scientific achievements, and Kidd points out how his interest in the emotions may be traced to a general concern with discovering the causes of phenomena and making theories square with facts. This chapter gives an interesting demonstration of the limits within which a Stoic could stray from orthodoxy on details and still remain true to the essentials.

Later Stoicism is also the main theme of the final chapter. Gerard Watson, in a discussion of 'the Natural Law and Stoicism', focuses attention on some of the problems which arise for Stoic ethics from their concept of natural law. He traces the origins of this concept and then gives a detailed treatment of its presentation in Cicero. Topics examined elsewhere in this book, including *oikeiosis* and determinism, are put together here, and Watson also discusses some of the practical applications of natural law and its later influence.

The absence of a chapter on the antecedents of Stoicism should not be taken to imply a belief in its discontinuity with earlier Greek philosophy. In fact, though scholars differ on the relative importance of specific influences, most now agree that Stoicism represents a continuation and development of much that went before. As I. G. Kidd observes (p. 213), the Stoics themselves were conscious of working within a tradition as well as breaking new ground. The dialogue between Stoics of the early period and the Sceptical Academy is one of the most interesting events in later Greek thought. Had it continued into the first century A.D. the Stoa might have been saved from fossilisation. But the growth of Roman imperialism coincided with a decline in all the schools of philosophy. Interest in logic and physics, where it existed at all, was confined to commentary on past theories, and when Plutarch or Galen come to discuss Stoicism in the first and second centuries A.D. they revive debates which were current three or four hundred years earlier. This is antiquarianism, but at least it attests to an interest in the theory of Stoicism. Even after the Stoa ceased to exist as a school many of its doctrines survived through the influence they exercised on Neoplatonism and the Christian fathers. Much later, Stoicism was to leave its mark on humanists of the Renaissance and rationalists of the Enlightenment.

I

Phantasia Katalēptikē

F. H. SANDBACH

When, sometime in the winter of 87–86 B.C., Antiochus of Ascalon received two books written recently by his aged former teacher Philo of Larisa, head of the Academy in Athens, he was very angry.[1] It seems that Philo had maintained that the sceptical Academy had not denied the possibility of knowledge, but only that there was such a thing as a *phantasia katalēptikē* or 'cognitive presentation'. He had thereby abandoned the key position of Carneades' scepticism. To grasp the truth, Carneades had argued, if that phrase involves the consciousness that one is grasping it, is impossible unless there is in the mind a 'presentation' of the sort meant by those words. There are, however, no such presentations, and it is therefore never possible to know that one has hold of the truth. That there is truth, that there are objective facts or real things (*pragmata*) Carneades did not deny; he denied that any statements about those facts could be known to be true. Although most presentations, he said, probably correspond to the facts, there are none of such a kind that they can be recognised with certainty as corresponding. If there are no such presentations, knowledge cannot be possible.

The phrase *phantasia kataleptike* was taken by Carneades from the Stoics,[2] whom he was consciously attacking. Such a presentation was declared, at least by Chrysippus and his followers, to be a test of truth, and probably the basic test, on which the validity of any other tests depends. It must therefore, unless there is to be some superior test by which its credibility will be established, carry in itself the mark by which it can be recognised. The absence of such a mark from all presentations was maintained by the Academic sceptics: Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* II 101, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi

notam; 103, non inesse in eis propriam, quae numquam alibi esset, ueri et certi notam.

The rendering 'cognitive presentation' has been adopted after some hesitation.[3] The adjective *kataleptike* is ambiguous. It is formed from the verb *katalambanein*, which means 'grasp', 'apprehend', and may have an active or a passive sense. There is no English adjective with the same ambiguity. 'Cognitive' is always active. I shall argue later that the Stoics made use of the ambiguity of their word. *Phantasia* is a word that belongs to philosophical language, in which it functions as the noun of the verb *phainesthai*, 'appear', with a wide range of meaning. 'Presentation' is more technical, but it seems to indicate what the Stoics meant by the word.

