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THE APOLOGY
OF PLATO.

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THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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ADVERTISEMENT.

COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the *Philebus* in 1860, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium* were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The *Digest of Idioms*, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium*, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the *Apology* seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix

on the *δαιμόνιον* of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to publish it himself; and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the *Apology* and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In references to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the *Poetæ Scenici* published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.

The text of the *Apology* itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted; but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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June 8, 1867.

INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

THE trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary *γραφὴ δημοσία*. The indictment (*ἔγκλημα*) is called *ἀντωμοσία* 19 B, 24 B, and *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the *ἀνάκρισις* before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms *ἀντιγραφή*, *ἀντωμοσία*, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (*ἔγκλημα*) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. THE ACCUSERS.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the *Apology*. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining $\frac{1}{5}$ of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἀντος δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδίωκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδησαν δὲ οἱ ἔνδεκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, *magis oratorie*

quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (*Euthyphro* 2 B) as *νέος τις καὶ ἀγνώς*, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (*Ran.* 1302). The Meletus (*Andoc. de Myst.* 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (*Apol.* 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 1301) with Antiphon.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (*Apol.* 18 B) as *τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτον*, and Socrates is called by Horace (*Sat.* II. iv. 3) *Anyti reus*. He was a leather-seller (*Xen. Apol. Soc.* 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (*Xen. Hell.* II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (*Lys.* xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (*Isocr.* xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (*Meno* 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (*Athenæus* XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocration on the word *δεκάζεω*) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, *Philos. der Griech.* II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes¹ which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

¹ Socrates is made by Plato (*Apol.* 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. *Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτός καὶ Δέκανος, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν*

ἀχθόμενος, Ὅνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δέκανος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥήτορων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between *ῥήτορες* and *πολιτικοὶ* shows that the words severally denote definite classes

of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the *Apology* itself

of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitus' Comment. in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii., that there was any *order* of *ρήτορες*, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the *ἰσηγορία* which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these *ρήτορες* had attained a mischievous importance. Æschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as *δυναστείας ἔστοις περιποιοῦντες*, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that *ὅσα δὴ ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν η αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ρήτορων ἔνυμβονλῆς ἀπανταγγίγνεται*. To be a *ρήτωρ* had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name *ρήτορική*, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the *Gorgias* (448 D)—*τὴν καλούμενην ρήτορικήν*. In their capacity of *συνήγοροι* the *ρήτορες* were brought into prominence (Heeren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as *σύμβοντες* to the Assembly that the *ρήτορες* were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates

(viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it *τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν βόματος δυναστείαν*) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, *συμβούλευτική* and *δικαιοική*, of Aristotle's triple division of *ρήτορική* in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the *ρήτωρ*'s profession. The *πολιτικοί* as a class must have emerged at the same time as the *ρήτορες*. In itself *πολιτικός* means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by *πολιτικοί* that class of men who made public business their profession,—*τὸν πολιτικὸν λεγομένους*, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the *πολιτικοί* will be best completed by comparing them with the *ρήτορες*. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), *νῦν δὲ τῆς ρήτορικῆς ηὔξημενης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι: μὲν δὶ' ἀπειρίᾳ δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται*. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 A, Phdr. 258 B, and the general terms in which the *ρήτορες* are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as *οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες*.

as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τούς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ ταῦτα.

Diog. Laert. II. 40. ἡ ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρῦνος⁷, ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ. Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλιτος Μελίτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From *Æschines* (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a *γραφὴ παρανόμων* the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχεῖται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕδωρ τῷ κατηγόρῳ τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕδωρ τῷ τὴν γραφὴν φεύγοντι καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγοντι (i. e. τοῖς συνηγόροις, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ) τὸ τρίτον ὕδωρ ἐγχεῖται τῇ τιμήσει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς δργῆς τῆς ἴμετέρας (i. e. for the prosecutor to speak *again* on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his *συνήγοροι*, represented by the main part of the *Apology*, i. e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophonian *Apology* says (22) that speeches were made ὑπό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

⁷ [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]

prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named ; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' *ἀντιτίμησις*, where the *Apology* again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the *ἀντιτίμησις* that he brought forward his wife and children *ad misericordiam*.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. *Apol.* 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the *Apology* (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The *Xenophontean Apology* (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called *βῆμα*, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase *ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ*, *Apol.* 34 A, and similarly *Andoc.* i. 26. p. 4, *καὶ σιωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἴ τις ἀναβαίνειν βούλεται*, and *Æsch.* iii. 165. p. 77, *παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ βήματος ἔως ἂν εἴπῃς*.

6. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. SPEECHES OF THE ACCUSERS.

We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus *Apol.* 34 A, and for the other two *Apol.* 36 B, *ἀνέβη Ἀνυτός καὶ Λύκων*. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him *ἡθικὴ πίστις* in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of *ρήτωρ*. The only citation in Plato's *Apology* which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), *εἰ διαφεύξεται Σωκράτης, ἥδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νιεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἢ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται· ἢ οὖν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ*

προσεστηκότας πρὸς τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων οὐκ δλίγους δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος συνειλεγμένους εἰς τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ii. 5. p. 28, ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν περιεστηκότων (σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν πολιτῶν πάρεισιν) ἡ τῶν δικαστῶν, iii. 56. p. 61, δύος οὐδεὶς πώποτε μέμνηται πρὸς ἀγῶνα δημόσιον παραγενομένους.

Production of witnesses.

It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the *Apology* to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so —μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. Cf. *Æsch.* ii. 122. p. 44, καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψῆφον μέλλοντες φέρειν ἔστε μοι μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 A—καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε—he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 E καὶ τούτων ὑμῶν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δὲ ὑμῶν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέχομαι (cf. e. g. *Antiph.* v. 20. p. 131, and *Lysias* x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 A, τούτον πᾶν τούναντίον εὐρήσετε is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 A)—‘Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?’—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσθω· ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ· would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (*Demosth.* c. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή), and with the common practice (cf. *Lysias* xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a

formal ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκρωαι, ὡς γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) 'Η ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophonian *Apology* (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμησις—οὐτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὐτε τοὺς φίλους εἴασεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι δμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείᾳ and of the 30 minæ, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες ἀλλας ψῆφους δύδοικοιτα.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν φῶ οἱ ἀρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἥγον, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον, *ibid.*).

PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

- i. Its employment of commonplaces (*τόποι*).
- ii. The “old accusers.”
- iii. The Delphic response.
- iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
- v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

I. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

A close examination of the structure of the *Apology* resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the *Apology* is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the *Apology* itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—*ηδη·μον ἐπιχειρούντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τὸν δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Now the *Apology* is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received *τόποι* of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of “the old accusers,” of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.

(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being *δεινὸς λέγειν* (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isaeus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for *λόγους πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους* (as Isoer. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isoer. xv. 38. p. 318, *οὐτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν*), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the deprecation of *θόρυβος* (cf. e. g. *Æsch.* ii. 24. p. 31, *ἐπαινῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἀνδρες, ὅτι σιγῇ καὶ δικαλῶς ἡμῶν ἀκούετε*), the disclaiming a style unbefitting an old man (cf. Isoer. xii. 3. p. 233, *ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμόττειν*),—these topics, of which the exordium of the *Apology* is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of *διαβολαί* (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a *σοφὸς* is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isoer. xv. *passim*. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of common-places.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, *ταῦτα χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὐήθεις αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτε*.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common *τόπος*. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again *ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην* (33 A) with Isoer. xv. 85, *ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν ιδιωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ' ἐμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν δλην πειρῶμαι πείθειν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὃν αὐτοί τε εὐδαιμονήσουσι κ.τ.λ.*

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is

paralleled by Isoer. xv. 240, *τοὺς πατέρας ἀν ἑωράτε τῶν συνόντων ἡμῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ γραφομένους.*

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, *τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ μὲν ἥκουσι καὶ εἰσὶν ἔνθαδε τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκουστες· ὃν ὅστις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἀναβάσ με ἐλεγξάτω.*

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν ὃν τινα ἔχορην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isoer. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35. pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), *τοῦτο μὲν ἵτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον*, and (35 D), *ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμοῦ* is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antiphon (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία.....ἔξει [τὰ ἐπίχειρα], ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and ibid. 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) "The old accusers."

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, *περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔξ ὅν ἀν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο· οὐθὲν γάρ διαφέρει, εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς, εἴτε μῆ.*

An artifice in the *Apology* which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the *exordium* almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend

them further, and the designation of it at once as a *vox populi*, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance had done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out (“except perhaps a certain play-writer”); in default of which,—the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—“the original accusers,”—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἱ πρῶτοι κατίγοροι are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολὴ at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἦν ίμεις ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—“I hope, if possible, to convert *you* from a prejudice which *you*” (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) “have so long harboured” (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as *vox populi*—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to “the old accusers,” the ἡθικὴ πίστις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the *Apology*, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to “the old

accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chaerephon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed

to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an *ἀγῶν τιμητὸς* has prompted Plato to crown the *Apology* of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the *dramatis personæ*. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the *τίμησις* of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical *ἀντιτίμησις*, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. HOW FAR IS THE APOLOGY CHARACTERISTIC OF
SOCRATES?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the *Apology* of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the *Apology*; we have seen too how that same art has not been

restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion ; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic *Apology* was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean *Apology*, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhart's *Anmerkungen* I. 2 in Platon's *Sämmtliche Werke* über-setzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic *Apology* been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean *Apology* should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as *συνήγοροι*, and again (23) that Socrates refused *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other *Apologies* extant besides these. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic *Apology* of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, *εἰς ποῖον ιερὸν ἡσέβηκε* ; *τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν οὐδὲ ἡ πόλις νομίζει* ; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions ; *μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ*

περὶ Σωκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (18), and τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ ἔργου· καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργου εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story⁹ of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic *Apology* as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the *Apology* a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that “liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia” (Cic. *Tusc.* I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal *ἐρώτησις* of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

⁹ *Diog. Laert.* II. 40, *Cic. de Orat.* I. 54, *Quintil. Inst.* II. xv. 30, *XI. i.* 11, *Valer. Max.* VI. iv. 2, *Stob. Flor.* VII. 56.

which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words *ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν* (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the *Apology* to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGY AS A DEFENCE.

That the *Apology* aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the *Apology* as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the *Apology* as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone¹⁰ so little change

¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-

in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the *καὶνὰ δαιμόνια*) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i. e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the *Apology* first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the *Clouds* both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the *Apology* itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of *δαιμόνια καὶνά*, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sentation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides pre-deceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling:

whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138. note.

Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of *δαιμόνια καὶ* is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests *τὸ δαιμόνιον* into *δαιμόνια*, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the *δαιμόνια* of the indictment as if it had been *δαιμόνια πράγματα*. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean *Apology* enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the *Apology* addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.

In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of “the old accusers” contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ*, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and *φρόνιμος* which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5. Θαλῆν καὶ τὸν τοιούτον σοφὸν μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* consisted. The imputation contained in the words *τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων* or *ξητῶν*, i. e. *τὰ οὐράνια*, is equally general. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Nub. 96 says, *κοινὸν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀπάντων ἔγκλημα*. In 431 B. C. Diopithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τὸν τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἡ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας* (Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Eupolis (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, *ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν, ἀλιτήριος, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων*. Once more, the reference in *τὸν ἥττω λόγου κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ὅλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων* is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of *τὸν ἥττω κ.τ.λ.*, and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, *ώς ἔγώ τὸν ἥττον λόγους κρείττον δύναμαι ποιεῖν*, and again (30. p. 316), *ώς διαφθείρω τὸν νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι πλεονεκτεῖν*. Odium also attached to the profession¹¹ of an instructor in speaking. Hence Æschines’ designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as *λογογράφος*, and (117. p. 16) *ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τὸν νέον διδάσκειν*, crowned by the

¹¹ Λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν (Xen. Mem. I. ii. 31) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and

freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of *λόγων τέχνη* to survive the Tyranny?

designation *σοφιστής* (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλεῖστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὃσοις ἔνμβοντεύσατο τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, ἡ περὶ τὸν λόγον δεινότης ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἐπι-βούλευειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the *Clouds*) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The *μετέωρα φροντίζων* is due to the Philosopher, and the *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κ.τ.λ.* to the Sophist, while the title *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ* stands¹² alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he¹³ denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

¹² Plat. *Apol.* 20 A, Evenus is ἀνὴρ Πάριος σοφός, Xen. *Mem.* II. i. 21, Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός is mentioned; as on the other hand *σοφιστής* is borrowed to express Philosopher.

¹³ There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the *Phædo* of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (*Apol.* 19 C), ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance

with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. *Mem.* VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.

been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, *εἰ τυποί ἀκηκόατε κ.τ.λ.* 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clinch the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for tenets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher

and Sophist when once Aristophanes¹⁴ had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρῆσει, ἐάνπερ*

¹⁴ Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the

popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the *Apology* here as elsewhere as true to facts?

αιρῆ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ "Ανυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken ¹⁵identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—*ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθη, καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπεχθάνομαι* (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

¹⁵ The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No Philosophers!' 'Church and King for ever!' And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as the head and front of the 'Philosophers' of Birmingham."—Smiles' Life of Boulton, ch. 20.

It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), was not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he

was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes¹⁶ had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity¹⁷ he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the¹⁸ political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

¹⁶ [So Stallb. *Prolegg.* ad *Plat. Sympos.* p. 28. Zeller (II. p. 150) asserts the contrary and appeals to Aristoph. *Ran.* 1491 sqq.]

¹⁷ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 142.

¹⁸ Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-

pation of the Thirty lasted from June 404 B. C. to February 403. The Archonship of Euclides began in 403 and ended in 402. In April 399 Anytus brought Socrates to trial.

for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the

same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the *Apology* which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points *seriatim*. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-

taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i. e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D),—the proof of the divine call, i. e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the *ἀντιτίθεντος* (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to

elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer *ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς κ.τ.λ.* finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing¹⁹ him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

¹⁹ It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an *ἀγών τιμητός*, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the *Apology*, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first

step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister “laboured “till the going down of the sun to de-“liver him.” The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation *Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ κ.τ.λ.*, they gave their voice against the truth.

inquiry into the worth of the *Apology* as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns²⁰ all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the *Apology*.

²⁰ That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were them-

selves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.

B = Bekker.

S = Stallbaum.

Z = Zurich editors.

H = Hermann.

Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the *Apology* anew for this edition, and also the *Crito*, *Phædo*, and *Symposium*.]

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. "Ο τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὡς ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ὀλίγους ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 5 οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὡν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν φῷ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπὸ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δει- 10 βοῦν ὅντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπὸ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργω, ἐπειδὰν μηδὲ ὄπωσ- 15 τιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτο μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὄμολογοίνην ἀν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ρήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

A. The
Defence.
Exordium.

5. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the οὐδὲν following, making it equivalent to οὐ τι οὐδὲν below.

8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough litotes: 'far above these: 'a far greater orator than they.' Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα εὐρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδάτην τε τὸν βουκόλον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ.

ἢ τι ἡ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκού- p. 17
σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δῖ, ὁ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ
οἱ τούτων, ρήμασί τε καὶ ὄνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη-

1. *ἢ τι ἡ οὐδὲν]* This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, Ἀνδρῶν δὲ οὐκέν τις μοι ἐρίσσεται, ηὲ καὶ οὐκί. So Hdt. iii. 140, η τις η οὐδείς. And Eurip. Dan. Fr. vi. Κρείσσων γάρ οὕτις χρημάτων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ, Πλὴν εἴ τις οὕτις δὲ οὐτός εστιν οὐχ ὅρω.

2. *οὐ μέντοι]* Opposed to ἀκούσεσθε π. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, *but* not dressed up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὄνόμασι· after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δὲ—ἀληθειαν) and continues to εἰσιέναι,—since πλάττοντι λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; α μειράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. *ώσπερ οἱ]* The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by *ώσπερ*. The attracted construction, exemplified by *ώσπερ μειρακίω* below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. *ρήμασι . . . ὄνόμασι]* What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Διὸς φῦλος is the *ρῆμα*,

Διόφιλος the *ὄνομα*). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical significance; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ ρήμάτων τις οὐκ ἀνέξεπλάγυη ἀκούων; 199 b, δύνομασι καὶ θέσει ρήμάτων, 221 e, τοιάντα καὶ ὄνόματα καὶ ρήματα whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. *Æschin.* iii. 72. p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἔφη δεῖν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ρῆμα μέμνημαι ὡς εἴπε, διὰ τὴν ἀηδίαν τοῦ ὄνόματος) ἀπορρήξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the *ρῆμα* is the whole expression, the *ὄνομα* is ἀπορρήξαι. Further, as Socrates could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of *ὄνόματα*, would consist in what *Æschines*—ii. 153. p. 48—calls η τῶν ὄνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isocr. ix. 9. p. 190, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὄνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξενοῖς τὰ δὲ καυνοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφορᾶις while *ρήματα* would extend to whole expressions, cf. *Æschines*' caricature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μιαρὰ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπίθανα ρήματα.

p. 17. μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούστεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὄνόμασι πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἀ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν δήπου πρέποι, ὡς ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέν- 5 τοι καὶ πάνυ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόαστι, ¹⁰ καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὐτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

4. ὥσπερ—εἰσιέναι] Three peculiarities; 1. μειρακίῳ is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικίᾳ and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δέ. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐρώτησις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled

with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

9. ἀγορᾷ κ.τ.λ.] The passage of Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 10) is well known;—ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ. πρωὶ τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέστηθαι. For τράπεζαι as places of resort cf. Lysias ix. 5. p. 114, κάμοι μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διείλεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ· and shops generally, cf. Lys. xxiv. 20. p. 170.

ὑμῶν πολλοὶ] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζαι would be of the richer class.

10. θορυβεῖν] See Introd. p. ix. note 8.

11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isaeus, Fr. vii. 1. l. 15, λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον. The ἀναβέβηκα refers to the βῆμα, cf. Introd. p. vii.

ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λεξεως. ὥσπερ p. 17.
οὖν ἀν, εἰ τῷ ὅντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὅν, ξυνεγιγνώ-
σκετε δήπου ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18.
τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἰσπέρ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
5 τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιου, ὡς γέ ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν
τρόπον τῆς λεξεως ἔστιν· ἵστως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἵστως
δὲ βελτίων ἀν ἐστι· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἡ μήδικαστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθή λέγειν.

First part of Defence;
—Justification of himself against the prejudices of the court, and his coun-
trymen generally.

10. II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός είμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,
ω ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδῆ κατη-
γορημένα καὶ τὸν πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ
πρὸς τὰ ὑστερα καὶ τὸν ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ οἱ
κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἥδη
15 ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον
φοβοῦμαι ἡ τὸν ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτον, καίπερ ὅντας καὶ

malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolato-
rem referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Criton. 52 e,
videturque jam Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II.
§ 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at
duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse scite Boeckhius Corp.
Inscr. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv.
Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7.” Zeller
agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] ‘I request this
of you as a piece of justice.’
Cf. 41 d, χρὴ . . . τοῦτο δια-
νοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, Legg. 795 c,
ταῦτὸν δὴ τοῦτο . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀλ-
λοις πᾶσι χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ὄρθον
(as the right thing.)

6. ἵστως μὲν γὰρ] The reason urged is a general one. The consideration of style, if allowed at all, will be operative just in those cases where it is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it

will interfere with true judgment.

9. αὕτη] This represents the preceding clause αὐτὸ—ἡ μήδικα being in fact τοῦτο, attracted into the gender of ἀρετή. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλαι] This καὶ only emphasises πάλαι. Dig. 133. And in καὶ οὐδὲν—λέγοντες we have the common καὶ after πολλοί.—It was 24 years since the Clouds were represented: Forster.

ρ. 18. τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὡς ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ 5 εἰ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φόμιην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἥγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἐπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον 10 ἥδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾧ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παιδες ὅντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές.

2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely with ἐκ παιδῶν. They ἐπειθοῦν all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below c, παιδες ὅντες ἔνιοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπειθοῦν and κατηγόρουν just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ.] below, e. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—‘were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.’

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This “accusation,” both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xv. The charges it contains

are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxiv. n. 12.

13. παιδες . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, ‘when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.’

14. ὁ δὲ—ὅτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated

a. Existence of such prejudices, and their nature, viz. that Socrates was, as a Physicist and a Sophist, a subverter severally of religion and of morality.

πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὄνόματα οὗν τε p. 18. αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδιοποὺς δ τυγχάνει ὥν ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους 5 πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οὗν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ 10 λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οὐήθητε δεῦν πρὸς ἐκείνους ε πρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἡκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμῳδιοποὺς] VH; κωμῳδοποὺς BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phædo 70 c all the MSS. have κωμῳδοπ.; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others. Mœris' assertion that κωμῳδοποὺς is the Attic and the other the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would be δὲ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἴ τις] Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 553), Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, Ὡς τᾶλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, ὅπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι Τούτου κατημέληκεν. And a play of Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes' Clouds, was called the Connos, and the Chorus was of Phrontistæ (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as

Plato (Menex. 235 e, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the music-master Connus Socrates' instructor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but the εἴ τις· that is, ὅσοι stands for ὅσοι ἄλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b, where πάντα ἄ is equivalent to πάντα τᾶλλα ἄ. This ὅσοι [ἄλλοι] is then subdivided into [οἱ μὲν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι and οἱ δὲ—πείθοντες. The οἱ μὲν is supplied from οἱ δὲ by anastrophe; Dig. 241. The ἄλλοις πείθοντες is put in to make the sense clear, but virtually repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον· it does not affect the regularity of the construction.

p. 18. ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἰεν· ἀπολογητέον δή, ὡς ἄν-
p. 19. δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἔξελέσθαι τὴν
διαβολήν, ἦν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην
ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Βουλούμην μὲν οὖν ἀν τοῦτο
οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ 5
πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ
χαλεπὸν ἔναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶνον ἐστι.
ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἵτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἔξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγο- 10
ρία ἐστίν, ἔξ ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ
ἡ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
εἰεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες;
ῶσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶ-

3. [ἔσχετε] BZH; [ἔχετε] V. The preposition *ἐν* would be strange with *ἔσχετε* if the meaning were 'have entertained *during* so long a time.' *ἐν* means rather 'within the limits of,' and so, with respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus *ἔσχετε* exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long ago.'

4. [ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than *οὕτως ἐν ὅλῳ*, yet it occurs; e. g. below 24 a (where this passage is alluded to); Isaeus vi. 33. p. 59, *ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*, Lysias, xix. 8. p. 152, *ἐν οὕτω δεινῷ καθέστηκεν*. The rhythm probably determines the order. There is no need for the *οἵτωσὶν* of V.

2. τὴν διαβολήν] Not the name of *σοφός* (cf. 20 d, τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again 23 a); nor 'calumny' simply (cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἔξ ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή); but *calumny believed*, i. e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὐ πάνυ here as elsewhere retains its meaning of 'hardly,' 'scarcely,' but this is to be interpreted as a *litotes*—'I can hardly say I do not know.' Dig. 139.

11. ἡ δὴ] The antecedent of *ἡ* is *διαβολή*. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτο

ἐστίν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλητος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
βολή.

13. διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες] This fulness of expression is common in Plato, and gives the air of deliberateness. Dig. 262.

14. ὕσπερ qualifies not only *κατηγόρων* but also *ἀντωμοσίαν* and *ἀναγνῶνται*. They are *quasi-prosecutors*; it is a *quasi-indictment*; and Socrates makes believe to read it.

ἀντωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This

ναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζη- p. 19.
 τῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον
 κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. c
 τοιαύτη τίς ἔστι· ταῦτα γάρ ἔωράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν
 5 τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεὶ περι-
 φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-
 λὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὃν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα
 οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω
 τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 10 σοφός ἔστι· μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας

b. Refu-
tation of
them.

2. καὶ οὐράνια] So Z; VBSH καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια. 8. μικρὸν]
 According to Maeris, *σμικρὸς* is Attic. Yet in *Aeschin.* and *Isochr.*
μικρὸς occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have *σμικρόν*.
 But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, Pathol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst. § 1, who instances pas-
 sages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even
 in the same sentence; Dem. Ol. B. 14. p. 22, Arist. Hist. An. II.
 xv. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the
 general principle οὐκ ἔξωμάλισται τὰ τῶν διαλέκτων καὶ μάλιστα τὰ
 τῶν Ἀττικῶν. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree
 a guide.

term, like *ἀντιγραφὴ* 27 a, is used to designate the *ἔγκλημα*. Both *ἀντωμοσία* and *ἀντιγραφὴ* were properly said of the *defendant's* plea, presented in writing and sworn to, in the *ἀνάκρισις*, or preliminary proceeding before the archon Basileus. But as the *ἔγκλημα* was likewise then presented in writing and sworn to, the same words came to be applied to it also. See Introd. p. i.

7. ὃν ἐγὼ] The antecedent of *ὃν* must be the matters in the *ἀντωμοσία*, not the immediately preceding words.

οὐδέν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cognate, not accus. of the object; Dig. 6. *Ἐπαῖω* is intransitive.

8. καὶ οὐχ ὡς—ἔστι] This is well-marked irony. Socrates declines here to pronounce, before an audience who would have welcomed it, a condemnation of studies against which at other times he had freely declared himself, on the double ground (1) that *human* nature ought to be studied first, Xen. Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the physicists got involved in questions which were really beyond the powers of the human mind, ib. 11, and arrived moreover at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. vii. 6, 7.

10. τοσαύτας] 'Upon so grave a charge' as that of pronouncing upon things of which he

p. 19. δίκας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὡς ἄνδρες
d' Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν
τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους
διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκη-
κόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσι·
φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἡ σμικρὸν ἡ μέγα
ῆκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομέ-
νου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἔστι καὶ
τὰλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἔστιν, οὐδέ γ' ¹⁰
εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-
ε πους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἶσ-
τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοὺς] H. brackets. But if we read *aὐτοὺς* just before, following the weight of MSS., *τοὺς* is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reprobated in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] ‘But the truth is.’ Dig. 147.

3. τοὺς πολλοὺς] A modest way of saying ‘all of you.’ Cf. Isoer. xvii. 23. p. 363, τί ἀν ὑμῶν τὰ πολλὰ λέγοιμι; and Rep. 556 a, τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἔκουσίων συμβολαίων.

ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φρά-
ζειν] This is a *hysteron proteron*: Dig. 308. With *φρά-
ζειν* is to be supplied of course ἀλλήλοις, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὥσπερ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small: ὡς δὲ πλεῖστα κτησάμενος ὡν ἡμεῖς μνημονεύομεν,

Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χιλίους μόνους στατήρας κατέλιπε. Isoer. xv. 155. p. 83. The ὑποκριταὶ, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evenus’ price, 5 minæ (500 francs), seems to have been above the average: Isocrates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 minæ (3-400 fr.) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 minæ for his rhetorical course; Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists’ courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.

Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος. p. 19.
 τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος, ὡς ἄνδρες, οἵος τ' ἔστιν ἡνὶ⁵
 εἰς ἔκαστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν
 ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προΐκα ξυνεῦναι φῶς ἀν βούλωνται,
 5 τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἔκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας p. 20.
 σφίσι ξυνεῦναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσει-
 δέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἔστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε
 σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ
 προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς
 10 πλείω ἡ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἰππονίκου-
 τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἔστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νιέες—ὡς
 Καλλία, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τῷ νιέε πώλω ἡ
 μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἀν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάτην λα-
 βεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλώ τε καὶ
 15 ἀγαθῷ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δὲ ἀν b
 οὗτος ἡ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἡ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δὲ
 ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔστον, τίνα ἀντοῦ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπι-
 στάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρω-
 πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν; οἷμαι γὰρ

14. καλώ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synalæpha.

5. τούτους πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig.

277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσειδέναι] The πρὸς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—‘and at Athens

there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.’

8. ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἔστιν ἐνθάδε.

10. Καλλίᾳ] Cf. Cratyl. 391 b, οἱ σοφισταὶ, οἶσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. “Callias fuit omnium Atheniensium suæ aetatis non modo facile ditissimus, ita ut simpliciter ὁ πλούσιος diceretur, sed etiam nequissimus siue peculii maxime prodigus.”—Fischer.

p. 20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νιέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἡ δ' ὁσ. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδατός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐηνός, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μιῶν καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐηνὸν εἰς ἐμακάριστα, εἰς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ 5 οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰς ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. ‘Υπολάβοι ἀν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἵστως ἀλλ' ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἔστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αῦται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γάρ δίπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μή τι ἐπραττεις ἀλλοῖον ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἔστιν, 15 δ' ἡνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίκη τό τε

6. ἐγὼ οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἐγωγε is not wanted here.

9. ‘Υπολάβοι ἀν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with ‘the old accusers,’ passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed *σοφός* to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxvi.

10. *πρᾶγμα*] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα, Euthyd. 304 a, τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, εἰ, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἔστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

σόν· ‘What is it, then, that *you* (since we are not to identify you with the *σοφοί*) have been about?’

13. εἰ μὴ—πολλοὶ] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένου an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἀν παράσχοιτε εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε,—where εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε repeats διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246, Εἴπερ γάρ κ' Ὁδυσσεὺς κ.λ., ἀλλά κεν αὐτὸν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπίσποι, Εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο.

c. Exposition of the veritable peculiarities in himself, which had been mistaken for those of Physicist and Sophist,—viz. his conviction of the hollowness of the prevalent pretensions to knowledge,

ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἵσως μὲν p. 20.
 δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παιζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἵστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρώ· ἐγὼ γάρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι'
 οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα.
 5 ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἵσως ἀνθρω-
 πινη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἴναι
 σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἀρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ε
 ἡ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἴεν, ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τί¹
 λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις
 10 φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῆ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί
 μοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν
 δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν

1. *ὄνομα*] Of *σοφός*. See note
 on *σοφὸς*, 18 b.

5. *ἥπερ κ.τ.λ.*] ‘My wisdom
 is precisely (*περ*) that only wis-
 dom, as I believe (*ἵσως*), which
 is possible to man :’ namely
 (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his
 own ignorance. Socrates speaks
 of this as *knowledge* because it
 implies two things ;—(1) the
 possession of a standard or
 ideal of knowledge, with the
 conception of a method for at-
 taining it ; and (2) self-know-
 ledge, such as would result
 from the Socratic system of
 self-examination (cf. 38 a, note),
 revealing the amount of actual
 short-coming. This is know-
 ledge until the positive know-
 ledge is attained, and if that
 never can be, then this is the
 only knowledge. Socrates’ faith,
 however, in the partial attain-
 ableness of positive knowledge
 never wavered, and his mis-
 giving here must be restricted
 to the possibility of complete
 attainment.

8. ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] ‘Or
 some wisdom that—I know
 not how to characterise it.’ It
 is some predicate, alternative
 with *μείζω* ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον, which
 Socrates affects to be at a loss
 for. The idiom is an expe-
 dient for abbreviation ; the
 sentence is hurried to its con-
 clusion *after its point has been
 expressed*, by a clause super-
 seding the enumeration of fur-
 ther particulars : cf. Dig. 257,
 where the present passage is
 especially compared with Gorg.
 494 d, (A) Φημὶ τὸν κνώμενον
 ἥδεως ἀν βιῶναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ
 τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κυησιῶ, ἡ ἔτι
 τί σε ἐρωτῶ ;

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp.
 177 a, ἡ μέν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου
 ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίπ-
 πην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλὰ
 Φαιδρον τοῦδε. Cf. also Alc. I.
 113 e. The verse in the Me-
 lanippe was οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος
 ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur.
 Hel. 513, λόγος γάρ ἐστιν οὐκ
 ἐμός, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος.

p. 20. λόγον, ὃν ἀν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τις ἔστι σοφία καὶ οὕτα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν

p. 21. Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἵστε που. οὐτος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος τε 5 καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅ τι ὄρμήσειε. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὡς ἀνδρες· ἥρετο γὰρ δή, εἴ τις 10 ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα

(attested
by the
enigmati-
cal re-
sponse
from
Delphi),

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοῖς] “There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45. note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates’ tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up.” It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates’ eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—*σοφός Σοφοκλῆς* &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. *σοφός*, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia’s simple negative recited here.

6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατῆλθε] This allusion to Chærephon’s antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase *πλήθει ἑταῖρος* is

to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the *ἑταῖροι* of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. *φυγὴν* refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called *ταύτην*, ‘the recent.’ So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Pisistratidæ;—*τὴν δημοκρατίαν . . . δις ἥδη καταλυθεῖσαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα γενομένας*, viii. 123. p. 184. With *κατῆλθε* cf. Lysias, x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὅτου ὑμεῖς κατεληλύθατε· it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months’ reign of the Thirty, signalled by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piraeus to Athens.

σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν p. 21. αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

and the course of experiments by which he had confirmed that conviction;

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὅν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω δὲ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὐτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὐτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὥν· τί οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἡπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἐπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζῆτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἥλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς εἴηται θά, εἴ πέρ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὐτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δὲ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—οὐόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἥν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς δὲν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξε μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς

1. ἀδελφὸς] Chærecretes: Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.

2. μαρτυρήσει] The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. x.

10. οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν.

17. τῶν πολιτικῶν] In itself this word means no more than 'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been applied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old law-givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's time speaking of Athens would

mean by πολιτικὸν that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικὸν λεγομένους (Politic. 303 e). As distinguished from the ῥήτορες, they were men who sought appointments to public offices, while the ῥήτορες were professional speakers in the Ecclesia. Cf. 23 e, and see Introd. p. ii. note 1.

