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ANCIENT SCEPTICISM

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6 Sextus Empiricus

1 LIFE AND WORKS

Sextus Empiricus, who surely lived in the second and third centuries CE, is one of those rare Greek philosophers whose works we have more or less complete in the form in which he wrote them. Before the great commentaries and treatises of the Neo-Platonists at the end of antiquity, this is hardly the case except for Plato, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Plotinus. But should we place Sextus in such illustrious company? If his work had not been preserved, our knowledge of ancient scepticism would be much more limited; but, leaving aside the fact that he is an irreplaceable source, is Sextus "an obscure and unoriginal Hellenistic writer," as Richard Popkin says?[1] Or, on the contrary, did he introduce original elements into the philosophical debate of his time?

Of the life of Sextus Empiricus we know virtually nothing. We know that he was a doctor (he tells us himself, *M* 1.260, *PH* 2.238) and Diogenes Laertius lists him as the penultimate head of the sceptical school.[2] It seems that Sextus wrote some works that are now lost. He refers to his own *Medical Treatises* (*M* 7.202); one wonders whether or not this is the same work as the *Empiric Treatises* cited in *M* 1.62. The other books of his that Sextus himself appears to cite are probably ways of referring to passages from the works that have survived.[3] But that leaves us three works of his that seem (more or less) complete.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism (*PH*) is presented by Sextus as a sort of summary, in three books, of the sceptical doctrine. Very often he appeals to its "outline" character to justify his relatively brief treatment of some question. Book 1 is a general introduction to the sceptical philosophy; we shall discuss it in detail below. The two other books attack the "dogmatic" systems of thought, following

the generally accepted plan for philosophical exposition: logic, physics, ethics. Book 2 deals with the "logical" part of philosophy, Book 3 with the physical and ethical parts.

The second work that has come down to us is a treatise *Against the Dogmatists* in five books: the first two (*Against the Logicians* 1 and 2) refute various philosophers' theses in the logical part, that is, various systems of logic and theories of knowledge; with *Against the Physicists* in two books and *Against the Ethicists* in one book, *Against the Dogmatists* thus covers the same ground as the last two books of *PH*. The opening lines of *Against the Logicians* allude to a general presentation of scepticism; this was long seen as an allusion to *PH*, but is more probably a back-reference to an introduction that has not survived. For the refutation of philosophers, Sextus thus offers two versions, with the same theses, often in identical or related terms, and relying on the same examples – one of them, however (that of *PH*), being more condensed. The first book of *PH*, on the other hand, has nothing corresponding to it in the version of *Against the Dogmatists* that has survived.

Then we have the treatise *Against the Learned* (or, more precisely, "against those involved with the sciences," hence sometimes called *Against the Professors*, and often designated by its Latin title *Adversus Mathematicos*) in six books: against the grammarians, the rhetoricians, the geometers, the arithmeticians (originally, no doubt, these last two books were together in one), the astrologers, and the musicians. Unfortunately, because of the arrangement of the manuscripts, the habit has arisen of citing these two last treatises under the same name, *Adversus Mathematicos*, a work that then comprises eleven books[4]: 1, *Against the Grammarians*, 2, *Against the Rhetoricians*, 3, *Against the Geometers*, 4, *Against the Arithmeticians*, 5, *Against the Astrologers*, 6, *Against the Musicians*, 7 and 8, *Against the Logicians*, 9 and 10, *Against the Physicists*, and 11, *Against the Ethicists*. In order to conform to standard usage, we will therefore cite the entirety of these texts by the title *Adversus Mathematicos*, abbreviated to *M*.

II A PROBLEMATIC TEXT

One cannot treat Sextus Empiricus like a "normal" philosophical author, and this for several reasons. First, there are historical

uncertainties connected with the life of Sextus and the history of scepticism, which make it very difficult to determine exactly which "version" of scepticism Sextus adhered to: among the influences affecting him, which one, or which ones, turned out to be decisive? What place did he occupy in the philosophical arena? On his relations with his predecessors in scepticism, especially Aenesidemus, Sextus gives us a few basics, but here too we are largely reduced to conjecture. Since antiquity, to judge from Diogenes Laertius (9.116), there were two opposing views on the history of scepticism.[5] According to one, attributed by Diogenes to Menodotus of Nicomedia, Timon had no successor and it was only Ptolemy of Cyrene who "revived the sect." This Ptolemy was the teacher of Heraclides, who was the teacher of Aenesidemus. Others, on the contrary, speak of an uninterrupted tradition, but the list of names they give very probably includes a gap, which modern scholars have done their best to pinpoint in time. In the second case, too, the sceptical "school"[6] would have suffered an eclipse, and therefore a renaissance. Indeed, the difference between these two views is less important, in the end, than their agreement: whether or not it nominally survived throughout this time, the sceptical movement at some point lost its luster. Some modern interpreters have thought that this gap (in the first form or the second) was in some sense filled by the New Academy, and that it is not until after the disappearance, or the enfeeblement, of the latter that the sceptical movement regained its vigor. In any case, starting with Ptolemy, there was an uninterrupted succession of sceptical philosophers up to Saturninus Cythenas, the pupil of Sextus; if the list does not continue, it may be simply because Diogenes Laertius was a contemporary of Saturninus.

Sextus is therefore situated at the end of a movement of sceptical renaissance, a movement that drew its inspiration and took its name from Pyrrho. Aenesidemus, who was the main author of this revival, was perhaps the one who introduced the term "Pyrrhonian" (he wrote some *Pyrrhonist Discourses*, whose plan Sextus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* picks up on, at least in part) and was also the one who sharply separates the Pyrrhonian sceptics from the New Academy, a school to which he belonged for a time himself.[7] It is important to understand that Sextus represents the end of a movement of return to the source, and that in this sense Sextus is a "fundamentalist" sceptic. We shall see that he is more of one than is generally believed.

The reader of Sextus is faced from the start with numerous problems. Whether he is attacking philosophies, in *M* 7–11 and *PH* 2–3, or the arts in *M* 1–6, what Sextus prima facie offers the reader is a collection of arguments, among which he marks no differences – neither between those he borrows from other sceptics and those of which he is himself the author, nor between arguments that strike us as highly subtle and others that seem to us rather weak. (For instance, at *PH* 3.4 he suggests that it would be "silly" to say that God is incorporeal and blessed, since without knowing the essence of God one cannot know his attributes.) This lack of differentation is perhaps at its most extreme when he juxtaposes quite different *types* of argumentation, as in the case of the Modes.[8] It is understandable for a doxographer or a historian, like Diogenes Laertius, to report the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Five Modes of Agrippa, for example, one after the other. But Sextus' procedure is exactly the same: in *PH*, having laid out at length the Modes of the "older sceptics" (1.36), which he elsewhere (*M* 7.345) attributes to Aenesidemus, he moves to those of Agrippa remarking simply "The more recent sceptics have left us five Modes of suspension of assent" (1.164). Since Sextus is not playing the role of a historian, but that of an advocate of scepticism, it is worth asking how he intends to make such different devices work together. Finally, let us note that Sextus' argumentation is often structured in "waves": what has just been ruled out is conceded, in order to show that *aporia*, or impasse, still remains. For example: there is no criterion of truth; but even if we admit that there is one, it is useless and empty, etc. This procedure is not peculiar to the sceptics; one can find it in Gorgias, for example (nothing exists; and even if something does exist, one cannot grasp it; and even if one can grasp it, one cannot communicate it). If one resists explaining these facts about the text by Sextus' stupidity or negligence, one needs to find a genuinely philosophical significance for them.

The first kind of non-differentiation indicated above is clearly of particular importance for the historian of philosophy: in the Sextan corpus, which parts are exposition of others' arguments and which exposition of Sextus' own material? The problem is largely insoluble, because along with his reticence about himself, Sextus is *theoretically* self-effacing to a degree unparalleled in history. So someone who wants to expound "the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus" is not

in the same position as someone intending to analyze "Aristotle's physics" or "Chrysippus' logic"; one has to settle for expounding "the sceptic way" as it appears in the Sextan corpus, attempting occasionally to surmise innovations by Sextus.

III THE SCEPTIC WAY AND SUSPENSION OF ASSENT

To try to uncover these innovations, as well as to give point to the lack of differentiation (in its various forms) indicated above, we have to give special attention to the first book of *PH*, which, as noted, has no counterpart in *M*. Here, Sextus describes the "sceptic way" and situates scepticism in the ancient philosophical landscape. He insists, indeed, on the fact that the sceptics are not a philosophical school in the usual sense of the word (1.16–17). Still, one finds among the sceptics a central feature of philosophical schools, namely, strong relations between teacher and student, and Sextus himself alludes to this, saying "where my teacher held discussion, there I now hold discussion" (*PH* 3.120). To designate the manner in which the sceptics both manage their investigations and conduct their lives, Sextus uses the word *agôgê*, here translated "way." Besides literally "transporting" something, this Greek word signifies "conduct" in every sense of the term: the directing of an army, the conduct of political affairs, the manner of conducting one's life, the manner of conducting a piece of reasoning or intellectual research (*PH* 1.4, 6, 7, etc.). Sextus thus means to indicate that being a sceptic is a matter of conduct more than of doctrine. In *PH* 1, Sextus offers a general "account" (*logos*) of the sceptical philosophy, while the part that makes objections against the various parts of dogmatic philosophy is the "special" account (*PH* 1.5–6). This distinction between general and special accounts does not appear in the other major report on scepticism that we possess, that of Diogenes Laertius, and this is perhaps a case of innovation by Sextus. In any case, one should note the force, the rigor, and the elegance of this general account of scepticism. Many elements in this general account were no doubt collected by Sextus from the prior sceptical tradition, as he sometimes says himself. This is the case in his account of the Modes, in which, as we have seen, Sextus proceeds by accumulation rather than by construction. Nonetheless, it is in this first book of *PH* that we have the best chance of finding Sextus being "original."