A *phantasia* is, according to them, an impression (*typōsis*) or alteration (*heteroiōsis*) in the psyche, and in that part of it they called the *hēgemonikon*, or command-centre. It occurs when something 'becomes apparent', *phantazetai*. We should call it a mental event, and associate it with changes in the brain. For the Stoics the two things are one and the same: the psyche is material, and any mental event *is* a physical event. So presentation is a physical change in the psyche. The word was first used to give a name to what happens when sense-organs are turned to the outer world. Objects in that world make an impression on the percipient. But his psyche is aware not merely that it has undergone a change: it simultaneously *perceives* the external object, and part of the change is this perception. This is very clearly stated in Aetius (= Ps. Plut. *Placita*) IV 12, 1 (*SVF* II 54), who bases himself on the authority of Chrysippus.

> A presentation is a happening that occurs in the psyche, displaying both itself and[4] what has caused it. For example, when by vision we look upon what is white, what has occurred in the psyche through the act of seeing is an affect; and because of this affect we can say that there is a white object which it implies. *Phantasia* has its name from *phos* (light); for just as light makes itself visible and also the things it encompasses, so the presentation displays itself and also what has caused it.

Although in the example given the presentation correctly reveals the external object, it need perhaps not be supposed that it always does so. Certainly elsewhere we meet with 'false presentations' obtained by vision (*SVF* II 131, p. 40.34, perhaps Chrysippus). But clearly this passage does imply that there always is an external object, and that is explicitly stated in the sequel, where the affect that does not arise from an external object is called by another name, *phantastikon* or 'imaginative product'. Elsewhere this limitation of *phantasia* is not preserved, but the word is applied to dreams and the hallucinations of madmen (Sextus *Adv. math.* VIII 56, *SVF* II 88).

The passage of Aetius is obviously written with reference to those presentations that arise through the senses. Presentations that arise by mental activity, not through the stimulation of the sense organs, must usually be *about* external objects, although not immediately caused by them, e.g. presentations that the sun is larger than the earth, or that a providential God exists. But if one thinks that somewhere there are Centaurs or men with eyes in their chests, that corresponds to a hallucination, e.g. 'this is a dagger I see before me'. (See further below Chapter V pp. 82ff. on *logikai phantasiai*.)

II

Cicero reports a manual simile used by Zeno to illustrate the stages of cognition, and it has become famous. He started by holding out his open hand with fingers outstretched: 'a presentation', he said, 'is like that'. Then he contracted his fingers a little: 'assent is like that'. Then he closed his hand entirely, saying that was apprehension or cognition. The word he used was *katalepsis*, a new name. But when he had brought up his left hand and firmly clasped his fist with it, he said that knowledge was a thing like that.[5]

This image presents the first stage, *presentation*, as purely receptive. As Sextus Empiricus puts it, it does not lie with the subject, but with the object that causes the presentation, that he is affected as he is.[6] All that is required of the percipient is that he shall be ready to perceive. For example, to see he must open his eyes, and that corresponds to holding out the hand. This analysis is, however, inapplicable to presentations that arise not from the senses, but through the mind. A man who as

the result of reflection has a presentation that the earth goes round the sun must create that presentation in himself.[7] It is no doubt a weakness of the Stoic scheme that they applied the same word to what 'appeared' through the senses and to what 'appeared' to the mind. What was said about the first was not always appropriate to the second. Mental presentations were of increasing importance, and Epictetus, who made 'the right use of presentations' his ideal of morality, had them more in view than those that came from the senses.[8] Nevertheless, the accounts that we have of presentations are almost all formed with reference to the latter sort; and similarly disputes about the existence of the cognitive presentation were often carried on in terms of sense-perception and used illustrations drawn above all from the sphere of vision. This was not only simpler, but also justified by the Stoic doctrine that the mind was at birth like a blank sheet of paper. It had powers but no content. Sensation supplied the first content, and unless some of that was known to be reliable, no development of it by the mind could deserve any greater credence.

In this paper I shall follow the precedent of the ancient world and concentrate on the presentations that come through the senses. Some, but not all, of what I say will apply also to mental presentations.

Assent is assent to a presentation. But if a presentation is nothing but a physical change in the psyche, a *typosis*, how can one assent to it? Assent should be to a proposition; it is *that* which is true or false. This criticism was made by Arcesilaus (Sextus *Adv. math.* VII 154). But something can be said for the Stoics.