19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξε μοι] This inversion of government is of common occurrence among the forms of changed construction: Dig. 271. ἔδοξε is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.

p. 21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἔαυτῷ, εἶναι δὲ οὗ κάπειτα
d ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός,
εἴη δὲ οὗ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολ-
λοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἔμαυτὸν δὲ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλο-
γιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώ- 5
τερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν
καλὸν κάγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἴεται τι εἰδέ-
ναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ
οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ
τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἀ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι 10
εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἦταν τῶν ἐκείνου δο-
ει κούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα
ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν ἥδη ἐφεξῆς ἦταν, αὐσθανόμε- 15
νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,
ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ
πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἵτεον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησ-
μόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι.

p. 22. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς 20
ὑμᾶς τάληθῆ λέγειν· ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον·
οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῦν
τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν,
ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φανλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι
ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῶν τὴν 25
ἔμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦν-

20. νὴ τὸν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αλγυπτίων θεόν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the

mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.

23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. Euthyd. 292 e, τοῦ ἵσου ἡμῶν ἐνδεῖ ἡ ἔτι πλείονος.

τος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 22.
 γὰρ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἥτα ἐπὶ τὸν ποιητὰς τούς τε
 τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τὸν τοὺς
 ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληφόμενος
 5 ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὅντα. ἀναλαμβάνων
 οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἢ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πε-
 πραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἀν αὐτοὺς τί λέ-
 γοιεν, ἵν' ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύ-
 νομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρες, τάληθη· ὅμως δὲ
 10 ῥήτεον. ὡς ἐπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἄπαντες
 οἱ παρόντες ἀν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὃν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποι-
 ἡκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

1. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H's conjecture *καὶ ἐλεγκτὸς* (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since *ἐλεγκτὸς* is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction'; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be *true*, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense.

12. ἐν δλίγῳ] H's conjecture *ἐν λόγῳ* is needless. For *ἐν δλίγῳ* means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time'; just like *ἐν βραχεῖ*, Symp. 217 a, *ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ*, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course *ἐν λόγῳ* occurs also, e. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between *κατ' δλίγον* and *κατὰ λόγον*, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ἵνα μοι — γένοιτο] 'With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.' A double meaning is wrapped up in *μοι*, —it is both 'by my agency' and 'for my satisfaction.' *καὶ* signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. *μαντεία* signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains

distinct from that of *μαντεῖον*, which was the *form of words* in which the oracle was given; *μαντεία* is the *meaning* of the *μαντεῖον*: a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb. and against Wolf, we must take this to mean 'those present at each several time,' and not 'the present audience.'

p. 22. τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἢ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει ε τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῷδοι· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵστασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὥν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τι μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα 5 ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἢ οὐκ ἡσαν. ἀπῆρα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, φῆπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν χειροτέχνας ἥα·¹⁰ d ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἥδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἡπίσταντο ἢ ἔγὼ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην καί μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἡσαν. ἀλλ', ω ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτόν¹⁵ μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὥπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἔκαστος ἥξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην ε τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερω-²⁰

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is ἀπέκρυπτεν. The editors have espoused ἀπέκρυπτεν, but such a text would not account for such a variant as ἀποκρύπτει in the best MSS. Ἀποκρύπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ-

The usage of the orators proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A. a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5. p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρόντων οὐν ἀν δικηρότερος . . . ἦν. Lysias uses in the same meaning, but without the same possibility of question, οἱ παραγένομενοι. The expressions used, whether for the audience or for the court, are different;

e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143, πολλοὶ τῶν περιεστάτων τούτων ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστανται, Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδὲν ἴμων τῶν καθημένων οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐπιτρέψειε.

16. ἔδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί. The force of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἔδοξε, 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are especially meant.

τᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἀν οὗτως p. 22. ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὡν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἀ-
ἐκεῦνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
5 τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, ὡν ἄνδρες
10 Αθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαὶ μοι γεγόνασι καὶ p. 23. οἵαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς δια-
βολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι,
τοσοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες
ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἀν ἄλλον ἔξελέγξω τὸ
δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὡν ἄνδρες, τῷ ὅντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἢ ἀνθρω-
πίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξίᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ
15 φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι
δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ b
ἀν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὡν ἀνθρωποι, σοφώτατός
ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἀξίος ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ

μάτευμαι, ἀπείρηκα, Phædo 99 d, ὁρῶ ib. 98 b); but points to ἀπο-
κρύπτειν, which is to be governed by ἔδοξε understood from ἔδοξαν
which gives also the best sense.

6. *ταυτησὶ*] The *-i* is not always strictly *δεικτικόν*. Lob. Path. Pars II. p. 230, “Sæpe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquuntur, quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos propo-
nunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et saepius etiam negligunt, si de presentibus.” Cf. *τοιτὶ*, 37 e. *ἔξετάσεως*] We cannot fol-
low Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading *ἔξεως*, which is the result
of an old contraction misread. 15. *τοῦτ' οἵ]* This conjecture
of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for *τοῦτον* of the MSS.

9. *ὄνομα δὲ—εἶναι*] Lit. ‘and
I am called by this name, that
I am wise.’ The subject of λέ-
γεσθαι is [ἐμέ], not *ὄνομα*. And
σοφὸς *εἶναι* is by attraction for
[τὸ] *εἶναι* με σοφόν.

11. *τὸ δὲ*] Accus. of pronoun
neuter, standing for the whole
sentence immediately follow-
ing: Dig. 19.

14. *καὶ οὐδενός* ‘or nothing’: the *καὶ* is disjunctive.

p. 23. μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ζῆτω καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ὃν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολὴ⁵ γέγονεν ἀξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ’ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

c. X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἔξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται· εἴτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἔξετάζειν· κάπειτα, οἴμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἔξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὄργιζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ¹⁵ ταῦτοις, καὶ λέγουσιν ως Σωκράτης τίς ἔστι μιαρώδης τατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις

and moreover gave a pretext for fastening on Socrates individually the imputation (previously only a class-imputation) of perverting the youth;

I. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔχω ἔτι, but in the hand of a restorer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἔχων as the reading. ἔχων would be redundant, like ἔχων φλυαρεῖς, &c.) 2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS. Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: cf. Dig. 237, and add Phædo 85 a, αὐτὴ ἡ τε ἀηδῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ δ ἔποψ. II. μιμοῦνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμούμενοι is a conjecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for abstaining from public life.

6. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ] Cf. Legg. 677 c, the beautiful expression μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, Rep. 520 c, μυρίῳ βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

II. καὶ αὐτοὶ—ἔξετάζειν] For-

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γένεσθαι, ως παιδῶν αὐτοῖς καταχρώνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἔξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ δόλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται] By practising upon each other.

αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾶ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι p. 23.
 μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν
 ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρό-
 χειρα ταῦτα λέγονται, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ-
 γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥπτω λόγον
 κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἀν ἐθέ-
 λοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιού-
 μενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ὅτε οὖν, οἶμαι,
 φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντε-
 το ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλή-
 κασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὅτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια-
 βάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ

and lastly,
in com-
bination

9. *ξυντεταγμένως*] So BSZ. H with two MSS. *ξυντεταμένως*.
 But *ξυντεταγμ.* means 'in set array' : cf. *Æschin.* ii. 74. p. 37,
 οἱ *ξυντεταγμένοι* ῥήτορες.

4. *ταῦτα*] Latin *ista*; idiomatically expressive of contempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand *ζητῶ* or the like, by comparison of 19 b.

12. *ἐκ τούτων*] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—'that I am now attacked by' &c. The meaning 'in consequence of' would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning 'upon the strength of' would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, *ἡ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ Μέλητος — ῥήτορων] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives,

and of the classes of persons called here *πολιτικοί* and *ῥήτορες*, see Introd. p. ii. note 1.

The *δημιουργοί* are here joined with the *πολιτικοί*, because Anytus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunction of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts (Xen. *Œcon.* iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of *σχολὴ* (Dig. ii. 31, *Æl. Var.* x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncommercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. iv.)

p. 23. *Αυντος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Αυντος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ*

p. 24. *τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ρήτορων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰς οὗτος τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν 5 οὗτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονοῦιαν. ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὡς ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδὲ ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω 10 οἱ καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα ἔστι. καὶ ἔαν τε νῦν ἔαν τε αὐθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.*

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοι μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἵκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς 15 πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὐθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὅντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐτὸν τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὥδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς 20 τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει εοὺς νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτον ἔστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἔγκλήματος

with the old general prejudice, had inspired the present prosecution.

Second part of Defence;—Justification of himself as against the counts of the indictment, separately:—

1. *ὑπὲρ*] We are to understand, not that the accusers were acting on behalf of their respective classes, but merely that they were to be regarded as representatives of the feelings of those bodies.

9. *τοῖς αὐτοῖς*] Lit. ‘through the same things:’ that is, in stating the facts I am virtually reiterating and attesting the

charges.

11. *ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ*] Emphasis is of course on *διαβολή*. ‘This is,’—i. e. ‘in this consists — the prejudice against me.’

16. *ἀγαθόν*] ‘Public benefactor.’

20. *ἔχει δέ πως ὥδε*] See Introd. p. vi.

a. Perversion of the youth.

ἐν ἔκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους p. 24.
ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται,
ράδιος εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγ-
μάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὃν
οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως
ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὡς Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι
ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d
ιο ἔσονται; "Εγωγε. "Ιθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐ-
τοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἰσθα, μέλον γέ
σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς,
ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελ-
τίους ποιοῦντα ἔθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἔστι.
15 ὄρᾶς, ὡς Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ
τοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ίκανὸν τεκμήριον
οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ,
ὡς γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. 'Αλλ' ε
οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὡς βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος,
20 ὅστις πρώτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.
Οὗτοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὡς

3. σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται] Oxy-
moron: 'is playing off a jest
under solemn forms.' The
machinery of the law, with all
its solemnity of circumstance
and all its serious consequences,
is set in motion by him for his
mere amusement. Cf. χαριεντί-
ζόμενος in the same sense 27
a, where it is explained by
παιζόντος.

8. Καί μοι κ.τ.λ.] The ex-
amination of Meletus by So-
crates, which now follows,

though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary ἐρώτησις, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. x.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citi-
zens,'—better toward others :
whereas βελτίους above means,
strictly speaking, better in
themselves.

p. 24. Μέλητε ; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οῖοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι ; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἄπαντες, ἢ

οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ οὐ ; "Απαντες. Εὑ γε νὴ τὴν

"Ηραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὡφελούν-

p. 25. των. τί δὲ δή ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι, 5
ἡ οὐ ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί ; Καὶ οἱ βου-

λευταί. 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ὡς Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 10

οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους ; ἢ

κάκενοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἄπαντες ; Κάκενοι. Πάν-

τες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι 15

πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὗτοι λέγεις ;

Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατ-

έγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ 20

ἡ ἵππους οὗτοι σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-

οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ 25

διαφθείρων ; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μέν τις ὁ

βελτίους οἵος τ' ὅν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοι·

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵππους, δια-

φθείρουσιν ; οὐχ οὗτοις ἔχει, ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ

ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄπαντων ζώων ; πάντως δή-

που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ "Ανυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε·

πολλὴ γὰρ ἀν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ

εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡφε-

λοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς Μέλητε, ἵκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι

ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς 25

ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέ-

ληκε περὶ ὅν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But the truth is,' as above 19 c, &c. Dig.

I 47.

26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Between ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a

play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant

2. the
stupidity
of it.

XIII. *Ἐτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ ὁ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, p. 25.*
πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἀμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ
πονηροῖς; ὁ τὰν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν
ἔρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς
ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὅντας, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;
Πάνυ γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυ-
νόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκρι-
ναι, ὁ γαθέ· καὶ γάρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἔσθ’ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε
το δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς
νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
Ἐκόντα ἐγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ
ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἰ τηλικούτου ὅντος τηλικόσδε ὡν,
ῶστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργά-
ζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγα-
θοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω,
ῶστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἔάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω
τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ’ αὐ-
τοῦ, ὕστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς
φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὁ Μέλητε,
οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ’ ἢ οὐ p. 26.
διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὕστε σύ γε κατ’
ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιού-
των καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσά-
γειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἵδια λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν.

recurrence of the juxtaposition ; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. *εἰπὲ — Μέλητε*] The address *ὁ Μέλητε* has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of *εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς* with it : Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c, τι

οἵει, *ὁ πρὸς Διός*, *ἢν δὲ ἐγώ*, and 26 e below.

8. *ὁ νόμος*] See note, 24 c.

13. *τηλικόσδε*] Meletus was a very young man : cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 e extr.—Stallb.

p. 26. δῆλον γάρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἔνγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷς νόμος ἔστιν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν ἢ δῆλον ἥδη ἔστιν, ὃ ἔγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγει ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὃ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἔγραψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις οἱ νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὃ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἔγὼ γάρ οὐ δύναμαι ₁₅ μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὖσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἔτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἔτέρους ἢ παντάπασί με ₂₀ φῆς οὕτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις

2. ἔφυγες] ‘Didst decline.’ Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, κάξελαύνειν χρή τὸ λοιπόν, κάν φύγη τις ζημιοῦν. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφεύγειν. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἔφυγες and οὐκ ἡθελεῖν a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὕτε — σμικρὸν] Accus. cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not

nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. ὃν νῦν] ‘Whom the argument at present concerns:’ equivalent to οὓς λέγομεν as distinguished from περὶ ὃν λέγομεν. — Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὐ τ’ ἔστι καὶ ὅτου [ὅ λόγος], Legg. 678 a, πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας πέρι καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, . . . μνήμην εἶναι.

b. Disbelief of established gods, and setting forth of strange spiritual agencies— answered by reducing Meletus to a contradiction.

θεούς. ³Ω θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ὥντα τι ταῦτα λέγεις; p. 26.
οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥστε^d
περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποι; Μὰ Δῖ, ὃ ἀνδρες δικασταί,
ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην
γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἵει κατηγορεῖν, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε,
καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἵει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους
γραμμάτων ἔιναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξα-
γόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν
λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθά-
νουσιν, ἀ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ε

3. Μὰ Δῖ] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. Ἀναξαγόρου] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι. Anaxagoras' formula was μύδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκήσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Laert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpp. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον ἔξεδωκε συγγραφῆς, librum a se scriptum edidit. Hoc tamen de Anaximandro alii, alii de Pherecyde Syro dicunt."—Forst.

9. καὶ δὴ καὶ] Ironical : 'and so then.'

10. ἀ—πριαμένους] The doctrines, not the books. ἐνίοτε· that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλοιμ τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τετα-

μέναν αἰωρήμαστι πέτραν ἀλύσεσι χρυσέασι, φερομέναν δίνασι, βῶλον ἔξ ολύμπου. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i. e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeck's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ] 'At the most : the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἀξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, ἐὰν πάμπολυ, . . . δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο. The ut-

p. 26. ἐκ τῆς ὄρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιήται ἔαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς Διός, οὔτωσί σοι δοκῶ, οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἀπιστός γ' εἰ, ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ

p. 27. καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ

4. *νομίζειν*] Oxon. alone has *νομίζω*, which, though anacoluthic after *δοκῶ*, has a vividness of its own, and certainly points to the right way of understanding the sentence as an instance of binary structure: see Commentary. But we cannot claim acceptance for *νομίζω* with such preponderating authority in favour of *νομίζειν*.

most the *θεατρώντος* could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeck, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. *ἄλλως τε καὶ*] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of *ἄτοπα* is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar'; etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he

would uphold the gods.

3. *οὔτωσί—εἶναι*] The two sentences *οὔτωσί σοι δοκῶ* and *οὐδένα—εἶναι* are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; *οὔτωσί σοι δοκῶ* stands by a sort of attraction for *οὔτωσί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ*, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been *ἐμὲ οὐδένα—εἶναι*. Dig. 207, 208.

5. *Ἀπιστός κ.τ.λ.*] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—*οὔτωσί σοι δοκῶ*; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.

ωσπερ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμενῷ, ἀρα γνώσε- p. 27.
 ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζόμενον καὶ
 ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί-
 νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ,
 ωσπερ ἀν εἰ εἴποι ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νο-
 μίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἐστι
 παιζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ω ἄνδρες, ἣ μοι φαί-
 νεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ω Μέλητε·
 ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνη- b
 σθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς
 λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ω Μέλητε,
 ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα ἐίναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ
 15 οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ω ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ
 ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει
 είναι, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει,
 αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ω ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν
 εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένῳ] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ωσπερ —ξυντιθ.) within another (διαπειρ.) ; as Rep. 555 e, τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνέντεις ἀργύριον τιτράσκοντες. Notice, that it is ωσπερ αἴνιγμα, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of men-

tioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες, Phdr. 235 a, ως οὗτος τε ὁν, ταῦτα ἔτέρως τε καὶ ἔτέρως λέγων, ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα, 271 d, ἔστιν οὐν εἴδη τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, Legg. 721 b, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ, Phileb. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐθίς τε καὶ αὐθίς.

16. θορυβείτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering ;—brawling, as we might say.

π. 27. ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι· εἴσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαιμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. 'Ως ὡνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φήσ με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καὶνὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαιμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ εἴστιν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαιμονας οὐχὶ ἥτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆσ ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαιμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φήσ, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαιμονες, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη ὁ ἔγω φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαιμονας ἡγοῦμαι εἰ δ' αὐτὸν οἱ δαιμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων, ὃν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἀν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῦτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀν ἄτοπον εἴη, εἴσπερ ἀν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῦτο ἢ καὶ ὅνων

6. δαιμόνια γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμόνια καὶνὰ was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here

the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 c. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἔγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀνταμοσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐξ τινων ἄλλων ὅν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ὅν τινων.

[τοὺς ἡμίονους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῦτο εἶναι. p. 27.
 ἀλλ', ὡς Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ
 ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύ-
 την] ἡ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα.
 5 ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἀν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν
 ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ως οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ
 δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε
 δαιμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή p. 28.
 ἔστιν.

Third part 10 of Defence;
 —Justifi-
 cation of
 the pursuit
 in which
 his life had
 been spent,
 viz., that
 of a moral
 reformer,
 interwoven
 with no-
 tices of
 the reform-
 atory doc-
 trine itself.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ως μὲν
 ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς
 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ίκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέ-
 χθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι ἀληθές
 15 ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρῇ, οὐ
 Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή
 τε καὶ φθόνος. ἀ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγα-
 θοὺς ἄνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ b
 δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ. ἵσως δὲ ἀν ὄννι εἴποι τις·

6. *πείθοις ἀν ως οὐ*] The *οὐ* is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the coming negative *οὐδεμία*. Dig. 264.

18. *οὐδὲν—στῆ*] ‘The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.’ This use of *οὐδὲν δεινὸν* is idiomatic: cf. Gorg. 520 d, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μὴ ἀδικηθῆ*, ‘we need not apprehend for him any injury,’ Phædo 84 b, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ*, ‘we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.’ The ‘apprehension’ is

supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself. *στῆ* is also idiomatically used, as a quasi-impersonal;—that is, a vague nominative, such as ‘the course of events,’ is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix, *στῆσται γὰρ κάκει*. *στῆ* is literally ‘come to a stand-still.’ Stallb. is wrong here.

p. 28. ἐπ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἀν δίκαιου λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὡς ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός 5 ἔστι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκέινο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ εἴργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γάρ ἀν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἴεν τῶν ήμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νίος, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κιν- 10 δύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμούμενῷ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὐτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ- μαι: ὡς παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐ- 15 τίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὃ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὡλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὡν- 20 δ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ὥνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω κατα- 25 γέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γάρ ἔχει, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐδὲν τις ἔαυτὸν τάξην ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρ- χοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα 25

a. That first and foremost it was undertaken in obedience to the already mentioned divine call, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences or counter-inducements

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι.] See below, d note.

5. ὅτον τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of *καὶ* with *σμικρὸν τι* is frequent: Dig. 132.

10. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same

illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. Il. xviii. 90.

23. οὐδὲν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former *ἢ* in this sentence is hyperbolically postponed to *ἔαυτὸν τάξην*, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.

κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.
ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἀν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὁ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, ε
5 οὐσ ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὖν ἔκεινοι ἔτα-
τον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον
ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε
καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετά-
10 ζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς p. 29.

ἡ θάνατον ἡ ἄλλο διοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.
δεινὸν μέντ’ ἀν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ’ ἀν με δικαίως
εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι
ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιώς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος
15 σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὡν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὁ
ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ
δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἀ οὐκ οἰδεν. οἰδε
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδὲ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι
20 δὲ ὡς εὐ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ b
τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] ‘Giving any countervailing weight to ;’ literally, ‘reckoning per contra.’ The ὑπὸ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτιδαίᾳ—Δηλίῳ] At Potidaea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of

bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάττοντος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastic; but ‘what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance ?’ τοῦ οἰεσθαι which follows is a genitive exegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.

p. 29. τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἀ οὐκ οἰδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἵσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἴ δή τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἴκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν⁵ τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αὐστρόν ἔστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὃν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἔστω, ἀ μὴ οἶδα εἴ ἀγαθὰ ὅντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδὲ εἴ με εἰ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἡ τὴν ^{io} or human ^{inhibi-} ^{tion} ;— ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἴ διαφευξοίμην, ἥδη ἀν ὑμῶν οἱ νίεῖς

2. τούτῳ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter *τούτῳ* both relate to the same fact, to the same *ὅτι*,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 ε, *λαμπτός τ' ἔστιν ἔκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καπὶ τούτῳ ἐπειγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος, Ἡν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ἄν*. The suppression after *τούτῳ ἄν* is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death.

It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (*ὅς ἔφη—ἀποκτεῖναι με*), but with those next to them (*λέγων—διαφθαρήσονται*). Stallb. differs.

13. *ἥδη ἄν*] The construction of the fut. indic. with *ἄν* is abundantly established. *ἄν* here belongs to *διαφθαρήσονται*, and to refer it to the part. *ἐπιτηδεύοντες* is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to *διαφθαρήσονται* itself, that its not being affected by the *Oratio Obliqua* is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that *διαφευξοίμην* denotes an event equally in the future. But

ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντά- p. 29.
 πασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε ὁ
 Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφί-
 εμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ
 5 τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀλῶς
 ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, δ
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμι ἀν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὁ
 ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἔωσπερ ἀν ἐμπνέω καὶ
 10 οἵος τε ὁ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἀν ἀεὶ¹
 ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἴαπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι ὁ ἄριστε
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὁν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ
 15 εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν
 οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλει-
 στα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀλη-
 θείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ
 ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισ-
 βητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν
 20 οὐδὲ ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἔξετάσω καὶ
 ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' ὧτε . . . φιλοσοφεῖν.] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] “Ασπά-
 ζεσθαι est aliquem salutare ita,
 ut eum amplectaris; φιλεῖν
 ita, ut eum osculeris.”—Stallb.
 Here of course both words are
 used, by transference, for the
 feelings which those actions
 betoken. Note too, that the

transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀσπάζομαι: their co-ordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πείσομαι—ιμῶν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

14. ἰσχύν] Stallb., after Fischer, “de animi magnitudine et fortitudine.”

ρ. 30. δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἀν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μον ἐγγυτέρῳ ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὐ⁵ ἔστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδέν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ πειρέρχομαι ἡ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων
b ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω¹⁰ σφόδρα ώς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ώς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων δια- φθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ’ ἀν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ¹⁵ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ ταῦτα, οὐδέν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἀν, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἡ μή, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἡ μὴ ἀφίετε, ώς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀν ποιήσοντος
c ἄλλα, οὐδὲ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ’²⁰ b. That it
ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς
ἀν λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ώς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὄν-
στεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῦν
καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ’ οἷς ἵστως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς
ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὐ²⁵ γὰρ ἔστε, εὖν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοι-
οῦτον ὅντα, οἶον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε

That it
was of vital
use to his
country-
men,—a
divine
blessing
to them,

15. ταῦτ’ ἀν εἴη] ‘If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.’ The *ταῦτα* is not identical with the *ταῦτα* of the line before, but is more com-

prehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase *ταῦτα λέγων*, and means ‘this practice of mine.’

24. βοήσεσθε] A stronger expression of feeling than *θορυβεῖν*.

ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀν βλάψειεν p. 30.
οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν δύναυτο· d
οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεί-
ρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μέντ' ἀν ἵσως ἡ ἔξε-
5 λάσειεν ἡ ἀτιμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐτος ἵσως οἴεται
καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οἴομαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἀ οὐτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὡς ἄνδρες
10 Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο-
γεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἀν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι
ἔξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ρᾳδίως ε
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον
εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡσπερ
15 ὑππω μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναιῷ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθε-
στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος·
οἶν δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι
τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνει-
δίζων ἔνα ἔκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ήμέραν ὅλην p. 31.
20 πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ρᾳ-
δίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πεί-
θησθε, φείσεσθέ μον· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἵσως τάχ' ἀν ἀχθό-
μενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

5. ἀτιμάσειεν] H substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειεν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάξω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἀτιμός, while ἀτιμός is to make ἀτιμός, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἡτι-
μάσθω πάσας. 23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of H occurs here,—δρούσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον refers, not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμενον—θεοῦ, but to the simile

which follows them.

23. κρούσαντες] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύωψ.

p. 31. ἀν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ρᾳδίως ἀν ἀποκτείναιτε, ἐᾶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἀν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡν τοιοῦτος, οὗτος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἀν κατανοήσαιτε⁵ οὐ γάρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἥδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ιδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ¹⁰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἰχον ἀν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὄρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τάλλα πάντα ἀπαντχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί εἰ τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαντχύντησαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα,¹⁵ ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἥτησα. ικανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀληθῆ ὡς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. *"Ισως ἀν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ*

κρούσαντες is ‘debile pulsandi verbum.’ Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. *καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι]* H drops the *τοι*, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatical for *καὶ μέντοι εἰ τι*. Cf. 41 e.

14. *οὐχ οἷοί τε]* They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence *ἀπαντχύντησαι* — *μάρτυρα* lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb *ἀπαντχύντησαι*. See Dig. 303.

19. *"Ισως ἀν οὖν]* The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a

as its singularity alone might suffice to shew.

c. (In answer to a

supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

έγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυ- p. 31.
 πραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβάνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἔστιν ὁ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ-
 5 λαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνε- d
 ται φωνή, ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλη-
 τος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-
 νον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀπο-
 τρέπει με τοῦτο ὁ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ
 10 οὐποτε· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἔστε, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπε-
 χείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὕτ' ἀν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὕτ' ἀν ε
 15 ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθή· οὐ

5. γίγνεται φωνή] All MSS. have this φωνή, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη.

9. τοῦτο ὁ ἀν] Edd. prefer τούτου. But ἀποτρέπει πράττειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theat. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποτρέπει ξυνέναι, [Dem.] Procem. xx. p. 1431, δεῖξας ἡ τότε ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταῦτὰ παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια κατέχουσιν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τούτου. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μή μοι, comparing Phædo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Pnyx; as in the famous πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἄνω καθῆτο, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.

5. θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

6. ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] When he

spoke of the ἔτερα κανὰ δαιμόνια,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικωμῳδῶν, which seems to mean ‘selecting for caricature.’ So σκώπτειν is to mock at, ἐπισκώπτειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.

ρ. 31. γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὕτε ὑμῖν οὕτε
ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δια-

ρ. 32. κωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει
γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι τὸν τῷ ὅντι μαχού-
μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον
σωθήσεσθαι, ἴδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δὲ ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι
τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμῆτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-
σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ὃντες ὅτι οὐδὲ
ἄν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, ¹⁰
μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἄμα κανὸν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορ-
τικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἔγὼ γάρ, ὡς Ἀθη-

as experience on
two occasions of
his life had
shewn him.

11. ἄμα κανὸν] This is Ast's conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided between ἄμα καὶ ἄμα ἀν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἄμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην, and ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄμ' ἀν ἀπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἄμα καὶ ἄμ' ἀν, B ἄμ' ἀν ἀπολοίμην, H ἄμ' ἀν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἄμα καὶ ἄμα. The variants may easily have come from ἄμα καν, in the form ἄμα καὶ ἀν. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἀλλα καὶ ἀλλ' ἀν ἀπ., 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph. O. T. 661, ὃ τι πύματον δοίμαν.

12. δικανικά] Η conjecturally prefixes οὐ, observing "quis credit, Socratem, qui statim a principio se ἔνεινται ἔχειν τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia verba promittere?" But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not δικανικά; Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 a, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ὃ—ἔργα] 'What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life.' ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when acting as judges in the Ecclesia, or the Heliæa,—'you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.'

Here appears, in a refined form, the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's past services in his defence; of which

practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει εἰθισμένον ἔστι, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν . . . ὡς στρατιῶται ἀγαθοὶ εἰσι κ.τ.λ. Whence again Socrates says just below, he is 'about to employ a topic of vulgar use, and one that savours of the law-courts.'

11. μὴ ὑπείκων δέ] 'But would be ready to perish at once as the price of not yielding.'

φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά] φορτικὰ

ναιοι, ἀλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἥρξα ἐν τῇ p. 32.
 πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀν-
 τιοχὶς πρυτανεύοντα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τὸν δέκα στρατηγὸν
 τὸν οὐκ ἀνελομένους τὸν ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβού-
 λεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ
 χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ’ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυ-
 τάνεων ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν

7. ὑμῖν is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with all the edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS.: although ἡναντιώσθαι does not require a dative of reference, especially in a description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,'—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐρῶ ὑμῖν sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικανικά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 e, *εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικὰ, . . . ἀφύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ, δικανικὰ* is likewise a colourless word;—not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsichtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. *τὸν δέκα*] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννέα στρατηγούς.

5. *παρανόμως*, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἀθροοι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.

vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannonus); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχέα ἔκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γάρ προύτεθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον· and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἡναντιώθην . . . ἡναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἡναντιώθην a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἡναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλεύεται γάρ ποτε, . . . ἐπιστάτης ἐν

ρ. 32. *νόμους καὶ ἐναντίᾳ ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὅντων*

τῷ δῆμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μιᾶς ψήφῳ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἡθελησεν ἐπιψηφίσαις, δρυγιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων.

(b) Ib. IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δῆμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἐναντιώθη τοιάτη δρμῇ τοῦ δήμου κ.τ.λ.

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9-15, ἐντεῦθεν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήγεγε τὴν ἐναντίην γνώμην, Καλλιξένου εἰπόντος, τῆμδε . . . τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων τινῶν οὐ φασκόντων προθήσειν τὴν διαψήφισιν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, αὐθις Καλλιξένος ἀναβὰς κατηγόρει αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτά, οἱ δὲ ἐβώντες καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας, οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ώμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν, πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὐτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ νόμον ποιήσειν.

(d) Axioc. 368 d. . . . οἱ πρώην δέκα στρατηγοὶ· ὅτι ἐγώ μὲν οὐκ ἐπηρόμην τὴν γνώμην· οὐ γάρ ἐφαίνετο μοι σεμνὸν μαινομένῳ δῆμῳ συνεξάρχειν· οἱ δὲ περὶ Θηραμένουν καὶ Καλλιξένουν τῇ ὑστεραὶ προέδρους ἐγκαθέτους ὑφέντες κατεχειροτόνησαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄκριτον θάνατον. The word ἐγκάθετοι is explained by Aesch. iii. 3. p. 54; καὶ ταῦτα ἔτεροι τινες τὰ ψηφίσματα ἐπιψηφίζουσιν, οὐν ἐκ τοῦ δικαιοτάτου τρόπου λαχόντες προεδρεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ παρασκευῆς καθεξόμενοι.

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πέρουσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. For this, as Luzac aptly remarks, is the

historical fact before us disguised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The reference of ἐναντιώθην must therefore be to Socrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντίᾳ ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἐναντιώθην, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων· the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Socrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν p. 32.

προβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡναυτιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make *μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων* flat, since the *πρυτάνεις* had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the *προβούλευμα* being read out by the *κῆρυξ*, it was handed to the proedri, who with the nomothetae had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the proedri and nomothetae. The *hysteron proteron* is on Greek principles natural: ἡναυτιώθην—*νόμος* precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Aeschines, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἀναστὰς ἐκ τῶν προέδρων Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπιψηφιεῖν· βοώντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τοὺς προέδρους ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα κατ' ὄνομα καλούντων,

οὗτος ἀκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows:—1. The *προβούλευμα* was handed to the proedri, who after conferring with the nomothetae pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the *κῆρυξ*. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an *ἰνωμοσία* in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to *ἐνδειξις* if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the proedri (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Aesch. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν] 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of *ἐνδειξις* and *ἀπαγωγὴ* are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timoer. 146. p. 745, Lept. 156. p. 594, Antiphon v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the *βουλευτικὸς ὄρκος* as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heffter's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). *Ἐνδειξις* might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent

p. 32. κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ
 ἐδικαίου ὥμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ'
 ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα
 δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρα-
 τουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο,⁵
 οἱ τριάκοντα αὖτις μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν
 εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος
 Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ
 ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλό-
 μενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι το
 δ ἔγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖτις ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ

instance) against any prytanis or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timoer. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἔνδειξις, which ἔνδειξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The thesmothetae had exclusive cognisance of ἔνδειξις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἔνδειξις, on which some writers rely,—that it was δομολογουμένου ἀδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεομένου,—is called by Heffter ‘a mere jingle of words.’ Ἀπαγωγὴ was of wider application than ἔνδειξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἔνδειξις was not the rule.

