**Conceptions and Concepts**

**LS27A. Seneca, *Letters* 58.13–15 (SVF 2.332, part)**

The Stoics want to place above this [the existent] yet another, more primary genus... Some Stoics consider ‘something’ the first genus, and I shall add the reason why they do. In nature, they say, some things exist, some do not exist. But nature includes even those which do not exist – things which enter the mind, such as Centaurs, giants, and whatever else falsely formed by thought takes on some image despite lacking substance.

**B. Alexander, *On Aristotle's Topics* 301,10–25 (SVF 2.329)**

This is how you could show the impropriety of the Stoics’ making ‘something’ the genus to which the existent belongs: if it is something it is obviously also existent, and if existent it would receive the definition of the existent. But they would escape the difficulty by legislating for themselves that ‘existent’ is said only of bodies; for on this ground they say that ‘something’ is more generic than it, being predicated not only of bodies but also of incorporeals.

**C. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 1.17 (SVF 2.330)**

If something is taught, it will be taught either through not-somethings, or through somethings. But it cannot be taught through not-somethings, for these have no subsistence for the mind, according to the Stoics.

**D. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 10.218 (SVF 2.331, part)**

They [the Stoics] say that of somethings some are bodies, others incorporeals, and they list four species of incorporeals – sayable (*lekton*), void, place, and time.

**LS 30A. Stobaeus 1.136,21–137,6 (SVF 1.65)**

(l) (Zeno’s doctrine) They say that concepts are neither somethings nor qualified, but figments of the soul which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified. (2) These, they say, are what the old philosophers called Ideas. For the Ideas are of the things which are classified under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in general all the animals and other things of which they say that there are Ideas. (3) The Stoic philosophers say that there are no Ideas, and that what we ‘participate in’ is the concepts, while what we ‘bear’ is those cases which they call ‘appellatives’.

**C. Diogenes Laertius 7.60–1**

(1) A genus is a collection of a plurality of inseparable concepts, such as animal. For this embraces all the distinct animals. (2) A concept is a figment of the mind, which is neither something nor qualified, but a quasi-some thing and quasi-qualified, in the way that the pattern of horse arises even though none is present. (3) A species is that which is contained within a genus, as man is contained within animal. (4) Most generic is that which is a genus but has no genus – the existent, (5) Most specific is that which is a species but has no species, for example Socrates.

**E. Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 105,8–16 (SVF 2.278, part)**

(1) Indeed, Chrysippus too raises problems as to whether the Idea will be called a ‘this something’. (2) One must also take into account the usage of the Stoics about generically qualified things - how according to them cases are expressed, how in their school universals are called ‘not-somethings’, and how their ignorance of the fact that not every substance signifies a ‘this something’ gives rise to the Not-someone [*Outis*] sophism, which relies on the form of expression. (3) Namely: ‘If someone is in Athens, he is not in Megara; <but man is in Athens; therefore man is not in Megara. >’ (4) For man is not someone, since the universal is not someone, and that is why the argument has this name, being called the ‘Not-someone’ argument.