PH 1 intends, in fact, to set up a portrait of scepticism. One can distinguish four parts. The first (chapters 1–12) traces the general contours of the sceptical position ("its conception, its principles, its arguments, its criterion and its end" (1.5)); the second (chapters 13–17) deals with the different sets of Modes of suspension of assent; the third (chapters 18–28) deals with the "sceptical expressions"; and the last examines the relations between the "sceptic way" and the main philosophical systems that could claim to be its rivals. Sextus actually gives a definition of scepticism (*skepsis*): it is the ability (*dunamis*) to place in opposition our impressions of sense-perception and intellect, "an ability by which, because of the equal force in the opposed objects and reasonings, we arrive first at suspension of assent and after that at tranquility" (1.8). There is another definition of scepticism that is latent in the whole work: scepticism is defined, that is, demarcated, against dogmatism. Modern historians of philosophy have often emphasized the fact that "dogmatic" for Sextus does not have the same pejorative connotation as in modern speech. Actually, the word is not exactly a compliment in his hands. The difference from modern usage is that, for the sceptics, a dogmatic person is one who holds an opinion that he takes to be true of the external world. But, unlike the dogmatic person in the modern sense, who professes his opinions in a tone of authority, and often derives them from irrational sources, the dogmatic person in Sextus' usage bases his convictions on rational discourse. The sceptic, by contrast, limits himself to describing his experiences as they appear to him: "he says what appears to himself and reports his own experience without holding opinions, making no firm pronouncements about external objects" (1.15). "External objects" here include what we call by this name, but also concepts that we form, and judgements that we make about these objects and concepts. Hence one falls into dogmatism as soon as one gives assent to an opinion.

For Sextus, then, the sceptic is defined as a searcher (that is why "zetetic," that is, "searching," is one of the labels for the sceptic "way" (*PH* 1.7)) who, like everyone, searches for the truth about things, and more precisely about the impressions or appearances (*phantasiai*) which present themselves to him. Sextus describes this attitude in these terms: the sceptic "was hoping to achieve tranquility by reaching a conclusion on the irregularities of things" (1.29). He then finds himself faced with a disagreement (*diaphônia*) between

opposed opinions on every subject. Everyone finds these opinions both in himself and among others, notably among the philosophers called "dogmatic." Now, these opposed opinions on the same subject have an equal force of conviction (this is *isostheneia*, "equal strength"), which leads the sceptic to what is normally considered the decisive moment of the "sceptic way," suspension of assent (*epochê*). One may note here one of the features of the sceptic way that are peculiar to it, or at least, shared with very few other philosophies. It is after having searched for the truth in the manner of the dogmatists that the sceptic – who isn't yet really a sceptic – suspends assent. In other words, no one can be a sceptic who has not previously been a dogmatist and sought tranquility of soul in the manner of the dogmatists.

This equal strength is *experienced* by the sceptic, in that he is equally convinced by the opposing arguments. Thus, early in *PH* 3, Sextus concludes that "it is also necessary to suspend assent about the existence of cause, saying that cause no more is anything than it is not, as far as what the dogmatists say is concerned" (3.29), because he has laid out one by one the arguments for and against and has found them equally plausible. "Plausible" renders the Greek term *pithanon*, which comes from the verb *peithô*, "convince, persuade"; the point, then, is that the plausibility of the opposed arguments carries equal conviction for the sceptic who listens to them.[9]

Now, Sextus continues "when they had suspended assent, tranquility followed fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body" (1.29). This last image, which according to Diogenes Laertius (9.107) comes from Timon and Aenesidemus, and this word "fortuitously" are designed to stress that one cannot assert a rule; to assert a rule of the form "one who suspends assent finds tranquility" would amount once again to maintaining an opinion.

One of the key aspects of Sextus' philosophical enterprise is precisely that he takes seriously this notion of "suspension of assent" and extends its range to the maximum (perhaps to an impossible) degree. This very broad extension of suspension of assent goes hand in hand with a no less broad extension that Sextus gives to dogmatism – one sign, among others, of his "fundamentalism." In reviving the epithet "Pyrrhonian," following the sceptics at least since Aenesidemus, Sextus means to disqualify the New Academic tradition, now generally seen as belonging within ancient scepticism.

From the opening lines of *PH*, Sextus dismisses the New Academy as dogmatic, even if he notes that they are not dogmatists "in the proper sense" (*idiôs*, 1.3). There are in fact three possible attitudes for an inquirer: either one declares that one has made a discovery (Sextus might have added "or that one is sure that sooner or later one will do so"), which is the dogmatic position "in the proper sense"; or one declares that the matter is inapprehensible (Sextus means "*for ever* inapprehensible"), which is the position of (among others) the New Academy; or one continues the inquiry. Saying that how things are is inapprehensible, that the human mind cannot have an adequate conception of things, etc., belongs in the category that is today called "negative dogmatism" or, following Jonathan Barnes, "negative metadogmatism."[10] Saying that providence exists, or does not exist, would be an example of an opinion "dogmatic in the proper sense." A member of the New Academy will say, on the contrary, that it is impossible ever to settle the question. He will present himself, then, as equally an adherent of suspension of assent, in that he will suspend assent on either one of the two propositions – that providence exists or that it does not – *because* one cannot settle the question. According to Sextus, that too is giving one's assent to an opinion. The sceptic suspends assent not only on whether or not providence exists, but also on whether the answer to this question is within reach for human beings, and he continues to inquire, without pronouncing on the prospects for this inquiry having a successful conclusion. Hence the "nomenclature of scepticism" recorded by Sextus: the sceptic way is called "searching," "suspensive," "aporetic," "Pyrrhonian" (1.7).

This central notion of suspension of assent is therefore far from being an invention of Sextus. Pierre Couissin[11] showed that it is of Stoic origin and that, since Zeno, the Stoics maintained that one should suspend assent as long as one did not have a firm grasp of an object (even if it is not certain that the Stoics used the term *epochê*), and that Arcesilaus had subsequently made it one of the central strategies of his philosophy.[12] The first sceptic of the Pyrrhonian tradition to take hold of it is Aenesidemus.[13] He made a sweeping attempt to turn suspension of assent against his former colleagues in the Academy, reproaching them with claiming to be "in impasse" while holding certain things true and others false.[14] But, as has been

shown,[15] what Aenesidemus refuses to assent to is the fact that one can determine that a thing is such and such by nature:

> none of them [the Pyrrhonists] has said that everything is absolutely inapprehensible, nor that they are apprehensible, but they say that they are no more of one kind than another, or sometimes of one kind and sometimes not, or that they are this way for one person and not this way for another, and for another completely non-existent. According to them things in general, or some of them, are neither accessible nor inaccessible, but no more accessible than inaccessible, or sometimes accessible and sometimes not, or accessible to one person and not to another.[16]

To be sure, Aenesidemus does not say that things are inapprehensible, as the New Academy does, but he does postulate the existence of a nature of things, which we cannot determine because we have access to it only *relatively*. Such a position is unacceptable to Sextus, who would without any doubt consider it an assertion about the nature of things, that is, a dogmatic position.

Hence the definition of suspension of assent in Sextus: "We use 'I suspend assent' in place of "'I am not able to say which of the things presented one should find convincing and which unconvincing'" (*PH* 1.196). But not being able to settle the question is not at all a fixed destiny for humanity. When he writes that "we act like historians and report according to what appears to us at the moment" (*PH* 1.4), Sextus wants to signify that neither is he able to say whether one day he *will* be able to settle the question. One could say, in fact, that the Stoics, the New Academy and even Aenesidemus practise a suspension of assent that is actually a refusal to give one's assent. For his part, Sextus is "unable to say if he should give his assent or refuse it" (*PH* 1.7).

IV SCEPTICAL DISCOURSE

Sextus will therefore take extraordinary precautions to prevent dogmatism from sneaking into sceptical discourse at the point where assent is suspended. Hence *PH* 1 goes to great lengths to *define the status of sceptical discourse*. It has been thought that, by doing this, it falls into dogmatism. Thus, as concerns the afore-mentioned equal strength of the dogmatists' opinions on each subject, does Sextus not introduce the *belief* that these dogmatic opinions are in equilibrium

and cancel each other out?[17] This is what he seems to say at *PH* 1.12: "The overriding principle of the sceptical structure is that to every argument [or "discourse," *logos*] an equal argument is opposed; indeed it is from this, it seems to us, that we cease to dogmatize." In fact, Sextus was aware of this danger, and he addresses it in the chapters he devotes to the analysis of "sceptical expressions." Thus, in *PH* 1.203 he writes: "so when I say 'to every argument an equal argument is opposed,' I am implicitly saying this: 'to every argument I have investigated that establishes something dogmatically, it seems to me that another argument establishing something dogmatically is opposed to it, equal to the first in terms of conviction and lack of conviction' – so that the utterance of this discourse is not dogmatic."

How, in fact, is one not to dogmatize as soon as one speaks? Sextus answers: by adopting *non-assertive* speech. In the famous passage of Aristocles of Messene quoted by Eusebius of Caesarea, which is one of our main sources of knowledge for pre-Sextan scepticism, we read that it was Timon who gave the name "non-assertion" (*aphasia*) to the disposition of the sceptic who does not want to pronounce on the nature of the objects that his assertion is supposed to be describing.[18] Sextus not only declines to make "ordinary" assertions in saying "X is F," but when he is describing sceptical positions and procedures, he does so in a non-assertive manner: "Of none of what is to be said do we insist that it is entirely as we say, but for each thing we act like historians and report according to what appears to us at the moment" (*PH* 1.4). Sextus defines non-assertion as "an affect that precludes us from saying that we posit or deny anything" (*PH* 1.192). When he adds "Hence it is clear that we adopt non-assertion, too, not with the idea that things are by nature such as to drive us absolutely to non-assertion" (1.193), one cannnot help thinking that he is explicitly distancing himself from Aenesidemus. The sceptical expressions indicated by Sextus are, for example, "not more," "perhaps," "it may be," "it is possible," "I suspend assent," "I determine nothing," "I do not apprehend." When Sextus says: "concerning all the sceptical expressions one must understand from the start that we do not insist on their being entirely true, since we say that they can be canceled by themselves, falling into the same category as the things they are applied to, just as purgative remedies not only eliminate the humors from the body, but are themselves expelled with the humors" (*PH* 1.206), he means that the "sceptical expressions" are not meant

to qualify the philosopher's discourse about things (as when, for example, Aristotle declares that regularities in the sublunary world hold only "for the most part") but to be "revelatory of the sceptical disposition and of our affects" (*PH* 1.187).