ἔνδειξις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγὴ a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐπ' αὐτοφάρῳ, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγὴ was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. θόλον] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἀναπλῆσαι] This word, like implere in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here ‘implicate.’ See for example Phædo 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antiphon, ii. A. a. 10. p. 116, συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ p. 32. ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδὲ ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔξεπληξεν οὕτως ἵσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἔξηλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὥχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἥγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥχόμην ἀπίστων οὔκαδε. καὶ ἵσως ἀν διὰ ταῦτ’ ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ ε τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

d. (In answer to a supposed objection) that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompromising adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth,

10. **XXI.** ⁹Αρ’ οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δέ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων 15 οὐδείς. ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἰ p. 33. πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ίδιᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντές με φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ 20 διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ’ ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἔμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. *ὑμῖν*] So MSS. and edd. generally. *ὑμῶν* is a conjecture of H.

9. *μάρτυρες*] The *μαρτυρίαι* are supposed to follow here. Introd. p. x.

20. *διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς*] He means (see b below) that he imparted no *μάθημα*,—no professional knowledge; even of *καλοκαγαθία* he never *ὑπέσχετο* *διδάσκαλος εἶναι* Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining *ἐπιμε-*

λεῖσθαι

Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; "not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but test theirs."—Zeller.

p. 33. διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὗ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίω καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὃν ἀν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἀν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὃν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην⁵ μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἴδιᾳ ὃ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσι¹⁰ οι τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἄν-¹⁰ δρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἔξεταξομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὗ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἔξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ¹⁵ παντὶ τρόπῳ, φέρε τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτιον προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστιν καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ δὴ ἐγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι²⁰ γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῦν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ'²⁵

—a suspicion which was also refuted independently.

11. εἶπον.] So Stallbaum, rightly. εἶπον, Hermann. See Commentary.

2. καὶ ἐάν τις] This is a soft way of saying, ‘And I am ready to question him, if he chooses.’

12. ὅτι ἀκούοντες] Stallb. rightly joins this with ἀλλὰ διὰ τι—διατρίβοντες; the ἀκηκόατε—εἶπον.

being interjected. Then ὅτι is ‘because.’ See the examples which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphro 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.

έμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμ- p. 33.
 νῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν
 πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὄρῳ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων
 οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου ε
 5 τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου
 τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὐτοσί,
 Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὃν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ
 ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεο-
 ζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος

2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them *there*, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's *Jul. Cæs.* Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in Xen. Mem. I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in Athen. V. 220 a, with Æschines, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see Diog. Laert. II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.). He was at variance with Aristippus (Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socratics: he is of the company named in the Phædo (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned Xen. Mem. III. xii. 1, and Phædo 59 b: his father Antiphon is not otherwise known. Demo-

docs, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, εἴη δὲ ἀν καὶ δ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς οἶος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἀλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφίᾳ ἀπέργοντα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the Rep. (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the Phædo (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the Symp. says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελές πεποίημαι ἔκαστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι δ τι ἀν λέγη ἡ πράτη, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Æantodorus are only mentioned here.

ρ. 33. τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀν ἐκεῦνός γε αὐτοῦ κατα-
 ρ. 34. δεηθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν
 Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,
 οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὗτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ
 Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς 5
 ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὡν τινὰ ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν
 τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·
 εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
 χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου
 πᾶν τούναντίον εύρήσετε, ὡν ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ¹⁰
 βοηθεῖν ἔτοιμος τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζο-
 b μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασι Μέλητος καὶ
 Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἀν
 λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-
 βύτεροι ἥδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα¹⁵
 ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἡ τὸν
 ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευ-
 δομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἰεν δή, ὡν ἄνδρες· ἀ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ²⁰ το
 ἀν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσως²⁰ Conclu-
 c e τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἀν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀνα-
 μησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἴ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ
 ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ίκέτευσε
 τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε
 αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὁ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη,²⁵
 καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ

for
not en-
treating
the mercy
of the
court.

ι. καταδεηθείη] The κατα-
 implies absence of all reserve
 or modification: here in a bad
 sense it expresses an unprin-
 cipled act. Dig. 122.

8. ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] The full
 expression occurs *Æschin.* iii.
 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ

βῆματος, ἔως ἀν εἴπης. Note by
 the way, that the examination
 of witnesses was extra to the
 time allowed for the pleadings;
 cf. *Lysias* xxiii. 4, 8, pp. 166,
 167, καὶ μοι ἐπίλαβε τὸ ὕδωρ.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄρα] 'And then
 finds that I.'

οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 34.
 ὡς ἀν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις
 ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἀν πρός με σχοίη,
 καὶ ὄργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἀν μετ' ὄργης
 5 τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὔτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ d
 μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἀν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς
 τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὡς ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μέν
 πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ
 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἔγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-
 10 φυκα, ἀλλ' ἔξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοί εἰσι
 καὶ νίεῖς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρέις, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον
 ηδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο
 ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψῆφίσασθαι. τί
 δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, e
 15 ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
 θαρραλέως ἔγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἀλλος
 λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη
 τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν
 ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα,
 20 εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον
 γέ ἐστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZH τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὡς ἀν δόξαιμι] Refers to κίνδυνον, not to ἔσχατον—‘danger, as *he* would think it.’

5. οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἰ—[‘I say *if*,] for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition,] *if* it should be so.’

6. ἐπιεικῆ] ‘Conciliatory.’

9. ‘Ομήρου] Odyss. xix. 163.

11. εἰς μὲν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). δύο· Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Phædo 116 b).

15. εἰ μὲν] ‘Whether I can look death in the face or not.’—Whewell.

19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφός· cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε κ.τ.λ.

ρ. 35. ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ γήτιαιοῦ ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἀν εἴη οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἔώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζόμενους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους 5 πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἀν τινα καὶ b τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἔαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ 10 ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὕτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι, οὕτ', ἀν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψή- 15

against both this and *τὸν Σωκράτη* stands the consideration, that the meaning would be ‘people have made up their minds that Socrates *is to differ*;’ it is the form of a resolution which *is to take effect*; whereas the meaning required is ‘they have made up their minds that Socrates *differs*’ now. *τῷ Σωκράτει* leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρείᾳ] Oxon. here has ἀνδρίᾳ, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρείᾳ alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diæresis ἀνδρηῖ· (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Herc. F. 475, πατήρ ἐπύργου, μέγα φρονῶν ἐπ’ ἀνδρίᾳ, which Elmsley has emended εὐανδρίᾳ); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρείᾳ till Apollonius invented ἀνδρία· (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρείᾳ. 3. οὕτε ὑμᾶς] VH ὑμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἡμᾶς. H says “ὑμᾶς commodum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberit velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere.”

3. ἔσονται] ‘If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,’ &c. *εἰεν* would have given a different turn to the meaning.

φιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος p. 35.
καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἡ τοῦ ἡσυ-
χίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὡς ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ
5 δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ σ
δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ κατα-
χαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα·
καὶ ὄμωμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἀν δοκῆ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ
10 δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκονν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς
ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῦν, οὔθ’ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέ-
τεροι γὰρ ἀν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με,
ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν,
ἀ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,
15 ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύ- d
γοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτοῦ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἀν, εἰ
πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμην ὄμωμοκότας,
θεοὺς ἀν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ
ἀτέχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἀν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς

9. ὄμωμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἡ μὴν ὄμοίως ἀκροάσεσθαι τῶν κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων Isocr. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαριεῖσθαι] 'That he will favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated,' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἄλλως—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable

hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νὴ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phaedo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλως τε πάντως νὴ Δία μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.

p. 35. θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὗτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εῖναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

e ΞXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ φίμην ἔγωγε οὗτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὶ τριάκοντα

B. The Counter-assessment of the Penalty.

12. *τριάκοντα*] So ZH; *τρεῖς* VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has *τριάκοντα* which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ὑμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' *ἀντιτίμησις*, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οὐκ—τοῦτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the

point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι] οὐκ, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὗτω παρ' ὀλίγον] Hyperbolical for *παρ'* οὗτως ὀλίγον. Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i. e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. *τριάκοντα*] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. iv.

μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ- p. 36.
 λητον μὲν οὖν, ως ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα,
 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό⁵
 γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη ⁷Ανυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορή-
 σοντες ἐμοῦ, καν ωφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλα- b
 βῶν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

a. Proposal
on the
footing of
full justice,
—ironical.

XXVI. Τιμάται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.
 εἰεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὡς ἄνδρες
 'Αθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίος
 εἴμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ
 ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί,
 χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ
 δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν

The implication in *μόναι* that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of *τριάκοντα* into *τρεῖς*. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, *πεντήκοντα* is a necessary emendation for *πέντε*. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. *ἀποπέφευγα*] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i. e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. ii.

6. *τὸ πέμπτον μ.*] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. *παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι*] A technical legal expression; *ἀποτίσαι* applies to a pecuniary penalty, *παθεῖν* to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἄν καταγνῷ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὅτου ἄν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι (part of the νόμος ὑβρεῶς), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ὅ τι μαθὼν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' *ἐν* is not 'during.'

13. *ἄλλων*] Here is the idiomatic use of *ἄλλος* for 'besides': Dig. 46. *ἄλλων* agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ξυνωμοσιῶν] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.

p. 36. καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησά-
ε μενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὅντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἡ ὥστε
εἰς ταῦτ' ιόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἥα, οἱ
ἐπλθῶν μήτε ὑμῶν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος
εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστον ἵων εὐεργετεῖν τὴν 5
μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἥα,
ἐπιχειρῶν ἔκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε
τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
μεληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος
ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πό- 10
λεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
d ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιωτος ὡν;
ἀγαθόν τι, ω ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτα γε ἀγαθὸν
τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἀν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρὶ 15
πένητι εὐεργέτη, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
τέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ω ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἡ εἰ τις ὑμῶν
ἴππῳ ἡ ἔνωνταί δι οὐγει νενίκηκεν Ὁλυμπίασιν. 20

5. ἐπὶ δε—εὐεργεσίαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐνταῦθα, and governed by ἥα: and the ἵων with εὐεργετεῖν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἵων would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστον ἐμελλον ἵων εὐεργετεῖν, i.e. οἱ δὲ ἵων ἐμελλον ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστον εὐεργ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'

16. εὐεργέτη] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys.

xx. 19. p. 159. Add Dem. F. L. 330. p. 446, τί δέ; δοίητ' ἀν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν ἡ ἄλλην τινὰ δωρεάν, αἰς τιμᾶτε τοὺς εὐ-εργέτας;

17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὕτως. Dig. 164.

20. οὐγει] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τρῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτασσον.

ο μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ p. 36. δὲ εἶναι· καὶ οὐ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ ε δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τι- p. 37. μᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

b. Compromise,—
ironical
also.

5 ΧΧVII. "Ισως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ω 'Αθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς 10 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· δὲ λίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα· ἐπεί, ως ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν 15 μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἀν· νῦν δὲ οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ δὲ λίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύτειαι. πεπεισμένος δὲ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ 20 δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ως ἀξιός εἰμι του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ, τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμάται, ὁ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ 25 ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὲ ἔλωμαι ὅν εὖ οἴδ' ὅτι κακῶν δύτων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, σ 30 δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἐως ἀν ἔκτισω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις] The Lacedæmonians, for instance.

See Thucyd. i. 132.

21. ὅν—δύτων] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of *knowing*, &c.: Dig. 26.

The clause however is complicated by the presence of *ὅτι*, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a

finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.

23. τοῖς ἔνδεκα] εἰς ἀφ' ἔκάστης φυλῆς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ γραμματεὺς ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συνηριθμέτο. Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.

p. 37. *ταῦτόν μοί ἔστι, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅπόθεν ἔκτισω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἵσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἴμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὅντες πολιταὶ μου οὐχ οἵοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῦν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόναστι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζῆτεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουστι ράδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὥστε Αθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος· εἰη ἔξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλην ἔξι ἀλλησ πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἔξελαννομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροασονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· καν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἔξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς· πρεσβυτέρους· ἐάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.*

XXVIII. *"Ισως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὥστε Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶος τ' ἔστι ημῖν ἔξελθών ζῆν; τουτὶ δή ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαι τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν*

p. 38. *ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε*

20. *τουτὶ*] Cf. textual note on *ταυτησί*, 22 e.

2. *ἀλλὰ δὴ*] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions.

Dig. 142.

9. *ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα*] Ironical.

11. *ἔξελθόντι*] 'If I quit the city:' as below e, *ἔξελθών ζῆν*.

20. *τουτὶ*] Namely, *ὅτι οὐχ οἶος τε ἔσομαι*.

διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαντὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ p. 38.
δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'

1. ὁ ἀνεξέταστος — ἀνθρώπῳ]
The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν*. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:—

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—δέ ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκέψαμενος ὅπουσός τις ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 e, διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον βεβίωκεν and below 39 c, διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου.

(3) examination of one's opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite: Alc. I. 133 c, ἀρ' οὐν

μὴ γεγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . δυναίμεθ' ἀν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἀγαθά,);—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16; περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων δεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τι εὐσεβέας, τι ἀσεβέας, τι καλόν, τι αἰσχρόν, τι δίκαιον, τι ἄδικον, τι σωφροσύνη, τι μανία, τι ἀνδρεία, τι δειλία, τι πόλις, τι πολιτικός, τι ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τι ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγείτο καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἀν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι and here (just above) τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρέτης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, Laches 188 b, ἀξιοῦντα μανθάνειν ἔωστερ ἀν ζῆ), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensableness of this discipline:—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν, καὶ ἀ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι γεγνώσκειν, ἔγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι, Soph. 230 d, τὸν δ' ἀνέλεγκτον αὐτὸν νομιστέον, ἀν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὃν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν κ.τ.λ., Hip. Ma. 304 e, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν καὶ ὅποτε οὔτω διάκεισαι, οἵτι σοι

p. 38. ἔτι ἡττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὐτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὡς ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμ’ οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην
b ἀν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀν 5
ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἀν
ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτον βούλεσθέ μοι τιμή-
σαι. ἵσως δ’ ἀν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀρ-
γυρίου· τοσούτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὡς
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ 10
Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύοντο με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμή-
σασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐγγνᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου,
c ἐγγυηταὶ δ’ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιό-
χρεω.

κρεῖττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνά-
ναι; and in the passage be-
fore us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμ’] A supplementary reason;—'Were silence possible, it would be no less a *κακόν* which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. οὐν δὲ οὐ γὰρ] This combination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy-

pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The δὲ and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor aposiopesis. Dig. 149.

12. ἐγγνᾶσθαι] Governed by an equivalent of 'they say' contained in *κελεύοντο*. Cf. Symp. 213 a, πάντας οὖν . . . κελεύεν εἰσιέναι καὶ καταλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν. Dig. 245.

13. ἀξιόχρεω.] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final verdict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be concluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges

C. Last
reflections,
addressed
to the
judges :
a. to those
who had
voted for
his con-
demnation;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὡς ἄνδρες p. 38.
'Αθηναῖοι, ὅνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-
μένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε,
ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ
5 καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ δὲ
περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἀν
ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρâτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι
πόρρω ἥδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω
δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ d
ιοκαταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς
τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἵσως με οἴεσθε, ὡς ἄνδρες,
ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἀν ὑμᾶς
15 ἔπεισα, εἰ φίμην δεῖν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε
ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ
μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναι-
σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα,
οἵ ἀν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ
οδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ e
καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε
20 ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φίθην

who choose to remain and hear
him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See Introd. p. vii.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνον] Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. 'It was but

a brief space after all, by fore-stalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.' *ἔνεκα* marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not 'you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,'—but 'a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.' The 'brief space,' accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.

p. 38. δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὔτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ

πολὺ μᾶλλον αἴρομαι ὡδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἡ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ'

p. 39. ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως 5
ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς

μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν
ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ' ἵκετείαν τρα-

πόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ
εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν 10
θάνατον, ἔάν τις τολμᾶ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ

μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἡ χαλεπόν, ὡς ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν,
ἄλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάττον γὰρ θα-

βνάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὡν καὶ
πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἔάλων, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ 15

κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάτ-

τονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπειμι ύφ' ὑμῶν
θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὗτοι δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας

7. τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις] Before ἄν VH have *ρᾶον*. BSZ reject it. H errs in thinking that *ρᾶον* exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaisf. Lectt. Plat., in whom “p. 39 a 3 *ρᾶον*” must be an erratum for “*ρᾶον* om.”

4. ἐκείνως] Understand ἀπολογησάμενος again.

12. μὴ . . . ἡ] An instance of the *presumptive* variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. θάττον γὰρ θ. θεῖ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 e, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ημῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, φ τὸ

ἀδικον λωβᾶται κ. τ. λ.; Gorg. 509 a, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.'s quotation of Odyss. viii. 329, οὐκ ἀρετὴ κακὰ ἔργα κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὁκίν is not to the point.

18. ὑπὸ—ωφληκότες] ‘Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.’—Whewell.

ώφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ p. 39. τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν που ἵστως οὗτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῦν, καὶ οἷμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρη-
5 σμωδῆσαι, ὡς καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ε-
ῆδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν φί μάλιστ’ ἀνθρωποι χρησμωδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὡς ἀνδρες,
οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἡξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ
τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δὲ’ ἡ οἵαν
10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἱόμενοι
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἱόμενοι] After οἱόμενοι H inserts conjecturally *μὲν*, taking this to be suggested by οἱόμενοι *με* of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably *με*, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δι φθέραν with an erasure between—διφθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγώ τε . . . καὶ οὗτοι] ‘I as well as they.’ ἐγώ has the stress, and stands (in accordance with Greek arrangement) first for that reason. Dig. 307.

6. ἐν φί—χρησμωδοῦσιν] The opinion, which connects prophetic enlightenment with the approach of death, has maintained its hold upon mankind in all ages. Patroclus foretells Hector’s death, Il. xvi. 851, and Hector the death of Achilles, Il. xxii. 358: instances to which classical writers often appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30, ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὁμηρος ἔστιν οἱ τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προγνώσκειν τὰ μέλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγώ χρησμωδῆσαι τι, Cic. De Div. I. 30, Facilius evenit appropinquante morte ut animi futura augurentur; ex quo et

illud est Calani, de quo ante dixi, et Homerici Hectoris qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat. So Shakespeare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i. (Gaunt) “Methinks, I am a prophet new inspir’d; And thus, expiring, do foretell of him.” And Sir H. Davy (“Remains,” p. 311) speaks of himself as “looking into futurity with the prophetic aspirations belonging to the last moments of existence”—in a letter dated just two months before his death.

9. οἵαν] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A virtual cognate accusative after ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.

11. διδόναι ἔλεγχον] Namely, under the process of ἔξέτασις. cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches 187 e there quoted.

¶. 39. ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ως ἐγώ φημι. πλεί-
δ ους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον,
ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται
ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν 5
τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ζῆτε, οὐκ ὄρ-
θως διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὕτε
πάνυ δυνατὴ οὕτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη
καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τὸν ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ως βέλτιστος. ταῦτα 10
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος
εἰς ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἀν δια-
λεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν
ῳ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἔγονται καὶ οὕπω ἔρχομαι 15 ^{to those}
οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ω ἄνδρες,
παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει
¶. 40. διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἄλλήλους, ἔως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν
γὰρ ως φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι
ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ω ἄνδρες δικα- 20
σταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὄρθως ἀν καλοίην
—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. ή γὰρ εἰωθυῖα μοι μαν-
τικὴ ή τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ^{to}
πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιού-
μένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὄρθως πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ 25

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ ἔνδεκα.

20. δικασταί] Steinhart re-
marks that up to this point,
where first the true and false
judges are separated, the form
of the address used has been
ω ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

22. ή εἰωθυῖα] 'The direction
I am wont to receive from the
divine voice.' See App. A, on
τὸ δαιμόνιον.

24. πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς] ἐπὶ sepa-
rates πάνυ from σμικροῖς, to
which it belongs: Dig. 298.

ξυμβέβηκε μοι, ἅπερ ὄρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτὶ ἃ γε δὴ p. 40. οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ b θεοῦ σημείου, οὕτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ 5 δικαστήριον, οὕτ’ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἔρειν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὕτ’ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὕτ’ ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; 10 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅστις οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ c τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς 15 σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. δυοῦν γὰρ θάτερόν ἔστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἡ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἡ κατὰ τὰ 20 λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις

5. μέλλοντί τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon., which stands ^{τι} μέλλοντί (*τι* being *prima manus*), importing that *τι* should follow μέλλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his representation. 7. ταύτην] So VBH; *αὐτὴν* SZ. It is impossible to find a clear meaning for *αὐτὴν*, which is the reading of Oxon. and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has *ταύτην* for *αὐτὴν*.

4. ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικ.] An emphasised equivalent of ἐπὶ τόδε τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d, κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, equivalent to κατ’ αὐτὴν μόνον τὴν πόλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἔκει δύο προεῖλοντο, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φιλιππον καθιστᾶσι.

18. οἷον.] ‘As it were.’ Parenthetical to the construction. The words which it qualifies are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject of μηδὲν εἶναι is τὸν τεθνεῶτα). Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἷον ὑπνος, and again ε, οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popular religious teaching.

p. 40. *τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.*
 δ καὶ εἴ γε μηδεμίᾳ αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οἶν ^{υπνος},
 ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ’ ὅναρ μηδὲν ὄρα, θαυμά-
 σιον κέρδος ἀν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀν οἷμαι, εἴ
 τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ᾧ οὗτως
 κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδ’ ὅναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
 νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-
 παραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν,
 πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης
 τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἷμαι ἀν μὴ το
 ε ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμή-
 τους ἀν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ
 νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε
 λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
 οὗτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μία νύξ. εἰ δὲ οὖν ἀποδημῆσαι ¹⁵
 ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ
 ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεὶ εἰσὶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθ-
 νεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἀν, ὡς ἀνδρες
 p. 41. δικασταὶ; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀιδου, ἀπαλ-
 λαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή- ²⁰
 σει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται
 ἐκεὶ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ραδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν, Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, &c., &c.

1. *τῇ ψυχῇ*] An intensified form of the dative of reference, equivalent nearly to a genitive: Dig. 28.

12. *αὐτὸν*] A resumption of *ἰδιώτην τινά* and *βασιλέα*, after the intervention of *εὐαριθμ.* ἀν *εὐρεῖν*.

22. *Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι*] These nouns are in the nominative by attraction to the interposed relative clause, *as the nearest construction*: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptolemus occur as judge of the dead (though in Hom. Hymn.

καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι p. 41,
έγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἀν εἴη ἡ
ἀποδημία; ἡ αὖ Ὁρφεῖ ἔνταξις οὐ γένεται καὶ Μουσαίῳ
καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὄμηρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἀν τις δέξαιτ' ἀν
5 ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ
ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ
ἀν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει
καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν
παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλ-

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles *Æacus* judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. *Æacus* was the hero of *Ægina*, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew. Vol. I.

Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'

7. διατριβῇ] Cf. Euthyphro sub init., Legg. I. 625 a.

ὅπότε—τέθνηκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence δόπτε—ἀηδὲς εἴη is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστὴ ἀν εἴη ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically, —an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τὸν πάνσοφον, δαναοί, τὰν οὐδὲν ἀλγύνονταν ἀηδόνα Μουσᾶν, τῶν ἔλλανων τὸν ἄριστον, the whole

p. 41. λοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἀν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἐστι δὲ οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δὲ ἀν τις, ὡς ἀνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν εἰς τραπείαν ἡ Ὀδυσσέα ἡ Σίσυφον, ἡ ἄλλους μυρίους ἀν τις εἴποι καὶ ἀνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνέναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἀν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροι εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ηδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὡς ἀνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τιναῖς τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμάνυν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλον εστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ηδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγ- 20

6. ἄγοντα] Edd. ἄγαγόντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγοντα. See Commentary.

audiencee, reminded of Socrates, burst into tears. Cf. Introd. p. xx. note 10.

6. ἄγοντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καθάπερ μάντις ἀπὸν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 c, Θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις . . . ἀρδην ἐν τῷ τότε

χρόνῳ διαφθέρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. ἡ ἄλλους—εἴποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. ἀληθές] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.

20. πραγμάτων] The wants and hardships of old age. Cf. Xen. Apol. 32, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ

μάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔμε ὡδαμοῦ p. 41. ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισα-
μένοις μον καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάντα χαλεπαίνω.
καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μον καὶ
5 κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ε
ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν·
τοὺς νιεῖς μον, ἐπειδὴν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ω
ἄνδρες, ταύτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύ-
πουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἡ χρημάτων ἡ ἄλλον του
ιοπρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἡ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι
εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν,
ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὅν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες
οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπον- p. 42.
θὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι υφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νιεῖς.
15 ἄλλὰ γάρ ἥδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένω,
ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις ὄπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ
ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἀδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῷ.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἡ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφίλοντος μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ
μὲν γάρ βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον
ἀπέλιπε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ πάντα] Here, as elsewhere, οὐ πάντα marks only a bare denial: Dig. 139. Socrates is satisfied with saying, 'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία would in no case have suffered him to say, 'I am far from being displeased.'

8. ταύτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By plying them unweariedly with warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἡ] This combination is exactly parallel to ἀλλ' ἡ. The two particles enter the combination coordinately, introducing the exception to the preceding universal negative in their own several ways. πλὴν implies 'it is known to none,—saying that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God'; ἡ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar. Nub. 360, οὐ γάρ ἀν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπ-
ακούσαιμεν . . . πλὴν ἡ Προδίκω.

APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαιμόνιον.

THE word *δαιμῶν* was used to denote either *θεός* or a spiritual being inferior to *θεός*. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being *in his dealings with men*. From Homer to Plato *δαιμῶν* is persistently marked by this meaning¹. *Δαιμόνιος* therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and *τὸ δαιμόνιον* denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), *τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ θεός ἡ θεοῦ ἔργον*, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), *εἰ δὲ ἐστιν ὅπερ οὐν ἔστι θεός ἡ τι θεῖον δῆρως*. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), *διετεθρύλητο ὡς φαίνη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔαντό σημαίνειν ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν*, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by *τὸ δαιμόνιον* a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the *Apology* Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression *ἐπικωμαδῶν*, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. *δαιμόνια πράγματα*. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), *ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται*, or (Phdr. 242 b), *τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθός σημείον γίγνεσθαι*, or (Euthyd. 272 e), *τὸ εἰωθός σημείον τὸ δαιμόνιον*, or (Theæst. 151 a), *τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον*. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

¹ In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of *δαιμῶν* appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that *θεός ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μήνυται*, all *μαντικὴ* is the province of the

δαιμῶν.

² Whence the phrase of *Æschines* (iii. 117. p. 70) *ἴσως δὲ καὶ δαιμονίου τινὸς ἔξαμαρτάνειν αὐτὸν προσαγομένου* is indeterminate.

of a personal attendant *δαιμῶν* (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to *τὸ δαιμόνιον*. ‘Η φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. *τὸ δαιμόνιον σῆμεῖον*), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον* as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by *divinum quiddam, Divin.* I. 54, not by *genius*), until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this *δαιμόνιον σῆμεῖον*?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these :

Mem. I. i. 2-5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔντῳ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιασθαι καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὃ δὲ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰώνοις τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὐδοί τε γάρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὅρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κακένος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιξεν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι φασὶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὅρνιθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δὲ, ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.

IV. iii. 12-13, Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἡ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι [οἱ θεοί], εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνοντοι ἡ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἡ μῆ. Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ σὺ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, γνώσῃ, ἀν μὴ ἀναμένης ἔως ἀν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδης, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὄρωντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔντῳ προσημαίνειν ἡ τε δέοι καὶ ἡ μῆ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5-6, Ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὁ Ἐρμόγενες, ἥδη μου ἐπιχειρούντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δὲ, Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἥδη;

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβῆς οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτὲ δ' ἄλλου τον ἐφιέμενος.

To which must be added still from the *Memorabilia*, I. i. 19, Σωκρατης ἡγέτο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' δαιμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the *θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται* in § 12 of the Xenophonian *Apology*) to the expression *σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον*, meaning by this expression (as already said) that *τὸ δαιμόνιον* is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [*θεοὶ*] *προσημαίνονται* (*Mem. IV. iii. 12*), *τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ* (*ib. viii. 6*), *θεῶν γνώμη* (*ib. 11*). Its intimations differ from those obtained by *μαντικὴ* in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (*Mem. I. i. 19*) πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων, he seems either to have directed others to *μαντική* (*Mem. I. i. 6*), or the oracle (*Cic. de Divin. i. 54*), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (*Mem. I. i. 4*). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (*Mem. IV. iii. 13*).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of *μαντική*, which is defined in *Mem. I. i. 6-9*, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τὸν ἐπιτηδεῖον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἀν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευομένους ἐπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ χαλκευτικὸν ἡ γεωργικὸν ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἔξεταστικὸν ἡ λογιστικὸν ἡ οἰκονομικὸν ἡ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπουν γνώμην αἱρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τὸν θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἀ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἀ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τὸν θεοὺς γὰρ οἵς ἀν δοῦν ἔλεω σημαίνειν.

This accords with *Plato. Apol. 40 a*, ἡ εἰωθνιά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical

—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere presentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c-d, τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ἔστιν ὁ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται φωνή, ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμαδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράφατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὁ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. 40 α-b, ἡ γάρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνή ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ δρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ ἔξυμβεβήκε μοι, ἅπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἡ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐτε ἔξιώντι ἔωθεν οὔκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὐτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθῷ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντίωται μοι.—Euthyd. 272 c, κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἡδη ἐν νῷ εἰχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μοι ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθός σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην.—Phdr. 242 b, ἡνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὅγαθε, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθός σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὁ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν—, καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἡ με οὐκ ἔῃ ἀπίειν πρὶν ἀν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον.—Alcib. I. init. 103 a-b, τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλά τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὐ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὑστερον πεύσει. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὐτω προσελήλυθα. εὐελπίς δέ εἰμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό.—Theaet. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν

³ Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the *Apology*. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the

Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the *δαιμόνιον* (31 d).

μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ἔννειναι ἐνίοις δὲ ἔτι.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δὲ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἀξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἡ γάρ πού τινι ἀλλω ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the *μαντικὴ* of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the *φωνὴ* unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—*ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, *ῶσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν οὕτω καὶ ἔλεγε*,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in *μαντικὴ* and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the *σημεῖον*; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of “all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works.” If, then,

declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unper-turbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to fore-*cast* and fore*judge* might become almost an immediate sense. But it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these difficulties, since Xenophon mentions it as a *singular* characteristic of Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὸ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλον προσδεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, which is the rationalised description of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occurrence of the *σημεῖον* which are related in Plato preclude the explanation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however penetrat-ing, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed crossing and brings him back to Phædrus, or which forbids him to leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus and his companions. If we are to accept these features as historical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first, we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account, and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is pre-judicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through something amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not by a chain of accidents.

We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of *τὸ δαιμόνιον* to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτεῖ*. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, *φάσκοντος αἰτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔαντφ προσημαίνειν ἀ τε δέοι καὶ ἀ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν*. cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as *κωλῦνον ή κελεῦνον*.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconciliation of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με*, he

describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato's notice points, the words *προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε* would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no *impulse*; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which *τὸ δαιμόνιον* represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was *κριτική*, not *ἐπιτακτική*. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will, would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates' substitute for *μαντική*. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every

part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.

APPENDIX B.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns :—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.

Idioms of Nouns :—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.

Idioms of Nouns :—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.

Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.

Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.

Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.

Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.

Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.

Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.

Idioms of Sentences :—Attraction, §§ 179—203.

Idioms of Sentences :—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.

Idioms of Sentences :—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.

Idioms of Sentences :—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.

Idioms of Sentences :—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.

Idioms of Sentences :—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.

Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

§ 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS :—ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, *viz.*—

- a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.
- β. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.

Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i. e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included. The “Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence” is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10—12).

§ 2. b. Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns *in agreement with* an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, *κατέδησαν τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ*).

Phædo 75 b, *ὅρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι*—‘perform the other acts of the senses.’

Ib. 85 b, *ἡγοῦμαι . . . οὐ χείρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν.*

Symp. 205 b, *τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὄνόμασιν*, i. e. ‘in the other cases.’ Stallbaum takes this of ‘the other (*εἴδη*) species of things’ which have to be named, ‘quod ad cæteras attinet formas.’ This might be; but the construction of the particular verb *χρῆσθαι* leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, *τῇ κρήνῃ . . . ἐγγὺς οὕσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἀξια ἐχρώντο*, Hdt. i. 132, *χρᾶται [τοῖς κρέασιν] ὃ τι μιν λόγος αἴρεει.*

Phdr. 228 c, (A) *“Ως μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν κ.τ.λ.* (B) *Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.*

Theæt. 193 c, *δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης.*

Legg. 792 c, *τοῦτ’ οὐκέτ’ ἀν ἐγὼ ξυνακολούθσαιμ’ ἄν*—‘this is one step further than I can go with you.’ Exactly parallel are the Homeric *τόδ’ ικάνεις, τόδε χώει, &c.*

Crat. 425 c, *εἴ τι χρηστὸν ἔθει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι.*

§ 3. c. Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, *καλώ τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν.*

Ib. d, *κινδυνεύω [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.*

Meno 93 b, *ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἡσαν.*

Rep. 349 e, *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπει φρόνιμον ἀγαθὸν [εἶναι λέγεις]*;—‘good at those things *in* which he is wise.’

