

# The Hellenistic philosophers

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VOLUME 2

Greek and Latin texts  
with notes and bibliography

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# Introductory note

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This second volume of *The Hellenistic Philosophers* is strictly ancillary to the translations and commentaries which appear in vol. 1. Whereas vol. 1 is designed to be usable on its own, vol. 2 provides the sort of supplementary information required by readers familiar with Greek and Latin. It is not designed to be read in isolation.

The principal object of vol. 2 is to supply the originals of the texts which are translated in vol. 1. These are sometimes presented here in longer excerpts than appear in vol. 1, and in such cases the additional portions are marked by smaller print. Occasionally an entire extra text is added, also in smaller print, and designated with a lower case (instead of the usual upper case) bold letter.

The texts are accompanied by notes. These do not attempt systematic or exhaustive commentary, but offer cross-references, information on context and on further relevant texts, and discussion of obscure or controversial points of interpretation, particularly where this is required in order to justify the translations and interpretations proposed in vol. 1. If our coverage at times seems uneven, that is because we have found that some texts demand extensive elucidation, while others seem able to speak adequately for themselves.

We have not, with one or two special exceptions, attempted to obtain readings of the original manuscripts, but have relied principally on a standard edition of each work. These editions are listed in the Index of sources appended to vol. 1. Although we do not always follow their precise readings or punctuation, we do adopt their systems of sigla in our apparatus criticus, so that readers requiring technical information on the manuscript and editorial traditions can consult them directly. We do not attempt to supply exhaustive information on the textual tradition, but we have tried to give full information at least in all cases where a philosophical interpretation might depend on the reading chosen. Our use of bracketing and other such conventions is standard. However, readers should be warned that some of our texts are papyrological or epigraphic, and that square brackets in such texts enclose editorial *fillings* for lacunae, whereas square brackets in other texts indicate editorial *deletions*, or, if their content opens with 'sc.', editorial glosses.

References in bold are to our own texts. If the final figure is not in bold, e.g.

*Introductory note*

**70E 2**, it refers to the line number in the vol. 2 text. If it is in bold, e.g. **70E 2**, it refers to a subsection of the text, as in vol. 1.

In the notes we have found it hard, for reasons of space, to do justice to all the relevant scholarship. In partial recompense, the bibliography, which is designed for use in company with the notes, often serves as our vehicle for referring to and evaluating the range of existing interpretations. Numbered references in square brackets, e.g. 'Pohlenz [298]', are to entries in the bibliography.

*Cambridge, June 1986*

AAL  
DNS

ἔστιν; ... (new fr. 1.2.7ff.) οὐ|κουν μὲν κενὰ λέγει | ταῦτα ὡς καὶ δύναμις | τοσαύτη  
 πρόσσε|τιν. οὐ | μὴν πάλιν, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν | κενά, αἰσθησ|ιν] ἔχει | καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ τῶ | ὄντι  
 προσλαλεῖ ἡμε|ίν], | ὡς ὑπολαμβάνει Δημ|ό|κριτος. [ἀ]μήχανον γὰρ λεπτοῖς ὑμέσιν  
 οὕτως καὶ | στερεμνίας φύσεως βάλθος οὐκ ἔχουσ|ε]ν ταῦτα προσεῖναι. οὗτοι μὲν ὄν κατὰ  
 τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπλανήθησαν οἷ τε Στωικο|ι] κ|αί] Δη|μόκριτος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωι|κοῖ καὶ ἦν 10  
 ἔχουσι δύναμ|ι μιν τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀφαι|ροῦνται. Δημόκριτος δὲ | καὶ ἦν οὐκ ἔχουσι  
 χα|ρί]ζεται.

For apparatus, see Chilton [170] and [171] and Smith [173] and [176].

Context: Diogenes' physics treatise, cf. E.

For Democritus' view, see also vol. 1, 145, and for the Stoics', 39B 5-6.

6 λέγει Sc. Epicurus.

## EPISTEMOLOGY

### 16 The truth of all impressions

#### A Lucretius 4.469-521

(1) denique nil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit  
 an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur. 470

hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam,  
 qui capite ipse suo in statuit vestigia sese.

(2) et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum  
 quaeram, cum in rebus veri nil viderit ante,  
 unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire vicissim, 475  
 notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit  
 et dubium certo quae res differre probarit.

(3) invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam  
 notitiam veri neque sensus posse refelli.

(4) nam maiore fide debet reperiri illud, 480  
 sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.

quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi  
 debet? (5) an ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit  
 dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est? 485  
 qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis.

(6) an poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an auris  
 tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris,  
 an confutabunt nares oculive revincant?

non, ut opinor, ita est. nam sorsum cuique potestas  
 divisast, sua vis cuiquest, ideoque necesse est 490  
 et quod molle sit et gelidum fervensve seorsum  
 et sorsum varios rerum sentire colores  
 et quaecumque coloribu' sint coniuncta videre.  
 sorsus item sapor oris habet vim, sorsus odores





(2) οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆς κινεῖται οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναται τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν. (3) οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι. (4) οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια αἰσθήσεις τὴν ὁμογενῆ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, (5) οὔθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν, οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικάι. (6) οὔτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται. (7) οὔθ' ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις γὰρ προσέχομεν. (8) καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ' ὑφεστάναι πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν. (9) ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε ὄραν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀκούειν ὡσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν. (10) ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρή σημειοῦσθαι. (11) [= 15F] (12) τὰ τε τῶν μαινομένων φαντάσματα καὶ <τὰ> κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ, κινεῖ γάρ· τὸ δὲ μὴ οὐ οὐ κινεῖ.

2 δύναται Gassendi: ἀδυνατεῖ codd. 4 αἰσθήσεις secl. Diano 6 ἤρτηται φ. εἴρηται cett.  
7 ἐπαισθήματα BP: ἀνεπαίσθητα FP(corr.) 11 <τὰ> Casaubon

*Context:* doxography of Epicurean canonic.

6–7 It is unclear how this relates to the arguments of 3–5, which seem in themselves to cover all possible cases. It apparently caps them with a quite general consideration, one which differs in not referring to different types of sensation at all.

