

Essays in Ancient Philosophy

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The Skeptic's Beliefs

There are no views or beliefs that define Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Nor are there any specific doctrines or dogmas which a skeptic, rather than a member of one of the 'dogmatic' schools, would have. Even the phrase, "nothing is to be known," is not accepted by the skeptical philosopher as expressing a skeptical doctrine (Sext. Emp. *P.H.* I 200). According to Photius (Bibl. cod. 212, 169^b 40ff.), Aenesidemus argued that the Academic skeptics really were dogmatists, since some of them did, in fact, claim that nothing is knowable (cf. S.E. *P.H.* I 2-3). There are no specifically Pyrrhonian doctrines, no views which any Pyrrhonist, just by being a Pyrrhonist, would have to accept. Still less is Pyrrhonian skepticism characterized by specifically skeptical views that rely on 'deeper' insights into the true nature of things. It is the dogmatists, not the skeptics, who claim to have such insights (S.E. *P.H.* I 2-3).

The usual interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism, of course, ascribes a far more radical stance to these skeptics. According to this interpretation, the skeptic not only claims to have no deeper insight into things, he also claims not to know anything at all; not only does he maintain no specifically skeptical doctrines, he also has no views or beliefs about anything. Such a characterization of Pyrrhonism typically relies on the following: as far as knowledge is concerned, the Pyrrhonist, as a full-blooded skeptic, can hardly assume that he knows anything without undermining his skepticism; and, as for beliefs, the ancient skeptics assure us that they are withholding judgment on whatever issue is under consideration. The skeptic refuses to assent to any proposition.

Any interpretation along these lines, however, seems fundamentally mistaken to me. No matter how ingenious he may be, the skeptic cannot avoid knowing many things. It might even turn out that, with great effort, imagination, and cleverness, he could bring about that he knows less and less. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the skeptic is pursuing such a strategy. If he, then, simply cannot avoid knowing many things, he will also often be aware of know-

ing, and not merely supposing, certain things. And if we turn from our own conception of skepticism to the words of Sextus Empiricus, we can see clearly that the skeptic, in many instances, does think of himself as knowing something. I can, in fact, see no reason why he should not think this; it is perfectly compatible with his skepticism. Yet, whatever the case may be with regard to knowledge, it seems clear to me both that there are many things the skeptic thinks or believes are the case and that it is perfectly compatible with his skepticism for him to have all sorts of views and beliefs. And it is just this last point which shall be our concern here—can the skeptic have beliefs?

Given how much speaks in its favor, it is hardly surprising that the received interpretation has won almost universal acceptance; indeed so much speaks in its favor that its defenders have not even been deterred by the fact that, on this interpretation, the skeptical position turns out to be inconsistent. For it is generally assumed that ordinary, everyday life is simply not possible without any beliefs or views; and so it is generally assumed that the skeptic refutes himself, when he insists on total suspension of judgment while, at the same time, constantly relying on all sorts of judgments in his actual life. Hume's version of this objection is perhaps the most familiar; without a doubt, it has contributed substantially to the standard picture of the skeptic as a person who, if only he took his own views seriously, would be completely helpless in ordinary life.

Of course, the ancient skeptics, starting with Arcesilaus at the latest, were quite familiar with this objection. Clearly, they felt it did not really tell against their position. Since the issue was raised again and again over the course of centuries, it seems reasonable to suppose that the skeptics had, in fact, considered the matter quite carefully, when they claimed that this objection did not tell against them. That in turn should lead us to suspect that the skeptics' position is more complicated than the objection would have it, that the objection somehow overlooks some crucial aspect of their position. Still, it is hardly a coincidence that, all their protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the skeptics find themselves faced with basically the same objection time and again. The skeptical position must be one that positively provokes such an objection. Yet it seems to me that one violates the canons of interpretation if one does not take the skeptics' constant protests—that this objection does not really tell against their position—at least as seriously as the fact that they were constantly confronted by it.

If we, then, take seriously the skeptics' protestations and try to understand how they could think that this objection somehow misses the mark, there seem to be basically two lines along which the skeptics could argue, in defending themselves against this objection. The objectors claim that the skeptics, in theory, suspend judgment on all matters, but that, in practice, they simply cannot avoid making all kinds of judgments. Thus, one could argue against the objection by (i) trying to show that the skeptics denied that one could not avoid mak-

ing judgments in practice, in everyday life—judgments like ‘it is very hot today’ or ‘this car is about to run me over’. The skeptics could grant that it is extraordinarily difficult to bring oneself into such a state that one no longer even feels any temptation to have any view but insist that it is, in principle, possible and, indeed, is compatible with living a life worth living. Or, (ii) one could argue that the skeptics thought that even if one suspended judgment on all matters, at least suspended judgment in the sense in which they recommend that one suspend judgment, one would still have many beliefs and views, quite enough, at any rate, to lead a worthwhile life.

For various reasons—which I shall come to—it seems as if the skeptics opted for the second line. Since, however, there are some indications that they pursued the first line, to meet the standard objection, I want to consider this interpretation of their position at least briefly. There are basically three points that make this interpretation seem attractive: (i) As I have already indicated, there are a large number of passages that seem to show that the skeptic suspends judgment about everything and hence has no views or beliefs. Precisely because this part of their position is so well attested, one might suppose that the only way out was for the skeptic to hold that one could go through life without any views or beliefs; (ii) there are at least some reasons for thinking that Pyrrho himself attempted to lead a life entirely without beliefs or views—and Pyrrho is generally thought to have been the source for Pyrrhonian skepticism; (iii) quite a number of skeptical arguments survive that seem to set out to show that human action and human life is possible even without beliefs, that acting does not presuppose that one believes this or that is the case. And this third point seems to fit in very well with the first two.

For the time being, I want to pass over (i) and note that it will turn out that it is only true in a restricted sense that the skeptics suspend judgment on all matters and that everything depends on how one construes this restriction. As for (ii) it may well be that Antigonus of Carystus, virtually a contemporary of Pyrrho's, thought that Pyrrho undertook leading a life without beliefs. Diogenes Laertius, whose report ultimately derives from Antigonus' biography, writes: “In his life he followed [his skepticism]; he avoided nothing, took no precautions, but faced all risks, carts, precipices, dogs or whatever else it happened to be; he left nothing to the guidance of the senses; but he was . . . saved from harm by his friends who always accompanied him” (D.L. IX 61). We cannot rule out that Antigonus' remarks, on which this report depends, were intended as a sort of critical caricature of skeptical philosophers. In that case we would have here yet another instance of the standard objection that skepticism and normal life are incompatible. Still, it is clear that Diogenes Laertius himself does not take his source in this way, and so we must, with all due caveats, perhaps suppose that Antigonus did see Pyrrho's life as an attempt at leading a life without beliefs. This interpretation is compatible with his regarding that attempt as

a failure; for the comment about Pyrrho's friends suggests that Pyrrho leads his life under false pretenses, that the appearance of living like a serious skeptic is achieved only by relying on the judgments of his friends. Whatever Antigonos' view may have been, it is this passage of Diogenes Laertius' that one will turn to, if one wants to claim that Pyrrho did attempt to live his life without any beliefs, even without beliefs of the sort we rely on in our ordinary, everyday life. However straightforward and simple, nontheoretical and nonphilosophical these beliefs may be, the serious followers of Pyrrho, on this view of skepticism, will seek to manage without them. He will not even think things like, e.g., that he has forgotten his watch or that he must do some shopping.

