields.

There is an important point to be made here about what we understand by governance in the European Union context and elsewhere. Certain political scientists understand a governance approach to the EU as one where “the shape of the Euro-polity ... is the independent variable” rather than “the dependent variable” (Jachtenfuchs, 2001, page 245). A governance approach, on this reading, is about treating the EU as an institutional configuration capable of patterning political relations and outcomes. By contrast, if we wish to interrogate the EU in terms of its ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991) then we need to investigate its particular *arts* of government. We need to pay more attention to the governmental technologies by which rule is effected. If the hierarchical bureaucracy was the institutional and infrastructural correlate of the national border (and of nation building more generally) it is the diagram of the network which seems to orient the government of the European border and its ‘insides’. The spread of this kind of power is made possible in part by the deployment of information technology. The most well-known of these is the Schengen Information System (SIS), a key feature of the Schengen Agreement, designed to facilitate ‘information exchange’ between national authorities.⁽⁵⁾ There are an estimated 44 000 access points to the system, and around 14 million records [information reported by Tony Bunyan, Statewatch, in House of Lords (1999, paragraph 40)]. Most data entries concern prohibited immigrants, wanted persons, and stolen vehicles. Another information system that has yet to come ‘on line’ is Eurodac, which will allow the electronic storage and exchange of the fingerprints of all those seeking asylum or apprehended illegally crossing the external border of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2000).

However, building networks and practising ‘information exchange’ in the area of border control and internal security are not simply a matter of ‘hard’ technologies. They also involve innovation in social practice. Here we might consider the constitution of new figures of authority and expertise, such as the *liaison* officer. Liaison has no doubt taken place formally and informally between national officials in the EU and elsewhere for many decades. What seems to be novel is the fact that liaison is now accorded a strategic significance and official status within the tactics of European integration. Under the Schengen Implementation Convention, and now under EU Joint Actions and other frameworks, specific provisions are made concerning liaison activities (Monar, 2000, page 24). Here it is insightful to draw a contrast with the national experience. The consolidation of national frontiers entailed the creation of trained bodies of customs, immigration, and police officers, agents who would faithfully and uniformly manage the nation’s borders. Liaison officers foster cooperation between these national agencies in such areas as drugs interception, customs, and document inspection. Liaison officers also extend these expert networks beyond the Schengen area, as these authorities are often posted to airports, immigration offices, and consulates sending people to the EU from ‘third countries’ [see, for example, Council of the European Union (2001), where liaison work in the area of police cooperation is

⁽⁵⁾ These technologies are not particularly ‘new’: one Schengen official observed that the SIS is no more sophisticated than the technology of automatic banking machines (interview, Brussels, 20 February 2001).

discussed]. The EU can be considered a catalyst for networks: through programmes like ODYSSEUS it sponsors the exchange of national officials responsible for immigration, asylum, and border maintenance (see Council of the European Union, 1998). In these, and other ways, we see the emergence of a veritable ‘archipelago of police’ (Bigo, 2000). Modern territoriality was created in part by the nationalization of borders. However, in the case of Schengen it is not a homogenous new European space that is emerging. Instead, these and other practices and discourses “reveal a concern about interstitial spaces *between* governed territories” (Sheptycki, 1995, page 630).

Borders and national identity

The nationalization of borders in Europe did not take place without an ideological context. On the contrary, this has been a process fiercely bound up with questions of national identity (Anderson and Bort, 1998; Donnan and Wilson, 1999; O’Dowd and Wilson, 1996). Indeed, one way to write the history of political borders would be in terms of the different ‘others’ that have been mobilized to sanction their construction. National border formation, like other aspects of state formation, was underpinned by the nationalist logic of friend/enemy. Territorial disputes came to involve the mobilization of armed forces in the name of the nation and claims to territory that were an essential part of its (mythic) history and geography. Similarly, with the Versailles peace conference after World War 1, we see the logic of ethnonationalism becoming articulated with the political technology of border construction: the norm that the drawing of the borders of the new nations emerging out of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires should accommodate patterns of ethnic settlement, and realize the political ideal of popular self-determination (Jackson Preece, 1998).⁽⁶⁾