**7 ἐπαισθήματα** The term ἐπαίσθησις seems to be 'sensory recognition' (C 24; 15A 15–16; P. Herc. 19/698, cols. 8–10, in Scott [149] – not a rational judgement as to an object's identity, but a successfully made sensory apprehension of something, normally an object or property (34.31.13 Arrighetti [119] is an exception, apparently a completely untechnical use). ἐπαίσθημα will be explicitly the product, the accomplished act of recognition, where ἐπαίσθησις can also include the power of recognition (this accords with Greek usage, and may be the most that can be got out of the confused Aetius 4.8.2 = Usener 249). But for a different view, see Asmis [225], 162–3. The role of ἐπαισθήματα in the present laconic argument is unclear: perhaps (cf. 15A 15) the point is that we can be said e.g. to hear external objects, not just their sounds: the senses successfully put us into contact with external objects in a way the sceptic would disallow.

10–12 This implicit glossing of ἀληθῆς as 'real' is made explicit at S.E. M. 8.9 (= Usener 247): for reservations about it as a satisfactory interpretation of Epicurus, see vol. 1, 85.

**11 φαντάσματα** A sign that Epicurus' own words are not being quoted. He uses this term for impressions in general (cf. 18C 21, 19A 8–9), whereas here it clearly carries its normal sense 'figments' (cf. its Stoic definition, 39A–B).

**C** Anonymous Epicurean treatise on the senses (P. Herc. 19/698), cols. 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, fr. 21

(1) τὴν μέ[ν] γ[ὰ]ρ [ὄ]ψιν ὄρατὰ κατα[λ]αμβ[ά]νειν ἡγούμεθ[α], τὴν δὲ | ἀφῆν ἀπτά, κα[ὶ] τὴν μὲν | χρώματο[ι]ς, τὴν δὲ σώ[ματος], καὶ [τ]ὴν ἑτέραν | τοῦ τῆς ἑτέρας [κρ]ίμα[τος] | μηθὲν π[ο]λ[υ]πραγμ[ο]λ[ο]γεῖν. ἐπειδήπερ εἰ συ[ν]έβαινε τὴν ὄψιν σώ[ματος] μέγεθος καὶ σχῆμα | κ[α]τα- λαμβάνειν, π[ο]λὺ | π[ρ]ότερον ἂν καὶ σώμα | κ[α]τελάμβανεν . . . (2) . . . τύπον εἰ[ς] . . . ε, καὶ πο[λλ]ά[κι]ς οὐδὲ αὐ[τὸ] τοῦτο. εἰ[περ] οὐκ οὐθὲν

ἑτερόν] | ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ὄρα[τὸν] | ἢ τῶν χρωμάτων] ἢ [ἐξω]τάτω  
 θέσις, οὐδὲ τὸ μ[έ]γεθος τὸ ὄρατὸν ἢ τῶν] | πλειόνων χρωμάτων] | ἢ  
 κατὰ τὸ ἐξ[ω] θέσις, ἴσ[ω]ς] δύνατον τὴν ἀ[ὐ]τῶν χρωμάτων οὐ[σ]αν  
 [ἀ]ντιληπτικὴν [τὴν] | ἐξωτάτω θέσιν τῶν] | χρωμάτων καταλαμ[βά]- 10  
 | νειν . . . (3) ὥστε | κατ' αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν | κοινὰ κρίματ' εἶναι | τῶν  
 αἰσθήσεων τοῦ[τῶν] τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ μέ[[γεθ]ος, ὃν λόγον ἔχει | τὰ τοῦ  
 χρώματος π[ρ]ὸς | τὸ χρῶμα, τοῦτον ἐχόντων [τ]ῶν τοῦ σώματος | πρὸς  
 τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ὃν | λόγον ἔχει τὸ χρῶμ[α] | πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀράσεως  
 [κατ]άληψιν, τοῦ[το]ν τοῦ[το] σ[ώ]ματος π[ρ]ὸς | τὴν δ[ιὰ] τῆς ἀφῆς 15  
 . . . (4) . . . ἀ]κοῆς, χωρὶς τῶν ἀνωτάτω καὶ κοινοτάτων | ἀ προδιήλο-  
 μεν, κρίμα | κοινὸν οὐκ οἰόμεθα | κατὰ τὸν πρόχειρον | τρόπον εἶναι | κατὰ  
 δὲ | τὸν οὐ πρόχειρον μὲν, | κοινότητα δὲ προσφερόμενον, ὥστ' ἀναλογίαν  
 εὐόδως ἂν ἔχειν | ῥηθῆναι, φῆσα[ι]μεν | ἂν κοινὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι κρίμα τὸ  
 σχῆμα | . . . (5) ὥστε | τῶν αἰσ[θ]ήσεων προσυπομνήσωμεν ὃ προσφερε- 20  
 ται ἴδιον ἐκάστη χωρὶς τῆς τῶν κρινομένων ἐπ[α]ισθήσεως. ἢ | μὲν  
 τοῖνυν ὄρασις ἰδιώ[τα]τον εἶ[χ]ει παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας, χωρὶς τῆς τῶν  
 [χ]ρωμάτων καὶ τῶν πρ[ὸ]ς αὐ]τὰ κρίσεως, τὸ ἐν ἀποστάσει κα[τ]αλαμ-  
 βάνειν | τὰς μορφάς, ἐπαισθανομένην καὶ τοῦ με[τα]ξὺ ἐαυ[τ]ῆς τε  
 κἀκεῖ[ων] δια[σ]τή[μα]τος . . . (6) ἢ δὲ ἀφ[ή], κατὰ μέ[ν] τὸ [ἴ]διον, 25  
 τὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ποιότητος· κατ[ὰ] δὲ τὸ κοινόν, | ἢ ποῖα σάρξ  
 ἐστίν, ὃ παρ[ρ]ακ[ο]λουθεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν, τὸ ἐτε[ρο]γενῶν  
 ποιότητων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. [σ]κληρῶν γὰρ καὶ μ[α]λακῶν] | οὐσ[α]  
 κριτικῆ, καταλαμβάνει καὶ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, τὰ τε ἐν ἐαυτῇ | καὶ παρ'  
 ἐαυτῇ | . . . (7) τῆς ὀράσεως τοῖνυν στερεμνιότητα μὴ κρινομένης, | 30  
 καταψεύδονται τ[ι]νες | κρίνειν νομίζοντες | ὑποβ[ά]λλειν γὰρ αὐτὴν |  
 καθ' ἀπλήν προσβολ[ή]ν | ὅταν π[έ]τρας ὀρώμ[ε]ν | . . .