If our main interest, however, is in the position that later goes under the name of Pyrrhonian skepticism, we need not be especially interested in what Pyrrho actually thought about this matter; and that for at least two reasons:

(A) It is striking that Pyrrho is the only ancient skeptic to whom the doxographers ascribe a life that can easily be regarded as at least an attempt at a life without beliefs. All the other skeptics seem to have led conventional lives; Sextus Empiricus even emphasizes that the skeptical life is, and should be expected to be, a conventional one. It seems clear that the later skeptics all sought a life which—on any ordinary criterion—would count as a satisfactory life. Their lives cannot readily be construed as lives without beliefs or even as attempts at lives without beliefs, rather they seem like lives guided by beliefs, whatever the skeptics may say. It is revealing that Aenesidemus, the philosopher presumably most responsible for Pyrrhonism, seems to have objected to those features of Pyrrho's life we found described by Antigonos of Carystus. According to Aenesidemus, Pyrrho did not act as foolishly as Antigonos had said he did (D.L. IX 62). An indication of how Pyrrhonists after Aenesidemus viewed Pyrrho's life is provided by Galen (*De subfiguratione empirica* XI, p. 82, 23ff. Deichgräber): Here Pyrrho is described in the way the Pyrrhonists see themselves—in practical life, the Pyrrhonist follows what seems evident to him. That, precisely, is what the Pyrrho of Antigonos' biography had not done; otherwise, he would not have needed his friends to save him from harm. Thus, when later skeptics, both Pyrrhonists and Academics, do recommend a life without beliefs, this surely is not the sort of life that the historical Pyrrho had recommended, but a life that at any rate superficially looked like a life led by someone who was guided by ordinary, everyday beliefs.

(B) I also think that it might very well be the case that Pyrrho's influence on Pyrrhonian skepticism is far less than generally assumed. The ancient doxographers already failed in their attempts to construct a continuous tradition linking Aenesidemus and Sextus with Pyrrho (D.L. IX 115ff.). Menodotus, a prominent Pyrrhonist himself, pointed out that the tradition was broken after Pyrrho. Since Pyrrho left no writings, later authors had to rely on the testimony of Timon, Pyrrho's student, a testimony of dubious value, as I have tried to show

elsewhere (*J. Phil.* 70, 1973; p. 806). How badly matters stood when it came to reconstructing Pyrrho's views is shown by these lines of Diogenes', which are clearly meant to give the sources for reports about Pyrrho: "Pyrrho himself left no writings, but those who knew him, Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius, Nausiphanes and others like them, did" (D.L. IX 102). Aenesidemus here seems in all likelihood to be the familiar Pyrrhonist; and if that is so, we cannot conclude, from the "those who knew him," that Numenius is not the well-known Platonist. If that is correct, it is clear just how bad the situation with respect to sources on Pyrrho really is.

Not surprisingly, then, it seems as if later Pyrronists were unclear about how their position was related to that of the historical Pyrrho. When Sextus (*P.H.* I 7) tells us that skepticism is sometimes called 'Pyrrhonian' because Pyrrho seems to have turned to skepticism "more than his predecessors," it is difficult to avoid the impression that Sextus has certain doubts about the position of the historical Pyrrho. When we hear of Theodosius' suggestion (D.L. IX 70) that the label 'Pyrrhonists' be dropped, since one cannot know what another person is thinking and hence cannot know what Pyrrho had actually intended, we ought not to see this primarily as raising an epistemological worry about other minds; rather, Theodosius seems to want to distance himself from the position of the historical Pyrrho or at least to leave open the question, to what extent was Pyrrho already a Pyrrhonist.

Thus, for these two reasons, it seems of relatively little significance for our question, what Pyrrho himself thought. Even if Pyrrho had really thought that a proper skeptic has no beliefs, this would have few implications for Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Finally (iii), there are whole series of skeptical arguments that purport to show that human action is possible without beliefs, that suspension of judgment does not lead to complete inactivity. Arcesilaus, for example, argued that human action requires nothing more than that things appear to us in a certain way and that we be so constructed that when things do appear to us in a certain way, a drive or instinct leading to action is triggered and that this does not require our also assenting to the appearances (see Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 1122 B-D; *De Stoic. rep.* 1057 A-B). Put more simply, if not as precisely, the point is just this: suppose someone is, say, hungry and is given his favorite food; why should he need—in addition to his hunger and the impression that he is being given his favorite food—the judgment that, in fact, he is being given his favorite food, to lead him to actually eat?

Given such arguments, one might think that we now have the solution to our problem: the skeptics *do* have an argument which—though we may not accept it—allows us to see why they thought that it is possible to manage without judgments or beliefs even in everyday life. Such a diagnosis of the situation, however, involves overlooking that the skeptic, in this case, would be doing pre-

cisely what he usually criticizes the dogmatist for doing: he would be trying to deny what quite obviously is the case, viz., that actions presuppose beliefs, by relying on a theoretical, dogmatic argument which purports to show that action is possible even without assent to appearances, even without judgments. The claim that actions do not presuppose beliefs, especially if based on an argument like the one outlined above, is no less dogmatic than the dogmatic claim that actions do presuppose beliefs. As soon as one sees this, it also becomes clear that the skeptics do not offer these arguments to try to show that we could not act without beliefs. That would be pure dogmatism. These arguments are rather offered to counterbalance the weight of the dogmatic arguments which tend to make us believe that it is not possible to act without beliefs (cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 34, 108). We cannot, then, assume, on the basis of such arguments, that the skeptics really did think that life is possible without beliefs, and thus they cannot escape the charge of self-refutation in this way. Indeed, it seems as if in this case, too, the skeptics are simply following their usual strategy of providing equipollent arguments on both sides of every issue.