Does Schengen have its ‘others’? Here we can follow a number of commentators who have noted another way that Schengen diverges from the national experience. What is interesting about Schengen as a process of border construction is that its ‘others’ are not nations understood as geopolitical security threats. It is not the collective defense of the EU from Russia, Turkey, or Morocco as military powers, or national movements which is at stake. Rather, the security threat takes the form of a host of transnational, social threats, and is often personified in the racialized figure of Islamic and nonwhite people (O’Dowd and Wilson, 1996; Pieterse, 1990). A security field has been assembled through elite and public discourse which brings together crime, drugs, asylum seekers, human smugglers, terrorists, and so on, as though their association were quite natural. It blurs the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ that had formerly organized modern state security practices (Bigo, 1994; 2000). This association of refugees with crime, drugs, and terrorism, and their distancing from discourses of democracy, human security, and human rights have been powerfully contested by domestic and international groups such as Amnesty International and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Nevertheless, it is these ‘folk devils’ that are typically mobilized to sanction the strengthening of the EU’s external border, as well as transnational ‘internal’ security measures. If the dangerous figure of the underclass has been successfully deployed to support a new punitiveness in domestic politics and social policy, this finds a parallel with the social panic surrounding the refugee or asylum seeker (den Boer, 1995).

⁽⁶⁾ As well as redrawing borders, Europe would embrace a second political tactic for aligning borders with populations on an ethnonational basis. This was the phenomenon of ‘population transfer’, a particular practice of mass expulsion. Prominent instances of such transfers include the ‘exchange’ of Greek and Turkish minorities under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Nazi policy of repatriating ethnic Germans—which worked in tandem with the deportation and genocide of the Jews—and the expulsion of Germans from many countries in Central and Eastern Europe following the end of World War 2 (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958; de Zayas, 1988; Jackson Preece 1998; Prescott, 1987; Schechtman, 1946).

Biopolitical borders

We come now to the last of my three trajectories for situating Schengen. Here we must confront the relationship of the border to population. The first point to make here is that, if today the political question of the border in a 'globalizing world' seems indissociable from that of the movement and regulation of people, this has not always been the case. For many centuries we can suppose that it was the sovereign aspect of the border that was predominant. Then, the border would have been more significant as a marker of the limit of the sovereign's exercise of right, and a site where goods and indeed life might be subtracted in his or her name. It is much more recently that the border has become an instrument of biopower, in the sense in which Foucault (1990; 1997) uses the term—power that, in contrast with sovereign power, and operating through a multitude of institutional sites like schools, prisons, and hospitals, is concerned with fostering life and promoting wealth, vitality, happiness by acting simultaneously at the level of the individual and the population.

How does the border become biopolitical? The biopoliticization of the border is signaled by the political concerns, events, and means by which the border will become a privileged instrument in the systematic regulation of national and transnational populations—their movement, health, and security. It is about the "filter function of border controls" (den Boer, 1995, page 92). Research on the history of immigration policy is instructive here. Certainly one finds instances of borders being used to control population movement throughout history. For example, Anderson (2000, page 18) notes that, in the heyday of the Byzantine Empire from the 7th century to the 12th century, "a network of border control posts was in place where cross-border visitors had to present passports and apply for visas". However, it is only quite recently that such interventions become in any way systematic. Contrary to our assumptions about the permanence of borders and their functions, it seems that administrative barriers to migration between nations in 19th-century Europe were quite minimal (Lippert, 1999, page 299; Marrus 1985, page 9). According to historian Bernard Porter, "For the best part of the 19th century ... the British government deliberately denied itself any control over immigration, and appeared indeed for the most part to take no interest in it" (Porter, 1979, page 4, cited in Lippert, 1999, page 299). In the USA, a principal destination for migrants, no federal records were kept of immigrants until the 1820s (Bernard, 1998, page 55). Immigration into the USA was not regulated federally until the 1880s (Castles and Miller, 1993, page 45).

It seems that World War I marks something of a watershed for the rise of the biopolitical border. Amidst concerns about national security, and then the Great Depression, passports, visas, and other controls became required everywhere (Hammar, 1986, pages 736–737). "With World War One the modern European state strengthen[ed] its border-enforcement functions and sovereign control over its territories; passports [were] suddenly checked" (Sassen, 1999, page 77). Many factors were involved, including the politicization of immigration in a context of economic downturns in many countries, and a hardened conception of the 'foreigner', which crystallized at the start of the 20th century (page 78). We might add that there was a heightened emphasis on 'race' in its biological and population aspects. This dates at least to the 1880s, when one sees biopolitical immigration laws passed to exclude Chinese and other Asians from the United States, and laws concerning 'Foreign Poles' working in Prussia. In the 1900s, restrictions were aimed at Jewish immigration to Britain, and there was Australia's White Australia Policy. More of these discriminatory laws were passed in many countries, including the United States, during the depression (Castles and Miller, 1993, pages 51–62). Overdetermining these various developments was the fact that this was a time of mass population displacement. Border controls were both a reaction to, and a

condition of, the emergence of a notion of refugees as a 'crisis' and an international 'problem' from the time of World War 1 onwards (Sassen, 1999, pages 77–79).