9 ἴσ[ω]ς Sedley: π[η]ῶς Scott 12 μέ[γεθ]ος: μέ[γεθ]ῶν pap. ante corr. 12 τ[ὰ] Sedley: τὸ  
 Scott 28 [σ]κληρῶν Asmis: [π]ληρῶν Scott

The full text is that of Scott [149], except where otherwise indicated. Fuller papyrological information will be found there.

Context: a work on the senses by an Epicurean, possibly Philodemus.

26–8 Cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1121B–C, τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐ λεγούσης [corr. Einarson/De Lacy: λέγουσι codd.] τὸ ἐκτὸς εἶναι θερμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθος γεγενέ[ναι] τοιοῦτον . . . For 'internal touch' as a common function of the senses, the aspect of self-awareness in the sensory process, see Cicero, *Acad.* 2.20 and 76, Aetius 4.8.7 (= *SVF* 2.852), and note on 53G. Although the only explicit attributions are to the Cyrenaics and Stoics, Cicero reports it to be a standard philosophical usage. Hence the suggestion in vol. 1, 84, that the Epicureans are invoking it here. Aetius, loc. cit., may be right to connect it with Aristotelian κοινὴ αἴσθησις. Before τὸ μηδεμιᾶς (25–6) and τὸ ἐτερογενῶν (27) understand ἰδιώ[τα]τον ἔχει from 22.

## D Epicurus, RS 23

εἰ μαχῆ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ' ἄς ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν

διειπεύσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνης.

1 εἰ μάχη Bywater: εἰ μὴ codd.

E Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.203–10 (Usener 247)

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ δοῦν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ τῆς  
 δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησιν ὑπάρχειν.  
 ὡς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη, τουτέστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος, ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τιμῶν καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ  
 ποιητικὰ συνίσταται, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἡ δὲ ἀλγηδὼν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν,  
 καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ποιητικὸν ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδὺ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος  
 παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγεινόν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἡδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγύνον ἀλγεινόν  
 τὴν φύσιν ὑποκείσθαι, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐσῶν τὸ ποιητικὸν  
 ἐκάστης αὐτῶν πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως φανταστόν ἐστιν, † ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὄν φανταστόν μὴ  
 ὑπάρχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται, ποιητικὸν φαντασίας καθεστάναι. ‡ καὶ ἐπὶ  
 τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον χρῆ λογίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὄρατόν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὄρατόν  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον ὅποιον φαίνεται· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστόν ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. γίνονται οὖν πάσαι αἱ  
 φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθῆς φαίνεται φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ  
 Ἐπικουρεῖοι, ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πάσα δὲ  
 φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστόν συνίσταται, πάσα  
 κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς. (1) ἕξαπατᾶ δὲ ἐνίους ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ  
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ οἷον ὄρατοῦ δοκουσῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασιῶν, καθ'  
 ἣν ἡ ἀλλοιοχρῶν ἢ ἀλλοιοσχῆμον ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ  
 ὑποκείμενον· ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν οὕτω διαφερουσῶν καὶ μαχομένων  
 φαντασιῶν δεῖ τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιῶν ψευδῆ  
 τυγχάνειν. ὃ πέρ ἐστιν εὐθῆες καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνορώντων τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι  
 φύσιν. (2) οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὄραται τὸ στερεμνίον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν ποιῶμεθα  
 τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου. τοῦ δὲ χρώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν  
 ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου, καθά περ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου  
 διαστήματος βλεπομένων· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου κὰν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς  
 τόποις ὑποκείμενον, καθά περ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρου-  
 μένων· τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἐξαλλαττόμενον καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον  
 σχῆμα τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν, ὅποιον καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν  
 ὑπόκειται. (3) ὃν περ οὖν τρόπον οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ κρονομένῳ χαλκῷματι φωνῇ  
 ἐξακούεται οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγότος ἀλλ' ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῇ  
 ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθήσει, καὶ ὡς οὐθεὶς φησὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς  
 ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν, ἐπεὶ περ σύνεγγυς ἔλθων ὡς μείζονος  
 ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται, (4) οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, ὅτι  
 ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος μικρὸν ὄρα τὸν πύργον καὶ στρογγύλον, ἐκ δὲ  
 τοῦ σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ ὅτε  
 φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιουτόσχημον, ὄντως ἐστὶ μικρὸν  
 καὶ τοιουτόσχημον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾶ ἀποθραυομένων τῶν κατὰ τὰ  
 εἶδωλα περάτων, καὶ ὅτε μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιοσχῆμον, πάλιν ὁμοίως

μέγα καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, ἤδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφοτέρα καθεστώς. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστρόφου λοιπὸν ἔστι δόξης οἶεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν. (5) αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ κινούντος αὐτὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οἷον χρώματος, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τὸ ἐνθάδε ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε ὑποκείμενον. (6) διὸ περ αἱ μὲν φαντασίαι διὰ ταῦτα πᾶσαι εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς· <αἱ δὲ δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς>, ἀλλ' εἶχόν τινα διαφορὰν. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἐπεὶ περ κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις, κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς, τὰ δὲ μοχθηρῶς ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναί τι καὶ προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ὑφαίρειν τι τούτων καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως.

8 ἐκάστης Kayser: ἐκάστου codd. 45 suppl. Usener

*Context:* the beginning of the section on Epicurus within a brief history of theories of the criterion, almost certainly derived from the *Canonica* of Antiochus (cf. on 18A, the sequel to this passage; and note the Stoicizing reading of Epicurus at 14–15, for which cf. 40C 4–5, etc.). The first person singular in 33 shows how little Sextus has adapted his source material.

3–13 This first exegesis of ‘all impressions are true’ looks too feeble to deserve serious attention, unless the apparent corruption in 8–9 conceals some more subtle ground than that *prima facie* offered, that every sense-object really is a sense-object.

