

A New Answer to an Old Puzzle: Νοεῖν ἀπλῶς (Sextus Empiricus, *PH* II 1–10)¹

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Abstract

Sextus responds to the Dogmatists' criticism that the Sceptics cannot investigate Dogmatic theses, formulating his own version of Meno's puzzle against them. He thus forces them to adopt νοεῖν ἀπλῶς – a way of thinking that does not carry any commitment to the reality of what someone thinks – as their only solution to the puzzle and as the necessary starting point of their investigation. Νοεῖν ἀπλῶς avoids Dogmatic assumptions without making use of the Sceptical argumentation that leads to suspension of judgment. It constitutes a novel answer to Meno's puzzle, Dogmatism- and Scepticism-free, with important consequences both for Dogmatism and for Scepticism.

Sextus notes that persistent criticism was directed against the Sceptics, according to which “the Sceptics can neither investigate nor think in any way about the matters on which the Dogmatists hold beliefs” (*PH* II 1).² Sextus devotes the first ten paragraphs of the second book of his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (*PH* II 1–10) to his reply. He prefixes this reply as an introduction to the Sceptical attack on the three parts of Dogmatic philosophy, the attack which he elaborates in the last two books of the *Outlines*. As this criticism threatens the very possibility of a Sceptical investigation into Dogmatic theses, Sextus' reply seems to be a prerequisite for what follows.

Contemporary scholars have recently shown an increasing interest in this criticism.³ Nevertheless, they have either ignored⁴ or underestimated⁵ the part of Sextus' reply where

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Seminar on Ancient Philosophy at the University of Crete (2011), at the Faculty Seminar of the Department of Philosophy and History of Sciences at the University of Athens (2012) and at the Conference “Truth, Falsehood and Deception in Ancient Philosophy” at the Faculty of Classics of the University of Cambridge (2012). I owe a great deal to all the participants, and especially to Tamer Nawar for his comments. I discussed many of the views I present here with M. Frede who initially guided and has always inspired my work on Sextus Empiricus. J. Barnes' stimulating criticism on the thesis that the present paper was originally a chapter of, helped me to rethink, understand better, and see aspects I was blind to. P. Kalligas and G. Karamanolis read earlier versions and gave me valuable advice. I would also like to thank the referee for *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* for his/her bibliographical suggestions. Finally, Katerina Ierodiakonou supervised my thesis on Sextus and helped me turn this topic into an article; I would like to express my gratitude to her for all her support and encouragement.

² For the translations, I rely on Annas & Barnes 1994; Bett 2005; Bury 1933–49. In those cases where there is no crucial disagreement between the translators, I do not specify which I mostly rely on. When there is crucial disagreement or when I propose a different translation, this is noted and the different translations cited.

³ Cf. Corti 2009, 185–205 and 2015, 123–145; Fine 2010 and 2014, 345–368; Vogt 2010, 176f. and 2012, 140–157.

⁴ Fine in her discussion of *PH* II 1–11 omits the end of II 6 as well as II 7–9. She notes this omission in Fine 2010, p. 494, fn. 3 and in Fine 2014, p. 332, fn. 7 without any explanation.

⁵ Vogt refers to the part of Sextus' reply where he formulates his own version of Meno's puzzle (Vogt 2012, 148f.), but she concludes that the whole of *PH* II 1–12 “is arguably incomprehensible” (ibid., 153). Corti presents

he formulates his own version of *Meno's* puzzle against the Dogmatists. The first aim of this paper is to analyse Sextus' reply, focusing on his version of *Meno's* puzzle and on his attempt to force the Dogmatists to accept that their only way out is to adopt νοεῖν ἀπλῶς – a way of thinking that does not carry any commitment to the reality of what someone thinks – as the starting point of their own investigation into unclear things. I intend to argue that Sextus' main strategy in *PH* II 1–10 is not to challenge the possibility of Dogmatic investigation,⁶ but to force the Dogmatists to recognize that νοεῖν ἀπλῶς constitutes the necessary condition that makes their investigation possible. Thus, according to Sextus, νοεῖν ἀπλῶς becomes the necessary starting point both for the Dogmatists' investigation as well as for the Sceptics' investigation into the Dogmatists' theses.

My second aim is to understand and evaluate the consequences that νοεῖν ἀπλῶς has both for Dogmatism and for Scepticism. I shall argue that νοεῖν ἀπλῶς undermines the Dogmatists' realistic assumptions according to which the process of thinking always, somehow, keeps us in touch with reality and our natural notions or preconceptions provide us with basic truths *before* the philosophical investigation. At the same time, prior to and quite independently of the results of the Sceptical attack on Dogmatic philosophy, νοεῖν ἀπλῶς ensures for the Sceptics the possibility of not having to commit themselves to the reality of the notions they are investigating. Thus I argue that νοεῖν ἀπλῶς is a novel answer to *Meno's* puzzle, Dogmatism- and Scepticism-free, with important consequences both for Dogmatism and for Scepticism.

Finally, I will focus on Sextus' argument to the effect that νοεῖν ἀπλῶς is perfectly compatible with the Sceptical disposition of suspending judgement. I will argue that in order to understand Sextus' text and argument here correctly, we need to distinguish the Sceptics' thinking when they are engaged in the activities of everyday life from the νοεῖν ἀπλῶς which the Sceptics use specifically in arguing against the Dogmatists.

1.1. A version of *Meno's* puzzle against the Sceptics

Sextus cites the following puzzle as the argument used by the Dogmatists to justify that “the Sceptics can neither investigate nor think about the Dogmatists' positive theses”:

They say that the Sceptics either apprehend or do not apprehend what is said by the Dogmatists. If they apprehend it, how can they be puzzled about what they say they apprehend? If they do not apprehend it, they do not even know how to talk about what they have not apprehended. (*PH* II 2)

This puzzle is a version of *Meno's* puzzle on inquiry. Plato's Socrates recasts *Meno's* objection that one cannot investigate what one does not know at all in the following puzzle:

It isn't possible for man to search either for what he knows or for what he doesn't know. For he wouldn't search for what he knows – for he knows it, and there is no need to search for something like that; nor for what he doesn't know, for he doesn't even know what he is going to search for. (*Meno* 80e2–5)

this part of Sextus' reply (2009, 194f.), but he sees in it just “une valeur dialectique, au sens où elle fournit au dogmatique de bonnes raisons pour ne pas soulever l' objection contre les sceptiques” (ibid., 195).

⁶ Contrary to Fine (2010 and 2014), who focuses just on *PH* II 4–5 and claims that Sextus aims to show that the Dogmatists cannot investigate.

Meno's puzzle does not specify either who is inquiring or the kinds of things that are inquired into. The puzzle Sextus cites concerns the Sceptics' investigation and specifies the Dogmatists' positive theses, or what the Dogmatists say (τὰ δογματιζόμενα παρ' αὐτοῖς or τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα) as the subject matter of this investigation.⁷ The use of the notion of "apprehending" (καταλαμβάνειν), in place of that of "knowing" (οἶδα) that Plato used in the original puzzle suits the Sceptics' denial of apprehension better and reflects the general context of Hellenistic philosophy, where the kind of knowledge that Socrates was after was discussed in terms of "apprehension". Thus we have a puzzle which is adapted to the Sceptical investigation against the Dogmatists, and which is updated according to the epistemological terminology of Hellenistic philosophy.

Right after the formulation of the puzzle, Sextus attempts to explain the second horn of the dilemma. In order to illustrate that if the Sceptic does not apprehend what the Dogmatists say he does not even know how to speak about it, he presents the case of someone who is ignorant of two highly technical terms of Stoic logic and who, for that reason, is unable to say anything about them.⁸ We are all accustomed to such cases: those who are unfamiliar with philosophical or scientific theory do not understand, and therefore cannot speak about, technical aspects of this theory. Sextus' example implies that some kind of semantic understanding is a prerequisite for an investigation into philosophical theories, or even for speaking and thinking about them. But neither the Sceptics' denial of apprehension nor – at first sight – the above criticism concern the case we have in this example, namely that of just not being familiar with technical philosophical terms.

However, Corti points out that the phrase καταλαμβάνειν τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα is ambiguous, insofar as it may mean either (i) understanding what has been said, or (ii) knowing that what has been said is true (Corti 2009, 192). Therefore, τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα in our puzzle is ambiguous: it can denote just the expressions, the words the Dogmatists utter in formulating their theses, or it can denote the things these words have as referents. Moreover, Corti proposes that "Sextus' text suggests that the Dogmatists attacked the sceptics with a *semantic* version of the argument we have considered so far, in which the crucial claim is that understanding the meaning of the word 'y', which denotes a non-evident object, implies knowing and believing something about y. That is: if y is a non-evident object (say Providence), then to understand the meaning of 'y' implies to know and believe something about y" (Corti 2015, 142). Thus it seems that the puzzle Sextus cites has a semantic aspect which we do not find in the original puzzle in the *Meno* and, contrary to the original puzzle, it explicitly questions not only the Sceptics' ability to investigate the Dogmatists' theses, but at the same time their ability to think and speak about these theses.