Suppose I look at a round object. It will—at any rate for Chrysippus—lie at the base of a cone of air in tension, and in some way its roundness will be conveyed along that cone to my eyes and thence to the *hegemonikon*, which will be affected thereby. Now if I am aware of the affect in my *hegemonikon*, there can be no question of giving or withholding assent to that; only by a deliberate falsehood could I deny the awareness. But a presentation is something more. What 'appears' to me is not merely that there is a certain affect in my *hegemonikon*, but that there is an external round object. More than that, the object will normally be identified as belonging to some class of round object, as

being an orange or a cricket-ball; or even as a particular member of a class, as when we say, not 'that appears to be a planet', but 'that appears to be Venus'. The presentation, the *phantasia*, 'what appears', is at once an impression made through the senses and an interpretation of that impression. So Plato at *Sophist* 264 a-b says that *phantasia* arises by way of sensation, but that 'what appears' is a combination of sensation and opinion. Similarly for Chrysippus the *phantasia* reveals not only itself but also that which caused it; that is to say it gives information about the external object. It is this information to which we can assent or refuse to assent. An anecdote about Zeno's pupil Sphaerus illustrates the point clearly. Ptolemy Philopator had a dish of wax pomegranates put before him and when the philosopher reached to take one exclaimed that he had assented to a false presentation. Sphaerus replied that his assent was not to 'those are pomegranates', but to 'it is probable those are pomegranates'.[9]

Admittedly Zeno's psychology was elementary. He correctly saw that perception is something more than awareness of a sensation. But this physical explanation of the activity as the reception of a kind of print[10] of the object perceived was clearly inadequate and even misleading. Even Chrysippus' modification, which substituted for the print the vague notion of an 'alteration' of the material psyche, was unsatisfactory, since he did not explain how one could assent to such a thing.[11]

Apprehension, or cognition, was said to be assent to cognitive presentation.[12] Hence Zeno's symbol, which suggests that assent and apprehension were succeeding stages, is misleading. Is it also misleading when it suggests that what is grasped by apprehension is the presentation, just as it is the presentation to which assent is given? I believe not, if trust can be put in Cicero and Augustine. The first writes of Zeno: quoniam esset quod percipi (=*katalambanesthai*) posset. quid ergo id est? uisum. The word uisum is in itself ambiguous. It could mean 'the thing seen', but it was also regularly used to translate *phantasia*, and that is how it is used here, for Cicero continues: quale igitur uisum? tum illum ita definisse: ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum.[13]

But although grasp, apprehension, cognition, whatever we

call it, is primarily of the presentation, it is secondarily of the external object, because the presentation, as we have seen, declares or makes plain that object, and a cognitive presentation does so truthfully, being 'in accord with the object'. To apprehend the presentation is then also, and more importantly, to apprehend the object from which it originated.

There is, however, a difference in that whereas the whole of the presentation is grasped, it is not necessarily the whole of the object that is apprehended. The presentation does not of necessity reproduce all the characteristics and qualities of the object. To invent an example, the cognitive presentation of the moon given by sight will not provide any information about its far side, or its temperature, or whether it smells of green cheese. Hence Cicero writes that comprehensio (=*katalepsis*) was so called, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret.[14]

If *katalepsis*, apprehension, is a grasp primarily of the presentation, but secondarily of the external object, it is easier to understand the phrase *kataleptike phantasia* and its opposite *akatalēptos phantasia*. The first adjective belongs to a type that is usually, but by no means always, active in sense, the second to a type that is even more predominantly passive.[15] This distinction fits. The *akataleptos* is a presentation that cannot be grasped, and so no question arises of a secondary grasp of the object. The *kataleptike*, on the other hand, is so called in deliberate ambiguity. It is one which when grasped entails grasp of the object. Although strictly speaking the presentation is not itself the agent that grasps the object but the medium through which the mind grasps it, the adjective can be understood in an active sense, 'the presentation associated with the process of grasping'.