22–3 Cf. C 2.

25–7 The hazy outline of distant objects is attributed to the fact that some of their colour is physically transmitted to the air surrounding them.

27–9 For the same basic interpretation, cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1121A (Usener 252, part).

36 τὸ αἰσθητόν Not the tower itself, since solid bodies are not the object of vision, but its colour-at-a-distance, an object distinct from its colour-close-up (38–9).

45 διαφορὰν This may well be meant to paraphrase Epicurus’ *διάληψιν* at 15A 40, but if so Antiochus has probably missed the relevant technical sense of the latter term (see vol. 1, 86, 109–10).

## F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.63–4 (Usener 253)

(1) ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν, (2) πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. (3) ἐπὶ γοῦν τοῦ Ὁρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἐρινύας, ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις ὑπ’ εἰδῶλων κινουμένη ἀληθῆς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἰδῶλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι στερέμνοιό εἰσιν Ἐρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησὶν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰν εἰσάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε γὰρ φαινόμενα διδάξουσι τὸ

ροιοῦτον (ζητεῖται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα) οὔτε ἀδῆλω (διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει τὸ ἀδῆλον ἀποδείκνυσθαι). 10

*Context:* 'Is there anything true?'

5 The text implies that the fantastic images acted on Orestes' eyes, not directly on his mind. **15D** 2–4 may suggest that this is strictly inaccurate. On the other hand, note the similar but innocuous inaccuracy at **15D** 791.

### G Lucretius 4.353–63

(1) quadratasque procul turris cum cernimus urbis,  
 propterea fit uti videantur saepe rutundae,  
 angulus obtusus quia longe cernitur omnis 355  
 sive etiam potius non cernitur ac perit eius  
 plaga nec ad nostras acies perlabitur ictus,  
 aera per multum quia dum simulacra feruntur,  
 cogit hebescere eum crebris offensibus aer.  
 hoc ubi suffugit sensum simul angulus omnis, 360  
 fit quasi ut ad tornum saxorum structa terantur,  
 (2) non tamen ut coram quae sunt vereque rutunda,  
 sed quasi adumbratim paulum simulata videntur.

361 *terantur* Munro: *tuantur* OQP: *tuamur* Lachmann

*Context:* optical illusion.

359 Cf. **E** 37–8.

### H Lucretius 4.364–86

umbra videtur item nobis in sole moveri  
 et vestigia nostra sequi gestumque imitari; 365  
 aera si credis privatum lumine posse  
 indugredi, motus hominum gestumque sequentem.  
 nam nil esse potest aliud nisi lumine cassus  
 aer id quod nos umbram perhibere suemus.  
 nimirum quia terra locis ex ordine certis 370  
 lumine privatur solis quacumque meantes  
 officimus, repletur item quod liquimus eius,  
 propterea fit uti videatur, quae fuit umbra  
 corporis, e regione eadem nos usque secuta.  
 semper enim nova se radiorum lumina fundunt 375  
 primaque dispereunt, quasi in ignem lana trahatur.  
 propterea facile et spoliatur lumine terra  
 et repletur item nigrasque sibi abluit umbras.  
 nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum.  
 nam quocumque loco sit lux atque umbra tueri 380

illorum est; eadem vero sint lumina necne,  
 umbraque quae fuit hic eadem nunc transeat illuc,  
 an potius fiat paulo quod diximus ante,  
 hoc animi demum ratio discernere debet,  
 nec possunt oculi naturam noscere rerum.  
 proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli.

385

Context: following G.

## I Plutarch, Col. 1109A–E (Usener 250)

ὁ δ' οὖν δόξας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον Ἐπικουρείῳ δόγματι κέχρηται τῷ  
 πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι' αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς. εἰ γὰρ δυοῖν λεγόντων τοῦ μὲν αὐστηρὸν  
 εἶναι τὸν οἶνον, τοῦ δὲ γλυκὺν οὐδέτερος ψεύδεται τῇ αἰσθήσει, τί μᾶλλον ὁ οἶνος αὐστηρὸς  
 ἢ γλυκὺς ἐστιν; καὶ μὴν λουτρῶ γε τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς μὲν ὡς θερμῶ, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ψυχρῶ  
 χρωμένους ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχρὸν, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν ἐπεμβάλλειν κελεύουσιν . . . εἴπερ  
 οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας ἀληθῆς αἰσθήσις, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ μὴ μᾶλλον  
 εἶναι ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν . . . εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ <τὸ> φαινόμενον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ φάσκει τις,  
 ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι λέγων λέληθεν. αἱ δὲ πολυθρύλητοι συμμετρίαι καὶ ἁρμονίαι  
 τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων αἴ τε πολυμιξίαι τῶν σπερμάτων, ἃ δὴ  
 πᾶσι χυμοῖς καὶ ὀσμαῖς καὶ χροιαῖς ἐνδιεσπαρμένα λέγουσιν ἑτέραν ἑτέρῳ  
 ποιότητος κινεῖν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον τὰ πράγματα  
 συναλαύνουσιν αὐτοῖς; τοὺς γὰρ οἰομένους ψεῦδεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅτι τὰ  
 ἐναντία πάθη γινόμενα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρῶσι, παραμυθού-  
 μενοι διδάσκουσιν ὡς ἀναπεφυρμένων καὶ συμμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ τι  
 πάντων, ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλῳ πεφυκότος ἐναρμόττειν οὐκ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς  
 ποιότητος ἐπαφή καὶ ἀντίληψις οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι κινεῖ πάντα  
 ὡσαύτως τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις ἕκαστοι μόνοις ἐντυγχάνοντες  
 πρὸς ἃ σύμμετρον ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς διαμάχονται περὶ τοῦ  
 χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ ἢ λευκοῦ ἢ μὴ λευκοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὰς αὐτῶν  
 οἰόμενοι βεβαιοῦν αἰσθήσεις τῷ τὰς ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖν. δεῖν δὲ αἰσθήσει μὲν  
 μηδεμιᾶ μάχεσθαι· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἄπτονται τινός, οἶον ἐκ πηγῆς τῆς  
 πολυμιξίας ἐκάστη λαμβάνουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον· ὄλου δὲ μὴ  
 κατηγορεῖν ἀποτόμενους μερῶν· μηδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶεσθαι δεῖν πάσχειν  
 ἄπαντας, ἄλλους κατ' ἄλλην ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ πάσχοντας. ἀρα  
 δεῖ σκοπεῖν, τίνες μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασι ἢ οἱ πᾶν μὲν τὸ  
 αἰσθητὸν κράμα παντοδαπῶν ποιότητων ἀποφαίνουσι "σύμμεκτον ὥστε γλευκὸς ὕλιστή-  
 ριον" ἔρρειν δὲ ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς κανόνας αὐτοῖς καὶ παντάπασιν οἴχεσθαι τὸ κριτήριον, ἅν  
 περ εἰλικρινῆς αἰσθητὸν ὅτιοῦν καὶ μὴ πολλὰ ἕκαστον ἀπολίπωσιν.