Closer examination, thus, shows that the considerations which might have led us to defend the skeptic on these grounds—that he supposes, perhaps correctly, that it is possible to manage without beliefs even in everyday life—are, in light of the historical facts, unconvincing. But a skeptical position grounded in this way would itself also be scarcely plausible. Roughly speaking, the claim that it is possible to live without beliefs involves both a theoretical and a practical problem. If we suppose, as it seems we must, that all humans, in the course of their normal development, come to have a large number of beliefs, the practical question is whether or not it is possible, in practice, for a person both to rid himself of these beliefs as well as to prevent himself from acquiring any new ones, and this in such a way that he does not so diminish his capacity for acting that it no longer seems appropriate to speak of human action and a human life. Even if this practical question could be answered affirmatively, it is difficult to see what, besides sheer dogmatism, would lead someone to make use of this possibility. The dogmatist, who has certain views about what real knowledge is and who rejects everything else as mere belief, who believes that everything depends on his beliefs not being merely beliefs and who, like the Stoics, thinks mere beliefs are sinful—such a dogmatist will also believe that he must somehow resist the ordinary way of doing things, of thinking about things, and that he must get rid of his beliefs, once he has been shown that even what he had previously taken for certain knowledge has turned out to be, by his own dogmatic criteria, merely belief. The dilemma—either one must have certain knowledge or one must manage in life without beliefs—is not a dilemma with which the skeptic is confronted; on the contrary, he confronts the dogmatist with it, the dogmatist who rejects our ordinary beliefs and even our ordinary knowledge as ‘unscientific’ or ‘unphilosophical’, hence as irresponsible.

It will be objected that it is not dogmatism but experience that leads the skeptic to resist the ordinary way of thinking about things, in particular, the surprising experience that suspending judgment is accompanied by what he had hoped for from right reason, from judging correctly, namely, peace of mind.

Against this, we can say that it is only suspension of judgment understood in a special, qualified sense, alluded to above, that leads the skeptic to his goal. I shall have more to say about this sense later. However, by looking at *P.H.* I 12 and I 29, we can already see that the skeptic's experience, his discovery, is not that it is entirely possible to live without beliefs but that, if one considers things only on the basis of theory and reflection, one finds that, for every proposition, as much speaks in its favor as against it; thus, one cannot but suspend judgment, because the arguments always end up balancing each other, and, surprisingly, it turns out that it does not matter that one cannot form any judgments in *this* way; one even finds oneself in a wonderful state of calm. It seems to me that we can imagine ourselves in the situation of someone who thinks he has made such a discovery, but it also seems to me that this situation is not at all like that of someone who thinks he has discovered that a life without beliefs is accompanied by peace of mind.

Furthermore, the objection, that it is not dogmatism but his discovery (that a life without beliefs brings peace of mind) that leads the skeptic to give up all of his beliefs, does not solve our problem. For while this objection could perhaps explain why the skeptic leads a life without beliefs, once he has discovered that a life without beliefs is a tranquil one, our problem was seeing what would lead the skeptic to discover this in the first place. For the skeptic to make this discovery, however, he must either bring it about that he is in a state in which he has no beliefs or somehow be put into such a state. What, though, could bring him into such a state, on what grounds could he bring himself into such a state; they could only be dogmatic ones. It is relatively easy, though, to see how someone could find himself more and more able at contriving arguments for and against any position and thus also find it ever harder to reach a decision or make a judgment, and we can see how someone might end up in the skeptic's position without particularly trying to end up in such a position.

Perhaps, someone could, in practice, come to live without beliefs by acting *as if* he had a belief that something was the case in every situation in which he previously would have believed that something was the case? What, though, is he now supposed to do in those cases where, previously, he only would have acted as if he believed that something was the case? Is not the very distinction, between acting as if one believed something was the case and acting because one believes something to be the case, a dogmatic one, with no content, no implications for practice? For reasons of this sort, a skeptical position relying on the claim that it is possible, in practice, to live without beliefs, seems quite unsatisfactory to me; and a skeptical position relying on a *theory* of action which im-

plied that human action does not presuppose beliefs would, of course, be still more unsatisfactory. Thus, for philosophical as well as historical reasons this sort of defense for the skeptic seems unattractive to me.

Fortunately, the problem is solved for us by Sextus Empiricus' own words. In *P.H.* I 13ff., Sextus explains in what sense the skeptic is not dogmatic. What is not in question, at least if we follow Sextus, is whether the skeptic has no dogmas, no beliefs at all but whether he has no beliefs of a certain sort. Sextus distinguishes between a wider (*koinoteron*) and a narrower sense of 'belief'; and only beliefs in the narrower sense count as dogmatic. Hence, there can be no doubt whatsoever that, according to Sextus, a serious Pyrrhonian skeptic can have beliefs.

What needs to be asked is what sorts of beliefs these are, and how is the fact that the skeptic does have beliefs compatible with the claim that the skeptic suspends judgment about every issue. Those who incline toward an interpretation according to which the skeptic has no beliefs even in everyday life have the following answer. They will say that it is necessary to distinguish between how things are and how they appear. The skeptic will suspend judgment on how things are, and, if he wants to be consistent, he will also have no beliefs on how things are. This, however, by no means rules out that he should have beliefs about how things appear to him.

As a matter of fact, various passages seem to support this view. We find Sextus, for example, saying, "no one, presumably, disputes that the underlying thing appears to be such or such; what is in question is whether the thing is as it appears to be" (*P.H.* I 22). This second question, whether the thing is as it appears to be, is the one the dogmatists think they have the answer to, while the skeptic suspends judgment. So it seems as if the skeptic has no beliefs about how things are and thus not really any beliefs at all. Of course, one can, if one wants to, say that the skeptic has beliefs about how things appear to him; and it is with reference to these beliefs that Sextus (in *P.H.* I, 13ff.) speaks as if there were nondogmatic beliefs.

Against this interpretation, I want to maintain that, although there is a sense in which the skeptic has no beliefs about how things are—namely, he has no beliefs about how things *really* are—there is a perfectly good sense in which he does have beliefs about how things are—namely, to the extent that it seems to be the case that things are so or so. Obviously, this distinction needs textual support as well as some clarification. Sextus repeatedly points out that when the skeptic uses expressions of the form ' . . . is . . . ', these are to be construed as ' . . . appears . . . ' (*phainetai*—cf. *P.H.* II 135; 198; 200; *Adv. math.* XI 19); but ' . . . is . . . ' is also used in the sense of ' . . . is in reality (or, in the nature of things) . . . ' (*physei, pros ten physin, kata ten physin*—cf. *P.H.* I 27, 78, 140). This second use of ' . . . is . . . ', Sextus in one passage at least, seems to gloss as follows: "but if [honey] also *is* sweet, to the extent

that this is a question for reason, we [i. e., the skeptics] call into question" (*P.H.* I 20).

