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THE APOLOGY
OF PLATO.

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THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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ADVERTISEMENT.

COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the *Philebus* in 1860, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium* were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The *Digest of Idioms*, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium*, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the *Apology* seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix

on the *δαιμόνιον* of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to publish it himself; and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In references to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the *Poetæ Scenici* published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.

The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted; but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

EDWIN PALMER.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD,
June 8, 1867.

INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

THE trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary *γραφὴ δημοσία*. The indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) is called *ἀντωμοσία* 19 B, 24 B, and *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the *ἀνάκρισις* before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms *ἀντιγραφὴ*, *ἀντωμοσία*, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (*ἐγκλημα*) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. THE ACCUSERS.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's *Euthyphro* 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the *Apology*. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining $\frac{1}{3}$ of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, *Disp.* xxxix. p. 228, *Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο ἄνυτος δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδίωκε*. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—*κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔδησαν δὲ οἱ ἑνδεκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης*—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, *magis oratorie*

quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (*Euthyphro* 2 B) as νέος τις καὶ ἀγνός, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (*Ran.* 1302). The Meletus (*Andoc. de Myst.* 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (*Apol.* 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (*Apol.* 18 B) as τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, and Socrates is called by Horace (*Sat.* II. iv. 3) Anyti reus. He was a leather-seller (*Xen. Apol. Soc.* 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (*Xen. Hell.* II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (*Lys.* xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (*Isocr.* xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (*Meno* 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (*Athenæus* XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocration on the word δικάζειν) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (*Zeller, Philos. der Griech.* II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes¹ which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

¹ Socrates is made by Plato (*Apol.* 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν

ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ρητόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ῥήτορες and πολιτικοὶ shows that the words severally denote definite classes

of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the *Apology* itself

of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (*Sokrates* p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus' Comment. in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii, that there was any *order* of *ρήτορες*, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the *ισσηγορία* which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these *ρήτορες* had attained a mischievous importance. Æschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as *δυναστείας* *ἐαυτοῖς περαιοῦντες*, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that *ὅσα δὴ ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ρητόρων ξυμβουλῆς ἅπαντα γίγνεται*. To be a *ρήτωρ* had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name *ρητορική*, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the *Gorgias* (448 D)—*τὴν καλουμένην ρητορικήν*. In their capacity of *συνήγοροι* the *ρήτορες* were brought into prominence (Heeren, *Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece*, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as *σύμβουλοι* to the Assembly that the *ρήτορες* were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates

(viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it *τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος δυναστείαν*) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, *συμβουλευτική* and *δικανική*, of Aristotle's triple division of *ρητορική* in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the *ρήτωρ's* profession. The *πολιτικοὶ* as a class must have emerged at the same time as the *ρήτορες*. In itself *πολιτικός* means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by *πολιτικοὶ* that class of men who made public business their profession,—*τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους*, Plat. *Politic.* 303 C. Our conception of the *πολιτικοὶ* will be best completed by comparing them with the *ρήτορες*. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (*Pol.* V. v. 7), *νῦν δὲ τῆς ρητορικῆς ἡὑξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται*. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 520 A, *Phdr.* 258 B, and the general terms in which the *ρήτορες* are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as *οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες*.

as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.

Diog. Laert. II. 40. ἡ ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἀνέκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος⁷, ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ· Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλιτος Μελλίτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκον Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From Æschines (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφὴ παρανόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχείται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕδωρ τῷ κατηγορῷτὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕδωρ τῷ τὴν γραφὴν φεύγοντι καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσι (i. e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ).....τὸ τρίτον ὕδωρ ἐγχεῖται τῇ τιμῇσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ὑμετέρας (i. e. for the prosecutor to speak *again* on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνηγόροι, represented by the main part of the Apology, i. e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophontean Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

⁷ [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]

prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' *ἀντιτίμησις*, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the *ἀντιτίμησις* that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called *βῆμα*, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase *ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ*, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, *καὶ σιωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἴ τις ἀναβαίνειν βούλεται*, and Æsch. iii. 165. p. 77, *παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος ἕως ἂν εἴπῃς*.

6. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SPEECHES OF THE ACCUSERS.

We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, *ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων*. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him *ἡθικὴ πίστις* in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of *ρήτωρ*. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), *εἰ διαφέρεται Σωκράτης, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νικεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται· ἢ οὖν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ*

προσεστηκότας πρὸς τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος συνειλεγμένους εἰς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ii. 5. p. 28, ἣ τῶν ἔξωθεν περιεστηκότων (σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πολιτῶν πάρεισιν) ἣ τῶν δικαστῶν, iii. 56. p. 61, ὅσους οὐδεὶς πώποτε μέμνηται πρὸς ἀγῶνα δημόσιον παραγενομένους.

Production of witnesses.

It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the *Apology* to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so—*μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι*. Cf. *Æsch.* ii. 122. p. 44, *καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψῆφον μέλλοντες φέρειν ἐστέ μοι μάρτυρες*. Similarly, when at 21 A—*καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε*—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 E *καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες* must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula *τούτων δ' ὑμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι* (cf. e. g. *Antipho* v. 20. p. 131, and *Lysias* x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 A, *τούτου πᾶν τὸνναντίον εὐρήσετε* is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 A)—‘Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?’—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge *εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσθω· ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ* would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (*Demosth.* c. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, *τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή*), and with the common practice (cf. *Lysias* xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a

formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκριναι, ὦ 'γαθέ' καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμῃσις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμῃσις—οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἶασεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν. The Platonic ἀντιτίμῃσις, both of the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ and of the 30 minæ, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμῃσις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἦγον, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμένετε τοσούτον χρόνον, *ibid.*).

PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

- i. Its employment of commonplaces (τόποι).
- ii. The "old accusers."
- iii. The Delphic response.
- iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
- v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

I. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—*ἤδη·μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡγναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received τόποι of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.

(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινὸς λέγειν (cf. Lys. xix. 1. 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολλὴν τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους (as Isocr. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isocr. xv. 38. p. 318, οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the deprecation of θόρυβος (cf. e. g. Æsch. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπαινώ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι σιγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἡμῶν ἀκούετε), the disclaiming a style unbefitting an old man (cf. Isocr. xii. 3. p. 233, ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ ἁρμόττειν),—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of διαβολαί (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isocr. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταῦτα χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὐήθεις αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτε.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην (33 A) with Isocr. xv. 85, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ιδιωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἑμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρῶμαι πείθειν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐδαιμονήσουσι κ.τ.λ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is

paralleled by Isocr. xv. 240, τοὺς πατέρας ἂν ἐωρᾶτε τῶν συνόντων ἡμῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ἡκουσι καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκοντες· ὦν ὅστις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἀναβάς με ἐλεγξάτω.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν ὦν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isocr. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35. pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμοῦ is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία.....ἔξει [τὰ ἐπείχαιρα], ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and *ibid.* 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) "The old accusers."

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῇ ἀπολύσεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς, εἴτε μή.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend

them further, and the designation of it at once as a *vox populi*, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance had done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which, —the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—“the original accusers,”—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἱ *πρῶτοι κατηγοροὶ* are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν *διαβολή*, and what makes the neutralising of this *διαβολή* at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἡν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—“I hope, if possible, to convert *you* from a prejudice which *you*” (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) “have so long harboured” (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as *vox populi*—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν *διαβολή* τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to “the old accusers,” the ἡθικὴ πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to “the old

accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed

to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἀγὼν τιμητὸς has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the dramatis personæ. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the *τίμησις* of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical ἀντιτίμησις, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. HOW FAR IS THE APOLOGY CHARACTERISTIC OF
SOCRATES?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been

restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhart's *Anmerkungen* I. 2 in *Platon's Sämmtliche Werke übersetzt von Hieronymus Müller*, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as *συνήγοροι*, and again (23) that Socrates refused *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, *εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει*; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; *μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ*

περὶ Σωκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (18), and τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οὔεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἶεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story⁹ of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "*liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia*" (Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal *ἑρώτησις* of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

⁹ Diog. Laert. II. 40, Cic. de Orat. II, Valer. Max. VI. iv. 2, Stob. Flor. I. 54, Quintil. Inst. II. xv. 30, XI. i. VII. 56.

which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone¹⁰ so little change

¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-

in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the *καὶ δαιμόνια*) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i. e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the *Apology* first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the *Clouds* both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the *Apology* itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of *δαιμόνια καὶ κῶνά*, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sensation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides predeceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling:

whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138. note.

Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of *δαιμόνια καινὰ* is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δαιμόνιον into *δαιμόνια*, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the *δαιμόνια* of the indictment as if it had been *δαιμόνια πράγματα*. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.

In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ*, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and *φρόνιμος* which we find in Aristotle (*Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5. Θαλὴν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὗ φασιν εἶναι*). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* consisted. The imputation contained in the words *τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων* or *ζητῶν*, i. e. *τὰ οὐράνια*, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Nub. 96* says, *κοινὸν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἔγκλημα*. In 431 B. C. Diopithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας* (Plutarch. *Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380*). Eupolis (*Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490*) says of Protagoras, *ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν, ἀλιτήριος, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων*. Once more, the reference in *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων* is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of *τὸν ἥττω κ.τ.λ.*, and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (*xv. 15. p. 313*) speaks of the charge being made against himself, *ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἥττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν*, and again (*30. p. 316*), *ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν*. Odium also attached to the profession¹¹ of an instructor in speaking. Hence Æschines' designation (*i. 94. p. 13*) of Demosthenes as *λογογράφος*, and (*117. p. 16*) *ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν*, crowned by the

¹¹ *Λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν* (Xen. *Mem. I. ii. 31*) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and

freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of *λόγων τέχνη* to survive the Tyranny?

designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon *ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δῆμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅσοις συμβουλευσαί τὸ τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν*. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, *ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν*.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα*. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The *μετέωρα φροντίζων* is due to the Philosopher, and the *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κ.τ.λ.* to the Sophist, while the title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* stands¹² alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he¹³ denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

¹² Plat. Apol. 20 A, Evenus is *ἀνὴρ Πάριος σοφός*, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, *Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός* is mentioned; as on the other hand *σοφιστής* is borrowed to express Philosopher.

¹³ There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phædo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), *ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι*. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance

with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.

been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, *εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε κ.τ.λ.* 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for tenets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher

and Sophist when once Aristophanes¹⁴ had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάν περ*

¹⁴ Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the

popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?

αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken ¹⁵identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—*ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ ληθῆ, καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι* (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

¹⁵ The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No

"Philosophers!" 'Church and King for ever!' And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as the head and front of the 'Philosophers' of Birmingham."—Smiles' *Life of Boulton*, ch. 20.

It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), was not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he

was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes¹⁶ had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity¹⁷ he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the¹⁸ political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

¹⁶ [So Stallb. *Prolegg.* ad Plat. *Sympos.* p. 28. Zeller (II. p. 150) asserts the contrary and appeals to Aristoph. *Ran.* 1491 sqq.]

¹⁷ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 142.

¹⁸ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-

pation of the Thirty lasted from June 404 B. C. to February 403. The Archonship of Euclides began in 403 and ended in 402. In April 399 Anytus brought Socrates to trial.

for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the

same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the *Apology* which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points *seriatim*. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-

taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the *ἀντιλήσις* (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to

elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς κ.τ.λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing¹⁹ him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

¹⁹ It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἀγὼν τιμητός, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first

step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured 'till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ κ.τ.λ., they gave their voice against the truth.

inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns²⁰ all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

²⁰ That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were them-

selves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.

B = Bekker.

S = Stallbaum.

Z = Zurich editors.

H = Hermann.

Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόν-
θατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν
καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω
πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 5
οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν
πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν
ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δει-
νοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνηθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα
ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μὴδ' ὅπως- 10
τιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν
αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν κα-
λοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τᾶληθῇ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τού-
τους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

A. The
Defence.

Exordium.

5. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] This quali-
fies the οὐδὲν following, making
it equivalent to ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν
below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This
sentence is not affected by the
tense of the main construction,
because the contingency it ex-
presses remains still future at
the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest
of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough
litotes: 'far above these:' 'a
far greater orator than they.'
Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μη-
τέρα εὐρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδά-
την τε τὸν βουκόλον καὶ τὴν γυ-
ναῖκα αὐτοῦ.

ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκού- p. 17
 σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δι', ὧ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ
 οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη- c

1. ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν] This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, Ἄνδρῶν δ' ἢ κέν τις μοι ἐρίσσειται, ἢ καὶ οὐκί. So Hdt. iii. 140, ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρείσσων γὰρ οὔτις χρημάτων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ, Πλὴν εἴ τις· ὅστις δ' οὗτός ἐστιν οὐχ ὁρῶ.

2. οὐ μέντοι] Opposed to ἀκούσεσθε π. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, *but* not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὀνόμασι after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δ'—ἀλήθειαν) and continues to εἰσιέναι,—since πλάττοντι λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μειράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὥσπερ οἱ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὥσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥήμασι . . . ὀνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Διὶ φίλος is the ῥῆμα,

Δίφίλος the ὄνομα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; 199 b, ὀνόμασι καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων, 221 e, τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Æschin. iii. 72. p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἔφη δεῖν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα μένημαι ὡς εἶπε, διὰ τὴν ἀηδίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος) ἀπορρῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥῆμα is the whole expression, the ὄνομα is ἀπορρῆξαι. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὀνόματα, would consist in what Æschines—ii. 153. p. 48—calls ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isoer. ix. 9. p. 190, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξενόις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς while ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Æschines' caricature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα.

p. 17. μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε· εἰκὴ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυ-
 χούσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω,
 καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
 δήπου πρέποι, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μει-
 ρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μὲν- 5
 τοι καὶ πάνν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι
 καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ
 μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν
 ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι,
 d καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου 10
 ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικα-
 στήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγυνὼς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here : " Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

4. ὥσπερ—εἰσιέναι] Three peculiarities ; 1. μειρακίῳ is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176 ; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικίᾳ and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δέ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθῇ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence ; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled

with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

9. ἀγορᾷ κ.τ.λ.] The passage of Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 10) is well known ;—ἐκείνός γε αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερόῳ. πρῶτ' τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. For τράπεζαι as places of resort cf. Lysias ix. 5. p. 114, καὶ μοι μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διείλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ· and shops generally, cf. Lys. xxiv. 20. p. 170.

ὑμῶν πολλοὶ] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζαι would be of the richer class.

10. θορυβεῖν] See Introd. p. ix. note 8.

11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isæus, Fr. vii. 1. l. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβέβηκα refers to the βῆμα, cf. Introd. p. vii.

ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ p. 17.
οὖν αὖν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγινώ-
σκετε δῆπου ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18.
τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
5 τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν
τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔᾶν· ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως
δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθῇ λέγειν.

First part
of Defence;
—Justifi-
cation of
himself
against the
prejudices
of the
court, and
his coun-
trymen ge-
nerally.

10 II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,
ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῇ κατη-
γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγορούς, ἔπειτα δὲ
πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ b
κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλοι πολλὰ ἥδη
15 ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον
φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ

malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolato-
rem referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Criton. 52 e,
videturque jam Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II.
§ 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at
duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse scite Boeckhii Corp.
Inscr. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv.
Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller
agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] 'I request this
of you as a piece of justice.'
Cf. 41 d, χρὴ . . . τοῦτο δια-
νοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, Legg. 795 c,
ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτ' . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄλ-
λοις πᾶσι χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ὀρθόν
'as the right thing.'

6. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ] The reason
urged is a general one. The
consideration of style, if al-
lowed at all, will be operative
just in those cases where it
is better or worse than the
case deserves,—just where it

will interfere with true judg-
ment.

9. αὕτη] This represents
the preceding clause αὐτὸ—ἢ
μή· being in fact τοῦτο, at-
tracted into the gender of
ἀρετή. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλοι] This καὶ only
emphasises πάλοι. Dig. 133.
And in καὶ οὐδὲν—λέγοντες we
have the common καὶ after πολ-
λοί.—It was 24 years since
the Clouds were represented:
Forster.

p. 18. τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ 5
 c τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγούνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 10
 ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

a. Existence of such prejudices, and their nature, viz. that Socrates was, as a Physicist and a Sophist, a subverter severally of religion and of morality.

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές.

2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely with ἐκ παίδων. They ἔπειθον all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below c, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἔπειθον and κατηγοροῦν· just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.] below, e. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—‘we were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.’

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This “accusation,” both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xv. The charges it contains

are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνὴρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxiv. n. 12.

13. παῖδες . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, ‘when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.’

14. ὁ δὲ—ὅτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated

πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε p. 18.
 αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς d
 τυγχάνει ὧν ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι
 ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους
 5 πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'
 ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκια-
 μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀπο-
 κρινομένου. ἀξιῶσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
 10 λέγω, διπτούς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἐτέ-
 ρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς
 πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους e
 πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων
 πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμωδιοποιὸς] VH; κωμωδοποιὸς BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phædo 70 c all the MSS. have κωμωδοπ.; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others. Mæris' assertion that κωμωδοποιὸς is the Attic and the other the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would be ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἴ τις] Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, ὅς τ' ἅλλα μὲν πεφρόν-τικεν, ὁπότεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι Τούτου κατημέληκεν. And a play of Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes' Clouds, was called the Connos, and the Chorus was of Phrontistæ (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as

Plato (Menex. 235 e, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the music-master Connus Socrates' instructor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but the εἴ τις· that is, ὅσοι stands for ὅσοι ἄλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b, where πάντα ἄ is equivalent to πάντα τὰλλα ἄ. This ὅσοι [ἄλλοι] is then subdivided into [οἱ μὲν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι and οἱ δὲ—πείθοντες. The οἱ μὲν is supplied from οἱ δὲ by anastrophe; Dig. 241. The ἄλλους πείθοντες is put in to make the sense clear, but virtually repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον· it does not affect the regularity of the construction.

p. 18. ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὥ ἄν-
 p. 19. δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελεῖσθαι τὴν
 διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην
 ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο
 οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ 5
 πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάννυ με λανθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν.
 ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἵτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
 πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγο- 10
 ρία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἥ δὴ καὶ
 b πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
 εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες ;
 ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀνωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώ-

3. ἔσχετε] BZH; ἔχετε V. The preposition ἐν would be strange
 with ἔσχετε if the meaning were 'have entertained *during* so long
 a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;' and so, with
 respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἔσχετε
 exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long
 ago.'

4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than
 οὕτως ἐν ὅλῳ, yet it occurs; e. g. below 24 a (where this passage
 is alluded to); Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάννυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias,
 xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὕτω δεινῷ καθέστηκεν. The rhythm probably
 determines the order. There is no need for the οὕτωςιν of V.

2. τὴν διαβολήν] Not the
 name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τό τε
 ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again
 23 a); nor 'calumny' simply
 (cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐξ ἧς
 ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή)· but *calumny*
believed, i. e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὐ πάννυ here as elsewhere
 retains its meaning of 'hardly,'
 'scarcely;' but this is to be in-
 terpreted as a litotes:—'I can
 hardly say I do not know.'
 Dig. 139.

11. ἡ δὴ] The antecedent of
 ἡ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτ'

ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλη-
 τος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
 βολή.

13. διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες]
 This fulness of expression is
 common in Plato, and gives the
 air of deliberateness. Dig.
 262.

14. ὥσπερ qualifies not only
 κατηγορῶν but also ἀνωμοσίαν
 and ἀναγνώναι. They are *quasi-*
prosecutors; it is a *quasi-in-*
dictment; and Socrates *makes*
believe to read it.

ἀνωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This

ναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζη- p. 19.
τῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον
κρίπτω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. c
τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑώρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν
5 τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-
φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-
λὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα
οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἀτιμάζων λέγω
τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
10 σοφός ἐστι· μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτρου τοσαύτας

b. Refu-
tation of
them.

2. καὶ οὐράνια] So Z; VBSH καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια. 8. μικρὸν]
According to Mæris, *σμικρὸς* is Attic. Yet in Æschin. and Isoer.
μικρὸς occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have *σμικρόν*.
But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, Pa-
thol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst. § 1, who instances pas-
sages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even
in the same sentence; Dem. Ol. B. 14. p. 22, Arist. Hist. An. II.
xv. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the
general principle οὐκ ἐξωμάλισται τὰ τῶν διαλέκτων καὶ μάλιστα τὰ
τῶν Ἀττικῶν. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree
a guide.

term, like ἀντιγραφὴ 27 a, is
used to designate the ἐγκλη-
μα. Both ἀντωμοσία and ἀντι-
γραφὴ were properly said of
the *defendant's* plea, presented
in writing and sworn to, in
the ἀνάκρισις, or preliminary
proceeding before the archon
Basileus. But as the ἐγκλημα
was likewise then presented in
writing and sworn to, the same
words came to be applied to it
also. See Introd. p. i.

7. ὧν ἐγὼ] The antecedent
of ὧν must be the matters in
the ἀντωμοσία, not the imme-
diately preceding words.

οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cog-
nate, not accus. of the object;
Dig. 6. Ἐπαῖω is intransitive.

8. καὶ οὐχ ὥς—ἐστι] This is
well-marked irony. Socrates
declines here to pronounce,
before an audience who would
have welcomed it, a condem-
nation of studies against which
at other times he had freely
declared himself, on the double
ground (1) that *human* nature
ought to be studied first, Xen.
Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the
physicists got involved in ques-
tions which were really beyond
the powers of the human mind,
ib. 11, and arrived moreover
at impotent conclusions, ib. IV.
vii. 6, 7.

10. τοσαύτας] 'Upon so grave
a charge' as that of pronounc-
ing upon things of which he

p. 19. δίκας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες
d 'Αθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν
τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους
διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκη-
κόατε διαλεγόμενον· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι·
φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα
ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγόμε-
νου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ
τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. 'Αλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδέ γ' 10
εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-
e πους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴος
τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοὺς] H. brackets. But if we read αὐτοὺς just before, follow-
ing the weight of MSS., τοὺς is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reprobated in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth is.' Dig. 147.

3. τοὺς πολλοὺς] A modest way of saying 'all of you.' Cf. Isocr. xvii. 23. p. 363, τί ἂν ὑμῖν τὰ πολλὰ λέγοιμι; and Rep. 556 a, τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων.

ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φρά-
ζειν] This is a hysteron pro-
teron : Dig. 308. With φρά-
ζειν is to be supplied of course ἀλλήλοις, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation : Dig. 233.

14. ὥσπερ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small : ὁ δὲ πλείστα κτησάμενος ὧν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν,

Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας κατέλιπε. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83. The ὑποκριταί, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 minæ (500 francs), seems to have been above the average : Isocrates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 minæ (3-400 fr.) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 minæ for his rhetorical course ; Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists' courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.

Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 19.
 τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν
 εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν
 ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται,
 5 τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας p. 20.
 σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσει-
 δέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε
 σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ
 προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς
 10 πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου
 τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέ—^ω
 Καλλία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱέ πώλῳ ἢ
 μόνῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἵχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λα-
 βεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ
 15 ἀγαθῶ ποιήσῃν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἣν δ' ἂν b
 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ'
 ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπι-
 στάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρω-
 πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ

14. καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synalepha.

5. τούτους πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσιδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens

there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστὶν ἐνθάδε.

10. Καλλία] Cf. Cratyl. 391 b, οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. "Callias fuit omnium Atheniensium suæ ætatis non modo facile ditissimus, ita ut simpliciter ὁ πλούσιος diceretur, sed etiam nequissimus suique peculii maxime prodigus."—Fischer.

p. 20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐηνός, ἔφην, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐηνὸν c ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὥς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ 5 οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην αὖν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὺν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί 10 σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μή τι ἔπρατες ἄλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, d ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι 15 δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε

c. Exposition of the veritable peculiarities in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the hollowness of the prevalent pretensions to knowledge,

6. ἐγὼ οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἔγωγε is not wanted here.

9. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old accusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed σοφός to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See *Introd.* p. xxvi.

10. πρᾶγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. *Crito* 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα, *Euthyd.* 304 a, τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, e, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

σόν· 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the σοφοί) have been about?'

13. εἰ μὴ—πολλοί] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένου· an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: *Dig.* 207. Very parallel is *Thuc.* V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε . . . , εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε,—where εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε repeats διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also *Hom. Od.* ii. 246, Εἵπερ γάρ κ' Ὀδυσσεὺς κ.λ., ἀλλὰ κεν αὐτοῦ ἀεϊκέα πότμον ἐπίσποι, Εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο.

ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν p. 20.
 δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εἰ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ· ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι'
 οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα.
 5 ποίαν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρω-
 πινῇ σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι
 σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ e
 ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί
 λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ γε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις
 10 φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί
 μοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' εἰ
 δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν

1. ὄνομα] Of σοφός. See note on σοφός, 18 b.

5. ἥπερ κ.τ.λ.] 'My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wisdom, as I believe (ἴσως), which is possible to man:' namely (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates speaks of this as *knowledge* because it implies two things;—(1) the possession of a standard or ideal of knowledge, with the conception of a method for attaining it; and (2) self-knowledge, such as would result from the Socratic system of self-examination (cf. 38 a, note), revealing the amount of actual short-coming. This is knowledge until the positive knowledge is attained, and if that never can be, then this is the only knowledge. Socrates' faith, however, in the partial attainableness of positive knowledge never wavered, and his misgiving here must be restricted to the possibility of complete attainment.

8. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or some wisdom that—I know not how to characterise it.' It is some predicate, alternative with μείζω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον, which Socrates affects to be at a loss for. The idiom is an expedient for abbreviation; the sentence is hurried to its conclusion *after its point has been expressed*, by a clause superseding the enumeration of further particulars: cf. Dig. 257, where the present passage is especially compared with Gorg. 494 d, (A) Φημὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώωαι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp. 177 a, ἢ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίπην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμός ὁ μῦθος ἀλλὰ Φαῖδρου τοῦδε. Cf. also Alc. I. 113 e. The verse in the Melanippe was οὐκ ἐμός ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur. Hel. 513, λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐμός, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος.

- p. 20. λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιώχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν
- p. 21. Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε πον. οὗτος ἐμός τε (attested by the enigmatical response from Delphi),
 ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε 5
 καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὥς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις 10
 ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοῖς] “There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45. note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates’ tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up.” It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates’ eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—σοφός Σοφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. σοφός, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia’s simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατῆλθε] This allusion to Chærephon’s antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλήθει ἑταῖρος is

to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἑταῖροι of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φυγὴν refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταύτην, ‘the recent.’ So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Pisistratidæ;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν. . . δις ἥδη καταλυθεῖσαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα γενομένας, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατῆλθε cf. Lysias, x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὅτου ὑμεῖς κατεληλύθατε· it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months’ reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.

σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περί ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν p. 21.
αὐτοῦ οὕτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύ-
τηκεν.

and the
course of
experi-
ments by
which he
had con-
firmed that
conviction;

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω b
5 γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα
γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει
ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε
μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαντῶ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν
ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ
10 δῆπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῶ· καὶ πολὺν
μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγισ
πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.
ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὥς c
ἐνταῦθα, εἴ πέρ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀπο-
15 φανῶν τῶ χρησμῶ ὅτι οὕτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι,
σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι
γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν,
πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῶ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος
20 ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς

1. ἀδελφός] Chærecrates : Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.

2. μαρτυρήσει] The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. x.

10. οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῶ] Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν.

17. τῶν πολιτικῶν] In itself this word means no more than 'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been applied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old law-givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's time speaking of Athens would

mean by πολιτικοὶ that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους (Politic. 303 e). As distinguished from the ῥήτορες, they were men who sought appointments to public offices, while the ῥήτορες were professional speakers in the Ecclesia. Cf. 23 e, and see Introd. p. ii. note 1.

19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῶ, ἔδοξέ μοι] This inversion of government is of common occurrence among the forms of changed construction: Dig. 271. ἔδοξε is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.

p. 21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ· κᾷπειτα
d ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός,
εἴη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολ-
λοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλο-
γιζόμεν ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώ- 5
τερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν
καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέ-
ναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ
οἶομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ
τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι 10
εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δο-
e κούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταῦτ' αὐτὰ
ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμε- 15
νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,
ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ
πλείστου ποιέισθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησ-
μόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι.
p. 22. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς 20
ὑμᾶς τάληθ' ἡ λέγειν· ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον·
οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν
τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν,
ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι
ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν 25
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦν-

20. νῆ τὸν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the

mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.

23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. Euthyd. 292 e, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν ἐνδεεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλείονος.

τος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 22.
 γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε
 τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἅ
 ἄλλους, ὥς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος
 5 ἐμαντὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων
 οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πε-
 πραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέ-
 γοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύ-
 νομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, τάληθ' ὅμως δὲ
 10 ῥητέον. ὥς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγον αὐτῶν ἅπαντες
 οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποι-
 ήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

I. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture *κἂν ἐλεγκτὸς* (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since *ἐλεγκτὸς* is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction;' and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be *true*, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense. 12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H's conjecture *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* is needless. For *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time;' just like *ἐν βραχεῖ*, Symp. 217 a, *ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ*, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course *ἐνὶ λόγῳ* occurs also, e. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between *κατ' ὀλίγον* and *κατὰ λόγον*, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

I. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double meaning is wrapped up in *μοι*, —it is both 'by my agency' and 'for my satisfaction.' καὶ signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. *μαντεία* signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains

distinct from that of *μαντεῖον*, which was the *form of words* in which the oracle was given; *μαντεία* is the *meaning* of the *μαντεῖον*. a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and not 'the present audience.'

p. 22. τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει
 c τινὲ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ
 χρησμοφδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ
 καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι
 ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα 5
 ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα
 σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὥπερ
 καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα· 10
 d ἐμαντῷ γὰρ ξυνῆδεν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὥς ἔπος
 εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἦδεν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ
 καλά ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην,
 ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη
 σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν 15
 μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ
 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξε-
 γάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σο-
 φώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην
 e τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαντὸν ἀνερῶ- 20

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is ἀποκρύπτει. The editors have espoused ἀπέκρυπτεν· but such a text would not account for such a variant as ἀποκρύπτει in the best MSS. Ἀποκρύπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ-

The usage of the orators proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A. a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5. p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρόντων οὐκ ἂν ὀκνηρότερος . . . ἦν. Lysias uses in the same meaning, but without the same possibility of question, οἱ παραγερόμενοι. The expressions used, whether for the audience or for the court, are different;

e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143, πολλοὶ τῶν περιεστώτων τούτων ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστανται, Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδ' ἑμῶν τῶν καθημένων οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπιτρέψει.

16. ἔδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί. The force of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἔδοξε, 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are especially meant.

τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως p. 22.
 ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων
 σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἂ
 ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
 5 τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

which
 experi-
 ments fur-
 ther sup-
 plied the
 key to the
 intensity
 of the
 prejudice
 against
 Socrates
 individu-
 ally, in the
 personal
 enmities
 which
 they had
 excited;

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὃ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθαι μοι γεγόνاسι καὶ p. 23.
 οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς δια-
 βολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι,
 10 σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες
 ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἂ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ
 δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,
 καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρω-
 πίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
 15 φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκρησθαι
 δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ b
 ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός
 ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
 ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ

μάτευμαι, ἀπείρηκα, Phædo 99 d, ὁρῶ ib. 98 b); but points to ἀπο-
 κρίπτειν, which is to be governed by ἔδοξε understood from ἔδοξαν·
 which gives also the best sense.

6. ταυτησὶ] The -ι is not always strictly δεικτικόν. Lob. Path.
 Pars II. p. 230, "Sæpe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquuntur,
 quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos propo-
 nunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et sæpius etiam negligunt, si
 de presentibus." Cf. *ταυτὶ*, 37 e. ἐξετάσεως] We cannot fol-
 low Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading ἔξεως, which is the result
 of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ' οὐ] This conjecture
 of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτον of the MSS.

9. ὄνομα δὲ—εἶναι] Lit. 'and
 I am called by this name, that
 I am wise.' The subject of λέ-
 γεσθαι is [ἐμὲ], not ὄνομα. And
 σοφὸς εἶναι is by attraction for
 [τὸ] εἶναι με σοφόν.

11. τὸ δὲ] Accus. of pronoun
 neuter, standing for the whole
 sentence immediately follow-
 ing: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ οὐδενός· 'or nothing':
 the καὶ is disjunctive.

p. 23. μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολή 5 γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν 10 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται· εἴτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ 15 αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιᾶρ-
d τatos καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις

and moreover gave a pretext for fastening on Socrates individually the imputation (previously only a class-imputation) of perverting the youth ;

1. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔχω ἔτι, but in the hand of a restorer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἔχων as the reading. ἔχων would be redundant, like ἔχων φλυαρεῖς, &c.) 2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS.

Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato : cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ.

11. μιμοῦνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμούμενοι is a conjecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for abstaining from public life.

6. ἐν πενία μυρία] Cf. Legg. 677 c, the beautiful expression μυρίαν τινὰ φοβεράν ἐρημίαν, Rep. 520 c, μυρία βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Œcon. ii. 3.