7 &lt;τὸ&gt; Einaston/De Lacy 15 αὐτῆς &lt;πᾶσι&gt; Pohlenz 21 μηδεμιᾶ Dübner: μηδὲ δια- codd.

Context: reply to the Epicurean Colotes' attack on Democritus for allegedly holding that things are 'no more this than that' (a standard sceptic formula, cf. 1F–G, 71C).

8 συμμετρίαι Explained at 15A 23–5, 60–1.

19 **χρηστόν ἢ πονηρόν** The argument *en passant* defends the objectivity of moral qualities. 'Good' and 'bad' are no doubt included on the ground that they are reducible to the sensible properties 'pleasant' and 'painful'.

## 17 The criteria of truth

**A** Diogenes Laertius 10.31

(1) ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἔστιν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, (2) οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας· λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον ἐπιτομῇ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Κυρίαις δόξαις.

2-4 οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι-δόξαις secl. Diano 3 καὶ (αὐτὸς) Usener

*Context:* doxography of Epicurean canonic.

2 The same list appears at Cicero, *Acad.* 2.142.

2-3 For Epicurus' own appeals to φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, in addition to the texts cited in vol. 1, 90, see 11E 15-16.

3-4 I.e. at **B**, **C** and **D**.

**B** Epicurus, RS 24

(1) εἴ τιν' ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμενόμενον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. (2) εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμενόμενον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν <...> οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον· ὥστ' ἐξηρηκῶς ἔσθι πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς. 5

1-2 κατὰ τὸ προσμενόμενον BP: καὶ τὸ προσμένον F 5 προσμενόμενον BP: προσμένον F 6 lacunam ind. Mühl 6-7 ὥστ' ἐξηρηκῶς Usener: ὡς τετηρηκῶς codd.

2, 5 **προσμενόμενον** 'Evidence yet awaited.' The reading *προσμένον* has been preferred here, at **C** 9, and at **18B** 3, by all modern editors except Bollack [123]. It is generally glossed as 'that which awaits ἐπιμαρτύρησις'. But the passive form is the reading of the best MSS both here and at **C**, and its shortening by a simple haplography in the inferior MSS is likelier palaeographically than that the same dittography should have occurred independently three times. Even at **18B**, where the active form is found in all MSS, the illustration is 'waiting to get near the tower and find out what it looks like from close to'. This is quite inappropriate to *προσμένον* on the traditional interpretation, according to which it is the belief, not the observer, that does the waiting. There too, then, the passive form should be adopted.

**C** Epicurus. *Ep. Hdt.* 37-8

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὡ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ



εὐληφέειναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσι ἢ κενούς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἔξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάξομεν. (2) εἶτα κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμενόμενον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

3 post ἡμῖν, ἢ g: ἢ d: om. cett. 7 εἶτα Gassendi: εἶτε codd.: εἶτι τε Arndt 9 προσμενόμενον BP: προσμένον FP(corr.)

*Context:* opening methodological recommendations of the *Letter to Herodotus*.

1–7 For discussion, see especially Striker [9], 68–73. The absence of the actual word *πρόληψις* is more economically explained (cf. vol. 1, 89) as due to Epicurus' avoidance of excessive technical assumptions at the outset than by the suggestion (Sedley [126], 14) that this part of *Ep. Hdt.* was written before the term itself had been introduced.

9 **προσμενόμενον** See on **B 2**.

## D Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 82

ὄθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις, καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κριτηρίων ἐναργεία. ἂν γὰρ τούτοις προσέχωμεν, τὸ ὄθεν ὁ τάραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγένετο ἐξαιτιολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀπολύσομεν, ὑπὲρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογούντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν αἰεὶ παρεμπιπτότων, ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως.

1 πάθεσι Bonnet: πᾶσι codd.

*Context:* the need to gear physical research to the goal of tranquillity (cf. **18C**; **25B**).

1–2 For *κοινὰ αἰσθήσεις* see Bignone [121] ad loc., and Striker [9], 68, who helpfully cites Philodemus, *Rhet.* 1.207, 2.41, and Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.1, 981b14.

## E Diogenes Laertius 10.33

(1) τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἰονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοϊαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην, τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον “τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος”. (2) ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθύς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. (3) παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι. (4) καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό· οἷον “τὸ πόρρω ἐστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς;” δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκῆναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοῦς μορφήν. (5) οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαμεν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. (6) ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσι

αἱ προλήψεις· (7) καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται, 10  
ἐφ' ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν, οἷον "πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;"

5 ὑποεταγμένον Gassendi (cf. C 1): ἐπι- codd.

Context: doxography of Epicurean canonic (immediately following 16B).

1 For Epicurus as originator of the term πρόληψις, see 23E 3. For the Stoics' definition and use of it, cf. 40A 3, N, S; and for the Pyrrhonists, 40T.

2 We punctuate after *τουτέστι μνήμην*, to make this a gloss on the preceding two words. Other editors take it directly with what follows, but that severs *τοῦ πολλάκις κτλ.* from *κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν κτλ.*, leaving the latter as hopelessly weak definitions of *πρόληψις*.

6-9 For the same principle, see 23E 2, 40T 1; S.E., M. 1.57, 11.21; and cf. 39C 4.