⁷ Corti (2009, 203f.) argues that the version of *Meno*'s puzzle we find in *PH* 1–10 was part of a family of arguments whose archetype was the paradox of the Platonic dialogue. He refers to one more version that belongs to the same family of arguments found in *M VIII* 337ff. (this version will be discussed later) and points out that these arguments do not conclude that it is not possible for the Sceptics to investigate in general, but do conclude that the Sceptics cannot investigate the Dogmatic theses.

⁸ ὁ μὴ εἰδώς, εἰ τύχοι, τί ἐστι τὸ καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν θεώρημα, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν τι δύναται περὶ αὐτῶν (*PH* II 3). Cf. Annas & Barnes' footnotes to their translation (op. cit. 67) for the identification of τὸ καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν θεώρημα as types of arguments in Stoic logic.

1.2. Two different senses for “apprehending” (καταλαμβάνειν)

In his first move against those formulating this argument, Sextus poses the question “how are they here using the word ‘apprehend’ (καταλαμβάνειν)?” (*PH* II 4). He is not requesting a general definition of it; he is asking about the sense of the term in the specific context of the Dogmatists’ argument against the Sceptics (νῦν [...] ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, loc. cit.) and offers them two options:

does it mean simply “think of” (νοεῖν ἀπλῶς), without any further affirmation of the reality of the things we are talking about? Or does it also include a positing of the reality of the things we are discussing? (loc. cit.)

The question is, which one of the two possible alternatives provides an appropriate meaning for the term within this specific context?

1.3. The Dogmatic sense of “apprehending”

Sextus explains the second of the two alternatives, citing the Stoic definition for “apprehension” (κατάληψις). “Apprehension” is defined as the assent to an “apprehensive impression” (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), and “an apprehensive impression comes about from what is (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος), and it is imprinted and stamped in exact accordance with that which is, and is such that it could not come from anything that is not” (*PH* II 3). That is to say, the Stoic definition of “apprehending” requires that one has an altogether true impression which corresponds exactly and exclusively to a real object or fact; it requires, almost literally, that he or she has a grasp on reality.⁹ According to this meaning, then, for the Sceptics to be able to apprehend the Dogmatists’ positive theses they would have to grasp the reality that these theses are supposed to represent. It would mean for them to see that these theses are about real objects or facts, and even more that they are in exact accordance with them. If this kind of apprehension were a necessary condition for being able to think about, to speak of and to investigate what the Dogmatists say, the Sceptics clearly do not satisfy this condition. This kind of apprehension is of the type that the Sceptics deny they have attained when they declare that they do not apprehend.

In order to show that this – let us call it “Dogmatic” sense of “apprehending” – is not the proper sense of the word in the context of the Sceptics’ investigation into the Dogmatists’ theses, Sextus turns his attention to two similar contexts, where we would need to have “apprehending” in a similar sense. The first is a Dogmatist’s investigation into the theses of an opponent Dogmatist, and the second the Dogmatists’ investigation into unclear things (τά ἄδηλα). By examining the implications of adopting the Dogmatic sense of “apprehending” in these contexts, he forms two arguments against the Dogmatists to the effect that, in these closely similar contexts, the Dogmatists themselves would not choose to use “apprehending” in this Dogmatic sense.

⁹ Here I follow Frede in his interpretation of the Stoic definition of “apprehension”. Cf. Frede 1987, 164f. and Frede 1999a, 302f.

1.4. *A Dogmatist's investigation into the theses of an opponent Dogmatist*

Sextus first takes the case of Dogmatists who investigate other Dogmatists' beliefs when the latter differ from their own. If apprehending in the Dogmatic sense is the necessary presupposition, for example, for the Stoic investigation against the Epicurean theses that substance is divided, or that god does not show providence for things in the universe, or that pleasure is good, then the Stoics, where they do apprehend them, are in effect rejecting the Stoa. Where they do not apprehend them, it is not possible to conduct an investigation into the Epicurean theses. As Sextus concludes, attributing such a sense to "apprehending" would have the undesired consequence for the Dogmatists that they "cannot investigate anything in opposition to one another" (*PH* II 6).

Although at first sight this argument seems to be a legitimate and powerful argument against the Dogmatists, Sextus does not seem to appreciate it as such. This is implied in the way he introduces his second argument. He writes: "or rather – to avoid talking nonsense – [...] (μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ χρὴ μὴ ληρεῖν [...])" (*PH* II 6).

We should not take "ληρεῖν" here literally, as a person using the phrase "εἰ χρὴ or δὲ μὴ ληρεῖν" would not be saying that he has really been talking nonsense, but just that what he has said is not really important or is not really the case, and that he is now coming to the point. By using this phrase Sextus expresses the view that this argument, at least in comparison with the one that follows, is not particularly effective against the Dogmatists.¹⁰

One could argue that the situation with the Dogmatists' investigation of certain theses in opposition to one another is not the same as the Sceptics' investigation of the Dogmatists' theses. Though the Dogmatists, like the Sceptics, cannot apprehend in the Dogmatic sense of apprehending their opponents' theses, nevertheless they do apprehend – or at least, contrary to the Sceptics, claim to apprehend – the matters their opponents dogmatize, such as, for example, what god is. Therefore, instead of having to adopt Sextus' proposed alternative meaning, i. e. νοεῖν ἄπλωως, they may need just to show how their apprehension of the matter is sufficient for them to prove both that their thesis is true and that their opponents' thesis is false.

However, in Hellenistic times it was common practice when philosophers argued against one another to follow the tradition of the Socratic elenchus. They would make use of dialectical arguments that were based on the opponents' sayings in order to reveal the contradictions that the opponents' theses and views entailed. In this way, they aimed to show that their opponents were not authorized to claim that they had real knowledge of the matter. Such a practice, like Socrates' elenchus, does not presuppose that the dialectician, who produces the arguments against an opponent, possesses or claims to possess any knowledge of the matter. All it presupposes is an understanding of, if not an insight into, what the opponent maintains. It is this practice that the Academics and the Pyrrhoneans in particular followed (cf. Frede 1997b, 129f. and 1999b, 265–267).

Vital though this aspect of the philosophical discussion may have been in practice, or may have been considered to be, it was not an aspect essentially related to what Dogmatism

¹⁰ Fine maintains that "Sextus doesn't have a good *ad hominem* point" here (Fine 2014, 335). Vogt also argues that this first part of Sextus' response "is quite worthless" (Vogt 2012, 149). Both consider Sextus' argument as being directed specifically against the Stoics, and they point out that Sextus misrepresents the Stoic epistemology and the Stoic answer to *Meno*'s puzzle.

was. Sextus' reservations about the effectiveness of his first argument might concern the fact that, in contrast to the Dogmatists' investigation of certain theses in opposition to one another, the Dogmatists' investigation into unclear things is far more important to them, as it is directly related to what Dogmatism is; for this is precisely the investigation through which the Dogmatists come to adopt certain Dogmatic theses.

1.5. Dogmatists' investigation into unclear things (τὰ ἄδηλα): a version of Meno's puzzle against the Dogmatists

Sextus explicitly expresses his conviction that his second argument, which questions the possibility of the Dogmatists' investigation into unclear things is decisive both against Dogmatism as a whole and in favor of Scepticism. In his introduction he notes that: "pretty well all of their Dogmatism will be confounded [or rescinded] and the Sceptical philosophy will rapidly move to the fore" (*PH* II 6). And he concludes with: "and from this, I think, it will directly result that the Dogmatic fabrications are destroyed and the philosophy of suspension is introduced" (*PH* II 9).

This time it is the Sceptics who make use of *Meno's* puzzle. Sextus does not attempt simply to trap the Dogmatists in the old puzzle as it was formulated in Plato's *Meno*. He does not argue, following this puzzle that the Dogmatists either, where they have apprehended certain things, do not investigate them because there would be no point in doing so, or, where they have not apprehended them, that they cannot even begin to get their investigation off the ground. His primary aim here is not to argue that the Dogmatists do not investigate.¹¹ On the contrary, he starts from the fact that the Dogmatists declare that they have found truth, and his first basic move is to commit them to the need for previous investigation in forming their beliefs and assertions. For, according to Sextus' argument, the Dogmatists cannot but claim that they have apprehended the unclear things about which they make assertions and hold beliefs,¹² and this apprehension can only be the result of some inquiry. Direct apprehension, which could be an alternative, is excluded, as this kind of apprehension could only apply to something evident (ἐναργές or πρόδηλον) and not something unclear (ἄδηλον).¹³ Hence, what is crucial in Sextus' version of *Meno's* puzzle is that it specifies the subject matter of the Dogmatists' investigation as what is unclear.

Sextus presupposes that the Dogmatists are committed to an opposition of what is unclear to what is evident in two ways. First, what is evident is apprehended directly and through itself, while what is unclear is not apprehended in this way; second, what is evident

¹¹ Although this is what he implies at the beginning of *PH*, when he argues that the Dogmatists claim that they have discovered the truth, and have therefore stopped investigating, in contrast to the Sceptics who still continue with their investigations. He will also adduce the same point here, at *PH* II 11, as an additional argument, after challenging the sense that the Dogmatists give to "apprehension" in contexts where apprehension precedes investigation.