Ib. 579 d, *δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας.*

Laches 191 c, *τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἐλεγον ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος.*

So Thucyd. i. 37, *αὐταρκῆ θέσιν κειμένη, v. 34, ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν ἀτιμίαν τοιάνδε.*

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)

§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as *περᾶν πόδα, βρύχειν ὁδόντας*. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, *θαυμαστὸς τὸ κάλλος*.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 371, *τυφλὸς τά τ' ὥτα τόν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὅμματ' εἰ.*

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, ἀ δὲ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, . . . ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν.

Ib. e, *ὅσα τροφὴν . . . ἡ γῆ . . . πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν.*

Rep. 467 c, *οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται*—‘to the extent of human capacities.’ It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 e, *σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μελλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον.*

Ib. 54 d, *ἀλλ' ἵσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, εάν τι λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς.*

Rep. 405 c, *ἰατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίαν.*

Phdr. 274 a, *οὐ γάρ . . . ὅμοδούλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν . . . , ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον.*

Tim. 42 e, *ἄριστα τὸ θυητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸν ἔαντι φύγοντο αἴτιον.*

Ib. 69 d, *σεβόμενοι μιάνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη.*

Ib. 90 e, *διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμηστέον, ὅ μή τις ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν.*

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied *metaphorically*, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, *οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέονται σιδήρον.* As we say, ‘not one *bit*’

Cf. *τι δεῖ*; (‘what need?’ not ‘why is there need?’) illustrated by Isaeus, ii. 39, *τι ἔδει αὐτοὺς ὀμνύναι . . . ; οὐδὲ ἐν δήπον.*

Phædo 91 d, *σῶμά γ' ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται*—‘ceases not one bit.’ To join it with *σῶμα* would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, *ἄπερ . . . οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων*, and Euthyphro 8 c, *οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτ' ἀμφισβητοῦντες.*

Phædo 99 c, *τάγαθὸν καὶ δέον* ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.

Euthyd. 293 c, *ἡττον οὖν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ;*

Charm. 174 c, *ἡττόν τι ἡ λατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει;*

Crito 47 c, *τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαιόντων.* Note, that *ἐπαιόντων* is intransitive (as *infra d*, *εἴ τις ἐστιν ἐπαιῶν*), and therefore *μηδὲν ἐπ.* is not ‘who understand nothing,’ but ‘who do not understand one bit.’

Apol. 19 c, *δῶν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαιῶ.*

Ib. 21 b, *ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν* ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς δῶν.

Ib. 26 b, *Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν—* where, in accordance with the two last instances, *οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν* is not the Nom. to *ἐμέλησεν*, nor in regimen with *τούτων*, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after *ἐμέλησεν*. In Crat. 425 c, *οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας*, and Legg. 887 e, *ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηται*, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, *πλείω τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύτηταί.*

Phileb. 23 e, *πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον.*

Symp. 193 a, *ἄπαντα εὐσεβεῖν περὶ θεοὺς—* ‘in all his acts to act piously toward the gods.’

Apol. 30 c, *ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.*

Gorg. 512 b, *ἐλάττω δύναται σώζειν.*

Cf. Homer’s *πάντα*, as in Od. iv. 654, *τῷ δ’ αὐτῷ πάντα ἐφέκει*, and the common expression *τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ*.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the *way*, or *manner*—

Symp. 207 d, *τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον, ἡ θυητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι.*

Politie. 296 e, *τὸν ὄρον . . . ὃν ὁ σοφὸς . . . διοικήσει τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων.*

Rep. 416 b, *τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι—* ‘on a footing of the greatest possible caution.’ (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας like *τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς*, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)

Cf. Ar. Pax 232, *καὶ γάρ εξίεναι, γνώμην ἐμὴν, μέλλει.*

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*, &c.: and, probably, the “Accusative Absolute,”—‘on such and such a footing.’

Protag. 314 c, *δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ἐπορευόμεθα.*

Critias 107 e, *ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἀν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδούνται συγγιγώσκειν χρεών.*

Phileb. 13 b, *τι οὖν δὴ ταῦτὸν . . . ἐνὸν, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*

προσαγορεύεις; Cf. Andoc. i. 92. p. 12, σκέψασθε τί αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχον ἔτέρων κατηγοροῦσι.

§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied *metaphorically*. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 e, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀρ' οὐ μυγνύναι αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρητέον;—where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲ . . . μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι—'ten thousand times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκέτ' ἀν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—'saying anything further' for 'saying anything *more*;'—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up *space*. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ ρήμάτων τίς οὐκ ἀν ἔξεπλάγη ἀκούων; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallb. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below: or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives &c.; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are *Accusatives*. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest:—

Theæt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πενθου, and the Adverbs ἀρχήν, ἀκμήν, τήν πρώτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, *the sentence itself*. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inad-

quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole ; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, *τούτοις, δι' εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγὴν, ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέμενος.*

Crat. 395 d, *ὅν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρὶς ἀνετράπετο.*

Crito 45 d, *τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἀν τύχωσι τοῦτο πράξουσι.*

Soph. 260 a, *τὸ μὲν μέγυστον, φιλοσοφίας ἀν στρεφθεῖμεν.*

Apol. 25 b, *ἡ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν, εἰς μέν τις κ.τ.λ.*

Legg. 691 a, *τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολὺ, βασιλέων τοῦτο εἶναι νόσημα.*

Politic. 293 a, *ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ζητεῖν.*

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, *τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . ἔρως.*

So 223 d, Critias 108 e, Theaet. 190 b. Cf. Ep. to Heb. viii. 1.

Theaet. 153 c, *ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 66 e, *δυοῖν θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἡ κ.τ.λ.*

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: Il. iv. 28, *Λαὸν ἀγειρούση, Πριάμῳ κακά, 155, θάνατόν νύ τοι ὅρκι' ἔταμον, 15, οὐ τι Ψεύδος ἐμάς ἄτας κατέλεξας, xxiv. 735, βίψει . . . ἀπὸ πύργου, λυγρὸν δλεθρον, Od. xxi. 35, ἔγχος ἔδωκεν, Ἀρχὴν ξεινοσύνης. Ἀesch. Ag. 225, θυτὴρ γενέσθαι θυγατρός, γυναικοποίων πολέμων ἀρωγάν, 140b, νεκρὸς . . . τῆσδε δεξιᾶς χερὸς Ἐργον, Cho. 200, εἶχε συμπενθεῖν ἐμοί' Ἀγαλμα τύμβον, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν δόμοιο, τοῖς τ' ἐμοῖσιν ἐμφερεῖς. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἐλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεω λίπην πικράν. Ar. Acharn. 411, οὐκ ἔτὸς χωλοὺς ποιεῖς. (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, Proinde tona eloquio, solitum tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν ἔξελθόντες (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent Il. xix. 302, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναικες, Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε ἔκάστη (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλον). Ar. Vesp. 338, Τοῦ δ' ἔφεξιν, ς μάταιε, ταῦτα δρᾶν σε βούλεται; Antipho v. 63. p. 136, ἀλλ', αὐτὸ*

τὸ ἐναντίον, ἐκεῖνος τοῦτο θᾶσσον ἀν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπεισθῇ. Add, as above, Soph. O. T. 603, Καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον . . . πεύθουν.

§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, *ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αἰσθάνονται.*

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γάρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός κ.λ.

Phædo 77 d, *δοκεῖς . . . δεδιέναι, τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος κ.τ.λ.*—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδιέναι, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν . . . διασκεδάννυσιν that is, does not mean ‘to fear, as children fear,’ but ‘to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.’

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 e, *τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι—*
‘which is what men describe when they say they are,’ &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἐρωτησέων, οἵον ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides’ use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθίᾳ μὲν θράσος λογισμὸς δὲ ὅκνον φέρει and vi. 55, οὐχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὅν ἡπόρησεν ἐν φῷ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς ὡμιλήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν φῷ is not=ἐν τούτῳ ἐν φῷ, but=ἐν τούτῳ ὃ, i. e. ‘in a predicament which was that of his not having,’ &c. And in the common expressions ἀνθ' ὅν=ἀντὶ τῶν, ὁ, and οὐνεκα=ἐνεκα τοῦ, ὃ, the Relatives ἀ and ὃ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὁ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκώς, κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—‘and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtlety, cheat in argument.’

Theæt. 158 b, (A) ἀρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς . . . ;
(B) Τὸ πῶν; (A) ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἀν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι κ.τ.λ.—‘that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,’ &c.

Symp. 188 c, ἀ δὴ, προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τὸν ἐρωτας—where ἀ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—‘And thus it stands, accordingly;—μαντικὴ is charged with the care of,’ &c.

Symp. 222 b, ἀ δὴ, καὶ σοὶ λέγω μὴ ἔξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου—‘and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,’ &c.

§ 16. So with the ‘parenthetical’ *οἷον*,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—

Rep. 615 b, καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλῶν θανάτων ἥσαν αἴτιοι . . ., κομίσαντο. So Politic. 298 a, Tim. 19 b.

Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γάρ που,—οἷον φαμὲν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 e, οἷον οἱ ἔμποροι καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαμάχοιντ’ ἀν οὗτοι ξύμπαντες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποτιμῷ λόγῳ οἶν ἀλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 e, τὴν οἶν τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρώματων ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἡδονὰς τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις; (B) οἶν τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν οἶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν . . . οἶν ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δνοῖν θάτερόν ἔστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἡ γὰρ οἶν μηδὲν εἶναι . . . τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of *οἷον* shew that¹ it stands outside the construction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. Note, that this *οἷον* has two shades of meaning, according as it introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means ‘as it were;’ or (b) an instance, when it means ‘for instance.’ A different analysis is required for *οἶν δῆ, οῖα δῆ, οῖα, e. g. in*

Critias 112 c, οῖα θέρους, κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἶν δῆ εὐωχίας οὔσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Antecedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, *κατεχρῶντο ἐπὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς*, in the latter *προσαιτήσουσα*. The Relative sentence is elliptical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with *δῆ*, and the fuller expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα εἶπεν οῖα δῆ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες.

¹ The *ὅσον* in *ὅσον οὐ* stands exactly in the same position.

§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, *ὅτι γάρ, ὃ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη*—where *ταῦτα* is the pronominal substitute for *ὅτι ἔστι*.

Legg. 630 e, *ἀρετῆς μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *μόριον*.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) *χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν*; (B) *πάνν γε, καὶ ταῦτα γε πολύ*—where *ταῦτα* is the substitute for *χρυσίον ἔχειν*.

Rep. 341 c, *νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὅν καὶ ταῦτα*—where *ταῦτα* = *ἐπεχείρησας*, which thus is brought close to *οὐδὲν ὅν*, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, *καταστῆναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστὴν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι*—where *τοῦτο* stands for *καταστῆναι ἐραστὴν*, and therefore becomes endued with the capacity of governing *ἐνός* (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, *οὐδὲ γάρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν*).

Phileb. 37 d, *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν ἀν ὄρθότητα ἵσχη*; *ταῦτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν*; where *ταῦτὸν* stands for *μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν ἐροῦμεν ἀν ὄρθότητα ἵσχη* repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, *εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα*.

Phædo 68 c, *καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα*.

Hom. Il. iii. 179, *Ἀμφότερον βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής*.

§ 18. β. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, *τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἀν νενικηκώς εἴη*,—*τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο*; ('the next question,'—as *Protag. 323 c.*)

Theæt. 189 e, *λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται . . . τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἵνδιλλεται . . . , οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι*.

Tim. 27 c, (A) *σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν . . . , καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς*. (B) *Ἄλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε δὴ, πάντες . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς ὄρμῇ . . . πράγματος θεὸν ἀει που καλοῦσιν*.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. *τοῦτο*, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, *τοῦτο* is placed between the two sentences as a

symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it *stands for* the sentence preceding, and *is in apposition with* the sentence following. So in the instances which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) καλλιον δέ που κατ' εῖδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτ' ἄν, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (B) Ὁρθότατα ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτό, πῶς ἀν τις γένος καὶ μέρος . . . γνοίη;

Meno 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως . . . τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πολλὴ ἀνοιά ἔστι κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 178 e.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὐτὸν οἱ ἀμαθεῖς . . . ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν γὰρ τοῦτο, ἔστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι—where αὐτὸν τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι, which is also, as to meaning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—εἶναι evidently contains the reason for ἔστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία only that it is expressed not in the regular causal form, ὅτι τις οὐκ ὄν . . . δοκεῖ αὐτῷ εἶναι, or παρὰ τὸ μὴ . . . δοκεῖν, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive (see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτὸν τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence as a reason. In other words, αὐτὸν τοῦτο here stands in three relations; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι it is related Appositionally; and (3) to ἔστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which follow under this head:—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a preceding sentence in a *causal* relation to the principal construction of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 e, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ('this is just what it is') . . . ηκω παρὰ σὲ ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ πατὴρ . . . ὅτι ἐγὼ . . . τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἔω.

Cf. Arist. Nub. 335, Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐποίουν ὑγρᾶν νεφελᾶν . . . ὄρμάν, 353, Ταῦτ' ἄρα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Aeschyl. Pers. 165, Ταῦτά μοι διπλῆ μέριμν' ἄφραστός ἔστιν ἐν φρεσὶ, and Eum. 512, ταῦτά τις τάχ' ἀν πατὴρ . . . οἰκτον οἰκτίσαιτ' ἐπειδὴ πιτνεῖ δόμος δίκας. Soph. O. T. 1004, (A) Καὶ μὴν χάριν γ' ἀν ἀξίαν λάβοις ἐμοῦ. (B) Καὶ μὴν μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως Σοῦ πρὸς δόμους ἐλθόντος εὐ πράξαιμι τι.

Eur. Androm. 209, Σὺ δ' ἦν τι κνισθῆς, . . . Μενέλεως δέ σοι Μείζων Ἀχιλλέως· ταῦτά τοι σ' ἔχθει πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5. καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δὲ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες, ἐπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—

Phædo 105 a, ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὗτος δρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο,—δὲ ἀν ἐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίον . . . ἐναντίτητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Protag. 326 a, οἵ τ' αὐτοὶ κιθαρισταί, ἔτερα τουαῦτα, σωφροσύνης ἐπιμελοῦνται.

Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὡφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 283 d, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο,—μῶν μὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Demosth. Cor. 123. p. 268, καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο, in Leoch. 55. p. 1097, ἐπεὶ κάκείνο, Lys. xiii. 79. p. 137, ἀλλ' ἔτερον.

Soph. 248 d, τὸ δὲ, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δὲ,—πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Ib. 803 d, τὸ δ',—ἢν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὕτ' οὖν παιδὶ πεφυκύνα οὕτ' αὐτὸ παιδεία.

Apol. 23 a, τὸ δέ,—κινδυνεύει . . . τῷ ὅντι δὲ διδοὺς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δέ, δ σπείρων φειδομένως, φειδομένως καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, τό, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεῦσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δέ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally *τις* or *ἄλλος*) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phædo 58 c, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) δ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾶ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—where *τί* stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; ‘he who desires things beautiful desires that *they should*—what?’ The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that *τί* stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Æsch. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ' ἀν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάδ' ήντοσεν; (B) Εν ποικίλοις ἀν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οὗτος δὲ τί;—where *τί* is the implicit completion of the sentence.

On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, *ἴνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις*; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no *γένηται* to be supplied; *τι* in itself is the full representative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, *εἰ μή τι* (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, *εἰ μή τι ἄλλο*. The sentence is complete; the *τι* and the *τι ἄλλο* stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) *οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως . . .* (B) *Ἄλλὰ τι μήν*; (A) *Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ*. Here the *τι* refers back to the words *τοῦ καλοῦ*, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer *Τῆς γεννήσεως*. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. *conjectures*) *ἄλλὰ τίνος μήν*; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b ('and what then?'). The same explanation holds of the *τι* in the phrase of polite assent, *τι μήν*;² (literally 'if not, then what?') The explanation of *τι*; in the sense of 'why?' is the same; and of the answering particle *ὅτι* 'because.'

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the *τι* is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 c, *τι σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος*;—*οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρῆσθαι*;

Protag. 309 b, *τι οὖν ταῦν*;—*ἢ παρ' ἐκείνον φαίνεται*;

Soph. 266 c, *τι δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην*;—*ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικὴ φήσομεν ποιεῖν*;

Phædo 78 d, *τι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . .*; *ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.*; (The genitive *τῶν—καλῶν* is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)

Phileb. 27 e, *τι δὲ ὁ σὸς [βίος] . . .*;—*ἐν τίνι γένει ἄν λέγοιτο*;

So probably Phædo 64 d, (A) *φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἴναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἥδονάς καλούμενας τὰ τοιάσδε κ.τ.λ.*; (B) *Ἡκιστα.* (A) *Τι δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισιών*; (B) *Οὐδαμῶς.* (A) *Τι δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας*;—*δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος*; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).

Legg. 630 c, *οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων*

² Add *τι μέλλει*; as in Hipp. Mi. invariable, though attracted sometimes into *μέλλομεν*.
373 d, Rep. 349 d. *μέλλει* can be

ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους. Here ἄλλο denotes in outline a whole clause, the form of which is revealed to us by the contrasted clause *πρὸς—βλέπων*.

Rep. 372 d, *τι ἀν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἔχόρταζες*; where *τι ἄλλο* represents a sentence parallel to the contrasted sentence *αὐτὰς ἀν ταῦτα ἔχόρταζες*.

Illustrations of this construction abound in Thucydides, e. g. iii. 85, ὅπως ἀπόγραια ἢ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ii. 16, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτὸν ἀπολείπων ἔκαστος, 49, μήτ' ἄλλο τι ἢ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, iv. 14, ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, v. 98, *τι ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς . . . πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε*; vii. 75, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεποιηρκημένη ἔφεσται, viii. 5, ἀμφοτέρων . . . ὅντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὀσπέρ ἀρχομένων. (Notice the two last, which prove the invariableness of the οὐδὲν ἄλλο.)

§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives ἄλλο *τι ἢ* and ἄλλο *τι* are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer: (2) as to their construction, the ἄλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

Ἄλλο *τι ἢ* challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἄλλο *τι*) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, ἄλλο *τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ*, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; The interrogation is made as to *περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ*.

Rep. 372 a, ἄλλο *τι ἢ σίτον τε ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑποδήματα*; The interrogation is made as to *σίτον τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα*, to the exclusion of the Verb *διαιτήσονται*.

Alc. I. 129 b, *τῷ διαλέγει σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοὶ*;

The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἢ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as

Gorg. 459 b, *τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι*;

Politic. 266 b, (A) *μῶν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἢ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.*; (B) *Οὐκ ἄλλως*.

Legg. 683 e, *βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται ἢ καὶ τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν*;

Protag. 330 c, *τίν' ἀν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην*;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e, *διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι*, and the variations,

Soph. 220 e, *τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκη χρὴ προσαγορεύειν*;

Phædo 91 d, *ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀ κ.τ.λ.*; and the common formulae *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ* and *τι ἄλλο ἢ* which are not ambiguous.

"*Ἄλλο τι* challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 e, *ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὗτος ποιήσεις*;—'you mean, do you, that *you* will do so?'

Ib. 369 d, *ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἰς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφαττής*;—where the force of the *ἄλλο τι* cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, *ἄλλο τι οὖν οὗτος καὶ περὶ πάντων,—ἔάν τις τι πράττῃ ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται κ.τ.λ.*;—where the interrogation must go on to the end; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause *οὗτος καὶ περὶ πάντων*.

Phædo 79 b, (A) *Φέρε δή, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι τὸ δὲ ψυχή*; (B) *Οὐδὲν ἄλλο*.

Symp. 201 a, *ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἀν εἴη ἔρως, αἰσχους δ' οὐ*;

(In Euthyd. 286 c, *ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῆ κ.τ.λ.*, the interrogation goes through several clauses: but here two MSS. omit *ἢ*.)

Thus *ἄλλο τι* affects the whole of the sentence, like the French *n'est ce pas que*. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning? For there is no colour for supposing that it *stands for* *ἄλλο τι ἢ*.

It represents an unexpressed *sentence* (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us);—namely, 'any different' proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by *ἄλλο τι*, 'puts the question' about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to

the *ἄλλο τι* alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of *ἄλλος* as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, *ὅσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.*

Theæt. 159 b, *καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἀ νῦν διήλθομεν.* (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense *πάντα* must stand for *τὰλλα πάντα*. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by *καὶ* to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of *ὅσαντας* and *καθεύδοντα*: for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with *ὅσαντας* in the one case and *καθεύδοντα* in the other.

Theæt. 145 a, *ἢ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μονικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;*

Phdr. 227 c, *πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πρόστεστι.*

Ib. 246 e, *τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον.*³

§ 24. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—GENITIVE CASE.

A.—Genitive of Epexegesis.

Apol. 29 b, *ἀμαθία . . . αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπονεΐδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἀ οὐκ οἶδεν.*

Phædo 78 b, *τοῦτο τὸ πάθος . . . , τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι.* [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, *δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.*

Ib. 97 a, *αὐτῇ ἄρα αἰτίᾳ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.*

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with *ώς*, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, *καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὐλειον θύραν κρονομένην πολὺν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ώς κωμαστῶν*—where *ώς κωμαστῶν* does not closely follow *ψόφον*, but characterises the general effect produced.

³ [Under these three examples is written in the MS. “Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives.”]

Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, *οὐτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς . . . φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὕσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν*—('not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.') *Æsch. Eum. 628, θανεῖν . . . Τοξεῖς ἐκηβόλουσιν, ὡστ' Ἀμαζόνος, Cho. 990, Ἐχει γάρ αἰσχυντῆρος, ὡς νόμον, δίκην* (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Soph. Aj. 998, *Οξεῖα γάρ σου τάξις, ὡς θεοῦ τινός, Διῆλθ' Ἀχαιούς* ('like a *θεῖα φύμη*', that is.) Trach. 768, *προσπτύσσεται Πλευράσιν ἀρτίκολλος, ὡστε τέκτονος* ('like carver's work.') Ib. 112, *πολλὰ γάρ ὡστ' ἀκάμαντος ἡ νότου ἡ βορέα τις κύματα . . . ἴδοι*—which points again to the Homeric *τὸν δ' οὐποτε κύματα λείπει Παντοίων ἀνέμων*, Il. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of *knowing, seeing, shewing.*

Apol. 27 a, *ἀρά γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου*;

Ib. 37 b, *Δν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.*

Crat. 412 a, *μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.*

Rep. 558 a, *ἡ οὐπω εἶδες . . . αὐτῶν μενόντων*;

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 357, *Ὦς γνῶ χωμένοιο.* *Æsch. P. V. 760, Ὦς τοίνυν ὄντων τῶνδε σοι μαθεῖν πάρα.* Soph. Aj. 281, *Ὦς ὁδὸς ἐχόντων τῶνδε ἐπίστασθαι σε χρῆ.* Eur. Med. 1311, *Ὦς οὐκέτ' ὄντων σῶν τέκνων φρόντιξε δῆ.*

Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 e, *ἐθεασάμεθα . . . τοῦ εἴδους*, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Rep. 485 b, *μαθήματος . . . ὃ ἀν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.*

In Legg. 646 d, *καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον*, the Genitive has tacit reference to *περὶ* in the question previously put, *οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*;

In Rep. 375 d, *οἰσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἥθος, κυνῶν* is governed by *ἥθος*.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after⁴ Verbs of *mentioning.*

Meno 96 a, *ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν πράγματος, οὐ κ.τ.λ.* ;—Why

⁴ The passage, Rep. 439 b, *τοῦ τοξέου καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, is to be construed otherwise; *τοῦ τοξέου* is governed by *χείρ*. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).

this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 e, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ' ἀν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὕτε ἵππικῆς οὕτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἀν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀν πρέπον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποίου κέκραγας ἀνδρὸς ὁδὸς ὑπέρφρονα; and ib. 1257, Ο. C. 355, Ἄ τοῦδ' ἔχρησθη σώματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μητρὸς ἥκω τῆς ἐμῆς φράσων.

In Homer, Verbs of *knowing* &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

Il. xii. 229, Εἰδείη τεράων, Od. xxii. 36, Γνώτην ἀλλήλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ' ἀλλήλων. Il. xiv. 37, ὁψείοντες ἀντῆς, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενος πολέμοιο.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . .; ἅρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 d, τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον . . . ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ.;

Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πόλιν εὐ παρεσκενασμένην ἀρχὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὐ κειμένοις νόμοις, . . . οὐδὲν πλέον εὐ τεθέντων [ἐστι].

Rep. 576 d, ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις;

Cf. Aesch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὗτος· and Eum. 211, Τί γάρ γυναικὸς ἡτις ἄνδρα νοσφίσῃ; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἀν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὅργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 e, τὴν πόλιν ἔατέον τῆς κατοικίσεως.

§ 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 e, μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phædo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἰναι.

Phileb. 58 c, *τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν.*

Legg. 760 e, *τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά.*

Ib. 820 e, *ἄστρων . . . τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.*

β. Dative of Pronouns.

Charm. 157 e, *ἡ πατρός ὑμῖν οἰκίᾳ.*

Legg. 624 b, *ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους.*

Theæt. 210 b, *ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη.*

Phædo 60 c, *θεός . . . ξυνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς.*

Ib. 72 e, *ἢν που τὸν ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχή* [Oxon.], and ibid. *ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις.*

Cf. Thuc. i. 6, *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων.* Isæus vi. 6. p. 56, *τῷ μὲν οὐν ἀδελφῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἐτελευτησάτην.*

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, *ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἐρωτι.*

Rep. 607 a, *ὑμνούς θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.*

Legg. 653 d, *τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς τοῖς θεοῖς.*

Ib. 950 e, *ἀγώνων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς.*

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theæt. 204 d, *ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι.* So Protag. 320 d, Phileb. 21 c.

Soph. 241 e, *τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα εἰσί.*

Phdr. 239 b, *τῆς ὅθεν ἀν κ.τ.λ.* (referring to *συνονοσία*.)

Ib. 247 e, *ἐν τῷ ὅ ἔστιν ὃν ὅντως.*

Phileb. 37 a, *τὸ φ τὸ ὑδόμενον ἡδεται.*

Tim. 39 e, *τῷ ὅ ἔστι ζῶν.*

Critias 115 b, *τὸν ὅσος ξύλινος* (referring to *καρπός*.)

Legg. 761 e, *περὶ τοὺς ὃν ἐπιμελοῦνται.*

Ib. 905 b, *ἐκείνων τῶν οὓς κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 75 a, ἐκείνου ὁρέγεται τοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἵστον.

Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὅτι Φαιδων δὲ Φαιδων ἔστιν.

Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that “this idiom is peculiarly Platonic,” adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.

Theæt. 166 a, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε.

Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 20 b, δεινὸν προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ.

Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἔτην.

Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνας τὸν δύμας;

Phdr. 258 a, καὶ ὁ εἰπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.

Jelf, G. G. § 452, says “this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative.”

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.

Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.

Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν.

Symp. 213 e, τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν.

Legg. 732 e, τὸ θυητὸν πᾶν ζῶον.

Phædo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὄντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i. e. τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.

Phileb. 43 a, τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον.

Legg. 659 d, τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὁρθὸν εἰρημένον.

Ib. 790 c, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων.

Ib. 793 b, δὲ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθεῖς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. *Æschyl.* Cho. 496, φίλτατον τὸ σὸν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σόν), Suppl. 9, αἰτογενῆ τὸν φυξάνορα γάμον (for γάμον τὸν φυξ.). Soph.

Phil. 133, 'Ἐρμῆς ὁ πέμπων δόλιος (for Ἔ. δόλιος ὁ πέμπων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς χωρίοις. Ar. Eq. 1323, 'Ἐν ταῖσιν ἰστεφάνουσιν οἰκεῖ ταῖς ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθήναις (the last three instances from Jelf).

β. *Æsch.* Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφιλεῖ σκότῳ Διμὸς ἔνυοικος (where λιμὸς is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἷμ' ὅμαιμον (perhaps, for the αἷμ' ὅμαιμον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in *Æschin.* iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μιστέκνος, καὶ πατὴρ πονηρός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο δημαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατὴρ πονηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τὰν ἱκέτιν φυγάδα περιδρομον. Soph. Aj. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρύτου Σαλαμῖνος . . . ἀγχιάλου, ib. 1166, τὸν ἀείμνηστον τάφον ἐνώπεντα, Phil. 394, τὸν μέγαν Πάκτωλον εὔχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σὸν . . . στόμα Ἐλευσόν, ib. 1199, τὰν γαμψώνυχα παρθένον χρησμῷδόν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τὰν σὰν πόλιν . . . λαοτρόφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεῖς, v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὕσης (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμός. *Æsch.* Agam. 1226, τῷ μολόντι δεσπότῃ Ἐμῷ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμεῶν ἐμός, O. T. 1462, Ταῖν δὲ ἀθλίαν οἰκτράν τε παρθένοιν ἐμᾶν. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεὺς ὁ γεννήτωρ ἐμός. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—‘artificers of freedom for the city.’

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων—‘that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.’

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—‘beauty as attributable to the god.’

Theat. 175 a, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας—‘a marvel in the way of minuteness.’

Crat. 391 b, *δρθοτάτη τῆς σκέψεως*—‘truest manner of viewing’—*ἡ δρθοτάτη* would have been ‘the truest part of the view.’

Hip. Ma. 282 a, *φθόνον τῶν ζῶντων*—‘envy against the living.’

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, *τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀποπίᾳ*, vi. 76, *ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρίᾳ*. Hdt. ii. 19, *τοῦ ποταμοῦ δὲ φύσιος πέρι* (*φύσιος* being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, *ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν*, 817 a, *ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ξένων*, 820 b, *ὦ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, where the Vocative supersedes the Article.

§ 35. e. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen. The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ρυθμοῦ*.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, *τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος*. Hdt. i. 22, *τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ*.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the construction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, *οὐτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε*—‘for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,’ &c.
That is, *Φλιασίων* is governed by *οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν*.

Legg. 625 c, *τὴν τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν*—where *Κρήτης* is governed by *χώρας φύσιν*.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, *τῶν ξυστρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων*, vii. 30, *διέφθειραν . . . Θηβαίων τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν*.

§ 37. f. Omitted after *οὗτος* preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, *ταύτας δύο ἀρμονίας*.

Ib. 621 b, *οὗτος, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη*.

Symp. 179 c, *τοῦτο γέρας*.

Soph. 237 d, *τὸ τοῦτο ρῆμα*.

Gorg. 489 b, *οὗτοι ἀνήρ*.

Ib. 505 c, *οὗτος ἀνήρ*.

Phileb. 16 c, *ταύτην φήμην*.

Tim. 52 d, *οὗτοι . . . δεδόσθω λόγος*.

§ 38. g. Omitted before *ἀνὴρ* or *ἄνθρωπος* standing (as Forster expresses it) “pronominis loco.”

Phædo 58 c, *εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ* [so Oxon. and three other MSS.]
 ἐφαίνετο, ὃς Ἐχέκρατες—(ἀνὴρ being the subject.)

Ib. 98 b, *ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγυνώσκων δρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον.*

Cf. *Æschin.* ii. 57. p. 35, *σκέψασθε δὴ δευτὴν ἀναισχυντίαν ἀνθρώπου*—
 also iii. 99. p. 67, *καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνθρωπος ἴδιον καὶ οὐ κοινὸν ποιεῖ*,
 and 125. p. 71, *ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρωπος οὐκ ἥδυνατο σφῆλαι.*

§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) “*Ταῦτόν, θάτερον*, sometimes take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis, they are regarded as simple words :

Tim. 37 b, *περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.*

Ibid. *ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος.*

Ib. 44 b, *τό τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν.*”

§ 40. IDIOMS OF PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accusative Case (§§ 15—23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact.

This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style ; firstly, by varying it ; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many constituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in particular juxtapositions :—

Protag. 323 c, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω·* ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., *τοῦτο σοι μετὰ τούτῳ πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι.*

Symp. 173 c, *εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν.*

Ib. 198 b, *οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδὲ ἐγγὺς τούτων*—where *τούτων* = *τοῦ οἷος τ' εἶναι.*

Ib. 204 b, *Ἐρωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αὐτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις.*

Phædo 62 d, *τάχ' ἀν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.*

Phædo 105 d, τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον . . . τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. Π] ὀνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.

Tim. 87 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἀλλος λόγων.

Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸν λόγον ποιήσει.

Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπηπερ ἀν τεσσαραι τούτων ἡγήσωνται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιῶται τινες.

Cf. Antiph. vi. 1. p. 141, ἥδιστον . . . μὴ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ., καὶ εὐχόμενος ἀν τις ταῦτα εὐξαίτο. ἈΕschin. ii. 166. p. 50, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ προδότης καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. And primarily Hom. Il. viii. 362, Οὐδέ τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὃ οἱ μάλα πολλάκις νιὸν Τειρόμενον σώεσκον.