11. καὶ αὐτοὶ—ἐξετάζειν] For-

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γέυνονται, ὡς παιδιὰ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, αἰεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι . . . καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας περὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται] By practising upon each other.

αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι p. 23.
 μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν
 ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρό-
 χειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ
 5 γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον
 κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέ-
 λουεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιού-
 μενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι,
 φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντε-
 10 ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλή-
 κασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὧτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια-
 βάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ

and lastly,
 in com-
 bination

9. ξυντεταγμένως] So BSZ. H with two MSS. ξυντεταμένως.
 But ξυντεταγμ. means 'in set array:' cf. Æschin. ii. 74. p. 37,
 οἱ ξυντεταγμένοι ῥήτορες.

4. ταῦτα] Latin ista; idiomatically expressive of contempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand ζητῶ or the like, by comparison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τούτων] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—'that I am now attacked by' &c. The meaning 'in consequence of' would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning 'upon the strength of' would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, ἡ δὲ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος κ.τ.λ.

καὶ Μέλητος — ῥητόρων] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives,

and of the classes of persons called here πολιτικοὶ and ῥήτορες, see Introd. p. ii. note 1.

The δημιουργοὶ are here joined with the πολιτικοί, because Anytus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunction of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts (Xen. Œcon. iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of σχολή (Diog. ii. 31, Æl. Var. x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncommercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. iv.)

p. 23. Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν
ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ

p. 24. τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε,
ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ'
εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν 5
οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. ταυτ'
ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῇ, καὶ ὑμᾶς
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω
οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καί τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς
αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῇ λέγω 10
b καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια
ταυτά ἐστι. καὶ εἰάν τε νῦν εἰάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε
ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι
κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· 15
πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς
φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι
ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων
ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμο-
σίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς 20
τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει
c οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ
ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος

with the
old general
prejudice,
had in-
spired the
present
prosecu-
tion.

Second
part of
Defence;—
Justifica-
tion of him-
self as
against the
counts of
the indict-
ment, sepa-
rately;—

1. ὑπὲρ] We are to under-
stand, not that the accusers
were acting on behalf of their
respective classes, but merely
that they were to be regarded
as representatives of the feel-
ings of those bodies.

9. τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through
the same things:' that is, in
stating the facts I am virtually
reiterating and attesting the

charges.

11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ] Empha-
sis is of course on διαβολή.
'This is,'—i. e. 'in this con-
sists—the prejudice against
me.'

16. ἀγαθόν] 'Public bene-
factor.'

20. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε] See In-
trod. p. vi.

a. Perver-
sion of the
youth.

ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους p. 24.
ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται,
ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγ-
5 μάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν
οὐδὲν τούτῳ πάποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὥς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως
ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

Two an-
swers (both
dialecti-
cal);
1. the
hypocrisy
of the
charge;

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὧ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι
ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d
10 ἔσονται; Ἐγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐ-
τοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ-
σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὥς φῆς,
ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελ-
τίους ποιοῦντα Ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν.
15 ὁρᾷς, ὧ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καί
τοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον
οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ,
ὧ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' e
οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὧ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος,
20 ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.
Οὔτοι, ὧ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὧ

3. σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται] Oxy-
moron: 'is playing off a jest
under solemn forms.' The
machinery of the law, with all
its solemnity of circumstance
and all its serious consequences,
is set in motion by him for his
mere amusement. Cf. χαριεντι-
ζόμενος in the same sense 27
a, where it is explained by
παίζοντος.

8. Καί μοι κ.τ.λ.] The ex-
amination of Meletus by So-
crates, which now follows,

though it naturally affords
scope for exhibiting Socrates'
characteristic talent, is legally
speaking the customary ἐρώ-
τησις, to which either party
was bound to submit at the
requisition of the other. In-
trod. p. x.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citi-
zens,'—better toward others:
whereas βελτίους above means,
strictly speaking, better in
themselves.

p. 24. Μέλητε ; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἱοί τέ εἰσι καὶ
 βελτίους ποιούσι ; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ
 οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ ; Ἄπαντες. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν
 Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούν-
 p. 25. των. τί δὲ δῆ ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιούσιν, 5
 ἢ οὐ ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί ; Καὶ οἱ βου-
 λευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ,
 οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους ; ἢ
 κακέينوι βελτίους ποιούσιν ἅπαντες ; Κακέينوι. Πάν-
 τες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιούσι 10
 πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις ;
 Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατ-
 ἐγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναί ῃ καὶ περὶ
 b ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-
 οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ 15
 διαφθείρων ; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ
 βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί·
 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, δια-
 φθείρουσιν ; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ
 ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων ; πάντως δῆ- 20
 που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε·
 πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ
 εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφε-
 c λούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι
 ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς 25
 ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέ-
 ληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμέ εἰσάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But the truth is ;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.

26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be- tween ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a

play upon words is doubtless intended ; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant

2. the
stupidity
of it.

XIII. Ἐπι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, p. 25.
 πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ
 πονηροῖς ; ὦ τᾶν, ἀποκρίναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν
 ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς
 5 αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι ;
 Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυ-
 νόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι ; ἀποκρι- d
 ναι, ὦ γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι ; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε
 10 δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὥς διαφθείροντα τοὺς
 νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιῶντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα ;
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε ; τοσοῦτον σὺ
 ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν,
 ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργά-
 15 ζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγα- e
 θοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω,
 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, εἰάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω
 τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐ-
 τοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὥς
 20 φῆς σύ ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε,
 οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ p. 26.
 διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ'
 ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιού-
 των καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσά-
 25 γειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοουθετεῖν·

recurrence of the juxtaposition ; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. εἰπέ — Μέλητε] The address ὦ Μέλητε has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of εἰπέ πρὸς Διὸς with it: Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c, τί

οἶε, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, and 26 e below.

8. ὁ νόμος] See note, 24 c.

13. τηλικόσδε] Meletus was a very young man: cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 e extr.—Stallb.

p. 26. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν 5

b δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πάποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὁμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθεῖρουν, ὃ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις 10 νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθεῖρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὃ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ c ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι 15 μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἢ παντάπασί με 20 φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζει

b. Disbelief of established gods, and setting forth of strange spiritual agencies—answered by reducing Meletus to a contradiction.

2. ἔφυγες] 'Didst decline.' Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, κάξελαύνει χρὴ τὸ λοιπόν, κἂν φύγῃ τις ζημιούν. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφεύγειν. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἔφυγες and οὐκ ἦθ. form a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὔτε — σμικρὸν] Accus. cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not

nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. ὧν νῦν] 'Whom the argument at present concerns:' equivalent to οὓς λέγομεν, as distinguished from περὶ ὧν λέγομεν. — Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σὺν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπου [ὁ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, . . . μνήμην εἶναι.

θεούς. ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις; p. 26.
οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσ-^d
περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί,
ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην
5 γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε,
καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους
γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξα-
γόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν
λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθά-
10 νουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίστε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς e

3. Μὰ Δί'] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. Ἀναξαγόρου] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι. Anaxagoras' formula was μύδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκῆσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Laert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpp. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον ἐξέδωκε συγγραφῆς, librum a se scriptum edidit. Hoc tamen de Anaximandro alii, alii de Pherecyde Syro dicunt."—Forst.

9. καὶ δὴ καὶ] Ironical: 'and so then.'

10. ἃ—πριαμένους] The doctrines, not the books. ἐνίστε that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τετα-

μέναν αἰωρήμασι πέτραι ἀλύσει χρυσέαισι, φερομένην δίναισι, βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i. e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeck's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ] 'At the most:' the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἄξιός μιν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, ἐὰν πάμπλου, . . . δύο δραχμαὶ ἐπράξατο. The ut-

p. 26. ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῇται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὧ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ, οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα 5 μέντοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντῶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινι

p. 27. καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γάρ

4. νομίζειν] Oxon. alone has νομίζω, which, though anacoluthic after δοκῶ, has a vividness of its own, and certainly points to the right way of understanding the sentence as an instance of binary structure: see Commentary. But we cannot claim acceptance for νομίζω with such preponderating authority in favour of νομίζειν.

most the θεατρώνης could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeck, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καὶ] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar,' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he

would uphold the gods.

3. οὕτωςί—εἶναι] The two sentences οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ and οὐδένα—εἶναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὕτωςί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμὲ οὐδένα—εἶναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. Ἄπιστός κ.τ.λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.

ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμενῳ, ἄρα γνώσε- p. 27.
ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ
ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί-
5 νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νο-
μίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι
παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἣ μοι φαί-
10 νεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε·
ὕμεις δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνη- b
σθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς
λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε,
ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ
15 οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ
ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππων μὲν οὐ νομίζει
εἶναι, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει,
αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν
εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένῳ] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ὥσπερ—ξυντιθ.) within another (διαπειρ.); as Rep. 555 e, τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπέκοντα ἐνέκτες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες. Notice, that it is ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of men-

tioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες, Phdr. 235 a, ὡς οἶός τε ὦν, ταῦτά ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων, ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα, 271 d, ἔστιν οὖν εἴδη τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, Legg. 721 b, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμία, Phileb. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐθὺς τε καὶ αὐθὺς.

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.

p. 27. ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι
 c ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαί-
 μονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας, ὅτι
 μόγῃς ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν
 δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' 5
 οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ
 ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δῆ-
 που πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως
 ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ 10
 d οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε
 ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε.
 Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν
 θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί
 σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγού- 15
 μενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περ
 γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες
 εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν
 δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας
 ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, 20
 e ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων

6. δαιμόνιά γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμόνια καινὰ was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here

the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 c. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἐγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀντωμοσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ὧν τινων.

[τοὺς ἡμιόνους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. p. 27.
 ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ
 ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύ-
 την] ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα.
 5 ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν
 ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ
 δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε
 δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή p. 28.
 ἐστίν.

Third part 10
 of Defence;
 —Justifi-
 cation of
 the pursuit
 in which
 his life had
 been spent,
 viz., that
 of a moral
 reformer,
 15 ἐστίν. καὶ τοῦτ'
 with no-
 tices of
 the reform-
 atory doc-
 trine itself.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν
 ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέ-
 χθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εἰ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς
 15 ἐστίν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴανπερ αἰρήῃ, οὐ
 Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή
 τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγα-
 θοὺς ἄνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ b
 δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις·

6. πείθοις ἂν ὡς οὐ] The οὐ
 is not simply pleonastic, as in
 the case of two negatives in
 the same clause, but it is irra-
 tional. It is a confused anti-
 cipation of the coming negative
 οὐδεμία. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδὲν—στῇ] 'The rule
 is in no danger of breaking
 down in my case.' This use
 of οὐδὲν δεινὸν is idiomatic:
 cf. Gorg. 520 d, οὐδὲν δεινὸν
 αὐτῷ μὴ ἀδικηθῇ, 'we need not
 apprehend for him any injury,'
 Phædo 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ
 φοβηθῇ, 'we need not appre-
 hend that the soul will have
 to fear.' The 'apprehension' is

supposed to affect the speaker
 and his hearers, as interested
 in the contingency under dis-
 cussion. So here Socrates is
 speaking half ironically, in-
 teresting himself, as it were,
 for the rule, against himself.
 στῇ is also idiomatically used,
 as a quasi-impersonal;—that
 is, a vague nominative, such as
 'the course of events,' is un-
 derstood. See Dig. 97; where
 among other parallels is given
 Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix. 9, στή-
 σεται γὰρ κακεῖ. στῇ is literally
 'come to a stand-still.' Stallb.
 is wrong here.

p. 28. εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός 5 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κιν- 10 δύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμονμένῳ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὥς ἐγῶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ. αὐ- 15 τικά γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότης ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγόρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν d καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω κατα- 20 γέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ' ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγήσάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα 25

a. That first and foremost it was undertaken in obedience to the already mentioned divine call, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences or counter-inducements

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.] See below, d note.

5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καὶ with σμικρὸν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.

10. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same

illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. Il. xviii. 90.

23. οὐδ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἢ in this sentence is hyperbatically postponed to ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.

κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.
ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὃ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, e
5 οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπ-
τον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον
ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὥς ἐγὼ φήθην τε
καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετά-
10 ζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς p. 29.
ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.
δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἶη, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τότε ἂν με δικαίως
εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι
ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἴομενος
15 σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὦν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὃ
ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ
ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι
20 δ' ὥς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ b
τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to ;' literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπὸ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction : see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτιδαία—Δηλίῳ] At Potidæa (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of

bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάττοντος κ.τ.λ. — δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastic ; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance ?' τοῦ οἴεσθαι which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.

p. 29. τοῦ οἶσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀίδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με
c νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ¹⁰ or human
ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλ-
θον, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγων
πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς

2. τούτῳ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter τούτῳ both relate to the same fact, to the same *ὅτι*,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 e, λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ πὺ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, ἔν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν. The suppression after τούτῳ ἂν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death.

It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (*ὃς ἔφη*—ἀποκτείναι με), but with those next to them (*λέγων*—διαφθαρήσονται). Stallb. differs.

13. ἥδη ἂν] The construction of the fut. indic. with *ἂν* is abundantly established. *ἂν* here belongs to διαφθαρήσονται, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιτηδεύοντες is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσονται itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφευξοίμην denotes an event equally in the future. But

ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἅ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντά- p. 29.
 πασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε· ὦ
 Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφί-
 εμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ
 5 τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀλῶς
 ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, d
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἵποίμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ
 10 οἶός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰὲ
 ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ
 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν
 15 οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖ-
 στα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀλη- e
 θείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ
 ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισ-
 βητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν
 20 οὐδ' ἅπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ
 ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι

the plan
being, to
teach the
paramount
value of
the soul,
and the
duty of
caring for
it, and the
need of
consci-
ously-pos-
sessed
principles
of action.

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ὅτε φιλοσοφεῖν.] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] “Ἀσπά-ζεσθαι est aliquem salutare ita, ut eum amplectaris; φιλεῖν ita, ut eum osculeris.”—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the

transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀσπαζόμεναι their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πείσομαι—ὑμῖν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

14. ἰσχύν] Stallb., after Fischer, “de animi magnitudine et fortitudine.”

p. 30. δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἔστέ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων b ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω 10 σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ 15 φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μὴ, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος c ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' 20 ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, εἰάν ἐμέ ἀποκτείνητε τοι- 25 οῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμέ μείζω βλάψετε

b. That it was of vital use to his countrymen,—a divine blessing to them,

15. ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη] 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more com-

prehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

24. βοήσεσθε] A stronger expression of feeling than θορυβεῖν.

ἡ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν p. 30.
οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· d
οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνουσι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεί-
ρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως ἡ ἐξε-
5 λάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος ἴσως οἶεται
καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο-
10 γείσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι
ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως e
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον
εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ
15 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθε-
στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος·
οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι
τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνει-
δίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην p. 31.
20 πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥα-
δίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πεί-
θησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθό-
μενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

5. ἀτιμάσειεν] H substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειεν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάζω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἄτιμος, while ἀτιμώω is to make ἄτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἡτιμᾶσθω πάσας.

23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of H occurs here,—ὀρούσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον refers, not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμενον—θεοῦ, but to the simile

which follows them.

23. κρούσαντες] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύωψ.

p. 31. ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε,
εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ
μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος
ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ
b τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· 5
οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ
ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμε-
λουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πρᾶττειν
αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν
πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ 10
μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβά-
νων ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν
δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα
ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί
c τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, 15
ὥς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα.
ικανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀληθῆ
ὥς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

as its sin-
gularity
alone
might suf-
fice to
shew.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ

c. (In an-
swer to a

κρούσαντες is 'debile pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι] H drops the *τοι*, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatical for καὶ μέντοι εἰ τι. Cf. 41 e.

14. οὐχ οἰοί τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι — μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. See Dig. 303.

19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a

supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιϖὼν καὶ πολυ- p. 31.
πραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ
πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου
δὲ αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ-
5 λαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνε- d
ται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλη-
τος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-
νον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, αἰὲ ἀπο-
τρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ
10 οὐποτε· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ
πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι·
εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαί ἐπε-
χείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαί ἂν
ἀπολώλη καὶ οὗτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὗτ' ἂν e
15 ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάλληθῃ· οὐ

5. γίγνεται φωνή] All MSS. have this φωνή, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη. 9. τοῦτο ὃ ἂν] Edd. prefer τούτου. But ἀποτρέπει πράττειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theæt. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποτρέπει ξυνεῖναι, [Dem.] Proœm. xx. p. 1431, δείξας ἃ τότε ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταῦτα παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια κατέχουσιν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τούτου. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μὴ μοι, comparing Phædo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Pnyx; as in the famous πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω καθῆτο, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.

5. θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] When he

spoke of the ἔτερα καὶ δαιμόνια,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικωμωδῶν, which seems to mean 'selecting for caricature.' So σκώπτειν is to mock at, ἐπισκώπτειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.

- p. 31. γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δια-
 p. 32. κωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον 5 σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τοῦτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῇτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκασθαι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, 10 μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἔρῳ δὲ ὑμῖν φορ-
 b τικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθη-

as experience on two occasions of his life had shewn him.

11. ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν] This is Ast's conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided between ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην, and ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἅμα καὶ ἅμ' ἂν, B ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην, H ἅμ' ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἅμα καὶ ἅμα. The variants may easily have come from ἅμα καὶ ἂν, in the form ἅμα καὶ ἂν. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλ' ἂν ἀπ., 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph. O. T. 661, ὃ τι πύματον ὀλοῖμαν.

12. δικανικά] H conjecturally prefixes οὐ, observing "quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a principio se ξένως ἔχειν τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia verba promittere?" But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not δικανικά; Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 a, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ὁ — ἔργα] 'What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life.' ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when acting as judges in the *Ἐκκlesia*, or the *Heliaea*,—'you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.'

Here appears, in a refined form, the common *τόπος* of rehearsing a man's past services in his defence; of which

practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἐστὶ, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν . . . ὥς στρατιώται ἀγαθοὶ εἰσι κ.τ.λ. Whence again Socrates says just below, he is 'about to employ a topic of vulgar use, and one that savours of the law-courts.'

11. μὴ ὑπέικων δέ] 'But would be ready to perish at once as the price of not yielding.'

φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά] φορτικά

ναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ p. 32.
 πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀν-
 τιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς
 τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβού-
 5 λεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ
 χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυ-
 τάνεων ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς

7. ὑμῶν is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with all the edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS.: although ἐναντιοῦσθαι does not require a dative of reference, especially in a description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,'—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐρῶ ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικανικά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 e, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, . . . ἀ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμος δέ. δικανικά is likewise a colourless word;—not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. τοὺς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννέα στρατηγούς.

5. παρανόμως, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἄθροοι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.

vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannonus); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχεία ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ἡ σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον· and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἡναντιώθην . . . ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἡναντιώθην a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε, . . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν

p. 32. νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μὴ ψήφῳ ἀποκτείνειν πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων.

(b) Ib. IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἡναντιώθη τοιαύτη ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου κ.τ.λ.

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9-15, ἐντεῦθεν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποιοῦν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήνεγκε τὴν ἐαυτῆς γνώμην, Καλλίξενος εἰπόντος, τήνδε . . . τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων τινῶν οὐ φασκόντων προθήσειν τὴν διαψήφισιν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, αὖθις Καλλίξενος ἀναβὰς κατηγορεῖ αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ ἐβόων καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας. οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ὡμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν, πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ νόμον ποιήσειν.

(d) Axiochus, 368 d. . . . οἱ πρῶν δέκα στρατηγοί· ὅτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἐπηρόμην τὴν γνώμην· οὐ γάρ ἐφαίνετό μοι σεμνὸν μαινομένῳ δήμῳ συνεξάρχειν· οἱ δὲ περὶ Θηραμένην καὶ Καλλίξενον τῇ ὕστεραῖα προέδρους ἐγκαθέτους ὑφέντες κατεχειροτόνησαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄκριτον θάνατον. The word ἐγκάθετοι is explained by Aesch. iii. 3. p. 54, καὶ ταῦτα ἕτεροί τινες τὰ ψηφίσματα ἐπιψηφίζουσιν, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δικαιοτάτου τρόπου λαχόντες προεδρεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς καθεζόμενοι.

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχόν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλῳτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. For this, as Luzac aptly remarks, is the

historical fact before us disguised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The reference of ἡναντιώθη must therefore be to Socrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἡναντιώθη, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων· the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Socrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ρητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν p. 32.

προβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make *μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων* flat, since the *πρυτάνεις* had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the *προβούλευμα* being read out by the *κῆρυξ*, it was handed to the *proedri*, who with the *nomothetæ* had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer *ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην* to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the *proedri* and *nomothetæ*. The *hysteron proteron* is on Greek principles natural: *ἡναντιώθην*—*νόμους* precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Æschines, ii. 84. p. 40, *ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἀναστὰς ἐκ τῶν προέδρων Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπιψηφιεῖν βούωντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τοὺς προέδρους ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα κατ' ὄνομα καλούντων,*

οὕτως ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The *προβούλευμα* was handed to the *proedri*, who after conferring with the *nomothetæ* pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the *κῆρυξ*. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an *ὑπομυσία* in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. 3. Or the *Epistates* might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to *ἐνδειξις* if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the *proedri* (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Æsch. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. *ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν*] 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of *ἐνδειξις* and *ἀπαγωγή* are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timocr. 146. p. 745, Lept. 156. p. 594, Antipho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the *βουλευτικὸς ἔρκος* as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffter's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). "*ἐνδειξις* might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent

p. 32. κελυόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ
^c δικαίου ᾧ μὴ μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ'
 ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα
 δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρα-
 τουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, ⁵
 οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν
 εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος
 Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὲ καὶ
 ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλό-
 μενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ¹⁰
 d ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ

instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to *ἐνδειξις*, which *ἐνδειξις* was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The thesmothetæ had exclusive cognisance of *ἐνδειξις*. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of *ἐνδειξις*, on which some writers rely,—that it was *ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεομένου*,—is called by Heffter 'a mere jangle of words.' 'Ἀπαγωγὴ was of wider application than *ἐνδειξις*. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in *ἐνδειξις* was not the rule.

ἐνδειξις was an interdictory procedure, *ἀπαγωγὴ* a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken *ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ*, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in *ἀπαγωγὴ* was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. *θόλον*] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. *ἀναπλῆσαι*] This word, like *implere* in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here 'implicate.' See for example Phædo 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antipho, ii. A. a. 10. p. 116, *συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναίτιους*.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' p. 32.
 οἷον, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι,
 τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ
 ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργά-
 5 σασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν
 τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα,
 ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμεν ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταυτ'
 ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ e
 τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

d. (In answer to a supposed objection that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth,

10 XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγε-
 νέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως
 ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβोधέθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ
 χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ,
 ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων
 15 οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ p. 33.
 πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς
 οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ
 δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὐς οἱ δια-
 βάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ
 20 διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς
 μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῇ
 ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ
 πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. ὑμῖν] So MSS. and edd. generally. ὑμῶν is a conjecture of H.

9. μάρτυρες] The μαρτυρίαι are supposed to follow here. In-
 trod. p. x.

20. διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμε-

λεῖσθαι Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; "not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but test theirs."—Zeller.

p. 33. διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ εἴαν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην 5 μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὃ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσιν —a sus-
c τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὧ ἄν- 10 picion
δρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· which was
ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις also re-
μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. futed inde-
ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ pendently.
θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ 15
παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὧ
Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ
d ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφ-
θαρκα, χρῆν δῆπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι 20
γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν
πώποτε τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας
ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ
ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ
ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἶπερ ὑπ' 25

11. εἶπον.] So Stallbaum, rightly. εἶπον, Hermann. See Commentary.

2. καὶ εἴαν τις] This is a soft way of saying, 'And I am ready to question him, if he chooses.'

12. ὅτι ἀκούοντες] Stallb. rightly joins this with ἀλλὰ διὰ τί— διατρίβοντες; the ἀκηκόατε—εἶπον·

being interjected. Then ὅτι is 'because.' See the examples which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphro 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.

ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμ- P. 33.
νῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν
πολλοὶ ἐντανθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων
οὔτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου e
5 τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου
τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὔτοσί,
Ἐπιγένους πατὴρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεο-
ζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος

2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them *there*, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's *Jul. Cæs.* Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in *Xen. Mem.* I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in *Athen. V.* 220 a, with Æschines, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see *Diog. Laert.* II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (*Schol.* in *Menex.*). He was at variance with Aristippus (*Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect.* II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratists: he is of the company named in the *Phædo* (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned *Xen. Mem.* III. xii. 1, and *Phædo* 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Demo-

docus, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the *Theages*. Of *Theages* it is said, *Rep.* 496 b, εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγου χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχέιν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἣ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the *Rep.* (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the *Phædo* (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the *Symp.* says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποιήμαι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὃ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Antodorus are only mentioned here.

p. 33. τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ κατα-
 p. 34. δεηθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν
 Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,
 οὗ ἀδελφός οὗτος Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ
 Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς 5
 ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν
 τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·
 εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
 χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου
 πᾶν τὸνναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὧ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ 10
 βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζο-
 b μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ
 Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν
 λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-
 βύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα 15
 ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν
 ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευ-
 δομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶπεν δὴ, ὧ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' Conclu-
 ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστί ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως 20 sion;—
 c τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτῇσειεν ἀνα- reason for
 μνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῖ τοῦ not en-
 ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε treating
 τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδίᾳ τε the mercy
 αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, 25 of the
 καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ court.

1. καταδεηθείη] The κατα-
 implies absence of all reserve
 or modification: here in a bad
 sense it expresses an unprin-
 cipated act. Dig. 122.

8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full
 expression occurs Æschin. iii.
 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ

βήματος, ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς. Note by
 the way, that the examination
 of witnesses was extra to the
 time allowed for the pleadings;
 cf. Lysias xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166,
 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα] 'And then
 finds that I.'

οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 34.
 ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις
 ταῦτα ἐννόησας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη,
 καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θέϊτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς
 5 τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ d
 μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς
 τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν
 πού τινες καὶ οἰκέιοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ
 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-
 10 φυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκέιοί μοι εἰσι
 καὶ νιεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον
 ἦδη, δύο δὲ παιδιά· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο
 ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί
 δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, e
 15 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
 θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος
 λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη
 τῇ πόλει οὗ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν
 ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα,
 20 εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον
 γέ ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZH τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι] Refers to κίνδυνον, not to ἔσχατον—'danger, as he would think it.'

5. οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἰ—['I say if;] for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition,] if it should be so.'

6. ἐπιεικῇ] 'Conciliatory.'

9. 'Ομήρου] Odyss. xix. 163.

11. εἰς μὲν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). δύο· Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Phædo 116 b).

15. εἰ μὲν] 'Whether I can look death in the face or not.'—Whewell.

19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφός· cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε σοφία εἴτε κ.τ.λ.

ρ. 35. ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἷον σπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὥς δεινόν τι οἰομένους 5 πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃ τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ
 b τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναῖων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ 10 ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταλῃ- 15

against both this and τὸν Σωκράτη stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates *is to* differ;' it is the form of a resolution which *is to* take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῷ Σωκράτει leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardt (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρία, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diæresis ἀνδρηῆ· (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Here. F. 475, πατὴρ ἐπύργου, μέγα φρονῶν ἐπ' ἀνδρία, which Elmsley has emended εὐανδρία); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρία· (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία.

13. οὔτε ὑμᾶς] VH ὑμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἡμᾶς. H says "ὑμᾶς commodum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἔσονται] 'If we are to given a different turn to the have such conduct on the part meaning.
 of those,' &c. εἰεν would have

φιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος p. 35.
καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιούντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυ-
χίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ
5 δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ
δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κáθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ κατα-
χαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα
καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ
10 δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς
ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιорκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέ-
τεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὖσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με,
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν,
ἂ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,
15 ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύ- d
γοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουῖ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ
πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας,
θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ
ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὥς

9. ὁμώμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἡ μὴν ὁμοίως ἀκροάσεσθαι τῶν κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων Isocr. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαριεῖσθαι] 'That he will favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated;' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἄλλως—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable

hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νῆ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.

p. 35. θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

e XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
p. 36. ναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθ-
μόν. οὐ γὰρ ὥμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα

B. The Counter-assessment of the Penalty.

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ὑμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread. *Introd.* pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οὐκ—τοῦτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the

point of the sentence: *Dig.* 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι] οὐκ, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον] Hyperbatical for παρ' οὕτως ὀλίγον' *Dig.* 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i. e. 'so close.' *Dig.* 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, *Introd.* p. iv.

μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ- p. 36.
λητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα,
καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό
γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή-
5 σοντες ἐμοῦ, καὶ ὦφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλα- b
βὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

a. Proposal
on the
footing of
full justice,
—ironical.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.
εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὃ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός
10 εἶμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ
ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί,
χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ
δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν

The implication in *μόναι* that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of *τριάκοντα* into *τρεῖς*. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, *πεντήκοντα* is a necessary emendation for *πέντε*. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπέφευγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i. e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. ii.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσαι applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἂν καταγῶ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρήμα, ὅτου ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιός εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι (part of the νόμος ὕβρεως), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ὅ τι μαθὼν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides': Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ξυνωμοσιῶν] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.

p. 36. καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησά-
 e μενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπικεικότερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε
 εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἱ
 ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος
 εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν 5
 μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα,
 ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε
 τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
 μεληθεῖν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος
 ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πό- 10
 λεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
 d ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν ;
 ἀγαθόν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν
 τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ 15
 πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
 τέρᾳ παρακελεύσει ; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
 πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν
 ὑπὸ φρὴν ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. 20

5. ἐπὶ δὲ—εὐεργεσίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐνταῦθα, and governed by ἦα· and the ἰὼν with εὐεργετεῖν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἰὼν would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἔμελλον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν, i.e. οἱ δὲ ἰὼν ἔμελλον ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον εὐεργ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'

16. εὐεργέτῃ] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys.

xx. 19. p. 159. Add Dem. F. L. 330. p. 446, τί δέ ; δοίητ' ἂν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δωρεάν, αἷς τιμᾶτε τοὺς εὐεργέτας ;

17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὕτως. Dig. 164.

20. ζεύγει] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτασσον.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ p. 36.
δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ e
δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τι- p. 37.
μᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

b. Com-
promise,—
ironical
also.

5 XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-
πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς
ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ
Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι
ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς
10 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διει-
λέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν b
μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ
ῥᾶδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύ-
15 εσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ
δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐ-
τός, ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου
τινὸς ἑμαντῶ, τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ
Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ
20 ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι
ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος;
πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, c
δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα;
ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις] The Lacedæmonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.

21. ὦν—όντων] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of *knowing*, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of *ὅτι*, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a

finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.

23. τοῖς ἔνδεκα] εἰς ἀφ' ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ γραμματεὺς ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συνηριθμεῖτο Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.

p. 37. ταῦτόν μοί ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
 σμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλή
 μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι,
 ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες 5
 πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς
 d διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γε-
 γόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ
 ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως.
 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος 10
 εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης
 πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ
 γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροά-
 σονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπε-
 λαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς 15
 e πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πα-
 τέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ
 ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν
 ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον 20
 πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ
 ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν
 p. 38. ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὥς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ
 λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ
 τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι- 25
 εῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε

20. τουτὶ] Cf. textual note on ταυτησί, 22 e.

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. Dig. 142.

9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] Ironical.

11. ἐξελθόντι] 'If I quit the city:' as below e, ἐξελθὼν ζῆν.

20. τουτὶ] Namely, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσομαι.

διαλεγόμενου καὶ ἐμavτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ p. 38.
δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'

I. ὁ ἀνεξέταστος — ἀνθρώπῳ] The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, Γνώθι σεαυτόν. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:—

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος ὁποῖός τις ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρεῖαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25 :

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 e, διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον βεβίωκεν' and below 39 c, διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου·

(3) examination of one's opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge : Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d :

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a pre-requisite : Alc. I. 133 c, ἀρ' οὐν

μὴ γινώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . δυνάμεθ' ἂν εἶδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16; περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων αἰὲ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὖσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδὼτας ἡγείτο καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλησθαι· and here (just above) τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, Laches 188 b, ἀξιοῦντα μανθάνειν ἕωσπερ ἂν ζῇ), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensableness of this discipline : —Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν, καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γινώσκων, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι, Soph. 230 d, τὸν δ' ἀνέλεγκτον αὐ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνη βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ., Hip. Ma. 304 e, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν καὶ ὅποτε οὕτω διάκεισθαι, οἷε σοι

p. 38. ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, ὧ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἶθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην
b ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν 5 ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ 10 Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, c ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

κρεῖττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; and in the passage before us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ'] A supplementary reason;—'Were silence possible, it would be no less a κακόν' which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ] This combination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy-

pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The δὲ and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor aposiopesis. Dig. 149.

12. ἐγγυᾶσθαι] Governed by an equivalent of 'they say' contained in κελεύουσι. Cf. Symp. 213 a, πάντας οὖν . . . κελεύειν εἰσιέναι καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν. Dig. 245.