¹² "For he who makes a dogmatic statement about an unclear matter will declare that he is making it either after having apprehended it or after not having apprehended it. But if he has not apprehended it, he will not gain credence" (*PH* II 7).

¹³ Sextus presents two possible ways in which the Dogmatist may claim that he has apprehended the unclear: "either directly and through itself and by its coming evidently into his notice, or else by way of some inquiry and investigation" (*PH* II 7).

is “equally apparent to everyone and agreed upon and not disputed” (*PH* II 8), but there is disagreement and dispute about what is unclear.¹⁴ By arguing that a Dogmatist makes assertions and holds beliefs about the reality of something unclear, which means about something that is disputed and not agreed upon,¹⁵ Sextus concludes that a Dogmatist would not have apprehended it through itself and by its having come to his notice evidently.¹⁶ Our Dogmatist can only claim to have apprehended it through investigation.

Sextus seems to take into account that Dogmatic philosophers of the Hellenistic era declare that they have answered the problem of how one can search for what one does not know. In general terms, they claim that there is some kind of direct knowledge, the acquisition of which does not presuppose investigation, and that this knowledge is the basis for research and for the attainment of further knowledge.¹⁷ We know that the Stoics, for example, provided an answer to *Meno*’s puzzle in terms of natural notions, and the Epicureans in terms of preconceptions. Such answers are supported by realistic accounts of the formation of our basic concepts, according to which our basic concepts are taken to arise naturally and to reflect reality correctly. But Sextus’ argument is designed in such a way that the Dogmatists’ claims that some kind of direct knowledge of what is evident is the basis of their research into what is unclear are not relevant to and do not contradict the point he wants to make. Whatever knowledge the Stoics, for example, may claim to have on the basis of natural notions, insofar as it is direct knowledge of something evident, it will not be knowledge of what is unclear; knowledge of what is unclear cannot but presuppose some kind of investigation. Thus Sextus secures that in order for the Dogmatists to apprehend or to claim that they have apprehended what is unclear, they need to have previously investigated what is unclear.

The kind of investigation that the Dogmatists are committed to accepting as necessary for their claimed apprehension of unclear matters becomes impossible if the Dogmatists adhere to the Dogmatic understanding of apprehension that is prior to and requisite for the investigation in question. As Sextus remarks:

The investigation requires that what is going to be investigated should first have been accurately apprehended and then be investigated; and the apprehension of the object under investigation in turn demands that the object has already been investigated. Thus, by the reciprocal mode of perplexity, it becomes impossible for them [sc. the Dogmatists] to investigate and hold beliefs about what is unclear: if any of them wish to start from apprehension, we face them with the demand that they should have already investigated the object before apprehending it; and if they wish to start from investigation, we face them with the demand that they should have apprehended what is to be investigated before investigating it. (*PH* II 9)

¹⁴ Sextus presents the Dogmatists in general as committed to this opposition between the concepts of the unclear (τὸ ἄδηλον) and the evident (τὸ ἐναργές or τὸ πρόδηλον) explicitly in *M* VIII 141 and 322. See also for the evident as directly apprehended: *PH* II 98, *PH* III 4, *M* VII 364; as commonly agreed and not disputed: *M* XI 76, *M* I 185; for the unclear as not directly apprehended: *PH* II 124, 178, *M* VII 366; and as disputed and not agreed upon: *PH* II 182 and *M* II 108.

¹⁵ περί ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνήνυτος γέγονε παρ’ αὐτοῖς διαφωνία (*PH* II 8).

¹⁶ οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’ ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὼν αὐτῷ κατελιγφῶς ἂν εἶη τὸ ἄδηλον ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ διαβεβαιούμενος τε καὶ ἀσφαινόμενος δογματικός (loc. cit.).

¹⁷ Cf. *M* VII 25: τὰ μὲν ἐναργῆ διὰ κριτηρίου τινὸς αὐτόθεν γνωρίζεσθαι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα διὰ σημείων καὶ ἀποδείξεων κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετὰβασιν ἐξιχνεύεσθαι.

We can now understand Sextus' remark that because of his puzzle "all of their Dogmatism will be confounded" (*PH* II 6) and that "it will directly result that the Dogmatic fabrications are destroyed" (*PH* II 9). Without a solution to this puzzle the Dogmatists cannot be Dogmatists as "it becomes impossible for them to investigate and hold beliefs about what is unclear", and they "can neither apprehend anything unclear nor make any firm assertion about it" (*PH* II 9).

1.6. *Sextus' version of Meno's puzzle in favour of Scepticism*

The question is whether we should consider the devastating effect this argument has on Dogmatism enough to justify Sextus' claims that this argument works in favour of Scepticism in such a way that "Sceptical philosophy rapidly moves to the fore" (*PH* II 6) and "the philosophy of suspension is introduced" (*PH* II 9). Moreover, the question could be raised whether Sextus' version of *Meno's* puzzle also renders the Sceptical investigation impossible and therefore whether it works in the same devastating way against Scepticism. After all, the Sceptics' suspension of judgement is the state the Sceptics find themselves in, in all the cases they *have investigated*. Therefore, as the Dogmatists for being Dogmatists, i. e. for forming their beliefs and assertions on what is unclear, need to have previously investigated the unclear, in the same way the Sceptics, for being Sceptics, i. e. for suspending judgement, also need to have previously investigated the matters they suspend judgement on.

Sextus does not discuss the original puzzle of *Meno* as being of any concern to Scepticism. The only version of *Meno's* puzzle he attempts to resolve in defending Scepticism is the one used by the Dogmatists to show that the Sceptics cannot investigate the Dogmatists' positive theses. And the resolution of this version, as far as it makes use of Sextus' own version of *Meno's* puzzle against the Dogmatists, would be pointless if this later version were endangering Scepticism and Dogmatism equally. Thus, Sextus' view seems to be that Sceptical investigation in general is affected neither by the original *Meno's* puzzle, nor by the version he himself uses against the Dogmatists.

The version of *Meno's* puzzle that Sextus uses against the Dogmatists, like the original puzzle itself, concerns an investigation that aims at the apprehension of a certain reality, object, or fact. The Dogmatic philosophers' research project to apprehend what is unclear is the kind of investigation that can be blocked by *Meno's* puzzle and by Sextus' version of it. But the investigation through which the Sceptics come to suspension of judgment is of a different type. Sextus defines Scepticism, not as aiming at the apprehension of a certain reality, but as "an ability (δύναμις) to oppose things which appear and are thought of in any way at all" (*PH* I 8). Through the modes of suspension of judgment, the Sceptics methodically exercise their ability to oppose things and accounts, and in this way they come to suspend judgment (cf. *PH* I 31–34). The Sceptics' declared persistence in philosophical investigation (ἐπιμονὴ ζήτησεως), which distinguishes Scepticism from the other forms of philosophy (*PH* I 1), amounts to their persistence in opposing things and accounts and such an investigation is not threatened by the version of *Meno's* puzzle Sextus uses against the Dogmatists.

Nevertheless, another objection could be raised. If the Dogmatists' investigation into the unclear becomes impossible because of Sextus' version of *Meno's* puzzle, and the Dogmatists are not able to produce any theses and theories, then the Sceptics' investigation

into the Dogmatists' theses loses its subject matter and in a sense becomes impossible too. But this situation does not jeopardize the existence of Pyrrhonism, because Pyrrhonian investigation does not exhaust itself in attacking Dogmatic philosophy. Sextus presents the attack on the three parts of Dogmatic philosophy as the subject matter of the specific Sceptical account,¹⁸ but he presents this attack neither as the general nor as the only type of Pyrrhonian investigation. The oppositions between things which appear and are thought of, in terms of which, as we saw, he defines Scepticism, do not need to be oppositions between philosophical theses or theories. The examples which Sextus provides about the kinds of oppositions that the modes of suspension of judgment set out prove that the materials used in these oppositions need not be the product of the Dogmatists' philosophical investigation; they can be common materials which we may all come to think about and which all philosophical schools may use when they philosophize. Consider Sextus' examples (in *PH* I 32): "the same tower appears round from a distance but square from nearby" and the opposition between "The orderliness of the heavenly bodies show that there is Providence" and "Often the good do badly, while the bad do well, therefore there is no Providence".

Now we can understand the point Sextus is making when he maintains that "Sceptical philosophy rapidly moves to the fore" and "the philosophy of suspension is introduced", if the Dogmatists' research into what is unclear becomes impossible and all the Dogmatists' fabrications are swept away from the ground of philosophizing. What remains in this case and comes to the fore is the Sceptics' way of philosophizing, which persists in forming unresolved oppositions like the ones which all philosophers use in the philosophical undertaking.