An explanation[16] of the word *kataleptike*, now rightly abandoned, was that it indicated that the presentation gripped the percipient and dragged him to give his assent. *Katalepsis* is in the ancient authorities always an activity in which the percipient is the agent. But the question remains open whether a cognitive presentation is one such that it is inevitably followed by assent. Here it seems to me that only one thing is certain: some people, whom Sextus calls 'younger Stoics', possibly Antipater or others of that time, gave examples of cognitive presentations which did

not win assent; Admetus had a cognitive presentation of Alcestis when she returned from the dead, but he did not accept it, and Menelaus did not accept the presentation he had of Helen when he met her in Egypt.[17] I do not think there is any evidence to show what was the opinion of the older Stoics. No weight can be put on their insistence that assent was something for which we are responsible; the phrase used, *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, does not imply that it is possible that we should do the opposite of what we in fact do. Whether assent necessarily follows on a cognitive presentation or not, we are still responsible for giving or withholding it. Nor do I think that any conclusion can be drawn from Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* II 38; there Antiochus' views are being put forward, and it is maintained controversially that the mind yields to *perspicua* as certainly as the scale to an imposed weight; but the supporters of *perspicua* do not accept their identity with cognitive presentations (ibid. 34).

III

Pohlenz maintained that for Zeno the test of truth was not, as for Chrysippus, the cognitive presentation, the *phantasia kataleptike*, but cognition itself, *katalepsis;* and that this difference was not a mere matter of words, but marked a change in psychological theory.[18] To abbreviate his argument and to maintain its force may be impossible, but I will attempt to summarise it as he put it in *Die Stoa*.

Zeno's position, according to Pohlenz, was this. Whether a presentation deserves credence is decided by Logos, which gives or withholds assent. *Katalepsis* takes place only when Logos has concluded that all the conditions for a cognitive presentation are fulfilled. But some presentations are so obviously plain that Logos will immediately accept it that the conditions are fulfilled. Now it is expressly recorded that Zeno found the criterion of truth not in the cognitive presentation but in *katalepsis*. This agrees with his basic position. The presentation has an external cause; assent to it first brings in an active element that ensures the autonomy of Logos. Posidonius tells us that many of the older Stoics held 'upright Logos' to be the criterion; and we can attach this view to Zeno. It does not mean that Logos can

judge external things without a presentation; but only if the Logos is sound and 'stands upright', resisting misleading presentations, will its assent be correct. Soundness of Logos is a pre-condition for every act of cognition.

Chrysippus, he continues, did not recognize different powers in the 'soul', but temporary conditions of the *hegemonikon* or command-centre. That could make judgements, or it could be a presentation. For a presentation is 'the command-centre in such-and-such a state'. In Zeno's way of thinking the criterion had arisen from the co-operation of two independent factors both of which must function normally. For Chrysippus the two factors were replaced by a single process of cognition that was completed in two stages: a divorce between presentation and Logos was unthinkable, and a cognitive presentation necessarily induced assent. The natural result was to transfer the criterion to this presentation, which brought the objects of the outer world in a trustworthy manner before our consciousness. From Chrysippus' time it was not *katalepsis*, but the kataleptic or cognitive presentation that counted as the criterion. But he did not mean to depreciate the importance of Logos. It was fundamentally important that Logos should be autonomously opposed to the outer world, and possess the ability to accept or reject the presentations that arose.

I hope it is fair to say that Pohlenz' view is this. For Zeno the cognitive presentation brings the truth about the external world. But we do not know that any presentation is cognitive until it has been examined by Logos, which may establish that the conditions for a cognitive presentation are fulfilled. Those conditions are that the presentation should be (1) from an existent thing, (2) in accord with the existent thing, (3) impressed and ensealed, and (4) such as could not arise from a non-existent thing. If these are satisfied, then assent takes place, and is *katalepsis*. For Chrysippus the cognitive presentation necessitates assent, so that although an activity of Logos is still required, it is determined by the presentation; that presentation is therefore the test of truth. This view seems to me inadequately supported by the ancient evidence, and open to other objections.

(i) The test of truth of a presentation for Zeno seems to be,

according to Pohlenz' argument, not the *katalepsis* with which he wishes to identify it, but the preceding activity of the Logos, or the evidence (whatever that may be) used by the Logos to examine the presentation. Certainly *katalepsis* will follow upon this activity, so that when there is *katalepsis* there will have been a true presentation. It will be a proof of the presentation's truth, but not a test of it. A degree certificate may be a proof of education, but the test lay in the examination that preceded its award.