§ 42. Αὐτά.

Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενοήσεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος.

Τὰ ἔτερα, ἀμφότερα, πότερα, &c.

Phædo 68 c, τυγχάνει ὡν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἡ ἀμφότερα.

Crito 52 a, δυοῖν θάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυοῖν τὰ ἔτερα Oxon. and Ven. Π].

Legg. 765 d, πατὴρ μάλιστα μὲν νίεων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μῆ, θάτερα.

Cf. Isaeus i. 22. p. 37, δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντιωτάτοιν θάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυοῖν τὰ ἔτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἵει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἡ μητρός; Antiph. v. 36. p. 133, ποτέρῳ χρήσονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα φ πρῶτον εἴπεν ἡ φ ὕστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ὃ μὲν ἐκεῖνοι ἔδεσαν, ἐλθόντας ἡμᾶς ὡς τοῦτον, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὄμοιογοῦμεν.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστι].

Alcib. I. 134 e, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, ἔχόμενά ἐστι τάξασθαι . . . ἔορτάς.

Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλείω ἡ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάττῳ δύναται σώζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 2, ὅτι νομίζομενα εἴη τὸν πρεσβύτατον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν.

And primarily Homer.

§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-

relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find *δέ μέν*—*δέ ἔτερος*, *τινές*—*οἱ δέ*, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of *ἄλλος* and *ἔτερος*.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every *ἔτερος* is an *ἄλλος*, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of *ἔτερος* in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, *ἐὰν βουλεύῃς θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἔτέρῳ** (though equally we have 879 b, *ὅς δὲ ἀκούεις ἄλλος ἄλλοι τρώσῃ*.)

Critias 109 b, *τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλοις προσῆκον, τοῦτο ἔτέρους αὐτοῖς κτᾶσθαι*.

Euthyphro 2 b, (A) *οὐ γάρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον* [γέγραψαι]. (B) *οὐ γάρ οὖν.* (A) *Ἄλλα σὲ ἄλλος;* (B) *Πάνυ γε.*

Phileb. 61 d, *ἡδονὴ . . . ἔτέρας ἄλλη . . . ἀκριβεστέρα.*

Politic. 262 a, *τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἔτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.*

Soph. 224 c, *τὸ μὲν . . . ἔτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ . . . ἄλλῳ προσρητέον* [οὐδέματι.]

Ib. 232 d, (A) *τὰ . . . περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . .* (B) *Καὶ πολλῶν γε ἔτέρων.*

Symp. 196 e, *ἄγαρ τις ἡ μὴ ἔχει ἡ μὴ οἰδειν, οὔτ' ἀν ἔτέρῳ δοίη οὔτ' ἀν ἄλλον διδάξειε.* Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theæt. 184 e, *ἄ δι' ἔτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι.*

§ 46. β. *ἄλλος* 'besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, *πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων.*

Apol. 36 b, *χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στασέων.*

§ 47. E. Uses of *aὐτός*.

a. Αὐτό. The Neuter Singular of *aὐτός* is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνη ἐπαινοῦντα. So 472 c.

Phædo 65 d, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ή οὐδέν;

Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ή ἀρετή.

Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ή νόησις.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, *aὐτός* in Concord, and *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* in Apposition, are used also. E. g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.

Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.

Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.

The remaining uses of *aὐτός* are not exclusively Platonic.

β. *aὐτός* in the sense of *sponde*.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. *aὐτός* in the sense of *solus*.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακὸς ὄντινα οὐκ ἀν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἐρως ἔνθεον ποιήσει πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Ib. 187 c, ἐν μέν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν.

Ib. 198 d, τὰληθῆ λέγειν . . . , ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγομένους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) οὕκουν ἐπιστήμων εἰ; (B) Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν.

Rep. 437 e, αὐτὸ τὸ διψῆν . . . ἐπιθυμίᾳ . . . αὐτοῦ πώματος—‘thirst, according to the simple notion of it’—whence we see how Use *a* flows from this.

§ 48. δ. *αὐτοῦ* (Adverbial) in the sense of ‘on the same spot as heretofore.’

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω—i. e. not ‘here’ nor ‘there,’ but ‘rooted to the spot.’

Ib. 220 c, ξυννόήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἔωθέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatic for ξυννόήσας ἔωθέν τι, αὐτόθι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν)—‘stood without moving from the spot where he was.’

Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει.

Cf. Hom. Il. ii. 237, τόνδε δὲ ἐώμεν Αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ γέρα πεσσέμεν, 332, 'Αλλ' ἄγε, μίμνετε πάντες, ἐϋκημῆδες Ἀχαιοὶ, Αὐτοῦ, εἰσόκεν ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἔλωμεν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἵκετῶν διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἵερῷ ἀλλήλους, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστᾶσι.

§ 49. F. Use of *ἐκεῖνος*.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by *οὗτος* or the oblique Cases of *αὐτός*, &c., and *ἐκεῖνος*. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phædo 60 d, λέγε τοίνυν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος . . . ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Here *ἐκείνῳ* is identical with *αὐτῷ*.

Ib. 68 e, φοβούμενοι ἑτέρων ἥδονῶν στερηθῆναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἀλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπὸ ἀλλων κρατούμενοι. The *ἐκείναι* are identically the *ἑτεραι*.

Ib. 73 c, ἔάν τις τι πρότερον ἦ ἤδων ἦ ἀκούστας . . . , μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἴ μοι δίδωσ τε καὶ ἔνγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα . . . Σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἔξῆς ἐκείνοις. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in *ἐκείνοις* to the same things which he had just called *ταῦτα*.

Ib. 106 b, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπύντος τοῦ ἄρτίου, ὥστερ ὡμολόγηται, ἀπολομένον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι. The *αὐτοῦ* and *ἐκείνου* both refer identically to *τὸ περιττόν*, *αὐτοῦ* becoming *ἐκείνου* as *ἄρτιον* is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε—where *αὐτοῖς* fades into *ἐκείνους* as mention *τῶν* ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 e, δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἀν μὲν τύχη, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἴ τις ἡμῶν . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδεῖξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων . . . δι' ἐκείνον δομολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν.

Politic. 277 e, τῶν στοιχείων ἔκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἵκανῶς διαισθάνονται, καὶ τὰληθῆ φράζειν περὶ ἐκείνα δυνατοὶ γίγνονται . . . ταῦτα δέ γε ταῦτα ἐν ἀλλαις ἀμφιγυοῦντες

κ.τ.λ. The *ἐκεῖνα* gives notice that our attention is to be presently turned to *ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις*.

Cf. Ar. Eth. IX. i. 4, ὃν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κάκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει—where *ἐκείνου* is identical in reference with the preceding *τούτοις*,—and more capriciously, X. ix. 16, ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κάκεῦνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται, εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι—where first *ἐκεῖνο* and then *τοῦτο* refer to *τὸ καθόλον*.

§ 50. G. Uses of *tis* (indefinite).

In the sense of ‘a particular this or that,’ *tis* is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations *tis* gives the force of ‘for instance,’ or rather the French ‘par exemple.’

Symp. 199 d, εἰ [ἔρως] μητρός τινος ἡ πατρὸς ἐστί.

Phædo 66 c, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν.

Phdr. 230 d, θαλλὸν ἡ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες.

Hip. Ma. 292 a, δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστί;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἡ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὁδυσσέα.

Phileb. 16 c, διά τινος Προμηθέως.

Cf. Æsch. Agam. 55, ὑπατος δ' ἀιῶν ἡ τις Ἀπόλλων ἡ Πὰν κ.τ.λ.

Ar. Ran. 912, Ἀχιλλέα τιν' ἡ Νιόβην κ.τ.λ.

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of ‘this or that :’ but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, δ . . . περὶ τέχνας ἡ χειρουργίας τινὰς [σοφὸς] βάναυσος.

Phædo 65 c, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδέ τις ἡδονή. [So Hermann from Oxon.]

Apol. 27 d, εἰ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων.

Phdr. 235 c, ἡ που Σαπφοῦς . . . ἡ Ἀνακρέοντος . . ., ἡ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν.

Politic. 305 b, μήθ' ἵπο τινων δώρων μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθ' ὑπό τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας.

§ 53. H. Uses of *τοιοῦτος*.

a. Conversationally, for 'such as I am thinking of,'—but have not yet explained.

Symp. 210 d, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ή ἔστι καλοῦ τοιοῦθε . . . ὃς γάρ ἀν . . . παιδαγωγῆθη, . . . κατόφεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of *τοιαύτην* beginning immediately after it, with ή ἔστι.

Phædo 73 c, . . . ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἴναι. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. [so Stallb. and Herm.] ἐάν τις κ.τ.λ. The *τοιούτῳ* expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows, at λέγω δέ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular *word* preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phædo 67 a, καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι . . . μετὰ τοιούτων ἐσόμεθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.

Ib. 80 c, ἐάν μέν τις χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτῆση καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ—where *τοιαύτῃ* simply means *χαριέσση*.

Ib. d, ή ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιούτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον—where *τοιούτον* *ἔτερον* means ἀειδῆ.

Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη . . . οἴεται. . . , ἐπειδὰν τελευτῆση, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιούτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where τὸ *τοιούτον* stands for τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.

Ib. 79 c, πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται κ.τ.λ., ἀτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη—where *τοιούτων* is a substitute for *πλανωμένων* καὶ *ταραττομένων*.

Symp. 208 d, ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.

Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γάρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιούτον δρᾶν—where *ἄσματος* is actually governed by τὸ *τοιούτον* δρᾶν, because this is the substitute for *προτιθέναι προοίμιον* in the foregoing sentence: cf. Symp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἔκαστα οὕτως—where οὕτως personates πολλά.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὅπσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν—where τοῦτο δρᾶν represents εἰς δικαστὰς ἄγειν or the like, implied from ἦν δεῖ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸν τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν preceding.

Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐνὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀν φανεῖν· γνώμη γὰρ τοιαύτη χρεώμενος—i. e. ἀρίστη. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος—i. e. εὐδαίμων, and VIII. iv. 1, δροίως δὲ καὶ ή διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί—i. e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν δροίως. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδρασαν εἰς φρέατα—i. e. ἔρριψαν σφᾶς αὐτούς, and iv. 64, καὶ τὸν ἄλλους δικαῖω ταῦτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν—i. e. ηστᾶσθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐλευθέριοι ὡφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δὲν τῇ δόσει—where *τοῦτο* stands for ὡφέλιμοι εἰσι, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἔωμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι ἔαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ή δὲν ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ρήτοις, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται, ή διτιδήποτε ἄλλο.

§ 56. IDIOMS OF VERBS.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with *εἰ*, depending on a similar Apodosis with *ἄν*, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἔξην σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλον.

Ib. 44 b, οἵος τ' ὁν σε σώζειν εἰ ηθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι.

Phædo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ο βίος μοι δοκεῖ . . . οὐκ ἔξαρκεῖν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεῖ δεῖν] μάλιστα μέν, εἰ πῃ δυνατὸν ήν, ἔργῳ βελτίους ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ξυμφέρει], εἰ δυνατὸν ήν, οἶον ἀεὶ πλέοντας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of *Sequence* here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 e, ἀξόν γ' ήν ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα ηκουσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὁφελον . . . οἴοι τε εἰναι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα οἴοι τε ἡσαν κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἴπεν κ.τ.λ., ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ήρξατο κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 378 a, φύμην [ἄν] δεῖν . . . δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν κ.τ.λ., ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.

Gorg. 506 b, ἡδέως ἀν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἔως αὐτῷ . . . ἀπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 e, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμην εἰχον—‘this would have been that of which they had knowledge.’

In the next instance *ἴνα* heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Meno 89 b, οὐδὲ . . . ἀν ἐφυλάττομεν, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτὸν διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν χρήσιμοι γίγνοιτο.

In the next, *ὅπως* loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by *ἄν*.

Legg. 959 c, ζῶντι ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπως ὅ τι δικαιοτάτος ἀν καὶ ὄσιωτάτος ἔξη τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἀν ἐγίγνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἴθ' ὡφελεις κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατειργάσω—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of *ἄν*. The usage begins with Homer: cf. Il. vi. 348, “Ενθα με κῦμ’ ἀπόερσε.

§ 58. β. Future Indicative with *ἄν*.

Rep. 615 d, οὐχ ἥκει, οὐδὲ ἄν ἥξει δεῦρο.

Apol. 29 c, ἥδη ἄν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες διαφθαρήσονται.

Symp. 222 a, ἰδὼν ἄν τις . . . εὐρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ νῦν οὐδὲ ἄν ὅτιον ἀποκρινεῖ;

Phdr. 227 b, οὐκ ἄν οἴει με καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this *ἄν* in *Oratio Obliqua*.

Legg. 719 e, τὸν αὐτὸν ἄν ἐπαυνέσοι.

Cf. Isaeus i. 32, προσηπεῖλησεν ὅτι δηλώσοι ποτ᾽ ἄν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a *deliberative* meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is ⁵ *Presumptive*.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. *Deliberative* (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ. *Hortatory* or *dehortatory*, when the sentence is not interrogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

⁵ This use is confined to negative sentences.

a. Presumptive use.

With *μή*.Gorg. 462 e, *μὴ ἀγροικότερον* $\tilde{\eta}$ *τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν*.Rep. 603 c, *μή τι ἄλλο* $\tilde{\eta}$ *παρὰ ταῦτα*;Symp. 194 e, *ἄλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὗτοι ἡμεῖς ὅμεν*.Apol. 39 a, *μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' $\tilde{\eta}$ χαλεπόν*.

The Indicative is also used with *μὴ* and *μὴ οὐ* similarly: e.g. Euthyd. 298 c, *μὴ οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις*; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, *ἄλλ' ὅρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις*—‘but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.’

With *ὅπως μή*.Crat. 430 d, *ὅπως μὴ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν $\tilde{\eta}$ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὄντομασιν οὕ*.The Indicative is also used with *ὅπως μή*.Meno 77 a, *ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι*.Phædo 77 b, *ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε , ὅπως μὴ διασκεδάννυται ή ψυχή*.§ 60. With *οὐ μή*.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with *οὐ μή* in

Rep. 341 c, *οὐ μὴ οὖς τ' $\tilde{\eta}$ s.*Phileb. 48 d, *οὐ μὴ δυνατὸς ὁ*.

Cf. Isæus viii. 24. p. 71, *οὐ μὴ εἰσίγης*. [So Bekker's edition: the Zurich editors give *εἴσει εἰς* from Bekker's conjecture]. Xen. Cyrop. VIII. i. 5, *οὐ μὴ δύνηται*. Soph. O. C. 1024 (some MSS.) *οὐ μή ποτε . . . ἐπεύχωνται*.

The following is only a variation of the use with *οὐ μή*, *πολλοῦ δεῖ* standing as a mere Adverb for *οὐ*.

Gorg. 517 a, *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτέ τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται*.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After *σκοπεῖν*, *δρᾶν*, and the like, with *μή*. (This is as it were the *Oratio Obliqua* of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, *σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι*.Gorg. 512 d, *ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν $\tilde{\eta}$* .

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e.g.

La. 179 b, *ὅρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οὔεται τι λέγειν*.

Soph. 235 a, διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.

Ly. 216 c, σκεψώμεθα μὴ . . . λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 218 d, φοβοῦμαι . . . μὴ . . . ἐντευχήκαμεν.

Phædo 84 e, φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερον . . . διάκειμαι.

§ 63. β. After *πρὶν*, without *ἄν*, in negative sentences.

Phædo 62 c, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύαι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ δ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ. [So all the MSS.]

Theæt. 169 b, τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς . . . προσπαλαῖσαι. [So all the MSS.]

Legg. 873 a, οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μιανθέν πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ δροίω ὅμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ.

§ 64. γ. After *σκοπεῖν*, *δρᾶν*, and the like with *ἔάν*.

Crito 48 e, ὅρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἔάν σοι ἵκανῶς λέγηται.

Phædo 100 c, σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἔξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἔάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

Gorg. 510 b, σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν.

Charm. 167 b, σκέψαι ἔάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῆς ἐμοί.

Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, σκέψασθε ἔάν ἵκανὸν γένηται τεκμήριον.

Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, ἀναμυνήσκεσθαι ἔάν ἀληθῆ λέγω. And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), Il. xv. 32, "Οφρα ὥῃ, ἦν τοι χραίσμη.

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that *ἔάν* gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual *εἰ*. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas *εἰ* would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. *Ἐάν* is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. δ. With *ὅς* *ἄν*.

The different shades of meaning presented by *ὅς* with the Indicative and *ὅς* *ἄν* with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of *εἰ* and *ἔάν* after *σκοπεῖν*. The meaning of *ὅς* *ἄν* bears upon a doubtful reading in Phædo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, οἷον ἀν ἢ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτα ἐστὶ—where *οἷον ἀν* *ἢ* leaves it quite undetermined of what kind *τὸ παρόν* is.

Phædo 98 e, ἐμοὶ βέλτιον δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἦν ἀν κελεύσωσι. Here it is not that *ἦν ἀν κελεύσωσι* has any future force, for the penalty had

been awarded: but it gives the meaning ‘that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.’

Phædo 96 a, *ἄν τι σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὃν ἀν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθώ περὶ ὃν ἀν λέγης χρήσει* (taking for granted here⁶ the reading *ὅν ἀν λέγης*)—‘you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.’ It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what *ὅν ἀν* intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said *ἔξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει προσθῆς ἡ ἀφέλγει*,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθῖναι δέομαι*,—he now, by giving a *general* turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.

§ 66. d. Optative Potential Constructions.

a. Without *ἄν*, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, *πρὸς ἄ τις ἀπαντα βλέψας διαπορήσειε.*

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) *Οὐκοῦν τὸν σαντοῦ πατέρα τύπτεις; (B) Πολὺ μέντοι δικαιότερον τὸν ἄμετέρον πατέρα τύπτοιμι.*

Gorg. 492 b, *τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη;*

Phædo 88 c, *μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἴμεν κριταί, ή καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπιστα ἥ*—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Conjunctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without *ἄν*, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.

Rep. 360 b, *οὐδεὶς ἀν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὔτως ἀδαμάντινος.* Cf. Thucyd. vi. 89, *δημοκρατίαν . . . οὐδενὸς ἀν χείρον [γιγνώσκοιμι], ὅσφ καὶ λοιδορήσαμι.*

Symp. 196 c, *κρατοῦντ' ἀν ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, δέ κρατοῖ.*

Phædo 99 a, *εἰ . . . λέγοι, . . . ἀληθῆ ἀν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι . . . ποιῶ, . . . πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ράθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.* [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . ὀφελοῖ ἀν ἡμᾶς. (B) *ἢ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ;*

⁶ It is the reading of Oxon. and one other good MS. But perhaps the other reading—*ἄν λέγεις*—ought to be preferred. So Hermann and the Zurich editors.

Rep. 382 d, (A) *πότερον* διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἀν ψεύδοιτο; (B) . . . (A) Ἀλλὰ δεδιώς τοὺς ἔχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο;

§ 68. γ. With *ἀν* in clauses where the *ἀν* adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὡς ἀν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνοιντο . . . , δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι.

Ib. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἀν εἰεν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἀν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον.

Gorg. 453 c, ἵνα οὕτω προῖη, ὡς μάλιστ' ἀν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, οὐχ οἵος τ' ἡσθα πείθειν, ὡς . . . ἀν . . . ἐπιδιδοίεν.

Phædo 82 e, δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἀν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ εἴη.

Protag. 318 e, εὐθονλία . . . ὅπως ἀν ἄριστα διοικοῖ.

Ly. 207 e, προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἀν εὐδαιμονίης.

Crat. 395 a, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτος τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων οἷος ἢ ἀν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι.

Ib. 398 e, οὐδός εἴ τι οἵος τ' ἀν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω.

Legg. 700 e, ἡδονὴ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἀν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὄρθοτάτα.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, ἐβούλευετο ή ἀνθρωπος ὅπως ἀν αὐτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοίη, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ή ἀπὸ δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, φιλοῖ, . . . ὅταν οἴοιτο κ.τ.λ., Legg. 661 c, ἔλαττόν [ἐστι κακὸν] ἀν ὡς δλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῷη, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. δ. With *ἀν*, equivalently for the Future.

(δ¹) Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phædo 107 c, ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἀν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.

Apol. 35 a, εἰ . . . ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἀν εἴη.

§ 70. (δ²) Following a Conjunctive with *ἀν* in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, ἐάν τις προστάττῃ . . . , χρηματίζοιτο ἀν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὅταν τις λέγῃ, εἴποιμεν ἀν.

Phdr. 244 b, ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν . . . , μηκύνοιμεν ἀν.

Phileb. 55 e, ἀν τις . . . χωρίζῃ . . . , φαῦλον . . . ἀν γίγνοιτο.

§ 71. (δ³) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, *εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἄν . . . εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς κ.τ.λ.*—where *εἰ ἐθέλεις βλέψαι* is a virtual Future.

Apol. 37 c, *πολλὴ ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὐτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι κ.τ.λ.*
—because the fact is not so *as yet*.

Protag. 349 c, *οὐκ ἄν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ . . . ἔλεγες*—because I do not know the fact *as yet*.

Crat. 428 b, *εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺν κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἄν θαυμάζοιμι.*

Laches 186 c, *εἰ δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἄν θαυμάσαιμι.*

§ 72. e. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.

a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without *ἄν* (see above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being

(a¹) Relative.

Gorg. 512 e, *τίν' ἄν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἀριστα βιώῃ*;

Meno 92 c, *πῶς οὖν ἄν εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος . . . , οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπειρος εἴης*;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, *Κερδαλέος κ' εἴη . . . ὃς σε παρέλθοι, ιν. 222, Ὁς τὸ καταβρόξειν . . . οὕ κεν βάλοι, xv. 358, Λευγαλέῳ θανάτῳ, ὡς μὴ θάνοι ὅστις ἔμοιγε . . . φίλος εἴη.*

§ 73. (a²) Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, *μετόχος εἴη, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀληθῆς ἄν διαβιοῖ.*

Meno 98 c, *ἀφέλιμοι ἄνδρες ἄν εἴεν, . . . εἴπερ εἴεν.*

Rep. 541 a, *ώς ἄν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς εὖ εἰρηκέναι.*

Politic. 295 c, *εἴπωμεν . . . ἵατρὸν μέλλοντα . . . ἀπέσεσθαι . . . συχνόν, ώς οἴοιτο, χρόνον, ἄν ἐθέλειν κ.τ.λ.*;

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 214, *ἀπ' ἐμένο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φώς, Εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τάδε τόξα φαεινῷ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, Od. xii. 106, μὴ σύ γε κεῖθι τύχοις, ὅτε ροιβδήσειεν, ib. 114, Τὴν δέ κ' ἀμυναίμην ὅτε μοι σίνοιτό γ' ἔταίρους, xxii. 114, Οὐ κέ μοι ἀχνυμένῳ τάδε δώματα πότινα μῆτηρ Λείποι ἄμ' ἀλλῷ ιοῦσ' ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπιτσθε λιποίμην.*

§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence being

(β¹) Relative.

Legg. 759 b, *οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον [ἐστὶν] ἱερέας.*

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 407, οὐδ δηναῖος, ὃς ἀθανάτουσι μάχοιτο, Od. vi. 286, Καὶ δὸς ἀλληγ νεμεσῶ, ητις τοιαῦτά γε ἡέζοι, iii. 319, Ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅθεν οὐκ ἔλποιτο γε θυμῷ. Andoc. iii. 1. p. 23, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀφ' ὅν η εἰρήνη γένοιτο ἐναντιοῦνται.

§ 75. (β²) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὐχ οὖν ἐνεκά τινες οὖνται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα . . . θεραπεύοιτο. Euthyd. 296 e, οὐχ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοίην . . . ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

Gorg. 448 e, οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννοῦντι δέ, ὃς μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiv. 374, Ἐλθέμεν ὀτρύνησιν, ὅτ' ἀγγελίη ποθὲν ἔλθοι, xvii. 250, Ἀξω τὴλ' Ἰθάκης, ἵνα μοι βίοτον πολὺν ἄλφοι.

§ 76. (β³) Adverbial with εἰ.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο . . . [ἔστι] ποιητεύν, εἰ μὴ μελλοιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Meno 80 d, εἰ ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτο ἔστιν;

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὅρα γάρ, εἰ . . . τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν.

Legg. 642 a, ὅρατε τί ποιῶμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔάσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.

Ilb. 658 c, εἰ . . . τὰ πάντα σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῦσι τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύντα.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, . . . συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 91 a, οὐ γάρ ὅπως . . . δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθῆσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καν εἰ μή τισν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος.

Cf. Hom. Od. vii. 51, θαρσαλέος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀμείνων Ἔργοισιν τελέθει, εἰ καὶ ποθεν ἀλλοθεν ἔλθοι. Ar. Eth. Nic. I. iv. 7, εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδέησει τοῦ διότι. Lysias xxxiv. 6, τί τῷ πλήθει περιγενήσεται, εἰ ποιήσαιμεν κ.τ.λ.;

§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὅν ἴστο.

Lysis 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἔτερος φιλοῖ, φῖλω εἶναι ἄμφω.

Theæt. 164 a, δεῖ γε μέντοι [τοῦτο φάναι], εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον.

Phædo 95 d, προσήκειν φῆς φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι.

Protag. 316 c, οἴεται τοῦτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Legg. 927 c, τὸν νοῦν, ὃ καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείη, προσέχοντα εὐεργετεῖν.

Phædo 85 d, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀπφαλέστερον . . . διαπορευθῆναι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 262, σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας αἰεὶ Ἔστηχ', ὥσπερ ἐμοί, πιέειν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι, Od. xxiv. 253, Τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικας, ἐπεὶ λούσαιτο φάγοι τε, Εἰδέμεναι μαλακῶς. Thuc. i. 120, ἀνδρῶν σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦντο ἡσυχάζειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ἀν) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, εὐνᾶς . . . τοιάντας, οἵας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ίκανᾶς εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιάντα, οἵα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἔχθεσθαι.

Protag. 334 c, χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ . . . ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι.

Theæt. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον, πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρέτερον σοφοῦ λαβεῖν.

Protag. 330 e, φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα . . ., ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρῆσαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκείνον καθίξειν.

Euthyd. 306 e, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ . . . ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὡς γέ πρός σε τάληθες εἰρῆσθαι.

Apol. 29 c, ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phdr. 269 d, τὸ δύνασθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἵκανὸς γένοιτο ἀν . . . ὥστε ἐκάστῳ προστάττειν τὸ προσῆκον.

Phædo 103 e, ἔστιν ἄρα περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστοι, ὅσον ἀποξῆν. And likewise

Soph. Ant. 303, Χρόνῳ ποτ’ ἔξεπραξαν ὡς δοῦναι δίκην, Αἰ. 378, Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ’ ἀν ταῦθ’ ὅπως οὐχ ὡδὸς ἔχειν, 924, ‘Ως καὶ παρ’ ἔχθροῖς ἄξιος θρήνων τυχεῖν.

§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following *οἷος τε*, *δυνατός*, &c.

Phædo 73 a, οὐκ ἀν οἷοί τ’ ἡσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσειν.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅπότε ἀν δοκῶσιν αἴτιοι εἶναι Ψηφιεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς. Isocr. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἡμῖν ἐνδείξεσθαι βουλόμενος. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξασθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, ἐλπίδας παρέχεται [ἡμᾶς] εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Euthyd. 278 c, ἐφάτην ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν.

Protag. 316 c, τοῦτο δὲ οἴεται οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ ξυγγένοιτο.

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 230, ἐν δοῖῃ δὲ σαωσέμεν η ἀπολέσθαι Νῆας, xiii.

666, Πολλάκι γάρ οἱ ἔειπε γέρων ἀγαθὸς Πολυύδος Νούσῳ ὑπ’ ἀργαλέῃ φθίσθαι, xxii. 119, ὄρκον ἔλωμαι Μή τι κατακρύψειν ἀλλ’ ἄνδιχα πάντα δάσσοσθαι, Od. ii. 171, φημὶ τελευτῆναι ἀπαντα, iv. 253, “Ωμοσα μὴ μὲν πρὸν . . . ἀναφῆναι, ix. 496, φάμεν αὐτόθ’ ὀλέσθαι. Thuc. i. 26, προεῖπον . . . ὡς πολεμίοις χρήσασθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις . . . μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεύσαι (so with οὐκ εἰκὸς iii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οἴεσθε ἥντινα οὐκ ἄμεινον παρασκευάσασθαι; v. 22, οἱ δὲ . . . οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ράδιως κρατῆσαι, iv. 63, τὸ ἀλιπές . . . ίκανὸς νομίσαντες εἰρχθῆναι, i. 126, τῷ Κύλων . . . ἀνέλεν δ θεός, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Aesch. Pers. 173, ἵσθι . . . μή σε δἰς φράσαι, Agam. 1262, ἐπεύχεται . . . ἀντιτίσασθαι (not ‘prays’ but ‘boasts’). Soph. Phil. 1329, παῦλαν ἵσθι τῇσδε μή ποτ’ ἐντυχεῖν Νόσου, Αἰ. 1082, Ταύτην νόμιζε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ Ἐξ οὐρίων δραμοῦσαν εἰς βυθὸν πεσεῖν (not aor. of *custom*, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, Σὲ μὲν γὰρ γῆχεις θεᾶς βρέτας σῶσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλέγονται . . . μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλῦσαι, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἔφη κατανέσαι. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι, ib. 32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οἷμαί σε ἔξαρνον γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενήσεσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνεχυράσασθαι φασιν.

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὡμολόγεις καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Gorg. 520 e, μὴ φάναι συμβούλευειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ.

Politic. 264 e, *ἢ οὐκ οἶει καὶ τὸν ἀφρονέστατον . . . δοξάζειν οὔτως* ;
 Cf. Thuc. iv. 24, *ἢ λπίζον . . . χειρώσασθαι, καὶ ἢδη σφῶν ἵσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι, 127, προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθείρειν, 27, ὅτι . . . αὐτοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Ἀesch. Eum. 892, τίνα με φῆς ἔχειν ἔδραν; Antipho ii. A. a. 5. p. 115, τὸν μείζονα ἐπίδοξον ὅντα πάσχειν. Isaeus ii. 32, ἀμόσταμεν εὖ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους. Isocr. vi. 69. p. 130, μὴ γὰρ οὔτεσθ' αὐτοὺς μένειν. [So Bekker's edition: the Zurich editors give *μενεῖν* from Bekker's conjecture.]*

§ 83. δ. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of *saying*, *thinking*, &c.) sometimes contain a *Dictative* force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to 'say' becomes to 'recommend' or to 'pray' to 'think' becomes to 'think fit,' or to 'give counsel.' But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, *Σιμωνίδης ἤγγιστο καὶ αὐτὸς . . . τύραννον . . . ἐπαινέσαι*—'thought fit'—lit. 'thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.'

Crat. 399 d, *ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.*

Hip. Ma. 291 a, *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ . . . ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.*—not 'that we say' but 'that we should say.'

Phædo 83 e, *οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐχ δινοὶ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασι.* Here the meaning is not 'for the reason which the world attributes to them,' but 'for the reason for which the world says people *ought* to be [temperate].' That is, *φασὶ* is followed by *κοσμίους εἶναι* understood, and this *εἶναι* contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, *δ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι*—'what I proposed that we should define.'

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 98, *φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἢδη Ἀργείονς καὶ Τρῶας* ('I think good'). Thucyd. iii. 44, *νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς βουλεύεσθαι*, iv. 86, *οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἔλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν*, vii. 42, *νομίσας, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι . . ., οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἔπαθεν* (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, *τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ τὸ κ.τ.λ.*, v. 40, *ἡγούμενοι, ὅπῃ ἀν ἔυγχωρῷ, ἡσυχίᾳν*

ἔχειν, i. 40, ἀντείπομεν, τοὺς προσήκοντας ἔυμμάχους αὐτὸν τινα κολάζειν, v. 46, λέγων . . . τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, iv. 99, ἀπεκρίναντο . . . ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα ('answered, Carry off your dead'), vi. 13, ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς Σικελιώτας καθ' αὐτοὺς ἔυμφέρεσθαι. *Æsch. Choeph.* 143, Λέγω ('I pray') φανῆναι σοῦ, πάτερ, τιμάορυν. *Soph. Trach* 543, Ἐγὼ δὲ θυμῶσθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι ('do not know that one ought to be angry').

§ 84. ε. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.

Symp. 194 d, οὐδὲν διοίσει, ὅπηοῦν ὅτιοῦν γύγνεσθαι. So Rep. 523 e.

In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, δὲ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τάληθῆ λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριοι ἀν εἰεν ἡ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ τοίαν.

Symp. 209 b, εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἰον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative⁷ of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in *justification* of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is included in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apologetic Infinitive.'

Phædo 99 b, πολλὴ ἀν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γάρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶον τ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινόν, ἄλλοις μέν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους κ.τ.λ. ; . .

'Ηρακλέους καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους . . . ἄλες ἔπαινον ἔχοντες . . . καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἀν ἔγκεκωμιασμένα. τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiedly dispassionate statement of the case.

Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, Τὸ καὶ προέσθαι μαλθακὸν λόγους φρενί· and, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 60 b, ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἡδὺ] πρὸς . . . τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἄμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἄμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὡς θαυμασίως. [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

⁷ If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is *Causal*. See § 18 above.