Hence a very important point of interpretation. In several well-known passages, Sextus specifies an aspect of the status of sceptical discourse. The sceptic "supposes that, just as the expression 'everything is false' states that it too, along with everything else, is false – and the same goes for 'nothing is true' – so too the expression 'no more'[19] says that it too, along with everything else, is no more this than that, and for this reason falls into the same category as all the rest. And we say the same thing about the other sceptical expressions. Besides, if the dogmatist posits as real that about which he dogmatizes, whereas the sceptic utters his expressions in such a way that they themselves in effect carry their own limitation, he cannot be said to dogmatize in uttering them" (*PH* 1.14–15). The word translated "carry a limitation" (*perigraphein*) has generally been understood as signifying "cancel,"[20] which has made commentators think that Sextus accepted the idea that his argumentation was self-refuting, and that he could accept this because sceptical arguments refute themselves only *after* having refuted dogmatic theses. This is how Sextus' images for sceptical critique, comparing it to purgative remedies that are evacuated with the humors they eliminate, to fire which consumes itself in burning combustible material, or to the ladder that one pushes away after using it to climb "to a high place" (*M* 8.481), have been understood. But perhaps Sextus should not be read as accepting that self-refutation applies to sceptical discourse and expressions, because "nothing is true," for example, is only self-refuting if one employs it dogmatically.[21] It is in fact the dogmatist who is reproaching the sceptic with self-refutation, and it is noteworthy that Sextus deals with the self-limiting of expressions like "nothing is true" in a chapter entitled "Whether the Sceptic Dogmatizes."

A particular case of this general problem of self-refutation is that of the "demonstration" that there is no such thing as demonstration. At *PH* 2.188, Sextus begins by refuting the dogmatists while adopting their own point of view. Their position is: if there is a demonstration, there is a demonstration; if there is no demonstration, there is a demonstration (since the non-existence of demonstration is *demonstrated*); but either there is one or there isn't; therefore there is one. Now,

according to them, if the premise "if there is a demonstration, there is a demonstration" is true, the negation of the consequent must conflict with the antecedent; therefore the second premise is false. It should be noted that the sceptic, in assembling arguments, can put himself in the dogmatist's point of view and accuse him of incoherence. But the true sceptical position is different, and Sextus concludes his chapter on demonstration like this: "We offer this [i.e., the criticisms of the dogmatists from their own point of view] as an extra. For if the reasonings about demonstration are plausible – and let us suppose they are – and the attacks brought against demonstration are also plausible, it is necessary to suspend assent about demonstration too, and to say that it no more is than is not" (*PH* 2.192).

Sextus' response to the two accusations of self-refutation, one against the "sceptical expressions," the other against sceptical arguments like those directed against demonstration, is basically the same. It is based on *affect*. We have seen that Sextus defines non-assertion as "an affect that precludes us from saying that we posit or deny anything" (*PH* 1.192). This is applicable to all the "sceptical expressions": in uttering these expressions, the sceptic "reports" (*apangellei*, which one could render by "announce") the affect that strikes him at the moment. The same for the suspension of assent about demonstration: for it to occur, the sceptic must find equally convincing (*pithanos*) the arguments for and the arguments against, the latter no doubt being less readily convincing. Now at *M* 8.473 Sextus writes that the sceptics "will say that the argument against demonstration is merely convincing (*pithanon*) and that at this moment it convinces them and leads them to assent, but that they do not know if this will still be the case later, given the variability of the human mind." In saying "nothing is true" or in declaring himself convinced by the arguments put forward against the existence of demonstration, the sceptic thus reveals his own affect as he feels it at the instant when he reveals it. Insofar as it describes my present affect, the expression "nothing is true" does not apply to itself.

This matter of "affect" (*pathos*) is crucial, in that it also allows for a response to the major objection that, since antiquity, has continued to be made against scepticism, that of *apraxia*: how can the sceptic take part in any activity, especially social activity, if he proposes to live without opinion? To live at all, don't I just have to have the opinion that it is day and that it will soon be night, that cars can

run people over, or that tyranny is the worst kind of regime?[22] This has given rise to a distinction (along with a debate) among some current interpreters, between a "rustic" and an "urbane" scepticism,[23] the former rejecting absolutely all opinions, including those about everyday things, and the latter attacking only the "technical" opinions of philosophers and experts and accepting, by contrast, the opinions of the ordinary person. It is interesting to note that this distinction had been in a way anticipated, but on a practical level, by Pyrrho himself, about whom the tradition gives us a twofold picture. Sticking to the text of Diogenes Laertius (9.61–69), we see, on the one hand, Pyrrho living an eccentric life (he took no precautions against cars, precipices, or dogs, and survived only by the aid of his friends, he kept on talking to people who had departed, he disappeared to wander with companions at random, he passed by his friend Anaxarchus who had fallen into a swamp, he talked to himself) and, on the other hand, the same Pyrrho living a most orderly life – living "in upright fashion" (9.66)[24] with his midwife sister and selling chickens and pigs with her at the market, and so well integrated into society that his city made him high priest, an office he does not appear to have refused. In the end, the appropriate lesson to draw from the doxography on Pyrrho is surely that the distinction between rustic and urbane scepticisms is groundless. Pyrrho, as it were, pushed indifference to the point of not choosing between the two.[25] As for Sextus, a close reading of the texts appears to show that, especially in *PH*, he combined an extreme (and in this sense fundamentalist and "rustic") sceptical position with an active life as an individual and in society. And the main way in which he reconciles this rusticity and urbanity is, precisely, affect.

In an oft-cited passage, Sextus writes: "So, attending to apparent things, we live observing the rules of ordinary life without holding opinions, since we cannot be completely inactive. This observation of the rules of ordinary life seems to have four aspects: one consists in the guidance of nature, another in the necessity of the affects, another in the handing down of laws and customs, and another in the teaching of the arts" (*PH* 1.23). Sextus' words by no means force us to decide (as the "urbane" interpretation has it) that this important activity of the sceptic requires him, in the domain of everyday life, to accept having opinions and to confine his avoidance of opinion to "dogmas" (which the opinions that accompany our everyday life are obviously

not). Besides, Sextus himself explicitly says that the sceptic does not take this position: he conducts his activities "without holding opinions" (*adoxastôs*). At *PH* 2.102 Sextus gives a striking example of the sceptic's attitude towards everyday life: "The commemorative sign is made trustworthy by ordinary life, since someone who sees smoke sees there the sign of fire, and having noticed a scar, he says that there was a wound. Hence not only do we not come into conflict with ordinary life, but we are on its side, giving our assent, without holding opinions, to what it trusts in, and setting ourselves in opposition to the fictions peculiar to the dogmatists." Sextus' claim, therefore, is that the sceptic, *without holding an opinion*, gives his assent not to the inference "no smoke without fire," which would be a general rule bearing on the external world, but to "relying on my past experience, it seems to me that what has struck me as smoke is a sign of what has struck me as fire." An inference of this kind does not go beyond the domain of the affects.

Now we can see the point of the expression "guidance of nature" (*huphêgêsis phuseôs*): when he emphasizes the points of contact between the "sceptic way" and Methodist medicine,[26] Sextus writes that this medical school, "following what is apparent, takes from it what seems to be beneficial, in this respect following the sceptics" (*PH* 1.237). The same passage also explains what Sextus means by "necessity of the affects": "by the necessity of the affects the sceptic is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger to food" (1.238). In the same way Methodist medicine is guided to the remedy *by the disease itself*, "by contraction and dilatation" (1.238). As for customs and laws, "following the rules of everyday life without holding opinions, we say that there are gods, we revere the gods and we say that they are provident" (*PH* 3.2). Sextus is not claiming that saying that gods and providence exist is not an opinion,[27] but that *he* says "gods exist" because it is the custom where he lives – that in doing so he follows the rules of ordinary life, and that opinion is not at issue. There is no question here of the hypocrisy of an atheist pretending to believe to avoid persecution, or simply to be like others, since Sextus is not an atheist – that would be to hold an opinion. One may, like Jonathan Barnes, find this "rustic" reading "forced."[28] But the "urbane" reading is much worse; it would ascribe to Sextus the view that the existence of the gods and providence are not dogmas. As for the arts, we know that Sextus was a doctor and thought that he could, like the

Methodist doctors, practise his art "without holding opinions." But the arts present special problems for the sceptic, which we shall consider below.

Sextus therefore kept his distance from the provocative indifference of a Pyrrho, in favor of a more conformist existence; but this shift was not at the cost of any weakening of the position – on the contrary. The Sextan sceptic lets himself be guided by his impressions and his affects, and this is enough for him to conduct himself in the world. Perhaps the extreme point of this attitude is reached when, at *PH* 1.198, Sextus specifies that "indeterminacy is an affect of thought by which we neither reject nor posit any of the objects of dogmatic inquiry." We should note right away the expression "affect of thought" (*pathos dianoias*), which indicates that thought too, like the senses, is affected in one way or another by the world on which Sextus refuses to make pronouncements. At this point, Sextus has completely broken with the approaches of the new Academy and of Aenesidemus: for him, indeterminacy and undecidability are not only not in the things – they are not in the subject, either. They merely appear in conjunction with one of his affects.

In this context, we can in a way verify the interpretation just advanced by considering one of the most famous examples in ancient philosophy, the proposition "honey is sweet." In a brilliant and subtle article, Jacques Brunschwig[29] puts forward what seems the best reading of this example. At *PH* 1.20, Sextus writes "Honey seems to us to have a sweetening action. But whether, in addition, it is sweet, *insofar as that follows from the preceding argument*, we continue to search." The subject of Brunschwig's paper is precisely the sense of the expression *hoson epi tôi logôi*, here translated by "insofar as that follows from the argument." It is possible that *logos* here designates the "notion" of honey, but it is more likely, as Brunschwig shows, that it has to do with an argument, probably one put forward by the dogmatists. The passage would then signify: the sceptic agrees – that is, gives his assent to the fact – that honey appears to him here and now to have a sweetening action, but as for knowing whether it is sweet, on the basis of (1) the phenomenon and (2) the principle that there is a conformity between phenomenal qualities and real qualities (a principle that, besides, he rejects), the sceptic does not agree.[30]

Within the framework of this production of arguments that rely in the last resort on affects presenting themselves, a certain number of

the oddities noted above make sense. The accumulation of arguments of different force and type is an example. The important point is that they appear convincing to me in a given circumstance. Deciding that the Modes of Agrippa are more general, more refined, and/or more convincing than those of Aenesidemus is something that the Sextan sceptic cannot do. One should bear this in mind when approaching the problem of discrepancies in the work of Sextus.