1.7 *The solution of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς*

But Sextus' aim here is not to knock out the Dogmatists with a single blow. What he wants to argue for is the possibility of the Sceptical investigation into the Dogmatists' theses. His aim is to show that there is a way out of this puzzle, which not only secures the possibility of the Sceptical investigation against the Dogmatists, but which first of all the Dogmatists themselves need to follow. Sextus presents the Dogmatists with the solution of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, which he initially introduced as one of the two possible alternative senses for "apprehension that precedes investigation"; he described it as meaning "simply 'thinking of', without any further affirmation of the reality of the things we are talking about" (*PH* II 4). The Dogmatists are now forced to accept this sense as the proper sense of "apprehension" that precedes investigation into what is unclear, otherwise such investigation becomes impossible. But in this case, as Sextus remarks: "it is no longer impossible for those who suspend judgment to inquire about the reality of what is unclear" (*PH* II 10).¹⁹

The Sceptics are able to investigate "the matters on which the Dogmatists hold beliefs", just like the Dogmatists need to do about the reality of unclear things, precisely because they can "simply think of" them, which means that they can apprehend them without

¹⁸ "The specific account is the one in which we argue against each of the parts of what they call philosophy" (*PH* I 6).

¹⁹ Annas & Barnes 1994 translate: "then investigation is not impossible for those who suspend judgment about the reality of what is unclear". The structure of the Greeks (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον [ἐν] τοῖς ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν ἀδηλῶν ζητεῖν) allows both translations.

making about them any dogmatic assumption that would contradict the fact that as Sceptics they suspend judgment.

II.

Two questions arise now. First: why is Sextus not following the typical Sceptical practice of accepting *ad hominem* the Dogmatists' notions and theses, i. e. why does he not answer the Dogmatists' criticism he presents in *PH* II 1 using *ad hominem* the Dogmatists' solution to *Meno*'s puzzle in terms of preconceptions,²⁰ instead of proposing νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as a new Sceptical solution to *Meno*'s puzzle? And second: how much does he really gain by forcing the Dogmatists to accept νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as the starting point of their own investigation into what is unclear?

In fact, we find in Sextus' text, in *M* VIII 337–336a, a Sceptical response to a similar criticism, in which Sextus accepts some sort of preconceptions as the starting point for the Sceptical investigation. A close reading of *M* VIII 337–336a will lead us to a comparative evaluation of the two Sceptical answers, i. e. the Sceptical answer in terms of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς and the Sceptical answer in terms of preconceptions. Through this comparison I will attempt to elucidate a) the superiority of the solution of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς and b) the consequences that this solution has both for the Dogmatists and for the Sceptics.

II.1. *The solution in terms of preconceptions (M VIII 337–336a)*

In *M* VIII 337–336a, in the context of his discussion of "proof",²¹ after he has announced that he is about to inquire whether or not the existence of proof follows from its notion and preconception, Sextus introduces the following objection:

Some people, however, and especially those of the Epicurean School, raise a rustic objection saying: "Either you think of what proof is, or you do not. And if you think of it and have a notion of it, proof exists; but if you do not think of it, how can you investigate what you do not think of at all?" (*M* VIII 337)

Here the Sceptic is confronted with the following dilemma: if the Sceptic thinks of what proof is, then he has a notion of proof, and if he has a notion of proof, then proof exists. If he does not think of it, then he cannot investigate it.²²

Sextus' answer has certain similarities to the answer that he gives to the puzzle of *PH* II, but, at the same time, it differs considerably from the latter. In line with what he does in *PH* II, Sextus treats the objection that he attributes here to the Epicureans as being related to the general problem of the possibility of investigation. But this time Sextus accepts the Dogmatists' answer to *Meno*'s puzzle. He accepts the Epicurean suggestion that when something is being investigated, its preconception and notion must precede.

²⁰ Vogt (2012, 152) maintains that Sextus *should* have followed such an *ad hominem* strategy using preconceptions in his answer to the criticism of *PH* II 1.

²¹ In *M* VII, which corresponds to *PH* II, we do not find any introductory chapter, along the lines of *PH* II 1–10, that deals with the general criticism that the Sceptics cannot investigate, think of and speak about the Dogmatists' positive theses.

²² For a discussion of this criticism cf. Fine 2014, 345–368; Fine 2011; Corti 2009, 199–206; Vogt 2012, 149–152.

Sextus presents this as a matter of common agreement, and as a point that the Sceptics grant to their opponents.²³

To have a preconception, for the Epicureans, entails commitment to the reality of something that this preconception conceives of. According to Diogenes Laertius (X 33), the Epicureans claimed that a “preconception is as it were apprehension”. Moreover, Epicurus used preconceptions as a criterion of truth (cf. DL X 31) on the basis of the optimistic assumption that before any philosophical investigation preconceptions endow us with a grasp of basic truths about reality. Thus, when the Sceptics concede that they have preconceptions, they risk dogmatizing in several ways, the first of which is that they risk being committed to conceiving certain things as real and true. The Sceptics cannot arbitrarily reject this aspect of the Dogmatists’ conception of preconceptions.

To dialectically attain the rejection of the Epicurean thesis that a “preconception is as it were apprehension”, in his answer to the Epicurean criticism, Sextus mobilizes the Sceptical argumentation (ἀντίρρησις) that reveals the conceptual disagreement (διαφωνία). In the face of this disagreement the Sceptics are led to suspend judgment. As he remarks:

in fact so far are we from saying that we have not a notion of the whole object of inquiry that, on the contrary, we claim to have many notions and preconceptions of it, and that it is thanks to our inability to decide between them and to discover the one with the most authority among them that we revert to suspension and indecision. (*M* VIII 332a)

Brunschwig remarks that this answer implies “that the Sceptic accepts the ontological implication” (Brunschwig 1988, 149), i.e. the Sceptic accepts that his notions and preconceptions of the things he investigates commit him to the claims to reality and truth they are supposed to involve. But, as Sextus underlines, the Sceptic does not have *one* preconception of the object he investigates; on the contrary, he has many. The Sceptical ἀντίρρησις shows that these notions are manifold and conflicting, though equally trustworthy, and thus the Sceptic necessarily ends up suspending judgment about them. Therefore, in the face of the conflict and disagreement between these notions, the Sceptic can no longer accept that his notions entail some grasp of reality (*M* VIII 333a).

Sextus attempts to shift the Epicurean view about what a preconception is, to what a preconception necessarily becomes because of the conceptual disagreement that the Sceptical ἀντίρρησις reveals. From the fact that the Sceptic accepts that it is necessary to have a preconception that precedes inquiry, it does not follow – as the Epicureans, according to Sextus, require – that he also admits that he has apprehension. Insofar as the multiplicity and the conflict of the notions and preconceptions are revealed through inquiry, the notions and preconceptions that necessarily precede inquiry into things cannot amount to the reality of these things.²⁴ For that reason the Sceptic can say that when he

²³ τὸ μὲν παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου πρόληψιν καὶ ἔννοιαν δεῖν προηγεῖσθαι ὁμολογόν ἐστιν, and 332a: ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δίδομεν (331a:). Sextus evokes this Epicurean view explicitly in *M* XI 22 and in *M* I 57.

²⁴ Brunschwig (1988, 148–152) detects two different and incompatible answers that are developed: the first in 332a–333a, and the second in 334a–336a. According to him, in the first answer Sextus accepts the ontological implication, whereas in the second he clearly rejects it. This interpretation overlooks that Sextus in 334a rejects the ontological implication, as Brunschwig puts it, on the basis of what Sextus has already said (as Sextus explicitly declares in the last phrase of 334a: “for the reasons already set forth”), which is to say, on the basis of his argument about the conceptual disagreement which he develops in 332a–333a. Brunschwig draws attention to ἀλλὰ γάρ, the connecting particle that introduces 334a (*ibid.*, fn. 9). But here, it seems to me, the emphasis of ἀλλὰ γάρ

has a notion of a certain thing and he thinks of it, he does not in the least apprehend it (*M* VIII 334a).

In the last part of Sextus' answer to the Epicureans (335a–336a), the Sceptics and the Epicureans exchange roles; it is the Sceptics who now press the Epicureans by asking the questions. Sextus takes an example of the common philosophical practice in which philosophers develop arguments against certain philosophical theses they disagree with; namely, the Epicureans' arguments against the existence of the four elements. The Sceptics' question, in this case, is “whether Epicurus has or does not have a prior notion and conception of the four elements. And if he does not, how will he grasp the object being investigated, and investigate this thing of which he does not even have a concept? But if he does have it, how has he not apprehended that there are four elements?” According to Sextus, the answer that the Epicureans would give is that Epicurus has a notion of the four elements, but he does not in any way apprehend them. “For a notion is a bare movement of the mind, holding to which he denies that there are four elements” (*M* VIII 336a). In the same way, Sextus explains, the Sceptics have a notion of proof, on the basis of which they inquire whether it exists or not, without admitting that they have apprehension of it (*M* VIII 336a).

II.2. *How effective are Sextus' arguments as an answer to the objection that he ascribes to the Epicureans?*

In order to fully understand and evaluate Sextus' answer to the Epicureans, we need to understand what Sextus means by noting that the Epicureans almost refute themselves when they produce this argument against the Sceptics (ταῦτα γὰρ λέγοντες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν σχεδὸν περιτρέπονται [331a]). According to Burnyeat, “the noun *peritropē* and the verb *peritrepein* from which it derives are common terms of art” (Burnyeat 1976, 48) in Sextus. And we find a sophisticated use of the logical form of arguments called “περιτροπή”, especially in the case in which the thesis to be refuted itself serves as a premise for its own refutation (*ibid.*, 47f.).