Cf. Antipho i. 28. p. 114, *θαυμάζω* δὲ τῆς τολμης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας, τὸ διωμόσασθαι. Similarly Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 3, ἄξιον ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι. Here the Infinitives justify the warmth of the expressions *θαυμάζω* and *ἄξιον ἐστιν*.

Symp. 204 a, αὐτὸν γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶν χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κάγαθὸν μηδέ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for ἐστὶν χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which *ἀμαθία* has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἀλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ἔνυμβάλλεται κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 74 d, ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 e, ἐγὼ αἴτιος . . . τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὁ διανοούμενος ἡρόμην ἀλλ’ ἔτερον, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—'to get a thing done by another,'—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (*διδάσκεσθαι*), by some passages in the Meno.

Meno 93 d, ἡ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλέοφαντον τὸν νιὸν ἵππεα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγάθον; and, just after, ἐπαιδεύσατο—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

Meno 94 c, Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο νιεῖς ἔθρεψε . . ., καὶ τούτους ἐπαιδεύευσε τά τε ἀλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ—where the Active ἐπαιδεύεις is as distinctively used of the father's *getting his sons taught by others*. Similarly ib. b, d, ἐδίδαξε.

As the favourite example, *διδάσκεσθαι*, thus⁸ falls to the ground, so do the rest. *Δανείζεσθαι*, for instance, is ‘to take a *δανεῖον*’, as *δανείζειν* is ‘to give a *δανεῖον*’ that is, the general meaning of the Verb being ‘to deal in *δανεῖα*,’ the Middle means ‘to deal in them for oneself.’ So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: *χρᾶν* and *χρῆσθαι* express the active and passive side of ‘dealing in oracles.’ So, rather differently, ‘bringing a man to justice’ becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, *κρίνειν*, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, *κρίνεσθαι*.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning ‘to get a thing done by another;’ neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that “qui facit per alium facit per se.”

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in *Æsch.* Ag. 594, “Ομως δὲ θυνον,—where Clytaemnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in v. 87 described by the words *περίπεμπτα θυοσκινεῖς*,—in Hdt. iii. 80, [ἀνὴρ τύραννος] *κτείνει* ἀκρί-*tous*, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands half-way between the Middle and the Passive.

‘To allow oneself to be,’ ‘to expose oneself to be,’ ‘to get oneself,’—subjected to this or that, may be designated the *Semi-Middle* sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, *ἐξάγοντες καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι*—‘allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.’

Phædo 67 a, *ἀναπιμπλώμεθα*—‘allow ourselves to be infected.’
And so Hip. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [φθόγγοις] *τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μή*—‘which allow themselves to be united’—i. e. ‘which harmonise.’

Meno 91 c, *μηδένα . . . τοσάντη μανία λάθοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι*—‘get himself into disgrace.’

Phileb. 58 c, *ἀπεχθήσει Γοργίᾳ*—‘you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.’

⁸ *διδάξασθαι* also means ‘to take a pupil.’ So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, *τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι εἰδότι βρέφερον*, Simonid. ap. Gaisf. Fr. liv. p. 377, *διδαξάμενος* *χορὸν ἀνδρῶν*, Arist. Nub. 783, ‘Τθλεῖς ἀπέρρι, οὐκ ἐν διδαξάμην σ' ἔτι. (Socrates speaks.)

Apol. 35 c, *χρὴ οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἔθιζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὐθὲ ὑμᾶς ἔθιζεσθαι.*

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, *οὐνήμενος*—‘one that earns a benefit,’ iv. 373, *Ὦς δὴ δῆθ’ ἐνὶ νήσῳ ἐρύκεαι*—‘allowest thyself to be detained’ by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, *ἐλασπούμενοι ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις δίκαιοι* ‘letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,’ similarly iv. 64, *ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡστάσθαι.* Eur. Phœn. 602, (A) *Καί σε δεύτερον γ’ ἀπαιτῶ σκῆπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθονός.* (B) *Οὐκ ἀπαιτούμεσθα.* Soph. Aj. 217, *νύκτερος Αἴας ἀπελωβήθη.* Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, *τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα . . . εὐρήσετε πάντες ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἔξεταζομένην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεί,* c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, *ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τι καὶ συγχωρεῖν.* Add *στεφανοῦσθαι*, so common in Pindar (e. g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for ‘winning a crown.’

Hence also the double sense of Verbs in *-τός*, as *γνωστός*, from *γιγνώσκειν*, ‘known :’ *γνωστός*, from *γιγνώσκεσθαι*, ‘capable of being known’ (lit. ‘allowing itself to be known’). And in privatives—*ἄλυτος*, from *λύειν*, ‘unbroken ;’ *ἄλυτος*, from *λύεσθαι*, ‘that does not allow itself to be broken,’ ‘unbreakable.’

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, *Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur, lit.*, ‘let themselves be protected by the strength of their position’—i. e. ‘were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.’ So Juv. xv. 157, *defendier isdem Turribus, Virg. Aen. ii. 707, cervici imponere nostræ.* So *juris consultus* is ‘one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.’

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phædo 98 b, *ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος φλόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὅρῳ ἀνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον κ.τ.λ.* The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, *ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν,*

κ.τ.λ. The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, ἐδόκουν . . . εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν . . . , μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἴμεν κριταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπιστα ἔ. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ξυνέστησεν δ ἔνυιστάς . . . τάδε διανυηθείς, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα . . . τέλεον . . . εἴη, . . . ζτι δὲ ἵνα ἀγήρων καὶ ἀνοσον ἔ.

Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδὴ . . . γυναικα ἡγαγόμην . . . ἐφύλαττον . . . ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι παιδίον γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε —because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, πάντα ἀν ἐφοβούμην, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων . . . νῦν δὲ δύμως θαρρῶ. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορῆσαι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἔφη . . . λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ηδη ἀν ὑμῶν οἱ νιεῖς διαφθαρήσονται. The reason why διαφευξοίμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφθαρήσονται which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφεύξομαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι οὐχ οἶστος τ' ἔσομαι . . . οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ὀλίγον ἀποδρᾶς φύσιμην. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Ib. 198 e, προυρρήθη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἔκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ἀ νῦν οὗτος ἔφη συμβήσεσθαι, ἐὰν ἔγω στεφανῶμαι.

§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the *Oratio Recta*, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, *ἐβούλεύντο ὅ τι χρὴ αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι* would be an exception to the rule, if *χρῆ* were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, Il. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, Il. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the *Oratio Obliqua* of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, *οὐτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναεν εἰχον . . . , αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ιερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡφανίζετο*—where, just as *οὐκ εἰχον* is the Oblique Narration of the *thought* *οὐκ ἔχομεν*, 'they could not, they thought,' so *ἡφανίζετο* represents them thinking *αἱ τιμαὶ ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ. ἀφανίζεται*. Now *ἀφανίζεται* would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so *ἡφανίζετο* is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antipho ii. A. β. 9. p. 117, *ἀλοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἥδειν ἐκστησόμενος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἐστερούμην*—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58–60. p. 8, *φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγινόμην κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὑρισκον κ.τ.λ.*—where the *σκοπῶν* shews that *ἐγινόμην* means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, *αἱ δὲ ἀλλαι, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον.*

Gorg. 484 a, *ἔαν . . . φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, . . . ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος δοῦλος.*

Phileb. 17 d, *ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα λάθησι οὕτω, τότε ἐγένουν σοφός.*

Lysis 217 d, *ὅταν δὴ τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκαῖ.*

The Subjunctive construction with *ἄν*, not admissible with a past

Tense, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. *β.* Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.

Phædo 88 d, *πῆ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον*; lit. ‘overtook’ (same metaphor as 89 c, *εἰ . . . με διαφεύγοι* [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.] *δ λόγος*). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, *μετάλλασέν τέ μιν*. Antiphon ii. A. a. 3. p. 115, *ἔως ἂν διωχθῇ*, ‘until he is caught.’

Ib. 108 c, [*ἡ μὲν*] *φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπονταν οἰκησιν* *ἡ δὲ . . . φέρησε τὸν αὐτὴν ἔκαστη τόπον προσήκοντα*—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, ‘at once finds a home in’ &c.

Symp. 172 a, *οὗτος, οὐ περιμένει*; Κάγδῳ *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα*—not ‘waited for him to come up with me,’ but ‘let him come up with me.’

Ib. 173 b, *τί οὖν οὐδηγήσω μοι*; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, ‘why not at once relate it to me?’ So Phædo 86 d, Soph. 251 e, &c. Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, *Τί οὐκ ἀπεκοιμήθημεν*;

Symp. 209 a, *ἄψυχος προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ κνέν. κυῆσαι* is the first moment of the state *κνέν*.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, *ἔδοξε, ἔδοξαν*, ‘I came to think.’

§ 95. *D.* Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as *ὑει*, *νιφει*, *ἔστεισε* (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. *a.* Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, *οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται*.

Ib. 261 b, *λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται*.

Polit. 299 a, *ἄν δὲ ἀν καταψήφισθῇ*.

Legg. 914 a, *δηλωθέντων* (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. *b.* Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as ‘the circumstances,’ ‘the event,’ ‘the course of events,’ is understood. The common words *ἐνδέχεται*, *παρέχει* (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase *οὗτος ἔχει*, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis

(as Hom. Il. iv. 345, *φίλ'* [ἥν], xiv. 98, *Τρωστὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται*, xvi. 128, *οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλωνται*, xxii. 533, *δίω λοίγι' ἔσεσθαι*, Od. ii. 203, *ἴσα ἔσσεται*, viii. 384, *΄Ηδ' ἄρ' ἔτοιμα τέτυκτο*, xi. 455, *οὐκέτι πιστὰ γναιξίν*, Thuc. ii. 3, *ἐπεὶ ἔτοιμα ἦν*, i. 102, *τούτου ἐνδεῖ ἐφαίνετο*, i. 7, *πλωτήμωτέρων ὅντων*, Hdt. vi. 52, *δῆλά σφι ἔσεσθαι*, the common *ἀδύνατά ἔστι*, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, *δέξεται*, *ώς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*, *καὶ ἐτέραν ἀπόδειξιν*—‘the case will admit.’

Ib. 452 d, *καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο*—‘the result made this plain also.’

Phædo 73 b, *έάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγη ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχει*—‘what ensues is proof positive,’ &c.

Apol. 28 b, *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ*—lit. ‘lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.’ ‘There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.’ Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, *στήσεται γὰρ κάκει*—‘for there too demonstration must stop.’ Hdt. iii. 82, *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μοναρχίην*.

Phileb. 25 d, *ἀλλ' ἵσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτὸν δράσει*—‘perhaps it will do equally well now.’

Phædo 118 a, *ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται*—‘when the action of the poison reaches the heart.’

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, *ἔξ ἦς ἐπιβατὸν ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους . . . ἐγίγνετο*.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, *προϊὸν δὲ τι σαφέστερον δείξει*—‘the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.’

Phædo 117 b, *καὶ οὔτως αὐτὸς ποιήσει*—‘the agent left to itself will complete its work.’ There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theæt. 200 e, *δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό*. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, “How deep is it?”, says, “How can I tell beforehand? *we shall see.*” From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἶόν ἔστιν, αὐτό σοι τάχα δηλώσει*.

Hip. Ma. 288 b, *ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει εὖ οἴδα· εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος αὐτὸς δεῖξει*—‘we shall see by the event.’

Protag. 324 a, *αὐτὸς σε διδάξει*.

Ib. 329 b, *ἴκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰς δηλοῖ*.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, *δῆλοι δὲ οὐ κατ’ ἐν μοῦνον, ἀλλὰ πανταχῆ, ἡ ἴστησιρή ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον*, vi. 86, *οὕτε μέμνημαι τὸ πρῆγμα, οὕτε με περιφέρει οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τουτέων τῶν ὑμεῖς λέγετε.* *Æsch. Choeph. 993, Φίλον τέως, νῦν δὲ ἔχθρὸν, ὡς φαίνεται, κακόν* (‘as the event shews.’) *Æschin. i. 40. p. 6, ὡς αὐτὸς τοῦργον ἔδειξεν.* *Antiph. v. 60. p. 136, αὐτῷ μοι πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀποκτέναι τὸν ἄνδρα.* *Lysias x. 20. p. 118, δηλώσει δέ* (sc. id quod sequitur δηλώσει) *οἰχήσεται γάρ.*

§ 101. We find also Non-Impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e. g.

Crat. 393 e, *τὸ ὄνομα, δὲ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 402 e, *τοῦτό γε (τὸ ὄνομα) διλγον αὐτὸς λέγει ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*

Soph. 237 b, *καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων δὲ λόγος αὐτὸς ἀν δηλώσειε.*

Cf. Dem. c. Dionys. 13. p. 1287, *ἔδήλωσε δὲ αὐτὸς τὸ ἔργον.* Eur.

Hel. 146 sqq., (A) *Συμπροξένησον, ὡς τύχω μαντευμάτων* “*Οπη νεῶς στείλαιμ’ αν οὕριον πτερὸν κ.τ.λ.*”—(B) *Πλοῦς, δὲ ξέν’*, αὐτὸς *σημανεῖ.*

§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. *Ἐχειν*, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From *ἔχειν* governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e. g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, *κίονες ὑψόσ’ ἔχοντες*—‘holding,’ properly not themselves, but their *heads*, or, vaguely, *parts of themselves*, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, *ἀνάβασις ἐσ αὐτοὺς ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ πάντας τοὺς πύργους ἔχουσα πεποίηται*—where *ἔχουσα* has for its Object each part of the *ἀνάβασις* in succession.

From *ἔχειν* governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e. g. Od. iii. 182, *αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε Πύλουνδ’ ἔχον*—‘held my ship on her course for Pylos;’—the

ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him;—whence simply ‘I held on for Pylos.’

On the other hand, in the following passage *κατέχειν* has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 c, *οἵοι τ' ἡσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν*—‘to keep themselves,’—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common *ἔχει δῆ* (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is ‘hold,’ scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—(as the case may be).

Gorg. 475 d, *τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ λατρῷ παρέχων*—‘offering,’ not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 e, *ὅταν τις ἐφῆ ἵσχυρῷ γέλωτι.* So 563 a, *ξυγκαθιέναι.*

Ib. 422 c, *ἀναστρέφειν.* So Lach. 191 e.

Ib. 467 b, *ἀναλαβεῖν.*

Ib. 473 b, *μεταβαλεῖν.*

Ib. 540 a, 591 e, *παρακινεῖν.* So 573 c, *ὑποκινεῖν.*

Phædo 65 a, *ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.*

Ib. 98 d, *χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα.*

Phdr. 228 e, *παῖε.* Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Politic. 258 a, *Θεατήτῳ . . . ξυνέμιξα.*

Phædo 72 b, *εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοῖη*—lit. (as we might say) ‘put in an appearance on the other side.’

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. Il. xxiii. 686, *ἀνασχομένω χεροὶ στιβαρῆσι.* The language had become accustomed to *ἀνασχέσθαι* Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, *Ἐμβαλέειν κώπης—ἐμβαλεῖν* being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for ‘dashing in the oars.’ (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, *νηὶ κατηγαγόμεσθα.*

§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, *πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν*—‘to fall short’—lit. ‘to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.’

Phdr. 237 d, *θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποθέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα. ἀναφέροντες*, ‘referring,’ scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, *ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ*—‘entrusting,’ scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of *ἔχειν* illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, *τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχότων*—there is no need to express *what* they pervaded or occupied, since *σεισμοὶ* (so used) must be *σεισμοὶ τῆς γῆς*. Or when *ἔχειν* is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, *ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον* so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said *ἄγειν*, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly *ἄγεται*, is said *ἄγειν* cf. Thuc. v. 54, *Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἔστεβαλον*. [So Arnold: *ἔστεβαλλον* Poppo and Götler].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phædo 58 e—59 a, *οὕτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆγει . . .* διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινὸν εἰσῆγει. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in *ἔλεος με εἰσῆγει*), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, *πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας*.

Ib. 274 e, *εἶναι γεγονός. 289 a, ἦν ἀν τεθέν.* 308 e, *ἐστὶ τείνοντα.*

Tim. 38 c, *ἐστὶν ὅν. 68 d, ἡγνοηκὼς ἀν εἴη. 77 e, εἴη διαδιδόμενον.*

Soph. 244 c, τὸ ἀποδέχεσθαι . . . [ἔστι] λόγον οὐκ ἀν ἔχον.

Legg. 860 e, εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐτως ἔχοντά ἔστιν.

§ 110. β. Peculiar Intransitive use of *ἔχων* with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 c, *ἔχων* φλυαρεῖς.

Phdr. 236 e, τὶ δῆτα *ἔχων* στρέψει;

§ 111. IDIOMS OF PREPOSITIONS.

Ανά.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀνατίθεμαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in

Hipparch. 229 e, ὥσπερ πεπτεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὁ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. Soph. Aj. 476, Προσθεῖσα κάναθεῖσα τοῦ γε κατθανεῖν, and Lobeck's note upon it.

Από.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἀν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μῆ—‘who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.’ (Even supposing that *κάτω* could refer to the starting point and *ἄνω* to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of *τὰ κάτω* and *τὰ ἄνω* in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, δ τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσκηκώς . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατός ἔστι μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 656, λόγισαι φαύλως μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἀπὸ χειρός.

§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative; ‘by help of.’ This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δι’ ἣν ἔπραξαν ἀ ἔπραξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 e, τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα . . . μὴ αὐτὴν δι’ αὐτῆς—‘acting only by and through itself,’ independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἰδεσι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη, and similarly 511 c.

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 14, *ὅταν μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται.*

Rep. 463 e, *εἰ δύναματα διὰ τῶν στόματων μόνον φθέγγουτο.*

Ib. 580 b, *οὐδὲ πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται—‘the paramount judge decides absolutely.’ An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.*

Meno 74 a, *τὴν μίαν, οὐδὲ πάντων τούτων ἔστι—‘which is out beyond all these,’ i. e. ‘which all these run up to,’ ‘which is paramount to all these.’*

Rep. 343 b, *διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—‘night after night and day after day.’*

Ib. 621 a, *πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.*

Symp. 220 b, *ἀνυπόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο.* This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy's Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer's διὰ νήσου *ἰών* in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, *διαπορεύεσθαι*, and Critias 106 a, *διαπορεία*—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —‘doing the distance.’ Cf. *διαθεῖν*, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. *Εἰς.*

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, *φέρονται . . . εἰς τὸν ποταμούς*—not ‘into’ but ‘along’ or ‘down’ the rivers⁹.

§ 114. β. ‘To the number of.’

Legg. 704 b, *ἀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινας ὄγδοήκοντα σταδίους.*

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, *δλίγους εἰς χιλίους.* So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. ‘In regard to,’ ‘in the point of,’ ‘with a view to.’

Symp. 184 b, *εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα.*

Ibid. d, *οὐ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔνυμβάλλεσθαι, οὐ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι.*

Ib. 196 c, *εἰς γε ἀνδρίαν Ἐρωτι οὐδὲ Ἀρης ἀνθίσταται.*

Ib. 219 d, *ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οὐδὲ ἐγώ οὐκ ἀν φύμην ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.*

Theaet. 169 a, *ἰκανὸν ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.*

⁹ [Under this example is in the MS. ‘Cf. Odyss.’]

Theaet. 178 e, τὸ περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἔκαστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἀν προδοξάσαις ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν δστισῦν;

Legg. 635 a, ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἀ καὶ μηδέν γε ἀνῆς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν.

Euthyd. 305 d, τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴστεσθαι σοφίας πέρι.

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 158, Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὅπα ἔοικεν. Also Andoc. ii. 23, πολιτείαν διδόντας τε, καὶ εἰς χρήματα μεγάλας δωρεάς. Lysias xxvi. 21, p. 177, περὶ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν οὗτος εἰπεῖν ἔξει εἰς μισθοδημίαν.

§ 116. Ἐκ.

a. Euthyd. 282 a, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρασκευάζεσθαι.

b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο—‘hereupon : the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 2, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιν, Choeph. 1055, Ποταίνιον γὰρ αἰμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι· Ἐκ τῶνδέ τοι ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει.

§ 117. Ἐν.

a. ‘In the point of.’

Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὅμολογοῦντα—‘agreeing in their aspect.’

Symp. 213 e, νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

Theaet. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ δψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειράμενος.

b. Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 457 a, ἐμβραχύ. Cf. the form *καθεῖς* in St. John viii. 9, ἐξήρχοντο εἰς καθεῖς.

§ 118. Ἐπί.

a. With Dative ;—‘in connection with’— signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.

Rep. 376 e, ἔστι δέ πον ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ μουσική.

Ib. 408 b, οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι.

Ib. 532 e, ἐπ’ ἀδυναμίᾳ βλέπειν.

Symp. 186 a, [Ἐρως] οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 184 e, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ Ἐρως ἄλλος δὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει.

Ib. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὄτφοῦν σώματι.

Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπ’ εἴδει καλόν.

Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἄμα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις ξυμφυὲς γεγονός.

Polit. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τέχνη φάρμακον.

Tim. 48 e, *ἰκανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεχθεῖσιν.*

Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, *τῶν φευγόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις.*

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.

Legg. 697 c, *ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους.*

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 245, *ἔξι ἔτι πατρῶν.*

§ 120. c. In Composition.

Crito 43 c, *ἐπιλύεται*—‘exempts.’ Perhaps the meaning of *ἐπὶ* is ‘with a further result’ or ‘condition,’ and so *ἐπιλύεσθαι* would be to obtain a man’s release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* be ‘to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,’ and so ‘to offer,’ ‘promise.’

Symp. 172 a, *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα.* *ἐπιστῆναι* is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. *στῆναι* is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So *ἐπιλέγεσθαι* is to pick out, e. g. in passing along a line. *ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα* is equivalent to the one word *ἐπέμεινα.* For *ἐπιμένειν* see under *περί*, § 127.

Phædo 62 e, δ *Σωκράτης . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἡμᾶς.* From the notion of succession here again we should get ‘looking [from Cebes] to us,’—‘turning to us.’ Cf. Apol. 31 d, *ἐπικωμῳδῶν.*

§ 121. *Katá.*

a. With Accusative.

Legg. 918 a, *ἐπεται κατὰ πόδα*—‘in close succession.’

Soph. 243 d, *κατὰ πόδα γε, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες*—‘you have caught at once the train of the thought.’ This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying *κατὰ πόδα ἐπόμενος.*

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.

Meno 74 b, *μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.*

Ib. 76 a, *κατὰ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω.*

Ib. 77 a, *κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι.*

Phædo 70 d, *μὴ τοίνυν κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο*—‘consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.’ The *κατὰ*, in a pregnant use, stands for *ὡς κατ’ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενον.*

Phdr. 260 b, *συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου.*

§ 122. c. In Composition.

a. Symp. 219 c, *καταδρθάνειν*—‘to earn by sleeping.’

β. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.

Apol. 33 e, οὐκ ἀν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, δοὺς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς ὄρθως εἴρηκε, κατανομοθετήσει.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἡ κατελεῆσαι ἡ καταχαρίσασθαι Ἀνδοκίδη.

Isaeus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀποδοῦναι τὰ ὅντ' αὐτῷ καταναγκάσαντες—‘peremptorily compelling.’

This *κατὰ* often, but not always or necessarily (see the last instance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

§ 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 e, μέχρι ὅποι.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλῶν ἐμαντόν.

Cf. Pind. Pyth. x. 62, πὰρ ποδός, and Soph. Phil. 838, παρὰ πόδα.

β. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον—literally, ‘up to so little’ difference from the other quantity compared, i. e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not ‘beyond’ but ‘contrasted with’ (lit. ‘put coordinate with’).

Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν.

Theaet. 144 a, ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντινον.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—‘our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.’

Symp. 188 d, δι περὶ τάγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς [Ἐρως]—‘temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.’

§ 125. c. With Genitive;—‘obtained from’ or ‘proceeding from,’—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεσθαι ταῦτα . . . οὐδὲν σοφόν—‘that these things should receive recognition from us.’

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

Politie. 296 a, λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον.

Critias 107 b, τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ρήθεντα.

Protag. 312 b, ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἐρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή. (παρὰ πάντων follows παρακέλευσις.)

Cf. Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, παρὰ πάντων ὀμολογουμένως ταῦθ' ὑμῖν ἵπάρχει.

§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the *παρά*.

Rep. 362 c, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον.

Ib. 461 e, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 612 c, μισθοὺς . . . ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ’ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.

Tim. 52 d, οὐτος . . . παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψῆφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόσθω λόγος.

With this use of *παρὰ* cf. that of *πρὸς*, Hdt. iii. 137, ὥνα φανῆ πρὸς Δαρείουν ἔὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑωυτοῦ δόκιμος. Antiph. i. 25. p. 114, καὶ γάρ ἀν δικαιότερον καὶ δσιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο ὑμῖν.

§ 127. Περί.

b¹⁰. With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ὅρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

Phædo 114 d, θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα. The feeling is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phædo 59 e, καὶ ὑμῖν ἔξελθῶν δ θυρωρὸς . . . εἰπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι κ.τ.λ. The meaning of *περιμένειν* will be elucidated by distinguishing it from *ἐπιμένειν*. *ἐπιμένειν* is to stop in the course of a progress from one point to another until somebody comes or something happens. The *ἐπί*, as in *ἐπιστῆναι*, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be resumed. It answers to the Latin *præstolari*. *περιμένειν* is to defer *any* intended proceeding, to remain *in statu quo*, until

¹⁰ [In the MS. the uses of *περὶ* with the Dative are lettered b., its uses in Composition d. Apparently uses with the Accusative and Genitive were to have come in, lettered a. and c.]

a certain future moment. The *περὶ* has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence *περιμένειν* here is ‘to wait a certain time,’ which time is specified in the next words. *ἐπιμένειν* would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, δὸς Φαληρεύς, ἔφη, οὐτος Ἀπολλόδωρος, οὐ περιμένειν; Κάγῳ ἐπιστὰς περιμένειν. Here the addition of the local *ἐπιστὰς* in the second sentence shews that *περιμένειν* is not local. οὐ περιμένειν; ‘wait a moment’ is more civil than ‘wait *there*.’

§ 128. Πρός.

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i. e. not ‘for’ but ‘*in regard of fitness for*’: in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phædo 117 b, τί λέγεις περὶ τοῦτον πόματος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τινι;—‘what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity?’ lit. ‘in regard of its fitness for a libation.’

Protag. 328 b, νοῆσαι τινα, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κάγαθὸν γενέσθαι—‘to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming’ &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνῆσαν ἀλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὡφέλειαν.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμὰς μείζοι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 69 a, ἡ ὁρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή—lit. ‘right in regard of fitness for making men good.’

Rep. 581 e, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἔκαστον τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ . . . πρὸς τὸ καλλιον καὶ αἰσχιον ζῆν.

b. With Dative.

Phædo 112 e, ἀναντει γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἔκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἥν—‘absorbed in.’

Cf. Dem. F. L. 127. p. 380, ἥν ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι (Jelf).

§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb *πρὸς* sometimes has the general meaning of ‘additionally,’ and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—‘to have in addition.’

Ib. 607 b, προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ—‘and let us say to her moreover.’

Theæt. 208 e, *τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀλλων προσλάβῃ*—‘apprehends in addition its difference from other things.’ So 209 d, *προσδοξάσται*.

Apol. 20 a, *σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.*

Phædo 74 a, *τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἔννοεῖν.*

Gorg. 516 d, *Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῆ προσεζημίωσαν.*

§ 130. ‘Υπέρ.

‘With a view to.’

Phædo 107 c, *ἐπιμελείας δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν φῷ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν.*

Protag. 318 d, *εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι.*

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, *οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀποθανόντος Θηραμένους, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πονηρίας.*

§ 131. ‘Υπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, *ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ [λόγον]*—‘somewhat impious.’

Gorg. 493 c, *ὑπό τι ἀτοπα.*

b. In Composition.

a. *ὑπολογίζεσθαι.*

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, *ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.*

Lach. 189 b, *λέγ' οὖν μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.*

Note, that *ὑπολογίζεσθαι* is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, *οὐδὲν εἰκὸς αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπόλογον γενέσθαι* [so Bekker; *οὐδένα . . . τούτου* Zurich editors]—where *αὐτῷ* means ‘in his favour,’ and xxviii. 13. p. 180, *οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τούτοις φημὶ ἀν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγήν*,—not, as Taylor, ‘honestam *excusationem* in suo *exsilio habere*,’ but ‘non *injuria* iis laudi imputandum.’

The word does not mean ‘to subtract,’ according to our notion of the operation; but ‘to reckon against,’ ‘per contra’:—the same meaning of *ὑπὸ* which we get in *ὑπαντῆν*, *ὑπωμοσία* (‘an affidavit to stop’ proceedings), *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* (equivalent to *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι*).

β. *ὑποπίνειν.*

Rep. 372 d, *μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες.*

§ 132. IDIOMS OF PARTICLES.

A. *Kai* expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here *kai* may generally¹¹ be rendered 'at all.'

Phædo 77 b, *πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι*—‘before it came at all.’

Ib. 88 a, *πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς*—‘before we came into being at all.’

Ib. 110 a, *ὅπου ἀν καὶ γῆ ἡ*—‘exists at all.’

Apol. 22 a, *ἴνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γίγνοιτο.* Here *kai* fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound *ἀνέλεγκτος*—‘not to be called in question at all.’

Phædo 66 d, *έάν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται.*

Ib. 108 d, *εἴ καὶ ἡπιστάμην*—‘if I even had had the knowledge.’

Ib. 110 b, *εἴ δει καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν*—‘if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.’

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, *ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο.*

This *kai* frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective *σμικρός*.

Apol. 28 b, *ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὅφελός ἔστιν.*

Soph. 247 c, *εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι συγχωρεῖν.*

Ib. 261 b, *θαρρεῖν χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον.*

Phileb. 58 a, *ἔνυμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται.*

Politic. 278 d, *πῶς . . . δύναται ἀν τις ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδοῦς ἐπὶ τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν*;

The remaining passages shew the *kai* entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphro 3 a, *τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;*

Ib. 6 b, *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν*;

Phædo 61 e, *τί γὰρ ἀν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο;*

Laches 184 d, *τί γὰρ ἀν τις καὶ ποιοῖ*;

¹¹ Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e. g. Thuc. ii. 11, *οὐκούν χρή, εἴ τις καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπένει, τούτον ἔνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν*—‘if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,—or rather ‘if we are

a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.’ So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, *εἰς ἡ δὴ βλέποντις καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν*—‘upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.’

There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with *τι*. The *καὶ* neutralises this affirmation. ‘What have you done?’ implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with *πῶς καὶ ποῦ καὶ, &c.*, where the *καὶ* *affirms* the implied Proposition: *Æsch. Choeph. 528, Ποῦ καὶ τελευτὴ . . . λόγος*; ‘what was the issue?’ —implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads *Καὶ ποῦ*. Cf. however *Eurip. Phoen. 1354, Πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων παίδων φόνος*;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of *καὶ* is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, παντάπασιν ἀν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη.

Euthyd. 304 e, οὐτωσὶ γάρ πως καὶ εἰπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι.

Rep. 328 c, διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκειν αὐτόν.

Ib. 395 e, πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν. This phrase often recurs.

Symp. 177 a, φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι.

Ibid. b, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡττον καὶ θαυμαστόν—where Stallbaum well compares *Thuc. vi. 1, ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέθεντο*, but wrongly joins *καὶ*, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean *Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπετίθεντο*, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. *ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο*.]

Phædo 107 c, δ κίνδυνος καὶ δόξειεν ἀν δεινὸς εἶναι.

Phileb. 25 b, σὺ καὶ ἔμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἥδη ἔτη.

Rep. 342 c, συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις.

Symp. 189 a, ἔφη εἰτεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ’ ἐπαύσατο.

Ib. 194 a, εὐ καὶ μάλ’ ἀν φοβοῦ.

Phædo 117 b, καὶ μάλα ἔλεως. *Ibid. c, καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς.*

Protag. 315 d, στρώμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς.

Legg. 832 a, καὶ μάλ’ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἀφυεῖς ὄντας.

Phædo 61 e, καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μελλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδη- μεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 404 b, ἀπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικῆ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

Legg. 773 c, ἀ μὴ βουλόμεθα ξυμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μᾶλιστα ξυμβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.

Euthyd. 293 e, (A) Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; (B) Καὶ μάλα, ή δ' ὅς—‘on the contrary.’

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 318, Δῶρον . . . δόμεναι οἰκόνδε φέρεσθαι, Καὶ μάλα καλὸν ἐλῶν, ib. 46, Καὶ λίγην κείνος γε ἑοικότι κεῖται δλέθρῳ, Il. xiii. 638, Τῶνπέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἶναι, Od. viii. 154, Κήδεα μοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἥπερ ἀεθλοι. Hdt. ii. 69, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θήβας καὶ κάρτα ἥγηνται αὐτὸνς εἶναι ἴρούς (where of course καὶ κάρτα goes with ἥγηνται). Aesch. P. V. 728, Αὖται σ' ὀδηγήσουσι καὶ μᾶλ' ἀσμένως, Choeph. 879, καὶ μᾶλ' ἡβῶντος δὲ δεῖ, Eum. 373, δόξαι τ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μᾶλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμναὶ κ.τ.λ. Soph. El. 1455, Πάρεστι δῆτα καὶ μᾶλ' ἄγηλος θέα.

§ 134. *Kai* is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the *kai* indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the *kai* is sometimes postponed.

Phædo 63 c, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δισχυρισάμην ἀν καὶ τοῦτο —where the *kai* emphasizes δισχυρισάμην.