## 18 Scientific methodology

A Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.211-16 (Usener 247, part)

(1) οὐκοῦν τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ  
ψευδεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἷ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι  
πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἷ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ  
ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. (2) ἔστι δὲ ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν  
κατάληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε 5  
ἔδοξάζετο, οἷον Πλάτωνος μακρόθεν προσιόντος εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ δοξάζω  
παρὰ τὸ διάστημα ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί, προσπελάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ προσεμαρ-  
τυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος, καὶ  
ἐπεμαρτυρήθη δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. (3) οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις δὲ ἐστὶν  
ἀκολουθία τοῦ ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ, οἷον 10  
ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων εἶναι κενόν, ὃ πέρ ἐστιν ἀδηλον, πιστοῦται δι'  
ἐναργοῦς πράγματος τοῦτο, τῆς κινήσεως· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ οὐδὲ  
κίνησις ὠφείλει εἶναι, τόπον μὴ ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν  
περιστήσεται διὰ τὸ πάντα πλήρη εἶναι καὶ ναστά· ὥστε τῷ δοξασθέντι  
ἀδήλῳ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον κινήσεως οὕσης. (4) ἡ μέντοι 15  
ἀντιμαρτύρησις μαχόμενόν τί ἐστι τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ  
ἀνασκευὴ τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀδήλῳ, οἷον ὁ Στωικός λέγει  
μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἀδηλόν τι ἀξιῶν, τούτῳ δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι ὀφείλει τὸ  
φαινόμενον συνασκευάζεσθαι, φημί δ' ἡ κίνησις· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ  
κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ κίνησις γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προδεδηλωμένον ἡμῖν 20  
τρόπον. (5) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις ἀντίξουσ ἐστὶ τῇ  
ἐπιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ ὑπόπτωσις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ  
εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὁποῖόν περ ἔδοξάζετο, οἷον πόρρωθεν τινος προσιόντος  
εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ  
διαστήματος ἔγνωμεν δι' ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτων. καὶ γέγονε τὸ 25  
τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ  
δοξαζόμενον. (6) ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ

ἀληθές εἶναι τι ἐστὶ κριτήριον, ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψεύδους εἶναι. πάντων δὲ κρηπὶς καὶ θεμέλιος ἢ ἐνάργεια.

17 ἀνασκευή codd.: συνανασκευή Gassendi

Context: immediately following 16E.

Our grounds for naming Antiochus as the source of this text (along with 16E), and for questioning its evidential value, are fully argued in Sedley [243]. For a more positive assessment, see especially Striker [9].

## B Diogenes Laertius 10.34

τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν, ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται, ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται, ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν <τὸ> προσμενό<μενο>ν εἰσήχθη· οἶον τὸ προσμεῖναι καὶ ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι τῷ πύργῳ καὶ μαθεῖν ὁποῖος ἐγγὺς φαίνεται.

5

3 <τὸ> Gassendi προσμενό<μενο>ν Sedley: προσμένων B: προσμένον B(corr.): πρὸς μὲν δὲν FP

Context: immediately following 17E.

3 προσμενό<μενο>ν See on 17B.

4–5 For the tower example, a standard one, see 16E 4, G; 72F 2.

## C Epicurus, Ep. Pyth. 85–8

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως εἶτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἶτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν <δεῖ> εἶναι ἥπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. (2) μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι μήτε ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα καὶ ἀναφῆς φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἄτομα στοιχεῖα, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δὴ ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει τοῖς φαινομένοις συμφωνίαν· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι σύμφωνον κατηγορίαν. (3) οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῆν. (4) πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσειστως κατὰ πάντων <τῶν> κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπη· ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπη, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλη ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὄν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. (5) σημεῖα δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συντελουμένων φέρει τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν τινα φαινομένων, ἃ θεωρεῖται ἢ ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινόμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς γενέσθαι. (6) τὸ μέντοι

5

10

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φάντασμα ἐκάστου τηρητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτῳ διαιρετέον ἃ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν γινομένοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι.

2 <δεῖ> Cassendi 6 σώμα codd.: σώμα<τα> Usener 7 δῆ Bignone: ἦ codd. 8 ὑπάρχει  
Cassendi: ὑπάρχειν codd. 11 ἰδιολογίας Stephanus: ἰδιαλογίας BP: ἡδὴ ἀλογίας FP(corr.) 13  
<τῶν> Bignone 17 δ' ἐπὶ Usener: δέ τι BP: δέ τινα FP(corr.) 18 φέρεται Kühn: φέρειν codd.

Context: methodological introduction to *Letter to Pythocles*.

## D Lucretius 5.509–33

- (1) motibus astrorum nunc quae sit causa canamus.  
 (2) principio magnus caeli si vertitur orbis, 510  
 ex utraque polum parti premere aera nobis  
 dicendum est extraque tenere et claudere utrimque;  
 inde alium supra fluere atque intendere eodem  
 quo volvenda micant aeterni sidera mundi;  
 (3) aut alium subter, contra qui subvehat orbem, 515  
 ut fluvios versare rotas atque haustra videmus:  
 (4) est etiam quoque uti possit caelum omne manere  
 in statione, tamen cum lucida signa ferantur;  
 (5) sive quod inclusi rapidi sunt aetheris aestus  
 quaerentesque viam circum versantur et ignis 520  
 passim per caeli volvunt summania templa;  
 (6) sive aliunde fluens alicunde extrinsecus aer  
 versat agens ignis; (7) sive ipsi serpere possunt  
 quo cuiusque cibus vocat atque invitat euntis,  
 flammea per caelum pascentis corpora passim. 525  
 (8) nam quid in hoc mundo sit eorum ponere certum  
 difficile est; sed quid possit fiatque per omne  
 in variis mundis varia ratione creatis,  
 id doceo plurisque sequor disponere causas,  
 motibus astrorum quae possint esse per omne; 530  
 e quibus una tamen sit et hic quoque causa necessest  
 quae vegeat motum signis; sed quae sit earum  
 praecipere haudquaquamst pedetemptim progredientis.

531 *sit et hic* Nencini: *sit et haec* Q: *sit in hoc* Munro: *siet hic* Bernays: *siet haec* Lachmann

Context: following Lucretius' account of cosmogony. The corresponding text in Epicurus is at *Ep. Pyth.* 92.