V UNITY OR SCHIZOPHRENIA?

There are several discrepancies between the texts in the Sextan corpus. At least three can be identified. The first has to do with two different ways of criticizing philosophers, one in *PH* 2–3 and the other in *M* 7–11. The second is a difference between *M* 11, *Against the Ethicists*, and the rest of the critique of philosophers in both *M* 7–10 and *PH* 2–3. The third is a difference between *M* 1–6, the treatise *Against the Professors*, and the rest of the corpus.

A number of recent studies have compared Sextus' treatment of the same questions in *PH* 2–3 and *M* 7–11, and they appear to have put into question one of the opinions that seemed most firmly established among interpreters of Sextus: the near-unanimous agreement that *PH* was earlier than *M* 7–11. Now, it has been observed that, although they take about three times as long to deal with the subjects tackled in *PH* 2–3, *M* 7–11 offer a text at once more chaotic, less refined, and above all less "advanced." It is once again Jacques Brunschwig who has shown this most brilliantly on one particular point, that of the critique of demonstration.[31] More specifically, to stress just one point, while both *M* 8 and *PH* 2 equally define demonstration by a series of dichotomies (demonstration is an argument, conclusive rather than non-conclusive, to a non-evident rather than an evident conclusion, etc.) the author of *M* 8 does not envisage the possibility of reasoning validly from false premises, and "he confuses an epistemological difference, which bears on the type of truth possessed by one of the premises, with a logical difference, which bears on the type of relation between premises and conclusion."[32] *PH* 2, by contrast, has neither of these defects.

There is another point concerning demonstration, also signaled by Brunschwig,[33] that should be discussed, incidentally because it reinforces the view maintained here of the more polished character

of *PH*, but also because it raises an absolutely fundamental point for Sextus' scepticism. Brunschwig begins by pointing out that scepticism is not a form of eclecticism, eclecticism being characterized as an approach claiming that different philosophies are saying the same thing, their disagreements being purely verbal – they use the same words for different concepts and different words for the same concepts. "On the other hand, the sceptic must assume that dogmatists … all have *the same notions* and use *the same words* to express them,"[34] otherwise there is no undecidable disagreement among them. But, says Brunschwig, the sceptic is also tempted to expose the disagreement among dogmatists when they give different definitions of the same term. And Brunschwig gives the example of *M* 8.300–36, where Sextus develops a critique of demonstration in which he takes all the philosophers to have the same conception of demonstration. But the Epicureans lay the following trap for the sceptic: either the sceptic has a notion of demonstration, in which case demonstration exists, or he does not, in which case he is in no position to critique it. Sextus replies first (332a–333a), in polemical manner, that the sceptic, far from being short of notions of demonstration, has lots of them – all the ones provided by the dogmatists. So he considers that the different definitions given by the dogmatists are indeed different. But he also accepts the following ontological implication: "If we had a single notion of the object of our inquiry, we would believe, guided by this notion, that there really exists an object of this nature" (333a). But immediately after (334a–336a), he adopts a completely different position, distinguishing the notion (*ennoia*), which is "a simple movement of the intellect," from the apprehension (*katalêpsis*), which includes recognizing the reality of its propositional content. These two strategies are incompatible with one another. This makes it all the more remarkable that the parallel passage of *PH* (2.9–10) adopts the second solution proposed by *M* 8 and rejects the ontological implication, while treating demonstration as a single concept. It is not far-fetched to think that Sextus, having noticed, by himself or with someone else's help, the absurdity of his position in *M* 8, corrected himself in *PH*.

Equally, the fact that *PH* 1 has nothing corresponding to it in *M* 7–11, even while *PH* borrows a lot of material from *M* 7–11, seems to be another indication of the later position of *PH*.[35] From all this a picture emerges of *M* 7–11 as a treatise put together from course notes, teacherly and a bit repetitive, and of *PH* as an incisive, terse summary

written later, taking account of comments and objections to the version offered in *M* 7–11.

I move now to the case of *M* 11, *Against the Ethicists*. This book puts forward a somewhat different position from that of the ethical portion of *PH* 3, and the nature and degree of this difference has been a subject of dispute among interpreters. It seems that a close reading of *M* 11 leads inevitably to the conclusion that this treatise presents doctrinal characteristics that are incompatible with the "sceptic way" as it was expounded in *PH* 1. The third chapter of *M* 11 (42–109), having shown that the dogmatists are not in agreement in their preconceptions of the good, the bad, and the indifferent, claims to present the arguments of "the sceptics," only to end by maintaining that there is nothing good or bad by nature. When one reads in *PH* 3.235 that "the sceptic, seeing such divergence in things, suspends assent about the existence of anything good or bad by nature," one gets a measure of the difference. For *M* 11, everything is good or bad only *relatively* to persons or circumstances, which evidently recalls the position of Aenesidemus. In *M* 11, then, Sextus does seem to endorse opinions, notably the opinion that nothing is good or bad by nature. For lack of a better alternative, we can settle for admitting that *M* 11, rather than being in contradiction with Pyrrhonism as some have held, is (to a greater extent than *PH*) in agreement with an earlier phase of Pyrrhonian scepticism, which could be that of Aenesidemus. A similar interpretation is offered in somewhat more detail elsewhere in this volume.[36]

Finally, the case of *M* 1–6, which may correctly be called *Adversus Mathematicos*, *Against the Professors*. This work exhibits differences from the rest of the Sextan corpus of a kind that some have been tempted to interpret from a chronological perspective; the term "schizophrenia" or even "double schizophrenia" has been used.[37] In criticizing the different arts, on the one hand Sextus makes a distinction between arguments based on their lack of utility, arguments which he declares dogmatic (he attributes them mainly to the Epicureans) and therefore rejects, and properly sceptical arguments which show the "non-existence" of the arts (making them look more like Academic than Pyrrhonian arguments). On the other hand, though, Sextus sometimes has a less clear-cut attitude towards the arguments based on lack of utility, to the point of mentioning them without criticizing them at all. The most striking example is *Against*

the Musicians, where Sextus juxtaposes the two sorts of argument, the first being called "somewhat dogmatic" and the second "somewhat aporetic" (*M* 6.4–5). He offers a justification whose exact sense is obscure, although the general point is clear enough: it involves heading off the objection that anything has been left out of the refutation. It must be recognized that Richard Bett's conclusion is not absurd, according to which *M* 1–6 reflects an earlier stage of Pyrrhonism, perhaps that of Aenesidemus – also the one described by Diogenes Laertius, who actually says that the Pyrrhonists "did away with" certain notions (9.90, 94, 97, 100). Thus, *M* 1–6, along with *M* 11, would constitute the Aenesidemean side of Sextus' scepticism. But an alternative, more unified reading of *M* 1–6's relation to *M* 7–10 and *PH* is also possible, and in the remaining space I shall offer a few brief remarks in support of it.[38]

The argumentation to the effect that some art, or some essential component of an art, does not exist is explicitly presented as "aporetic," that is, sceptical; but is it not itself dogmatic? The question is all the more difficult in that *M* 1–6 itself asserts that deciding on the existence or the non-existence of something is a dogmatic attitude (1.28). A first response to this question could be that in the rest of the Sextan corpus one can find affirmations of the form "X does not exist" without it being a question of existence in the dogmatic sense. Terms like *anuparktos* or *anupostatos*, commonly translated "non-existent," indicate not non-existence in the ontological sense, but inconsistency or lack of foundation (as when, in *Against the Musicians*, Sextus says that "sound does not exist" (6.58)). But there is more to the story than this.

The position of Françoise Desbordes seems fundamentally sound: "Sextus speaks differently than in other works because he is speaking of a different thing."[39] More precisely, he is no longer speaking of philosophy. In the introduction to *M* 1–6, Sextus says that the arts present "equal difficulties" (*M* 1.7) to those encountered in examining philosophical theories. But "equal difficulties" are not necessarily *the same* difficulties; "equal" may just mean "equally serious." The difficulties are fundamental ones concerning the very validity of the arts; it is not a matter of the equal strength of opposing theses, as in the case of philosophy. In acquiring an art, a student is taught a whole theoretical apparatus that claims to inform us about the nature of certain things; for example, grammar purports to decide on the nature

of the elements of discourse. Now, the introductory passage (*M* 1.6–7) is very clear that the end-point in philosophy is suspension of assent, whereas in *M* 1–6 it is arguing *against* the arts; the goal is plainly that of refutation or destruction, which is not the case in philosophy. And it seems to be this overturning of the pretensions of an art to possess a theoretical structure, and especially, principles (cf. *M* 1.40), that Sextus calls *anairein*, "overturning" or "destroying" an art.

Let us return to the arguments based on lack of utility. We have seen that sometimes Sextus not only does not criticize them, but even seems to make them his own. All this suggests that Sextus is talking of two distinct sorts of non-utility. Richard Bett is quite right to point out that, since the arts are defined by their utility, arguments attacking their utility are *one type* of argument for their non-existence – since if an art is not useful, it ceases to be an art.[40] So why accuse Epicurus of dogmatism when he holds their lack of utility against them? Sextus' statement of the Epicurean position is this: "the arts are useless for attaining wisdom (*sophia*)," and it is this that is labeled "dogmatic" (*M* 1.5). In other words, Epicurus' assertion has more to do with wisdom than with the arts, namely, that learning the arts taught in his time will not produce wisdom. He is taking a position in a recurring debate among ancient philosophers about the value to assign to intellectual culture in the philosophic life. In other passages, by contrast, it seems that drawing attention to the non-utility of the arts amounts to a critique of their very existence; and here the arguments advanced by various dogmatists, including the Epicureans, can be used by the Pyrrhonian sceptic. The Pyrrhonians and certain dogmatists, who had irreconcilable positions about philosophy, find common ground concerning the arts, namely in undermining one of their fundamental elements – in this case utility. The "somewhat aporetic" part of *Against the Musicians* then just continues that work of annihilation.