Ib. 68 c, ή σωφροσύνη, ἥν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην—where the stress of *kai* includes *hēn*.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ φύμην τοῖς δημηγόροις καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔγχωρεν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ—where καὶ emphasizes μόνοις.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐσ ὁ δὴ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπύθοντο—i. e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. Μή.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theæt. 192 e, Σωκράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει . . . , ὁρᾶ δὲ μηδέτερον—‘but sees, by the supposition, neither.’

Phileb. 18 e, τοῦτ' αὐτὸν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἔκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθὺς ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 106 d, σχολῆ γὰρ ἀν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο. The meaning is not ‘of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,’ but ‘there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.’ The existence of the whole class ‘incorruptible’ becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὁ ἀν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῆι, μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς—‘suppose we say, not.’

Hip. Ma. 299 d, ἀρ' οὐν ἡδὺν ἡδέος . . . διαφέρει τῷ ἡδὺν εἶναι; μὴ γάρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἦ ἐλάττων.

Politic. 292 e, πεττευταὶ τοσοῦτοι οὐκ ἀν γένοιντό ποτε, μή τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—‘let alone kings.’ Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of *μή τι* is enhanced by its *following* the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἔτοιμος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 295 e, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτερα προστάττειν; (‘is he to be forbidden?’)

Cf. Aeschin. iii. 21. p. 56, ὅτι ἡρξα, μὴ ἀποδημήσω; (‘am I not to’ &c.?)

The *μὴ* in the Brachylogical combination *μὴ ὅτι* comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (A) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ.; (B) Μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 a, (A) τί δέ; (B) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 b, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις· ἀλλὰ μὴ οῦτως.

Meno 75 a, (A) πειρῶ εἰπεῖν. (B) Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (A) Οὗτος σύ, ποι θεῖς; ἐπὶ καδίσκους; (B) Μηδαμῶς.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of ‘whether.’—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of ‘perhaps’—from which the sense of ‘whether’ just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ γάρ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνω συνάπτεις;—‘are you perhaps not joining’ &c.? i. e. ‘perhaps you are not joining.’

Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ἴπολαμβάνεις—‘perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.’

§ 139. οὐ πάνυ.

The universal meaning of *οὐ πάνυ* is ‘hardly,’ ‘scarcely.’

Theæt. 149 d, οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὐκ ἀν πάνυ τολμήσει φῆσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευεν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Phædo 63 a, οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι.

Ibid. c, οὐκ ἀν πάνυ διπχυρισταίμην.

Ib. 85 d, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ικανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.

Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ.

Theæt. 145 a, οὐ πάνυ ἀξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον πείσαι.

Phædo 59 a, οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσήγει.

Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μον καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'

Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδὲν αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα.

Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνυ οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲν αὐτὸς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.

Phileb. 41 a, σχεδὸν γάρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἀν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 e, κρανίων, ἃ ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'

Apol. 19 a, οἷμαι δὲ αὐτὸς χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶόν ἔστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'

Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μον . . . οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'

Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II. vii. 3, ἐλλείποντες περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίγνονται, IV. i. 30, τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται.

§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὐ πάνυ δλίγοις ἐγώ τούτων παραγέγονα—where πάνυ goes closely with δλίγοις. Quite different also are πάνυ οὐ, παντάπασιν οὐ, &c.

§ 141. Οὐδέ.

The use of οὐδέ for καὶ οὐ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδέ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδέ ῥάδιον—for σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον.

Legg. 730 d, *τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν· ὁ δὲ μηδὲ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἀξιος ἐκείνου*—‘but he who *beyond this* does not allow’ &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, *μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ἢ οὐδὲ μέμνησαι*;—for *ἢ καὶ οὐ μέμνησαι*; ‘or on the contrary,’ lit. ‘or, which is also an alternative.’

Phædo 72 a, *ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀδίκως ὠμολογήκαμεν*—i. e. *ἰδὲ τοίνυν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ὠμ.*

Crito 44 b, *ὅς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐδὲ μία ἔνυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.* Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have *οὐδεμίᾳ*], it will be explained by resolving the *οὐδέ*, and attaching the *καὶ* to *ὅς*, ‘since *moreover* the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but’ &c.

Ib. 45 a, *καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργυριον ἐστί*—for *καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 45 c, *ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον*—for *ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον*.

Cf. Isoer. xviii. 65. p. 383, *ὅτι οὐδὲ οὕτω ῥάδιον ἦν*—‘when, *besides*, it was not easy.’ Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, *ἔτι δὲ οὐδέ*—for *ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὐ*.

§ 142. Ἀλλά.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c-d, we have *seriatim ἀλλὰ γὰρ*—*ἀλλὰ δῆ*.

Apol. 37 b-c, we have the series *πότερον*—*ἀλλὰ*—*ἀλλὰ δῆ*.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series *πρῶτον μὲν*—*καὶ μὲν δὴ . . . γε*—*ἀλλά*.

§ 143. Εὐθύς, νῦν, αὐτίκα, πολλάκις, &c.

a. *εὐθὺς* ‘from first to last,’ Phdr. 259 c.

β. *νῦν* ‘as the case now stands,’ Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. *αὐτίκα* ‘for instance,’ Theæt. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 e,

Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, *ώσπερ αὐτίκα*, Laches 195 b, *ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα*.

δ. *πολλάκις* ‘perchance’ after *μή*, Protag. 361 c: after *εἰ ἄρα*, Phædo 60 e, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, *εἴ τινων πολλάκις ἄρα διακήκοας*, Phdr. 238 d, *ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος γένωμαι*. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, *ώσπερ γε καὶ Σιμίμιαν τις ἱδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη*.

ε. *ὅτε* ‘whereas.’ “*Οτέ οὖν δὴ* equivalent to *ἐπειδὴ οὖν*, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So *δόπτε*, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.

§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter *simultaneously* into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination *καὶ—δέ*, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, *ἔως ἀν καθήρη σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ*. The *δὲ* and the *καὶ* enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. *Καὶ μέντοι* only differs from *καὶ—δέ* in that the *μέντοι* is stronger than the *δέ*, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 e, *καὶ μέντοι οὐτωσὶ ποίησον*.

Ib. 222 a, *καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην κ.τ.λ.*

Apol. 17 c, *καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέοματι*.

Ib. 26 e, *ἄπιστός γ' εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαυτῷ*.

Ib. 31 b, *καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνον κ.τ.λ.*

Euthyd. 289 e, *καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν*.

Alc. I. 113 c, *καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις*.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is *καὶ οὖν καὶ*.

Protag. 309 b, *καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἰπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνον ἔρχομαι.*

d. Such again is *δ' ἀλλά*.

Soph. 235 d, *σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρῶτον*.

e. And again *δὲ—μέντοι*.

Phdr. 267 c, *Πρωταγόρεια δὲ οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄπτα*;

§ 147. f. *Ἄλλὰ γάρ*.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the *γὰρ* refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the *ἀλλὰ* belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition: for the *ἀλλὰ* sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the *γὰρ* does. *Ἄλλὰ γάρ* has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of ‘but be that as it may,’ or ‘but the truth is.’

Symp. 180 a, Αἴσχυλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ κ.τ.λ.· ἀλλὰ γάρ τῷ ὅντι κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 228 a, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι· ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐδέτερα ἔστι τούτων.

Phædo 87 d, μέτρι’ ἀν μοι φαινοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ δλιγοχρονιώτερον. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἀν φαίη ἔκαστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν . . . ἀναγκαῖον μέντ’ ἀν εἴη κ.τ.λ.—‘but, he might say, be that as it may,’ &c.

Ib. 95 c-d, μηρύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιόν ἔστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον.

Meno 94 e, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ ἐταῖρε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτὸν ἀρετή—‘but the truth is.’

Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδέν μέτεστι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 e, &c.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 237-242, Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὐ οἶδο μάχας κ.τ.λ.· ἘΑΛλ’ οὐ γάρ σ’ ἐθέλω βαλέειν κ.τ.λ., Od. x. 201, Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως κ.τ.λ.· ἘΑΛλ’ οὐ γάρ τις πρῆξις ἐγίγνετο μυρομένοισιν.

§ 148. g. ἘΑΛλ’ ἦ, πλὴν ἦ.

The joint meaning is ‘except.’ By the ἀλλὰ the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἦ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν [ἀνδρόγυνον] ἀλλ’ ἦ ἐν ὀνείδει ὄνομα κείμενον.

Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ ἦ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ.

Ib. 81 b, ὅστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸ σωματοειδές.

Ib. 97 d, οὐδέν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸ ἄριστον.

Protag. 329 d, οὐδέν διαφέρει ἀλλ’ ἦ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι.

Ib. 334 e, μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ’ ἦ ὁ τι σμικροτάτῳ.

Ib. 354 b, ἦ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, . . . ἀλλ’ ἦ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας;—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἀλλ’ ἦ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἄδηλον παντὶ being equivalent to δῆλον οὐδενί. The analogy of ἀλλ’ ἦ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἦ. The πλὴν and the ἦ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception

each in its own way: *πλὴν* implies ‘it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;’ *ἢ*, less harshly, ‘it is known to none, or however [only] to God.’

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, *οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλειόνων βούλευσάμενος*, ἀλλ’ *ἢ* ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας, 80, *ἐψηφίσαντο . . . μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῷ ἀλλ’ *ἢ* ἀμα*, vii. 50, *οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἡναντιούντο*, ἀλλ’ *ἢ* *μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι*, viii. 28, *οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ’ *ἢ* Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἰναι*.

§ 149. h. *νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ*. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The *δὲ* and the *γάρ* exercise a simultaneous force; *δὲ* represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and *γάρ* further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations *νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ* and *ἀλλὰ γάρ* approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. *Νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ* is however only used in contradicting the Protasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the *νῦν δέ*. The *δὲ* sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the *γάρ*: the *νῦν* (‘as the case actually stands’) belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the *νῦν δέ* but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro 11 c, *καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἔγώ ἔλεγον, ἵστως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες*.
νῦν δὲ σαὶ γάρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. *Ἄλλου δέ τυνος δεῖ σκώμματος.*

Ib. 14 c, *ὅ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἵκανῶς ἀν ἥδη ἐμεμαθήκη.* *νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν* τί. δή αὖ λέγεις κ.τ.λ.;

Apol. 38 a, *εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἀν* *νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἔστιν.*

Protag. 347 a, *σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέστως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἔψευγον.* *νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γάρ ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν.* *διὰ ταῦτά σε ἔγώ ψέγω.*

Charm. 175 a-b, *οὐ γάρ ἀν που . . . ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν.* *νῦν δὲ πανταχῆ γάρ ἡττώμεθα.*

Laches 184 d, *εἰ μὲν γάρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἡττον ἀν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει.* *νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ Λάχης Νικίᾳ ἔθετο.* *εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ.*

Ib. 200 e, *εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἀν ἦν κ.τ.λ.* *νῦν δὲ ὁ ὁμοίως γάρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα.* *τί οὖν ἀν τις κ.τ.λ.;*

Legg. 875 c, ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων . . . παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἀν δέοιτο κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλ᾽ ἡ κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἰρετέον.

Cf. Lysias xii. 61. p. 125, ὅμως δ' ἐγὼ γὰρ δέομαι ἀναπαύσασθαι.

§ 150. i. The cases of *οὐ μὴ* and *μὴ οὐ*, when they make *one* negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of *οὐ μὴ* a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ γῆσθῆσθαι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of *μὴ οὐ* Mr. Campbell, Theætetetus, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of *μὴ οὐ* to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 e, πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονὴ μὴ οὐχ ὅμοιότατον ἀν εἴη;— which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἀν ἐνδέχοιτο, ἡδονὴν ἡδονὴ μὴ οὐχ ὅμοιότατον εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with *ὅτι* or *ὅπως* which follow.

a. Οὐ μόνον ὅτι—‘I was not only going to say’ (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἐθέλουσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν πλέον εὐ τεθέντων, οὐδ' ὅτι γέλως ἀν πάμπολυς ξυμβαίνοι, σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἀν ἐπίω, ἥσσον τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι.

§ 152. b. Οὐχ ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover *οὐχ ὅπως* is said to be equivalent to *οὐχ ὅπως οὐ* which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the *οὐχ ὅπως* clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἴναι οὐχ ὅπως ἀλλων διδάσκαλοι οὐμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ . . . γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περιόψεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by κωλυταὶ γενήσεσθε from περιόψεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οὐχ ὅπως ξημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἀτιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. Οὐχ ὅτι—‘not but that;’ lit. ‘I was not going to deny

that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from *οὐ μόνον ὅτι*.

Theæt. 157 b, *ωστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἔν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ , τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς . . . ἡναγκάσμεθα . . . χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.*

Protag. 336 d, *Σωκράτη ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παιζεῖ—‘for all it be true that’ &c.*

Gorg. 450 e, *οὐδεμίαν οἷμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ρήματι οὗτως εἰπες.*

Lysis 219 e, *πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη . . . οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.*

§ 154. d. *Μὴ ὅτι—‘nendum,’ ‘much less’ or ‘much more,’ according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: ‘not to say,’ i. e. not supposing us to say.*

Symp. 207 e, *μὴ ὅτι . . . ἀλλὰ καί.* So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, *μὴ ὅτι . . . , ἀλλά.*

Protag. 319 d, *μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι . . . ἀλλά.*

Legg. 799 c, *πᾶς πον νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτης.*

Crat. 427 e, *ότιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.*

Phileb. 60 d, *καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἡ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονήν.*

Phdr. 240 e, *ἀ καὶ λόγῳ ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπέσ, μὴ ὅτι δή κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 512 b, *ὅς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν.*

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. *Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά—‘yet, so far from the contrary.’ After *οὐ μέντοι* is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλά.*

Symp. 199 a, *χαιρέτω δή· οὐ γάρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τά γε ἀληθῆ ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν—‘yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.’*

Meno 86 c, (A) *βούλει οὖν κ.τ.λ.;* (B) *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἐκείνῳ ἀν ἡδιστα σκεψαμην—‘yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to’ &c.*

Crat. 436 d, *ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ’ ἀν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αντοῖς—‘yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if’ &c.*

Cf. Thuc. v. 43, *οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡναντιοῦτο.*

So viii. 56, *ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι ἀλλ' ἄπορα νομίσαντες κ.τ.λ.*

§ 156. b. Of *οὐ γάρ ἀλλὰ* the same explanation holds;—‘for not the contrary, but,’ i. e. ‘for, so far from the contrary.’

Euthyd. 305 e, *τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι τι λέγειν; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλ' ὅ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν*—‘for I must say,’ &c.: more literally, ‘for, do you know, so far from the contrary,’ &c.

Ib. 286 b, *πῶς λέγεις; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτον γε τὸν λόγον . . . ἀεὶ θαυμάζω*—‘for, do you know, I must say I’ &c.

Phædo 83 e, *κόσμοι τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὁν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν . . . οὐ γάρ ἀλλ' οὗτοι λογίσατ' ἀν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου*—‘for, so far from the contrary,—i. e. ‘for, most assuredly.’

§ 157. c. *Οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλά.*

Phædo 107 b, *οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστὰλ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, δῆμος ἐπισκεπτέαι.* The full construction is *οὐ μόνον γε ταῦτα εὖ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.*—‘not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,’ namely *τὰς ὑποθέσεις κ.τ.λ.*

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, *οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά*, *οὐ γάρ ἀλλά*, and *οὐ μόνον γ' ἀλλά*, is, that the *οὐ* is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by *its contrary* expressed in the *ἀλλά* clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. *Μέν γε* answered by *δέ*, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, *πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῷ θεά; ή μέν γε κ.τ.λ. ή δέ κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 215 b, *πολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνους ὁ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. σὺ δέ κ.τ.λ.*

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, *οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοί.* Dem. de Cor. 93. p. 257,

ὅ μέν γε σύμμαχος ὁν. [So Bekker: *ὅ μέν γάρ Zurich ed.*]

Æschin. iii. 63. p. 62, *ὅ μέν γε τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκε.*

b. *καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε.*

Legg. 728 d—e, *τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἴσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.*

§ 160. The following are various combinations with *δή*, to which *γε* is often subjoined.

c. *Kai* *μὲν* *δὴ*, with and without *γε* subjoined.

Rep. 409 a, διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις . . . φαίνονται κ.τ.λ. *Kai* *μὲν* *δὴ*, ἔφη, σφόδρα *γε* αὐτὸ δάσκοντιν.

Symp. 196 e, φὸ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρῆσθαι, ὅτι ποιητὴς ὁ Ἔρως . . . πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μονσικὴν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάθου παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. 'Αλλὰ *μὲν* *δὴ*, without or with *γε*.

Crat. 428 b, ἀλλὰ *μὲν* *δὴ*—‘well, no doubt.’

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ *μὲν* *δὴ* . . . *γε*—‘well, but then’ (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἀλλὰ *μὲν* *δὴ* . . . *γε*—‘but further’—in a consecutive proof.

e. 'Ατὰρ οὖν *δὴ* . . . *γε*. Politic. 269 d.

f. 'Αλλ' οὖν *δὴ* ὅμως *γε*. Rep. 602 b.

g. Οὐ γὰρ *δὴ* . . . *γε*. Phædo 92 b.

h. 'Ως *δὴ* *τοι*—‘how true is it that.’ Rep. 366 e, Tim. 26 b.

i. 'Ως *δὴ* *σὺ*—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. *Kai* *δὴ* *καὶ*—‘then, I suppose,’ ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato *οὐ* has more frequently *δὲ* contrasted with it than *ἀλλά*.

b. Instead of the common *ἀλλως τε καὶ* we find sometimes *καὶ αλλως καί*, as Laches 181 a, 187 c.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μάλα *μὲν* ἀτόπου, παντάπασι^τ *γε* μὴν *ἀληθοῦς*.

Legg. 927 b, ὅξεν *μὲν* ἀκούοντι, βλέποντι *τε* *ὅξεν*.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ *μὲν* κεφάλαιον, κ.τ.λ. ἀλλ' *οἱ μὲν* . . . *οἱ δὲ* κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 177 b, *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν* ἡττον *καὶ* θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορίᾳ *μέν* ἔάλωκα, οὐ *μέντοι* λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that *μέντοι* is used, and not *δέ*, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, *δέ* could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by *δέ*.

§ 163. IDIOMS OF COMPARISON.

- A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
- B. " " words of the Superlative Degree.
- C. " " other Comparative words and formulæ.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by *ἢ*, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, *οὐκ ἀν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι, ἢ λόγους μισήσας.*

Crito 44 c, *τίς ἀν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.* ;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀν εἴη αὐτοῖς χαλεπώτερον τούτων, ἢ πυνθάνεσθαι.* We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, *οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦγε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον, Ἡ δοῦ δροφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχητον Ἀνήρ ἡδὲ γυνή.* So Hdt. i. 79, *ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἔσχε τὰ πρήγματα, ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς κατεδόκεε.*

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. 'Ως as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, *ἄγε μείζω πόνον παρέχει οὐκ ἀν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἀν εὖροις ὡς τοῦτο.*

Apol. 36 d, *οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς . . . σιτεῖσθαι.*

Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 277, [νέφος] μελάντερον ἡντε πίσσα. So Lysias vii.

12. p. 109, *ηγούμενος μᾶλλον λέγεσθαι ὡς μοι προσῆκε, ib. 31. p. 111, προθυμότερον πεποίηκα ὡς . . . ηναγκαζόμην.*

§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the *παρὰ* in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 e, *παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαῦλην παιδιάν.* And Thucyd. v. 90, *ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.*

Polit. 296 a, *εἴ τις γιγνώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους.*

Legg. 729 e, *ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τὸν ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θέδον ἀνηρτημένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον.*

Πρό.

Phædo 99 a, *δικαιότερον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν . . . ὑπέχειν . . . δίκην.*

Crito 54 b, *μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.*

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, *οῖσι ἡ τυραννίς πρὸ ἐλευθερίης ἢν ἀσπαστότερον.*

‘Αντι.

Rep. 619 c, αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

‘Εν.

Euthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

Κατὰ after ἢ.

Phædo 94 e, πολὺν θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν.

§ 166. c. Irregularities.

a. Pleonastic form.

Crat. 433 d, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον . . . ἀλλον, ἢ κ.τ.λ.;

Gorg. 482 b, οἶμαι τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀγαρμοστεῖν . . . μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐμαντῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι.

Charm. 159 e, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 e, 854 e;—all instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or ἢ ττον.

§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

Protag. 350 b, θαρράλεωτεροι εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.

Symp. 220 e, προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σεαυτόν.

A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.

Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τό γ' ὑπόδοιπον τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μηδὲ φήθησαν.

§ 168. γ. Case after ἢ assimilated to the Case before it, by Attraction.

Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.

This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare the constructions with ὁσπερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use with ἢ varies: on the one hand we have, Il. i. 260, καὶ ἀρείστιν ἡέπερ ὑμῖν Ἀνδράσιν ὡμίλησα· on the other hand, Il. x. 557, ἀμείνονας, ἡέ περ οἴδε, Ἰππονος δωρήσαιτ', Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρὴ δόμεναι καὶ λώιον ἡέ περ ἀλλοι, Il. xxiv. 486, Μνῆσαι πατρὸς σεῖο . . . Τηλίκου ὡσπερ ἐγών. In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἢ e. g. F. L. 27. p. 349, οὐδὲν ἐλάττονος ἢ τούτου· but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερον

ἢ ἐγὼ δοκιμασάντων, ib. 178. p. 287, ἡμῶν ἀμεινον ἢ ἕκεῖνοι προορω-
μένων.

§ 169. δ. Omission of *ἢ*.

Legg. 956 a, ὑφὴν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς μᾶς ἔμμηνον.

Ib. 958 e, ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἀνδρῶν ἔργον.

Phædo 75 a, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἵσου . . . μᾶλλόν τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.

[Oxon. alone omits *ἢ* here. The other MSS. and the edd. have
ἢ καὶ.]

§ 170. ε. Omission of *μᾶλλον*.

Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἵσως οὕτω ράδιον ἢ ἕκείνως.

Meno 94 e, ἵσως ράδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ. Cf., as the
Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrat. v. 115.
p. 105, viii. 50. p. 169.

Tim. 75 c, ξυνέδοξε τοῦ πλείονος βίου φαυλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἐλάττονα
ἀμείνονα ὄντα παντὶ πάντως αἰρετέον.

Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἰ δρα τι ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ('other
than') ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν. Lysias ii. 62. p. 196, θάνατον μετ'
ἐλευθερίας αἴρομενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας, xxi. 22. p. 163, οὐκ οἰδ'
οὓς τινας ἢ υἱᾶς ἐθουλήθην περὶ ἐμοῦ δικαστὰς γενέσθαι.

§ 171. B. Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

Ἐπί.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ καλλιστὸν καὶ ἀριστὸν γένος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e. g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν
γὰρ ἀρίστην Μῆτιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φάσ' ἔμμεναι.

Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομί-
σματος ἄξια κτήματα.

Ib. 892 a, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἀνδρειότατος τῶν ὑστερον ἐπιγιγνομένων. Cf.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

β. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

Legg. 731 b, πρᾶον ὡς ὅ τι μάλιστα.

Ib. 908 a, ὡς ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος.

Legg. 758 a, ὡς ὁ τι μάλιστ' ὀλιγίστοις.

Cf. Hom. Od. viii. 582, μάλιστα Κήδιστοι.

§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulæ.

a. With *ἢ*.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες.

Ib. 455 c, διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Phædo 95 c, διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μῆ.

Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἄλλά τις ἡμῶν Ἰδιών τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 e, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ;

§ 174. b. With *παρά*.

Rep. 337 d, ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίω τούτων.

Phædo 105 b, παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἄλλην.

Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν.

Ib. 181 d, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.

Legg. 927 e, ποικίλλοντες ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἰδίοις τὸν τῶν ὀρφανῶν βίον παρὰ τὸν τῶν μῆ.

And, with *παρὰ simply*, Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὀντικοῦν.

§ 175. c. With *ὡσπερ* and the like Adverbs; and with correlative Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σύ.

Ib. 100 c, ἐὰν σοὶ ἔνδοκῃ ὡσπερ ἐμοί.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὡσπερ οἱ παιδεῖς.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους ὡσπερ οἱ τούτων.

Politic. 274 d, ἔδει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καθάπερ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδὲν οἷμαι τοσοῦτον κακόν, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς.

Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς οἷον οἱ κύρτοι ἔνυνθηνάμενος.

Protag. 327 d, ἄγριοί τινες, οἷοίπερ οὖς πέρυσι Φερεκράτης ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Δηναίῳ. So Crat. 432 e.

Cf. Hom. Od. xx. 281, Πάρ δὲ ἀρ' Ὁδυσσοῦ μοῖραν θέσαν . . . Ἰσην ὡς αὐτοί περ ἐλάγχανον.

§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by *ώσπερ* is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxiv. 486, *Μνῆσαι πατρὸς σεῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦν, Τηλίκουν, ὡσπερ ἔγων.* Lysias vi. 32. p. 106, *λυπουμένῳ ὡσπερ οὐτος.* Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, *τοὺς ὡσπερ Καλλίμαχος βεβιωκότας.* This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as *Æschin.* ii. 120. p. 44, *τοὺς μικροπολίτας, ὡσπερ αὐτός, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα.* [So Bekker: *αὐτοὺς* Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, *οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὡσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς,* Soph. O. C. 869, *δοίη βίον Τοιούτον οἷον κάμε γηρᾶναι ποτέ,* Lys. 492. 72, [i. e. xiii. 72. p. 136] *οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἔστιν Ἀγόρατον Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι ὡσπερ Θρασύβουλον.* We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, *οὐ γὰρ ἀν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὡσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι,—where μειρακίῳ is affected by Attraction to πλάττοντι.*

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Symp. 179 e, *διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, . . . οὐχ ὡσπερ Ἀχιλλέᾳ ἐτίμησαν.*

Ib. 189 c, *δοκοῦσι . . . θυσίας ἀν ποιεῖν . . . , οὐχ ὡσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται.*

Ib. 213 b, *ἔλλοχῶν αὐτοῦ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκεισο, ὡσπερ εἰώθης ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι.*

Ib. 216 d, *ἔρωτικῶς διάκειται . . . , καὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ Σειληνῶδες;* This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after *τοῦτο.* The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theæt. 187 b, *χρή, ὡς Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.*

Apol. 39 c, *τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἔξειν . . . χαλεπωτέραν τὴν Διὸς ἢ οἴαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.*

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, *ἔγενετο αὐτοῖς ἐσ τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἢ ἰδίᾳ παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ἔνυμαχίας ἥνθησαν—taking ὡς to be not ‘when’ but ‘how,’ but*

primarily Hom. Od. xxiv. 195–199, ὡς εὖ μέμνητ' Οδυσῆος
Οὐχ ὡς Τυνδαρέον κούρη κακὰ μήσατο ἔργα.

§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἡττον ἀν εἴην ἀηδῆς.

Politic. 286 b, ἔσχε μῆκος πλέον.

Phædo 115 b, ἀπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, οὐδὲν καινότερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἡττόν τι, Euthyd. 293 c, ἡττον οὖν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft *οὐκ* and *οὐκοῦν*.

Cf. the Latin *si* minus.

§ 179. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ATTRACTION.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέστι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι, or Lysias xxvii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχοντιν . . . ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρὴ δικαιοῖς εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e. g. Aesch. Choeph. 140, Αὐτῇ τέ μοι δὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἑκείνους λέγεται οὐδὲν οἷον τε γενέσθαι προνοθῆναι.

Hip. Ma. 292 c, τὸ καλόν, ὁ παντί, φ ἀν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἑκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as βουλομένων ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.

One common type is (e.g.) Hdt. v. 38, *ἔδεε ξυμμαχίης οἱ μεγάλης ἔξευρεθῆναι*. And primarily Homer, Il. xviii. 585, *οἱ δὲ ἥτοι δακέειν μὲν ἀπετρωπῶντο λεόντων*, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is *ἔγώ δίκαιος εἰμὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν* which stands for *δίκαιον ἔστιν ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν*—the *ἐμὲ* being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt. ix. 77, *ἄξιοι ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημιώσαται*.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. ‘Binary Structure,’ §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, *εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔανταί εἶναι δὲ τὸ ἔρως ἔστιν*—where *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of *ἔρως ἔστιν* in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, *ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν*.

Gorg. 513 e, *ἐπιχειρητέον ήμιν ἔστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν*.

Legg. 790 c, *τρόπον ὅνπερ ἥργυμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν*.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, *δεῖ ἀκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων*.

Euthyd. 282 d, *οῖων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι*.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, *τὸν αὐτῷ ξυνειδότα φερόμενον*.

Charm. 169 a, *οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαντῷ ἵκανδε εἶναι*.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after *δίκαιον ἔστιν*, *ἀνάγκη ἔστιν*, *οἶόν τε ἔστιν*, and the like, or after Verbs of *judging*, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after *δίκαιον* &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,

e. g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a : whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὡφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 e, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἵει δίκαιον εἶναι ;

Phædo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

Hip. Ma. 289 e, τὸ ὄρθως λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.

Ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι.

Charm. 164 b, γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ιατρῷ.

Meno 88 c, εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὡφελίμῳ εἶναι.

Laches 196 e, ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρίαν.

Menex. 241 a, οὗν τε ἀμύνεσθαι ὀλίγοις πολλούς.

Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ ἀπόδλυσθαι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ρῆθηναι.

Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἰσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

Crat. 392 a, ὅρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὅρνέῳ.

Phædo 92 c, πρέπει ξυνωδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας [λόγῳ].

Soph. 231 e, ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὐήθης.

Apol. 34 e, δεδογμένον ἐστὶ τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 82, above.]

Cf. Philolaus ap. Stob. p. 458, οὐχ οὗν τ' ἡς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἔοντων καὶ γιγνωσκομένων ὑφ' ἀμῶν γνωσθῆμεν, and again ib., ἀδύνατον ἡς ἀν καὶ αἰταῖς κοσμηθῆμεν. [Quoted by Boeckh in his Philolaos, p. 62.] Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, τάδε ὑμῖν ἔξιον ἐνθυμηθῆναι.

On the other hand we have, unusually,

Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e. g.

Crito 51 d, προαγορεύομεν Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ . . . ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι.

Cf. Hdt. ix. 78, καὶ τοὶ θεὸς παρέδωκε ρυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι, and Hom. Il. x. 187, τῶν ὑπνος ὀλώλει Νύκτα φυλασσομένοισι.

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, οὐδὲ γάρ ἀν πρέποι τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττοντι λέγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικίᾳ though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπουμέναις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Cf. Hom. Il. iv. 101, Εὔχεο . . . ρέξειν ἐκατόμβην . . ., Οἴκαδε νοστήσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὐτε αὐτὸς ἐθελήσαμι ἀν πιεῖν, οὐτε ἄλλῳ συμβούλευσαμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα—where κραιπαλῶντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβούλευσαμι. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 e, τοῦ δυναμένου παίζειν . . . μυθολογοῦντα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186. c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e. g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὐ μανθάνω ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e. g.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύοντιν ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύοντιν ἢ ἀποθήτικεν. This is an Attraction for κινδυνεύει λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὐτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν—where τὸ . . . Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ὁμολογεῖς (compare δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, above).

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ, ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα ἐργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοί, οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τὰλλα οἱ ἀν ἐκάστη ἵοι—i. e. δῆλόν ἐστι δή, οἱ ἀν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη ἵοι.

For the rest of the instances under this head see 'Binary Structure,' §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by *ἢ*, attracted, after omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal construction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς.

(See the remarks under 'Idioms of Comparison,' § 168, above.)

§ 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν ὡν οἱδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν.

Phdr. 249 b, ἀξίως οὐδὲ βέβιωσαν βίου.

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἡς Τρωῖ περ εὐρυόπα Ζεὺς Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before *βούλει*¹², which with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin *quibus*.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.

Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα . . . οἵα τούτων δις βούλει εἰργασται.

Phileb. 43 d, τριῶν ὄντων ὄντινων βούλει.

γ. From Dative into Genitive.

Legg. 966 e, πάντων διν κίνησις . . . οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν.

δ. From Nominative into

Genitive.

Theæt. 165 e, ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ δή σε χειρωσάμενος . . . ἀν ἐλύτρου.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γὰρ διν ἔτυχεν ἦν—i. e. τούτων ἀ ἔτυχεν.

¹² Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δι οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδὲ οἱδα εἰ γενόμενον διν.

Symp. 216 d, ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οὔτεσθε γέμει σωφροσύνης;

Euthyphro 15 a, τι δι οὔτει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα;

Phædo 59 c, τίνες φῆσιν οἱ λόγοι;

Dative.

Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα.

Phædo 69 a, τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιόν ἔστιν φῶν δὴ ἐλέγετο.

Accusative.

Cf. Thuc. v. 111, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύεσθε [βουλὴν] ἡνὶ μᾶς πέρι . . . ἔσται. (The same interpretation is suggested as “possible” in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. ε. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, *absorbed* by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν πόλει ἡ ἡκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν.

Ib. 533 d-e, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρία κέκληται—where οἷς must be for ἐν οἷς.

Crat. 438 e, ἀρα δὲ ἄλλου του ἡ οὐπερ εἰκός;

Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δὲ εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν δινπερ νῦν δὴ.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus

Apol. 27 d, ἡ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων δων δὴ καὶ λέγονται is simply ‘or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.’

Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπόλλυμεν φῆπερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν φῆπερ.