The explanation for this distinction depends, above all, on the following: it is characteristic of the dogmatists that they believe it is possible to go behind the surface phenomena to the essence of things, to the nature of things, to true reality. We believe that the objects around us are colored; in reality, however, they only reflect light of certain wave-lengths that makes them appear colored. The dogmatists further believe that it is reason—if only we would follow it—that can lead us beyond the world of appearances to the world of real being; and thus for them it is a matter of reason, what is to count as real and as true, and what is to count as appearance. It is in the sense of *this* distinction that the skeptic suspends judgment on how things really are. He has discovered by experience that he can reach no decision, if he leaves a question to reason. When all that is at issue, however, is whether something seems to him to be the case, the skeptic too will not deny that something seems to him to be the case. It may well seem to him that something is red, or sweet. What he does suspend judgment on is whether it really, in the nature of things, is red, or sweet. And so, the skeptic will also have beliefs about how things are, not only about how they appear to him. Against this, it will be urged that the skeptic uses "seem" or "appears" (*phainesthai*) in a nonepistemic sense; when he says, "it seems to me that *p*," this does not mean that he thinks or believes that *p* is the case, only that things appear as if *p* were the case. If, for example, we see a partially submerged oar, while it may appear as if the oar were bent, we do not believe that it is. According to this objection, it is just in this nonepistemic sense of appears that many things appear to be the case for the skeptic; for he suspends judgment on how things are.

Three things, it seems to me, tell against this objection: (i) the assumption that the skeptics use "appears" only in this nonepistemic sense is based on the false presupposition that it is true, without qualification, that the skeptic suspends judgment about how things are; (ii) the objection relies on an inadequate understanding of the contrast between appearance and reality, between how things seem and how they are; (iii) it ultimately leads to what I take to be a disastrous misunderstanding of the epistemological problem, the misunderstanding that certain mental contents (ideas or representations) are directly accessible and that the problem is only how to get from these representations to knowledge of the things that the representations represent. This division into the inner world of the I with its immediately accessible contents and a problematic outer world which needs to be reconstructed, strikes me as dogmatic and philosophically problematic; certainly this division is not just a matter of common sense; it would require some argument to see things in this way.

(i) It is true only with qualifications that the skeptic suspends judgment on how things are. At *P.H.* I 215, Sextus distinguishes between the stance of the

Pyrrhonists and that of the Cyrenaics with these words, "as for the objects in the external world, we suspend judgment insofar as it is a matter of reason" (epechomen hoson epi to logo). Sextus does indeed say that the skeptic suspends judgment on how things are. Yet, it is important to note how he qualifies this claim—insofar as it is a matter of reason. The qualification or restriction is not that the skeptic suspends judgment about how things are but not about how they appear; the restriction, rather, is that the skeptic suspends judgment about how things are in a certain respect. That, however, implies that there is another respect in which the skeptic does not suspend judgment about how things are. Once we have noticed this curious restriction here, we can see that such restrictions, "hoson epi + dative" occur again and again in the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (e.g., III 65, hoson epi to philosopho logo, cf. also II 26; 104; III 6; 13; 29; 65; 81; 135; 167). This construction also occurs in the gloss on the one sense of ' . . . is . . . ' which we considered above. There we had, "if [honey] also is sweet, to the extent that this is a matter of reason, we call into question" (*P.H.* I 20). We may, thus, assume that the import of this restriction is that the skeptic suspends judgment on how things really are; but that is not the same as claiming that the skeptic suspends judgment on how things are without any restriction.

Sextus' discussion of the sign, at *P.H.* II 97ff. and *Adv. math.*, 141ff., illustrates this nicely. Suppose that the question arises, are there signs, i.e., can anything count as the sign of another thing? The dogmatists, of course, believe that there are signs; they have a theory of signs, and they construct arguments which supposedly show that there are signs. The skeptic will, as usual, produce a whole series of arguments, which purports to show that there are no signs, in order to neutralize the persuasive force of the dogmatists' arguments. With plausible arguments on both sides of the question, an equilibrium is reached; one no longer knows which argument to trust. Sextus proceeds in exactly this way. Yet, despite all of his arguments against the existence of signs, it is clear that Sextus himself thinks that there are signs, namely, the so-called commemorative ones (*P.H.* II 104; *Adv. math.* VIII 151–58). Sextus does not say that it only seems as if there were signs, that the skeptic only has the idea of signs but does not think that there actually are any; his point, rather, is that even the skeptic takes certain things as signs of other things, e.g., smoke as a sign of fire. Sextus' discussion of signs, thus, is a good example of how, in a certain sense, the skeptic does suspend judgment about how things are—namely, to the extent that one considers this matter for arguments, for reason—but also of how, despite his suspension of judgment, the skeptic does think that, given how things are, there are signs.

When the skeptic reports that he regards the existence of signs as a phenomenon, that it seems to him that there are signs, this report does not merely indicate that it appears to him that there are signs, though he does not believe there actually are any; rather, this report indicates that it appears to him that there are

signs in the sense that he thinks there are signs. How this is supposed to be compatible with the claim that the skeptic does not believe that there are really, in the nature of things (*physei, ontōs, alethōs*), may be a difficult question. But it would be naive to suppose that one cannot make out a meaningful contrast between how things are and how things really are and thus think that someone who has no view about how things really are can only have a view about how things seem (nonepistemically) to him.

(ii) It is necessary, then, to get a clearer understanding of the contrast between appearance and reality, at least sufficiently clear to see how it is possible that someone can really believe something to be the case without believing this is how things are in reality.

If something seems to us to be the case, we can, at least in some cases, come to regard the matter differently, if we are, say, given an explanation of why the thing only appears that way. It is necessary to distinguish between two quite different sorts of cases: (a) it can happen that something no longer seems to be the case. If, for example, it is pointed out that we have not properly seen the thing, that we falsely presupposed this or that, that we inferred something incorrectly etc., we shall no longer think that what seemed to be the case is so. In certain especially interesting cases, an impression that things are thus or thus persistently recurs, despite the fact that we know quite well that things are not as they appear; the illusions of the senses are a good example of this type of case.