Earlier I insisted that the geopolitical border should be regarded not merely as a line, a physical location, or even as a symbol, but in terms of a larger heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Something similar can be said of the biopolitical border. It forms a machine with an assortment of technologies, simple and complex, old and new. These include passports, visas, health certificates, invitation papers, transit passes, identity cards, watchtowers, disembarkation areas, holding zones, laws, regulations, customs and excise officials, medical and immigration authorities.⁽⁷⁾ But this machine does not emerge fully formed, nor is it static. It is a matter of many different practices, each with their own history, their own technical and political preconditions, their own temporality, and of how these will be assembled in a functioning unity. Torpey (1999) has written a fascinating account of the invention of the passport, but in fact each element can be the subject of such a history. For instance, the history of the visa is yet to be written (though see Bo, 1998). What insights would the genealogy of this little form—at once mundane but also, in its limit cases, a matter of life and death—generate concerning the political and social codification of populations and their movements, the ascription of status, the geopolitical division of the desirable and undesirable, and the regulation not just of the migrant's experience of space but also of their time?

The fact of this assemblage means that, as Sassen puts it, "the state has typically been involved long before the moment of border control presents itself" (1999, page 150). Among its chief effects are the filtering and protection of the national population, the regulation of the movement of things and risks, and the collection of revenue. It is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss the changing forms that the biopolitical border will take.⁽⁸⁾ However, the following description of one of the most famous immigration 'depots', nicely illustrates the condensed, disciplinary nature of the biopolitical border.

"In contrast to the casual paternalism of Castle Garden, Ellis Island was efficient and impersonal. After quarantine and customs procedures immigrants were hustled past doctors on an assembly-line basis, each doctor assigned to looking for one specific disease; three special inspectors decided on the doubtful cases. As health regulations were added to the exclusion clauses, the examinations grew more complex and time-consuming. Those who passed were then interviewed by registry clerks who recorded vital statistics and other background information. Finally, the immigrants were sent to special offices housed in the federal station for currency exchange, rail tickets, baggage handling, and telegrams" (Bernard, 1998, page 61).

This discussion of the biopolitical border has emphasized some of its control functions. However, this should not be taken to imply an orthodox view of the border as a purely restrictive or repressive device. Like the many biopolitical spaces that Foucault and others have described, the border is a locale where power is produced. For instance, it does not simply act on a population that is already fully given. Rather, the border can

⁽⁷⁾ A key concept in contemporary refugee law is 'refoulement', meaning repulsion or turning back. Under human rights conventions, states have pledged not to engage in the refoulement of refugees. It would be interesting to know how far the emergence and legalization of this concept have as their practical correlate the construction of borders and border controls capable of systematically policing and repelling population flows.

⁽⁸⁾ Perhaps one can speak of a certain militarization of this assemblage, as observed in the case of the US–Mexico border, where the biopolitical is overcoded with the geopolitical border. In such instances the fortified border is reemergent. This tendency can be identified at the EU external border also. For example, through a joint Spanish–EU initiative, the land border between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Ceuta on the North African coast has now been fortified with barbed wire, sensory detectors, spotlights, and closed-circuit television. According to Statewatch, this was classified as a *military* project (see *Statewatch Bulletin* 1995).

be regarded as a privileged institutional site where political authorities can acquire biopolitical knowledge about populations—their movements, health, and wealth. In a sense, then, the border actually contributes to the production of population as a knowable, governable entity.

Schengen's new control tactics

What kind of transformation in the space and rationality of the biopolitical border is effected by Schengen? Here we have to consider the fact that the essence of the Schengen agreement was that the gradual abolition of common frontiers was to be compensated and counterbalanced with a series of 'flanking measures'. These were a series of security provisions to assuage the concerns of security personnel and officials that the relaxation of border controls would make their countries vulnerable. Their main features are: strict control of the external frontier, which becomes an official object of joint concern according to common rules contained in the Schengen Manual for the External Frontier; the exchange of information through the SIS; enhanced police cooperation amongst participating states; and the commitment to move towards a common visa, asylum, and immigration policy. The British House of Lords summarized the implications of this project:

"[Schengen] does not seek to loosen or lift controls but, rather, to transfer these away from internal borders. This means that controls will take place within the territories of individual Schengen States or, more usually in the case of travellers subject to passport or visa checks, at the external frontiers of the Schengen area" (House of Lords, 1998, paragraph 19).