13. ἀξιόχρεοι.] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final verdict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be concluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges

C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges :
 a. to those who had voted for his condemnation ;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὧ ἄνδρες p. 38.
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-
 μένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε,
 ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ
 5 καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν
 περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν
 ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι
 πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ d
 10 καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες,
 ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς
 ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾧμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε
 ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ
 15 μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναι-
 σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα,
 οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἤδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνηοῦντός τέ μου καὶ
 ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ e
 καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὲ καὶ εἴθισθε
 20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾧήθη

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See *Intro.* p. vii.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but

a brief space after all, by forestalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' ἔνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.

- p. 38. δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκη οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ'
- p. 39. ἐμέ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετεῖαν τραπεύμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ὧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάτονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας
- b 15

7. τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις] Before ἂν VH have ῥᾶον· BSZ reject it. H errs in thinking that ῥᾶον exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. Lectt. Plat., in whom “p. 39 a 3 ῥαῖον” must be an erratum for “ῥαῖον om.”

4. ἐκείνως] Understand ἀπολογησάμενος again.

12. μὴ . . . ἢ] An instance of the *presumptive* variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. θάπτον γὰρ θ. θεῖ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 e, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένον, ᾧ τὸ

ἄδικον λωβᾶται κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 a, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.'s quotation of Odys. viii. 329, οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα· κινᾶνει τοι βραδὺς ὥκυν' is not to the point.

18. ὑπὸ — ὠφληκότες] ‘Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of,’—Whewell.

ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ p. 39.
τιμῆματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως
οὔτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρη-
5 σμφοδῆσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἰμι c
ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες,
οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ
τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν
10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἰόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι H inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking this to be suggested by οἰόμενοί με of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably με, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δι φθέραν with an erasure between—διφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγὼ τε . . . καὶ οὔτοι] 'I as well as they.' ἐγὼ has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307.

6. ἐν ᾧ—χρησμοδοῦσιν] The opinion, which connects prophetic enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector's death, Il. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, Il. xxii. 358: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προ-
γινώσκων τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοδῆσαί τι, Cic. De Div. I. 30, Facilius evenit appropinquante morte ut animi futura augurentur; ex quo et

illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homericī Hectoris qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shakespeare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i. (Gaunt) "Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir'd; And thus, expiring, do foretell of him." And Sir H. Davy ("Remains," p. 311) speaks of himself as "looking into futurity with the prophetic aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence"—in a letter dated just two months before his death.

9. οἶαν] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A virtual cognate accusative after ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.

11. διδόναι ἔλεγχον] Namely, under the process of ἐξέτασις· cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.

p. 39. ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλεί-
d οὺς ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον,
ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται
ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν 5
τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρ-
θῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγή οὔτε
πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη
καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολουέιν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα 10
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος
e ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν δια-
λεχθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν
ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω ἔρχομαι 15
οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες,
παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ καλύνει
p. 40. διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν
γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὓσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι
ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, δικα- 20
σταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην
—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαν-
τικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ
πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰὲ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιου-
μένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξαι· νυνὶ δὲ 25

b. to those
who had
voted for
his ac-
quittal.

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ ἔνδεκα.

20. δικασταί] Steinhart remarks that up to this point, where first the true and false judges are separated, the form of the address used has been ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

22. ἡ εἰωθυῖα] 'The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice.' See App. A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

24. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς] ἐπὶ separates πάνυ from σμικροῖς, to which it belongs: Dig. 298.

ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἃ γε δὴ p. 40.
 οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι.
 ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξiónτι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ b
 θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοί ἐπὶ τὸ
 5 δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι
 ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με
 ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύ-
 την τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ
 ἡναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;
 10 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς
 τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ c
 τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ
 γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς
 15 σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὥς πολλῇ
 ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν
 ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἰσθη-
 σιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ
 20 λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις

5. μέλλοντί τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon.,
 which stands μέλλοντι^{τι} (τί being *prima manu*), importing that *τι*
 should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his repre-
 sentation. 7. ταύτην] So VBH; αὐτήν SZ. It is impossible
 to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon.
 and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has
 ταύτην for αὐτήν.

4. ἐνταυθοί ἐπὶ τὸ δικ.] An
 emphasised equivalent of ἐπὶ
 τόδε τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d,
 κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, equi-
 valent to κατ' αὐτήν μόνον τὴν
 πόλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ
 ἐκεῖ δύο προεῖλοντο, viii. 28, καὶ
 ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον
 καθιστάσι.

18. οἷον] 'As it were.' Pa-
 renthetical to the construction.
 The words which it qualifies
 are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject
 of μηδὲν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνεῶτα).
 Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἷον ἀποδηῆσαι,
 and again ε, οἷον ἀποδηῆσαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popu-
 lar religious teaching.

p. 40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.
d καὶ εἴ γε μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος,
ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρα, θαυμά-
σιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ
τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὕτω 5
κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μὴδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-
παρθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν,
πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης
τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ 10
e ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμή-
τους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ
νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε
λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημησαί 15
ἐστίν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῇ
ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθ-
νεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες
p. 41. δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλ-
λαγείς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή- 20
σει τοὺς ὥς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται
ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὥς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὥς is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὥς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν, Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὥς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified form of the dative of reference, equivalent nearly to a genitive: Dig. 28.

12. αὐτὸν] A resumption of ἰδιώτην τινά and βασιλέα, after the intervention of εὐαριθμ. ἂν εὐρεῖν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι] These nouns are in the nominative by attraction to the interposed relative clause, as the nearest construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptolemus occur as judge of the dead (though in Hom. Hymn.

καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι p. 41.
 ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ
 ἀποδημία; ἡ αὖ Ὀρφεὶ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ
 καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν
 5 ὕμῳ; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ
 ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει b
 καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν
 παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλ-

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Æacus judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Æacus was the hero of Ægina, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I.

Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'

7. διατριβῇ] Cf. Euthyphro sub init., Legg. I. 625 a.

ὅποτε—τέθνηκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence ὅποτε—ἀηδὲς εἴη is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically, —an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τὸν πάνσοφον, ὃ Δαναοί, τὰν οὐδὲν ἀλγύνουσιν ἀηδόνᾳ Μουσᾶν, τῶν ἐλλάνων τὸν ἄριστον, the whole

p. 41. λοντι τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, 5 δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν c στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ 10 ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι 15 d τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δηλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγ- 20

6. ἄγοντα] Edd. ἀγαγόντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγοντά. See Commentary.

audience, reminded of Socrates, burst into tears. Cf. *Introd.* p. xx. note 10.

6. ἄγοντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. *Legg.* 635 a, καθάπερ μάντις ἀπὸν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 c, Θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις . . . ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε

χρόνῳ διαφθεῖρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἢ ἄλλους—εἴποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: *Dig.* 257.

16. ἀληθές] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

20. πραγμάτων] The wants and hardships of old age. Cf. *Xen. Apol.* 32, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ

μάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ p. 41.
 ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισα-
 μένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.
 καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ
 5 κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς e
 ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν·
 τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὧ
 ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύ-
 πουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του
 10 πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι
 εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν,
 ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες
 οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇτε, δίκαια πεπον- p. 42.
 θὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.
 15 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ,
 ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ
 ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἦ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ πάνυ] Here, as elsewhere, οὐ πάνυ marks only a bare denial: Dig. 139. Socrates is satisfied with saying, 'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία would in no case have suffered him to say, 'I am far from being displeased.'

8. ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By plying them unweariedly with warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἦ] This combination is exactly parallel to ἀλλ' ἦ. The two particles enter the combination coordinately, introducing the exception to the preceding universal negative in their own several ways. πλὴν implies 'it is known to none,—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;' ἦ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar. Nub. 360, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω γ' ὑπακούσαιμεν . . . πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ.

APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαιμόνιον.

THE word δαίμων was used to denote either θεός or a spiritual being inferior to θεός. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being *in his dealings with men*. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning¹. Δαιμόνιος therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαιμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ ²θεοῦ ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἔρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διετεθρῦλτο ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι κακὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαιμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμωδῶν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαιμόνια πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 e), ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον γίνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον τὸ δαιμόνιον, or (Theæt. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

¹ In Plat. Symp. 202 d—203 a, δαίμων.

this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεὸς ἀνθρώπων οὐ μέγνυται, all μαντικὴ is the province of the

² Whence the phrase of Æschines (iii. 117. p. 70) ὕσως δὲ καὶ δαιμονίου τινὸς ἐξαμαρτάνειν αὐτὸν προαγομένον is indeterminate.

of a personal attendant δαίμων (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαιμόνιον. Ἡ φωνὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαιμόνιον as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by *divinum quiddam*, Divin. I. 54, not by *genius*), until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαιμόνιον σημεῖον?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these :

Mem. I. i. 2-5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρώνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κάκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασὶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὄρνιθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δὲ, ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοὶς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12-13, Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκόασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι [οἱ θεοί], εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτῶμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ. Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθὴ λέγω καὶ σὺ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένης ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἔξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρᾶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἅ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5-6, Ἀλλὰ νῆ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἐρμόγετες, ἥδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθῃ τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, Θαναμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δὲ, Θαναμάξεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἥδη ;

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβὲς οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτὲ δ' ἄλλου του ἐφίμενος.

To which must be added still from the *Memorabilia*, I. i. 19, Σωκράτης ἡγείτο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πρᾶττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρῆναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' δαιμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him 'unsolicited'. He adheres (unless we admit as his the θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται in § 12 of the Xenophontean Apology) to the expression σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαιμόνιον is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προσημαίνουσι (Mem. IV. iii. 12), τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by μαντική in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ παρῆναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων, he seems either to have directed others to μαντική (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of μαντική, which is defined in Mem. I. i. 6-9, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσσομένους ἔπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκῆσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἐαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἂ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν, ἂ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ᾧσιν ἴλεω σημαίνειν.

This accords with Plato, *Apol.* 40 a, ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical

—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere presentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or in expediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—*Apol.* 31 c-d, *τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν.* 40 a-b, *ἣ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶς ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἤνικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμῶς μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὐτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντιώται μοι.*—*Euthyd.* 272 e, *κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἥδη ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην.*—*Phdr.* 242 b, *ἡνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὦγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—αἰεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—, καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἣ με οὐκ ἔα ἀπέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον.*—*Alcib.* I. init. 103 a-b, *τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεῦσαι. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα. εὐέλπιδος δέ εἰμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό.*—*Theæt.* 151 a, *ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν*

³ Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the *Apology*. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the

Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the *δαιμόνιον* (31 d).

μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι ἐνίοις δὲ ἔᾱ.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἥ γάρ πού τιτι ἄλλω ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the *μαντική* of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the *φωνή* unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—*ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε* (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, *ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν οὕτω καὶ ἔλεγε*,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in *μαντική* and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the *σημεῖον*; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,

declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a *singular* characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὸ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the σημεῖον which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phædrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is prejudicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.

We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαιμόνιον to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (*Apol.* 31 d), ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (*Mem.* IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαντῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (*De Divin.* i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (*De Socr. Dæm.* c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as κωλύον ἢ κελεύον.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in *Apol.* 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconciliation of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με, he

describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato’s notice points, the words *προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no *impulse*; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαιμόνιον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was *κριτική*, not *ἐπιτακτική*. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will, would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates’ substitute for *μαντική*. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every

part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.

APPENDIX B.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns :—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.

Idioms of Nouns :—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.

Idioms of Nouns :—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.

Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.

Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.

Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.

Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.

Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.

Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.

Idioms of Sentences :—Attraction, §§ 179—203.

Idioms of Sentences :—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.

Idioms of Sentences :—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.

Idioms of Sentences :—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.

Idioms of Sentences :—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.

Idioms of Sentences :—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.

Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

§ 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS :—ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.

β. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.

Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i. e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included.

The “Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence” is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10—12).

§ 2. *b.* Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns *in agreement with* an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατέδρσαν τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ).

Phædo 75 b, ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—‘perform the other acts of the senses.’

Ib. 85 b, ἡγοῦμαι . . . οὐ χείρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἅλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν, i. e. ‘in the other cases.’ Stallbaum takes this of ‘the other (εἶδη) species of things’ which have to be named, ‘quod ad cæteras attinet formas.’ This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρῆσθαι leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῇ κρίνῃ . . . ἐγγὺς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστον ἄξια ἐχρῶντο, Hdt. i. 132, χρᾶται [τοῖς κρέασιν] ὃ τι μιν λόγος αἰρέει.

Phdr. 228 c, (A) Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν κ.τ.λ. (B) Πάνν γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

Theæt. 193 c, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης.

Legg. 792 c, τοῦτ’ οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἐγὼ ξυνακολουθήσαιμ’ ἄν—‘this is one step further than I can go with you.’ Exactly parallel are the Homeric τόδ’ ἱκάνεις, τόδε χάεο, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἴ τι χρηστὸν ἔδει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι.

§ 3. *c.* Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν.

Ib. d, κινδυνεύω [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.

Meno 93 b, ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

Rep. 349 e, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ. φρόνιμον ἀγαθὸν [εἶναι λέγεις];—‘good at those things *in* which he is wise.’

Ib. 579 d, δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας.

Laches 191 c, τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐταρκῇ θέσιν κειμένη, v. 34, ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν ἀτιμίαν τοιάνδε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)

§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as *περᾶν πόδα, βρύχειν ὀδόντας*. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, *θαυμαστὸς τὸ κάλλος*.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 371, *τυφλὸς τὰ τ' ὦτα τὸν τε νοῦν τὰ τ' ὄμματ' εἰ*.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, *ἃ δὲ ἡ χάρα πρὸς τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, . . . ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν*.

Ib. e, *ὅσα τροφήν . . . ἡ γῆ . . . πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν*.

Rep. 467 c, *οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται*—‘to the extent of human capacities.’ It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 e, *σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε ἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον*.

Ib. 54 d, *ἀλλ' ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς*.

Rep. 405 c, *ιατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίας*.

Phdr. 274 a, *οὐ γὰρ . . . ὁμοδούλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν . . . , ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον*.

Tim. 42 e, *ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβεργᾶν ζῶον, ὅ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον*.

Ib. 69 d, *σεβόμενοι μαίνουν τὸ θεῖον, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη*.

Ib. 90 e, *διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστέον, ὃ μὴ τις ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν*.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied *metaphorically*, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, *οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέονται σιδήρου*. As we say, ‘not one *bit*.’

Cf. *τί δεῖ*; (‘what need?’ not ‘why is there need?’) illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, *τί ἔδει αὐτοὺς ὁμνῆναι . . . ; οὐδὲ ἐν δήπου*.

Phædo 91 d, *σῶμά γ' αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται*—‘ceases not one bit.’ To join it with *σῶμα* would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, *ἅπερ . . . οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων*, and Euthyphro 8 c, *οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτ' ἀμφισβητοῦντες*.

Phædo 99 c, τὰγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.

Euthyd. 293 c, ἦττον οὖν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ;

Charm. 174 c, ἦττόν τι ἡ ἱατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει;

Crito 47 c, τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων. Note, that ἐπαϊόντων is intransitive (as infra d, εἴ τις ἐστιν ἐπαίων), and therefore μηδὲν ἐπ. is not 'who understand nothing,' but 'who do not understand one bit.'

Apol. 19 c, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω.

Ib. 21 b, ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοῖδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν.

Ib. 26 b, Μελέτω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν—where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν is not the Nom. to ἐμέλησεν, nor in regimen with τούτων, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμέλησεν. In Crat. 425 c, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας, and Legg. 887 e, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, πλείω τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.

Phileb. 23 e, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον.

Symp. 193 a, ἅπαντα εὐσεβεῖν περὶ θεοὺς—'in all his acts to act piously toward the gods.'

Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείζω βλάπτει.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σώζειν.

Cf. Homer's πάντα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα ἐφύκει, and the common expression τὰ μέν—τὰ δέ.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—

Symp. 207 d, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον, ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι.

Politic. 296 e, τὸν ὅρον . . . ὃν ὁ σοφὸς . . . διοικῆσει τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι—'on a footing of the greatest possible caution.' (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας like τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)

Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γὰρ ἐξιέναι, γνώμην ἐμὴν, μέλλει.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, &c.: and, probably, the "Accusative Absolute,"—'on such and such a footing.'

Protag. 314 c, δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ἐπορενόμεθα.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρόπον ἂν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδοῦναι συγγινώσκειν χρεών.

Phileb. 13 b, τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτόν . . . ἐνδόν, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι

προσαγορεύεις ; Cf. Andoc. i. 92. p. 12, σκέψασθε τί αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχον ἐτέρων κατηγοροῦσι.

§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis ; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied *metaphorically*. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 e, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐ μὲν γίνονται αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρητέον ;—where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲν . . . μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι—'ten thousand times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκ ἐν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσαις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—'saying anything further' for 'saying anything *more* ;'—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up *space*. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσαις, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων ; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallb. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases ; see a below : or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns ; see b below : or Demonstratives &c. ; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice ; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are *Accusatives*. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove ; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest :—

Theæt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πείθου, and the Adverbs ἀρχήν, ἀκμήν, τήν πρότην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, *the sentence itself*. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-

quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, *τούτοις, δι' εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγῆν, ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέν-
μενος.*

Crat. 395 d, *ὦν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρὶς ἀνετράπετο.*

Crito 45 d, *τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν.*

Soph. 260 a, *τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθῆμεν.*

Apol. 25 b, *ἡ τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν, εἴς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.*

Legg. 691 a, *τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολὺ, βασιλέων τοῦτο εἶναι νόσημα.*

Politic. 293 a, *ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ζητεῖν.*

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, *τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . ἔρως.*

So 223 d, Critias 108 e, Theæt. 190 b. Cf. Ep. to Heb. viii. 1.

Theæt. 153 c, *ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 66 e, *δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἢ κ.τ.λ.*

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: Il. iv. 28, *Λαὸν ἀγειρούση, Πριάμῳ κακά, 155, θάνατόν νύ τοι ὄρκι' ἔταμνον,* ix. 115, *οὗ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄσας κατέλεξας, xxiv. 735, ῥίψει . . . ἀπὸ πύργου, λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον,* Od. xxi. 35, *ἔγχος ἔδωκεν, Ἀρχὴν ξεινοσύνης.* Æsch. Ag. 225, *θυτὴρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός, γυναικοποιῶν πολέμων ἀρωγάν, 1406, νεκρὸς . . . τῇσδε δεξιᾷς χερὸς Ἔργον,* Cho. 200, *εἶχε συμπευθεῖν ἐμοί Ἀγαλμα τύμβου, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον,* Poδῶν ὁμοίῳ, τοῖς τ' ἐμοῖσιν ἐμπερεῖς. Eur. Or. 1105, *Ἑλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεω λύπην πικράν.* Ar. Acharn. 411, *οὐκ ἐτὸς χαλοὺς ποιεῖς.* (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, *Proinde tona eloquio, solitum tibi.*) Thucyd. iii. 111, *πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχαισμὸν ἐξελθόντες* (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent Il. xix. 302, *ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες, Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἐκάστη* (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, *πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλον*). Ar. Vesp. 338, *Τοῦ δ' ἔφεξιν, ὦ μάταιε, ταῦτα δρᾶν σε βούλεται;* Antipho v. 63. p. 136, *ἀλλ', αὐτὸ*

τὸ ἐναντίον, ἐκεῖνος τοῦτο θάσσον ἂν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπείσθῃ. Add, as above, Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πεύθου.

§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμωδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αἰσθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γάρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός κ.λ.

Phædo 77 d, δοκεῖς . . . δεδιέναι, τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδιέναι, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτὴν . . . διασκεδάννυσιν that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear,' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 e, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάσθαι— 'which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἐρωτησέων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει and vi. 55, οὐχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὢν ἡπώρησεν ἐν ᾧ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς ὠμιλεῖ τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν ᾧ is not=ἐν τούτῳ ἐν ᾧ, but=ἐν τούτῳ ὃ, i. e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἀνθ' ὧν=ἀντὶ τῶν, ἃ, and οὖνεκα=ἔνεκα τοῦ, ὃ, the Relatives ἃ and ὃ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανεοκῶς, κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtilty, cheat in argument.'

Theæt. 158 b, (A) ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς . . . ; (B) Τὸ ποῖον; (A) ὃ πολλὰκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοῖναι ἐρωτῶντων, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ἃ δὴ, προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς ἔρωτας—where ἃ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly;—μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.

Symp. 222 b, ἂ δὴ, καὶ σοὶ λέγω μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου.—‘and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,’ &c.

§ 16. So with the ‘parenthetical’ οἶον,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—

Rep. 615 b, καὶ οἶον εἴ τις πολλῶν θανάτων ἦσαν αἵτιοι . . . , κομίσαντο. So Politic. 298 a, Tim. 19 b.

Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γάρ που, —οἶον φαμέν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 c, οἶον οἱ ἔμποροι καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαμάχονται ἂν οὗτοι ξύμπαντες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποτιμῶ λόγῳ οἶον ἄλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 c, τὴν οἶον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρώματων ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἡδονὰς τὰς τοιάσδε, οἶον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις ; (B) οἶον τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν οἶον ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν . . . οἶον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δυοῖν θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἡ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of οἶον shew that¹ it stands outside the construction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. Note, that this οἶον has two shades of meaning, according as it introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means ‘as it were;’ or (b) an instance, when it means ‘for instance.’ A different analysis is required for οἶον δὴ, οἶα δὴ, οἶα, e. g. in

Critias 112 c, οἶα θέρους, κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἶον δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Antecedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς, in the latter προσαιτήσουσα. The Relative sentence is elliptical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δὴ, and the fuller expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιαῦτ’ ἅττα εἶπεν οἶα δὴ ἐώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες.

¹ The ὅσον in ὅσον οὐ stands exactly in the same position.

§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, *ἔτι γὰρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μείσστη*—where *ταῦτα* is the pronominal substitute for *ἔτι ἔστι*.

Legg. 630 e, *ἀρετῆς μύριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φανλότατον*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *μύριον*.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) *χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν*; (B) *πάνν γε, καὶ ταῦτα γε πολὺ*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *χρυσίον ἔχειν*.

Rep. 341 c, *νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα*—where *ταῦτα* = *ἐπεχείρησας*, which thus is brought close to *οὐδὲν ὦν*, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, *καταστῆναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι*—where *τοῦτο* stands for *καταστῆναι ἐραστήν*, and therefore becomes endued with the capacity of governing *ἐνός* (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν*).

Phileb. 37 d, *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχη; ταυτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν*; where *ταυτὸν* stands for *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν ἐροῦμεν ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχη* repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, *εἴ τις οὐ μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα*.

Phædo 68 c, *καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρα*.

Hom. Il. iii. 179, *Ἀμφοτέρον βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής*.

§ 18. β. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, *τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἂν νενικηκὼς εἴη*,—*τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο*; ('the next question,'—as Protag. 323 c).

Theæt. 189 e, *λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται . . . τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται . . ., οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι*.

Tim. 27 c, (A) *σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν . . ., καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεοῦς*.
(B) *Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε δὴ, πάντες . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁρμῇ . . . πράγματος θεὸν αἶε που καλοῦσιν*.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. *τοῦτο*, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, *τοῦτο* is placed between the two sentences as a

symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it *stands for* the sentence preceding, and *is in apposition with* the sentence following. So in the instances which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) κάλλιον δέ που κατ' εἶδη καὶ δῖχα διαιροῖτ' ἄν, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (B) Ὀρθότατα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτό, πῶς ἄν τις γένος καὶ μέρος . . . γνοίῃ;

Meno 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως . . . τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πολλὰ ἄνοιά ἐστι κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 178 e.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς . . . ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι—where αὐτὸ τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι, which is also, as to meaning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—εἶναι evidently contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία· only that it is expressed not in the regular causal form, ὅτι τις οὐκ ὦν . . . δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι, or παρὰ τὸ μὴ . . . δοκεῖν, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive (see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτὸ τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence as a reason. In other words, αὐτὸ τοῦτο here stands in three relations; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι it is related Appositionally; and (3) to ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which follow under this head:—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a preceding sentence in a *causal* relation to the principal construction of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 e, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ('this is just what it is') . . . ἤκω παρὰ σὲ ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ πατήρ . . . ὅτι ἐγὼ . . . τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμενη ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω.

Cf. Arist. Nub. 335, Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐποιοῦν· ὑγρᾶν νεφελᾶν . . . ὁρμάν, 353, Ταῦτ' ἄρα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Æschyl. Pers. 165, Ταῦτά μοι διπλὴ μέριμν' ἄφραστός ἐστιν ἐν φρεσὶ, and Eum. 512, ταῦτά τις τάχ' ἂν πατήρ . . . οἴκτον οἰκτίσται· ἐπειδὴ πιτνεί δόμος δίκας. Soph. O. T. 1004, (A) Καὶ μὴν χάριν γ' ἂν ἀξίαν λάβοις ἐμοῦ. (B) Καὶ μὴν μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως Σοῦ πρὸς δόμους ἐλθόντος εὖ πράξαιμι τι.

Eur. *Androm.* 209, Σὺ δ' ἦν τι κνισθῆς, . . . Μενέλειος δέ σοι Μείζων Ἀχιλλέως ταῦτά τοί σ' ἔχθει πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5. καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισεσθέντες, ἐπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—

Phædo 105 a, ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο, —ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρει τι ἐναντίον . . . ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Protag. 326 a, οἱ τ' αὖ καθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης ἐπιμελούνται.

Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελείν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 283 d, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο, —μὴν μὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Demosth. Cor. 123. p. 268, καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο, in Leoch. 55. p. 1097, ἐπεὶ κάκεινο, Lys. xiii. 79. p. 137, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

Soph. 248 d, τὸ δέ, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνώσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐ συμβαίνειν πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δέ, —πῶς χρὴν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Ib. 803 d, τὸ δ', —ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὗτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκνῖα οὗτ' αὐ παιδεία.

Apol. 23 a, τὸ δέ, —κινδυνεύει . . . τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δέ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, τό, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεῦσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δέ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τις or ἄλλος) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phædo 58 c, τί δέ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—where τί stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; 'he who desires things beautiful desires *that they should—what?*' The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τί stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Æsch. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ' ἂν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τὰδ' ἤνυσεν; (B) Ἐν ποικίλοις ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οὗτος δέ τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.

On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένηται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, εἰ μή τι (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο. The sentence is complete; the τι and the τι ἄλλο stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως . . . (B) Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) ἀλλὰ τίνος μὴν; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b ('and what then?'). The same explanation holds of the τί in the phrase of polite assent, τί μὴν;² (literally 'if not, then what?') The explanation of τί; in the sense of 'why?' is the same; and of the answering particle ὅτι 'because.'

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τί is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος;—οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρησθαί;

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τανῦν;—ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην;—ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν;

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχει, ἦ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)

Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σὸς [βίος]. . . ;—ἐν τίνι γένει ἂν λέγοιτο;

So probably Phædo 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ἥκιστα. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; (B) Οὐδαμῶς. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπειάς;—δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγείσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).

Legg. 630 c, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων

² Add τί μέλλει; as in Hipp. Mi. invariable, though attracted sometimes into μέλλομεν.

ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους. Here ἄλλο denotes in outline a whole clause, the form of which is revealed to us by the contrasted clause πρὸς—βλέπων.

Rep. 372 d, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες; where τί ἄλλο represents a sentence parallel to the contrasted sentence αὐτὰς ἂν ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες.

Illustrations of this construction abound in Thucydides, e. g. iii. 85, ὅπως ἀπόγονια ἢ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ii. 16, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος, 49, μήτ' ἄλλο τι ἢ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, iv. 14, ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐνανμάχουν, v. 98, τί ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς . . . πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε; vii. 75, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένη ἐφύκσαν, viii. 5, ἀμφοτέρων . . . ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων. (Notice the two last, which prove the invariableness of the οὐδὲν ἄλλο.)

§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer: (2) as to their construction, the ἄλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

Ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἄλλο τι) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; The interrogation is made as to περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ.

Rep. 372 a, ἄλλο τι ἢ σίτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑποδήματα; The interrogation is made as to σίτόν τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα, to the exclusion of the Verb διαιτῆσονται.

Alc. I. 129 b, τῷ διαλέγει σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἢ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as

Gorg. 459 b, τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι ;

Politic. 266 b, (A) μὴν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἢ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. ; (B) οὐκ ἄλλως.

Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται ἢ καὶ τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη μὴν ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ;

Protag. 330 e, τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο ; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην ;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e, διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, and the variations,

Soph. 220 c, τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκει χρὴ προσαγορεύειν ;

Phædo 91 d, ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ᾧ κ.τ.λ. ; and the common formulae οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ and τί ἄλλο ἢ which are not ambiguous.

*Ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 c, ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις ;—'you mean, do you, that you will do so ?'

Ib. 369 d, ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ἵφαντής ;—where the force of the ἄλλο τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων,—ἐάν τις τι πράττη ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται κ.τ.λ. ;—where the interrogation must go on to the end ; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων.

Phædo 79 b, (A) Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ ; (B) οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

Symp. 201 a, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἂν εἴη ἔρως, αἵσχους δ' οὐ ;

(In Euthyd. 286 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῇ κ.τ.λ., the interrogation goes through several clauses : but here two MSS. omit ἢ.)

Thus ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French *n'est ce pas que*. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning ? For there is no colour for supposing that it *stands for* ἄλλο τι ἢ.

It represents an unexpressed *sentence* (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us) ;—namely, 'any different' proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλο τι, 'puts the question' about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to

the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.

Theæt. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τὰλλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καὶ to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἄσαντας and καθεύδοντα: for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἄσαντας in the one case and καθεύδοντα in the other.

Theæt. 145 a, ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

Phdr. 227 c, πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πρόσσεστι.

Ib. 246 e, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον.³

§ 24. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—GENITIVE CASE.

A.—Genitive of Epexegetis.

Apol. 29 b, ἀμαθία . . . αὕτη ἡ ἐπινειδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν.

Phædo 78 b, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος . . . , τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Ib. 97 a, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνδοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὥς, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὐλειον θύραν κρονομένην πολὺν ψόφον παρσχέιν ὥς κωμαστῶν—where ὥς κωμαστῶν does not closely follow ψόφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

³ [Under these three examples is written in the MS. "Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives."]

Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς . . . φαρὲν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν—('not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.') Æsch. Eum. 628, θανεῖν Τόξοις ἐκηβόλοισιν, ὥστ' Ἀμαζόνος, Cho. 990, ἔχει γὰρ αἰσχυνητῆρος, ὡς νόμου, δίκην (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Soph. Aj. 998, Ὀξεία γὰρ σου βάξις, ὡς θεοῦ τινός, Διῆλθ' Ἀχαιοῖς ('like a *θεία φήμη*, that is.) Trach. 768, προσπτύσσεται Πλευραῖσιν ἀρτίκολλος, ὥστε τέκτονος ('like carver's work.') Ib. 112, πολλὰ γὰρ ὥστ' ἀκάμαντος ἢ νότου ἢ βορέα τις κύματα . . ἴδοι—which points again to the Homeric τὸν δ' οὐποτε κύματα λείπει Παντοίων ἀνέμων, Il. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of *knowing, seeing, shewing*.

Apol. 27 a, ἄρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὲ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου ;

Ib. 37 b, ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.

Crat. 412 a, μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.

Rep. 558 a, ἡ οὐπω εἶδες . . αὐτῶν μενόντων ;

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 357, Ὡς γυνῶ χωομένοιο. Æsch. P. V. 760, Ὡς τοίνυν ὄντων τῶνδ' εἰ σοὶ μαθεῖν πάρα. Soph. Aj. 281, Ὡς ᾧδ' ἐχόντων τῶνδ' ἐπίστασθαι σε χρή. Eur. Med. 1311, Ὡς οὐκέτ' ὄντων σῶν τέκνων φρόντιζε δῆ.

Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 e, ἐθεασάμεθα . . . τοῦ εἶδους, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Rep. 485 b, μαθήματος . . ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.

In Legg. 646 d, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οὐκοῦν χρή καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ;

In Rep. 375 d, οἶσθα γὰρ πού τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, κυνῶν is governed by ἦθος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after⁴ Verbs of *mentioning*.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν πράγματος, οἷ κ.τ.λ. ;—Why

⁴ The passage, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., is to be construed otherwise ; τοῦ τοξό-

του is governed by χεῖρ. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).

this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 e, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἶποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὥς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποίου κέκραγας ἀνδρὸς ᾧδ' ὑπέρφρονα; and ib. 1257, O. C. 355, Ἄ τοῦδ' ἐχρήσθη σώματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μητρὸς ἦκω τῆς ἐμῆς φράσων.

In Homer, Verbs of *knowing* &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

Il. xii. 229, Εἰδείη τεράων, Od. xxi. 36, Γνώτην ἀλλήλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ' ἀλλήλων. Il. xiv. 37, ὀψείοντες αὐτῆς, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενος πολέμοιο.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ. ; Gorg. 509 d, τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον . . . ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις, . . . οὐδὲν πλέον εὖ τεθέντων [ἐστὶ].