It remains true that Sextus thinks it is possible to practise certain arts, and at a high level, without holding opinions. This was especially the case in medicine. Sextus' relations with medicine are a complicated subject, which is examined elsewhere in this volume.[41] It is difficult to determine to what extent the influence went from scepticism to the medical schools and to what extent they exerted an influence on scepticism. In any case, it is in Sextus' sceptical milieu that antiquity has bequeathed its one attempt at a non-metaphysical use (in Auguste Comte's sense) of reason in the natural sciences.

NOTES

Translated into English by Richard Bett.

1 Popkin [354], p. 19. (But see the partial reassessment in Popkin [355], p. 18.)
2 See House [235].
3 Cf. Brochard [61], pp.319–20, with some doubt about the treatise *On the Soul* mentioned at *M* 10.284.
4 On this issue, see also the Introduction, section II.
5 Unlike many in this volume, I generally reserve the term "scepticism" for the Pyrrhonist tradition alone. (On the more common usage in which it also includes certain Academics, see the Introduction, section II.)
6 Diogenes thinks naturally in terms of a "school" (or "sect," *hairesis*), a label that the sceptics reject, as we shall see.
7 For more on this, see R. J. Hankinson, Chapter 5 "Aenesidemus and the Rebirth of Pyrrhonism."
8 See Paul Woodruff, Chapter 11 "The Pyrrhonian Modes."
9 One must remember that the *pithanon* was the criterion by which Carneades rebutted the accusation of "inactivity." See Bett [174], also Harald Thorsrud, Chapter 3 "Arcesilaus and Carneades" and Katja Vogt, Chapter 8 "Scepticism and Action." Sextus' account probably incorporates a critique of the dogmatism of the New Academy.
10 Editor's note: neither the author nor Jonathan Barnes could trace the source of this quotation, but both are comfortable with the attribution.
11 Couissin [247].
12 See further Harald Thorsrud, Chapter 3 "Arcesilaus and Carneades."
13 That Aenesidemus recommended suspension of assent is attested to by Sextus himself when he presents the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, although we cannot be completely sure that Aenesidemus used the term *epochê*. According to Diogenes Laertius, Aenesidemus said that Pyrrho "philosophized in terms of the method of suspension of assent" (9.62) and for Timon and Aenesidemus "the end is suspension of assent, which tranquility follows like its shadow" (9.107). The passage of Photius' *Library* which forms the most complete testimony on Aenesidemus' *Pyrrhonist Discourses* (cf. note 16) speaks of "freedom in relation to all dogma."
14 Photius, *Library* 170b28.
15 See e.g. Bett [143], p. 199.
16 Photius, *Library* 169b41–170a11. For more on the significance of the Photius text, and for a different view of Aenesidemus, see R. J. Hankinson, Chapter 5 "Aenesidemus and the Rebirth of Pyrrhonism"; the passage just quoted forms part of text 5 in that chapter.
17 Burnyeat [276]'s objection.

18 For more on this, see Svavar Svavarsson, Chapter 2 "Pyrrho and Early Pyrrhonism" in this volume.
19 The expression "no more" (i.e. no more one way than the opposite) is in Sextus' hands an expression of suspension of assent between opposing alternatives (*PH* 1.188–91).
20 E.g. Annas and Barnes [40].
21 For a convincing case along these lines, see Castagnoli [246]. For the usual position see Hankinson [68] and especially McPherran [256].
22 For more on the *apraxia* objection and sceptical responses to it, see Katja Vogt, Chapter 8 "Scepticism and Action."
23 It was Galen who coined the term "more rustic sceptics" (*On the Differences in Pulses*, 8.711K).
24 This detail no doubt derives from the sceptics' (like the Cynics') questioning of social conventions, including incest.
25 For a different reading of this evidence, see Svavar Svavarsson, Chapter 2 "Pyrrho and Early Pyrrhonism."
26 For more on this, see James Allen, Chapter 12 "Pyrrhonism and Medicine."
27 To avoid attributing such a position to Sextus, one must take *adoxastôs*, "without opinions," with *katakolouthountes*, "following," not with *phamen*, "we say."
28 Barnes [238], p. 2646.
29 Brunschwig [244].
30 Brunschwig [244], p. 120 (p. 257 in the English translation).
31 Brunschwig [242].
32 Brunschwig [242], p. 158.
33 Brunschwig [243].
34 Brunschwig [243], p. 147.
35 At least, if *M* 7–11 was not preceded by a now lost general introduction; but see above.
36 See Richard Bett, Chapter 9 "Scepticism and Ethics." For a fuller picture, see also the introduction and commentary to Bett [41].
37 See Bett [298]; before him Barnes [297].
38 I have developed this reading in more detail in Pellegrin [312]. For another strongly "unified" reading of the place of *M* 1–6, see Emidio Spinelli, Chapter 13 "Pyrrhonism and the Specialized Sciences."
39 Desbordes [306].
40 Bett [298], p. 21.
41 See James Allen, Chapter 12 "Pyrrhonism and Medicine." See also Pellegrin [347].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography has two aims: to provide details of all scholarly works referred to in the essays in this volume, and to offer a comprehensive (though not exhaustive) survey of scholarship in the area. With respect to the latter goal, given the likely readership of this volume, there is a bias towards scholarship in English. For a number of reasons, there is also a bias towards works published in roughly the last thirty years.

The bibliography is organized into sections, as shown in the Table of Contents below. Some works might naturally belong in more than one section. In some cases this is explicitly indicated: at the end of some sections, a short list of relevant works listed in other sections is appended. But it would be impossible to do this in every case, and so it should be borne in mind that the divisions are not foolproof. Nonetheless, this layout is intended, and may be expected, to be more useful than a single long list with no thematic divisions.

CONTENTS

1 SOURCE MATERIALS IN THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGES

1.1 Editions of Greek and Latin texts, collections of fragments

1.1.1 Texts of Sextus Empiricus

The standard text of Sextus Empiricus is the four-volume Teubner edition, *Sexti Empirici Opera*, which consists of:

[1] Vol. I, *Purrhôneiôn Hupotupôseis (Outlines of Pyrrhonism)* in 3 books, ed. H. Mutschmann, rev. J. Mau (Leipzig: Teubner, 1958)
[2] Vol. II, *Adversus Dogmaticos* in 5 books (=*M* 7–11: *Against the Logicians, Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists*), ed. H. Mutschmann (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914, reprinted 1984)
[3] Vol. III, *Adversus Mathematicos* in 6 books (=*M* 1–6: *Against the Grammarians, Rhetoricians, Geometers, Arithmeticians, Astrologers, Musicians*), ed. J. Mau (Leipzig: Teubner, 1961)
[4] Vol. IV, *Indices*, collected by K. Janáček (Leipzig: Teubner, 1962)

An expanded edition of vol. IV was published as:

[5] Janáček, K. 2000 *Sexti Empirici Indices* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki)

Vols. I–III are out of print; Mutschmann's original 1912 version of vol. I (*PH*) can be found online at www.archive.org/details/rsoperarecensuit01sextuoft

A more recent edition of *Against the Musicians* is:

[6] Davidson Greaves, D. 1986 *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Musicians (Adversus Musicos)* (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press). With translation, introduction and notes.

A Greek text of Sextus can also be found in the four volume Loeb translation by R. G. Bury, see below [39]; however, with rare exceptions Bury follows the earlier

[7] *Sexti Empirici Opera*, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin: Reimer, 1842), which the Teubner edition generally supersedes. Also of interest is:
[8] Fabricius, J. A. *Sexti Empirici Opera Graece et Latine*, originally published in 1718 and reissued in a two volume revised version in 1840–1842 (Leipzig: Kuehniana); besides the text itself, this includes Latin translations by Stephanus and Hervetus as well as explanatory notes (also in Latin) that are occasionally very helpful.

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[14] Mette, H. J. 1986–87 "Philon von Larissa und Antiochus von Ascalon" *Lustrum* 28: 9–63. The section on Philo is, however, superseded by the Appendix to Brittain [195].

1.1.3 Editions of texts or fragments of other authors or schools, or of multiple authors or schools including sceptics

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[28] Tecusan, M. 2004 *The Fragmens of the Methodists I: Methodism Outside Soranus* (Leiden/Boston: Brill). Fragments with English translation and introduction.
[29] Westerink, L. G. 1990 ed. *Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon* (Paris: Belles Lettres).

For texts of Galen, see 4.5.1.

For texts of Christian and post-ancient authors, see 4.6.2.

1.2 Linguistic and other philological studies

1.2.1 Karel Janáček

A key figure in this area is Karel Janáček. Janáček's major works are:

[30] Janáček, K. 1948 *Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus* (Olomouc: Nákladem Palackého University).
[31] Janáček, K. 1972 *Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods* (Prague: Universita Karlova).

He also wrote a great number of short essays, mostly in English or German, which have recently been collected and reprinted (and, for the few originally in Czech or Russian, translated into German) in:

[32] Janáček, K., 2008 *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius und zur pyrrhonischen Skepsis*, J. Janda and F. Karfik eds. (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter).

Perhaps the most significant of these, which is cited separately in this volume, is:

[33] Janáček, K., 1963 "Die Hauptscrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso erhalten?" *Philologus* 107: 271–77.

For a retrospective on Janáček's work, see:

[34] Janda, J. 2006 "Karel Janáček, Sextus Empiricus und der neupyrrhonische Skeptizismus" *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philologica* 1 (Graecolatina Pragensia XXI), pp. 29–49. This piece includes a complete bibliography of Janáček's works on Sextus and Pyrrhonism. On Janáček's methods see also Barnes [219], sec. X; Bett [41], Appendix C.

1.2.2 Other wide-ranging studies

Other significant and wide-ranging philological studies are:

[35] Blomqvist, J., 1968 "Textkritisches zu Sextus Empiricus" *Eranos* 66: 73–100.

[36] Heintz, W. ed. Harder, R. 1932 *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag).

1.2.3 Specific topics

On specific topics see also:

[37] Blomqvist, J. 1974 "Die Skeptika des Sextus Empiricus" *Grazer Beiträge* 2: 7–14.