For example, I might, when I see an oar partially submerged in water, say that 'it appears bent to me,' where 'appears to me' has the sense that I believe that the oar is bent; if, however, someone explains to me why it only appears bent to me, I shall no longer think that the oar is bent. Nonetheless, the oar still *looks* bent. And thus I can still say that the oar appears to be bent, but now I shall be using 'appears' nonepistemically. (b) It can, however, also happen that, even after we have been given an explanation of why something only appears a certain way and even after we have accepted this explanation, we still think the thing is as it appears to be. Suppose, for example, that a particular wine seems quite sweet to me. Someone might explain, it only seems sweet, because I had eaten something sour just before tasting the wine. If I accept this explanation, I shall no longer think that the wine is sweet; at most, I shall think the wine only seems to be sweet. Yet, someone might also try to provide a quite different explanation. He might say that there is, in reality, no such thing as sweetness, no such thing as sweetness in wine; the wine, rather, has certain chemical properties which, in normal circumstances, make it taste such that we call it sweet. It may even be that I am convinced by an explanation of this sort and come to view how things taste in an entirely new light. Nonetheless, such an explanation might seem rather puzzling, because it is not entirely clear how it is supposed to bear on my claim that the wine is quite sweet. Even if I accept this explanation, the wine will still seem sweet, and I shall still think that it is. Thus, in a

sense, it will still be true that it does not merely seem as if the wine is sweet, even if I believe that, in reality, there is no such thing as sweetness.

Cases of the second sort, it seems to me, show that the contrast between how things really are and how they appear nonepistemically is insufficient. If one does not think that something is so and so in the true nature of things, this does not yet mean it only seems as if the thing were so and so. Thus, if the skeptic suspends judgment on how things are in reality, this does not mean that he only has impressions, but no beliefs, about things.

That, in fact, something like this more complex contrast is what is involved here seems clear to me not only from the problem itself but also from the situation of the skeptic. Ancient skepticism is essentially a reaction to dogmatism, to the attempt to get behind the phenomena, with the aid of reason, to true reality and, thus, to dissolve the real or apparent contradictions among the phenomena, the contradictions in the world as it appears to us (cf. *P.H.* I 12). However, it is characteristic of dogmatism that this attempt, to move beyond the phenomena, calls into question the status of the phenomena themselves. Parmenides and Plato are particularly clear examples of this, but, in the last analysis, the same is true of all the other dogmatic philosophers. But in calling into question the status of the phenomena, they also call into question the status of our ordinary beliefs and claims, as these are beliefs and claims that reflect how things appear to us. Since, however, the dogmatists, generally speaking, do not deny that the phenomena have at least some objective status, it does not follow that if someone suspends judgment about how things really are, he only has impressions about how things are, and, no beliefs. Plato, for example, ascribes a precarious intermediate status to the objects of belief or *doxa* in the *Republic*; they come between what really is, the objects of reason and knowledge, and what does not exist at all. He does not say that what we ordinarily call 'reality' is nothing but appearance, that our ordinary beliefs and impressions are no better than hallucinations. Though they fail to capture true being and, thus, are not really true, this does not mean that they are simply false in the way that it is simply false that Socrates died in 398. Another example is the role the assumption that, in the case of an ordinary object, for any predicate F, it is never really F, plays in so many interpretations of Plato. Obviously, the import of this assumption is not that for some reason or other water, say, is never heated long enough to be really hot. To put the point rather simply, what is at issue is not whether or not Socrates died in 399, but whether it is appropriate, given the true nature of things, whether it correctly mirrors reality, to speak of Socrates' having died in 399. This question is not at all settled by the fact that it is clear that we ordinarily do say Socrates died in 399. For it might be that, given the true nature of things, it is inappropriate to speak of persons and times. Yet, even if someone believed this, that would not mean that he could not continue to think and say that Socrates died in 399; and there is no reason to suppose that his belief would differ

from anyone else's who believes that Socrates died in 399. Thus, there is a perfectly good sense in which someone who suspends judgment about how things really are can have beliefs about how things are.

What is to stop the skeptic from having such beliefs? It is the dogmatists who talk endlessly about the need to go beyond the phenomena, who insist on the need to rely on reason and reason alone, which is also why, at least in medicine, they are called *logikoi*, i.e., rationalists (cf. *Adv. math.* VIII 156). For they think that reason and reason alone has access to how things really are. It is the dogmatists who believe that it is necessary for us to revise our beliefs, or at least all the important and central ones, in the light of reason. The Stoics even think we ought to give up all beliefs that do not meet the strict criteria of reason and thus are not validated by reason. They, thus, expect us to rid ourselves of all the beliefs we have acquired in ordinary ways, if these should fail to meet the rigorous criteria of reason. Beliefs that do meet these criteria are beliefs about how things are, to the extent that this is a matter of reason, i.e., beliefs about how things really are. The skeptic indeed has no such beliefs; and if he followed the dogmatists' strictures—to accept only those beliefs validated by reason—he would, in fact, have no beliefs about how things are.

Yet why should he accept their strictures? What could lead him to follow only reason? It has been his experience that whenever he tries to rely only on reason, he fails to reach a decision; this past experience could hardly motivate him to follow only reason. We can imagine someone being faced with the following conflict: he has certain beliefs, acquired in some ordinary way which not only cannot be validated by reason but which turn out to conflict with certain insights of reason. If we believe the Eleatics, or the Atomists, or Plato, or Aristotle, or the Stoics, we should expect to be faced with conflicts of this sort rather often. In such a case, we would need to choose whether to follow reason or our ordinary beliefs. The skeptic, however, is not in this situation. Whenever he follows reason seriously and fully, he can form no judgment, hence also no judgment that conflicts with his ordinary beliefs. Thus, he is not even faced with the choice, should he follow only reason (against his ordinary beliefs), at least not in this way.

Since he has not been dissuaded from doing so, the skeptic will continue to rely on how things appear to him, on what seems to him to be the case. He will not think that it only seems as if things were so and so; for that thought presupposes that he believes what the dogmatists believe, namely, that, in reality, things are quite different from the way they seem to be. For him, of course, nothing rules out the possibility that, in reality, things should be exactly as they appear to be. Since he suspends judgment on how things are in reality, he will not think that it merely seems to him that things are thus or thus. If it had been his discovery that, in every instance, it only seems to him that this or that is the case, he would indeed have no beliefs on how things are. When the skeptic,

however, speaks of what seems to him to be the case, and when he says that he is only reporting how it appears to him, he cannot be speaking of something which he thinks *only seems* to be the case; and that for the reasons indicated.

Thus, it seems to me that if we properly construe the contrast between how things really are and how they seem to us, it does not follow that the skeptic has no beliefs about how things are just in virtue of his suspending judgment about how they are in reality.

(iii) As a matter of fact, Sextus often does speak as if ideas or impressions (*phantasiai*) were directly accessible and the problem was to determine whether or not to assent to these impressions, that is, whether or not one should think that things are the way our impressions represent them as being. The conventional interpretation holds that the skeptic does indeed have such impressions but that he consistently refuses to assent to them and, hence, has no beliefs about how things are.