At first sight, it is not clear how Sextus' argument could form a self-refutation for the Epicureans. Sextus himself, with the use of *σχεδὸν* which means “approximately, more or less, roughly speaking, almost”, indicates that what we have here is not a clear case of an argument with the technical characteristics of *περιτροπή*. But, in any case it must be the thesis that “when something is being investigated, a preconception and a notion must precede” that leads the Epicureans to self-refutation, when at the same time they maintain that this preconception commits to the reality of something conceived by this conception.

The Epicureans' view that a “preconception is as it were apprehension” depends heavily on their account of perception as well as on their ontology. But Sextus does not bring all this

is not that Sextus at this point moves on to a new argument incompatible with the one he has been developing. In effect, in the first phrase of 334a “ἀλλὰ γὰρ προλήψεις ἔχομεν τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὸν ὑποθεδεδειγμένον τρόπον” Sextus refers back to 332a, where he accepts that the Sceptic has notions and preconceptions of the thing under investigation, and to the situation of having manifold and conflicting notions, which he has just described in 333a. Thus ἀλλὰ γὰρ emphasizes a certain irregularity. Contrary to what we would expect, the fact that the Sceptic has notions does not mean that he has apprehension (as he concludes in 334a: νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἡ πρόληψις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος οὐχ ὑπαρξίς ἐστιν, ἐπινοεῖν μὲν αὐτὸ φαμεν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι δὲ μηδαμῶς διὰ τὰς προεγκειμένας αἰτίας).

into the discussion. On the contrary, in order to form an argument with the characteristics of περιτροπή, he needs to keep all this out of the discussion, and to focus on the formal necessity that links the conditions of having preconceptions of certain objects and inquiring into them. Based on the Epicurean view that it is necessary that a preconception of the object of inquiry should precede the inquiry, he goes on to show that the inquiry itself dictates that these preconceptions cannot be tantamount to apprehension. The inquiry itself leads the Sceptics to suspend judgment about the preconceptions of the object being inquired into, and therefore leads them to reject the view that the preconception needed for inquiry is apprehension. At the same time the inquiry itself, at least a special kind of inquiry, namely the inquiry in opposition to certain philosophical theses, forces the Epicureans to accept that the notion they need as a basis for their investigation cannot be apprehension.

The problem is that the two kinds of investigation that Sextus presents as refuting the Epicurean view, namely the Sceptical inquiry and the Epicurean inquiry into the theses of an opponent Dogmatist, could be taken as essentially different from the kind of philosophical investigation the Epicureans suggested that preconceptions are a necessary basis for. For the Epicureans suggested preconceptions as the presupposition and the yardstick of philosophical investigation that leads successfully to knowledge of the nature of things, and not as the presupposition of an investigation against certain theses. Therefore, it is problematic to speak about self-refutation here, as it is not the investigation for which the Epicureans primarily suggested preconceptions as being necessary, which demands that preconceptions are not tantamount to apprehension.

Thus, Sextus' first argument based on the conceptual disagreement leaves it open for the Epicureans to deny the status of preconceptions to the conflicting notions that the Sceptic has, instead of rejecting that "preconception is apprehension", as Sextus does in 334a. The Epicureans could argue that all of these conflicting notions, or some of them, are "empty utterances" and not real preconceptions. Now, the Sceptics are still able to reject the objection of *M VIII* 337 by maintaining that the Sceptics use as a model for their investigation the Epicureans' investigation into certain philosophical theses they disagree with. Sextus' second argument shows that the Epicureans themselves need to base their investigation on notions that are just "bare movements of the mind" in order to be able to develop arguments against certain philosophical theses they disagree with; and the Sceptics can do the same.

Sextus concludes his reply to the Epicureans with the following comment: "But we will address these people again at some point" (337a). Sextus implies here that he is going to give another answer to, or at least to present arguments relevant to, the Epicurean criticism he has been discussing up to this point. However, we do not find anything like that in *Against the Dogmatists*. Still, Sextus' promise that he is going to return to this matter could be an indication that he was aware that his answer here is not satisfactory.

II.3. Comparison of the two Sceptical answers: the superiority of the solution of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς

In the objection ascribed to the Epicureans in *M VIII*, the possession of a notion is taken to amount directly to its reality and the notion of "apprehending" (καταλαμβάνειν) does not appear in its formulation. In the version of *Meno's* puzzle against the Sceptics, in *PH II*, it

is apprehension in the dogmatic sense that is considered to be required for the Sceptics' investigation into the Dogmatists' theses and commits the Sceptics to the reality of what they apprehend.

In both cases – more explicitly in *M* VIII – the Dogmatists' objections to the possibility of the Sceptical investigation are based on what Burnyeat called “the Parmenidean principle” (Burnyeat 1982): thought requires an object distinct from itself, and that object must actually exist. Burnyeat detected in ancient philosophy, “an unquestioned, unquestioning *assumption* of realism” – not “an explicit philosophical thesis” (ibid., 33), as he underlines – according to which the process of thinking and speaking means we are always in touch with reality.²⁵ If all ancient philosophers (the Sceptics included, according to Burnyeat)²⁶ took for granted such an assumption, then the Sceptics' investigation of the Dogmatists' theses, even their very process of thinking and speaking, contradicts their Scepticism.

Sextus' answer in both cases focuses on the notion of “apprehension”. In *PH* II he uses νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as an alternative sense for “apprehending”, while in *M* VIII 334a he understands “apprehending” only in the Dogmatic sense. In *M* VIII 334a, Sextus adopts the Dogmatic terminology of “preconceptions” and “notions”, but ends up with preconceptions and notions which do not involve apprehension; thus, he ends up with a state of thinking about the objects of inquiry that is similar to the state of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς in *PH* II 1–10, insofar as they both reject the involvement of apprehension in the Dogmatic sense.

But the answer that Sextus gives to the Dogmatists in *PH* II 1–10 is clearly superior to the answer he gives to the Epicureans in *M* VIII. In *M* VIII Sextus' answer presupposes the Sceptical arguments that reveal the conflict and the disagreement between the notions that precede investigation in order to contradict the Dogmatic belief that these notions represent some kind of grasp of reality. On the contrary, in *PH* II Sextus treats the problem of the kind of thinking that necessarily precedes investigation into the unclear as an autonomous problem that can be examined with no reference to any Dogmatic beliefs and without the need for any Sceptical attack on them. Thus he establishes the necessity of not being committed to the reality and the truth of the notions he is investigating, quite independently of and prior to the results of the Sceptical ἀντίρρησις.

Νοεῖν ἀπλῶς in *PH* II is not a matter of suspending judgment *after* the development of the Sceptical ἀντίρρησις, but it is the necessary starting point for the investigation into unclear matters; both for the Dogmatists' investigation into them and for the Sceptics' investigation into the Dogmatists' theses. The necessity that invalidates the Dogmatists'

²⁵ Fine, while analysing the Epicurean objection in *M* VIII, refers to a similar view, namely that thought is object-dependent, and cites Long and Sedley who speak of “Epicurus' lingering Platonist assumption that any object of thought must somehow objectively exist in order to be thought of”. She rejects this view in passing and claims that “it is controversial; we seem able to think about centaurs and Santa Claus, even though they don't exist”; and she continues: “Be that as it may, I favor a different interpretation”. (Fine 2014, 354). I cannot see here any decisive argument against Long and Sedley; on the contrary, Burnyeat's thesis about ancient philosophy seems to me to confute Fine's view (cf. Burnyeat 1982).

²⁶ Burnyeat claims that both the Dogmatists and the Sceptics took for granted what he calls the “Parmenidean principle”. As he writes, “recalling Parmenides, one might put it this way: the skeptic's thinking and speaking, no less than that of his dogmatic opponents, is of something, and something that is” (ibid., 29). I am going to maintain that Sextus' νοεῖν ἀπλῶς proves this claim to be wrong when it comes to the Pyrrhonian Sceptics' thinking about what the Dogmatists say.

answers in terms of preconceptions and natural notions to *Meno's* puzzle, and commits the Dogmatists to start their investigation into what is unclear from “simply thinking of” is a formal necessity. If the Dogmatists choose apprehension that involves some kind of a grasp on reality as the starting point for investigation into what is unclear, they make such an investigation impossible. According to Sextus’ argument, the only way to have a consistent answer to the version of *Meno's* puzzle he presents the Dogmatists with is to start investigation from νοεῖν ἀπλῶς.

Hence, *PH* II provides a purely formal answer to *Meno's* puzzle. On the one hand, this answer avoids Dogmatic assumptions about the ontological implications of the use of certain notions, while on the other it does not presuppose the Sceptical ἀντίρρησις.