Rep. 576 d, ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις ;

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὕτως; and Eum. 211, Τί γὰρ γυναικὸς ἦτις ἀνδρα νοσφίσῃ; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 c, τὴν πόλιν ἐατέον τῆς κατοικίσεως.

§ 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phædo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.

Phileb. 58 c, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν.

Legg. 760 e, τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστω τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά.

Ib. 820 e, ἄστρον . . . τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.

β. Dative of Pronouns.

Charm. 157 e, ἡ πατὴρ ὑμῖν οἰκία.

Legg. 624 b, ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους.

Theæt. 210 b, ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη.

Phædo 60 c, θεὸς . . . ξυνήψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς.

Ib. 72 e, ἣν ποὺ ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ [Oxon.], and ibid. ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις.

Cf. Thuc. i. 6, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων. Isæus vi. 6.

p. 56, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀδελφῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἐτελευτησάτην.

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἐρωτι.

Rep. 607 a, ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

Legg. 653 d, τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς.

Ib. 950 e, ἀγώνων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς.

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theæt. 204 d, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί. So Protag. 320 d, Phileb. 21 c.

Soph. 241 e, τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα εἰσὶ.

Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ὁθεν ἂν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνουσία.)

Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὃν ὄντως.

Phileb. 37 a, τὸ ὃ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται.

Tim. 39 e, τῷ ὃ ἐστί ζῶον.

Critias 115 b, τὸν ὅσος ξύλινος (referring to καρπός.)

Legg. 761 e, περὶ τοὺς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦνται.

Ib. 905 b, ἐκείνων τῶν οὗς κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 75 a, ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν ἴσον.

Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν.

Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that "this idiom is peculiarly Platonic," adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.

Theæt. 166 a, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε.

Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 20 b, δεινὸν προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ.

Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σέ καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔαν.

Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνος τοὺς ὑμᾶς ;

Phdr. 258 a, καὶ ὃς εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.

Jelf, G. G. § 452, says "this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative."

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.

Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.

Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν.

Symp. 213 e, τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν.

Legg. 732 e, τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῶον.

Phædo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὄντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i. e. τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.

Phileb. 43 a, τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον.

Legg. 659 d, τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον.

Ib. 790 c, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων.

Ib. 793 b, ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθείς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Æschyl. Cho. 496, φίλτατον τὸ σὸν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σόν), Suppl. 9, αἰτογενῇ τὸν φυξάνορα γάμον (for γάμον τὸν φυξ.). Soph.

Phil. 133, Ἐρμῆς ὁ πέμπων δόλιος (for Ἐ. δόλιος ὁ πέμπων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς χωρίοις. Ar. Eq. 1323, Ἐν ταῖσιν ἰσπετεφάνοισιν οἰκεῖ ταῖς ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθήναις (the last three instances from Jelf).

β. Æsch. Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφιλεῖ σκότῳ Διμὸς ξύνοικος (where λιμὸς is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἷμ' ὅμαιμον (perhaps, for the αἷμ' ὅμαιμον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Æschin. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατὴρ πονηρός, οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο δημαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατὴρ πονηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τὰν ἱκέτιν φυγάδα περιδρομον. Soph. Aj. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρύτου Σαλαμῖνος . . . ἀγχιάλου, ib. 1166, τὸν αἰμνηστον τάφον εὐρώνοντα, Phil. 394, τὸν μέγαν Πάκτωλον εὔχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σὸν . . . στόμα Ἑλινόν, ib. 1199, τὰν γαμφύ-
νυχα παρθένον χρησμοφόν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τὰν σὰν πόλιν . . . λαοτρόφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθείς, v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμός. Æsch. Agam. 1226, τῷ μολόντι δεσπότῃ Ἑμῷ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμεὼν ἐμός, O. T. 1462, ταῖν δ' ἀθλίαιν οἰκτραῖν τε παρθένοις ἐμαῖν. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεὺς ὁ γεννήτωρ ἐμός. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—‘artificers of freedom for the city.’

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων—‘that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.’

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—‘beauty as attributable to the god.’

Theæt. 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς μικρολογίας—‘a marvel in the way of minuteness.’

Crat. 391 b, ὀρθοτάτη τῆς σκέψεως—‘truest manner of viewing’—
ἡ ὀρθοτάτη would have been ‘the truest part of the view.’

Hip. Ma. 282 a, φθόνον τῶν ζώντων—‘envy against the living.’

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν τ’ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀποπία, vi. 76, ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμοῦ δὲ φύσιος πέρι (φύσιος being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, 817 a, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ξένων, 820 b, ὦ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative supersedes the Article.

§ 35. e. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen. The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the construction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε—‘for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,’ &c.

That is, Φλιασίων is governed by οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τὴν τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν—where Κρήτης is governed by χώρας φύσιν.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ξυστρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διέφθειραν . . . Θηβαίων τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after οὗτος preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας δύο ἀρμονίας.

Ib. 621 b, οὗτος, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη.

Symp. 179 c, τοῦτο γέρας.

Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥῆμα.

Gorg. 489 b, οὐτοσὶ ἀνὴρ.

Ib. 505 c, οὗτος ἀνὴρ.

Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φήμην.

Tim. 52 d, οὗτος . . . δεδόσθω λόγος.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἀνὴρ or ἄνθρωπος standing (as Forster expresses it) “pronominis loco.”

Phædo 58 e, εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.]
ἐφαίνετο, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες—(ἀνὴρ being the subject.)

Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προῦν καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν
χρώμενον.

Cf. Æschin. ii. 57. p. 35, σκέψασθε δὴ δεινὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀνθρώπου·
also iii. 99. p. 67, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν ποιεῖ,
and 125. p. 71, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν πόλιν ἄνθρωπος οὐκ
ἡδύνατο σφῆλαι.

§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) “Ταῦτόν, θάτερον, sometimes
take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis,
they are regarded as simple words :

Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.

Ibid. ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος.

Ib. 44 b, τό τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.”

§ 40. IDIOMS OF PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato
has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and
variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion
of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accu-
sative Case (§§ 15—23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact.

This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style ; firstly, by
varying it ; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex
phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many con-
stituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in
particular juxtapositions :—

Protag. 323 c, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ
κ.τ.λ., τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσσομαι ἀποδείξαι.

Symp. 173 c, εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγέσασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν.

Ib. 198 b, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων—where τούτων=τοῦ
οἷός τ' εἶναι.

Ib. 204 b, Ἐρωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῶ
καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις.

Phædo 62 d, τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.

Phædo 105 d, τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον . . . τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. II] ὀνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

Tim. 87 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων.

Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπηπερ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τούτων ἡγήσονται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιωταί τινες.

Cf. Antipho vi. 1. p. 141, ἥδιστον . . . μὴ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ., καὶ εὐχόμενος ἂν τις ταῦτα εὖξαιτο. Æschin. ii. 166. p. 50, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ προδότης καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. And primarily Hom. II. viii. 362, Οὐδέ τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὃ οἱ μάλα πολλάκις υἱὸν Τειρόμενον σώεσκον.

§ 42. Αὐτά.

Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενοήσεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος.

Τὰ ἕτερα, ἀμφοτέρα, πότερα, &c.

Phædo 68 c, τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

Crito 52 a, δυοῖν θάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα Oxon. and Ven. II].

Legg. 765 d, πατὴρ μάλιστα μὲν νιέων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μή, θάτερα.

Cf. Isæus i. 22. p. 37, δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντιωτάτοις θάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἶει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἢ μητρός; Antipho v. 36. p. 133, ποτέρῳ χρήσονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα ᾧ πρῶτον εἶπεν ἢ ᾧ ὕστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ἃ μὲν ἐκείνοι ἥδεσαν, ἐλθόντας ἡμᾶς ὡς τούτων, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστί].

Alcib. I. 134 e, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, ἐχόμενά ἐστι τάξασθαι . . . ἐορτάς.

Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλείω ἢ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττω δύναται σώζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 2, ὅτι νομιζόμενα εἶη τὸν πρεσβύτατον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. And primarily Homer.

§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-

relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find *ὁ μὲν*—*ὁ ἕτερος*, *τινές*—*οἱ δέ*, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. *a.* Use of *ἄλλος* and *ἕτερος*.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every *ἕτερος* is an *ἄλλος*, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of *ἕτερος* in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, *ἐὰν βουλεύσῃ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἐτέρῳ* (though equally we have 879 b, *ὅς δ' ἂν ἄκων ἄλλος ἄλλον τρώσῃ*.)

Critias 109 b, *τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλοις προσήκον, τοῦτο ἐτέρους αὐτοῖς κτᾶσθαι*.

Euthyphro 2 b, (A) *οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὥς σὺ ἕτερον [γέγραφα]*. (B) *Οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. (A) *Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος*; (B) *Πάνυ γε*.

Phileb. 61 d, *ἡδονὴ . . . ἐτέρας ἄλλη . . . ἀκριβεστέρα*.

Politic. 262 a, *τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὖ θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή*.

Soph. 224 c, *τὸ μὲν . . . ἐτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ . . . ἄλλῳ προσρητέον [ὀνόματι]*.

Ib. 232 d, (A) *τὰ . . . περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . .* (B) *Καὶ πολλῶν γε ἐτέρων*.

Symp. 196 e, *ἂ γάρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ δοίῃ οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλον διδάξει*. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theæt. 184 e, *ἂ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι*.

§ 46. β. *ἄλλος* 'besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, *πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων*.

Apol. 36 b, *χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημογориῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στασιῶν*.

§ 47. E. Uses of αὐτός.

a. Αὐτό. The Neuter Singular of αὐτός is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντα. So 472 c.

Phædo 65 d, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;

Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή.

Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἡ νόσις.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὐτός in Concord, and αὐτὸ τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E. g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.

Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.

Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.

The remaining uses of αὐτός are not exclusively Platonic.

β. αὐτός in the sense of *sponte*.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὐτός in the sense of *solus*.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακὸς ὄντινα οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρως ἔνθεον ποιήσῃε πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Ib. 187 c, ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικά διαγιγνώσκειν.

Ib. 198 d, τὰλθθῇ λέγειν . . . , ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγόμενους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, μικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) οὐκ οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ; (B) Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν.

Rep. 437 e, αὐτὸ τὸ διψῆν . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . αὐτοῦ πάματος—'thirst, according to the simple notion of it : '—whence we see how Use *a* flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὐτοῦ (Adverbial) in the sense of 'on the same spot as heretofore.'

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγῆράσω—i. e. not 'here' nor 'there,' but 'rooted to the spot.'

Ib. 220 c, ξυννοήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἔωθέν τι εἰστίκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatic for ξυννοήσας ἔωθέν τι, αὐτόθι εἰστίκει σκοπῶν)—'stood without moving from the spot where he was.'

Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει.

Cf. Hom. II. ii. 237, τόνδε δ' ἐῶμεν Αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, 332, ἄλλ' ἄγε, μίμνετε πάντες, ἐϋκνημίδες Ἀχαιοί, Αὐτοῦ, εἰσόκεν ἄστρ' ἄστρ' ἄστρ' Πριάμοιο ἔλωμεν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστάσι.

§ 49. F. Use of ἐκεῖνος.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by οὗτος or the oblique Cases of αὐτός, &c., and ἐκεῖνος. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phædo 60 d, λέγε τοίνυν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἐκεῖν' βουλόμενος . . . ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Here ἐκεῖν' is identical with αὐτῷ.

Ib. 68 e, φοβούμενοι ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. The ἐκεῖνοι are identically the ἕτεραι.

Ib. 73 c, εἰάν τις τι πρότερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας . . . , μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἴ μοι διδῶς τε καὶ ξυγχαρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα Σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in ἐκείνοις to the same things which he had just called ταῦτα.

Ib. 106 b, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἄρτίου, ὥσπερ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενέαι. The αὐτοῦ and ἐκείνου both refer identically to τὸ περιττόν, αὐτοῦ becoming ἐκείνου as ἄρτιον is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόςους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτοῖς fades into ἐκείνους as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 e, δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχη, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἴ τις ἡμῶν . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδείξει τίνες Ἀθηναίων . . . δι' ἐκείνους ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν.

Politic. 277 e, τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανῶς διαισθάνονται, καὶ τὰληθῆ φράξω περὶ ἐκείνα δυνατοὶ γίγνονται . . . ταῦτα δὲ γε ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις ἀμφιγνοῦντες

κ.τ.λ. The *ἐκεῖνα* gives notice that our attention is to be presently turned to *ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις*.

Cf. Ar. Eth. IX. i. 4, *ὦν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει*—where *ἐκείνου* is identical in reference with the preceding *τούτοις*,—and more capriciously, X. ix. 16, *ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται, εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι*—where first *ἐκείνο* and then *τοῦτο* refer to *τὸ καθόλου*.

§ 50. G. Uses of *τις* (indefinite).

In the sense of 'a particular this or that,' *τις* is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations *τις* gives the force of 'for instance,' or rather the French 'par exemple.'

Symp. 199 d, *εἰ [ἔρως] μητρός τινος ἢ πατρὸς ἐστί*.

Phædo 66 c, *ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν*.

Phdr. 230 d, *θαλλὸν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες*.

Hip. Ma. 292 a, *δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστί* ;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, *εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσεά*.

Phileb. 16 c, *διὰ τινος Προμηθέως*.

Cf. Æsch. Agam. 55, *ὑπατος δ' αἶων ἢ τις Ἀπόλλων ἢ Πὰν κ.τ.λ.*

Ar. Ran. 912, *Ἀχιλλέα τιν' ἢ Νιόβην κ.τ.λ.*

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of 'this or that:' but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, *ὁ . . . περὶ τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς [σοφὸς] βάναντος*.

Phædo 65 c, *μήτε ἀκοή μήτε ὕψις μήτε ἀληθδὼν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή*. [So Hermann from Oxon.]

Apol. 27 d, *εἰ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων*.

Phdr. 235 c, *ἢ που Σαπφούς . . . ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος . . . , ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν*.

Politic. 305 b, *μήθ' ὑπὸ τινων δώρων μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθ' ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας*.

§ 53. H. Uses of *τοιούτος*.

a. Conversationally, for ‘such as I am thinking of,’—but have not yet explained.

Symp. 210 d, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε . . . ὅς γάρ ἄν . . . παιδαγωγηθῇ, . . . κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλὸν κ.τ.λ.
—the explanation of *τοιαύτην* beginning immediately after it, with *ἣ ἐστὶ*.

Phædo 73 c, . . . ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε· [so Stallb. and Herm.] ἕάν τις κ.τ.λ. The *τοιούτῳ* expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows, at λέγω δέ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular *word* preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phædo 67 a, καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι . . . μετὰ τοιούτων ἐσόμεθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.

Ib. 80 c, εἰ μὲν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ—where *τοιαύτη* simply means *χαριέσση*.

Ib. d, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰεδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον—where *τοιοῦτον ἕτερον* means *αἰεδῆ*.

Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη . . . οἴεται . . . ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where *τὸ τοιοῦτον* stands for *τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον*.

Ib. 79 c, πλανᾶται καὶ τaráττεται κ.τ.λ., ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη—where *τοιούτων* is a substitute for *πλανωμένων καὶ ταραττομένων*.

Symp. 208 d, ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.

Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—where *ἥσματος* is actually governed by *τὸ τοιοῦτο δρᾶν*, because this is the substitute for *προτιθέναι προοίμιον* in the foregoing sentence: cf. Symp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως—where *οὕτως* personates *πολλὰ*.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὅποσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν—where *τοῦτο δρᾶν* represents *εἰς δικαστῆς ἄγειν* or the like, implied from *ἣν δεῖ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν* preceding.

Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἑνὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἂν φανείη· γνώμη γὰρ τοιαύτη χρεώμενος—i. e. ἀρίστη. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος—i. e. εὐδαίμων, and VIII. iv. 1, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί—i. e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδρασαν εἰς φρέατα—i. e. ἔρριψαν σφᾶς αὐτούς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίῳ ταῦτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὕψ' ὕμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν—i. e. ἡσσᾶσθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐλευθέριοι· ὠφελίμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει—where τοῦτο stands for ὠφελίμοι εἰσι, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥς φίλῳ δωρεῖται, ἡ ὀτιδήποτε ἄλλο.

§ 56. IDIOMS OF VERBS.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with εἰ, depending on a similar Apodosis with ἂν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλουν.

Ib. 44 b, οἶός τ' ὦν σε σώζειν εἰ ἦθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι.

Phædo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ . . . οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεῖ δεῖν] μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πη δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ἐνυφέρει], εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, οἶον αἰεὶ πλεόντας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of *Sequence* here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 e, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα ἦκουσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον . . . οἰοί τε εἶναι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν κ.τ.λ., ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ἤρξατο κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 378 a, ὥμην [ἂν] δεῖν . . . δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν κ.τ.λ., ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.

Gorg. 506 b, ἡδέως ἂν Καλλικλεί τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ . . .
ἀπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 e, ταῦτο δ' ἦν ἂν, οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—'this would have been that of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ἵνα heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Meno 89 b, οὓς . . . ἂν ἐφυλάττομεν, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν χρήσιμοι γίνοντο.

In the next, ὅπως loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by ἂν.

Legg. 959 c, ζῶντι ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπως ὅ τι δικαιοτάτος ὦν καὶ δσιώτατος ἔξη τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἂν ἐγίγνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἴθ' ὄφελος κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατειργάσω—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἂν. The usage begins with Homer: cf. Il. vi. 348, Ἐνθα με κῦμ' ἀπέρσεε.

§ 58. β. Future Indicative with ἂν.

Rep. 615 d, οὐχ ἦκει, οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο.

Apol. 29 c, ἥδη ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες διαφθαρήσονται.

Symp. 222 a, ἰδὼν ἂν τις . . . εὐρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Phdr. 227 b, οὐκ ἂν οἶέ με καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἂν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 e, τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινέσοι.

Cf. Isæus i. 32, προσηπείλησεν ὅτι δηλώσοι ποτ' ἂν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a *deliberative* meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is ⁵ *Presumptive*.

† In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. *Deliberative* (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ. *Hortatory* or *dehortatory*, when the sentence is not interrogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

⁵ This use is confined to negative sentences.

a. Presumptive use.

With μή.

Gorg. 462 c, μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.

Rep. 603 c, μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ;

Symp. 194 c, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὔτοι ἡμεῖς ὤμεν.

Apol. 39 a, μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν.

The Indicative is also used with μή and μὴ οὐ similarly : e. g. Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις ; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.'

With ὅπως μή.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μὴ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ἢ τοῦτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μή.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι.

Phædo 77 b, ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . , ὅπως μὴ . . . διασκεδάννυται ἢ ψυχή.

§ 60. With οὐ μή.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with οὐ μή in

Rep. 341 c, οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ἦς.

Phileb. 48 d, οὐ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

Cf. Isæus viii. 24. p. 71, οὐ μὴ εἰσίης. [So Bekker's edition: the Zurich editors give εἴσει εἰς from Bekker's conjecture]. Xen. Cyrop. VIII. i. 5, οὐ μὴ δύνηται. Soph. O. C. 1024 (some MSS.) οὐ μὴ ποτε . . . ἐπεύχωνται.

The following is only a variation of the use with οὐ μὴ, πολλοῦ δεῖ standing as a mere Adverb for οὐ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσεται.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὀρᾶν, and the like, with μή. (This is as it were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι.

Gorg. 512 d, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦ.

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative : e. g.

La. 179 b, ὀρώμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεται τι λέγειν.

Soph. 235 a, *διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.*

Ly. 216 c, *σκεψώμεθα μὴ . . . λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 218 d, *φοβοῦμαι . . . μὴ . . . ἐντετυχήκαμεν.*

Phædo 84 e, *φοβείσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερον . . . διάκειμαι.*

§ 63. β. After *πρὶν*, without *ἂν*, in negative sentences.

Phædo 62 c, *μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ.* [So all the MSS.]

Theæt. 169 b, *τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς . . . προσπαλαίσει.* [So all the MSS.]

Legg. 873 a, *οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίνεσθαι τὸ μανθὲν πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ.*

§ 64. γ. After *σκοπεῖν*, *ὁρᾶν*, and the like with *εἰάν*.

Crito 48 e, *ὅρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεται.*

Phædo 100 c, *σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, εἰάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί.*

Gorg. 510 b, *σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν.*

Charm. 167 b, *σκέψαι εἰάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ.*

Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, *σκέψασθε εἰάν ἱκανὸν γένηται τεκμήριον.*

Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, *ἀναμνησκεισθαι εἰάν ἀληθὴ λέγω.* And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), Il. xv. 32, *"Οφρα ἴδῃ, ἣν τοι χραίσμη.*

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that *εἰάν* gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual *εἰ*. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas *εἰ* would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. *Ἐάν* is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. δ. With *ὅς ἂν*.

The different shades of meaning presented by *ὅς* with the Indicative and *ὅς ἂν* with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of *εἰ* and *εἰάν* after *σκοπεῖν*. The meaning of *ὅς ἂν* bears upon a doubtful reading in Phædo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, *οἷον ἂν ᾗ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτα ἐστί*—where *οἷον ἂν ᾗ* leaves it quite undetermined of what kind *τὸ παρόν* is.

Phædo 98 e, *ἐμοὶ βέλτιον δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιοτέρον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσι.* Here it is not that *ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσι* has any future force, for the penalty had

been awarded : but it gives the meaning ‘that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.’

Phædo 96 a, ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὦν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθᾶ περὶ ὦν ἂν λέγῃς χρήσει (taking for granted here⁶ the reading ὦν ἂν λέγῃς)—‘you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.’ It is true that the objections had preceded ; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last : and what ὦν ἂν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said ἐξεπότηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὔτ’ ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι,—he now, by giving a *general* turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.

§ 66. d. Optative Potential Constructions.

a. Without ἂν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρὸς ᾧ τις ἅπαντα βλέψας διαπορήσει.

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) Οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτοῦ πατέρα τύπτεις ; (B) Πολὺ μέντοι δικαιοτέρον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι.

Gorg. 492 b, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶη ;

Phædo 88 c, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταί, ἧ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾗ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Con-junctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without ἂν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.

Rep. 360 b, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὥς δόξειεν, οὔτως ἀδαμάντινος. Cf. Thucyd. vi. 89, δημοκρατίαν . . . οὐδενὸς ἂν χείρον [γινώσκειμι], ὅσφω καὶ λοιδορήσασθαι.

Symp. 196 c, κρατοῦντ’ ἂν ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ.

Phædo 99 a, εἰ . . . λέγοι, . . . ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι’ ὥς μέντοι . . . ποιῶ, . . . πολλῇ καὶ μακρᾷ ῥαθυμίᾳ εἶη τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς. (B) Ἡ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ ;

⁶ It is the reading of Oxon. and to be preferred. So Hermann and one other good MS. But perhaps the Zurich editors. the other reading—ἂν λέγεις—ought

Rep. 382 d, (A) *πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιών ἂν ψεύδοιτο*; (B) . . . (A) *Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο*;

§ 68. γ. With *ἂν* in clauses where the *ἂν* adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, *ὥς ἂν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνοιτο* . . . , *δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι*.

Th. 190 c, *δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὥς ἂν εἶεν κ.τ.λ.*

Phdr. 230 b, *ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθης, ὥς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον*.

Gorg. 453 c, *ἵνα οὕτω προῖη, ὥς μάλιστα ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ*.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, *οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦσθα πείθειν, ὥς . . . ἂν . . . ἐπιδιδόειν*.

Phædo 82 e, *δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ εἴη*.

Protag. 318 e, *εὐβουλία . . . ὅπως ἂν ἀριστα διοικοῖ*.

Ly. 207 e, *προθυμούνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης*.

Crat. 395 a, *κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων οἷος ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι*.

Th. 398 e, *οὐδ' εἴ τι οἶός τ' ἂν εἴην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω*.

Legg. 700 e, *ἥδονῃ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνονται ὀρθότατα*.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, *ἐβουλεύετο ἡ ἀνθρωπος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοίη, πότερα πρὸ δειπνου ἢ ἀπὸ δειπνου*.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, *φιλοῖ, . . . ὅταν οἴοιτο κ.τ.λ.*, Legg. 661 c, *ἐλαττόν [ἐστὶ κακόν] ἂν ὥς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῶη*, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. δ. With *ἄν*, equivalently for the Future.

(δ¹) Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phædo 107 c, *ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει*.

Apol. 35 a, *εἰ . . . ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη*.

§ 70. (δ²) Following a Conjunctive with *ἂν* in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, *ἐάν τις προστάτῃ . . . , χρηματίζονται ἂν*. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, *ὅταν τις λέγῃ, εἴποιμεν ἂν*.

Phdr. 244 b, *εἰάν δὴ λέγωμεν . . . , μηκύνοιμεν ἂν*.

Phileb. 55 e, *ἄν τις . . . χωρίζῃ . . . , φαῦλον . . . ἂν γίγνοιτο*.

§ 71. (δ³) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζεις ἂν . . . , εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ ἐθέλεις βλέψαι is a virtual Future.

Apol. 37 c, πολλὴ ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἰμι κ.τ.λ.—because the fact is not so *as yet*.

Protag. 349 c, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ . . . ἔλεγες—because I do not *know* the fact *as yet*.

Crat. 428 b, εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι.

Laches 186 c, εἰ δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι.

§ 72. e. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.

a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἂν (see above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being

(a¹) Relative.

Gorg. 512 e, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὥς ἄριστα βιῶναι ;

Meno 92 c, πῶς οὖν ἂν εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος . . . , οὐ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης ;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερδαλέος κ' εἴη . . . ὅς σε παρέλθοι, iv. 222, Ὅς τὸ καταβρόξεν . . . οὐ κεν βάλοι, xv. 358, Δευγαλέω θανάτῳ, ὥς μὴ θάνοι ὅστις ἔμοιγε . . . φίλος εἴη.

§ 73. (a²) Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, μετόχος εἴη, ἵνα ὥς πλείστον χρόνον ἀληθὴς ὦν διαβιοῖ.

Meno 98 c, ὠφέλιμοι ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν, . . . εἴπερ εἶεν.

Rep. 541 a, ὥς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

Politic. 295 c, εἴπωμεν . . . ἱατρὸν μέλλοντα . . . ἀπέσσεσθαι . . . συχνόν, ὥς οἶοιτο, χρόνον, ἂν ἐθέλειν κ.τ.λ. ;

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 214, ἀπ' ἐμεῖο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φῶς, Εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τάδε τόξα φαινωῦ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, Od. xii. 106, μὴ σύ γε κεῖθι τύχοις, ὅτε ροιβδῆσειεν, ib. 114, Τὴν δέ κ' ἀμυναίμην ὅτε μοι σίνουτό γ' ἑταίρους, xxi. 114, Οὐ κέ μοι ἀχρυμένῳ τάδε δώματα πότνια μήτηρ Δείποι ἄμ' ἄλλῳ ἰοῦσ' ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λιποίμην.

§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence being

(β¹) Relative.

Legg. 759 b, οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον [ἔστιν] ἱερέας.

Cf. Hom. II. v. 407, οὐ δηναῖός, ὃς ἀθανάτοισι μάχοιτο, Od. vi. 286, Καὶ δ' ἄλλη νεμεσῶ, ἥ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι, iii. 319, Ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅθεν οὐκ ἔλποιτό γε θυμῷ. Andoc. iii. 1. p. 23, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀφ' ὧν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο ἐναντιοῦνται.

§ 75. (β²) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὐχ οὐ ἕνεκά τινες οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα . . . θεραπεύοντο. Euthyd. 296 e, οὐχ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖην . . . ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

Gorg. 448 e, οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Ale. I. 135 a, τυραννοῦντι δέ, ὥς μὴδὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiv. 374, Ἐλθέμεν ὀτρύνησιν, ὅτ' ἀγγελίη ποθὲν ἔλθοι, xvii. 250, Ἀξω τῇλ' Ἰθάκης, ἵνα μοι βίοντα πολὺν ἄλφοι.

§ 76. (β³) Adverbial with εἰ.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο . . . [ἐστὶ] ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Meno 80 d, εἰ ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστίν;

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὅρα γάρ, εἰ . . . τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν.

Legg. 642 a, ὁρᾶτε τί ποιῶμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 658 c, εἰ . . . τὰ πάντῃ σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινούσι τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύντα.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, . . . συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 91 a, οὐ γὰρ ὅπως . . . δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἷη πάρεργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκείον ὄνομα εἷη, τὸ κέρδος.

Cf. Hom. Od. vii. 51, θαρσαλέος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀμείνων Ἐργοισιν τελέθει, εἰ καὶ ποθεν ἄλλοθεν ἔλθοι. Ar. Eth. Nic. I. iv. 7, εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Lysias xxxiv. 6, τί τῷ πλήθει περιγενήσεται, εἰ ποιήσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.;

§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῶτο.

Lysis 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλῳ εἶναι ἄμφω.

Theæt. 164 a, δεῖ γε μέντοι [τοῦτο φάναι], εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον.

Phædo 95 d, προσήκειν φῆς φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότει.

Protag. 316 c, οἴεται τοῦτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Legg. 927 c, τὸν νοῦν, ᾧ καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείη, προσέχοντα εὐεργετεῖν.

Phædo 85 d, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον . . . διαπορευθῆναι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 262, σὺν δὲ πλείον δέπας αἰεὶ ἔστηχ', ὥσπερ ἐμοί, πίεειν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι, Od. xxiv. 253, Τοιούτῳ δὲ ζοικας, ἐπεὶ λούσαιτο φάγοι τε, Εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς. Thuc. i. 120, ἀνδρῶν σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο ἡσυχάζειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ἀν) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, εἰνὰς . . . τοιαύτας, οἷας χεიმῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρουσ ἱκανὰς εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι.

Protag. 334 c, χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ . . . ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέριαν κατασβέσαι.

Theæt. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον, πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν.

Protag. 330 e, φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα . . . , ὥς οὐκ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρῆσαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὥς ἐκείνον καθίζειν.

Euthyd. 306 e, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ . . . ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὥς γὰρ πρὸς σε τἀληθὲς εἰρῆσθαι.

Apol. 29 c, ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phdr. 269 d, τὸ δύνασθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα εἰλέσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἱκανὸς γένοιτ' ἂν . . . ὥστε ἐκάστῳ προστάττειν τὸ προσῆκον.

Phædo 103 e, ἔστιν ἄρα περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι, ὅσον ἀποζῆν. And likewise

Soph. Ant. 303, Χρόνῳ ποτ' ἐξέπραξαν ὡς δοῦναι δίκην, Aj. 378, Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν ταῦθ' ὅπως οὐχ ᾧδ' ἔχειν, 924, Ὡς καὶ παρ' ἐχθροῖς ἄξιος θρήνων τυχεῖν.

§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following οἶός τε, δυνατός, &c.

Phædo 73 a, οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσιν.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅποτε ἂν δοκῶσιν αἴτιοι εἶναι ψηφιεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Isocr. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἡμῖν ἐνδείξεσθαι βουλόμενος. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξασθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, ἐλπίδας παρέχεται [ἡμᾶς] εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Euthyd. 278 c, ἐφάτην ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν.

Protag. 316 c, τοῦτο δὲ οἶεται οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 230, ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σαωσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι Νῆας, xiii. 666, Πολλάκι γάρ οἱ ἔειπε γέρων ἀγαθὸς Πολυῦδος Νούσφ' ὑπ' ἀργαλέῃ φθίσθαι, xxii. 119, ὄρκον ἔλωμαι Μῆ τι κατακρύψειν ἀλλ' ἄνδιχα πάντα δάσασθαι, Od. ii. 171, φημί τελευτηθῆναι ἅπαντα, iv. 253, Ὡμοσα μὴ μὲν πρὶν . . . ἀναφῆναι, ix. 496, φάμεν αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι. Thuc. i. 26, προείπον . . . ὡς πολεμίοις χρήσασθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους . . . μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεῦσαι (so with οὐκ εἰκὸς iii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οἶσθε ἦντινα οὐκ ἄμενον παρασκευάσασθαι ; v. 22, οἱ δὲ . . . οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαδίως κρατῆσαι, iv. 63, τὸ ἑλλιπὲς . . . ἱκανῶς νομίσαντες εἰρχθῆναι, i. 126, τῷ Κύλωνι . . . ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεός, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Æsch. Pers. 173, ἴσθι . . . μὴ σε δις φράσαι, Agam. 1262, ἐπεύχεται . . . ἀντιτίσασθαι (not 'prays' but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil. 1329, παῦλαν ἴσθι τῆσδε μὴ ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν Νόσου, Aj. 1082, Ταύτην νόμιζε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ Ἐξ οὐρίων δραμοῦσαν εἰς βυθὸν πεσεῖν (not aor. of *custom*, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, Σὲ μὲν γὰρ ἠϋχεις θεᾶς βρέτας σῶσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλέγουσαι . . . μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλῦσαι, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἔφη κατανέσαι. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι, ib. 32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οἰμαί σε ἔξαρνον γενέσθαι, xxiii. 2, ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενήσεσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνεχυράσασθαί φασιν.

