

TEXTS. 2.a.

*The wise in every age conclude,
What Pyrrho taught and Hume renewed,
That dogmatists are fools.*

Poem by Thomas Blacklock as it appears in Hume's letter of 20 April 1757 to Clephane in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1: 231.

T1. *M* VII 402-411

[...]appearances come about from unreal things as well as from real ones. (403) And an indication of their indistinguishability is their being found equally plain and striking, while an indication of their being equally striking and plain is the fact that the corresponding actions are connected with them. For just as in waking life the thirsty person who is taking in drink is pleased, and the person who is fleeing a wild animal or some other horror shouts and yells, so too **in dreams** people who are thirsty and think they are drinking from a spring have relief [...] (404) And just as, in a healthy condition, we trust and assent to very clearly apparent things – for example, we relate to Dion as Dion and Theon as Theon – so too in madness some people are affected in a similar way. (405) At any rate Hercules **in madness**, after grasping an appearance from his own children as if they were Eurystheus', put the corresponding action together with this appearance. The corresponding action was doing away with his enemy's children – which he did. [...] (408) So then, this indistinguishability between apprehensive and nonapprehensive appearances, in terms of the property of being plain and intense, is established. But the Academics show equally well their indistinguishability in terms of stamp and print. They bring the Stoics up against things that are apparent. (409) For in the case of things that are alike in shape, but that differ in terms of what is underlying, it is impossible to distinguish the apprehensive appearance from the false and nonapprehensive one. For example, if there are two eggs exactly alike, [...] (410) The same argument also applies **in the case of twins**. For the superior person will grasp a false appearance, even though he has the appearance as from a real thing and stamped and impressed in accordance with just that real thing, if he gets an appearance from Castor as if from Polydeuces [...] (411) The apprehensive appearance, then, does not have any peculiarity by which it differs from false and nonapprehensive appearances.

T2. *Academica* II 61-62

[*Lucullus points out again and again the impossible results of the Academic position; here, he is addressing Cicero directly.*]

(61) Will you really [...] follow that philosophy which conflates the true with the false, takes away our own judgement, deprives us of any approval, and robs us of our senses? [...] those whom you approve of, having poured such darkness upon us, have not left us any glimmer of light so that we might see something; if we follow them, we shall be constrained by such shackles that we cannot move at all. (62) For by removing assent, they have removed both any movement of the mind and any practical action; this cannot just be not right but is not possible at all.

T3. *PH* II 97-98

[97] Some objects, then, according to the Dogmatists, are clear (*πρόδηλα*) and some are unclear (*ἄδηλα*). And of the unclear, some are unclear once and for all, some are unclear for the moment, some are unclear by nature. What comes of itself to our knowledge, they say, is clear (e.g. that it is day); what does not have a nature such as to fall under our apprehension is unclear once and for all (e.g. that the stars are even in number!); [98] what has an evident nature but is made unclear for us for the moment by certain external circumstances is unclear for the moment (e.g. for me now, the city of the Athenians); and what does not have a nature such as to fall under our evident grasp is unclear by nature (e.g. imperceptible pores — for these are never apparent of themselves but would be deemed to be apprehended, if at all, by way of something else, e.g. by sweating or something similar').