Moreover the solution of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς can sufficiently support the possibility of the Sceptics’ investigation against the Dogmatists without modeling the Sceptics’ investigation after the Dogmatists’ investigation of certain theses in opposition to one another. Sextus’ first argument in *PH* II, as we have seen, is based on the Dogmatists’ investigation into the theses of opponent Dogmatists, but this is just an extra argument, not an argument strictly necessary for νοεῖν ἀπλῶς. The necessity of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς is forced upon the Dogmatists through Sextus’ version of *Meno's* puzzle, which concerns their prime philosophical investigation, i. e. their investigation into what is unclear. For the Dogmatists, rejecting νοεῖν ἀπλῶς jeopardizes the very investigation that makes them philosophers. Accepting νοεῖν ἀπλῶς forces them to accept that their investigation into the nature of things and the Sceptics’ investigation against them are both possible from the same starting point, i. e. a state of “simply thinking of” without any further affirmation of the reality of what they are thinking about.

On the contrary, the possibility of the Sceptics’ investigation into the Dogmatists’ theses on the basis of having preconceptions without apprehension needs to be supported by the model of “empty utterances”, which the Epicureans accept precede their own attack on philosophical theses they disagree with. For the Epicureans, in order for the philosophical investigation into the nature of things to be successful, it needs to be based on real preconceptions that involve some kind of apprehension, whereas the Sceptics’ investigation into the Dogmatists’ theses turns out to have a different starting point, i. e. “empty utterances” or “bare movements of the mind”. Thus, there is plenty of room to accuse the Sceptics that their investigation is not the sort of serious philosophical investigation that starts off with real preconceptions and aims at the apprehension of truth about the world, but is only an investigation which starts off with “empty utterances” and aims at winning the dialectical game. In this case – the Epicureans could maintain – “empty utterances” and not real preconceptions are enough for the Sceptics to proceed along the barren road that they share with the Sophists more than they do with serious philosophers.

Thus, in *M* VIII Sextus advocates the possibility of the Sceptical investigation into the Dogmatists’ theses only at the cost of leaving it vulnerable to attacks on its status. Such attacks could invalidate Sextus’ endeavor, in the first book of his *Outlines*, to present Scepticism as one of the three major forms of philosophy – the other two being Dogmatic philosophy and Academic philosophy (cf. *PH* I 1–4) –, in particular the only one that shows the appropriate devotion to philosophical investigation²⁷ and at the same time the

²⁷ In *PH* I 1–4, Sextus implies that the Dogmatists and the Academics gave up philosophical investigation, even though their investigations had not, as they claimed, brought them either to the truth that they were looking for, or

one that attains the aim of tranquility (ἄταραξία) and answers in the best available way the philosophical concern about living a good life (cf. *PH* I 25–30). Therefore Sextus' answer to the Epicureans in *M* VIII could hardly serve his purposes in *PH*.

II.4. Consequences of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς for Dogmatism and Scepticism

However, the acceptance of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as the starting point for the Dogmatists' and for the Sceptics' investigations is not without consequences for both Dogmatism and Scepticism.

As Sextus remarks, νοεῖν ἀπλῶς is a way of thinking that the Dogmatists themselves accepted as possible: “for we can think, as they say, not only of real things but also of unreal things (ἀνύπαρκτα)” (*PH* II 10).

The standard example that the Dogmatists give of unreal things, as Sextus himself tells us in a different context (*PH* I 162), is the centaur (ἵπποκένταυρος). The goat-stag (τραγέλαφος) is another common example that was Aristotle's favorite. Apart from mythical animals like these, there were certain philosophical “entities”, or even things, which we commonly accept as real, and which the Dogmatists used to prove as unreal. For example, ἰδέαι were unreal for the Stoics (*SVF* I 63). The same happens with the “uncaused” (ἀναίτιον) and the “accident” (αὐτόματον) (*SVF* II 973). But also, joy at one's neighbour's misfortune and ungratefulness are unreal for them (*SVF* III 672). Both in the case of the mythical animals and in the case of the Dogmatists' notions that turned out to be unreal, the Dogmatists cannot deny that we can understand semantically what these terms mean. We can say, for example, what “goat-stag” means, although there is no goat-stag to refer to, and thus meaning in these cases turns out to have a semantic and not a referential status. Whatever accounts the Dogmatists may give about the operations through which mind composes these concepts, and in whatever way they attempt to fit them in with their realistic accounts about the formation of our basic concepts, accepting that we have such concepts of unreal things makes Sextus' suggestion of “simply thinking of” the unclear matters a possibility that the Dogmatists cannot deny.

Nevertheless, for the Dogmatists, cases like that of goat-stag and centaur are rare, exceptionally problematic cases (cf. Burnyeat 1982, 19). According to their view, what happens normally is that our process of thinking and our concepts somehow connect us with reality. As we have seen, the Dogmatists took for granted the realistic assumption that before any philosophical investigation, some concepts, for example the Stoic common notions or the Epicurean preconceptions, can provide us with basic knowledge of the nature of things, on which we can step in order to go further. But this is not without consequences for the kind of investigations they develop in order to answer our philosophical worries. Finding truth becomes for them, to a considerable extent, a matter of working hard on our concepts, starting from our preconceptions, elaborating their definitions and their interconnections. This is how Sextus understands the Dogmatists' project of research, as it becomes clear from the fact that an essential part of his own strategy against the Dogmatists is to develop lines of argument showing that the Dogmatists fail to properly define in their interconnec-

to the inapprehensibility of such truth. On the contrary, the Pyrrhoneans chose the name “Sceptics” for themselves and “Scepsis” for their school, in order to imply that they are the only philosophers who are consistent with an ideal of philosophizing which demands persistence and commitment to philosophy.

tions, notions such as “criterion of truth, truth, indicative sign, proposition, proof, body, time, place, soul, the relatives, god and cause”, and therefore these notions are unreal.

By making νοεῖν ἀπλῶς (i. e. “simply thinking of something” while leaving open the question whether there is something real which we think of) the necessary starting point for the investigation into what is unclear, Sextus brings to the surface and undermines the Dogmatists’ implicit realistic assumptions on which they based their philosophical investigation. Νοεῖν ἀπλῶς transforms mere semantic understanding of concepts, which for the Dogmatists concerned rare and exceptional cases, to the necessary norm when they come to investigate what is unclear. But such an alteration to the starting point of the Dogmatists’ investigation renders their optimistic assumption that the answers to our philosophical concerns are to be found along with their project of research in concepts unjustified.

It has been pointed out that whereas the Dogmatists pursue their inquiries in the hope of discovering the truth regarding the matters into which they inquire, this is not so in the case of the Sceptics. This lack of hope – among other things – has been interpreted as an indication of negative Dogmatism, i. e. of the belief that truth cannot be reached (cf. Palmer 2000, 367f.). I believe it is right to think that the Sceptics are not dedicated to the Dogmatists’ project of research and they do not share with them their hope of discovery and their optimism about the results of this project. But it seems that a good explanation can be illustrated in the following anecdote:

A drunken man is looking for his keys under the light of a public lamp in the middle of a road during a dark night. Another man comes and offers his help so both try to find the keys there. After a few hours with no results, the man asks: “But where did you drop these keys? Are you sure you dropped them here?” “Oh no, not at all”, answers the drunken man, “but I search here because I thought that here we have at least enough light”.

The same applies to the Dogmatists: they search along the path of the elaboration of our concepts, producing more and more technicalities, because they think that there is enough “light” to find out the truth. But if the Dogmatists need to start their investigation into what is unclear from νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, then we have no reason to believe that this kind of investigation is particularly promising. And when the Sceptics come to search along the same path, they do not have to believe that truth is there to be found. The Sceptics do not have the Dogmatists’ hope of discovery, but the lack of this hope, instead of being the result of negative Dogmatism, comes from a consistent anti-Dogmatism which counters not only the dogmatic results of the Dogmatists’ project of research but also the implicit assumptions by which this project was marked as dogmatic from the very beginning.

Sextus forces the Dogmatists to accept νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, protecting Scepticism from attacks on the status of the Sceptical investigation and at the same time he strikes a decisive blow against Dogmatism even before he gets the Sceptical ἀντίρρησις off the ground.

III. How do the Sceptics come to νοεῖν ἀπλῶς without contradicting their Scepticism?

As we have seen, Sextus' aim was to show that if the Dogmatists accept νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as the proper sense of the apprehension that precedes investigation into what is unclear, then when the Sceptics investigate the Dogmatists' theses, they do not need to apprehend the subject matter of their investigation in a way that contradicts their Scepticism. Both Dogmatists and Sceptics enter the field of this investigation simply thinking of the unclear things without affirming their reality. However, in order to give a complete answer to the criticism that the Sceptics cannot think of, speak about, or investigate what the Dogmatists say, Sextus needs to argue not only for the necessity of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, but also for the Sceptics' actual ability to achieve, without contradicting their Scepticism, such a way of understanding and thinking.

To that end, Sextus presents his view that the Sceptic is not barred from having thoughts (νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι [*PH* II 10]), and then, using two participles (γινομένης and μὴ πάντως εἰσαγωγούσης) which modify the process of thinking he is referring to (i. e. νοήσεως), first he gives an account of the process through which these thoughts arise (ἀπό τε τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καί) κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων αὐτῶ λόγων γινομένης) and second he underlines that having these thoughts does not in any way at all imply the reality of what he's thinking of (καί μὴ πάντως εἰσαγωγούσης τὴν ὑπαρξιν τῶν νοουμένων).

