1. Whatever moves, exists.
2. Whatever moves, is moved by something.
3. If that which moves something ceases to move it, this thing stops moving.
4. If y is the essence of x, then it is impossible for x not to be y.
5. The essence of the soul is self-motion.
6. It is impossible for the soul to stop moving itself. (4, 5)
7. It is impossible for the soul to stop moving (itself). (6)
8. It is impossible for the soul to stop being moved (by itself). (7)
9. If x does something, x exists.
10. If x moves, x does something.
11. There is something that the soul cannot stop doing. (8, 10)
12. It is impossible for the soul to cease existing. (9, 11)

**Notes.**

A. The error lies in the confusion between “x, insofar as it exists, cannot fail to have the essence it has” and “x has a specific essence that prevents it from not existing.”

B. The term “essence” as I used it is anachronistic in relation to Plato in the *Phaedrus*. Preferable phrases are: “the definition of the soul is self-motion,” “the soul is identified with self-motion.”

C. Dialectically, the argument might be more persuasive and simple if motion were identified with life itself from the beginning. As I presented it, it is not as faithful to the text, yet it is stronger, as the initial assumptions are more indisputable. In my opinion, it still fails to be valid, even in this form.