The question, though, is does Sextus Empiricus speak this way because this is how *he* sees the problem of knowledge or because he needs to tailor his argument to his dogmatic opponents' way of regarding matters. After all, his goal is to get the dogmatist to suspend judgment on the basis of his own principles and theories. This much at least is clear: it is the dogmatists, especially the Stoics, who assume that certain impressions arise in us, impressions which we voluntarily either do or do not assent to, which we—if we proceed responsibly—need to judge by a criterion of truth, before we assent to them and form a judgment. Such a view seems wholly dogmatic, because it presupposes a theory about what beliefs actually are, how they arise and how they *ought* to arise. I very much doubt that Sextus shares the view that our beliefs are formed thus: certain impressions arise in us, and, by some means or other, we decide whether or not to assent to them. At any rate, it is conspicuous that Sextus himself, whenever he speaks of the circumstances in which the skeptic, too, will give his assent, avoids speaking as if the skeptic were assenting to an impression. The explanation for this does not seem to be Arcesilaus' criticism of this way of talking (cf. *Sext. Emp. Adv. math.* VII 154) but, rather, something deeper. Moreover, the skeptic has no criterion, on the basis of which he could decide whether or not to assent to an impression. In fact, certain things just seem to him to be the case; the skeptic has no theory on how or why this is so. If, however, someone insists on using dogmatic terminology, he can say that things affect the skeptic in such a way that he comes to assent to something (cf. *P.H.* I 19; 113, 193). Yet, it is hardly plausible that Sextus, when he speaks this way, means to commit himself to the view that there are mental acts of assenting which, together with the appropriate impressions, constitute having beliefs and forming judgments. For these reasons, I am inclined to believe that the skeptic has beliefs not only about how things seem to him but also about how they are, and to believe that things appear to him to be the case, in the sense that he believes they

are the case without, of course, believing this is the way they are in reality, this is the way they are insofar as it is a matter for reason to determine what is true and what is real.

If Sextus believes that a skeptic can have beliefs about how things are, we would expect to be able to see this in the passage already mentioned, where Sextus explains in what sense the skeptic can have beliefs (*dogmata*). Conversely, if it really were true that the skeptic can only have beliefs about how things seem to him, this too we should be able to see from this passage. At any rate, it strikes me as methodologically sound to base one's interpretation of an author's views primarily on those passages where he explicitly sets them out and not rest content with indirect indications of what they might be. Since Sextus Empiricus explicitly considers our question in *P.H.* I 13, let us turn to this passage: "We say that the skeptic does not dogmatize, not in the sense of 'belief' (dogma) in which some say, speaking quite generally, a belief consists in consenting to a thing (eudokein tini pragmati); for the skeptic does assent to such affections which necessarily result when things appear to him in certain ways; he would not, for example, when he is hot or cold, say, 'I believe I am not hot (cold)'; We rather say, he does not dogmatize, in the sense of 'belief', in which some say a belief consists in assenting to one of the nonevident things which the sciences have as their objects of inquiry; for the Pyrrhonian assents to nothing nonevident."

The expression on which a lot depends here is, "consenting to something." "Eudokein," to judge from its frequent occurrence in papyri, is quite a common word, especially in legal contexts. It also occurs frequently in Hellenistic literature, e.g., in Polybius. On the other hand, it hardly appears at all in philosophical texts; as a philosophical term, it occurs nowhere else. Thus, it has no philosophical or technical meaning, no philosophical associations and is connected with no special philosophical claims; presumably, it is exactly this fact that leads Sextus to choose the word. Eudokein and eudokeisthai are used in the sense of 'be content with', 'assent to', 'agree', 'consent to', 'recognize', 'accept', or 'suppose'. The *Suida* has, s.v. eudokein, the following entry: "synkatatithesthai. ho de ephe eudokein tois legomenois, ei labe pisteis. anti tou arestekesthai." First we are given a synonym, then a quote from Polybius, finally a gloss on his use of the term. In the *Etymologicum Magnum* (ed. Gaisford), there is an entry for eudokein, which is of no interest for us here, but also a gloss on eudokoumenos, which we encounter again in the *Lexeis rhetorikai* (Anecdota Graeca Bekkeri, v. I, p. 260); it runs as follows: "ho synkatatithemenos kai me antilegon." This gloss seems to fit in very well with our Sextus passage, because its two parts seem to correspond to the two parts of Sextus' explanation of how the skeptic consents to something: (a) the skeptic assents to something (synkatatitethai), (b) he does not oppose it and does not protest.

Precisely which meaning of eudokein, however, should we ascribe to Sextus

here? The following sentence from Polybius (I, 8, 4) provides a good example of the ordinary use of *eudokein*: *hoste . . . pantas . . . eudokesai strategon hauton hyparchein Hierona*. Out of context, this sentence could mean any number of things—they decided, voted, decreed, agreed, that Hiero was to be their *strategos*, they all thought it would be a good thing, would be proper, if Hiero would be their *strategos*. In fact, the sentence means that they accepted the fact that Hiero was to be their *strategos*, they recognized (in the legal sense) that Hiero was their *strategos*.

Obviously, in our passage, beliefs, not decisions, are being discussed. Therefore, our task is to find an interpretation on which *eudokein* has its usual meaning even though it is beliefs which are being talked about.

It seems as if the following interpretation would satisfy this condition: what the skeptic literally accepts, what he is content with, what he has no objection to is whatever seems to him to be the case, whatever seems evident to him. He accepts the judgment of *phantasia*; at least he raises no objection against its verdict; if it says things are thus or thus, he does not challenge this. The gloss and Sextus' explanation (*hoion oun an . . .*) do indeed suggest that the principle, that one consents if one does not object, is at work here. Such an interpretation fits in well with our observations on the question whether Sextus accepts the dogmatists views about the origin of beliefs. The dogmatists see assent as a voluntary act, a judgment about the impressions which presents itself to us; it is only this judgment that leads to a belief. Sextus, to judge by the passage at hand, sees things differently: something which can count as a belief, a judgment, arises in us when we do not object and consequently consent. In the case of those illusions of the senses familiar to us, we do object; otherwise we would falsely believe that the oar was bent. That what the skeptic does not object to is what seems evident to him, what seems to him to be the case, is clear from the next bit of our passage; for there Sextus says that the skeptic refuses to assent to anything nonevident. If he does not refuse to assent to something, it will be a phenomenon, something evident, something that seems to him to be the case.

Why is the skeptic content with what seems to him to be the case; why does he raise no objection? If he were a dogmatist, he certainly would not be content; the dogmatist is so concerned that things might, in reality, be quite different, that he does not accept the verdict of *phantasia*; instead, he relies on reason in order to find out how things really are (cf. *P.H.* I 12). He is also not disturbed by the fact that his reason, in its reckless haste, contradicts the phenomena (cf. *P.H.* I 20). The skeptic, on the other hand, has learned from experience, that reason, if he tries to follow it seriously and fully, gets him no further and, thus that, he must rest content with how things appear (cf. *P.H.* I 12). It may be objected that skeptics will also argue against what seems evident to them, since they argue against everything; but Sextus himself explains that the skeptic only argues against phenomena for dialectical reasons (*P.H.* I 20).