[38] Perilli, L. 2005 "'Quantum Coniectare (non) Licet.' Menodotus between Sextus Empiricus (P. 1.222) and Diogenes Laertius (9.116)" *Mnemosyne* 58: 286–93

2 TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES

2.1 Sextus Empiricus

The only complete English translation of Sextus is that of:

[39] Bury, R. G. 1933–49 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library), 4 vols. (On the facing Greek text see under 1.1 above.) Vol. 1 contains *PH*, vol. 2 *M* 7–8, vol. 3 *M* 9–11, vol. 4 *M* 1–6. But this translation is outmoded and philosophically unreliable, and should be avoided whenever a more recent substitute is available. Currently available are:

[40] Annas, J. and Barnes, J. 2000 Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[41] Bett, R. 1997 Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press). With commentary.

[42] Bett, R. 2005 Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Reviewed by:

[43] Machuca, D. 2008 *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2008.01.11 (online).
[44] Blank, D. L. 1998 Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos I)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press). With commentary.
[45] Mates, B. 1996 *The Skeptic Way:* Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (New York: Oxford University Press). With commentary.

See also Davidson Greaves [6].

Translations of Sextus into other languages include:

[46] Bergua Cavero, J. 1997 Sexto Empírico, *Contra los profesores libros I–VI* (Madrid: Editorial Gredos).
[47] Flückiger, H. 1998 *Gegen die Dogmatiker* (*M* 7–11) (St. Augustine: Academia).
[48] Hossenfelder, M. 1999 *Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis* (*PH*), 3rd edn. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
[49] Jürss, F. 2001 Sextus Empiricus, *Gegen die Wissenschaftler, Buch 1–6* (*M* 1–6) (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann).
[50] Pellegrin, P. 2002 Sextus Empiricus, *Contre les professeurs* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil). Includes Mau's text [3] with occasional deviations.

Reviewed by:

[51] Machuca, D. 2004 *Ancient Philosophy* 24: 503–10.
[52] Russo, A. 1972 *Contro i matematici. Libri I-VI* (Rome: Laterza).
[53] Spinelli, E. 1995 Sesto Empirico, *Contro gli etici* (Naples: Bibliopolis). With commentary; includes Mutschmann's text [2].
[54] Spinelli, E. 2000 Sesto Empirico, *Contro gli astrologi* (Naples: Bibliopolis). With commentary; includes Mau's text [3] with very occasional deviations.

2.2 Other authors

[55] Barnes, J. 1975 Aristotle*: Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (2nd edn. 2002). With commentary.
[56] Brittain, C. 2006 Cicero, *On Academic Scepticism* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett). With introduction and notes.
[57] Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 1999 Diogène Laërce*: vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres* (Paris: LGF, Livres de poche).

[58] King, P. 1995 Augustine, *Against the Academicians and The Teacher* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett). Includes excerpts from other texts relevant to Augustine's attitude to scepticism.
[59] Marcus, R. 1953 Philo, *Questions and Answers on Genesis*, translated from the ancient Armenian version of the original Greek (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, Philo Supplement I).

For translations of: (a) Galen, see 4.5.1; (b) post-ancient and other Christian authors, see 4.6.2; except for Descartes, who is under 4.7.1.

See also under 1.1, some of which texts include translations and commentaries.

3 SECONDARY LITERATURE: GENERAL

3.1 General studies of ancient scepticism

[60] Bailey, A. 2002 *Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (Includes discussion of Academics, despite its title. This is also true of Dumont [64] and Robin [70] below.)
[61] Brochard, V. 1923 *Les Sceptiques grecs* (Paris: Vrin). Originally published 1887; reissued 2002 (Paris: LGF, Livre de Poche).
[62] Chiesara, M. L. 2003 *Storia dello scetticismo greco* (Turin: Einaudi).
[63] Dal Pra, M. 1975 *Lo scetticismo greco*, 2nd edn. (Rome: Laterza).
[64] Dumont, J. P. 1972 *Le Scepticisme et le Phénomène. Essai sur la signification et les origines du pyrrhonisme* (Paris: Vrin).
[65] Frede, M. 1997 "The Sceptics" in D. Furley ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. II, *From Aristotle to Augustine* (London: Routledge), pp. 253–86.
[66] Gigante, M. 1981 *Scetticismo e epicureismo* (Naples: Bibliopolis).
[67] Goedeckemeyer, A. 1905 *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche).
[68] Hankinson, R. J. 1995. *The Sceptics* (London/New York: Routledge).
[69] Ricken, F. 1994 *Antike Skeptiker* (Munich: Beck).
[70] Robin, L. 1944 *Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme grec* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). Reissued 1980 (New York/London: Garland Publishing).
[71] Sedley, D. N. 1983 "The Motivation of Greek Skepticism" in Burnyeat [78], pp. 9–29.
[72] Spinelli, E. 2005 *Questioni scettiche. Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico* (Rome: Lithos).
[73] Stough, C. 1969 *Greek Skepticism* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press).

Reviewed by:

[74] Frede, M. 1973 *Journal of Philosophy* 70: 805–10.

3.2 Collections of articles on multiple topics, or multi-author studies, in which ancient scepticism is a main or the main focus

[75] Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfeld, J., and Schofield, M. eds. 1999 *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[76] Barnes, J., Brunschwig, J., Burnyeat, M., and Schofield, M. eds. 1982 *Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[77] Brunschwig, J. 1994 *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[78] Burnyeat, M. F. ed. 1983 *The Skeptical Tradition* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press).
[79] Burnyeat, M. and Frede, M. eds. 1997 *The Original Sceptics* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett).
[80] Everson, S. ed. 1990 *Epistemology: Companions to Ancient Thought 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[81] Giannantoni, G. ed. 1981 *Lo scetticismo antico* (Naples: Bibliopolis), 2 vols.

Review essay by:

[82] Stopper, M. R. 1983 "Schizzi Pirroniani" *Phronesis* 28: 265–97.
[83] Görler, W. 1994 "Ältere Pyrrhonismus, Jüngere Akademie, Antiochos aus Askalon" in H. Flashar ed., *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Die Philosophie der Antike*, Bd. 4, *Die hellenistische Philosphie* (Basel: Schwabe), pp. 719–989.
[84] Long, A. A. 2006 *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[85] Schofield, M., Burnyeat, M., and Barnes, J. eds. 1980 *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[86] Sihvola, J. ed. 2000 *Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition*, Acta Philosophica Fennica (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland), vol. 66.
[87] Striker, G. 1996 *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[88] Voelke, A. J. ed. 1990 *Le scepticisme antique: perspectives historiques et systématiques*, Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie 15 (Genève).

3.3 Other studies partly or wholly about topics other than ancient scepticism, but of relevance

[89] Allen, J. 2001 *Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates About the Nature of Evidence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[90] Annas, J. 1990 "Stoic Epistemology" in Everson [80], pp. 184–203.
[91] Annas, J. 1992 "Plato the Sceptic" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, suppl. vol. 3, pp. 43–72. Revised version in P. Vander Waerdt 1994 *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press), pp. 309–40.
[92] Annas, J. 1993 *The Morality of Happiness* (New York: Oxford University Press).
[93] Bett, R. 1999 "Reactions to Aristotle in the Greek Sceptical Traditions" *Méthexis* 12: 17–34.
[94] Bett, R. 2006 "Socrates and the Sceptics" in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar eds., *A Companion to Socrates* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 298–311.
[95] Bonazzi, M. 2003 *Academici e Platonici* (Milano: LED).
[96] Bonazzi, M. 2003 "Un dibattito tra academici e platonici sull'eredità di Platone. La testimonianza del *Commentario anonimo* al Teeteto" in *Papiri filosofici. Miscellanea di studi* IV (Florence: Olschki), pp. 41–74.
[97] Brennan, T. 1996 "Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism" *Phronesis* 41: 318–34.
[98] Brennan, T. 2005 *The Stoic Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[99] Dillon, J. 1977 *The Middle Platonists* (London: Duckworth).
[100] Dillon, J. 2003 *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy 347–274 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[101] Dorandi, T. 1991 *Ricerche sulla cronologia dei filosofi ellenistici* (Stuttgart: Teubner).
[102] Ferrary, J.-L. 1988 *Philhellénisme et impérialisme* (Rome: École française de Rome).
[103] Frede, M. 1983 "Stoics and Sceptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions" in Burnyeat [78], pp. 65–94.
[104] Frede, M. 1999 "Stoic Epistemology" in Algra *et al.* [75], pp. 295–322.
[105] Hadot, I. 2005 *Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique*, 2nd edn. (Paris: Vrin).
[106] Hadot, P. 2002 *What is Ancient Philosophy?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), trans. M. Chase. Original French publication 1995.
[107] Inwood, B. 1985 *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[108] Ioppolo, A.-M. 1986 *Opinione e Scienza* (Naples: Bibliopolis).

Review essays by:

[109] Annas, J. 1988 "The Heirs of Socrates" *Phronesis* 23.1: 100–12 and
[110] Maconi, H. 1988 "Nova Non Philosophandi Philosophia" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6: 231–53.
[111] Lévy, C. 1993 "Le concept de *doxa* des Stoïciens à Philon d'Alexandrie" in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum eds., *Passions and Perceptions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 250–84.
[112] Long, A. 1974 *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics* (London: Duckworth). Reprinted with updated bibliography by University of California Press, 1986.
[113] Long, A. A. 1988 "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy" *Classical Quarterly* 38.1: 150–71.
[114] Nussbaum, M. 1994 *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
[115] Perin, C. 2005 "Stoic Epistemology and the Limits of Externalism" *Ancient Philosophy* 25: 383–401.
[116] Reed, B. 2002 "The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 23: 147–80.
[117] Sharples, R. 1996 *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy* (London/New York: Routledge).
[118] Striker, G. 1990 "The Problem of the Criterion" in Everson [80], pp. 143–60.
[119] Striker, G. 1996 "*Kritêrion tês alêtheias*" in Striker [87], pp. 22–76. Originally published in German 1974.
[120] Striker, G. 1996 "*Ataraxia*: Happiness as Tranquillity" in Striker [87], pp. 183–95. Originally published 1990.
[121] Warren, J. 2002 *Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[122] Woodruff, P. 1986 "The Sceptical Side of Plato's Method" *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 40: 22–37.
[123] Zeller, E. 1909 *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Pt. 3, vol. II, 4th edn. (Leipzig: Reisland).

4 SECONDARY LITERATURE: PARTICULAR PHILOSOPHERS AND TOPICS

4.1 Antecedents to Greek scepticism

[124] Barnes, J. 1976 "Aristotle, Menaechmus, and Circular Proof" *Classical Quarterly* 70: 278–92.
[125] Barnes, J. 1987 "An Aristotelian Way with Scepticism" in Mohan Matthen ed., *Aristotle Today* (Edmonton: Academic), pp. 51–76.