Schengen appears as two types of border at once. There is a hardened exterior frontier which, in those places where it comprises watchtowers, fences, and detection devices, is very much continuous with the long history of frontier as obstacle or barrier. But articulated with this is a more diffuse, networked, control apparatus that is no longer territorially fixed and delimited, and which has unfolded in response to the removal of common frontiers. It is worth quoting at length the description offered by Michel Pinault, a French Representative on the Central Group of Schengen:

"The security services were used to having fixed border posts that were properly set up with the necessary facilities to carry out border checks, they were used to covering a limited amount of terrain which they were very familiar with and practically overnight they had to change their working method finding that they no longer had fixed border posts to deal with but were rather on the move, moving much more into the hinterland to carry out checks ... [This] change in working method meant that our security services in France had to develop relationships of trust with the security services across the border in the other countries and gradually over a period of time through an exchange of information, through exchanges of officials, they have had to familiarize themselves with the way in which the other security services operate in order to ensure and feel comfortable with the fact that what they are giving up is being taken over properly and carried out properly by the security services in the other countries" (House of Lords, 1999, Question 48, Minutes of Evidence, 2 December 1998).

It seems that if this new type of dispersed, networked control is taking over some of the regulatory responsibilities of the old fixed border, this is, to some extent at least, a reaction to changes in the way that the problem of crime and 'illegal' immigration is perceived by political authorities. As the means and the avenues for migrating temporarily across borders increase dramatically—tourism, business, foreign study, family ties—it may not be possible to intercept the 'illegal' immigrant at the border because they are not 'illegal' at that point.

“Illegal immigration is not made up simply of people coming through the border points where they might be discovered to be illegal immigrants. Illegal immigration also occurs within the territory of a country. There are people who are residing in the country who are not legally there, perhaps because they came in legally but over-stayed their legal right to stay, perhaps because they came in illegally by some means. Where these people are living in the country in an irregular fashion they must find a way to live and this of course leads to a certain amount of illegal work, to non-declared work, to tax evasion, to social security fraud and so on, and it is by checks in these different areas, tax, social security and so on, that it is possible to discover the presence of illegal immigrants. So it is not simply a question of checking the border points ...” (House of Lords, 1999, Question 49, Minutes of Evidence, 2 December 1998).⁽⁹⁾

Pinault goes on to explain that increasingly border authorities do not work in isolation but in cooperation with officials from other countries, as well as with ‘interior’ policing agents. Through such connections, the border is folded with the electronic, virtual territory of databanks, employment, and social security records.

What concepts best capture this transformation in the border with respect to its regulation of population? For Bigo, it is the realization of a new field of “internal security” which plays upon various ‘fears’ and ‘insecurities’ related to flows of population (1994; 2000). For Foucher, there is the spread of surveillance into the hinterland: “in certain respects, the entire national territory is now being treated as an expanded frontier zone” (1998, page 238). This includes customs work which has “gone inland to meet the goal of economic security” (Foucher, 1998, page 239). Anderson (2000, page 24) considers this a “deterritorialization of border controls”, a development which encompasses: controls exercised in consulates worldwide, carrier liability legislation, and the pressures on east central European countries to accept Schengen norms. It also includes what he calls ‘immigration diplomacy’ with countries of origin. It seems that the world of customs reveals certain parallels with this pattern of dispersal.

Although these observations are certainly well made, they do not go as far as they might in connecting border-control practices to the history of power relations understood more broadly. One of the advantages of relating the border to biopolitics and its disciplinary mechanisms is that we cast it immediately in a much wider field. If the border of the early 20th century, as exemplified by Ellis Island, bore a certain resemblance to the school, the factory, the asylum, and other dense institutional sites, then what population control system might we look to for comparisons today? Here Deleuze’s (1995) brief reflections on what he calls ‘control societies’ might be helpful.