In the second part of our passage, Sextus tells us the sense in which the skeptic has no beliefs. The relevant sense of 'belief' seems surprisingly narrow at first, especially if one assumes that the skeptic has no beliefs about how things are. Only those beliefs will count as dogmatic which involve an assumption or claim about one of the nonevident objects of scientific inquiry. Sextus clearly has the theorems of philosophers and scientists in mind, theorems which they attempt to establish in their efforts to go beyond the phenomena and what is evident in order to get a grip on true reality. These are the doctrines which serve to characterize the various dogmatic schools and allow us to distinguish among them. Menodotus apparently has the same sense of belief in mind when he says that all of Asclepiades' beliefs are false (*omnia eius dogmata esse false*—Galen *De subf. emp.* 84, 21–22 D). If Sextus had only such typical school doctrines in mind here, it would be clear that the skeptic could have all sorts of beliefs about how things are. For our ordinary, everyday beliefs are, in general, not theoretical doctrines, not assumptions that are part of any science. The skeptic would thus be free to have such 'unscientific' beliefs. Actually, however, matters are presumably more complicated. Since the skeptic suspends judgment—either in a restricted or in an unrestricted sense—on every matter, even those things that are evident to him must, in a certain respect, be nonevident. Presumably, we need to understand this as follows: everything, if considered only as an object for reason, can be called into question; every question can be regarded as a question to be answered by reason, a question requiring a theoretical answer derived from first principles which are immediately evident to reason. Nothing, looked at in this way, will be evident to the skeptic, not even the most lowly, ordinary belief. Any belief, whatever its content may be, can be a dogmatic belief; conversely, every belief can be an undogmatic one. Thus, it is not the content of theoretical views (though, as we shall see, content is not entirely irrelevant) that makes them dogmatic views; it is, rather, the attitude of the dogmatist who believes his rationalist science actually answers questions, actually gives him good reasons for believing his theoretical doctrines. Sextus probably does have primarily the doctrines of the dogmatic schools in mind here, but it would presumably be a mistake to construe the notion of dogmatic belief so narrowly that it could not, in principle, apply to any belief, regardless of content.

What then, does this passage tell us about our question? It seems to me that the text does not even so much as suggest that the skeptic can have beliefs but only ones about how things seem to him not ones about how things are. As far as the second part of our passage is concerned, it says only that the skeptic may not have beliefs of a certain kind, viz., philosophical or scientific ones which depend on reasoned grounds (here, of course, he is presupposing a dogmatic notion of knowledge and science; if there can be such a thing as skeptical science remains to be seen). Whichever way we choose to interpret the text, there will be a large number of beliefs about things which are not dogmatic beliefs. As far

as the first part of our passage is concerned, here too the claim is not that the beliefs which the skeptic may have are only ones about his own impressions. On the contrary, the text says, at least on the interpretation suggested, that the skeptic will be content with what seems to him to be the case; surely, that will include a large number of observations about the world around him.

Whoever wants to find the claim, that the skeptic only accepts such beliefs as are about his own impressions, in this passage, will refer to two details: (a) Sextus says that the skeptic assents to certain affections (*pathe*); (b) the example he provides seems—if translated in the usual way—to show that the skeptic will not deny that he feels so or so, if that is how he does feel. As for (a), we need to get clearer about what Sextus means by affections, when he says the skeptic assents to them. There are two main possibilities (though it is not clear that, from a skeptical perspective, they do not collapse into one): (1) Referring to, say, *P.H.* I 22, we could say Sextus means to talk of impressions (*phantasiai*) when he speaks of affections here. In that case, Sextus would be using only a slight variant of the dogmatists' way of speaking; the dogmatists talk as if (and Arcesilaus criticizes them for this—cf. *Adv. math.* VII 154) what we assent to is an impression, a way of talking which, as we have noted, Sextus seems to take pains to avoid. These impressions, however, are impressions of things which appear thus or thus to us; and assenting to them is assuming that things are the way they appear to be. (2) Sextus might, when talking of affections, be referring to the disposition to be affected by things in a certain way, whether one wants to be so affected or not. And assenting to these affections would consist in acquiescing: that it is *this* that seems to be the case, this and nothing else, and *that* it seems to be the case. Neither (1) nor (2), however, give us any reason to think that the belief will only be about the skeptic's own impressions. In any event, "assenting to such impressions" cannot mean "assenting to the claim that one is affected in this way, that one has such impressions." Yet, such a meaning is required, if the first detail is to bear on the issue at hand.

So, only the example remains. A precise analysis of the example is difficult for both linguistic and intrinsic reasons. For example, how exactly is "I am hot" to be understood; how is "thermainesthai" to be translated—'to be heated' or perhaps 'to feel hot'? Fabricius, in his revision of Henricus Stephanus' translation, opts for the first, literal meaning; Bury and Hossenfelder opt for the second one. It is by no means clear if the word can even have this second meaning. It can mean 'having a fever'; and the dictionary (LSJ) refers to at least one passage (Plato. *Theaet.* 186 D) where it unquestionably means 'feel heat' or 'sense heat', a meaning we perhaps also find in one place in Sextus (*P.H.* II 56). If we followed ordinary usage, we would be inclined to think that here as well "thermainesthai" is to be translated by 'be heated', especially since this seems to conform to Sextus' usual usage. The context certainly provides no reason not to

translate it so; one will, thus, translate it differently only under the influence of a preconceived notion of what Sextus' position is.

Nevertheless, let us suppose that "thermainesthai" does refer here to the subjective feeling, to sensation. In that case, the expression "dokō mē thermainesthai" ('I do not think I am feeling any warmth') creates difficulties. Now the translation presumably must read, when the skeptic feels warmth he will not say, 'I do not think I am feeling any warmth'. Presumably now the "thermainomenos," in the previous line, refers to the affection of the skeptic, the affection which he does not refuse to assent to by objecting to it. If the skeptic, however, feels or notices warmth, the objection should not be, "I do not think I am feeling warmth," but it should rather be, "I do not think that there is any warmth," or, "it seems to me that it is not warm." For, as we have just seen, assenting to an affection does not consist in assuming that it exists. What the skeptic does not deny, when he senses warmth, is that something is warm. Perhaps, however, we should still assume that thermainomai can mean 'I am hot' or 'I feel hot'. One passage in Sextus (*Adv. math.* I 147) shows that the transition to this meaning would be easy. In that case, we could say that the affection consists in the impression that one is feeling hot; and the skeptic will not go against this impression by saying, 'I do not think that I am feeling hot'. Perhaps nothing rules out this interpretation. Yet, it is worth considering that (1) it assumes a very strange meaning for thermainesthai, (2) the text does not suggest this meaning, and (3) even if translated this way, the passage still will not yield the intended interpretation. Sextus is interested in providing an especially clear example of something that is evident even to the skeptic. If Sextus chooses the example of feeling hot, this by no means implies that only his own impressions will be evident to the skeptic; rather, it is just an exceptionally clear example of the sort of thing that could be evident to someone.