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Gorg. 520 c, μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ.

Politic. 264 e, ἡ οὐκ οἶε καὶ τὸν ἀφρονέστατον . . . δοξάζειν οὕτως ;

Cf. Thuc. iv. 24, ἡλπίζον . . . χειρώσασθαι, καὶ ἤδη σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι, 127, προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθείρειν, 27, ὅτι . . . αὐτοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Æsch. Eum. 892, τίνα με φῆς ἔχειν ἔδραν ; Antipho ii. A. a. 5. p. 115, τὸν μείζονα ἐπίδοξον ὄντα πάσχειν. Isæus ii. 32, ὠμόσαμεν εἰ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους. Isocr. vi. 69. p. 130, μὴ γὰρ οἶεσθ' αὐτοὺς μένειν. [So Bekker's edition : the Zurich editors give μενείν from Bekker's conjecture.]

§ 83. δ. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of *saying, thinking, &c.*) sometimes contain a *Dictative* force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to 'say' becomes to 'recommend' or to 'pray:' to 'think' becomes to 'think fit,' or to 'give counsel.' But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς . . . τύραννον . . . ἐπαινέσαι—'thought fit'—lit. 'thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.'

Crat. 399 d, ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Hip. Ma. 291 a, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ . . . ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not 'that we say' but 'that we should say.'

Phædo 83 e, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασι. Here the meaning is not 'for the reason which the world attributes to them,' but 'for the reason for which the world says people *ought* to be [temperate].' That is, φασὶ is followed by κοσμίους εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, δ τοῖνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι—'what I proposed that we should define.'

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 98, φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἥδη Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας ('I think good'). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς βουλευέσθαι, iv. 86, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, vii. 42, νομίσας, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι . . . , οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἔπαθεν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ τὸ κ.τ.λ., v. 40, ἡγούμενοι, ὅπη ἂν ξυγχωρῇ, ἡσυχίαν

ἔχειν, i. 40, ἀντίπομεν, τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολλάζειν, v. 46, λέγων . . . τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, iv. 99, ἀπεκρίναντο . . . ἀποφέρεισθαι τὰ σφέτερα ('answered, Carry off your dead'), vi. 13, ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς Σικελιώτας καθ' αὐτοὺς ξυμφέρεισθαι. Æsch. Choeph. 143, Δέγω ('I pray') φανῆναι σοῦ, πάτερ, τιμῶρον. Soph. Trach. 543, Ἐγὼ δὲ θυμοῦσθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι ('do not know that one ought to be angry').

§ 84. ε. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.

Symp. 194 d, οὐδὲν διοίσει, ὅπησιν ὅτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι. So Rep. 523 e.

In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, ὁ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγούντο εἶναι, τὰληθῆ λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἡ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ τοίαν.

Symp. 209 b, εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἷον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative⁷ of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in *justification* of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is *included* in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apogetic Infinitive.'

Phædo 99 b, πολλὰ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινόν, ἄλλοις μὲν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους κ.τ.λ.; . . . Ἑρακλέους καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους . . . ἄλλες ἔπαινον ἔχοντες . . . καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα. τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν περὶ πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiously dispassionate statement of the case.

Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, τὸ καὶ προέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί' and, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 60 b, ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἡδὺ] πρὸς . . . τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἄμα μὲν αὐτὰ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἄμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὡς θαυμασίως. [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

⁷ If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is *Causal*. See § 18 above.

Cf. Antipho i. 28. p. 114, *θανυμάζω δὲ τῆς τόλμης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας, τὸ διομόσασθαι*. Similarly Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 3, *ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἕνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι*. Here the Infinitives justify the warmth of the expressions *θανυμάζω* and *ἄξιόν ἐστιν*.

Symp. 204 a, *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν*. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for *ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία*: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which *ἀμαθία* has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, *τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 74 d, *ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι*; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 e, *ἐγὼ αἴτιος . . . τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἡρόμην ἀλλ' ἕτερον*, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—‘to get a thing done by another,’—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (*διδάσκεσθαι*), by some passages in the *Meno*.

Meno 93 d, *ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλέοφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἱππεῖα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν*; and, just after, *ἐπαιδέυσατο*—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

Meno 94 c, *Θουκυδίδης αὐτὸν δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε . . . , καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων* τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθία ἔδωκε τὸν δὲ Εὐδόρω—where the Active *ἐπαίδευσε* is as distinctively used of the father's *getting his sons taught by others*. Similarly ib. b, d, *ἐδίδαξε*.

As the favourite example, *διδάσκεισθαι*, thus⁸ falls to the ground, so do the rest. *Δανείζεσθαι*, for instance, is ‘to take a *δανεῖον*,’ as *δανείζειν* is ‘to give a *δανεῖον*,’ that is, the general meaning of the Verb being ‘to deal in *δανεία*,’ the Middle means ‘to deal in them for oneself.’ So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: *χρᾶν* and *χρῆσθαι* express the active and passive side of ‘dealing in oracles.’ So, rather differently, ‘bringing a man to justice’ becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, *κρίνειν*, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, *κρίνεσθαι*.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning ‘to get a thing done by another;’ neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that “qui facit per alium facit per se.”

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in *Æsch. Ag.* 594, *Ὅμως δ’ ἔθνον*,—where Clytæmnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in v. 87 described by the words *περίπεμπτα θυοσκινεῖς*,—in *Hdt. iii.* 80, [*ἀνὴρ τύραννος*] *κτείνει ἀκρίτους*, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands halfway between the Middle and the Passive.

‘To allow oneself to be,’ ‘to expose oneself to be,’ ‘to get oneself,’—subjected to this or that, may be designated the *Semi-Middle* sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, *ἐξάγοντες καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι*—‘allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.’

Phædo 67 a, *ἀναπιμπλώμεθα*—‘allow ourselves to be infected.’

And so *Hip. Ma.* 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [*φθόγγους*] *τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μῆ*—‘which allow themselves to be united’—i. e. ‘which harmonise.’

Meno 91 c, *μυθένα . . . τοσαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι*—‘get himself into disgrace.’

Phileb. 58 c, *ἀπεχθήσει Γοργία*—‘you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.’

⁸ *διδάσασθαι* also means ‘to take a pupil.’ So *Pind. Ol.* viii. 77, *τὸ διδάσασθαι δέ τοι εἰδοῖσι βέτερον*, *Simonid.* ap. *Gaisf. Fr.* liv. p. 377, *διδασκόμενος*

χορὸν ἀνδρῶν, *Arist. Nub.* 783, *ἴθλεις ἀπέρβ’, οὐκ ἂν διδαξάμην σ’ ἐτι*. (So crates speaks.)

Apol. 35 c, *χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιорκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίξεσθαι.*

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, *ὀνήμενος*—‘one that earns a benefit,’ iv. 373, *ὦς δὴ δῆθ' ἐνὶ νήσῳ ἐρύκεαι*—‘allowest thyself to be detained’ by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, *ἐλασσούμενοι ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαῖαις δίκαις* ‘letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,’ similarly iv. 64, *ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡσασθαι.* Eur. Phœn. 602, (A) *καὶ σε δευτέρον γ' ἀπαιτῶ σκῆπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθονός.* (B) *οὐκ ἀπαιτούμεσθα.* Soph. Aj. 217, *νύκτερος Ἀἴας ἀπελωβήθη.* Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, *τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα . . . εὐρήσετε πάντες ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐξεταζομένην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αἰί,* c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, *ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τι καὶ συγχωρεῖν.* Add *στεφανοῦσθαι*, so common in Pindar (e. g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for ‘winning a crown.’

Hence also the double sense of Verbals in *-τός*, as *γνωστός*, from *γιγνώσκειν*, ‘known :’ *γνωστός*, from *γιγνώσκεσθαι*, ‘capable of being known’ (lit. ‘allowing itself to be known’). And in privatives—*ἄλυτος*, from *λύειν*, ‘unbroken ;’ *ἄλυτος*, from *λύεσθαι*, ‘that does not allow itself to be broken,’ ‘unbreakable.’

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, *Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur*, lit., ‘let themselves be protected by the strength of their position’—i. e. ‘were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.’ So Juv. xv. 157, *defendier isdem Turribus*, Virg. Æn. ii. 707, *cerviçi imponere nostræ.* So *juris consultus* is ‘one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.’

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phædo 98 b, *ἀπὸ δὲ θανμαστῆς ἐλπίδος ᾗχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρώμενον κ.τ.λ.* The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, *ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν,*

κ.τ.λ. The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, *ἡ πόρουν τί ποτε λέγει*. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, *ἐδόκουν . . . εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν . . . , μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον εἶμεν κριταί, ἥ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ*. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, *ξυνέστησεν ὁ ξυνιστὰς . . . τάδε διανοηθείς, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα . . . τέλεον . . . εἴη, . . . ἔτι δὲ ἵνα ἀγῆρων καὶ ἄνυσον ἦ*.

Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, *ἐπειδὴ . . . γυναῖκα ἡγαγόμεν . . . ἐφύλαττον . . . ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι παιδίον γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.*

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, *ἔλεγον, ὥς χρὴν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε* —because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, *πάνν ἂν ἐφοβούμεν, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων . . . νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ*. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of *ἀπορῆσαι* will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, *ἔφη . . . λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νιείς διαφθαρήσονται*. The reason why *διαφευξοίμην* is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with *διαφθαρήσονται* which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. *εἰ διαφεύξομαι* would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, *ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι . . . οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνῃς ὀλίγου ἀποδρὰς ὀχόμεν*. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Ib. 198 e, *προυρρήθη γάρ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει*.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, *ἂ νῦν οὗτος ἔφη συμβήσεσθαι, ἐὰν ἐγὼ στεφανῶμαι*.

§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the Oratio Recta, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐβουλεύοντο ὃ τι χρὴ αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι would be an exception to the rule, if χρὴ were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, Il. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, Il. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the Oratio Obliqua of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον . . . , αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίζετο—where, just as οὐκ εἶχον is the Oblique Narration of *the thought* οὐκ ἔχομεν, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἠφανίζετο represents them thinking αἱ τιμαὶ ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἀφανίζεται. Now ἀφανίζεται would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἠφανίζετο is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antipho ii. A. β. 9. p. 117, ἀλοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ᾗδεν ἐκστησόμενος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔστερούμην—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58—60. p. 8, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγινόμεν κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὕρισκον κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγινόμεν means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον.

Gorg. 484 a, εἰαν . . . φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, . . . ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος.

Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός.

Lysis 217 d, ὅταν δὴ τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο χρώμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκαί.

The Subjunctive construction with ἄν, not admissible with a past

Tense, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. β. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.

Phædo 88 d, *πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον*; lit. 'overtook' (same metaphor as 89 c, *εἰ . . . με διαφεύγοι* [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.] *ὁ λόγος*). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, *μετάλλασέν τέ μιν*. Antipho ii. A. a. 3. p. 115, *ἕως ἂν διωχθῇ*, 'until he is caught.'

Ib. 108 c, [*ἡ μὲν*] *φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν ἥ δὲ . . . ᾤκησε τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα*—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, 'at once finds a home in' &c.

Symp. 172 a, *οὗτος, οὐ περιμένεις*; *Κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα*—not 'waited for him to come up with me,' but 'let him come up with me.'

Ib. 173 b, *τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω μοι*; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, 'why not at once relate it to me?' So Phædo 86 d, Soph. 251 e, &c. Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, *τί οὐκ ἀπεκοιμήθημεν*;

Symp. 209 a, *ἂ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ κυεῖν*. *κυῆσαι* is the first moment of the state *κυεῖν*.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, *ἔδοξε, ἔδοξαν*, 'I came to think.'

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as *ὔει, νίφει, ἔσεισε* (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, *οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται*.

Ib. 261 b, *λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται*.

Politic. 299 a, *ὧν δ' ἂν καταψηφισθῇ*.

Legg. 914 a, *δηλωθέντων* (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as 'the circumstances,' 'the event,' 'the course of events,' is understood. The common words *ἐνδέχεται, παρέχει* (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase *οὕτως ἔχει*, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis

(as Hom. Il. iv. 345, *φίλ' [ἦν]*, xiv. 98, *Τρῳσὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται*, xvi. 128, *οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλονται*, xxi. 533, *οἶω λοίγι' ἔσσεσθαι*, Od. ii. 203, *ἴσα ἔσσεται*, viii. 384, *Ἡδ' ἄρ' ἔτοιμα τέτυκτο*, xi. 455, *οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξίν*, Thuc. ii. 3, *ἐπεὶ ἔτοιμα ἦν*, i. 102, *τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο*, i. 7, *πλωϊμωτέρων ὄντων*, Hdt. vi. 52, *δηλά σφι ἔσσεσθαι*, the common *ἀδύνατά ἐστι*, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, *δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐτέραν ἀπόδειξιν*—‘the case will admit.’

Ib. 452 d, *καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο*—‘the result made this plain also.’

Phædo 73 b, *ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει*—‘what ensues is proof positive,’ &c.

Apol. 28 b, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή*—lit. ‘lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.’ ‘There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.’ Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, *στήσεται γὰρ κάκει*—‘for there too demonstration must stop.’ Hdt. iii. 82, *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόβου ἀπέβη ἐς μονναρχίην*.

Phileb. 25 d, *ἀλλ' ἔσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτόν δράσει*—‘perhaps it will do equally well now.’

Phædo 118 a, *ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται*—‘when the action of the poison reaches the heart.’

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, *ἐξ ἧς ἐπιβατόν ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους . . . ἐγίγνετο*.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, *προῖον δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει*—‘the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.’

Phædo 117 b, *καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει*—‘the agent left to itself will complete its work.’ There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theæt. 200 e, *ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό*. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, “How deep is it?”, says, “How can I tell beforehand? *we shall see*.” From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἷόν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι τάχα δηλώσει*.

Hip. Ma. 288 b, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος αὐτὸ δείξει—'we shall see by the event.'

Protag. 324 a, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει.

Ib. 329 b, ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὥς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μῶνον, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, vi. 86, οὔτε μέμνημαι τὸ πρῆγμα, οὔτε με περιφέρει οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τουτέων τῶν ἡμεῖς λέγετε. Æsch. Choeph. 993, Φίλον τέως, νῦν δ' ἐχθρόν, ὥς φαίνει, κακόν ('as the event shews.') Æschin. i. 40. p. 6, ὥς αὐτὸ τοῦργον ἔδειξεν. Antipho v. 60. p. 136, αὐτῷ μοι πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀποκτείνει τὸν ἄνδρα. Lysias x. 20. p. 118, δηλώσει δέ· (sc. id quod sequitur δηλώσει) οἰχῆσεται γάρ.

§ 101. We find also Non-Impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e. g.

Crat. 393 e, τὸ ὄνομα, ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 402 e, τοῦτό γε (τὸ ὄνομα) ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 237 b, καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε.

Cf. Dem. c. Dionys. 13. p. 1287, ἐδήλωσε δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον. Eur.

Hel. 146 sqq., (A) Συμπροξένησον, ὥς τύχῳ μαντευμάτων Ὅπη νεὼς στείλαμ' ἀν οὔριον πτερὸν κ.τ.λ.—(B) Πλοῦς, ὦ ξέν', αὐτὸς σημανεῖ.

§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. Ἐχειν, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e. g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, κίονες ὑψόσ' ἔχοντες—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their *heads*, or, vaguely, *parts of themselves*, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, ἀνάβασις ἐς αὐτοὺς ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ πάντας τοὺς πύργους ἔχουσα πεποιήται—where ἔχουσα has for its Object each part of the ἀνάβασις in succession.

From ἔχειν governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e. g. Od. iii. 182, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε Πύλονδ' ἔχου—'held my ship on her course for Pylos;'—the

ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him;—whence simply ‘I held on for Pylos.’

On the other hand, in the following passage *κατέχειν* has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 c, οἰοί τ' ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν—‘to keep themselves,’—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common ἔχε δὴ (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is ‘hold,’ scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—(as the case may be).

Gorg. 475 d, τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ παρέχων—‘offering,’ not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 e, ὅταν τις ἐφίῃ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι. So 563 a, *ἐνυκαθίεναι*.

Ib. 422 c, *ἀναστρέφειν*. So Lach. 191 e.

Ib. 467 b, *ἀναλαβεῖν*.

Ib. 473 b, *μεταβαλεῖν*.

Ib. 540 a, 591 e, *παραινέειν*. So 573 c, *ὑποκινέειν*.

Phædo 65 a, ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.

Ib. 98 d, χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα.

Phdr. 228 e, παῦε. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Politic. 258 a, Θεαιτήτῳ, . . ξυνέμειξα.

Phædo 72 b, εἰ τὸ καταδρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδοίῃ—lit. (as we might say) ‘put in an appearance on the other side.’

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. Il. xxiii. 686, ἀνασχομένῳ χερσὶ στιβαρῇσι. The language had become accustomed to ἀνασχέσθαι Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, Ἐμβαλέειν κόπης—ἐμβαλεῖν being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for ‘dashing in the oars.’ (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, νηὶ καταγαγόμεσθα.

§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, *πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν*—‘to fall short’—lit. ‘to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.’

Phdr. 237 d, *θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα. ἀναφέροντες*, ‘referring,’ scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, *ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ*—‘entrusting,’ scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of *ἔχειν* illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, *τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων*—there is no need to express *what* they pervaded or occupied, since *σεισμοὶ* (so used) must be *σεισμοὶ τῆς γῆς*. Or when *ἔχειν* is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, *ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον* so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said *ἄγειν*, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly *ἄγεται*, is said *ἄγειν* cf. Thuc. v. 54, *Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον*. [So Arnold: *ἐσέβαλλον* Poppo and Gölter].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phædo 58 e—59 a, *οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆι . . . διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνν μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆι*. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in *ἔλεός με εἰσῆι*), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, *πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας*.

Ib. 274 e, *εἶναι γεγονός*. 289 a, *ἦν ἂν τεθέν*. 308 e, *ἐστὶ τείνοντα*.

Tim. 38 c, *ἐστὶν ὄν*. 68 d, *ἡγνοκῶς ἂν εἶη*. 77 e, *εἶη διαδιδόμενον*.

Soph. 244 c, τὸ ἀποδέχεσθαι . . . [ἐστὶ] λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

Legg. 860 e, εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν.

§ 110. β. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἔχων with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 c, ἔχων φλυαρεῖς.

Phdr. 236 e, τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει ;

§ 111. IDIOMS OF PREPOSITIONS.

Ἀνά.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀνατίθεμαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in

Hipparch. 229 e, ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. Soph. Aj. 476, Προσθεῖσα κἀναθεῖσα τοῦ γε κατθανεῖν, and Lobeck's note upon it.

Ἀπό.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱδρομῆς ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν ἐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή—'who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.' (Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἄνω to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἄνω in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, ὁ τελείως παγκράτιον ἡσκηκὼς . . . οὐκ ἀπο μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἐστι μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 656, λόγισαι φαύλως μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἀπὸ χειρός.

§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative ; 'by help of.' This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν ἃ ἔπραξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 e, τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα . . . μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς—'acting only by and through itself,' independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἶδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη, and similarly 511 c.

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 14, ὅταν μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται.

Rep. 463 e, εἰ ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στόματων μόνον φθέγγονται.

Ib. 580 b, ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται—'the paramount judge decides absolutely.' An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.

Meno 74 a, τὴν μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστί—'which is out beyond all these,' i. e. 'which all these run up to,' 'which is paramount to all these.'

Rep. 343 b, διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—'night after night and day after day.'

Ib. 621 a, πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματος τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.

Symp. 220 b, ἀνυπόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο. This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy's Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer's διὰ νήσου ἰὼν in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, διαπορεύεσθαι, and Critias 106 a, διαπορεία—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —'doing the distance.' Cf. διαθεῖν, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. Εἰς.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, φέρονται . . . εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς—not 'into' but 'along' or 'down' the rivers⁹.

§ 114. β. 'To the number of.'

Legg. 704 b, ἀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινὰς ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίου.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, ὀλίγον ἐς χιλίους. So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. 'In regard to,' 'in the point of,' 'with a view to.'

Symp. 184 b, εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα.

Ibid. d, ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ξυμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι.

Ib. 196 c, εἰς γε ἀνδρίαν Ἔρωτι οὐδὲ Ἄρῃ ἀνθίσταται.

Ib. 219 d, ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἷώ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ὦμην ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.

Theæt. 169 a, ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.

⁹ [Under this example is in the MS. "Cf. Odys."]

Theæt. 178 e, τὸ περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν;

Legg. 635 a, ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἃ καὶ μηδὲν γε ἀνῆς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν.

Euthyd. 305 d, τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οὔσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 158, Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικεν. Also Andoc. ii. 23. p. 22, πολιτεῖαν διδόντας τε, καὶ εἰς χρήματα μεγάλας δωρεάς. Lysias xxvi. 21. p. 177, περὶ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν οὗτος εἰπεῖν ἔξει εἰς μισοδημίαν.

§ 116. Ἐκ.

a. Euthyd. 282 a, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρασκευάζεσθαι.

b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλλτός μοι ἐπέτετο—‘hereupon :’ the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence. Cf. Æsch. Eum. 2, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιν, Choeph. 1055, Ποταῖνιον γὰρ αἱμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι. Ἐκ τῶνδὲ τοι ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει.

§ 117. Ἐν.

a. ‘In the point of.’

Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα—‘agreeing in their aspect.’

Symp. 213 e, νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

Theæt. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος.

b. Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 457 a, ἐμβραχύ. Cf. the form καθεῖς in St. John viii. 9, ἐξήρχοντο εἰς καθεῖς.

§ 118. Ἐπί.

a. With Dative ; — ‘in connection with’—signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.

Rep. 376 e, ἔστι δὲ πού ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

Ib. 408 b, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι.

Ib. 532 c, ἐπ’ ἀδυναμία βλέπειν.

Symp. 186 a, [Ἐρως] οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 184 e, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ Ἐρως ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει.

Ib. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ σώματι.

Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπ’ εἶδει καλόν.

Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις ξυμφυὲς γεγονός.

Politic. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τέχνη φάρμακον.

Tim. 48 e, *ικανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεχθείσιν.*

Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, *τῶν φευγόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις.*

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.

Legg. 697 c, *ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους.*

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 245, *ἐξ ἔτι πατρῶν.*

§ 120. c. In Composition.

Crito 43 c, *ἐπιλύεται*—‘exempts.’ Perhaps the meaning of *ἐπὶ* is ‘with a further result’ or ‘condition,’ and so *ἐπιλύεσθαι* would be to obtain a man’s release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* be ‘to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,’ and so ‘to offer,’ ‘promise.’

Symp. 172 a, *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα. ἐπιστῆναι* is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. *στῆναι* is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So *ἐπιλέγεσθαι* is to pick out, e. g. in passing along a line. *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα* is equivalent to the one word *ἐπέμεινα*. For *ἐπιμένειν* see under *περί*, § 127.

Phædo 62 e, *ὁ Σωκράτης . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἡμᾶς.* From the notion of succession here again we should get ‘looking [from Cebes] to us,’—‘turning to us.’ Cf. Apol. 31 d, *ἐπικωμῶδῶν.*

§ 121. *Κατά.*

a. With Accusative.

Legg. 918 a, *ἔπεται κατὰ πόδα*—‘in close succession.’

Soph. 243 d, *κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες*—‘you have caught at once the train of the thought.’ This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying *κατὰ πόδα ἐπόμενος*.

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.

Meno 74 b, *μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.*

Ib. 76 a, *κατὰ παντός σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω.*

Ib. 77 a, *κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι.*

Phædo 70 d, *μὴ τοῖνυν κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο*—‘consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.’ The *κατά*, in a pregnant use, stands for *ὡς κατ’ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενον*.

Phdr. 260 b, *συντιθεῖς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου.*

§ 122. c. In Composition.

a. Symp. 219 c, *καταδαρθάνειν*—‘to earn by sleeping.’

β. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.

Apol. 33 c, οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεθείη—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, δούς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, κατανομοθετήσει.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἡ κατελεῖσθαι ἢ καταχαρίσασθαι Ἀνδοκίδῃ.

Isæus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποδοῦναι τὰ ὄντ' αὐτῷ καταναγκάσαντες—'peremptorily compelling.'

This κατὰ often, but not always or necessarily (see the last instance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

§ 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 c, μέχρι ὅποι.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαντόν.

Cf. Pind. Pyth. x. 62, παρ ποδός, and Soph. Phil. 838, παρὰ πόδα.

β. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον—literally, 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared, i. e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not 'beyond' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put coordinate with').

Phdr. 276 c, παγκάλῃν λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν.

Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντινόν.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρων λέγειν ὑπέβησθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—
'our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.'

Symp. 188 d, ὁ περὶ τὰγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς [Ἔρως]—'temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.'

§ 125. c. With Genitive;—'obtained from' or 'proceeding from,'—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν γινώσκεισθαι ταῦτα . . . οὐδὲν σοφόν—
'that these things should receive recognition from us.'

Crat. 412 c, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

Politic. 296 a, λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον.

Critias 107 b, τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα.

Protag. 312 b, ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακείμεσις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή. (παρὰ πάντων follows παρακείμεσις.)

Cf. Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως ταῦθ' ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει.

§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the παρὰ.

Rep. 362 c, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευασθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον.

Ib. 461 e, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 612 c, μισθοὺς . . . ὅσους τε καὶ οἷους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.

Tim. 52 d, οὗτος . . . παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόςθω λόγος.

With this use of παρὰ cf. that of πρὸς, Hdt. iii. 137, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς Δαρείου ἔων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑωντοῦ δόκιμος. Antipho i. 25. p. 114, καὶ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον καὶ ὀσιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο ὑμῖν.

§ 127. Περί.

b¹⁰. With Dative—'in the sphere of,' literally.

Protag. 314 a, ὅρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβέης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

Phædo 114 d, θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα. The feeling is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phædo 59 e, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρὸς . . . εἶπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίεναι κ.τ.λ. The meaning of περιμένειν will be elucidated by distinguishing it from ἐπιμένειν. ἐπιμένειν is to stop in the course of a progress from one point to another until somebody comes or something happens. The ἐπί, as in ἐπιστήναι, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be resumed. It answers to the Latin præstolari. περιμένειν is to defer any intended proceeding, to remain *in statu quo*, until

¹⁰ [In the MS. the uses of περὶ with the Accusative and Genitive were to the Dative are lettered b., its uses in have come in, lettered a. and c.]
Composition d. Apparently uses with

a certain future moment. The *περὶ* has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence *περιμένειν* here is 'to wait a certain time,' which time is specified in the next words. *ἐπιμένειν* would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, ὁ Φαληρεὺς, ἔφη, οὗτος Ἀπολλόδορος, οὐ περιμένεις; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα. Here the addition of the local *ἐπιστὰς* in the second sentence shews that *περιμένειν* is not local. οὐ περιμένεις; 'wait a moment' is more civil than 'wait *there*.'

§ 128. Πρός.

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i. e. not 'for' but '*in regard of fitness for*': in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phædo 117 b, τί λέγεις περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τινι;—'what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity?' lit. 'in regard of its fitness for a libation.'

Protag. 328 b, νοῆσαι τινα, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι—'to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνῆσαν ἅλεις ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμὰς μείζουσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζους κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 69 a, ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ—lit. 'right in regard of fitness for making men good.'

Rep. 581 e, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστων τοῦ εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ . . . πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν.

b. With Dative.

Phædo 112 e, ἅπαντες γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν—'absorbed in.'

Cf. Dem. F. L. 127. p. 380, ἦν ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι (Jelf).

§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb *πρὸς* sometimes has the general meaning of 'additionally,' and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—'to have in addition.'

Ib. 607 b, προσεῖπόμεν δὲ αὐτῇ—'and let us say to her moreover.'

Theæt. 208 e, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ—‘apprehends in addition its difference from other things.’ So 209 d, προσδοξάσαι.

Apol. 20 a, σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσεیدنαι.

Phædo 74 a, τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.

Gorg. 516 d, Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτά ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζήμωσαν.

§ 130. ‘Υπέρ.

‘With a view to.’

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δέεται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὕμῶν ἀποθανόντος Θηραμένους, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πονηρίας.

§ 131. ‘Υπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ὑπό τι ἄσεβῃ [λόγον]—‘somewhat impious.’

Gorg. 493 c, ὑπό τι ἄτοπα.

b. In Composition.

a. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγ’ οὖν μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

Note, that ὑπολογίζεσθαι is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οὐδέν εἰκὸς αὐτῷ τούτο ὑπόλογον γενέσθαι [so Bekker; οὐδένα . . . τούτου Zurich editors]—where αὐτῷ means ‘in his favour,’ and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τούτοις φημί ἂν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγὴν,—not, as Taylor, ‘honestam excusationem in suo exsilio habere,’ but ‘non injuria iis laudi imputandum.’

The word does not mean ‘to subtract,’ according to our notion of the operation; but ‘to reckon against,’ ‘per contra’:—the same meaning of ὑπὸ which we get in ὑπαντᾶν, ὑπωμοσία (‘an affidavit to stop’ proceedings), ὑποτιμᾶσθαι (equivalent to ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι).

β. ὑποπίνειν.

Rep. 372 d, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες.

§ 132. IDIOMS OF PARTICLES.

A. *Kaì* expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here *kaì* may generally¹¹ be rendered ‘at all.’

Phædo 77 b, *πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι*—‘before it came at all.’

Ib. 88 a, *πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς*—‘before we came into being at all.’

Ib. 110 a, *ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ*—‘exists at all.’

Apol. 22 a, *ἴνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γίγνοιτο*. Here *καὶ* fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound *ἀνέλεγκτος*—‘not to be called in question at all.’

Phædo 66 d, *ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται*.

Ib. 108 d, *εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην*—‘if I even had had the knowledge.’

Ib. 110 b, *εἰ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν*—‘if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.’

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, *ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο*.

This *καὶ* frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective *σμικρός*.

Apol. 28 b, *ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν*.

Soph. 247 c, *εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι συγχωρεῖν*.

Ib. 261 b, *θαρρεῖν χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον*.

Phileb. 58 a, *ξύμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται*.

Politic. 278 d, *πῶς . . . δύναται ἂν τις ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδοῦς ἐπὶ τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν* ;

The remaining passages shew the *καὶ* entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphro 3 a, *τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους* ;

Ib. 6 b, *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν* ;

Phædo 61 e, *τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο* ;

Laches 184 d, *τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ* ;

¹¹ Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e.g. Thuc. ii. 11, *οὐκουν χρῆ, εἴ τφ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι, τούτου ἕνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν*—‘if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,—or rather ‘if we are

a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.’ So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, *εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν*—‘upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.’

There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with *τί*. The *καί* neutralises this affirmation. 'What have you done?' implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with *πῶς καί*, *ποῦ καί*, &c., where the *καί* *affirms* the implied Proposition: Æsch. Choeph. 528, *Ποῖ καί τελευτᾷ . . . λόγος*; 'what was the issue?'—implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads *Καί ποῖ*. Cf. however Eurip. Phœn. 1354, *Πῶς καί πέπρακται διπτύχων παίδων φόνος*;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of *καί* is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, *παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καί ἀτιμίαν σχοίη*.

Euthyd. 304 e, *οὐτωςὲ γάρ πως καί εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι*.

Rep. 328 c, *διὰ χρόνου γάρ καί ἐωράκειν αὐτόν*.

Ib. 395 e, *πολλοῦ καί δεήσομεν*. This phrase often recurs.

Symp. 177 a, *φάναι δὲ πάντας καί βούλεσθαι*.

Ibid. b, *καί τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καί θανααστόν*—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1, *ἢ μᾶλλον καί ἐπέθεντο*, but wrongly joins *καί*, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have *ἢ μᾶλλον καί ἐπετίθεντο*, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. *ἢ καί μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο*.]

Phædo 107 c, *ὁ κίνδυνος καί δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι*.

Phileb. 25 b, *σὺ καί ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὥς οἶμαι*.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, *καί πάσαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη*.

Rep. 342 c, *συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καί μάλα μόγισ*.

Symp. 189 a, *ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καί μάλ' ἐπαύσατο*.

Ib. 194 a, *εὖ καί μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖο*.

Phædo 117 b, *καί μάλα ὕλεως*. Ibid. c, *καί μάλα εὐχερῶς*.

Protag. 315 d, *στρώμασι καί μάλα πολλοῖς*.

Legg. 832 a, *καί μάλ' ἐνίστε οὐκ ἀφνεῖς ὄντας*.

Phædo 61 e, *καί γὰρ ὥσως καί μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. 404 b, *ἀπλῇ που καί ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικὴ καί μάλιστα ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*.

Legg. 773 c, ἃ μὴ βουλόμεθα ξυμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα ξυμβαίνει ταῖς πλείστοις πόλεσι.

Euthyd. 293 e, (A) 'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον ; (B) Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς—'on the contrary.'