“Control societies are taking over from disciplinary societies” (1995, page 178). In the disciplinary society, populations are governed in terms of sites of confinement—education is experienced in terms of the organized space and time of the school, punishment is synonymous with the prison, work with the factory, and so on. Such institutions mold individuals and populations as they pass from one to the next. But in control societies, although we still encounter these institutions, biopolitics has become much more supple, dispersed, and nebulous. Education, for instance, is no longer reducible to the time and space of the school. Under the auspices of ‘lifelong learning’, education is a set of practices which, given the mediation of information technologies, the techniques of flexible certification, and the ethos of human capital (‘invest in yourself’), is now more pervasive and interior. Disciplinary societies mold us through their institutions; control societies operate in terms of modulation—“like a self-transmuting molding continually

⁽⁹⁾ Apparently, the majority of those arrested as ‘illegal immigrants’ in the Netherlands constitute ‘overstayers’, not illegal entrants (Evidence of Professor Groenendijk, House of Lords, 1999, paragraph 26).

changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another” (Deleuze, 1995, page 179). Perhaps we should see aspects of the control society at work in the Schengen border, for the border is no longer reducible to fixed control posts and sites of inspection and observation. Instead, it is networked, an articulation of social security and health data systems, employment registers. It reaches back into the territory of the nation, but also outwards, linking systematically with gateways into the EU, such as foreign consulates, airlines, and travel agents. And the border operates in terms of codes which classify mobile populations, making entry quick and efficient for some, and difficult for others (Kosłowski, 2001).

Yet, in highlighting the ‘control’ aspects of Schengen, it is nevertheless important not to assume a linear path of evolution. One of the problems of Deleuze’s formulation is a certain technological determinism. One gets the impression that societies move inexorably towards more complex and sophisticated regimes of regulation. However, we do not move simply from disciplinary borders to diffusely controlled borders. For one thing, we find instances of interior controls somewhat earlier in history. Reflecting on the interwar state, where border controls were used to promote welfare and protect labour, Caestecker notes the limits of this tactic: “Border controls could never be tight enough to stem the flow of migrants across the borders, certainly since a select group of migrants was always in demand ... Thus control within the borders became essential, for the mere reason that separating desirable from undesirable immigrants at the border was not an easy task” (1998, page 87). Likewise, the ‘extension’ of border control outward is not entirely recent: as early as 1924, the United States was requiring all immigrants to possess a visa on arrival. This meant they could be screened by US consuls in their host countries long before they reached the US border (Bernard, 1998).

But also, the extent to which interior controls supplant finite border controls is not simply a technological question but a political one. It is determined by political choices and tactics. The Schengen model of decentred and dispersed ‘internal’ controls is not predestined to replace the national model of fixed, disciplinary arrangements in which control is concentrated at the border. This much is evident from the politics of Britain’s refusal to fully ‘Europeanize’ its frontier controls, a political stance that has been recognized in the Amsterdam Treaty. The British government has argued that Schengen reflects a longer continental tradition “where because of the difficulty of policing long land frontiers, there is much greater dependence on internal controls such as identity checks” (Home Office, 1998, paragraph 2.9; see also the debate in House of Lords, 1999). In contrast, the argument goes, in part because of its island geography, Britain has been able to rely on strict border controls concentrated in seaports and airports, the principal gateways into its territory. It has obviated the need for a range of internal controls common in countries like France, such as identity cards and the requirement of registering oneself in hotels.⁽¹⁰⁾ No doubt this argument is offered as a post hoc

⁽¹⁰⁾ In citing Britain’s ‘maritime and insular destiny’ as a reason for excluding Britain from the European Community De Gaulle used this geographically founded discourse of British exceptionalism against Britain. Belgium, shortly after its independence, had a system of registration for nationals as well as for aliens. Beginning in 1846 all inhabitants were required to register their whereabouts with communal authorities, and, after World War I, carry an identity card (Caestecker, 1998). Brochmann (1999) makes the useful distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ controls in relation to immigration. Established countries of immigration like Canada, USA, and Australia have relied on external controls, as has Britain. She suggests this is because intercontinental migrants traveling by ship or plane are easier to check at a distance than those who arrive by land. Scandinavian countries, for instance, use identity numbers for their population registers, but also for the internal control of noncitizens. However, it should be noted that the relative lack of internal identity checks in Britain is not just a consequence of its ‘island geography’ but also a reflection of the strong antiracist movement and culture which has opposed identity cards. See the chapter on Britain in *No One is Illegal* (2000).

rationalization of government policy, and is not without a hint of chauvinism. ('Liberal' British political culture is contrasted with continental 'statism'.) However, these alternate approaches do suggest that we should see border controls in the context of a wider field of population management, in which the tensions between liberty and security are negotiated in different ways. To some extent, at least, these are not stages but different strategies of control. In the British model, the physical space of the border remains preeminent.