(ii) How can Logos decide that the presentation arose 'from an existent thing' and therefore satisfied the first condition for being cognitive? It is not known how or whether Zeno defined 'the existent', but later the orthodox definition was 'that which causes a cognitive presentation'.[19] If by Logos discursive reason is meant, then it cannot argue that a presentation is cognitive because it arose from an existent thing; for an existent is only known to be existent if it causes a cognitive presentation. There would be a fatal *petitio principii*.

(iii) Diogenes Laertius records that 'certain others of the older Stoics lay down correct reason as the criterion' (or 'a criterion'), 'as Posidonius says in his book on the criterion'.[20] Pohlenz slightly misrepresents this when he ascribes this view to 'many' of the older Stoics, thereby making more plausible his suggestion that Zeno is to be included among these anonymous persons. To refer to the founder of your school by the phrase 'certain others of the older Stoics' would seem to me, I must confess, a strange use of language. But it is more important that the phrase 'correct reason' is elsewhere in our sources for Stoicism particularly, perhaps uniquely, associated with the ideal wise man or 'sage'.[21] Hence it is unlikely that Zeno would have used it in this context alone to refer to the reason employed by all men to recognize cognitive presentations. I suspect that whoever it was who spoke of correct reason as a test of truth did not do so with primary reference to the testing of sense-data; rather they saw in correct reason a test of universal applicability, but one which only the select few had the power to use. It is to be noted that Diogenes (VII 47) defines the virtue of ἁματαιότης, the possession of the wise, as 'a state that refers presentations to correct reason'.

(iv) Is it true that Zeno made *katalepsis* and not the presenta-

tion the test of truth? No one in antiquity states that Zeno differed from Chrysippus by not accepting the presentation as a test. Pohlenz relies on Cicero, *Acad. Post.* I 42; inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat [sc. Zeno] eamque neque in rectis neque in prauis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. Cicero was following Antiochus, and in the previous section wrote, again of Zeno: uisis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed eis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum quae uiderentur. Can we believe that when he wrote soli credendum esse he meant that comprehensio (*katalepsis*) is the test of truth, but that by adiungebat fidem eis solum he did not mean that the cognitive presentations were such a test? The fact is that Cicero is not here in the least concerned to state accurately what Zeno held to be ultimately the test of truth, but is arguing that there is in Zeno's view a reliable method of cognition which is intermediate between ignorance and perfect knowledge.[22]

Sextus (*Adv. math.* VII 152) gives it as Stoic doctrine that knowledge exists only in the wise, opinion only in the bad, while *katalepsis* belongs to both sorts and is the test of truth. Since this opinion was, he says, attacked by Arcesilaus, it must have been held by Zeno. But he gives no indication that it was in any way inconsistent with orthodoxy. Later (ibid. VII 253) he writes that the older Stoics say that the test of truth is the cognitive presentation. He cannot intend to exclude Zeno, Cleanthes, and all their contemporaries from the class of 'older Stoics'.

I conclude that there is no reason for seeing any difference of substance between Zeno and Chrysippus over the question of the test of truth. The former may, to be sure, have said that *katalepsis* was the test. But if he did, he did not thereby intend to deny that the ultimate evidence is the cognitive presentation, recognized to be such by a kind of intuition.

IV

Pohlenz' account of Zeno's views is attractive because it seems to give an answer to a question which must trouble many who try to grasp the meaning of this doctrine of the cognitive presentation. How are such presentations to be recognized?

How is a man to know that he is right to give them his assent?

Ancient sources fail to offer any help. There is no discussion of this problem in any author who expounds the Stoic doctrine, and the attacks of the critics are not directed against the use of any particular methods of recognition. Their charge is simply that men misjudge their presentations, taking false ones to be true and being unable to distinguish these false ones from that they claim to be cognitive. The Stoics claim that cognitive presentations have some peculiar quality that marks them out, but cannot indicate what that is except by the use of words like 'evident' (*enargēs*, Sextus *Adv. math.* VII 257, 403) or 'striking' (*plēktikē*, ibid. VII 257, 258, 403).