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 318, Δῶρον . . . δόμεναι οἰκόνδε φέρεσθαι, Καὶ μάλα καλὸν ἐλὼν, ib. 46, Καὶ λίην κείνός γε εἰκότι κείται δλέθρῳ, Il. xiii. 638, Τῶνπέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἶναι, Od. viii. 154, Κῆδεά μοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἤπερ ἄεθλοι. Hdt. ii. 69, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θήβας καὶ κάρτα ἤγηνται αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἱρούς (where of course καὶ κάρτα goes with ἤγηνται). Æsch. P. V. 728, Αἰτὰί σ' ὀδηγήσουσι καὶ μάλ' ἀσμένως, Choeph. 879, καὶ μάλ' ἡβώντος δὲ δεῖ, Eum. 373, δόξαι τ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμναὶ κ.τ.λ. Soph. El. 1455, Πάρεστι δῆτα καὶ μάλ' ἄζηλος θέα.

§ 134. Καὶ is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the καὶ indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the καὶ is sometimes postponed.

Phædo 63 c, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δυσχुरισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο—where the καὶ emphasizes δυσχुरισαίμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην—where the stress of καὶ includes ἦν.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνους δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχαρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ—where καὶ emphasizes μόνους.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐς ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπύθοντο—i. e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. Μή.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theæt. 192 e, Σωκράτης ἐπιγινώσκει . . . , ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Phileb. 18 e, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἐστὶν εἰν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκότερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθὺς ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 106 d, σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'incorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς—'suppose we say, not.'

Hip. Ma. 299 d, ἄρ' οὖν ἡδὺν ἡδέος . . . διαφέρει τῷ ἡδὺν εἶναι ; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττων.

Politic. 292 e, πεπτευταὶ τοσοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε, μὴ τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—'let alone kings.' Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μὴ τι is enhanced by its *following* the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἔτοιμος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 295 e, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτερα προστάττειν ; ('is he to be forbidden?')

Cf. Æschin. iii. 21. p. 56, ὅτι ἥρξα, μὴ ἀποδημήσω ; ('am I not to' &c.?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head ; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (A) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ. ; (B) Μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 a, (A) τί δέ ; (B) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 b, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδέν θανμαστὸν λέγεις· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως.

Meno 75 a, (A) πειρῶ εἰπεῖν. (B) Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (A) Οὗτος σύ, ποῖ θεῖς ; ἐπὶ καδίσκους ; (B) Μηδαμῶς.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of 'whether.'—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of 'perhaps'—from which the sense of 'whether' just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λῖνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις ;—'are you perhaps not joining' &c. ? i. e. 'perhaps you are not joining.'

Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.'

§ 139. οὐ πάνν.

The universal meaning of οὐ πάνν is 'hardly,' 'scarcely.'

Theæt. 149 d, οὐ πάνν τοῦτο οἶδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὐκ ἂν πάνν τολμήσειε φῆσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνν διεμνημόνευεν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνν ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Phædo 63 a, οὐ πάνν εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι.

Ibid. c, οὐκ ἂν πάνν δυσχυρισαίμην.

Ib. 85 d, οὐ πάνν φαίνεται ικανῶς εἰρησθαι.

Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνν ξυγχωρῶ.

Theæt. 145 a, οὐ πάνν ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάνν ῥάδιον πείσαι.

Phædo 59 a, οὐδὲν πάνν μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆι.

Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνν χαλεπαίνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'

Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνν τι γινώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα.

Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνν οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὥς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι.

Phileb. 41 a, σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνν πονηρὰς ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θεΐη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρία.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 e, κρανίων, ἃ ἔστιν οὐ πάνν μαλακά—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'

Apol. 19 a, οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνν με λανθάνει οἶόν ἔστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'

Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου . . . οὐ πάνν χαλεπαίνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II. vii. 3, ἐλλείποντες περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνν γίνονται, IV. i. 30, τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνν συνδυάζεται.

§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὐ πάνν ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα—where πάνν goes closely with ὀλίγοις. Quite different also are πάνν οὐ, παντάπασιν οὐ, &c.

§ 141. Οὐδέ.

The use of οὐδὲ for καὶ οὐ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδὲ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥάδιον—for σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον.

Legg. 730 d, τίμος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μὴδὲν ἀδικῶν· ὁ δὲ μὴδ' ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν πλεον ἢ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἐκείνου—'but he who *beyond this* does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ἢ οὐδὲ μέμνησαι ;—for ἢ καὶ οὐ μέμνησαι ; 'or on the contrary,' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phædo 72 a, ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὁμολογήκαμεν—i. e. ἰδὲ τοίνυν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ὦμ.

Crito 44 b, ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐδὲ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have οὐδεμία], it will be explained by resolving the οὐδέ, and attaching the καὶ to ὡς, 'since *moreover* the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but' &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριον ἐστί—for καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 45 c, ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον—for ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.

Cf. Isocr. xviii. 65. p. 383, ὅτ' οὐδ' οὕτω ῥάδιον ἦν—'when, *besides*, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἔτι δὲ οὐδέ—for ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ.

§ 142. Ἀλλά.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c-d, we have seriatim ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἀλλὰ δὴ.

Apol. 37 b-c, we have the series πότερον—ἀλλὰ—ἀλλὰ δὴ.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—ἀλλά.

§ 143. Εὐθύς, νῦν, αὐτίκα, πολλάκις, &c.

a. εὐθύς 'from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν 'as the case now stands,' Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αὐτίκα 'for instance,' Theæt. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 e, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὥσπερ αὐτίκα, Laches 195 b, ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα.

δ. πολλάκις 'perchance' after μή, Protag. 361 c: after εἰ ἄρα, Phædo 60 e, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, εἴ τινων πολλάκις ἄρα διακίκοιτο, Phdr. 238 d, ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος γένωμαι. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη.

ε. ὅτε 'whereas.' "Οτ' οὖν δὴ equivalent to ἐπειδὴ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So ὁπότε, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.

§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter *simultaneously* into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καὶ—δέ, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, ἔως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. The δὲ and the καὶ enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καὶ μέντοι only differs from καὶ—δὲ in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δέ, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 e, καὶ μέντοι οὕτωςι ποίησον.

Ib. 222 a, καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 17 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι.

Ib. 26 e, ἀπιστός γ' εἶ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι στανῶ.

Ib. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον κ.τ.λ.

Euthyd. 289 e, καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν.

Alc. I. 113 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καὶ οὖν καί.

Protag. 309 b, καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.

d. Such again is δ' ἀλλά.

Soph. 235 d, σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἶπες πρῶτον.

e. And again δὲ—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δὲ οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ;

§ 147. f. Ἀλλὰ γάρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γάρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἀλλά belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition : for the ἀλλά sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γάρ does. Ἀλλὰ γάρ has two meanings : one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical ; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'

Symp. 180 a, Αἴσχυλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ κ.τ.λ.* ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 228 a, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἔμαντοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων.

Phædo 87 d, μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν . . . ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἂν εἶη κ.τ.λ.—‘but, he might say, be that as it may,’ &c.

Ib. 95 c-d, μνηύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιον ἐστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον.

Meno 94 c, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἐταίρε, μὴ οὐκ ἡ διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ—‘but the truth is.’

Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδέν μέτεστι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 c, &c.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 237-242, Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εἰ οἶδα μάχας κ.τ.λ.* Ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ σ’ ἐθέλω βαλέειν κ.τ.λ., Od. x. 201, Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως κ.τ.λ.* Ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις ἐγίγνετο μυρομένοισιν.

§ 148. g. Ἀλλ’ ἤ, πλὴν ἤ.

The joint meaning is ‘except.’ By the ἀλλὰ the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἤ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν [ἀνδρόγυνον] ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν ὀνείδει ὄνομα κείμενον.

Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ ἡ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ.

Ib. 81 b, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές ἀλλ’ ἡ τὸ σωματοειδές.

Ib. 97 d, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἀλλ’ ἡ τὸ ἄριστον.

Protag. 329 d, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἀλλ’ ἡ μεγέθει καὶ συμκρότητι.

Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρῆσθαι εἰλαίῳ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ὅ τι συμκροτάτῳ.

Ib. 354 b, ἡ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, . . . ἀλλ’ ἡ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας;—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἀλλ’ ἡ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

Apol. 42 a, ἀδελον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἀδελον παντὶ being equivalent to δῆλον οὐδενί. The analogy of ἀλλ’ ἡ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἤ. The πλὴν and the ἡ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception

each in its own way : *πλὴν* implies 'it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God ;' *ἢ*, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.'

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλείονων βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας, 80, ἐψηφίσαντο . . . μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ἅμα, vii. 50, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἡγαντιοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἢ μὴ φανερώς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίεσθαι, viii. 28, οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ' ἢ Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι.

§ 149. h. *νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ*. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The *δὲ* and the *γάρ* exercise a simultaneous force ; *δὲ* represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and *γάρ* further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations *νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ* and *ἀλλὰ γάρ* approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. *Νὺν δὲ* . . . *γάρ* is however only used in contradicting the Protasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied ; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the *νὺν δέ*. The *δὲ* sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the *γάρ* the *νὺν* ('as the case actually stands') belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the *νὺν δέ* but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro 11 c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες· νὺν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἄλλον δὲ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος.

Ib. 14 c, ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη ἐμεμαθήκη. νὺν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτῶμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· τί δὲ αὖ λέγεις κ.τ.λ. ;

Apol. 38 a, εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν· νὺν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.

Protag. 347 a, σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῇ καὶ ἀληθῇ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. νὺν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῇ λέγειν· διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

Charm. 175 a-b, οὐ γὰρ ἂν πού . . . ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν. νὺν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἦττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει. νὺν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γὰρ Δάχης Νικία ἔθετο. εὐ δὲ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ.

Ib. 200 e, εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ. νὺν δ' ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα. τί οὖν ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 875 c, ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων . . . παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἶη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἰρετέον.

Cf. Lysias xii. 61. p. 125, ὅμως δ' ἐγὼ γὰρ δέομαι ἀναπαύσασθαι.

§ 150. i. The cases of οὐ μὴ and μὴ οὐ, when they make *one* negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of οὐ μὴ a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ ἡσθῆσθαι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μὴ οὐ Mr. Campbell, *Theætetus*, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μὴ οὐ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 e, πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἶη;— which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο, ἡδονῇ ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὅτι or ὅπως which follow.

a. Οὐ μόνον ὅτι—‘I was not only going to say’ (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἐθέλουσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν πλεον εὔ τεθέντων, οὐδ' ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάμπολυς ξυμβαίνει, σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀντίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἡσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι.

§ 152. b. Οὐχ ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οὐχ ὅπως is said to be equivalent to οὐχ ὅπως οὐ which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὐχ ὅπως clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογούνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίσταςθαι.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ . . . γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περιόψεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by κωλυταὶ γενήσεσθε from περιόψεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οὐχ ὅπως ζημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἀτιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. Οὐχ ὅτι—‘not but that;’ lit. ‘I was not going to deny

that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from οὐ μόνον ὅτι.

Theæt. 157 b, ὥστε ἐξ πάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ . . . , τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς . . . ἡναγκάσμεθα . . . χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Σωκράτη ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσασθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 e, οὐδεμίαν οἰμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες.

Lysis 219 e, πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη . . . οὐχ ὅτι πολλὰκίς λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. Μὴ ὅτι—'nedum,' 'much less' or 'much more,' according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: 'not to say,' i. e. not supposing us to say.

Symp. 207 e, μὴ ὅτι . . . ἀλλὰ καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μὴ ὅτι . . . , ἀλλά.

Protag. 319 d, μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι . . . ἀλλά.

Legg. 799 c, πᾶς που νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτες.

Crat. 427 e, ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γε ἡδονήν.

Phdr. 240 e, ἂ καὶ λόγῳ ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, ὅς οὔτε στρατηγού, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά—'yet, so far from *the contrary*.' After οὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλά.

Symp. 199 a, χαίρετω δὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάσω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὰ γε ἀληθῆ . . . ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν—'yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.'

Meno 86 c, (A) βούλει οὖν κ.τ.λ.; (B) Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκείνο ἂν ἥδιστα σκεψαίμην—'yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to' &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς—'yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if' &c.

Cf. Thuc. v. 43, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡναντιοῦτο.
So viii. 56, ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι ἀλλ' ἄπορα νομίσαντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 156. b. Of οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ the same explanation holds ;—‘ for not *the contrary*, but,’ i. e. ‘ for, so far from the contrary.’

Euthyd. 305 e, τί οὖν ; δοκοῦσί σοί τι λέγειν ; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλ' ὃ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν—‘ for I must say,’ &c. : more literally, ‘ for, do you know, so far from the contrary,’ &c.

Ib. 286 b, πῶς λέγεις ; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον . . . ἀεὶ θαυμάζω—‘ for, do you know, I must say I’ &c.

Phædo 83 e, κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασιν . . . οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου—‘ for, so far from the contrary,’—i. e. ‘ for, most assuredly.’

§ 157. c. Οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλὰ.

Phædo 107 b, οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι. The full construction is οὐ μόνον γε ταῦτα εὖ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.—‘ not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,’ namely τὰς ὑποθέσεις κ.τ.λ.

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ, and οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλὰ, is, that the οὐ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by *its contrary* expressed in the ἀλλὰ clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. Μέν γε answered by δέ, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῶ θεά ; ἡ μὲν γε κ.τ.λ. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 215 b, πολὺ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου· ὁ μὲν γε κ.τ.λ. σὺ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοί. Dem. de Cor. 93. p. 257, ὁ μὲν γε σύμμαχος ὦν. [So Bekker : ὁ μὲν γὰρ Zurich ed.] Æschin. iii. 63. p. 62, ὁ μὲν γε τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκε.

b. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε.

Legg. 728 d-e, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with δή, to which γε is often subjoined.

c. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, with and without γε subjoined.

Rep. 409 a, διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις . . . φαίνονται κ.τ.λ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν.

Symp. 196 e, ϕ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρῆσθαι, ὅτι ποιητὴς ὁ Ἑρως . . . πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, without or with γε.

Crat. 428 b, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ—'well, no doubt.'

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'well, but then' (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε—'but further'—in a consecutive proof.

e. Ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ . . . γε. Politic. 269 d.

f. Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε. Rep. 602 b.

g. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ . . . γε. Phædo 92 b.

h. Ὡς δὴ τοι—'how true is it that.' Rep. 366 c, Tim. 26 b.

i. Ὡς δὴ σὺ—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Καὶ δὴ καὶ—'then, I suppose,' ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato οὐ has more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἀλλά.

b. Instead of the common *ἄλλως τε καὶ* we find sometimes *καὶ ἄλλως καί*, as Laches 181 a, 187 c.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς.

Legg. 927 b, ὅξυ μὲν ἀκούουσι, βλέπουσί τε ὅξυ.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, κ.τ.λ. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Pb. 177 b, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορία μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that *μέντοι* is used, and not *δέ*, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, *δέ* could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by *δέ*.

§ 163. IDIOMS OF COMPARISON.

- A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
 B. „ „ words of the Superlative Degree.
 C. „ „ other Comparative words and formulæ.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by *ἤ*, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, οὐκ ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι, ἢ λόγους μισήσας.

Crito 44 c, τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ. ;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς χαλεπώτερον τούτων, ἢ πυνθάνεσθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦγε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον, *H ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχοντο Ἄνῆρ ἡδὲ γυνή. So Hdt. i. 79, ὥς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἔσχε τὰ πρήγματα, ἢ ὥς αὐτὸς κατεδόκεε.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. ὡς as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις ὥς τοῦτο.

Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὥς . . . σιτεῖσθαι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 277, [νέφος] μελάντερον ἤτε πίσσα. So Lysias vii.

12. p. 109, ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον λέγεσθαι ὥς μοι προσήκε, ib. 31.

p. 111, προθυμότερον πεποίηκα ὥς . . . ἠναγκαζόμεν.

§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the *παρὰ* in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλῃν λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

Politic. 296 a, εἴ τις γινώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους.

Legg. 729 e, ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρτημένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον.

Πρό.

Phædo 99 a, δικαιοτέρον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν . . . ὑπέχειν . . . δίκην.

Crito 54 b, μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μὴδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οἷσι ἢ τυραννὶς πρὸ ἐλευθερίας ἦν ἀσπαστότερον.

Ἀντί.

Rep. 619 c, αἰτιάσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

Ἐν.

Euthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

Κατὰ after ἤ.

Phædo 94 e, πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν.

§ 166. c. Irregularities.

a. Pleonastic form.

Crat. 433 d, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίῳ τρόπον . . ἄλλον, ἢ κ.τ.λ.;

Gorg. 482 b, οἶμαι τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστέην . . μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐμαντῶ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι.

Charm. 159 c, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 e, 854 e ;—all instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or ἤττον.

§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

Protag. 350 b, θαρράλειώτεροι εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.

Symp. 220 e, προθυμότερος ἐγένον τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σεαυτόν. A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.

Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τό γ' ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μὴδ' ᾠήθησαν.

§ 168. γ. Case after ἢ assimilated to the Case before it, by *Attraction*.

Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τσοαύτης γραμμῆς.

This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare the constructions with ὥσπερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use with ἢ varies: on the one hand we have, Il. i. 260, καὶ ἀρείουσιν ἡέπερ ὑμῖν Ἀνδράσιν ὠμίλησα· on the other hand, Il. x. 557, ἀμείνονας, ἡέπερ οἶδε, Ἰπποὺς δωρήσασαί, Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρὴ δόμεναι καὶ λώϊον ἡέπερ ἄλλοι, Il. xxiv. 486, Μνηῆσαι πατὸρ σείῳ . . Τηλίκου ὥσπερ ἐγών. In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἢ· e. g. F. L. 27. p. 349, οὐδὲν ἐλάττωνος ἢ τούτου· but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερον

ἡ ἐγὼ δοκιμασάντων, *ib.* 178. p. 287, ἡμῶν ἀμεινον ἢ 'κεῖνοι προορω-
μένων.

§ 169. δ. Omission of ἢ.

Legg. 956 a, ὑφὴν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς μῖς ἔμμηνον.

Ib. 958 e, ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἀνδρῶν ἔργον.

Phædo 75 a, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου . . . μᾶλλον τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.

[Oxon. alone omits ἢ here. The other MSS. and the edd. have
ἢ καὶ.]

§ 170. ε. Omission of μᾶλλον.

Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὕτω ῥάδιον ἢ 'κείνως.

Meno 94 e, ἴσως ῥάδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ. Cf., as the
Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrat. v. 115.
p. 105, viii. 50. p. 169.

Tim. 75 c, ξυνέδοξε τοῦ πλείονος βίου φανλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἐλάττονα
ἀμείνονα ὄντα παντὶ πάντως αἰρετέον.

Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἰ ἄρα τι ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ('other
than') ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν. Lysias ii. 62. p. 196, θάνατον μετ'
ἐλευθερίας αἰρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας, xxi. 22. p. 163, οὐκ οἶδ'
οὓς τινας ἢ ὑμᾶς ἐβουλήθη περὶ ἐμοῦ δικαστὰς γενέσθαι.

§ 171. B. Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

Ἐπί.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον γένος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e.g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν
γὰρ ἀρίστην Μῆτιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φάσ' ἔμμεναι.

Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομί-
σματος ἄξια κτήματα.

Ib. 892 a, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἀνδρείοτατος τῶν ὕστερον ἐπιγιγνομένων. Cf.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

β. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς ὁ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

Legg. 731 b, πρᾶον ὡς ὁ τι μάλιστα.

Ib. 908 a, ὡς ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος.

Legg. 758 a, ὥς ὃ τι μάλιστα ὀλιγίστοις.

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 582, μάλιστα Κήδιστοι.

§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulæ.

a. With ἤ.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες.

Ib. 455 c, διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Phædo 95 c, διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοῦς ἐτελεύτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μῆ.

Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμῇ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 e, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχούμενος ἐν Θετταλία ;

§ 174. b. With παρά.

Rep. 337 d, ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίῳ τούτων.

Phædo 105 b, παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἄλλην.

Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν.

Ib. 181 d, ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.

Legg. 927 e, ποικίλλοντες ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἰδίοις τὸν τῶν ὀρφανῶν βίον παρὰ τὸν τῶν μῆ.

And, with παρὰ *simply*, Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντινούν.

§ 175. c. With ὥσπερ and the like Adverbs ; and with correlative Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, εἴ τις δυσχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ.

Ib. 100 c, ἐὰν σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνόητοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων.

Politic. 274 d, ἔδει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὁλος ὁ κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδὲν οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακόν, ὅσον δόξα ψευδής.

Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς οἶον οἱ κύρτοι ξυνυφηνάμενος.

Protag. 327 d, ἄγριοι τινες, οἵοίπερ οὓς πέρυσι Φερεκράτης ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. So Crat. 432 e.

Cf. Hom. Od. xx. 281, Πὰρ δ' ἄρ' Ὀδυσσῆϊ μοῖραν θέσαν . . . Ἰσην ὥς αὐτοὶ περ ἐλάγχανον.

§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by *ὥσπερ* is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. II. xxiv. 486, *Μνήσαι πατρὸς σείω, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ, Τηλίκου, ὥσπερ ἐγών.* Lysias vi. 32. p. 106, *λυπουμενῶ ὥσπερ οὗτος.* Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, *τοὺς ὥσπερ Καλλίμαχος βεβιωκότας.* This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Æschin. ii. 120. p. 44, *τοὺς μικροπολίτας, ὥσπερ αὐτός, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μεζόνων ἀπόρρητα.* [So Bekker: αὐτοὺς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, *οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς,* Soph. O. C. 869, *δοίη βίον Τοιοῦτον οἶον καὶ γηρᾶναι ποτέ,* Lys. 492. 72, [i. e. xiii. 72. p. 136] *οὐδαμῶ γὰρ ἔστιν Ἀγόρατον Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι ὥσπερ Θρασύβουλον.* We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μαιρακίᾳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι,*—where *μαιρακίᾳ* is affected by Attraction to *πλάττοντι*.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Symp. 179 e, *διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, . . . οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐτίμησαν.*

Ib. 189 c, *δοκοῦσι . . . θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν . . . , οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται.*

Ib. 213 b, *ἐλλοχῶν αὐτῷ ἐνταῦθα κατέκεισο, ὥσπερ εἰώθης ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι.*

Ib. 216 d, *ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται . . . , καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ Σειληνῶδες;* This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after *τοῦτο*. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theæt. 187 b, *χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς τὸ πρῶτον ᾧ κνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.*

Apol. 39 c, *τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν . . . χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.*

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, *ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὥς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνεῶς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἦνθησαν*—taking *ὥς* to be not 'when' but 'how;' but

primarily Hom. Od. xxiv. 195-199, ὡς εὖ μέμνητ' Ὀδυσῆος . . .
Οὐχ ὡς Τυνδαρέου κόρη κακὰ μήσατο ἔργα.

§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἥττον ἂν εἶην ἀηδής.

Politic. 286 b, ἔσχε μῆκος πλέον.

Phædo 115 b, ἄπερ αἰὲ λέγω, οὐδὲν καινότερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἥττόν τι, Euthyd. 293 c, ἥττον οὖν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft οὐκ and οὐκοῦν.

Cf. the Latin *si minus*.

§ 179. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—ATTRACTION.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν . . . ἐπιδίξετε πότερον χρῆ δικαίοις εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e. g. Æsch. Choeph. 140, Αὐτῇ τέ μοι δὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολλὴ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται οὐδὲν οἷον τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι.

Hip. Ma. 292 c, τὸ καλόν, ὃ παντί, ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as βυλομένων ἡμῶν προθύμων εἶναι, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.

One common type is (e. g.) Hdt. v. 38, *ἔδεε ξυμμαχίης οἱ μεγάλης ἐξευρεθῆναι*. And primarily Homer, Il. xviii. 585, *οἱ δ' ἦτοι δακείν μὲν ἀπετρωπῶντο λεόντων*, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is *ἐγὼ δίκαιος εἰμὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν* which stands for *δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν*—the *ἐμὲ* being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt. ix. 77, *ἄξιοι ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημῶσαι*.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here ; for the rest cf. ' Binary Structure,' §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, *εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν*—where *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of *ἔρως ἐστίν* in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, *ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίξειν*.

Gorg. 513 e, *ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν*.

Legg. 790 c, *τρόπον ὅνπερ ἤργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν*.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, *δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων*.

Euthyd. 282 d, *οἷων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι*.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, *τὸν αὐτῷ ξυνειδότα φερόμενον*.

Charm. 169 a, *οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαντῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι*.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after *δίκαιόν ἐστιν*, *ἀνάγκη ἐστίν*, *οἷόν τε ἐστίν*, and the like, or after Verbs of *judging*, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after *δίκαιον* &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax ; but this is not always the case,

e. g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a : whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 e, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἷε δίκαιον εἶναι ;

Phædo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

Hip. Ma. 289 e, τὸ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.

Ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι.

Charm. 164 b, γινώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἱατρῷ.

Meno 88 c, εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι.

Laches 196 e, ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρίαν.

Menex. 241 a, οἷόν τε ἀμύνεσθαι ὀλίγοις πολλούς.

Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὥς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

Crat. 392 a, ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὸς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέφ.

Phædo 92 c, πρέπει ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας [λόγῳ].

Soph. 231 e, ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εἰρήθης.

Apol. 34 e, δεδογμένον ἐστὶ τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 82, above.]

Cf. Philolaus ap. Stob. p. 458, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦς οὐθενὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ γινωσκομένων ὑφ' ἁμῶν γνωσθῆμεν, and again ib., ἀδύνατον ἦς ἂν καὶ αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆμεν. [Quoted by Boeckh in his Philolaos, p. 62.] Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, τάδε ὑμῖν ἄξιον ἐνθυμηθῆναι.

On the other hand we have, unusually,

Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρὸν δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e. g.

Crito 51 d, προαγορεύομεν Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ . . . ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι.

Cf. Hdt. ix. 78, καὶ τοὶ θεοὶ παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι, and Hom. Il. x. 187, τῶν ὕπνος ὀλώλει Νύκτα φυλασσομένοιισι.

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικία; though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπουμέναις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 101, Εὖχεο . . . ῥέξειν ἐκατόμβην . . . , Οἴκαδε νοστήσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὗτε αὐτὸς ἐθελήσαιμι ἂν πιεῖν, οὗτε ἄλλῳ συμβουλευσάμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα—where κραιπαλῶντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβουλεύσαιμι. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 e, τοῦ δυναμένου παίζειν . . . μυθολογοῦντα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186. c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e. g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὐ μανθάνω ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e. g.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. This is an Attraction for κινδυνεύει λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὥς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν—where τὸ . . . Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ὁμολογεῖς (compare δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, above).

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δὴλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα ἐργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοί, οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 82 a, δὴλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ῥοι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστι δὴ, οἱ ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη ῥοι.

For the rest of the instances under this head see 'Binary Structure,' §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἤ, attracted, after omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal construction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.

(See the remarks under 'Idioms of Comparison,' § 168, above.)

§ 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν.

Phdr. 249 b, ἀξίως οὐ ἐβίωσαν βίου.

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἥς Τρωῖ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before βούλει¹², which with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin *quínis*.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.

Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα . . . οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργασταί.

Phileb. 43 d, τριῶν ὄντων ὄντινων βούλει.

γ. From Dative into Genitive.

Legg. 966 e, πάντων ὧν κίνησις . . . οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν.

δ. From Nominative into

Genitive.

Theæt. 165 e, ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος . . . ἂν ἐλύτρου.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὧν ἔτυχεν ἦν—i. e. τούτων ἃ ἔτυχεν.

¹² Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δ' οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἂν.

Symp. 216 d, ἐνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης αἴεσθε γέμει σωφροσύνης;

Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἶε ἄλλο ἢ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα;

Phædo 59 c, τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

Dative.

Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα.

Phædo 69 a, τοῦτο δ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.

Accusative.

Cf. Thuc. v. 111, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος βουλευέσθε [βουλὴν] ἣν μιᾶς πέρι . . . ἔσται. (The same interpretation is suggested as "possible" in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. ε. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, *absorbed* by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν πόλει ἣ ἦκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν.

Ib. 533 d-e, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρία κέκληται—where οἷς must be for ἐν οἷς.

Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δι' ἄλλου του ἣ οὐπερ εἰκός;

Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὧνπερ νῦν δὴ.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus

Apol. 27 d, ἣ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'

Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπόλλυμεν ᾧπερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν ᾧπερ.

Of other writers, cf. Soph. O. C. 748, Οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ἐς τοσοῦτον αἰκίας πεσεῖν ἔδοξ' ὅσον πέπτωκεν. Isæus Fr. a. 8 [ed. Bekker. Is. xii. 7, ed. Zur.], ἄλλοθεν ποθὲν ἣ ἐκ τούτων ὧν, Lysias xiv. 2. p. 139, ἐπ' ἐνίοις [τούτων] ὧν οὗτος φιλοτιμεῖται τοὺς ἐχθροὺς αἰσχύνεσθαι, xxi. 21. p. 163, δέομαι μὴ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι ἃ ('any sum of money in consideration of which') ἐγὼ βουλοίμην ἂν τι κακὸν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι. [So Bekker and the MSS. δι' ἃ ed. Zurich.]

§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν πράγματος οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;

Politic. 271 c, τὸν βίον ὃν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἦν κ.τ.λ.;

Meno 96 c, ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι.

Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the

former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer : cf. Il. x. 416, φυλακὰς δ' ἄς εἴρεαι, . . . Οὔτις κεκριμένη ῥύεται στρατόν, Od. viii. 74, αἰδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν, Οἴμης τῆς τότε ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ., xxii. 6, σκοπὸν ἄλλον ὃν οὐπω τις βάλεν ἀνὴρ Εἴσομαι αἶ κε τύχωμι, xxiii. 356, Μῆλα δ' ἂ μοι κ.τ.λ., Πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ληίσσομαι, ἄλλα δ' Ἀχαιοὶ Δώσουσ' (where μῆλα represents ἀντὶ μῆλων). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds οἴμης to be attracted from οἴμη not οἴμην because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetic Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, Νήσφ' ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ . . . Νήσος δεινδρήεσσα, or Il. vi. 396, Ἡετίωνος Ἡετίων, ὃς ἔναίε κ.τ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φάμεν ἡμῖν παιδεντέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας.

Phædo 66 e, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ φάμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι φρονήσεως.

Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.

Crito 48 c, ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἢ κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, ἐκείνοι ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιττακοῦ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Apol. 41 a, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς ὅπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 131, μετὰ δ' ἔσσεται ἣν τότε ἀπηύρων, Κούρην Βρισηῖος.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἐκείνου, so in the others it has one understood ; and the Nouns τοὺς φύλακας, τοὺς σοφιστάς, ταῦτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταῦτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν, Ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον. Also Il. xii. 18—20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἔρῳσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Phædo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον—where ἐκεῖνος is attracted from ἐκείνον, since it is ἔχειν and not λέγοι which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγῆσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δέοι αὐτὸν ἐπιδείξαι ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ—where we should have had αὐτὸν . . . τὸν Ἔρωτα but for the intervention of ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself *abnormally* in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, οἷσθε χρῆναι, οὓς ἐκείνοι παρέλιπον . . . , ὑμεῖς ἀπολέσαι.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i. e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὄντος πάγου οἷου δεινοτάτου.

Phædo 104 a, τοῦ περιτοῦ ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οἷα γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

Legg. 674 c, οὐδ' ἀμπέλων ἂν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ' ἥτινι πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν—for ὅσον ποιήσεως ἐστὶν ὕμνοι.

Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 321, τὸ μὲν . . . εἴσκομεν . . . Ὅσσον θ' ἰστὸν νηός, x. 112, γυναῖκα Εὐρον ὅσην τ' ὄρεος κορυφήν, 167, Πείσμα δ' ὅσον τ' ὄργυιαν. Ar. Eq. 977, πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν οἷων ἀργαλεωτάτων. Soph. Aj. 488, πατὴρ Εἵπερ τινὸς σθένοντος, 1416, ἀνδρὶ . . . ἀγαθῷ . . . κοῦδενὶ πω λῶφον θνητῶν, O. C. 734, πόλιν . . . σθένουσαν . . . εἴ τιν' Ἑλλάδος μέγα. Arist. Metaph. IX. iii. 1, ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὃν ἓνα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πληθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν.

§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος above) are

Soph. 246 c, *ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας*—i. e. *ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*.

Gorg. 477 a, (A) *ὠφελείται ἄρα*; (B) *Ναί. (A) ᾗπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν*;—i. e. *ἄρα [ὠφελείται τοῦτο] ὅπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι*;

§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, *Εὐρύμαχ' ἡδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μνηστῆρες ἀγανοί*,—i. e. *ἄλλοι μνηστῆρες ἀγανοί, ὅσοι ἔστε* and Hdt. iv. 28, *ἀφόρητος οἶος κρυμός*—‘frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;’ and ib. 194, *οἱ δὲ σφι ἄφθονοι ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς οὖρεσι γίνονται* in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, *σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην*—‘inconceivable, so great was it.’

Gorg. 477 d, *ὑπερφυεῖ τινὶ ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῇ θανασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα*.

Cf. the common Idiom *ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ πλείστα ὅσα*—‘things *superlatively* many, so many were they’—where *ὅσα* is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbial expressions *ἀμηχάνως ὡς* (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), *ὑπερφυῶς ὡς* (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), *θαυμαστῶς ὡς* (Phædo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with *τοῖος* differs—e. g. in Od. i. 209, *θαμὰ τοῖον*, iii. 321, *Ἐς πέλαγος μέγα τοῖον*, iv. 371, *Νήπιος . . . λίην τόσον*, ib. 776 and vii. 30, *σιγῇ τοῖον*, xi. 134, *Ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος*, xv. 450, *Κερδαλέον δὴ τοῖον*, xx. 302, *Σαρδόνιον μάλα τοῖον*—‘to *that* degree,’—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our *οἶος* justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον*. So Protag. 317 c.