Conclusion

Let me conclude this paper by comparing its orientation with other literatures on Schengen and borders. No doubt one could make sense of Schengen in terms of a political economy of globalization and regionalization. The Schengen project of strengthening the external frontier of the EU represents, on this reading, a collective response of the wealthy states of Western Europe to the prospect of increasingly globalized patterns of migration. Put starkly, Schengen stands as a new iron curtain, designed to protect its member countries from the world's poor. At the same time, its other face—the removal of internal border controls—resonates powerfully with the neoliberal project of market-building and flexibilization. Although such a reading is not without its merits, I have nevertheless resisted the temptation to frame Schengen in terms of the neoliberal regionalization/globalization motif, for this move always runs the risk that it will make its objects merely one more expression or instance of an epochal shift, or of a master dynamic. It makes the border a self-evident feature of the present.

Drawing on certain methodological and theoretical precepts of genealogy I have tried to produce a different account of Schengen. Rather than relating it to a world of globalization that seems already known and which in turn makes Schengen knowable, I have sought to use Schengen to unsettle the present. At the same time I have sought to convey the sense in which Schengen involves a *making* of the present. It has been a dominant theme of this paper that Schengen is an event which allows us to denaturalize the connection between borders and nation-states. Schengen highlights the historicity of borders, revealing the contingency of the configuration of sovereignty, territory, and population associated with the modern state. It prompts us to ask questions not just about future possible configurations, but about how the arrangement associated with the modern state first came into being, and how it came to be regarded as natural.

Another advantage of a genealogical perspective on Schengen is that it does not totalize the border. I have not sought to capture the essence of the border, nor to suggest that it has a set number of finite functions. I have not assumed that it conforms to a singular temporality. Rather, I have sought its intelligibility in a method that disperses it, projecting it against three (though many others are possible) strategically chosen analytical fields of geopolitics, nationalization, and biopolitics. This has allowed me to draw 'diagonal lines' (Deleuze, cited in Marks, 2000, page 128), which are not the lineaments of systems-oriented political economy. Rather than situate Schengen in the field of the global society, these diagonal lines allow it to be compared with other rationalities and practices such as classical geopolitics. In this way, otherwise hidden facets can be uncovered.

But if this approach is somewhat different from one of political economy, it can also be contrasted with a postmodernist thematization of borders. I have not examined borders as metaphors in this paper. Nor have I examined in any great depth the border as an intervention which seeks to fix an otherwise unstable world of shifting political and cultural identities. State borders and now EU borders have undoubtedly played a central role in constructing an 'us' and a 'them', an 'inside' and an 'outside'. But it is not one I have been primarily concerned with here. Instead, I have explored the border in

terms of governmental practices—the shaping of administrative territories, the practice of security, the regulation of population.

Finally, it might be useful to highlight some directions that further genealogical research on Schengen might take. There are several themes that were hinted at, but which it was not possible to develop. The first of these would be to study Schengen in terms of certain questions of sovereignty. A certain line of argument would frame the rise of border agreements like Schengen, and the institutionalization of supranational powers at the regional level more generally, in terms of a ‘loss of sovereignty’. The problem with this view is that it tends to treat sovereignty as synonymous with the power of the state to rule over its territory. Sovereignty appears fixed, without history. Rather than accepting this image, future research might consider Schengen as a locale where discourses and practices of sovereignty are actually produced and multiplied. For instance, it could consider how opponents of regional agreements (for example, nationalist critics of Schengen in the United Kingdom) do not merely seek to defend a sovereignty that was always already there, but help to produce it anew through their discourse. But we could also look at Schengen as a trajectory for emerging new forms of networked, regional sovereignty. EU policymakers and commentators often refer to Schengen as a ‘laboratory’ where new border and policing arrangements were first invented and tested (Monar, 2000). To see Schengen in terms of new forms of sovereignty would deepen and radicalize this insight.

But a second theme for research would concern the spatiality of the border. The linear border enclosing its national territory is a historical, not an eternal phenomenon. Given the significance and centrality of air travel to human migration today, the space of the border is now shaped powerfully around the international airport. Hence, further research needs to trace this reconfiguring of the border from a space of lines and edges to one of nodes. How do airports in EU countries represent places where ‘external’ borders are now on the ‘inside’? How might we read the airport as a strategic locale where administrative practice seeks to reconcile liberty and security? How is this airport border being dramatized under the terms of the ‘war on terrorism’? These types of questions should be at the heart of any future attempt to map Schengenland.

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