In summary, we can say that the passage, in which Sextus explicitly discusses what sorts of beliefs the skeptic can have without being dogmatic, not only does not come out and say, but does not even suggest, that the skeptic can have beliefs only about his own impressions, only about how things seem to him.

It might be objected that what, on our interpretation, Sextus is prepared to call 'dogmata' are not even beliefs. We might, for example, think that the mere feeling that something is the case is not to be regarded as a belief just because we do not object to this feeling or impression. It may very well be the case that the skeptic's beliefs do not satisfy some specific, dogmatic definition of 'belief.' If, however, we stay with the ordinary use of verbs like 'believe', 'think', or 'suppose' (or the ordinary use of "dokein"), it is clear that the conditions for employing these verbs are so weak that the skeptic's beliefs will satisfy them without any difficulty. If someone steps into the house, and we ask him if it is still raining outside, and he, without hesitating, answers that it is, we would regard this as

an expression of his belief that it is still raining. One would need to have a dogmatic view about what is to count as a belief to be prepared to deny this. There is no reason to suppose that the skeptic, if asked such a question, would not answer either yes or no; and there is no reason to suppose that the skeptic would mean anything different by his answer than anyone else (cf. also Cicero *Acad. pr.* 104).

It is true that the skeptic does not believe that it is *really* still raining. His answer is not grounded in some insight into the true nature of things, an insight such that reason could not but give the answer it does. For reason throws up an unlimited number of possibilities about how it might, after all, be the case that it is no longer raining, without itself being able, as the skeptic has discovered all too often, to eliminate these possibilities. His answer, rather, tells us only what seems to him to be the case; if we ask *him*, that is how it strikes him. In this respect, however, his answer does not differ from that of the man on the street. He, too, only reports his impressions and does not also think that things *really* are the way he takes them to be, the way they appear to him.

How then does the skeptic differ from the man on the street? He differs, it seems to me, in two respects: (i) presumably the average person is quite dogmatic about some of his views, especially moral or ethical ones. As far as scientific speculation is concerned, he may be quite content to leave that to others, but when moral or political questions are at stake, he will tend to claim that he does have some deeper insight, even if his experience seems to tell against it, he has views about what is really good or really bad (cf. *P.H.* I 27; 30). (ii) In contrast to the man on the street, the skeptic is acutely aware of the fact that in all sorts of ways things might, in reality, be quite different from how they appear to be. He takes the phenomena as they come, but he knows better than anyone else that nothing rules out the possibility that things could really be radically different.

Does the skeptic differ from other people in regard to what he believes or thinks? We might think that the skeptic only believes what is evident to him, what is a phenomenon, and that only those things are evident to him which are accessible through observation and experience; and so we might go on to think that the skeptic will refuse to believe anything that is not accessible through observation. Any interpretation along these lines, however, seems false to me. I shall leave aside the fact that experience is extraordinarily complicated and that perception and observation, in the ordinary sense, play a comparatively subordinate role in experience. The skeptic simply has no general answer to the question, 'What is evident?'. There are things that are evident to him, and he could list any number of them. There is no reason, however, why the same things should be evident to other people, or to most people, much less to all people; there is also no reason to suppose that only things which can be perceived or observed should be evident to the skeptic. The text of Sextus Empiricus shows

that he believes many things are the case which cannot be observed. Even if it should turn out that all the things that seem evident to a skeptic are also things that can be observed, this could not be because the skeptic only considers things that can be observed as true. For if he thought that, he would be, just like the dogmatists, using a criterion to distinguish between true and false impressions. But the skeptic does not rely on any criterion for his beliefs.

This, of course, does not mean that his skepticism will have no influence on the content of his beliefs. There are, for example, large numbers of views which one in all likelihood would not have unless one relied on reason dogmatically, unless one thought one had arguments which justified these views. It is not very likely that someone would think that there is no motion or no change without also thinking he had some special insight and some good reason for thinking this. Not very likely, but not impossible. For we can imagine someone who has been raised by Stoics and who thus has the Stoic concept of God. As a skeptic, he no longer believes that the Stoic proofs of God's existence entail their conclusion; since, however, his belief was not induced by these arguments, nothing about his belief need change even when the arguments no longer carry conviction. On the whole, though, the skeptic will mostly believe what experience suggests to him.

What fundamentally distinguishes the skeptic from other people are not the beliefs he has but his attitude toward them. He no longer has the more or less naive and partially dogmatic attitude of the 'ordinary' man; his relation to his beliefs is permeated by the awareness that things are quite possibly different in reality, but this possibility no longer worries him. This distinguishes him from the dogmatist who is so worried by the question, how are things in reality, that he succumbs to the illusion that reason could guarantee the truth of his beliefs, could give him the knowledge which would be secure because of his awareness that things could not, in reality, be different from the way reason says they are. This dogmatic craving for the security of true belief as a necessary, perhaps even a sufficient condition for the tranquility and healing of the soul strikes the skeptic as, at best, futile, perhaps even pathological and harmful. As the passage quoted at the end of this paper shows, the skeptics were not alone in this view; but it was a view that quickly lost ground during the second and third centuries. We know of only one successor of Sextus in the third century, Saturninus (D.L. IX 116). The temptation had become too great: if mere reason could not lead us to the truth we need for our salvation and beatitude, it would require cleansed, purified, and illuminated reason, perhaps even reason in the light of some revelation; but whatever it takes, we must have the real truth if our lives are not to fail.

These are the introductory sentences to Heron's treatise on artillery: "The largest and most important part of philosophical activity is that which is devoted to peace of mind. Those who want to attain wisdom have carried out and, in-

deed, carry out to this very day a large number of investigations concerned with peace of mind. In fact, I believe that theoretical inquiry about this will never end. In the meantime, however, mechanics has progressed beyond the theoretical study of peace of mind, and it has taught all men, how, with the help of part of it—a very small part indeed—to live with peace of mind, I mean the part concerned with artillery.” (Hero’s *Belopoiika* ed. by H. Diels and E. Schramm; Abh. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin, 1918, p. 5.). The skeptic saw his task as, on the one hand, not giving in to the temptation to expect more from reason and philosophical thinking than these can provide without, on the other hand, coming to hold reason in contempt.¹