Politic. 308 b, *οὐδαμῶς ὡς οὐ φήσομεν*.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 145, *οὐδαμῶν τῶν οὐ μέζω*.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ρεύματος ἐκείνου πηγῇ, ὃν ἤμεράν Ζεὺς ὠνόμασε' (where the Antecedent of ὃν is ρεύματος.)

Cf. the Homeric ἡ θέμις ἐστίν. Il. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, δέομαι . . . τοῦτο σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.· δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή
—where of course αὕτη refers to τοῦτο σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὃν ἄρα ἐστίν ὄντως ἦν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

Crat. 386 c, εἰ . . . ἐστίν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Minos 317 a, πολιτικά ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσιν.

Crito 48 c, ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἦ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέμματα, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 239, σκῆπτρον . . . ὃ δέ τοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὄρκος, v. 305, ἔνθα τε μηρὸς Ἴσχύφ' ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλῃν δέ τέ μιν καλέουσι. Hdt. i. 86, ἀκροθίνια ταῦτα (sc. τὸν Κροῖσον) καταγιεῖν. Æsch. P.V. 753, "Οὔφ' θανεῖν μὲν ἐστίν οὐ πεπωμένον· Αὕτη γὰρ ἦν ἂν πημάτων ἀπαλλαγῇ. So Virg. Æn. x. 828, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 c, οὐτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη.

Legg. 735 c, τοὺς μέγιστα ἡμαρτηκότας ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὖσαν βλάβην.

Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, ἃ δὴ ὥς ιδέας αὐτὰς οὖσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Politic. 271 c, θεὸς ἔνεμεν . . . , ζῶον δὲ ἕτερον θεϊότερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 c, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.

Cf. Hdt. vi. 130, τῆς ἀξιόσιος, τῆς ἐξ ἐμεῦ γῆμαι. Xen. Mem. I. iii. 3, καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι, τὴν Καδ δύναμιν ἔρδειν.

§ 204. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—BINARY STRUCTURE.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments ; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all : in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous ; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive ; the thought has moved in the interval between them ; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature ; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by *Asyndeton*.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with *anacoluthic* redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other ; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows *epexegetically*.

C. When a Dependent sentence has been resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction, and placing in advance of it, a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts coordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain : and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer ; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, θαυμαστή ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι,—ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη.

Symp. 198 c, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἐπεπόνθη,—ἐφοβούμην κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 67 e, εἰ φοβούνται καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη,—εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκείσε ῥοιεν οἱ κ.τ.λ. ;

Ib. 68 d, οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν,—ἀκολασία τινὶ σὼφρονές εἰσιν ;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθῆναι.

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with πάσχειν.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύεται, ἥ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ—εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος . . . οἴχεται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ. Here the sentence εὐθὺς . . . ᾗ is the complete double of the sentence ἐκείνη . . . ἀποθάνῃ.

Ib. 86 b, τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν . . . εἶναι,—ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., κρᾶσιν εἶναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 505 e, ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γέννηται,—ἂ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι.

Phileb. 35 e, (A) τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσφ' τούτων γίγνηται ; (B) Πῶς ἐν μέσφ' ; (A) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ κ.τ.λ. ;

Legg. 697 a, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν . . . πειραθῶμεν,—διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἐσμῶν [ὁ κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπον,—ἐν γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰδὴν χώρας οἰκίζηται.

This Idiom begins with Homer : see Od. viii. 339, Αἰ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἀναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἀπολλων,—Δεσμοὶ μὲν τρεῖς τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν, . . . Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὖδοιμι παρὰ χρυσῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ. Cf. Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἰ δὲ πάνν δεῖ τοῦτο δρᾶν, ὑμῖν χαρίζεσθαι, ταλαιπωρήσομεν.

Virtually similar is

Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη . . . γέγονεν,—εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιόν ἢ οἱ πολλοί· (for σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ . . . πολλοί is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε . . . , εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε.

§ 208. b. ¹³Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οἷε γὰρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενον κ.τ.λ., εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγοντος κ.τ.λ. ;

Crito 45 e, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα . . . ἀνανδρία πεπρᾶχθαι . . . —κακία καὶ ἀνανδρία διαπεφευγῆναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

Apol. 26 e, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι ; [So Oxon. alone. See note at p. 61, above.]

Legg. 859 d, εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ.,—κατ' αὐτό γε . . . παγκάλους εἶναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἂν ποτε ἄρα ἴδωσι κ.τ.λ.,—ὀλιγωρεῖν τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great tendency to the Binary Structure : the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer : e. g. Il. ix. 13, ἂν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων Ἰστατο δακρυχέων, ὥστε κρήνη μελάνυδρος . . . ,—Ὡς δὲ βαρὺ στενάχων ἔπε' Ἀργείοισι μετῆυδα. Cf. also Soph.

¹³ [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quære. Are these really distinct from those given in § 207?"]

Aj. 840, Καὶ σφᾶς . . . Ξυναρπάσειαν, ὥσπερ εἰσορώσ' ἐμὲ Αὐτοσφαγῇ πίπτοντα,—τῶς αὐτοσφαγεῖς . . . ὀλοίατο. *Ced. Col. 1239, ὅδ' . . . ὥς τις ἅκτᾱ . . . κλονεῖται,—ὡς καὶ τόνδε κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 483 e, οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους . . .—ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπιάδοντες, καταδουλοῦμεθα.

Politic. 296 e, τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι . . . , ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης . . . σώζει τοὺς συνναύτας,—οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 61 a, ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι,—καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν.

Ib. 109 e, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἰχθύες ἀνακίπτοντες ὁρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε,—οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν.

Crito 54 d, ταῦτα ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν,—καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ . . . βομβεῖ.

Politic. 260 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδὲ πη, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.,—καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν γένος ἔοικεν ἀφωρῖσθαι.

Crat. 417 b, ἔοικεν, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρωῶνται,—οὐ ταύτην λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 433 a, ἵνα μὴ ὀφλῶμεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιύοντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ,—καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαιέτερον τοῦ δέοντος.

Tim. 19 b, προσέοικε δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις . . . ἀφίκοιτο κ.τ.λ.,—ταῦτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.

§ 210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phædo 60 c, ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον' ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

Charm. 156 b, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιαύτη [ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῇ] οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἕως ἥδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱατρῶν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—λέγουσί σου ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is

the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative *τί*, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, *τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρῆσθαι;—* where *τί* foreshadows *ὑπερφυῶς εἰρῆσθαι*. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, *ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ*.)

Ib. 269 a, *τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν ἄδραστον οἴομεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτοὺς . . . εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.;*

Charm. 154 d, *τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;*

Phileb. 27 e, *τί δὲ ὁ σὸς [βίος]; ἐν τίνι γένει ἂν λέγοιτο;*

Ib. 56 e, *τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ὥς μία λεκτέον;*

Phdr. 277 d, *τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺς εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν κ.τ.λ.; ἄρα οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα . . ὥς κ.τ.λ.;—τί* foreshadows *ὥς κ.τ.λ.*

Protag. 309 b, *τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει;*

Soph. 266 c, *τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν;*

Phædo 78 d, *τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.;* (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, *τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά;* Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by *τόδε*, which therefore is Nominative; and the Predicate by *τί*, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, *τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σοι τύχης ἔστηκεν;*

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under 'Accusative Case,' §§ 15-19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are *virtually* of Binary Structure: for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.

a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, τῇ αἰε καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα.

Phædo 65 d, λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρα κ.τ.λ.,—τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον οὖν.

Ib. 81 e, τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίας.

Ib. 82 b, εἰς ταῦτόν, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.

Ib. 113 a, τῶν τετελευτηκότων, τῶν πολλῶν.

Symp. 215 b, τῷ Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσύᾳ.

Euthyd. 274 e, τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὴν ἀρετὴν, μαθητὸν εἶναι.

Crat. 415 a, τὸ ὄνομα ἢ μηχανή.

Ib. 435 c, τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ.

Protag. 317 b, εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι.

Charm. 173 e, ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρῃμα εἶναι πάντα.

Gorg. 462 c, οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι,—χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις ;

§ 214. β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

Apol. 24 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.

Crat. 423 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μμείσθαι δύναιτο ἐκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν.

Gorg. 500 c, οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις, ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν; (the two expressions are οὐδ and ἢ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

Ib. 518 a, ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.

Phileb. 38 b, ἔπεται ταύταις . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

Tim. 22 d, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὅρεσι διασώζονται, βουκόλοι νομεῖς τε.

Protag. 351 a, τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν.

Rep. 396 c, ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ, ἐθελήσειν.

Legg. 861 d, τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοί, τό γε μὴ λέγειν κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 198 d, τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν.

Ib. 207 d, δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.

Ib. 222 a, ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος . . . νοῦν ἔχοντας μόνους εὐρήσει, τῶν λόγων.

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὐτὸ in its peculiar Platonic meaning.

Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.

Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχὴν.

Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή.

Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες.

§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι, τοὺς φύλακας.

Phædo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἴσοις. Similarly Hip. Ma.

291 e, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 e, Legg. 653 e, &c.

Crat. 422 b, ἃ ἐρωτᾷς, τὰ ὀνόματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.

Tim. 33 a, ἃ ξυνιστᾷ, τὰ σώματα.

Hip. Ma. 294 a, ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστι μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν, ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Theæt. 167 b, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα . . . ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν—'and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.'

Tim. 40 b, ἐξ ἧς δὴ τῆς αἰτίας γέγονεν ὅσα . . . ἀεὶ μένει—'and hence, from this cause namely, arise,' &c.

Legg. 647 a, φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν . . . ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε . . . αἰσχύνην.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with τὰ φαντάσματα, and τῆς αἰτίας. See 'Attraction,' § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Æschin. i. 72. p. 10, ὧν . . . ἡκούσατε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, θάπτονσαν ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας—'him whom thou forbadeest to bury, namely that corpse' (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι.

Gorg. 477 a, ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν—i. e. [τοῦτο] ὅπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι.

Phædo 78 d, ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι—where ἥς is the Predicate and τοῦ εἶναι the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν.

Critias 110 c, πάνθ' ὅσα ξύννομα ζῶα . . . πᾶν δυνατὸν πέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ἡ δὲ . . . [ψυχῇ] . . . σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οὓς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους . . . , τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, . . . μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.

Ib. 105 a, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ . . . , αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνεῖα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγον δυνάμιν ἐστι πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμιμημένων ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν δὴ τινα ξυνοφῆν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ' ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οἶόν τ' ἐστὶ τὴν τ' ἐφυφῆν καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτὸν . . . σῶμα τυμβεῦσαι τάφῳ, 1147, Οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸ σὸν λάβρον στόμα . . . τάχ' ἂν τις . . . Χειμῶν κατασβέσειε τὴν πολλὴν βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι . . . , πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγοι . . . ὥς διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, . . . πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.

§ 220. β. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτοὺς διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλληλα . . . ἀπεργασάμενος, ὃ τί περ πῦρ πρὸς αέρα τοῦτο αέρα πρὸς ὕδωρ, καὶ ὃ τι ἀήρ πρὸς ὕδωρ ὕδωρ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer : e. g. Od. i. 348, ὅστε διδῶσιν

Ἄνδράσιν ἀλφιστῆσιν ὅπως ἐθέλῃσιν ἐκάστω, x. 172, ἀνέγειρα δ' ἐταίρους Μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσι, παρασταδὸν ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enuntiation of part of it.

Phædo 64 b, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . ξυμφάναι ἂν, τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνν.

Gorg. 517 e, δόξαί καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 83, καὶ οἱ σύλλογον τῶν ἐπιβατέων ποιησάμενοι προηγόρευε εὖ ἔχοντα ἐκ πάντων Θεμιστοκλέης. Aristot. Eth. VI. xii, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recal to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theæt. 155 e, ἐάν σοι ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστώων τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Apol. 40 d, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρίθμητους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας.

Rep. 375 d, οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος.

Legg. 700 c, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παιδείῃσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλοι ἀποφνηαμένοις ὡς αἰὲ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν κ.τ.λ.

§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, *πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου, οὗ ἐστὶν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμῇ αὐτοῦ ;*

Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theæt. 188 b, *ἂ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἑτέρα ;*

Phædo 104 d, *ἂ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει . . . αὐτὸ ἴσχειν*, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, *τοὺς δὲ, βαθυτέρους ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Alcib. I. 115 e, *τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν . . . , ἥ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεΐπας ;*

Legg. 625 a, *τοῦτον οὖν φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς . . . , ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.*

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἑνιαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.*

Phileb. 49 b, *πάντες ὁπόσοι . . . ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἔπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 13 b, *κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὅμως σὺ προσγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά.* [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλὰ, which is represented by αὐτά.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, *ὁ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι.*

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, *τούτων δέ τινων . . . ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.*, the *τούτων . . . εἰδοῖν* is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, *φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἔρωτα . . . εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν*,—*πάντων . . . ὄντων* is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, *ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν.*) Again, Laches 182 d, *τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστὶ μάθημα . . . , χρὴ αὐτὸ μαθάνειν*,—*ὀπλιτικὸν* is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, *τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθούνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθούσα χεῖρ, κ.τ.λ.*,—*τοῦ τοξότου* belongs to the sentence *ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθούσα χεῖρ, κ.τ.λ.*

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

a. The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Euthyd. 294 c, οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὁπόσους ὁδόντας ἔχει ;

Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον διαφέρουσι.

Phædo 75 b, εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ὃ τι ἔστιν.

Theæt. 162 d-e, θεοὺς . . . οὐς ἐγὼ . . . ὥς εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ.

Phædo 86 d, Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη μαθεῖν τὸ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.

Gorg. 449 e, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὥς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιάνοιεν.

Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

Ibid. d, τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν . . . διαμάχουτ' ἂν . . . ὥς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν.

Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ;

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν . . . μεμελέτηκεν.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer : cf. Od. xvii. 373, Αὐτὸν δ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὔχεται εἶναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κέ μ' ἴδοις, εἰ ὦλκα διηνεκέα προταμοίμην. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νίκιᾳ . . . τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους, Aristoph. Av. 1269, Δεινόν γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν παρὰ τοὺς βροτοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. β. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.

Legg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἶναι] εὐτυχὲς ὄφρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.

Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἔστιν.

In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἡγγέλται . . . ἡ μάχη πάννυ ἰσχυρὰ γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also ; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινί, ἀληθεῖ εἶναι.

Crat. 425 b, σὺ πιστεύεις σαντῶ, οἷός τ' ἂν εἶναι—attracted for οἷόν τ' ἂν εἶναί σε.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, ἐφθόρουν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν παισίν, ὥς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.

Rep. 459 b, δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἷων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εὐδαίμων μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὥς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα. [ἀνὴρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MSS.]

Crito 43 b, σὲ . . . εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, ὥς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 246 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς † ἀπορρεῖ.

Symp. 172 a, διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος ξυνουσίαν . . . περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἥδη πρεσβύτερος ᾖ ;

Politic. 309 d, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν . . . ἄρ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατὸν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ † τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν ;

Protag. 318 e, εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν . . . † οἰκίαν διοικοῖ.

Tim. 24 c, τὴν εὐκрасίαν τῶν ὥρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδούσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἷοι—(sc. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαναμαστὸς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκίμηκεν ἐν † αὐτῷ ποιητῆς.

Apol. 25 c, ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι † μεμέληκε.

Meno 96 e, ὁμολογῆκαμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον † ὄν. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστί.

Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλειστοάναξ . . . ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰὲν προβαλλόμενος, ὥς διὰ τὴν †έκείνου κάθοδον παρανομηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ἐνυμβαίνου.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἳ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης—which means δῆλον δὴ οἷα καὶ τᾶλλα ἔσται, τούτεστιν οἳ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι—which means δῆλον ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσιν . . . ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 e, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὥς †εἰσηλθες, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. β. The Dependent sentence being Infinitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὴν τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται, μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν ἣ †γίγνεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα ;

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὥς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἀληθὲς δυσχυρίζεσθαι, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

Rep. 489 e, διῆμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλὸν τε κάγαθόν ἐσόμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἥργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνουσιν.

Politic. 285 e, τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων, ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν, αἰσθηταὶ τινες ὁμοιότητες πεφύκασιν.

Hip. Ma. 294 e, οἴχεται ἄρ' ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγὸς τὸ καλόν, γυνῶναι ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἕως εἰς ἐκπληξιν μεγέθεσιν τε κάλλεσιν τε ἔργων ἰδεῖν τὴν οἴκησιν ἀπειργάσαντο.

Phædo 84 c, ὥς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 409, Οὐ γάρ τις φειδὼ νεκρῶν κατατεθνηῶτων Γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ κε θάνωσι, πυρὸς μείλισσέμεν ὄκα.

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, ὕβριν . . . κατιδοῦσα ἢ θεός, πέρας . . . οὐδέν . . . ἐνόν.

In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Apol. 37 d, καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν.

Protag. 313 a, ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σέ.)

Rep. 525 b, προσῆκον τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ †λογιστικῇν ἰέναι.

Gorg. 449 b-c, εἰς μὲν ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν †τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει ξύμπαντα ἃ κ.τ.λ., οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὅπως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, εὐτελέστερα δὲ τὰ δεινά, †βραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ ἅμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατατρίψαι.

§ 231. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, ὃ τι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ ταύτῃ ὀνόμαζε.

Phædo 98 a, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἃ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξε μοι ἀξιομνημόνευτον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τούτων ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν. οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θανμαστὸν . . . εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὀσιὸν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.,—where after οἷς δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα . . . μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεως, parallel to τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου.

Politic. 258 a, Θεαιτήφ . . . συνέμιξα χθές διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα, Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα—where the clauses supply each other crosswise; ἀκήκοα requires the Genitive Θεαιτήτου, and οὐδέτερα implies a Σωκράτει parallel to Θεαιτήφ, as well as a Σωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἀλλήλοις is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων—where ἀλλήλοις is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 e, διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα—to μανθανέτω supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖν . . . καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι—sc. σοί.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ, δουλεύοντί τε—sc. ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἀλλήλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν—sc. ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων αἰεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν. i. e. καὶ ἔστι τῶν νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iii. 9, ὄρκους ἔλαβον καὶ ἔδοσαν παρὰ Φαρναβάζου.

§ 234. D.¹⁴ New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μὴδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ κείσθαι—sc. αὐτό.

Symp. 212 c, θύραν ψόφον παρασχέιν, . . . καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνὴν ἀκοῦειν—sc. αὐτούς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχέιν.

Ib. 187 e, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσῃται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμποιήσῃ—sc. ἡ ἡδονή.

Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε, καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς—sc. ταῦτα.

Phædo 58 b, νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύνειν—sc. αὐτούς.

Ib. 72 c, λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἐνδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο—sc. Ἐνδυμίῳ.

Apol. 40 a, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ἃ supplied from the preceding Accusative ἃ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

¹⁴ [Under this section is written in the MS. "Illustr. from Homer:" and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, "Illustr.:" but the illustrations were never put in.]

§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἔχει.

Ib. 201 a, οὗ ἐνδεὴς ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἔχει.

Phædo 65 a, ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.

Gorg. 482 b, ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις.

Menex. 243 c, ὧν χρὴ αἰεὶ μεμνησθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἥδοναί ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.

Ib. 395 d, ὧν φαμέν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.

Phædo 100 b, ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 e, πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδώς, . . . ἔπειτα . . . ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη, where μὴ εἰδώς is the equivalent of ὅς μὴ εἰδείη.

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρων τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον [] ἐαντῷ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 438 b—c, τὰ πλείω πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω . . . καὶ αὐ [] βαρύτερα πρὸς [] κουφότερα καὶ [] θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.

Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις, ἀγνοσία δ' ἐπὶ [] μὴ ὄντι.

Ib. 544 c, ἥ τε . . . ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητικὴ . . . καὶ [] δευτέρα . . . καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία.

Ib. 545 a, τὸν φιλόνηκον . . . καὶ [] ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὐ καὶ [] δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν.

Phædo 67 d, χωρισμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ [] σώματος. [So Oxon.]

Gorg. 469 e, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ [] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα. [So most MSS.]

Symp. 186 e, ἥ τε ἱατρικὴ . . . , ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ [] γυμναστικὴ καὶ [] γεωργία.

Phdr. 253 d, ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἥ [] κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν.

Phileb. 45 a, μείζους γίνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας . . . , ἥ περὶ [] ὑγιαίνοντας ;

Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, [] μείζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην.

Ib. 960 c, [] Δάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [] Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ [] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.

Symp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς Ὅμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον.

Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. c. Some larger part of the clause.

Politic. 308 e, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν . . . ὅσα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀθεότητα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe ; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.

The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose ; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)

Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων.

Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

Legg. 795 b, διαφέρει μαθῶν μὴ μαθόντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.

Cf. Hom. Od. xviii. 228, Ἑσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρηα. Æschyl. S. c. T.

314, ἀνδρολέτειραν καὶ τὰν ῥίψοπλον ἄταν, Suppl. 194, Αἰδοῖα καὶ γόεδνα καὶ τὰ χρεῖ' ἔπη, Cho. 727, χθόνιον δ' Ἑρμῆν καὶ τὸν νύχιον.

§ 241. b. Anastrophe of Pronouns in Correlative clauses.

Rep. 455 e, καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρική, ἥ δ' οὐ. So 451 e.

Symp. 207 d, νέος αἰὲ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς—where we must supply τὰ μὲν το νέος γιγνόμενος.

Phædo 105 d-e, (A) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται [τί ὀνομάζομεν] ; (B) Ἀμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἀμουσον must be supplied τὸ μὲν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.

Theæt. 191 c, κήρινον ἐκμαγείον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου—where before σκληροτέρου must be supplied ἐνίοις μὲν.

Apol. 18 d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μὲν.

Cf. Hom. Il. xi. 536, ἀφ' ἱππέων ὀπλέων ῥαθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον, Αἱ δ' ἀπ' ἐπισσώτρων, xxii. 157, παραδραμέτην, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ὅπισθε διώκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὅπισθ' ὀνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρέα ὥπτων ἄλλα δ' ἔπειρον, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεύμενη μενοεικέα, πολλὰ δ' ὅπισσω Λάγχανον (i. e. πολλὰ μὲν μενοεικέα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theæt. 192 d, ἀκούω, . . . τότε δὲ αἴσθησιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω.

Phædo 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Phileb. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common : e. g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxii. 171, [ἄλλοτε μὲν] Ἰδῆς ἐν κορυφῇσι πολυπτύχου, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε κ.τ.λ., xvi. 689, Ὅστε [ὅτε μὲν] καὶ ἄλκιμον ἄνδρα φοβεῖ . . . ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ., and so xx. 52.

§ 243. d. Anastrophe of Correlative Conjunctions.

Soph. 217 e, κατ' ἐμαντόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον.

Gorg. 488 d, διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 169 d, ἴδωμεν, ὁρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν. So 161 d.

Ib. 173 d, εἰ δὲ ἢ κακῶς . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λείληθεν.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 132, Ζῶει ὅγ' ἢ τέθηκε.

§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances : cf. Hom.

Il. xi. 374, Ἦτοι ὁ μὲν θώρηκα Ἀγαστράφου ἰφθίμοιο Αἴνυντ' ἀπὸ

στήθεσφι παναίολον ἀσπίδα τ' ὤμων. And Theocr. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνὰ κράνας, πάντ' ἄλσεα, ib. i 17, Οὐκ ἔτ' ἀνὰ δρύμῳ, οὐκ ἄλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰσιέναι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύουσὶ με τριάκοντα μυνὼν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυ-
ᾶσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἢ
τιν' ἄλλην δύναμιν—where to the last clause must be supplied
λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει—where
ἐστὶ is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, ξύμπαντα . . . ἐροῦμεν . . . εἶναί τε καὶ [supply 'are']
ὄντα.

Phdr. 234 e, σαφεῇ καὶ στρογγύλῃ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων
ἀποτετόρνευται.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νεῖλος εἷς τε τὰ ἄλλα σωτήρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς
ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἐν ἑκάστον μὲν . . . οὐδὲν ὀρώμενον, ξυναθροί-
σθέντων δὲ . . . ὀράσθαι.

Legg. 872 a, ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μή, βουλευέση δὲ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος
ἐτέρῳ.

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construc-
tion to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ θρέμματα θαλλὼν . . . προσείοντες ἄγουσι—
where to οἱ τὰ θρέμματα must be supplied ἄγοντες.

Phædo 114 b, οἱ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι—where
to διαφερόντως must be supplied βεβιωκέναι.

Theæt. 180 a, ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι—
where to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλεί-
στον λέγοντες, περὶ πενήκοντα—where to οἱ . . . λέγοντες must
be supplied λέγουσι. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,

οὕτω μὲν τοὺς τὰ πολυτελέστατα σκενάζουσι νεκρούς. Thuc. ii. 53, ῥῶον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἂν πρότερον ἀπεκρύνετο μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν—ἐτόλμα sc. καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 c, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἶδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 183 b, ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, ὥς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὁμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμη.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ προσήκουσα . . . νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὐσα—i. e. οὐ δὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστίν, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡ πρ. κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Xen. Mem. II. vi. 17, ὁ ταραττεῖ σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις . . . ὀρᾷς κ.τ.λ. Isocr. iv. 176. p. 77, ὁ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Lysias xxx. 29. p. 186, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. [So Bekker: Zurich edd. omit ὅτι.] We have also the following variations:—Isocr. vi. 56. p. 127, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (and similarly xviii. 18. p. 375), xv. 23. p. 314, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅταν κ.τ.λ., Lysias xix. 25. p. 154, ὁ δὲ μέγιστον τεκμήριον Δῆμος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν—where μεθύοντα ἄνδρα stands for μεθύοντος ἀνδρὸς λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλίνης τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 e, οὐτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. Il. xvii. 51, κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὁμοίαι.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Theæt. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἂν νῦν διήλθομεν—where πάντα stands for 'all besides.'

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς . . . καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

Phædo 69 b, τούτου πάντα . . . πιπρασκόμενα—'all other things being parted with for this.'

So τί μήν; 'what, if not what you say?'

§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, οὐδαμῶς [φιλοσόφους φήσομεν], ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὐ.

Theæt. 201 b, οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὐ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τοι ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [So Oxon. and two more MSS.] μὲν μοι, ἥξειν τήμερον—sc. 'but I am not sure.'

Phdr. 242 c, εἰμὶ μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάντῃ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαντῶ μόνον ἱκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταυτὶ ἔλεγεν ἄν, ἢ οὐ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι—sc. 'but another might not.' (οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been 'I think, but am not sure.'

§ 250*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 e, ἔως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῶ, ἕάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, [ἕάν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.] ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) Οὐ μὲν' ἂν . . . ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ—i. e. 'No: for else I should certainly not have,' &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἴθε γράψειεν κ.τ.λ. ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἁμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ τις σοφία . . . ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴπερ representing the Protasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκ οὐν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεῖ], ἀλλ', εἴπερ, σέ.

Rep. 497 e, οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὐκ, ὦ γαθέ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νουν δρῶ τούτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 e, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὅποσα φλαῦρα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη· also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227, "Ἐπειτ' ἀπὸ ταρβόου τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, 'Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence;—εἰ δὲ representing the Protasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὥς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἐρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι· εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τούτο ὀνόμαζε.

Euthyd. 285 c, εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, εἰ δ', ὃ τι βούλεται τοῦτο ποιεῖτω.

Legg. 688 b, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὥς παίζων· εἰ δ', ὥς σπονδάζων.

Alc. I. 114 b, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ· εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διεξέλθε.

This εἰ δέ does not stand for εἰ δὲ μή, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause ; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer : cf. Il. vi. 376, Εἰ δ', ἄγε, xxii. 381, Εἰ δ', ἄγετε, ix. 46, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, Φευγόντων κ.τ.λ., 262, Εἰ δέ, σὺ μὲν μευ ἄκουσον.

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence ;—suppression of Apodosis.

Rep. 575 d, οὐκουν ἐὰν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπέικωσιν—· ἐὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 520 e, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται—· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ.

More commonly the form is ἐὰν μὲν . . . εἰ δέ, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, ἐὰν μὲν σοι ἐθέλῃ παύεσθαι ἢ λύγξ—· εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 854 c, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν σοι λωφῇ τι τὸ νόσημα—· εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 325 d, ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται—· εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 311 d, ἀν μὲν ἐξικνῆται . . . —· εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 287 a, ἐὰν . . . ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι—· 'suppose I' &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀπόκριναί ὀλίγῳ πλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθῃς ὃ βούλομαι· εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην κ.τ.λ.—· 'suppose I were to ask, now,' &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τότε ἐνθυμεί . . . , ὅτι κ.τ.λ.—

Symp. 177 b, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With εἰ βούλει, or εἰ βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ βούλεσθε represents εἰ βούλεσθε σκέψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὁποῖος ἐστίν.

Crat. 392 a, εἰ δὲ βούλει περὶ τῆς ὄρνιθος.

Theæt. 196 e, εἰ δὲ βούλει, . . . κεχρήμεθα.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 580, Εἴπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' εἴ μιν ἀεικισσαίμεθ', κ.τ.λ., xxi. 487, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις πολέμοιο δαήμεναι κ.τ.λ.,

Od. xv. 80, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after ἐπεὶ,—as Il. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἂν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phædo 98 c, ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις . . . λέγοι.

In this common phrase the *ἂν* represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e. g. here πεπονθώς *ἂν* εἴη τις, but rather a vague sentence such as τὸ πρᾶγμα *ἂν* εἴη.

Apol. 29 b, τοῦτ' καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω . . . , καὶ εἰ δὴ τ' σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τοῦτ' *ἂν*—sc. σοφώτερος *ἂν* φαίην εἶναι—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Politic. 308 c, εἴ τις πρᾶγμα ὀτιοῦν, . . . κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον, . . . ξυνίστησιν. Here the κἂν . . . φαυλότατον is exegetic of ὀτιοῦν—'any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.' The καὶ is hyperbatically placed, and belongs to the εἰ clause.

Symp. 221 e, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται, Σατύρου *ἂν* τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν—'something [like] what a satyr's hide would be.' In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτέον κ.τ.λ.; Δέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' *ἂν*;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an *implicit* Proposition.

Phædo 61 b, Εὐήν' φράξε . . . *ἂν* σωφρονῇ ἐμὲ διώκειν—'tell him to follow me,—*which he will do* if he is wise.'

Symp. 173 d, ὁπόθεν . . . τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες . . . , οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ—'I do not know how you came by it, *but at all events it fits you*; for' &c.

Theæt. 158 a, ὁκῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι λέγω· ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, αἰσχυνοίμην *ἂν* ἔγωγε τοῦτο ὁμολογείν· ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, εἰμ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' *ἂν* ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phædo 100 d, ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη.

Legg. 834 e, εἴτε τριετηρίδες εἴτε αὐτὰ διὰ πέμπτων ἐτῶν εἴθ' ὅπη καὶ ὅπως *ἂν* . . . διανεμηθῶσι.

Tim. 48 c, τὴν μὲν περὶ πάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπη δοκεῖ.

Crito 50 a, εἴτ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο.

Apol. 41 b, Ὀδυσσεύα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους *ἂν* τις εἴποι.

Phædo 70 e, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον [τυγχάνει ὄν], καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Similarly Phædo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence :—

Protag. 358 a, εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὧ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀποκρίναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τὸν κνήμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

Apol. 20 d, οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν . . . μείζω τινα ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἄρχοντας . . . ὑπηρέτας . . . ἐκάλεσα οὐ τι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' ἡγοῦμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο.

Cf. Lysias xxviii. 4-5. p. 179, οἶμαι . . . οὐδένα ἂν . . . ἐπιτρέψαι . . . , ἄλλως τε καὶ Ἐργοκλῆς ἔλεγεν. St. Mark vi. 5, καὶ οὐκ ἡδύνατο ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποιῆσαι, εἰ μὴ . . . ἐθεράπευσε.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ . . . φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι . . . ; (B) τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν;

Phædo 63 d, (A) σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστὶν βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλοι εἰπεῖν. (B) τί δὲ ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλοι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων κ.τ.λ. ;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεῖ instead of οὐ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεῖ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεῖ is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ μυθολογητέον . . . , ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλὸς . . . , ἀλλὰ σκληρός. Fully and regularly this would have been οὐχ ἀπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ,—ἀλλὰ σκληρός.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται. Fully οὐ μήποτε τις (πολλοῦ γε δεῖ) τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 e, εἰς ταῦτόν βασιλέα καὶ τύραννον, ξυνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους ὄντας αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκατέρου τρόπον—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing τὸν τρόπον under the government of ξυνέθεμεν.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—i. e. σύ τε ἐξάγων, ἐγὼ τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀπείποιμεν δ' ἂν ἀκούοντές τε καὶ λέγοντες—i. e. ὑμεῖς τε ἀκούοντες, ἐγὼ τε λέγων. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη, τῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however μείζονα, still more brachylogically, stands for τὴν μὲν μείζω, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.