Sextus refers again to the Sceptic's having thoughts in *PH* I 24 in the context of his reply to the Apraxia challenge. According to this reply, the Sceptics "live in accordance with the ordinary ways of life" (βιωτική τήρησις). One of the four constituent parts of these ordinary ways of life is "guidance by nature", and "by nature's guidance the Sceptics are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking". But this kind of thinking, which the Sceptics rely on in everyday life, cannot be identical to the kind of thinking Sextus has argued that is necessary for the investigation against the Dogmatists.

First of all Sextus argues for the necessity and the possibility of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς only in the specific context of the apprehension that precedes the philosophical inquiry into unclear matters. He does not present νοεῖν ἀπλῶς as the general way we or the Sceptics need to think about everything. Besides, νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, which is defined as not involving in any way the reality or the existence of what the Sceptics are thinking about, could hardly represent the way the Sceptics think about things in everyday life. It would be absurd to maintain that the Sceptic comes by nature's guidance to think naturally, for example, that the food that he is tasting is delicious, in a way that would not even imply that there is any food in his mouth, or that in general there is no such a thing as food.

Therefore, when Sextus provides in *PH* II 10 an account of the process through which the Sceptics' thoughts arise, he is referring to the process through which the Sceptics come to understand and think specifically of what the Dogmatists say and he does not give an account of the process through which the Sceptics think in general. Unless we take it that Sextus' point here is that the Sceptics have the capacity to think and, just because of that, they are able to think of what the Dogmatists say. If this were the case, we could say that he gives an account of the general process through which the Sceptics think. But such a point would leave open the possibility that the Sceptics are not able to think about what the Dogmatists say, because they may lack knowledge of the special meaning that the

Dogmatists' technical terms have. As we have seen, Sextus brought this possibility into the discussion at *PH* II 2–3, right before the introduction of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, when he presented the case of being ignorant of highly technical terms.²⁸ Hence, the context of *PH* II 1–10 demands an explanation of the way the Sceptics come to understand and simply think of specifically what the Dogmatists say.

Now we need to understand Sextus' formulation:

[νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι] ἀπό τε τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καὶ) κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων αὐτῷ λόγων γινομένης (*PH* II 10).

The structure, the translation and the interpretation of this phrase are problematic. The problems are partly due to the two different versions of the text that we find in the manuscripts. The version of the text above reads λόγων,²⁹ following the main manuscripts, but λόγῳ can also be found in some manuscripts. Bury adopts λόγῳ³⁰ and translates: “from mental conception which arises through the reason itself [reading αὐτῷ λόγῳ] as a result of passive impressions and clear appearances”.³¹

I doubt that λόγῳ is the right word here and that the right way to read αὐτῷ is to take it with λόγῳ, translating with Bury as “reason itself”. Sextus uses the phrase αὐτὸς λόγος usually to refer to the same argument, or to the argument itself, and some times to refer to the same definition or the same analogy.³² We have no other case of Sextus speaking about “reason itself”.³³

On the other hand, it seems to me right to read αὐτῷ with the phrase τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καὶ) κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων, as referring to the Sceptic who has these passive observations and evident appearances³⁴ (following Annas & Barnes³⁵). The word αὐτῷ qualifies the phrase τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καὶ) κατ' ἐνάργειαν

²⁸ The examples Sextus uses there refer to types of arguments in the Stoic logic, cf. above fn. 8.

²⁹ It is the version that Mutschmann adopts in his Teubner edition (Mutschmann 1958).

³⁰ In the Loeb edition, following I. Bekker's 1842 Berlin edition.

³¹ Burnyeat proposes an interpretation along similar lines when he writes: “For Sextus insists that the sceptic is not prohibited from *noesis*, the forming of conceptions. He can form his own conceptions just so long as the basis for this is that things he experiences appear clearly to reason itself and he is not led into any commitment to the reality of the things conceived (*PH* II 10)” (Burnyeat 1997, 40).

³² Cf. *PH* I 50, 99, 219, II 63, 68, 161, 181, 248, III 52, 84, 166, *M* VII 41, 104, 144, 189, 292, 305, 366, 368, 392, 410, VIII 153, 163, 210, 467, 481, IX 107, 264, 273, 284, 320, X 5, 59, 79, 158, 211, 214, 243, 266, 272, 290, 323, 342, XI 44, 90, 117, 128, I 113, III 112, V 10.

³³ Burnyeat supports his reading, i. e. “appear clearly to reason itself” by the claim that “sometimes he [Sextus] goes so far as to speak of things appearing to reason (λόγος) or thought (διάνοια) (ambiguously so *PH* II 10, *M* VIII 70, unambiguously *M* VII 25, *M* VIII 141)” (Burnyeat 1997, 39). But apart from the passage that we are discussing now, i. e. *PH* II 10, none of the passages Burnyeat mentions refers, ambiguously or not, to things appearing to reason (λόγος), but just to thought (διάνοια).

³⁴ Mates reads αὐτῷ λόγῳ when he translates: “from a conception that arises during the discussion itself from clear appearances affecting him passively” but he does not understand λόγῳ as reason. He also translates “affecting him passively” and thus he takes another αὐτῷ to go with the phrase τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καὶ) κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων (Mates 1996). Although the interpretation implied in Mates' translation seems to me to be right, his understanding of the passage's structure and the acceptance of λόγῳ instead of λόγων seems to me to be wrong.

³⁵ Annas & Barnes omit the word λόγος altogether and translate: “from having thoughts, if they arise from things which give him a passive impression and appear evidently to him”. I follow them just as far as their reading of αὐτῷ goes.

φαινομένων in a way that makes it clear that Sextus is not speaking about φαινόμενα that appear evidently in themselves, irrespective of who has them, but about appearances that appear evidently to someone, in particular here the Sceptic. This is a qualification that Sextus uses in a standard way when he speaks about the appearances that the Sceptic follows (cf. for example *PH* I 4, 15, 20, 78).

Thus, I propose to accept λόγων instead of λόγω, and to take it as the grammatical subject of the phrase τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων (καί) κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων. Therefore what comes to the Sceptic's notice passively and appears to him clearly are λόγοι, i. e. the arguments, the definitions, the terms that the Dogmatists use to refer to unclear things; they are not "things" as Annas & Barnes suppose when they translate: "from having thoughts, if they arise from things which give him a passive impression and appear evidently to him". The unclear things the Dogmatists are speaking about could not come to Sceptics' notice passively and appear evidently to them, because as far as these things were doing that they would not be unclear, but would instead be evident. Additionally, whatever evident appearances derived from things the Sceptics might have, these could not be enough for them in order to understand the Dogmatists' assertions and doctrines. For example, how could such evident appearance be enough for the Sceptics to understand the Aristotelian or the Diodorian notion of "place"? Therefore, no direct impressions or clear appearances of any real objects are needed for the kind of thinking that Sextus describes here. Especially since one could have a clear impression not only of a thing, but also of certain λόγοι, without having any direct impression of whatever real things were supposed to correspond to them. Even for the Stoics, a thought could come to mind not by the direct causal agency of an external object, but through a discussion about something.³⁶ Thus, I propose the translation:

[The Sceptic is not barred from having thoughts,] which are derived from statements and arguments that affect him passively and appear to him clearly.

Now what is necessary for the Sceptic in order to be able to investigate the Dogmatists' theses is to be familiar with and have an understanding of the λόγοι, of the Dogmatists' λεγόμενα,³⁷ their words and the technical meaning that these words have in the special context of Dogmatic philosophy. This kind of understanding or apprehending of what is said by the Dogmatists amounts, according to Sextus, to a kind of thinking that not only does not affirm the reality of the things the Sceptics are thinking and arguing about, but it does not even imply in any way the reality or the existence of what the thought is about. For example, when a Sceptic, in his investigation against the Dogmatists, says (as he might well say) "I am now thinking of and investigating 'place' as Aristotle defines it, or more generally as the Dogmatists attempt to define it", he understands the Aristotelian conception of place but he is not confirming that place really is as Aristotle defines it –

³⁶ As Frede remarks, according to the Stoics, "thoughts may present themselves to the mind in all sorts of ways. They may come to mind when one considers the evidence concerning a question in doubt. But many of them are brought about by the causal agency of an external object which, through the sense organs, gives rise to an impression in us" (Frede 1987, 153).

³⁷ Sextus' argument here is still formulated in the context of his answer to the objection raised against the Sceptics in *PH* II 2. In section I.1 of the present paper I pointed out (following Corti 2009 and 2015) the ambiguity of the phrase τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα in this objection and the semantic aspect of the same objection. My interpretation of Sextus' text here is consistent with the context of this objection.

as the Dogmatic sense of apprehending demands –, he is not even implying in any way that there is something to which Aristotle’s “place” refers and which is the object of the Sceptic’s thought.