[126] Brunschwig, J. 1996 "Le fragment DK 70B 1 de Métrodore de Chio" in K. A. Algra, P. W. van der Horst, and D. T. Runia eds., *Polyhistory: Studies in the History and Historiography of Greek Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his 60th Birthday* (New York/Leiden: Brill), pp. 21–40.
[127] Brunschwig, J. 2002 "Democritus and Xeniades" in V. Caston and Daniel W. Graham eds., *Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Alexander Mourelatos* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp 159–67.
[128] Burnyeat, M. F. 1976 "Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's *Theaetetus*" *Philosophical Review* 85: 172–95. Reprinted in Everson [80], pp. 39–59.
[129] Burnyeat, M. F. (unpublished) "All the World's a Stage Painting: Scenery, Optics and Greek Epistemology."
[130] DeLacy, P. 1958 "*Ou mallon* and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism" *Phronesis* 3: 59–71.
[131] Fine, G. 1998 "Plato's Refutation of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*" *Apeiron* 31.3: 201–34.
[132] Fine, G. 1998 "Relativism and Self-Refutation: Plato, Protagoras, and Burnyeat" in Jyl Gentzler ed., *Method in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 138–63.
[133] Irwin, T. 1988 *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[134] Lee, M. 2005 *Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[135] Long, A. A. 1981 "Aristotle and the History of Greek Scepticism" in Dominic O'Meara ed., *Studies in Aristotle* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press), pp. 79–106. Revised version in Long [84], pp. 43–69.
[136] Sedley, D. 2004 *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's* Theaetetus (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[137] Svavarsson, S. H. 2009 "Plato on Forms and Conflicting Appearances: The Argument of *Phaedo* 74a9-c6" *Classical Quarterly* 59.1: 60–74.
[138] Taylor, C. C. W. 1980 "All perceptions are true" in Schofield *et al.* [85], pp. 105–24.
[139] Tsouna, V. 1998 *The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press).

Also relevant is Brunschwig [152].

4.2 Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism

[140] Ausland, H. 1989 "On the Moral Origin of the Pyrrhonian Philosophy" *Elenchos* 10: 359–434.
[141] Bett, R. 1994 "What Did Pyrrho Think about 'The Nature of the Divine and the Good'?" *Phronesis* 39: 303–37.

[142] Bett, R. 1994 "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho: The Text, its Logic and its Credibility" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12: 137–81.
[143] Bett, R. 2000 *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Reviewed by:

[144] Castagnoli, L. 2002, *Ancient Philosophy* 22: 443–57.
[145] Bett, R. 2002 "Pyrrho" in E. Zalta ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/pyrrho/, revised version 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/pyrrho/
[146] Bett, R. 2002 "Timon of Phlius" in E. Zalta ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/timon-phlius/, revised version 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/timon-phlius/
[147] Brennan, T. 1998 "Pyrrho and the Criterion" *Ancient Philosophy* 18: 417–34.
[148] Brunschwig, J. 1992 "Pyrrhon et Philista" in M. O. Goulet-Cazé, G. Madec, and D. O'Brien eds., *Sophiês Maiêtores, "Chercheurs de sagesse" – Hommage à Jean Pépin* (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes 1992), pp. 133–46
[149] Brunschwig, J. 1994 "Once Again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho" in Brunschwig [77], pp. 190–211.
[150] Brunschwig, J. 1994 "The Title of Timon's *Indalmoi*: From Odysseus to Pyrrho" in Brunschwig [77], pp. 212–23. Original French publication 1990.
[151] Brunschwig, J. 1997 "L'Aphasie pyrrhonienne" in C. Lévy and L. Permot eds., *Dire l'évidence (Philosophie et rhétorique antiques)* (Paris: L'Harmattan), pp. 297–320.
[152] Brunschwig, J. 1999 "Introduction: the Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology" in Algra *et al.* [75], pp. 229–60.
[153] Burnyeat, M. 1980 "Tranquillity Without a Stop: Timon, Frag. 68" *Classical Quarterly* 30: 86–93.
[154] Conche, M. 1994 *Pyrrhon ou l'apparence*, 2nd edn. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France).
[155] Ferrari, G. A. 1968 "Due fonti sullo scetticismo antico (Diog. Lae. IX, 66–108; Eus., Praep. Ev., XIV, 18, 1–20)" *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 40: 200–24.
[156] Ferrari, G. A. 1981 "L'immagine dell' equilibrio" in Giannantoni [81], pp. 339–70.
[157] Flintoff, E. 1980 "Pyrrho and India" *Phronesis* 25: 88–108.
[158] Long, A. A. 2006 "Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and Satirist" in Long [84], pp. 70–95. Original version 1978.

[159] Reale, G. 1981 "Ipotesi per una rilettura della filosofia di Pirrone di Elide" in Giannantoni [81], pp. 245–336.
[160] Sakezles, P. 1993 "Pyrrhonian Indeterminacy: A Pragmatic Interpretation" *Apeiron* 26: 77–95.
[161] Svavarsson, S. H. 2002 "Pyrrho's Dogmatic Nature" *Classical Quarterly* 52.1: 248–56.
[162] Svavarsson, S. H. 2004 "Pyrrho's Undecidable Nature" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 27: 249–95.
[163] von Fritz, K. 1963 "Pyrrhon" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 24 (Stuttgart: Druckenmüller), pp. 89–106.
[164] Warren, J. 2000 "Aristocles' Refutations of Pyrrhonism (Eus. *PE* 14.18.1–10)" *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 46: 140–64.
[165] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff U. von 1881 *Antigonos von Karystos* (Berlin: Weidmann).

4.3 The Sceptical Academy

4.3.1 Covering multiple periods

[166] Inwood, B. and Mansfeld, J. eds. 1997 *Assent and Argument. Studies in Cicero's Academic Books, Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Hellenisticum* (Leiden: Brill).
[167] Lévy, C. 2005 "Les petits Académiciens: Lacyde, Charmadas, Métrodore de Stratonice" in M. Bonazzi and V. Celluprica eds., *L'eredità platonica: studi sur platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo* (Naples: Bibliopolis), pp. 53–77.

4.3.2 Arcesilaus and Carneades

[168] Algra, K. 1997 "Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: the Ethical *Divisions* in Cicero's *Lucullus*" in Inwood and Mansfeld [166], pp. 107–39.
[169] Allen, J. 1994 "Academic Probabilism and Stoic epistemology" *Classical Quarterly* 44: 85–113.
[170] Allen, J. 1997 "Carneadean Argument in Cicero's *Academic* Books" in Inwood and Mansfeld [166], pp. 217–56.
[171] Allen, J. 2004 "Carneades" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carneades/
[172] Annas, J. 2007 "Carneades' Classification of Ethical Theories" in A. M. Ioppolo and D. N. Sedley eds., *Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155–86 BC* (Naples: Bibliopolis).
[173] Arnim, H. von 1895 "Arkesilaos" in *Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopädie* II 1 (Stuttgart: Metzler), pp. 1164–68.

[174] Bett, R. 1989 "Carneades' *Pithanon*: A reappraisal of its Role and Status" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 7: 59–94.
[175] Bett, R. 1990 "Carneades' Distinction Between Assent and Approval" *Monist* 73: 3–20.
[176] Brittain, C. 2005 "Arcesilaus" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arcesilaus/
[177] Brittain, C. and Palmer, J. 2001 "The New Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics" *Phronesis* 46.1: 38–72.
[178] Cooper, J. 2004 "Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic" in J. Cooper, *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good, Essays on Ancient Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 81–103.
[179] Couissin, P. 1983 "The Stoicism of the New Academy" in Burnyeat [78], pp. 31–63. Translation of "Le stoicisme de la nouvelle Academie" *Revue d'historie de la philosophie* 3 (1929): 241–76.
[180] Frede, D. 1996 "How Sceptical were the Academic Sceptics?" in R. Popkin ed., *Scepticism in the History of Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer), pp. 1–25
[181] Ioppolo, A. M. 2000 "Su alcune recenti interpretationi dello scetticismo dell Accademia. Plutarch. *Adv. Col.* 26, 1121f–1122f: una testimonia su Arcesilao" *Elenchos* 21: 333–60.
[182] Ioppolo, A. M. 2008 "Arcésilas dans le *Lucullus* de Cicéron" in *Cicéron, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 1: 21–44.
[183] Lévy, C. 1978 "Scepticisme et dogmatisme dans l'Académie: 'l'ésotérisme' d'Arcésilas" *Revue des Etudes Latines* 56: 335–48.
[184] Long, A. A. 1986 "Diogenes Laertius, the Life of Arcesilaus" *Elenchos* 7: 429–49. Revised version ("Arcesilaus in his Time and Place") in Long [84], pp. 96–113.
[185] Long, A. A. "Scepticism about Gods" in Long [84], pp. 114–27. Originally published 1990.
[186] Obdrzalek, S. 2006 "Living in Doubt: Carneades' *Pithanon* Reconsidered" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31: 243–80.
[187] Perin, C. 2006 "Academic Arguments for the Indiscernibility Thesis" *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86.4: 493–517.
[188] Schofield, M. 1999 "Academic Epistemology" in Algra *et al.* [75], pp. 295–354.
[189] Shields, C. 1994 "Socrates Among the Skeptics" in P. Vander Waerdt ed., *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press), pp. 341–66.
[190] Striker, G. 1980 "Sceptical Strategies" in Schofield *et al.* [85], pp. 54–83.
[191] Striker, G. 1981 "Über den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern" *Phronesis* 26: 353–69. English translation in Striker [87], pp. 135–49.

[192] Thorsrud, H. 2002 "Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: The Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40: 1–18.
[193] Thorsrud, H. (forthcoming) "Radical and Mitigated Skepticism in Cicero's *Academica*" in W. Nicgorski ed., *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press).

Also relevant are Bett [220] (section I), Bett [221], Frede [278], Striker [264].

4.3.3 Late Academy

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4.4 Pyrrhonism

For Pyrrho and his immediate successors, see 4.2. With the exception of 4.4.1, this part of the bibliography includes only works relating to Aenesidemus and his successors.