§ 262. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection ; e. g. εἶναι subjoined to ἐκὼν and the like :

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure :

3. Cases of fullness of Construction : e. g.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μόνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation ; as 'distinct from all the rest' is more accurate than 'distinct from all.'

Or the use of ὥστε with the Infinitive, following δύναμαι &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες ;

Ib. 34 d, ἐπιεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ . . . λέγειν λέγων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τούτου.

Legg. 858 a, *τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγναιτο.*

Phædo 75 d, *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.*

Cf. Isæus ii. 22, *οὐκ ἂν ποιησάμενος ἄλλον οἰκειότερον ἐμοῦ ποιήσαιτο ἂν* whereby we are reminded of Homer's (Od. xi. 612) *Μὴ τεχνησάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο ἄος κείνον τελαμῶνα ἔῃ ἐγκάτθετο τέχνη.*

Or, in coordinate clauses which have a common part, the expression of this in each clause, as in

Phdr. 255 d, *ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν.*

Rep. 553 b, *πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει.*

Phædo 67 d, *ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμών ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.*

(Compare these with the real Pleonasm of Prepositions below—§ 265.)

§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, *οὐπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη.*

Ib. 389 a, *οὐκοῦν Ὀμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα.*

Crito 43 b, *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἦθελον.*

Euthyd. 279 a, *οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν.* So Phædo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, *μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδ' ἡντινοῦν δυνατὸν λαβεῖν τέχνην.*

Phædo 100 a, *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.*

Hip. Ma. 292 b, *οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκρινάμην.*

Lysis 221 c, *οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ.*

Crat. 398 e, *οὐδ' εἴ τι οἶος τ' ἂν εἶην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνειν.*

Euthyphro 4 d, *οὐτ' εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δεῖν.*

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 86, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Theæt. 163 a, *ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.*

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.

§ 264. β. Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost ¹⁵irrational.

Apol. 27 e, ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν ὥς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστι.

Legg. 747 d, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους· οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον. οἱ μὲν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, οὔτε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἢ ἃ διώκει ἐν πράγματι τοιοῦτῳ, πιστεῦσαι δὴπου αὐτῷ ἀξιωτέρον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. b. Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 a, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . ἐν μόνοις τὸ ἐναργὲς εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν.

§ 266. c. Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 b, καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὲς ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἂν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνῃ ἂν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον ἀγαπῶν ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρυσάντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε.

e. Of ἔφη, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐ ἂν ἔχοι, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων.

Ib. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. B. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. C. Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι.

Legg. 805 a, ἡμίσεια πόλιν ἀντὶ διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phædo 58 a, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών.

Ib. 70 e, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται.

¹⁵ Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.

Soph. 219 b, ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὄν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ. So 265 b.

Cf. Lysias xxxi. 24. p. 189, τοιγάρτοι πρότερον βελτίων γενόμενος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὕστερον βουλευεῖν ἀξιούτω.

Phædo 64 c, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοί.

Ib. 76 e, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταῦτα δοκεῖ ἅπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom. II. vi. 476, δότε δὴ καὶ τόνδε γενέσθαι Παῖδ' ἐμόν, ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ περ, ἀριπρεπεία Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα.

Ib. 99 b, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία.

Ib. 79 e, ὅλῳ καὶ παντί (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐργηγορόσι μήτε εὐδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμένοις. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἴδη· θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ θάτερον τμήμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

Ib. 218 e, τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον καὶ σμικρόν . . . ; οἶον ἀσπαλιεντής.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theæt. 192 a, δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους.

Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 811 c, ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους . . . , ἔδοξαν . . . μοι . . . εἰρῆσθαι.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἰπεῖν, βλέψας κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαϊότατον ἔπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 173 d, σπουδαὶ δ' ἔταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δειπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πρᾶττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 208 e, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ.

Rep. 565 d-e, ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα . . . οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἂν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. c. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρονσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἕξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία . . . θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐργηγοροῖσι καὶ καθεύδουσι—the words καὶ ἐργηγοροῖσι καὶ καθεύδουσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phædo 88 c, εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τὸν ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα . . . , καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, . . . γέρα λαγχάνοντα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἄμεινον παντὶ . . . ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγούς . . . , δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴθ' ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία . . . ποτὲ λάβοι . . . , μήτε ἐργηγοροῖσι μήτε καθεύδουσι κύρτοις ἄργον θήραν διαπονουμένοις.

Critias 116 d, νεὸς ἦν σταδίου μὲν μῆκος, εὖρος δὲ τρισὶ πλέθοις.

§ 275 *. AA. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον.

Phædo 82 a, οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης.

Symp. 207 b, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἔτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων=τοῦ γενομένου.

Protag. 345 e, οὐχ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὰ πονῇ ἐκόν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι.

Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποθανουμένους, ὅς ἂν τοῦτο δρῇ.

Conversely to the last two instances

Symp. 187 e, προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσῃται.

b.

Rep. 554 a, θησαυροποῖς ἀνὴρ, οὗς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεί τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see 'Attraction,' §§ 192-194, above.)

Phædo 107 b, τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτεῖται σαφέστερον.

This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express *saying, seeming, or thinking*.

Crat. 384 c, ὅτι δὲ οὐ φησὶ κ.τ.λ., ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτὸν σκόπτειν.

Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν, . . . ὅτι οὐδὲν . . . δέοι κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πᾶς ἂν τοῦτο νοήσῃ, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμὴν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ . . . Ἐρωτα μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολημκέναι ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται.

Ib. 184 b, ἔστι . . . νόμος, ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνῃ δουλείᾳ ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.

Apol. 19 e, τούτων ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 190 d, αἱ μαῖαι δύνανται τὰς ὠδῖνας μαλθακώτερας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὃν δόξη ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσι.

§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, *κελεύεις γὰρ δὴ με, τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ ἐχθοδοποῦ γεγονυίας πολλοῖς, ἴσως δ' οὐκ ἐλάττωσιν ἑτέροις προσφιλῶς . . , μεθ' ὧν διακελεύει με κ.τ.λ.*

Crito 44 b, *χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηθῆναι τοιοῦτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μήποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 457 b, *ἐὰν δέ, οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κατὰ ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ.*

Rep. 530 b, *ἄτοπον . . ἡγήσεται, τὸν νομίζοντα . . καὶ ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

Critias 114 e, *ἡ νῆσος αὐτῇ παρείχετο . . . τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον μόνον, τότε δὲ πλέον ὀνόματος ἦν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ὀρυττόμενον ὀρειχάλκου.*

§ 279. d. Construction begun with *ἔτι*, after Verbs of *knowing* or *saying*, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, *αἰσθάνομαί σου ἐκάστοτε . . , ὅτι ὅπόσ' ἂν φῇ σοῦ τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν.*

Legg. 892 d, *εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατ' ἐμαντόν.*

Crito 50 b, *ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις ;*

Protag. 356 a, *εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἀλλὰ πολὺν διαφέρει.*

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with *οἶδα*, and with *λέγω* or *εἶπον*, *ὅτι* becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, *οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν διενεγκεῖν.*

Apol. 37 b, *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.*

Symp. 175 d, *καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 189 a, *εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ' ἐπαύσατο.*

§ 281. C. As to *Oratio Obliqua*.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive *Oratio Obliqua*.

Gorg. 517 c-d, *σέ . . οἶμαι . . ἐγνωκέναι ὥς . . ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δὲ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐκπορίζειν κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. 391 c-d, *μηδ' ἐώμεν λέγειν, ὥς Θησεὺς . . . ὥρμησεν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς, μηδέ τινα ἄλλον . . ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἂν κ.τ.λ.*

Charm. 164 d, *δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακείσθαι . . ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρει, ὥς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλους.*

Laches 198 b, *ἡγούμεθα . . δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.* δέος γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*

§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παιδεῖα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' εἰεν ἄγριοι.

Phædo 95 c-d, οὐδέν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μνηύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.' ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον κ.τ.λ.' καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη . . . ζῳή κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., ἡγνοηκὼς . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι . . . χαρίζεσθαι . . . , εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δόξαν εἶχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ὡς ἐκότερος ἡμῶν εἰς ἐστί, τοῦτο δέ, ὁ ἐκότερος ἡμῶν εἶη, οὐκ ἄρα εἶημεν ἀμφοτέροι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις . . . , τοῦτο δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν.

Phileb. 41 d, [ἐῖρηται] ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω δέχεσθον, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.

Charm. 156 d-e, Ζάμολξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὅτι . . . οὐ δέ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἶη κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these passages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the principal account to be given of this change of construction: it may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in

Tim. 18 c, ἐτίθεμεν, μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεὶς . . . γνώσοιτο, νομιῶσι δὲ πάντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, ἐμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . ἄρ', ἐπειδὴν κ.τ.λ., ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it

is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical *ὡς τινες ἔλεγον*, which usurps here the influence properly due to *πότερον*.

§ 285. c. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phædo 111 c, *τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Politic. 293 e, *λεκτέον μεμνημένας . . . , ἃς μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα μεμνησθαι.*

Cf. Hom. Il. xviii. 535, *Ἐν δ' Ἔρις ἐν δὲ Κυδοιμός ὀμίλειον, ἐν δ' ὀλοῇ Κήρ, Ἄλλον ζῶν ἔχουσα νεούτατον, ἄλλον ἄουτον, Ἄλλον τεθνηῶτα κατὰ μόθον ἔλκε ποδοῖν, Od. vii. 125, ὄμφακες εἰσὶν Ἄνθος ἀφιείσαι, ἔτεραι δ' ὑποπερκάζουσιν.*

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Theæt. 201 b, *οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες . . . , τούτους δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.,* where *τούτους* refers to *τινες*.

Phædo 70 e, *ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;—αὐτὸ refers to τι.*

Lysis 219 d, *ὁ ἂν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῇται . . . , ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτο;*

Phædo 105 b, *ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται;—sc. τὸ σῶμα.*

Symp. 204 b, *ὃν δὲ σὺ φήθης Ἐρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες.*

§ 287. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS AND CLAUSES.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Prepositions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.

The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato's own time. Socrates in the *Protagoras* (343 e), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτ' ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Ib. 860 d, ἀκουσίως δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—where the two clauses οὐκ ἔχει λόγον and ἀκουσίως ἐκούσιον πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστί.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Ἑρμείμαχε, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπέ ᾧ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. Similarly 26 e, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ἴνα . . . τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλὴν—ἐὰν εἴπω οὕτως—ἀναδήσω—ἄρα καταγελάσσεθέ μου ὡς μεθύοντος ;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—"That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well ! and if I shall say that,—what then ? will you make fun of me ?" In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajection as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας ;

Symp. 191 d, ἔστιν . . . ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας.

Politic. 309 a, ὑπὸ κακῆς βίᾳ φύσεως ἀπωθούμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παῦσαι τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον.

Cf. Andoc. i. 30. p. 5, τούτων οὖν ἐμοὶ τῶν λόγων ἢ τῶν ἔργων τί προσήκει; Hdt. ii. 134, ἔτεσι γὰρ κάρτα πολλοῖσι ὕστερον τούτων τῶν βασιλῆων τῶν τὰς πυραμίδας ταύτας ἦν λιπομένων Ῥοδῶπις.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες—where αὐτοῦ belongs to τὸ μὲν.

Theæt. 166 d, τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίδωκε—where μου belongs to τὸν λόγον.

Gorg. 469 d, καὶν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγένας δεῖν—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινα.

Phædo 60 b, ὡς ἄσπον . . . ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄσπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.

Theæt. 188 a, ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν.

Crito 53 b, ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς.

§ 290*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

Ib. 28 d, οὗ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

Οὕτω.

Legg. 747 b, ἐν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παιδείον μάθημα μεγάλην—where οὕτω belongs to μεγάλην.

Theæt. 169 c, οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε—where οὕτω belongs to δεινός.

§ 292. Ἰσως.

Legg. 640 e, τάχ' ἂν ὁρθῶς ἴσως μέμφοιτο.

Symp. 194 c, τάχ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτοὺς εἴ τι ἴσως οἶοιο κ.τ.λ. That this is a trajection of ἴσως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχ' ἂν ἴσως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of εἰ ἴσως.

§ 293. Ἐτι.

Symp. 187 b, οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη—where ἔτι is constructed with οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

Crat. 399 a, *κινδυνεύσω ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι—*
ἔτι with *σοφώτερος*.

Tim. 53 d, *τὰς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἀνωθεν θεὸς οἶδε*.

§ 294. *Μέντοι* intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.

Phdr. 267 c, *Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα* ;

Apol. 35 c, *μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, . . .*

ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα. The

phrase *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* is rent asunder to admit the words

μέντοι νῆ Δία, which could have found no other convenient

place. It is because *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* had become a fixed

phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the

sense into doubt. In the disengaged *μέντοι νῆ Δία* another

familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll.

Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, *Τίς ἦν ἐν ἧ ματτόμεθα μέντοι τᾶλφιτα* ;

§ 295. *Γε* intrusive.

Crito 48 a, *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ φαίη γ' ἂν τις οἰοί τ' εἶσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ*

ἀποκτινύνναι. It might seem at first sight improbable that this

γε should not belong to the clause within which it stands.

But we have ground for recognising a trajection here 1. in

the sense, which is not helped by *γε* with *φαίη* 2. in the

familiarity of the sequence *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε*, coll. Phædo

75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d : and 3. in the con-

sideration that *φαίη ἂν* is not consciously to the speaker a

separate clause ; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it

does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c,

τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι ; Euthyphro 15 a, *τί δ' οἶε ἄλλο ἢ τιμή* ;

Symp. 216 d, *πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει . . . σωφροσύνης* ; and to the

instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases

the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetic

Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the *ἂν* preceding the

φαίη, as in Phædo 87 a, *τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς* ;

but *ἂν* could not commence the clause if it were consciously

regarded as distinct.

Gorg. 492 e, *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος*.

§ 296. *Ἄν*, anticipated Hyperbatically with *οἶμαι* and the like.

Apol. 32 c, *ἀρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι* ;

Phædo 64 b, *οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . δοκεῖν*.

Soph. 223 a, *τὸ προσήκον ὄνομ' ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν*.

Soph. 224 d, οἶμαί σε, κἄν εἴ τις . . . προὔτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ. where ἄν belongs to καλεῖν.

Euthyd. 294 b, οὐκ ἂν οἶει ὁμολογῆσαι ἡμᾶς ;

Phdr. 234 e, οἶει ἄν τινα ἔχουν ;

Tim. 26 b, οὐκ ἂν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην.

Cf. Isæus viii. 20. p. 71, μὴ οἶσθ' ἄν, εἰ κ.τ.λ., μήτ' ἄν τὸν πατέρα . . . εἰσενεγκεῖν. Thuc. iv. 28, οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενος αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι, vi. 11, Σικελιώται δ' ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, . . . καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἦσσαν δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, viii. 103, οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλουν.

§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 711 e, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ξυμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.

Soph. 265 a, καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἶδεν.

Phædo 83 e, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασι.

Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, ὧν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἵνεκα ἐπεβουλεύθη.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς.

Ib. 395 b, ἔτι τούτων εἰς μικρότερα.

Ib. 397 b, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν.

Symp. 195 e, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.

Theæt. 205 c, ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.

Phædo 70 c, οὐ περὶ προσηγόντων.

Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.

Apol. 40 a, πάντ' ἐπὶ σμικροῖς.

Phdr. 245 d, μῆδ' ἐξ ἐνός. So Politic. 310 c.

Gorg. 449 c, ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Legg. 876 b, ὅτι περὶ σμικρότατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὥς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον, iii. 46, ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ, ibid. ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον, i. 23, ἔστι παρ' οἷς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι αἰτία, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ . . . καθ' ἕτερα, and so 59, μῆδὲ καθ' ἕτερα, and on the same principle vii. 72, ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἔτι λοιπὰς.

§ 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis : e. g.

Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἡρέμα προσάντει.

Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος ιδέα.

Legg. 797 d, ἐν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὐ.

Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάντῳ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).

Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὐ τοῖς.

Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προάγειν.

Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πόλιν.

Ib. 832 c, σὺν αἰετινὴ βίᾳ.

Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταῦτα.

Phileb. 35 e, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.

Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὐ ἀργυρίου.

Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὐ τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by interposition of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 e, καὶ ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοὶ κ.τ.λ., τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὁρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ—where ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων is continued in τὰ αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι.

Symp. 173 e, ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης ἀλλὰ διήγησαι.

Ib. 179 e, ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν . . . ὥστε . . . εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Αἴδου ἀνείναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνείσαν—the ὥστε being continued at τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνείσαν.

Theæt. 145 d, ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὅμως appertains to σμικρὸν τι ἀπορῶ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προϋθυμήθην γενέσθαι—where the construction of ὦν is continued at παντὶ τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη, ἐκάστην . . . ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἶη, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη is suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τί κωλύει, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίνεσθαι . . . , ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενέσθαι ;

Legg. 822 c, ἄρ' οὐκ οἴομεθα γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὁρθόν, ἐκεῖ γιγνόμενον ἦν ἂν τότε, νῦν ἐνταυθοὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίνεσθαι ;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν σὲ ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σε—where, in meaning, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν goes with ἐφοίτων, the ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ being explanatory.

Protag. 335 e, τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεισθαι.

Phdr. 244 d, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει.

Legg. 648 e, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοιο πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.

Thuc. vi. 68, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποχωρεῖν. Xen. Hell.

VII. iii. 7, ὑμεῖς τοὺς περὶ Ἀρχίαν . . . οὐ ψήφον ἀνεμείνατε ἀλλ' ἐτιμωρήσασθε. Isocr. viii. 85. p. 176, τοσοῦτον δὲ διήνεγκαν ἀνοία πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αἱ συμφοραὶ συστέλλουσι . . . , ἐκεῖνοι δ' οὐδ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐπαιδευθήσαν, xii. 118. p. 257, αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰτίαι . . . , διὰ μακροτέρων μὲν αὐτὰς διήλθον, αὐταὶ δ' οὖν ἦσαν. Dem. de Cor. 289. p. 322, ἀρετῆς καὶ δέματος, οὐκ ἐσάωσαν Ψυχάς, ἀλλ' Ἀἰδὴν κοινὸν ἔθεντο βραβῆ. Soph. Ant. 21, τάφου . . . , τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δ' ἀτιμάσας ἔχει.

Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, ἦν γε οὐ τὸν προὔχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναὺς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα.

Hom. Il. x. 307, Ὅστις τε τλαίῃ, οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κῦδος ἄροιο, Νηῶν ὠκυπόρων σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν. Æsch. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχὼν καὶ τετοληκὼς ἐμοί. Soph. Ant. 537, Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας, 1279, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις Ἑοικας ἦκειν καὶ τύχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά, El. 1154, ἧς σὺ πολλὰκις Φήμας λάθρα προὔπεμπες ὥς φανούμενος Τιμωρός, O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν ἄρθρα κείνος ἐνζεύξας ποδοῖν. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, τὸν δὲ γέροντα . . . κλάζον τε περισσαινουν τ' [Ἀλλί κλάζοντε], Epigr. xix. 1, Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ στᾶθι καὶ εἴσιδε.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i. e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, οὐ δὴ ἐφίεμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς . . . τυγχάνουσιν—where ἐφίεμενοι is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theæt. 142 c, δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ.

Ib. 173 b, πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες . . . τρεπώμεθα ;

Phædo 63 c, ὅτι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς [ἐλπίζω] ἦξειν . . . διύσχυρισαίμην ἄν. The virtual Primary Predicate is δεσπότης πάνυ ἀγαθοῦς.

Ib. 63 d, σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. The virtual Primary Predicate is βούλεσθαι, not δοκεῖ.

Ib. 65 b, ἡ . . . καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι . . . ὀρώμεν. The

Primary Intention, with which ἡ connects itself, is in the ὀρώμεν clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι . . . κείσεται. The ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι connects itself with the κείσεται clause.

Ib. 88 b, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence θάνατον . . . θαρρεῖν the virtual Primary Predicate is θάνατον θαρροῦντι—in other words, it would normally be θάνατον θαρρεῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχων.

Soph. 224 d, οἶμαί σε, κὰν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος . . . προὔτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δῆ.

Apol. 31 b, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυνητῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The οὐχ οἰοί τε connects itself with παρασχ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἄδελον ὃν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται. Hdt. ii. 134, οὐδὲ ὦν οὐδὲ εἰδότες μοι φαίνονται λέγειν, ix. 105, τοῦτον δὲ κατέλαβε ὕστερον τούτων ἀποθανόντα κείσθαι. Hom. Od. iv. 739, Εἰ δὴ ποῦ τινα κείνος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ὑφῆνας Ἐξελθὼν λαοῖσιν ὀδύρεται. Æsch. Ag. 479, τίς ὧδε παιδνὸς . . . , παραγγέλμασιν νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν, ἀλλαγὰ λόγον καμῖν ; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρωθέντα), 740, παρ' αὐτὰ δ' ἐλθεῖν ἐς Ἰλίου πόλιν λέγοιμ' ἂν φρόνημα νηνέμου γαλάνας ('there came what I should call a spirit' &c.—virtual Predicate not ἐλθεῖν but φρόνημα ν. γ.), 796, οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὄμματα φωτὸς τὰ δοκοῦντ' εὐφρονος ἐκ διανοίας ὑδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότῃ (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on δοκοῦντα the virtual Predicate is εὐφρονος, not σαίνειν—'which with seeming-kindly heart fawn' &c.). Soph. Aj. 798, τήνδε δ' ἔξοδον Ὀλεβρίαν Αἴαντος ἐλπίζει φέρειν—'he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here ὀλεβρίαν is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.

Rep. 438 c, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποία τις [ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ] ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός.

Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας.

Rep. 597 d, ὅντως κλίνης ποιητῆς ὅντως οὔσης· ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις.

Symp. 186 a, οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ib. 196 b, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται, οὐθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ, οὔτε θεόν.

Theæt. 173 d, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα, οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὐτ' ἀκούουσι.

Symp. 218 a, δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὦν ἂν τις δηχθείη, τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν γὰρ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

Soph. 231 a, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

Gorg. 474 c, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἡσυχρόν.

Phædo 102 c, σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας . . . , τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.

Ib. 69 b, τοῦτον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα.

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (A) πότερον . . . πείθει, ἢ οὐ ; (B) Οὐ δῆτα [sc. οὐ πείθει], ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

Ib. 496 d, (A) πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς κ.τ.λ. ; (B) Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) ἄλλο τι . . . ποιήσεις ; ὦν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινεῖ ; (B) Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι· εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειε.

Ib. 428 d, (A) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίσιν ; (B) Αὕτη, ἢ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.

Soph. 267 a, (A) Μιμητικὸν δὴ . . . ἀπονειμώμεθα· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθίσθω.

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170–197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170–4, corresponding to 187–190, and the remainder to the remainder. And Æsch. Ag. 622, 623, and ib. 1202–5, ΚΑ. Μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει· Προτοῦ μὲν αἰδῶς ἦν ἐμοὶ λέγειν τάδε. ΧΟ. Μῶν καὶ θεὸς περ ἡμέρῳ πεπληγμένος ; Ἀβρύνεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εὖ πράσσωσι πλέον.

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.

Rep. 341 b, (A) οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε κ.τ.λ. (B) Οὐδέ γ' ἄν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι.

Phædo 79 b, (A) τί δέ ἡ ψυχὴ ; ὁρατόν, ἢ ἀειδές ; (B) Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε.

Hip. Ma. 293 e, (A) τὸ πρόπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὃ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ, . . . ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων ; (B) Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (sc. ὃ—φαίνεσθαι).

Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου. (B) Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 e, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἑμαντοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι. The emphasis is on ἑμαντοῦ, and the ὑμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκλησθαι ἐπὶ δείπνον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπετωκνῖαν—'from some cause, *most probably* repletion.'

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα—'the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι—'for whatever cause, *most probably* for envy.'

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι—'I as well as they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron : where (in other words) the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence of facts.

Theæt. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phædo 80 c, συμπεσὸν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος.

Symp. 190 e, τὰς . . . ῥυτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τὰ στήθη διήρβρον.

Symp. 209 c, *τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ*.

Tim. 73 e, *γῆν ἐφύρασε καὶ ἔδενσε*.

Apol. 32 b, *ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην*.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 114, *ὁ δὲ γελάσας τε καὶ κατασχὼν πολλὸν χρόνον . . . εἶπε*.

§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.

Phædo 80 e, *ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα κ.τ.λ.* ;

Rep. 402 a, *ὥσπερ ἄρα γραμμάτων περί τότε ἱκανῶς εἴχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 581 e, *τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ποιῶμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν . . . τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 587 a, *πλείστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου καὶ τάξεως* ;

Ib. 590 a, *ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδες . . . αὔξηται* ;

Legg. 830 d, *καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖς . . . μὴ φαίνηταί τισι γελοῖα, οὐκ ἄρα νομοθετήσῃ* ;

Protag. 351 c, *ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ* ;

Ibid. d, *ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα* ;

Meno 78 c, *ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 88 d, *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . εἶναι, ἀρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.* ;

Symp. 216 d, *καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σειληνῶδες* ; [The Zurich editors give τοῦτο. οὐ σ. ;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.

Soph. 233 c, *δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν* ;

Hip. Ma. 301 c, *ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Gorg. 496 c, *τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγεσ πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι* ;

Phileb. 44 d, *οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁπουοῦν εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.* ;

Politic. 265 e, ὁ πολιτικὸς ἄρ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ. ;
 Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται, ὃ πρὸς Διός, ἥ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μὴν
 ὑπὸ τιῶν ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ;

Apol. 37 b, πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσῃ κ.τ.λ., τί δέϊσας ; [So
 Hermann punctuates.]

Crito 53 e, ἡ πλησιάζεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—
 τίνας λόγους, ὃ Σώκρατες ;

Ibid. e, ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων,—τί
 ποιῶν ; [The Zurich editors give δουλεύων]

Cf. Lysias xiii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγόρατος τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ
 φυγάδας ἐντεῦθεν ἐποίησε,—τίς ὦν αὐτός ;

§ 311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.

Phileb. 16 e, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί,
 ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη.

Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν ὅη
 γεγονέναι.

Ib. 46 e, ὅπότε . . . τις τὰναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσῃ, ποτὲ ῥίγων θέρηται
 καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχεται.

Phædo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν ; πώποτε τι . . . εἶδες ; [So Oxon. But the
 edd. give ἤδη οὖν πώποτε τι εἶδες ;]

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περιμὼν ὁ Φίλιππος Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ
 Τριβαλλοὺς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly ἂν commences a parenthetic clause.

Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς ; (See, above,
 § 295.)

Cf. Dem. Olynth. A. 14. p. 13, τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις ;
 [So one Paris MS. τις ἂν Zurich editors.]

§ 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

A. Metonymy.

Rep. 497 d, ὦν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε — 'of those
 [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον ἔχοντες—equivalent to ἐνῆν
 ἔπαινος ἅλεσι διδόμενος. A strange instance.

Ib. 205 b, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἰόντι ὁτφοῦν αἰτία—that is, ἡ
 τοῦ ἰέναι ὁτιοῦν αἰτία.

Theæt. 167 c, ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν
 εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.

Theæt. 190 e, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν—
'I should be ashamed at our being compelled' &c.

Apol. 33 c, χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις εἶναι σοφοῖς.

Phædo 88 d, ὁ λόγος . . . ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥηθείς—'the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.'

Ib. 68 a, τοῦτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς—'be rid of the company of this.'

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 e, καλὸν ἔστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γινόμενα—'let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely or decently performed.'

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

Ὑποπτεύειν for 'to expect.'

Theæt. 164 a, καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ.

Ἀμήχανος of number.

Phdr. 229 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθῃ τερατολόγων τινῶν φυσέων.

Δαιμόνιος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ὕψος τε δαιμόνιον ἔχοντα.

§ 314. Θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. 'Strange,' 'eccentric.'

Symp. 182 e, θαυμαστά ἔργα. So 213 d, θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται.

β. 'Incomparable,' 'capital;'—only the intention of *superlativeness* being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμαστὴν ἂν εἶη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—'decided,' 'emphatic,' 'positive.'

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακέλεις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή—
'most positive is the encouragement given by all.'

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου—'most decidedly approved.'

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν—'were particularly anxious.'

Phædo 74 b, (A) φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μὴδέν; (B) Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε. θαυμαστῶς qualifies φῶμεν not εἶναι—'say Yes most positively.'

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστῶς ὥς ἐπίεσθην—'was most decidedly convinced.'

§ 315. Ὑπερφνῶς, καλῶς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express *decided* assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 c, (A) ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα ; . . . (B) Ὑπὲρ φνῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ—‘I agree most decidedly.’

Phædo 76 e, ὑπερφνῶς δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἄρ’ οὐ ταῦτ’ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα . . . μουσικὴν ξύμπανσαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο ; (B) Κάλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλῶς λέγειν for ‘to say truly,’ e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἀτελὴ δ’ ὄντε δῆπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. So 39 e.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπὲ . . . εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. (B) Νὴ Δί’ ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα—‘most decidedly you did.’

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phædo 62 b, ὁ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥάδιος διδεῖν, ‘cumbersome,’ i. e. ‘perplexing.’

Euthyd. 275 d, τὸ μειράκιον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ἡρυθρίασέ τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἔβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ. So Hip. Ma. 287 a.

§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκίῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ’ ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἤσθησαν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐργηγορόσι μήτε εὖδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονομένοις—the supposition of the alternative εὖδουσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolic. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δεῖ . . . μήτ’ ἄκοντα μήθ’ ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, ἴτ’ ἴτ’ ὁπάονες Οἷ τ’ ὄντες οἷ τ’ ἀπόντες.

§ 318. D. Formulæ expressive of Contempt.

a. Οὔτος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὔτοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρῶνιν ταύτας τὰς δυσκολοκάμπτους [καμπάς].

§ 319. b. Ποῖος ;

Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἀλλ' ὥσως ἱματίων [τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν φῆς]
 . . . (B) Ποίωιν ἱματίων ;—'Clothes, forsooth !'

Charm. 174 b, (A) ἀρά γε ἦ [οἶδε] τὸ πεττευτικόν ; (B) Ποῖον
 πεττευτικόν ;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.

Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδοι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 98 c, αἴρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον.

Symp. 218 a, Φαῖδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξιμάχους.

Rep. 387 b, Κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας.

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 1439, Χρυσῆϊδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἰλῖφ. It is frequent in Aristophanes : cf. Ecclez. 1069, ὦ Πάνες, ὦ Κορύβαντες, Ach. 270, καὶ Λαμάχων ἀπαλλαγείς, Ran. 963, Κύκνους ποιῶν καὶ Μέμνονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γόνον ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελπέμεν γυναικῶν τε Καδμειᾶν ἔμολον, sc. Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.

§ 321. d. Periphrasis.

Legg. 953 e, θρέμματα Νείλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the Particle of Comparison omitted.

(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x—xi, where he characterises it as πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν.)

Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπιδὸν δ' ὑποδείσαντες τάχ' ἂν ἐξαίφνης εἰ σὺ φανείης σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι, Æsch. P. V. 856, οἱ δ' ἐπτοημένοι φρένας Κίρκου πελειῶν οὐ μακρὰν λελειμμένοι ἥξουσιν, Ag. 394, ἐπεὶ διώκει παῖς ποτανὸν ὄρνιν, Eurip. Bacch. 1114, Πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ ἦρξεν ἱερίᾳ φόνον.

§ 323. F. Play upon Words.

Rep. 621 b, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν.

Symp. 185 c, Πανσανίου δὲ πανσαμένον,—διδάσκουσι γὰρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί.

Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν.

Ib. 174 b, ὥς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί—in allusion to Agathon.

Apol. 25 c, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, . . . σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν.

Theæt. 194 c, κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα.

Phædo 80 d, εἰς . . . τόπον . . . αἰεδῇ, εἰς Αἴδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Ib. 89 b, ἐάνπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας.

Legg. 802 c, δεινὸν γὰρ ὄλη γε ἁρμονία ἀπάδειν ἢ ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν.

Ib. 803 d, ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὐτ' οὖν παιδεία.

Cf. Hom. Il. xiii. 773, νῦν τοι σῶς αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος.

§ 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of δεινωσις.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον.

Ib. 111 d, συντετρηῆσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν.

Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Tim. 87 d, ὦν οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν, οὐδ' ἐννοοῦμεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγοντα.

Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. ἐάν τις τι κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 e, τίς οὖν ἡ διάστασις; ἥδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδίζόμενος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 e.

Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἴ εὖνους. τίμι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 e, πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς.

Legg. 701 c, τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἔνα, εἴπερ κ.τ.λ.

Cratylus 111 a, πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτο πιστόν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 e, πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ.
[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]

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
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
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