IV. Νοεῖν ἄπλω̄ς, assent and Sceptical beliefs

Now Sextus needs to explain the compatibility of this procedure of understanding and thinking with the Sceptical disposition of suspending judgment. He writes:

Hence someone who suspends judgment maintains his Sceptical condition while investigating and thinking; for it has been made clear (δεδήλωται) that the Sceptic assents to (συγκατατίθεται) what falls under his notice by a passive impression (κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικῆν), insofar as it appears to him (καθὸ φαίνεται αὐτῷ) (*PH* II 10).

Sextus accepts that the kind of understanding and thinking required for the Sceptics’ investigation into the Dogmatists’ theses involves a kind of assent. But, as he claims, this kind of assent does not contradict Scepticism. With the phrase “it has been made clear” he refers back to *PH* I 13, where he speaks of a kind of assent involved in a special kind of belief that he allows the Sceptics to have. This back reference to *PH* I 13 leads us to consider νοεῖν ἄπλω̄ς as involving beliefs of the special type Sextus allows to the Sceptic in *PH* I 13. Thus, given Sextus’ previous description of the process through which the Sceptics arrive at νοεῖν ἄπλω̄ς, we can say that the Sceptics study what the Dogmatists say, they study their texts, they attend lectures and courses, they participate in philosophical discussions, and so they gain the necessary understanding of the Dogmatists’ theses and doctrines; an understanding which amounts to certain beliefs about what the Dogmatists say. The more the Sceptic has studied a certain topic, the firmer his understanding becomes; but the possibility of changing his mind and coming to a somewhat different understanding of a certain topic is always open to him. In *PH* II 10 Sextus qualifies the assent he allows to the Sceptic by adding the restriction καθὸ φαίνεται αὐτῷ. The Sceptic assents for the extent of time that Dogmatists’ sayings appear to him to be so, and in correspondence with how they appear to him to be. Thus the assent that the Sceptic gives, his understanding of the Dogmatists’ sayings, and the corresponding beliefs can be subject to change. In any case, according to these beliefs, items such as, for example, “proof” or “criterion” are such and such as far as what the Dogmatists say about them is concerned; but the question whether they really are as the Dogmatists say they are or whether they exist at all is a further question, and is exactly what the Sceptics investigate, and in the end suspend judgment about.

Both in *PH* I 13 and in II 10 Sextus uses *ad hominem* the same Dogmatic terminology when he speaks about “impressions”, “affections” and “assents”.³⁸ In I 13, the Sceptic

³⁸ Frede (1997a, 15) raised the question: “does Sextus Empiricus speak this way because this is how he sees the problem of knowledge or because he needs to tailor his argument to his dogmatic opponents’ way of regarding matters”? For Frede, “this much at least is clear: it is the dogmatists, especially the Stoics, who assume that certain impressions arise in us, impressions which we voluntarily either do or do not assent to” (ibid.); and as he concludes, “It is hardly possible that Sextus, when he speaks this way, means to commit himself to the view that there are mental acts of assenting which, together with the appropriate impressions, constitute having beliefs and forming judgments” (ibid., 16).

gives his assent to “the affections that are forced upon him by an impression” (τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν κατηναγκασμένοις πάθεσι), whereas in II 10 the Sceptic is said to assent to what comes to his notice by a passive impression (τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ὑποπίπτουσιν αὐτῷ). In the latter passage, Sextus does not explicitly say that it is affections that the Sceptic assents to, although he does again underline that what the Sceptic assents to is brought to him through a passive impression or a passive state of appearing. In I 13, Sextus uses an example that is taken from sensation (“for example, when heated or chilled”) in order to illustrate the affections that are forced upon the Sceptic, whereas in II 10 the passive impressions to which the Sceptic assents are not sense impressions, but rather thought impressions. The Stoics developed the whole language of “giving assent to impressions” primarily with reference to sensation, and the Academics’ criticism of the Stoic “apprehensive impression” also focused on sense impressions. Nevertheless, the Stoics clearly accepted that there are thought impressions as well³⁹ and it seems to me to be clear that Sextus’ use of a perceptual affection in the example that he gives in I 13 does not imply that all the Sceptic’s affections are perceptual affections. What we have in I 13 is not specifically an account of the beliefs that the Sceptic gets through sensation nor is it an account that purports to present all the Sceptical beliefs as ones that the Sceptic gets from sensation.

In I 13, Sextus provides a general model, in the Dogmatists’ terms, for all the beliefs that he needs to present as possible to the Sceptics and as compatible with their Scepticism. Apart from the beliefs of νοεῖν ἀπλῶς, i. e. the beliefs that are presupposed and involved in the Sceptic’s argumentative practice against the Dogmatists, there are at least three more types of such beliefs: the beliefs involved in everyday life, the beliefs involved in the utterance of the Sceptical phrases (φωναί), and the beliefs involved in the general account of Scepticism given by a Sceptic; none of these could be beliefs the Sceptics get exclusively from sensation. Thus, having an affection, as a state within the process of sensation, simply represents an exemplar that Sextus uses in order to illustrate this *ad hominem* – constructed in Dogmatic terminology – model. The Sceptical beliefs do not need to be what the exemplar is; what they need is simply to resemble the exemplar in certain aspects, and to fit within the model. Besides, the very idea of having a model is to keep it general enough so that a broad range of things can be modelled accordingly.

It has been argued that thinking could hardly fit into such a model. Burnyeat has argued that in the case of sensation it is easy to distinguish “a genuine experience – in Greek terms, a πάθος, a φαντασία, which awaits my assent. And it is important here that assent and impression are logically independent” (Burnyeat 1997, 56f.). But, as Burnyeat argues, in the case of philosophy, and more generally in the case of thought, things are not like that. He argues that the outcome of philosophical reasoning, but also more generally the impressions of thought, are in fact states of belief which presuppose assent, and you cannot have them independently of assent.⁴⁰ Thinking and speaking philosophically, which means

³⁹ Cf. DL VII 51: Τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ μὲν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ’ οὐ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δι’ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δ’ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λόγῳ λαμβανόμενων.

⁴⁰ As he writes, “if, beneath its disguise as a mere passive affection, the philosophical impression includes assent, it ought to make no sense for the sceptic to insist that he does not assent to it as true. That would be to contemplate a further act of assent to the assent already given. If the sceptic does insist, if he refuses to identify with his assent,

using the articulated technical philosophical notions that more than any other notions claim to grasp reality and following the standards of logic that claim to guarantee the truth, was unthinkable as a process which could carry no commitment to the reality of what we are thinking about and to the truth of the inferences we come to.

But Sextus does not ignore this difficulty; it is precisely, as we have seen, what he seeks to undermine through the whole argument about the necessity and the possibility of *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς* both for the Dogmatists and the Sceptics. With *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς* Sextus succeeds in gaining the independence of the thought impressions involved in the Sceptic's philosophical thinking in arguing against the Dogmatists, from any assent to the truth of these thought impressions. For the Sceptic – and Sextus' attempt is to commit the Dogmatists to accepting that – just having these thought impressions does not involve the further strong assent that these thought impressions are true in the sense that they present how things are in their real nature.

Moreover, Sextus gains that in the case of the beliefs that are involved in *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς* he can speak of “apprehension” (*κατάληψις*). Although apprehension was for the Sceptics' opponents a central notion in their concept of knowledge and involved commitment to the truth in the strong sense, and although the Sceptics denied that they had apprehension in this sense, it turns out that Sextus can say that the Sceptics apprehend the Dogmatists' sayings according to a sense of apprehension that Sextus attempts to commit the Dogmatists themselves to accepting in certain contexts. Therefore, at least in the case of the beliefs of II 10, not only is Sextus not obliged to speak about them only in terms of a non-epistemic appearing, but he can even speak about them in terms of some sort of apprehension and therefore in terms of some sort of knowledge. Sextus succeeds in fitting the beliefs that are involved in the Sceptics' understanding of what the Dogmatists say within the model of I 13, although this initially appeared very problematic and was not just provided along with that model.⁴¹

Thus if we ask about *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς* – as modern scholars do about the beliefs of I 13 – “does the Sceptic assent to the beliefs of *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς* as being true?”, or “do these beliefs represent knowledge or just non-epistemic appearances?” it turns out that what Frede claimed when examining specific sense impressions is equally right in the case of the beliefs that are involved in *νοεῖν ἄπλῶς*: “the contrast between how things really are and how they appear nonepistemically is insufficient” (Frede1997a, 13). It may appear to the Sceptic that such and such is the right semantic meaning of what the Dogmatists say. This can have an epistemic status, and the Sceptic can believe that his understanding is correct. But at the same time the Sceptic certainly does not believe that things in reality are as the Dogmatists claim that they are. This is exactly what the Sceptic seeks to find out by his investigation into them, and about which, in the end, he suspends judgment.

he is as if were detaching himself from the person (namely, himself) who was convinced by the argument, and he is treating his own thought as if it were the thought of someone else, someone thinking thoughts within him” (Burnyeat 1997, 57).

⁴¹ What we learn, then, is that before we conclude that the Sceptical beliefs, or a certain kind of Sceptical beliefs, cannot fit into the model of I 13, or that to fit them into this model would have disastrous results or implications for the Sceptics, we need to consider the extra notions that Sextus marshals or the extra work that he performs in order to fit each specific kind of Sceptical *δόγματα* into the model of I 13.

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