The various alternative explanations listed in the *Letter to Pythocles* and Lucretius 5.509–770 and 6.96ff. seem in general to be culled from Presocratic sources. Virtually any such theory is deemed intrinsically possible, provided only that it is sufficiently mechanistic in character to exclude divine control (cf. 13). Those in the present passage cannot be attributed with certainty: see Bailey [154] ad loc.

## E Lucretius 6.703–11

sunt aliquot quoque res quarum unam dicere causam  
 non satis est, verum pluris, unde una tamen sit;  
 corpus ut exanimum siquod procul ipse iacere 705  
 conspicias hominis, fit ut omnis dicere causas  
 conveniat leti, dicatur ut illius una.  
 nam neque eum ferro nec frigore vincere possis  
 interiisse neque a morbo neque forte veneno,  
 verum aliquid genere esse ex hoc quod contigit ei 710  
 scimus. item in multis hoc rebus dicere habemus.

710 *verum* Marullus: *utrum* OQ

*Context:* in the middle of a long series of explanations of natural phenomena, paving the way for four alternative explanations of the Nile's flooding at 712–37.

F Philodemus, *Sign.* 11.32–12.31

(1) τιθεμ[έ]νου γάρ | τοῦτό τε ἀληθεύ[ε]σθα|ι, τὸ εἰ τὸ | πρῶτον τὸ  
 δεύτε[ρο]ν, ὅταν ἀληθές ἦι τὸ εἰ μὴ τ[ὸ δ]εύτερον | [οὐ]δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ  
 [κα]τὰ τοῦτο | [συν]άγεται τὸ μόνον εἶναι τὸν | [κατὰ τ]ῆν ἀνασκευὴν  
 τρ[ό]πον ἀναγκαστικόν. (2) τὸ γὰρ εἰ μὴ | τὸ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον  
 ἀληθές [γ]ίνεται ποτέ μὲν παρ[ό]σον τοῦ δευτέρου καθ' ὑπόθεσιν {σθ} | ἀ- 5  
 νασκευασθέντος, παρ' αὐτὴν | τὴν ἀνασκευὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον  
 ἀναιρεῖται, (3) καθάπερ [ε]ἴχει | καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι κίνησι[ς] ἔστιν | κενόν·  
 ἀναιρεθέντος γὰρ | καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ κενοῦ, παρὰ ψιλὴν | τὴν ἀναίρεσιν  
 [αὐ]τοῦ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀναιρεθ[έ]σθ[η], ὥστ' εἰς τὸ | κατ' ἀνασκευῆ[ν] γέν[ε]σθ[ος]  
 ἐναρμότ[τε]ιν τὸ τοιοῦτ[ο]. (4) ποτέ δ' οὐχ οὐ[τ]ως ἀλλὰ παρ' [αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ] 10  
 δύνα[σ]θαι τὸ μὲν π[ρ]ῶτον ὑπάρ[χ]ον <ν>ο[εῖν] ἢ τοιοῦτον ὑπάρ[χ]ον τὸ  
 δὲ | [δ]εύτερον μὴ ὑπάρ[χ]ον ἢ μ[ὴ] το[ι]οῦτον, (5) ο[ἴ]ο[ν] εἶ[ν]αι Π[λά]των  
 ἔστιν ἀν[θ]ρωπος, καὶ Σωκ[ρά]της ἔστιν ἀν[θ]ρωπ[ο]ς: τούτου γὰρ  
 ἀληθοῦς | ὄν[τ]ος ἀληθές [γ]ίνεται[ι] καὶ τὸ | εἰ Σωκράτ[η]ς οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ἀνθρωπος, | οὐδὲ Π[λά]των ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος, | οὐχὶ τ[ῶ]ι τ[ῆ]ι Σωκράτους 15  
 ἀναιρέσει συνασκευ[ά]ζεσθα[ι] τὸν Πλάτωνα, ἀλλὰ τῶι μὴ δυν[α]τ[ί]-  
 [ον] | εἶναι τὸν μὲν Σωκ[ρά]τη[ν] νοεῖν | οὐκ ἀνθρωπ[ο]ν, τ[ὸ]ν δὲ Π[λά]των-  
 να ἀνθρωπ[ο]ν, [ὃ] δὴ τοῦ κ[αθ'] ὁμοιότητ[α] ἔχεται τ[ρ]ό[π]ου.

4 τὸ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον Bahnsch: τὸ πρῶτον οὐδὲ τὸ δεύτερον pap. 17 νοεῖν Sedley: εἶναι Gomperz

For fuller apparatus, see De Lacy [152].

*Context:* reply to the Stoic Dionysius' first two arguments against the Epicurean Similarity Method, reported in the lost portion of text preceding 42G. Philodemus' source is his Epicurean master Zeno of Sidon (19.4–11).

17 **νοεῖν** This, in preference to Gomperz's εἶναι, is supported by *Sign.* 14.26, 33.1–9. The 'inconceivability' that one of the similar items should lack an essential

property which the other possesses is presented in the *De signis* as an entirely cogent ground of inference.