This ought not in fact to cause any surprise. How could the bona fides of a cognitive presentation be established? We may of course say that the percipient must be awake and sober and looking at the object in a good light and that the presentation must not be inconsistent with others, past or present, and so on. But this is simply to check one presentation by others. If the check is to be valid, those presentations must themselves be cognitive. And how are we to know that? We shall find ourselves involved in an endless regress, as is pointed out by Sextus *Adv. math.* VII 428–9. There must be a point to call a halt. There must be some presentations that are immediately acceptable, that are self-evidently true. That is what constitutes a cognitive presentation.

It is the attitude of common sense that most presentations are of this sort. In ordinary life every man has no doubt that what 'appears to him' is really there, that the sun *is* shining, that those objects are pomegranates, that a waggon and horses are bearing down on him. Only occasionally will he have doubts, so that (if he is a Stoic) he will say that he has a *phantasia akataleptos*. For the most part he will believe without reservation that his presentations give him a grasp of external reality.

NOTES

1. Cicero, *Acad. prior.* II.

2. The fullest treatment of Stoic views on the subject is in Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 138–87, particularly 160–8. Later accounts that deserve attention are

to be found in Barth, *Die Stoa*², pp. 104–5; Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, pp. 80–107, Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 69–73, Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, pp. 59–63, Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 34–7, Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 133–47. My chapter was unfortunately with the printer before the last work was published.

3. It is used by Christensen, *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy*, p. 59.

4. The text is doubtful. I have translated *αὐτό τε καί*; Diels in *Doxographi graeci* and von Arnim in *SVF* may be right to prefer *ἐν αὐτῷ καί*. Both readings have manuscript support.

5. *Acad. prior.* II 155 (*SVF* I 66).

6. *Adv. math.* VIII 397 (*SVF* II 91).

7. See Sextus, *Adv. math.* VIII 409 (*SVF* II 85). But the date of this doctrine is unknown. It may be an anachronism to attach it to Zeno; perhaps it is Chrysippean.

8. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 141–5.

9. Diog. Laert. VII 177 (*SVF* I 625). Athenaeus 354e (*SVF* I 624), tells the same story, substituting birds for pomegranates.

10. Cleanthes, according to Sextus, interpreted the word literally, comparing the impress of a signet-ring. It is generally supposed that he was right in thinking that this was Zeno's meaning, especially in view of the words *ἐναπομεμαγμένη* and *ἐναπεσφραγισμένη* used in the definition of the *φαντασία καταληπτική*. I retain a lingering doubt whether it is right to ascribe such a simple-minded view to Zeno.

11. The difficulty of giving an adequate account of mental events in physical terms is notorious. I have wondered whether assent could be explained as preservation of the physical condition that constitutes *φαντασία*, and refusal of assent as allowing it to cease.

The Stoics underestimated the part played by the percipient in forming presentations. What we perceive depends upon past experience, and upon a selection from, and interpretation of, the stimuli that affect the organs of sense. I confess ignorance of the subject, which is difficult and complex. There is an interesting chapter in E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, (London 1962) pp. 204–44, which deals with the perception both of drawings and of objects in the three-dimensional world of reality; see particularly the illustrations 220, 225, 232, 235 and 236. A stiffer work is M. D. Vernon, *A Further Study of Visual Perception* (Cambridge 1952).

12. The standard Greek definition of the cognitive presentation, which although nowhere explicitly ascribed to Zeno is undoubtedly his, runs as follows: *ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος*.

13. *Acad. prior.* II 77. Augustine *Contra academicos* III 9, 18 gives as Zeno's doctrine: tale scilicet uisum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia. Another passage of Cicero seems to show that the presentation is grasped, but it contains two doubtful phrases that may detract from its authority. At *Acad. post.* I 41 he writes about Zeno as follows: uisis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed eis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae uiderentur: id autem uisum (i.e. a presentation of this latter sort) cum ipsum per se cerneretur comprehendibile—(feretis hoc? nos uero, inquam: quonam enim alio modo *καταληπτόν* diceres?)—sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset comprehensionem appellabat. There can be no doubt that Cicero writes as if the uisum (*φαντασία*) is what is grasped. But can he be relied upon? There is no evidence that any Stoic gave the name of *κατάληψις* (*comprehensio*) to a *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* that had received assent; it was the assent that they called *κατάληψις*. Then why does he suggest that the Greek term was *φαντασία καταληπτός*, not *καταληπτική*? It is this word *καταληπτός*, of necessarily passive meaning, which shows that

