**LS 35B Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2. 110–13**

(1) But passing over this problem too, we will find that the sound conditional cannot be grasped. (2) For Philo says that a sound conditional is the one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent. For example, when it is day and I am talking, 'If it is day, I am talking.' (3) Diodorus, on the other hand, says it is the one which neither was nor is able to have a true antecedent and a false consequent. On his view the aforementioned conditional seems to be false, since when it is day but I have fallen silent it will have a true antecedent and a false consequent, but the following one is true: 'If there are not partless elements of things, there are partless elements of things.' For it will always have the false antecedent 'There are not partless elements of things' and the (in his view) true consequent 'There are partless elements of things.' (4) Those who introduce 'cohesion' say that a conditional is sound whenever che contradictory of its consequent conflicts with its antecedent. On their view the aforementioned conditionals will be unsound, but the following one true: 'If it is day, it is day.' (5) But those who make 'entailment' the criterion say that a true conditional is one whose consequent is potentially included in the antecedent. On their view 'If it is day, it is day', and every duplicated conditional proposition, will presumably be false. For it is impossible for something to be included in itself. (6) Well, to adjudicate on this disagreement will look likely to prove impossible.

**LS 35C Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2.104–6**

(1) For example, those who are thought to have made accurate distinctions about the sign, the Stoics, when they wish to establish the conception of the sign, say that a sign is a leading proposition in a sound conditional, revelatory of the consequent. (2) And the proposition, they say, is a complete sayable which, so far as it itself is concerned, can be asserted; (3) while a sound conditional is the one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent. For the conditional either has a true antecedent and a true consequent, e.g. 'If it is day, it is light’; or a false antecedent and a false consequent, e.g. 'If the earth flies, the earth has wings'; or a true antecedent and a false consequent, e.g. 'If the earth exists, the earth flies'; or a false antecedent and a true consequent, e.g. 'If the earth flies, the earth exists.' Of these, they say that only the one with a crue antecedent and a false consequent is unsound, the others sound. (4) By 'leading' proposition they mean the antecedent in a conditional with true antecedent and true consequent. (5) It is 'revelatory' of the consequent, since in the conditional 'If this woman has milk, this woman has conceived', 'This woman has milk' seems to be indicative of 'This woman has conceived.'

**LS 36B Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2.140–3**

(7) Again, of true arguments some are demonstrative, others non-demonstrative. Demonstrative are those which by means of things pre-evident deduce something non-evident. Non-demonstrative are those not of this kind. For example, an argument like 'If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Therefore it is light' is non-demonstrative. For its conclusion, that it is light, is pre-evident. But one like 'If sweat flows through the surface, there are ducts discoverable by thought. But sweat flows through the surface. Therefore there are ducts discoverable by thought' is demonstrative, having the non-evident conclusion 'Therefore there are ducts discoverable by thought.' (8) Of those which deduce something non-evident, some lead us by means of the premises to the conclusion in a merely progressive way, others in a both progressive and revelatory way. (9) Those which lead us in a merely progressive way are the ones which seem to depend on trust and memory, such as 'If some god has told you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich. But this god' (I refer demonstratively to, say, Zeus) 'has told you that this man will be rich. Therefore this man will be rich.' For we assent to the conclusion less because of the cogency of the premises than because we trust the god's statement. (10) Those which lead us to the conclusion in a not only progressive but also revelatory way are ones like this: 'If sweat flows through the surface, there are ducts discoverable by thought. But the first. Therefore the second.' For the proposition that sweat flows is revelatory of the proposition that there are ducts, thanks to our preconception that liquid cannot penetrate a solid body. (11) Thus a demonstration must be an argument, and deductive, and true, and with a conclusion which is non-evident and revealed by the force of the premises. That is why a demonstration is said to be an argument which through agreed premises by means of deduction reveals a non-evident conclusion.