**G** Philodemus, *Sign.* 34.29–36.17

(1) τοῖς δ' ἐπιλαμβανόμενοις τῆς καθ' ὁμοιότητα | σημειώσεως ἢ τε  
 παραλλαγῇ | τῶν εἰρημέων ἀνεπισήμαντός ἐστι καὶ πῶς τὸ καθὸ  
 λαμβάνομεν, οἶον λόγου χάριν ὡς | ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθὸ ἀνθρώπος | θνητός  
 ἐστι· διὸ καὶ φαῖν ἄρ' || μὲν παρήται τὸ καθὸ, τὸν λόγον | ἀπρόβατον ὑπάρξειν, ἀν δὲ  
 παρалаμβάνηται, τῶι κατ' ἀνασκευὴν χρήσασθαι τρόπῳ. (2) τὸ γὰρ | τὸδε 5  
 περιεπέσομεν | τεθεωρηῆσθαι τοῦτο παρακολουθούν, καὶ ταῦτα ποικίλοις  
 ἐκ ταύτου γένους ἐντετυχηκότων | ζώοις καὶ παραλλαγὰς κατὰ τὰλλα  
 πρὸς ἀλλήλ' ἔχουσι, τῶν δὲ | τοιοῦτων κοινῶν | μίετ' ἔχουσι. (3) τὸν [οὐ]ν φα[με]ν κα[ὶ] | ἀνθρώπον [καθὸ] καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπ- 10  
 ὅς | ἐστὶ θνητὸν [εἶναι], τῶι [πε]ρι[πε]τ[ω]κένοι [πολλοῖς] καὶ ποικίλοις  
 ἀνθρώποις ἐξαλλαγ[έν] | δέ] τοιοῦτο σύμπτωμα μηδέ[ε]ποτ' ἔφευρ-  
 εἶν, εἰς τούναντίον | [τε] μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπώμε[νο]ν, (4) ὥστε κατὰ τὸν 15  
 τρόπον | τοῦτον εἰληφθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κα[ὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφ' ὧν  
 τάττομεν τὸ καθὸ καὶ τὸ ἡ, | τ[ῆ]ν ιδιότητα ἐνδεικνυμένου τοῦ μὴ ἄλλως 20  
 ἢ σὺν τούτῳ | καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρακολουθεῖν τοῦτο τούτῳ, (5) καὶ οὐκ  
 ἐπὶ | τῶν δι' ἀνασκευαζομένου σημεῖον μόνον λαμβανομένων. καὶ ἐπὶ  
 τούτων δὲ τὸ πᾶσι περιπεσεῖν τούτ' ἔχουσι | παρακολουθοῦν ἐργάζε-  
 ται | τὴν διαβεβαίωσιν. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ | τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κινούμενα {η} πάντα  
 διαφορὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἔχειν | κοινὸν δὲ τὸ διὰ κενωμάτων, πάντως τὸ κᾶν 20  
 τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ ἴνα | μὴ πυρὸς {οὐκ} ὄντος ἡ γεγονότος | ὁ καπνὸς  
 ἀνασκευασθῆι τῶι πάντως καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων καπνὸν | ἐκ πυρὸς ἐκκρινόμε-  
 νον τεθεωρηῆσθαι διατεινόμεθα. (6) διαπίπτουσι δὲ καὶ καθόσον οὐ 25  
 συνβλέπουσι τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς | ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀντιπίπτει διὰ τῶν | φαινο-  
 μένων. οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν εἶς | τὸ προσδέξασθαι τὰς ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον παρεκλί-  
 σεις τῶν ἀτόμων | διὰ τὸ τυχηρὸν καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ δεῖ  
 προσεπιδείξαι καὶ τὸ | μηδ' ἄλλο] εἶν τούτῳ μάχεσθαι | τῶν  
 ἐναργῶν].

8 κατὰ Gomperz; καὶ pap. 11–12 [πε]ρι[πε]τ[ω]κένοι–τοιοῦτο Sedley 12 μηδ[έ]ποτ' Sedley  
 For fuller apparatus, see De Lacy [152].

*Context:* Philodemus' report of an oral contribution to the same Epicurean–Stoic debate as in **F** by an unidentified Epicurean, replying to the Stoic proposal at **42G 4**. He accepts the suggested rewriting of the inference 'Since all men familiar to us are mortal, men everywhere are mortal' into the essentialist-sounding 'Since the men familiar to us are mortal in so far as they are men, men everywhere are mortal', but insists that the 'in so far as' premise is itself established empirically by the Epicurean 'Similarity Method'. However, in being prepared to include 'in so far as they are men' in the premise, this Epicurean goes beyond Zeno of Sidon's rejoinder to the Stoic objection stated in **42G 3**; cf. *Sign.* 16.5–29, 22.28–23.7.

2 τῶν εἰρημένων At 33.33–34.29 Philodemus' Epicurean source has distinguished four uses of καθό. (1) Necessary concomitant, e.g. 'Men in so far as they are men are prone to disease and ageing'; (2) definition and πρόληψις, e.g. 'Man, in so far as he is man, is a rational animal'; (3) attribute . . . (text truncated); (4) necessary concomitant of an attribute, e.g. '⟨A man, in so far as he⟩ is foolish, is utterly unhappy'. However, he adds that all four usages express a necessary connexion, and the thesis in the present passage that 'in so far as' premises are verified empirically seems to be intended as equally applicable to them all.

19–21 On this argument from motion to void, see vol. 1, 32.

25–6 The inference from τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς to the atomic swerve is well attested, e.g. at 20E 3, F. A similar inference from the existence of *luck* to that of the swerve is attested only here and at Plutarch, *Soll. an.* 964C (Usener p. 351, 11), and the latter passage is perhaps textually suspect. See further, Long [219], and cf. note on 20A 7.

26–8 This formal requirement of οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις in confirmation of the atomic swerve is fulfilled at 11H 249–50.

## 19 Language

### A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 75–6

(1) ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισι θᾶπτον, ἐν δὲ τισι βραδύτερον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τισι περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις ἀπὸ τῶν [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου] <ἰδίων χρεῶν κατὰ μείζους ἐπιδόσεις>, ἐν δὲ τισι κατ' ἐλάττους. (2) ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ' ἐκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, ὡς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἔθνῶν διαφορὰ ἦ· (3) ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἦττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλαις καὶ συντομωτέρας δηλουμένας· (4) τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνωρώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας παρεγγυῆσαι τινὰς φθόγγους· (5) τοὺς <μὲν οὖν> ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλομένους, κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι.

5 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου secl. Sedley: ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου secl. Mühlh. <ἰδίων χρεῶν> Sedley <κατὰ μείζους ἐπιδόσεις> Leopold 10 ἢ Usener: εἰη codd. 12 ἀλλήλαις BPF(corr.): -ους F: -οις Meibom 14 τοὺς <μὲν οὖν> Sedley: <καὶ> τοὺς <μὲν> Gassendi: τοὺς del. Usener

*Context:* following the section on world formation which includes 13C.

9–10 It is not clear whether these differences are a primary or merely a supplementary factor in the production of different languages and dialects: καί may suggest the latter (see Brunschwig [248]), unless it is an instance of Epicurus' redundant καί (see Usener [133], s.v.), as at 7B 29. Nor is it made clear how far impressions and reactions result (a) from environmental differences (cf. 22B 1), and (b) from differing racial physique (cf. 22Q 5–6).