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See also Bett [143], ch. 4.

4.4.3 Sextus Empiricus

(a) On our almost complete ignorance of Sextus' life, see:

[235] House, D. K. 1980 "The Life of Sextus Empiricus" *Classical Quarterly* 30: 227–38.

(b) The following works deal with aspects of Sextus' general outlook and approach:

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[243] Brunschwig, J. 1988 "Sextus Empiricus on the *kritêrion*: the Sceptic as Conceptual Legatee" in J. Dillon and A. Long eds., *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press), pp. 145–75.
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[252] Glidden, D. K. 1994 "Parrots, Pyrrhonists and Native Speakers" in S. Everson ed., *Language: Companions to Ancient Thought 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 129–48.
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[254] Long, A. A. 1978 "Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth" *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 25: 35–49.
[255] Machuca, D. 2008 "Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy" *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 55: 28–63.
[256] McPherran, M. 1987 "Sceptical Homeopathy and Self-Refutation" *Phronesis* 32: 290–328.
[257] Palmer, J. 2000 "Skeptical Investigation", *Ancient Philosophy* 20: 351–75.
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[266] Warren, J. 2003 "Sextus Empiricus on the Tripartition of Time" *Phronesis* 48: 313–43.
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Also relevant is Striker [191].

(c) On the Modes, especially (but not exclusively) in Sextus, see:

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[270] Barnes, J. 1990 *The Toils of Scepticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[271] Barnes, J. 1990 "Some Ways of Scepticism" in Everson [80], pp. 204–24.
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(d) On what kinds of belief, if any, are open to a Pyrrhonist of Sextus' variety, and what action will be like for such a Pyrrhonist, see:

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(e) On Sextus' practical attitudes, and his treatment of issues in ethics, see:

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[286] Grgic, F. 2006 "Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism" *Ancient Philosophy* 26: 141–60.
[287] Hankinson, R. J. 1994 "Values, Objectivity and Dialectic: the Sceptical Attack on Ethics; its Methods, Aims and Success" *Phronesis* 49: 45–68.
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[293] Thorsrud, H. 2003 "Is the Examined Life Worth Living? A Pyrrhonian Alternative" *Apeiron* 36: 229–49.
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(f) Sextus' attitude to religion is discussed in:

[295] Bett, R. 2009 "Sextus Empiricus" in N. Trakakis and G. Oppy eds. *History of Western Philosophy and Religion*, vol. 1, *Ancient Philosophy and Religion* (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing).
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On this topic see also Annas [422], Knuuttila and Sihvola [431], Long [185].

(g) On Sextus' treatment of the specialized sciences (*M* 1–6), see:

[296a] Barnes, J. 1986 "Is Rhetoric an Art?," *Darg Newsletter* 2, pp. 2–22.
[297] Barnes, J. 1988 "Scepticism and the Arts" in Hankinson [343], pp. 53–77
[298] Bett, R. 2006 "La double 'schizophrénie' de *M* 1–6 et ses origines historiques" in Delattre [302], pp. 17–34.
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[300] Cortassa, G. 1981 "Sesto Empirico e gli 'Egkuklia Mathemata'" in Giannantoni [81], vol. II, pp. 713–24.
[301] Dalimier, C. 2006 "Sextus Empiricus et les débordements ontologiques de 'la grammaire prophète'", in Delattre [302], pp. 89–103.
[302] Delattre, J. ed. 2006 *Sur le* Contre les professeurs *de Sextus Empiricus* (Villeneuve d'Ascq: L'Université Charles-de-Gaulle, Lille 3).
[303] Delattre, D. 2006 "Présence de l'èpicurisme dans le *Contre les Grammairiens* et le *Contre les Musiciens* de Sextus Empiricus" in Delattre [302], pp. 47–65.
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[306a] Dye, G. and Vitrac, B. 2009 "*Le Contre les géomètres* de Sextus Empiricus: sources, Cible, Structure" *Phronesis* 54: 155–203.
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[315] Sluiter, I. 2000 "The Rhetoric of Scepticism: Sextus Against the Language Specialists" in Sihvola [86], pp. 93–123.

(h) Sextus' relations to earlier Greek philosophers are discussed in the following set of essays:

[316] "Sesto Empirico e il pensiero antico" *Elenchos* 13 (1992).

Of these, essays cited in this volume are:

[317] Decleva Caizzi, F. "Sesto e gli scettici," pp. 279–327.
[318] Isnardi Parente, M. "Sesto, Platone, l'Accademia antica e I Pitagorici," pp. 119–67.

Essays in English are:

[319] Sedley, D. "Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criteria of Truth," pp. 19–56.
[320] Annas, J. "Sextus Empiricus and the Peripatetics", pp. 201–31.

4.5 Scepticism and medical theory

4.5.1 Galen, texts and translations

Aside from the sceptics themselves, the most important ancient author for this topic is Galen. A useful and accessible collection of relevant works in translation is:

[321] Walzer, R. and Frede, M. 1985 *Galen, Three Treatises on the Nature of Science*, translated with an introduction (Indianapolis: Hackett).

However, many of Galen's texts are still difficult or impossible to find (even in Greek) in accessible modern editions. The standard edition of his collected works is still:

[322] Kühn, C. G. 1821–33 *Galeni Opera Omnia* (Leipzig), 19 vols. Reprinted Hildesheim, 1965, usually abbreviated K.

A helpful "Guide to the Editions and Abbreviations of the Galenic Corpus" forms Appendix A of:

[323] Hankinson, R. J. 1998 *Galen: On Antecedent Causes*, edited with an introduction, translation and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The works by Galen (or attributed to him in antiquity) that are cited in "Pyrrhonism and Medicine" (ch. 12) in this volume are as follows (listed in order of appearance):

[324] *Outline of Empiricism* (*Subfiguratio empirica, Subfig. emp.*): text in Deichgräber [20], translation in Walzer and Frede [321].

[325] *On the Therapeutic Method (De methodo medendi, MM): text* in K vol. X, translation of books 1 and 2, with commentary, by R. J. Hankinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[326] *On Medical Experience*: survives only in Arabic translation, English version in Walzer, R., *On Medical Experience: First Edition of the Arabic Version with English Translation and Notes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), translation reprinted in Walzer and Frede [321].

[327] *Medical Definitions* (*Definitiones Medicae, Def. med.*): a spurious work, text in K vol. XIX.

[328] *On the Sects for Beginners* (*De sectis ingredientibus, Sect. ingred.*): text in vol. 3 of I. Marquardt, I. Mueller, and G. Helmreich eds., *Galeni Scripta Minora* (*SM*) (Leipzig: Teubner, 1884–91), 3 vols, translation in Walzer and Frede [321].

[329] *On the Best Sect* (*De optima secta*): a spurious work, text in K vol. I.

[330] *Introduction or the Doctor* (*Introductio seu medicus, Introductio*): a spurious work, text in K vol. XIV.

[331] *On diagnosing pulses* (*De dignoscendibus pulsibus*): text in K vol. VIII.

4.5.2 Overviews

Good overviews of the topic can be found in the following standard histories of scepticism:

Brochard [61], Livre IV ch. 1, "Les médicins sceptiques: Ménodote et Sextus Empiricus".

Hankinson [68], ch. XIII, "Scepticism in the Medical Schools."

Robin [70], Part IV, ch. 1, "Scepticism et médicine: la médicine empirique en général."

4.5.3 Other studies

[332] Allen, J. 2004 "Experience as Source and Ground of Theory in Epicureanism" in P. Lang ed. *Re-inventions: Essays on Hellenistic and Early Roman Science*, *Apeiron* XXXVII no. 4.

[333] De Lacy, P. 1991 "Galen's Response to Skepticism" *Illinois Classical Studies* 16: 283–306.

[334] Edelstein, L. 1967 *Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, O. Temkin and C. L. Temkin eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
[335] L. Edelstein, "The Methodists" in Edelstein [334], pp. 173–91.
[336] L. Edelstein, "Empiricism and Skepticism in the teaching of the Greek Empiricist School" in Edelstein [334],pp. 195–203.
[337] Eijk, P. J. van der 2005 "The Methodism of Caelius Aurelianus: Some Epistemological Issues" in P. J. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 299–327. Originally published 1999.
[338] Frede, M. 1983 "The Method of the So-called Methodical School of Medicine" in Barnes *et al.* [76], pp. 1–23.
[339] Frede, M. 1988 "The Empiricist Attitude Towards Reason and Theory" in Hankinson [343], pp. 79–97.
[340] Frede, M. 1990 "An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism" in Everson [80], pp. 225–50.
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4.6 Rediscovery and influence

4.6.1 General accounts

A leading figure on the Renaissance and early modern rediscovery of Pyrrhonism was R. H. Popkin. Popkin's main work on the subject, appearing in a succession of ever-expanding editions, is:

[353] Popkin, R. 1960 *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (Assen: van Gorcum). Revised version in 1964 (Assen:van Gorcum) and 1968 (New York: Harper and Row). Followed by:
[354] Popkin, R. 1979 *The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press). And finally:
[355] Popkin, R. 2003 *The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Also of interest is the following collection of essays:

[356] Popkin, R. ed. Watson, R. and Force, J. 1980 *The High Road to Pyrrhonism* (San Diego: Austin Hill Press).

A valuable recent study, more philologically rigorous (and more philosophically sober) than Popkin is:

[357] Floridi, L. 2002 *Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism* (New York: Oxford University Press).

4.6.2 Specific texts and studies

The following list, including almost all the texts and studies cited by Luciano Floridi, Chapter 14 "The Rediscovery and Posthumous Influence of Skepticism," covers a wide range of periods and traditions from late antiquity up to (but not including) Descartes.

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[367] Copenhaver, B. P. and Schmitt, C. B. 1992 *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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4.7 Comparisons between ancient and modern periods

4.7.1 Descartes

The standard collection of central works of Descartes in English is:

[416] Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch, D. 1985 *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated and edited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 3 vols.

The most recent and accessible English-language edition of the *Meditations* is:

[417] Descartes, R. 2006 *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, R. Ariew and D. Cress eds. and trans. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett).

4.7.2 Comparative studies of ancient Greek/Roman scepticism and scepticism in other times and places

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On this topic, see more generally the essays in the second half of Burnyeat [78]. Also relevant is Everson [249].

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