the presentation is grasped. Can Cicero have made a mistake, unlikely though that may seem? It has been argued that the word is confirmed by Epictetus *Diss.* IV 4, 13, where *φαντασίαι καταληπτοί* occur again. But since Schenkl's edition of 1916 it has been known that the Bodleian codex, from which all others are descended, had as its original text *καταληπτικῶν*; the letters *ικ* were erased by that ignorant busybody the second corrector, who was no doubt inspired to his mischief by the word *ἀκαταλήπτων*, which follows just after. But there is other support in a Herculaneum papyrus (*SVF* II 131) that sets out Stoic views and is reported to read *εστι δ' ημεναπροπτωσιαδιαθεσισασυνκαταθετοσπροκαταληψεωσσυνκατιθετικηνκατανερ . . . . . αιφαντασιαικαταληπτωι*.

Grumach, *Physis und Agathon* p. 74, argues that in so far as a presentation is grasped or not grasped by the mind it is called *καταληπτός* or *ἀκατάληπτος*, in so far as it allows the object to be grasped it is called *καταληπτική*. This may be right.

14. *Acad. post.* I 42 (*SVF* I 60). This is one of the surprisingly few passages that explicitly state *κατάληψις* to have external reality as its object. Diog. Laert VII 52, Cic. *Acad. prior.* II 23 Sextus VII 251 are, I think, others. But there are many where one may feel sure that this is meant. As Bréhier puts it, 'il ne s'agit pas seulement de juger des répresentations mais d'atteindre des réalitiés' (p. 100 note).

With some hesitation I take *relinqueret* to mean 'pass over, neglect' rather than 'relinquish, take and then drop'. *κατάληψις* is not permanent until it has been converted into knowledge; unless one is a 'wise man', one can be argued out of it (*SVF* I 68). But perhaps a *κατάληψις*, so long as it exists, does not relinquish any element in the presentation.

15. For verbal adjectives in—*τικός* with a passive sense, see e.g. Plato *Timaeus* 55c, *γῆ . . . τῶν σωμάτων πλαστικωτάτη*, ibid. 58d, *κινητικὸν . . . καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου*. Adjectives in—*τός* from transitive verbs are, if compounded with *ἀ-* privative, usually passive, but observe e.g. *ἀνότητος, ἀνώμοτος*. The ambiguity I see in *καταληπτική* is envisaged by Bréhier p. 95, but rejected. The view that a presentation is *καταληπτική* because it is one by means of which the percipient apprehends the external object is commonly held, e.g. by Hicks, Bréhier, Pohlenz, Watson.

16. It was that of Zeller, and so gained currency.

17. *Adv. math.* VII 254–7.

18. 'Zenon und Chrysipp', 175ff.; *Die Stoa* i pp. 60–2. His view is briefly criticised by Rieth, *Gnomon* xvi (1940) 106, to whom he replied in *Grundfragen*, pp. 105ff. It is accepted by de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* iii p. 119, rejected by Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 138ff.

19. Sextus *Adv. math.* VII 426, XI 183 (*SVF* II 70, 97). [See further Chapter V, p. 91. Ed.]

20. VII 54.

21. See *SVF* IV (index) p. 93, Pearson, *Zeno and Cleanthes*, pp. 8–9, Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 70–1. [On *orthos logos* and the sage see further Chapter V, p. 102. Ed.]

22. This point is made by Rieth, loc. cit. Pohlenz must lay weight on the word *soli*. I do not share the doubts of Halm and Christ about the genuineness of the word, but also do not think that Cicero can have meant that *comprehensio* was the only thing we can trust. We must be able to trust knowledge also. And unless the presentation can be trusted, how can trust be put in *comprehensio*? Either Cicero, as so often, is not precise, or by *soli* he means *per se*: *comprehensio* is by itself sufficient for belief; we do not need its conversion into knowledge before it can be trusted.