Of other writers, cf. Soph. O. C. 748, Οὐκ ἀν ποτ’ ἐσ τοσοῦτον αἰκίας πεσεῖν “Εδοξέ σον πέπτωκεν. Isæus Fr. a. 8 [ed. Bekker. Is. xii. 7, ed. Zur.], ἄλλοθεν ποθὲν ἡ ἐκ τούτων δων, Lysias xiv. 2. p. 139, ἐπ’ ἐνίοις [τούτων] δων οὐτος φιλοτιμεῖται τοὺς ἔχθροὺς αἰσχύνεσθαι, xxi. 21. p. 163, δέομαι μὴ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι δ (‘any sum of money in consideration of which’) ἐγὼ βουλούμην ἀν τι κακὸν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι. [So Bekker and the MSS. δι’ ἄ ed. Zurich.]

§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὄτουσον πράγματος οὐ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;

Polit. 271 e, τὸν βίον δὲ κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἦν κ.τ.λ.;

Meno 96 c, ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι.

Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἀν ἀφίκη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the

former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. Il. x. 416, *φυλακὰς δ' ἀς εἴρεαι*, . . . *Οὕτις κεκριμένη ρύνεται στρατόν*, Od. viii. 74, *ἀειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν*, *Οἴμης τῆς τότ' ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ.*, xxii. 6, *σκοπὸν ἄλλον ὃν οὕπω τις βάλεν ἀνήρ Εὔστορας αἴ κε τύχωμι*, xxiii. 356, *Μῆλα δ' ἄ μοι κ.τ.λ.*, *Πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔγω ληστομα, ἄλλα δ' Ἀχαιοὶ Δώσοντος* (where *μῆλα* represents *ἀντὶ μῆλων*). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds *οἴμης* to be attracted from *οἴμη* not *οἴμην* because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetic Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, *Νῆσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ . . . Νῆσος δενδρήεσσα*, or Il. vi. 396, *Ἡείωνος Ἡείων, ὃς ἔναιε κ.τ.λ.*.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N. B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, *οὐδὲ μονυπικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φαμεν ήμιν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας.*

Phaedo 66 e, *ἡμῖν ἔσται οὖν φαμὲν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι φρονήσεως.*

Protag. 342 b, *σοφίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.*

Crito 48 c, *ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα γῆ κ.τ.λ.*

Hip. Ma. 281 c, *ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὸν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, Πιττακοῦ κ.τ.λ.*

Symp. 200 d, *ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν δὲ οὕπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστίν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.*

Apol. 41 a, *εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.*

Cf. Hom. Il. ix. 131, *μετὰ δὲ ἔσσεται ἦν τότ' ἀπηύρων, Κούρην Βριτῆνος.*

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent *ἐκείνου*, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns *τοὺς φύλακας*, *τοὺς σοφιστάς*, *ταῦτα*, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (*Ταῦτα* represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν, Ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον. Also Il. xii. 18—20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὃν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπεῖπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Phædo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὐν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος οὐδέν ἀτοπον—where ἐκεῖνος is attracted from ἐκεῖνον, since it is ἔχειν and not λέγοι which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δέοι αὐτὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅποιός τις ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ—where we should have had αὐτὸν . . . τὸν Ἔρωτα but for the intervention of ὅποιός τις ἐστιν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself *abnormally* in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, οἵεσθε χρῆναι, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι παρελιπον . . . , ὑμεῖς ἀπολέσαι.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i. e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὄντος πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου.

Phædo 104 a, τοῦ περιπτοῦ ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οἴῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

Legg. 674 c, οὐδὲ ἀμπέλων ἀν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδὲν ἥτινι πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν—for ὅσον ποιήσεως ἐστιν ὕμνοι.

Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 321, τὸ μὲν . . . ἔισκομεν . . . Ὁστον θ' ίστὸν τῆς, x. 112, γυνάκα Εὐρον ὅσην τ' ὄρεος κορυφήν, 167, Πεῖσμα δ' ὅσον τ' ὅργιαν. Ar. Eq. 977, πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν οἵων ἀργαλεωτάτων. Soph. Aj. 488, πατρὸς Εἴπερ τινὸς σθένοτος, 1416, ἀνδρὶ . . . ἀγαθῷ . . . κούδενι πω λώφοι θυητῶν, O. C. 734, πόλιν . . . σθένουσαν . . . εἴ τιν' Ἑλλάδος μέγα. Arist. Metaph. IX. iii. 1, ἀντικείται δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὃν ἔνα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλήθος ὡς ἀδιαιρετον καὶ διαιρετόν.

§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος above) are

Soph. 246 c, *ὑπὲρ ἡς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας*—i. e. *ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*.

Gorg. 477 a, (A) *ῳφελεῖται ἄρα*; (B) *Ναί.* (A) **Ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν*;—i. e. *ἄρα [ῳφελεῖται τοῦτο] ὥπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι*;

§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, *Εὐρύμαχ' ἥδε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μηστῆρες ἀγανοί*,—i. e. *ἄλλοι μηστῆρες ἀγανοί, ὅσοι ἔστε* and Hdt. iv. 28, *ἀφόρητος οἵος κρυμός*—‘frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;’ and ib. 194, *οἱ δέ σφι ἀφθονοι ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς οὔρεσι γίνονται* in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, *σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὥσην*—‘inconceivable, so great was it.’

Gorg. 477 d, *ὑπερφνεῖ τινὶ ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλονσα*.

Cf. the common Idiom *ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ πλεῖστα ὅσα*—‘things *superlatively* many, so many were they’—where *ὅσα* is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbial expressions *ἀμηχάνως ὡς* (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), *ὑπερφνώς ὡς* (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), *θαυμαστώς ὡς* (Phædo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with *τοῖος* differs—e. g. in Od. i. 209, *θαμὰ τοῖον*, iii. 321, **Ἐς πέλαγος μέγα τοῖον*, iv. 371, *Νήπιος . . . λίνυ τόσον*, ib. 776 and vii. 30, *σιγῇ τοῖον*, xi. 134, **Ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος*, xv. 450, *Κερδαλέον δὴ τοῖον*, xx. 302, *Σαρδόνιον μάλα τοῖον*—‘to that degree,’—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our *οἷος* justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον*. So Protag. 317 c.

Politic. 308 b, *οὐδαμῶς ὡς οὐ φίσομεν*.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 145, *οὐδαμῶν τῶν οὐ μέζω*.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, *ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἵμερόν Ζεὺς ὠνόμασε*
(where the Antecedent of *όν* is *ῥεύματος*.)

Cf. the Homeric *Ἡ θέμις ἐστίν*. Il. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, *δέομαι . . . τοῦτο σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.*· δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή
—where of course *αὕτη* refers to *τοῦτο σκοπεῖν* κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, *οὐν ὃν ἄρα ἐστιν ὄντως ἡν λέγομεν εἰκόνα*;

Crat. 386 c, *εὶ . . . ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια* (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Minos 317 a, *πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν, οὓς οἱ ἀνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσιν*.

Crito 48 c, *ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . . , μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα γένονται*—where *ταῦτα* represents *τὰς σκέψεις*, but has been assimilated to *σκέμματα*, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 239, *σκῆπτρον . . . δ δέ τοι μέγας ἔστεται ὄρκος*, v. 305, *ἔνθα τε μηρὸς Ἰσχὺος ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλην δέ τέ μιν καλέοντι*.
Hdt. i. 86, *ἀκροβίνια ταῦτα* (sc. *τὸν Κροῖσον*) *καταγεῖν*. *Æsch.*
P.V. 753, *Οτρῳ θανεῖν μέν ἐστιν οὐ πεπρωμένον*. *Αὕτη γὰρ ἡν ἀν πημάτων ἀπαλλαγή*. So Virg. *Æn.* x. 828, *Si qua est ea cura*.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 c, *οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη*.

Legg. 735 e, *τοὺς μέγιστα ἡμαρτηκότας ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὖσαν βλάβην*.

Parmen. 134 b, *πάντα, ἀ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὖσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν*.

Polit. 271 e, *θεὸς ἔνεμεν . . . , ζῶον ὃν ἐτέρον θειότερον*.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 e, *ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαιμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα*.

Legg. 908 c, *τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα*.

Cf. Hdt. vi. 130, *τῆς ἀξιώσιος, τῆς ἐξ ἐμεῦ γῆμαι*. Xen. Mem. I. iii. 3, *καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι, τὴν Καδ δύναμιν ἔρδειν*.

§ 204. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—BINARY STRUCTURE.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all: in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive; the thought has moved in the interval between them; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.

C. When a Dependent sentence has been resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction, and placing in advance of it, a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts coordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain : and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer ; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, *θαυμαστὴ ἀν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι,—όπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἔγώ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἀν ἀηδὲς εἴη.*

Symp. 198 c, *τὸ τοῦ Ὁμῆρου ἐπεπόνθη,—έφοβούμην κ.τ.λ.*

Phædo 67 e, *εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἀλογίᾳ εἴη,—εἰ μὴ ἀσμενοὶ ἐκεῖσε ἰοιεν οἱ κ.τ.λ.;*

Ib. 68 d, *οὐ ταῦτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν,—ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν;*

Ib. 73 b, *αὐτὸν τοῦτο δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὐδὲν ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθῆναι.*

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with *πάσχειν*.

Ib. 70 a, *[ψυχὴ] ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, ἢ ἀνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ—εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος . . . οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ.* Here the sentence *εὐθὺς . . . ἢ* is the complete double of the sentence *ἐκείνη . . . ἀποθάνῃ.*

Ib. 86 b, *τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν . . . εἶναι,—ῶσπερ κ.τ.λ., κρᾶσιν εἶναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 505 e, *ἴνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται,—ἄ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἴς ὧν ἵκανὸς γένωμαι.*

Phileb. 35 e, (A) *τι δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται ;* (B) *Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ ;* (A) *Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ κ.τ.λ.;*

Legg. 697 a, τὸ δὲ τριχῆ διελεῖν . . . πειραθῶμεν,—διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἔσμῶν [δό κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπον,—ἐν γένος ἀπὸ μᾶς ἵὸν χώρας οἰκίζηται.

This Idiom begins with Homer: see Od. viii. 339, Αὐτὸν γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἀναξ ἐκατηβόλος Ἀπολλον,—Δεσμοὶ μὲν τρὶς τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχοιεν, . . . Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὑδοιμι παρὰ χρυσέη Ἀφροδίτη. Cf. Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἰ δὲ πάνυ δεῖ τοῦτο δρᾶν, ὑμῖν χαρίζεσθαι, ταλαιπωρήσομεν.

Virtually similar is

Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δῆπον σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσάντη φήμη . . . γέγονεν,—εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί· (for σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένον is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ . . . πολλοί is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἀν παράσχοιτε . . ., εἰ μὴ περιγένουισθε.

§ 208. b. ¹³ Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οὐεὶ γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενον κ.τ.λ., εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαι σον λέγοντος κ.τ.λ.;

Crito 45 e, μὴ δόξῃ ἀπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα . . . ἀνανδρίᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι . . .—κακίᾳ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ διαπεφενγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

Apol. 26 e, οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι; [So Oxon. alone. See note at p. 61, above.]

Legg. 859 d, εἶναι τὸν δικαίου ἀνθρώπους, ἀν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ.,—κατ' αὐτό γε . . . παγκάλους εἶναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἀν ποτε ἄρα ἴδωσι κ.τ.λ.,—ολιγωρεῖν τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer: e. g. Il. ix. 13, ἀν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων Ἰστατο δακρυχέων, ὥστε κρήνη μελάνυδρος . . ., ¹⁴Ως ὁ βαρὺ στενάχων ἔπει' Ἀργείοισι μετηνῦδα. Cf. also Soph.

¹³ [In the margin of the MS. is written—“Quære. Are these really distinct from those given in § 207?”]

Aj. 840, Καὶ σφᾶς . . . Ξυναρπάσειαν, ὥσπερ εἰσορῶσ³ ἐμὲ Αὐτοσφαγῆ πί-
πτοντα,—τὰς αὐτοσφαγεῖς . . . δλοίατο. (Ed. Col. 1239, 66 . . . ὡς τις
ἀκτὰ . . . κλονεῖται, — ὡς καὶ τόνδε κ.τ.λ.)

Gorg. 483 e, οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες
τοὺς βελτίστους . . . — ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπά-
δοντες, καταδονλούμεθα.

Politic. 296 e, τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὄρον εἶναι . . . , ὥσπερ ὁ
κυβερνήτης . . . σώζει τοὺς συνναύτας, — οὗτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 61 a, ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι ἐπικελεύειν,
ώσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεούσι διακελευόμενοι, — καὶ ἐμοὶ οὗτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ
ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν.

Ib. 109 e, κατιδεῖν ἄν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἵχθυες ἀνακύπτοντες
όρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, — οὗτως ἄν τυνα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν.

Crito 54 d, ταῦτα ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν
δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, — καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ . . . βομβεῖ.

Politic. 260 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε πῃ, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., — καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν
γένος ἔοικεν ἀφωρίσθαι.

Crat. 417 b, ἔοικεν, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρῶνται, — οὐ ταύτη
λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 433 a, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιῦόντες ὁψὲ
ὅδον, — καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὗτω πως
ἐληλυθέναι ὄψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος.

Tim. 19 b, προσέοικε δὲ δή τινί μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις . . .
ἀφίκοιτο κ.τ.λ., — ταῦτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἦν διήλθομεν.

§ 210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phædo 60 c, φὸς ἀν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ
ἔτερον ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ., — ἥκειν δὴ φαινε-
ται ἐπακολούθουν τὸ ἥδυ.

Charm. 156 b, ἔστι γὰρ τοιαύτη [ἥ ἐπφδὴ] οὐα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν
μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἵσως ἥδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν
ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδὰν κ.τ.λ., — λέγονσί που ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is

the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative *τί*, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek ; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, *τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος* ; *οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς εἰρῆσθαι* ;—
where *τί* foreshadows *ὑπερφυῶς εἰρῆσθαι*. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, *ό ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾶ* ; *Γειέσθαι αὐτῷ*.)

Ib. 269 a, *τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἀδραστον οἴόμεθα ή καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν κ.τ.λ.* ; *πότερον χαλεπῶς ἀν αὐτὸν . . . εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.* ;

Charm. 154 d, *τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος* ; *οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος* ;

Phileb. 27 e, *τί δὲ ὁ σὸς [βίος]* ; *ἐν τίνι γένει ἀν λέγοιτο* ;

Ib. 56 e, *τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.* ; *πότερον ὡς μία λεκτέον* ;

Phdr. 277 d, *τί δ' αὐτὸν καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν κ.τ.λ.* ; *ἄρα οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα . . . ὡς κ.τ.λ.* ;—*τί* foreshadows *ώς κ.τ.λ.*

Protag. 309 b, *τί οὖν τὰ νῦν* ; *ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει* ;

Soph. 266 c, *τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην* ; *ἄροτρον οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ φήσομεν ποιεῖν* ;

Phædo 78 d, *τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . .* ; *ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ.* ; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, *τί δὲ τόδε* ; *τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἔκαστοτε καλά* ; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by *τόδε*, which therefore is Nominative ; and the Predicate by *τί*, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, *τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου* ; *Ποῦ σοι τύχης ἐστηκεν* ;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under 'Accusative Case,' §§ 15-19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are *virtually* of Binary Structure : for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.

a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, *τῇ δὲ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα.*

Phædo 65 d, *λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι κ.τ.λ., — τῆς οὐσίας, δὲ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὅν.*

Ib. 81 e, *τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίᾳ.*

Ib. 82 b, *εἰς ταῦτον, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.*

Ib. 113 a, *τῶν τετελευτηκότων, τῶν πολλῶν.*

Symp. 215 b, *τῷ Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσύᾳ.*

Euthyd. 274 e, *τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὴν ἀρετὴν, μαθητὸν εἶναι.*

Crat. 415 a, *τὸ ὄνομα ἡ μηχανή.*

Ib. 435 c, *τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ.*

Protag. 317 b, *εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἷμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ δόμολο-γεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ ἔξαρνον εἶναι.*

Charm. 173 e, *ἔμμενομεν τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.*

Legg. 908 c, *τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.*

Gorg. 462 c, *οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ρήτορική εἶναι, — χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;*

§ 214. β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, *τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.*

Apol. 24 e, *αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους.*

Crat. 423 e, *αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύνατο ἔκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν.*

Gorg. 500 c, *οὐ τί ἀν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις, ἡ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν;* (the two expressions are *οὐ* and *ἡ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.*)

Ib. 518 a, *ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.*

Phileb. 38 b, *ἔπειτα ταύταις . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.*

Tim. 22 d, *οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὅρεσι διασώζονται, βουκόλοι νομεῖς τε.*

Protag. 351 a, *τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν.*

Rep. 396 c, *δέ μεν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐθελήσειν.*

Legg. 861 d, *τοῦν δυοῦν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοί, τό γε μὴ λέγειν κ.τ.λ.*

Symp. 198 d, *τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν δτιοῦν.*

Ib. 207 d, *δύναται δὲ ταύτη μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.*

Ib. 222 a, *ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος . . . νοῦν ἔχοντας μόνους εὑρήσει, τῶν λόγων.*

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression *ἢ δ' ὁσ δ Σωκράτης.*

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of *αὐτὸ* in its peculiar Platonic meaning.

Symp. 199 d, *αὐτὸς τοῦτο πατέρα*.
 Phædo 93 b, *αὐτὸς τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν*.
 Protag. 360 e, *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ή ἀρετή*.
 Crat. 411 d, *αὐτὸς ή νόησις*.
 Rep. 363 a, *οὐκ αὐτὸς δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες*.

§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, *οὐτε αὐτοὶ οὐτε οὗς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι, τοὺς φύλακας*.
 Phædo 74 d, *οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἵστοις*. Similarly Hip. Ma. 291 c, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 c, Legg. 653 e, &c.
 Crat. 422 b, *ἄντερας, τὰ ὄνόματα*. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.
 Tim. 33 a, *ἄννιστα, τὰ σώματα*.
 Hip. Ma. 294 a, *φάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι*.
 Symp. 200 d, *ἐκείνον ἐράν, δὲ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα*.
 Theæt. 167 b, *ἄντερας τὰ φαντάσματα . . . ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν*—‘and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.’
 Tim. 40 b, *ἔξ οὐδὲ τῆς αἰτίας γέγονεν ὅσα . . . ἀεὶ μένει*—‘and hence, from this cause namely, arise,’ &c.
 Legg. 647 a, *φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν . . . δὲν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε . . . αἰσχύνην*.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with *τὰ φαντάσματα*, and *τῆς αἰτίας*. See ‘Attraction,’ § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Æschin. i. 72. p. 10, *ῶν . . . ἡκούσατε τῶν νόμων*. And Soph. Ant. 404, *θάπτουσαν δὲ σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπεῖτας*—‘him whom thou forbadeſt to bury, namely that corpse’ (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit *sentence*, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 c, *ὑπέρ ής τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας*—i. e. *ὑπέρ [τοῦ] δὲ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*.

Gorg. 477 a, ἦνπερ ἐγώ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὡφέλειαν—i. e. [τοῦτο] ὅπερ ἐγώ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὡφέλειαν εἶναι.

Phædo 78 d, ἡς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι—where *ἡς* is the Predicate and *τοῦ εἶναι* the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούσι, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν.

Critias 110 c, πάνθ' ὅσα ξύννομα ζῶα . . . πᾶν δυνατὸν πέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ἡ δὲ . . . [ψυχὴ] . . . σῶμα γῆνον λαβοῦσα, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οἷς προχείρους εἰχον μύθους . . . , τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτους ἐνέτυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, . . . μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.

Ib. 105 a, ὁ ἀν ἐπιφέρη . . . , αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστι πᾶσα αὐτῇ ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμιημένων ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔκαστον τῶν σωμάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα ξυνυφήν ἡ καὶ πλέγμ' ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὖν τ' ἐστὶ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτὸν . . . σῶμα τυμβεῦσαι τάφῳ, 1147, Οὗτο δὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸ σὸν λάθρον στόμα . . . τάχ' ἄν τις . . . Χειμῶν κατασβέσειε τὴν πολλὴν βούν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι . . . , πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγοι . . . ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἀ ποιῶ, . . . πολλὴ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.

§ 220. β. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἔκαστον τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτοὺς διατεμῶ δίχα ἔκαστον.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλληλα . . . ἀπεργασάμενος, ὃ τι περ πῦρ πρὸς ἀέρα τοῦτο ἀέρα πρὸς ὑδωρ, καὶ ὃ τι ἀὴρ πρὸς ὑδωρ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: e.g. Od. i. 348, ὅστε διδωσιν

Ανδράσιν ἀλφηστῆσιν ὅπως ἐθέλησιν ἔκάστῳ, x. 172, ἀνέγειρα δὲ ἔταιρον Μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσι, παρασταθὼν ἄνδρα ἔκαστον.

§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enunciation of part of it.

Phædo 64 b, οἵμαι γάρ ἀν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . ξυμφάναι ἄν, τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ.

Gorg. 517 e, δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 83, καὶ οἱ σύλλογον τῶν ἐπιβατέων ποιησάμενοι προηγόρευε εὖ ἔχοντα ἐκ πάντων Θεμιστοκλέης. Aristot. Eth. VI. xii, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιῶσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὐτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recall to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theæt. 155 e, ἔαν σοι ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμεν αὐτῶν.

Apol. 40 d, οἵμαι ἀν μὴ ὅτι ἰδώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρίθμητον ἀν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν τάντας.

Rep. 375 d, οἵσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἥθος.

Legg. 700 c, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παιδευσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ξύμμαχος ἔκεινοις.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἡ ψυχὴ δικαίως ἀν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν κ.τ.λ.

§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, *πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου, οὐδὲ στιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ* ;
Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theæt. 188 b, ἀ μὴ οὐδὲν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔτερα ;

Phædo 104 d, ἀ ὅ τι ἀν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει . . . αὐτὸς ἴσχειν, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, *τοὺς δὲ, βαθυτέρους ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Alcib. I. 115 e, *τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν . . . , γὰρ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸς προσέπιπας* ;

Legg. 625 a, *τοῦτον οὖν φαῖμεν ἀν ἡμεῖς . . . , ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.*

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἂμα ἐκείνῳ ἔνυσταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.*

Phileb. 49 b, *πάντες ὁπόσοι . . . ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἔπεισθαι τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 13 b, *κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὅμως σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά.* [For it is *αὐτῶν*, not *τὰ πολλά*, which is represented by *αὐτά*.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, *ὅ παντὶ φῶ ἀν προσγένηται ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.*

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, *τούτων δέ τινων . . . ῥηθέντων δυοῦν εἰδοῦν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ.*, the *τούτων . . . εἰδοῦν* is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, *φημὶ οὐν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἔρωτα . . . εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν*,—*πάντων . . . ὄντων* is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, *ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλον ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν*.) Again, Laches 182 d, *τὸ δόλιτικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μέν ἐστι μάθημα . . . , χρὴ αὐτὸς μανθάνειν*,—*δόλιτικὸν* is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, *τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἂμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.*,—*τοῦ τοξότου* belongs to the sentence *ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.*.

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

a. The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Euthyd. 294 c, οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὅπόσους ὁδόντας ἔχει ;

Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον διαφέρουσι.

Phædo 75 b, εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἵσου, ὅ τι ἔστιν.

Theæt. 162 d–e, θεοὺς . . . οὓς ἔγω . . . ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἔξαιρω.

Phædo 86 d, Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἔγκαλει τῷ λόγῳ.

Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἀνθαυμάσαι καὶ τὸν Κάδμον λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἴη μαθεῖν τὸ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.

Gorg. 449 e, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἀν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν.

Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

Ibid. d, τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν . . . διαμάχοιτ' ἀν . . . ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν.

Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἶνον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθά ;

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ρήτορικὴν . . . μεμελέτηκεν.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύοντας ὅσαι κ.τ.λ. λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύονται.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer : cf. Od. xvii. 373, Αὐτὸν δ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὕχεται εἶναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κέμ' ἴδοις, εἰ ὁλκα διηνεκέα προταμοίμην. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας . . . τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους, Aristoph. Av. 1269, Δεινόν γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν παρὰ τοὺς βροτοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. β. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.

Legg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἶναι] εὐτυχές ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.

Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ρήθηναι.

Phdr. 242 b, αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ρήθηναι.

Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ ἔναι τὸ εἴρως ἔστιν.

In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, *ἥγγελται . . . ἡ μάχη πάνυ λισχυρὰ γεγονέναι.*

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also ; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, *ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ, ἀληθεῖ εἶναι.*

Crat. 425 b, *σὺ πιστεύεις σαντῷ, οἵος τ' ἀν εἴναι*—attracted for *οἵον τ' ἀν εἴναι σε.*

Hip. Ma. 283 e, *ἔφθονον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισίν, ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.*

Rep. 459 b, *δεῖ ἄκρων εἴναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.*

Euthyd. 282 d, *οἵων ἐπιθυμῷ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἴναι.*

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, *εὐδαιμόνων μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα.* [ἀνὴρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MSS.]

Crito 43 b, *σὲ . . . εὐδαιμόνιστα τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.*

Phdr. 246 d, *τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἦν ψυχῆς †ἀπορρεῖ.*

Symp. 172 a, *διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος ἔννοισίαν . . . περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνες ἡσαν.*

Euthyd. 272 b, *οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἥδη πρεσβύτερος ἔης ;*

Politie. 309 d, *τὸν δὴ πολιτικὸν . . . ἀρ' ἵσμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δύνατὸν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ †τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν ;*

Protag. 318 e, *εὐβούλια περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, δπως ἀν . . . †οἰκίαν διοικοῖ.*

Tim. 24 e, *τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὥρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδούσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι—(sc. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)*

Critias 108 b, *πρόλεγω σοὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκίμηκεν ἐν † αὐτῷ ποιητής.*

Apol. 25 e, *ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμελειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι †μεμέληκε.*

Meno 96 e, *ώμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἄλλως ἔχοι.*

Phædo 65 d, *τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον †ον.* (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, *μελίτης περὶ οὐσίας, ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστι.*

Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλειστοάναξ . . . ἐστὶ ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις ἀεὶ προβαλλόμενος, ὡς διὰ τὴν τέκείνον κάθοδον παρανομθεῖσαν ταῦτα ἔνυμβαίνοι.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phædo 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἀνέκαστη οἵοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν δμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης—which means δῆλον δὴ οἴα καὶ τᾶλλα ἔσται, τούτεστιν οἱ ἀνέκαστη οἵοι κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἵοι τὸ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἔξεργάζεσθαι—which means δῆλον ὅτι οἵοι τὸ εἰσὶν . . . ἔξεργάζεσθαι, τοιούτον γάρ ἔργον ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 e, μὴ δόξῃ ἄπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδριά τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς τείσηλθες, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. β. The Dependent sentence being Infinitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὴν τῶν ζώων ποίησιν τίς ἐναντιώσεται, μὴ οὐχὶ Ἔρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τριγύγεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα;

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἀληθὲς δισχυρίζεσθαι, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.

Rep. 489 e, διῆμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἵον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κάγαδὸν ἐσόμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἥργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραινεῖν.

Politic. 285 e, τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων, ράδίως καταμαθεῖν, αἰσθηταί τινες δμοιότητες πεφύκασι.

Hip. Ma. 294 e, οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμία σε ἀλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἔως εἰς ἔκπληξιν μεγέθεσί τε κάλλεστί τε ἔργων ἰδεῖν τὴν οἰκησιν ἀπειργάσαντο.

Phædo 84 c, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἔφαινετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 409, Οὐ γάρ τις φειδὼ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων Γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ κε θάνωσι, πυρὸς μειλισσέμεν ὁκα.

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, *ὑβριν . . . κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, πέρας . . . οὐδὲν . . . ἐνόν.*

In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Apol. 37 d, *καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν.*

Protag. 313 a, *ἐν φάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σέ.)*

Rep. 525 b, *προσῆκον τὸ μάθημα ἀν εἴη νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ τλογιστικὴν ἴεναι.*

Gorg. 449 b-c, *εἰσὶ μὲν ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τρούς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.*

Euthyd. 281 d, *κινδυνεύει ξύμπαντα ἀ κ.τ.λ., οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς ἔναι ὅπως κ.τ.λ.*

Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, *εὐτελέστερα δὲ τὰ δεινά, τβραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ ἂμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἑλληνας κατατρίψαι.*

§ 231. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, *ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ ταντῇ ὀνόμαζε.*

Phædo 98 a, *ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἀ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.*

Symp. 178 a, *ἀ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὅν ἔδοξε μοι ἀξιομνημόνευτον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τούτων ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.*

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phædo 62 a, *τυγχάνει . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἡ ζῆν. οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν . . . εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιόν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.,—where after οἷς δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.*

Ib. 69 b, *τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα . . . μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεως, parallel to τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου.*

Politic. 258 a, Θεατήτῳ . . . συνέμιξα χθὲς διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα,
Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα — where the clauses supply each other
crosswise; ἀκήκοα requires the Genitive Θεατήτου, and οὐδέτερα
implies a Σωκράτει parallel to Θεατήτῳ, as well as a Σωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two
co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, ἀξιῶ νῦν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν — where
ἀλλήλους is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων — where
ἀλλήλους is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 e, διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα — to μανθα-
νέτω supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖν . . . καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι — sc. σοί.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ, δουλεύοντί τε — sc. ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἀλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν — sc. ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ξύνεστι τε καὶ ἔστιν. i. e. καὶ ἔστι τῶν
νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iii. 9, ὅρκους ἔλαβον καὶ ἔδοσαν παρὰ Φαρναβάζου.

§ 234. D.¹⁴ New Subject in the second of two clauses silently
supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μηδὲν δέη αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι — sc. αὐτό.

Symp. 212 c, θύραν ψόφον παρασχεῖν, . . . καὶ αὐλητρίδος φωνὴν
ἀκούειν — sc. αὐτούς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχεῖν.

Ib. 187 e, ὅπως ἀν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσηται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ
μηδεμίαν ἐμποιήσῃ — sc. ἡ ἡδονή.

Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε, καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς — sc.
ταῦτα.

Phædo 58 b, νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν
πόλιν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι — sc. αὐτούς.

Ib. 72 c, λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἐνδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φαίνοιτο — sc.
Ἐνδυμίων.

Apol. 40 a, ἡ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἀν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι —
where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ἡ supplied from the preceding Accusative ἡ. (This is an instance of the next head
also.)

¹⁴ [Under this section is written in the MS. “Illustr. from Homer :” and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, “Illustr. :” but the illustrations were never put in.]

§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, ὁ οὐπω̄ ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἔχει.

Ib. 201 a, οὐ ἐνδεής ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἔχει.

Phædo 65 a, ὁ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.

Gorg. 482 b, ἀ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις.

Menex. 243 c, ὁν χρὴ ἀεὶ μεμνῆσθαι τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται.

Ib. 395 d, ὁν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτὸν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.

Phædo 100 b, ἀ εἴ μοι δίδωσ τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 e, πρώτον μὲν μὴ εἰδώς, . . . ἔπειτα . . . ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη, where μὴ εἰδώς is the equivalent of ὁς μὴ εἰδείη.

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τὸν κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὅν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον [] ἔαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν.

Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλείω πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω . . . καὶ αὐτὸν [] βαρύτερα πρὸς [] κουφότερα καὶ [] θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.

Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὅντι γνώσις, ἀγνώσια δ' ἐπὶ [] μὴ ὅντι.

Ib. 544 c, ἡ τε . . . ἐπαινούμενη, ἡ Κρητική . . . καὶ [] δευτέρα . . . καλούμενη δὲ δλιγαρχία.

Ib. 545 a, τὸν φιλόνεικον . . . καὶ [] δλιγαρχικὸν αὐτὸν καὶ [] δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικὸν.

Phædo 67 d, χωρισμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ [] σώματος. [So Oxon.]

Gorg. 469 e, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ [] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα. [So most MSS.]

Symp. 186 e, ἡ τε ἱατρικὴ . . ., ὁσαύτως δὲ καὶ [] γυμναστικὴ καὶ [] γεωργία.

Phdr. 253 d, ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ [] κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διεπομέν. Phileb. 45 a, μείζους γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας . . ., ἡ περὶ [] ὑγιαίνοντας;

Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, [] μείζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην.

Ib. 960 c, [] Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [] Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἀτροπον δὲ [] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.

Symp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς Ὀμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον.

Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. c. Some larger part of the clause.

Politic. 308 e, τὸν μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν . . . ὅσα ἔστι τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀθέοτητα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.

The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)

Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων.

Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἔστι τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

Legg. 795 b, διαφέρει μαθῶν μὴ μαθόντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.

Cf. Hom. Od. xviii. 228, Ἐσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρηα. Aeschyl. S. c. T.

314, ἀνδρολέτειραν καὶ τὰν ρίψοπλον ἄταν, Suppl. 194, Αἰδοῖα καὶ γόεδνα καὶ τὰ χρεῖ ἔπη, Cho. 727, χθόνιον δ' Ἐρμῆν καὶ τὸν νύχιον.

§ 241. b. Anastrophe of Pronouns in Correlative clauses.

Rep. 455 e, καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρική, ἡ δ' οὐ. So 451 e.

Symp. 207 d, νέος δὲ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς—where we must supply τὰ μὲν το νέος γιγνόμενος.

Phædo 105 d—e, (A) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μονσικὸν μὴ δέχηται [τί ὄνομάζομεν]; (B) Ἀμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἀμουσον must be supplied τὸ μέν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.

Theæt. 191 c, κήρυνον ἐκμαγεῖον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου—where before σκληροτέρου must be supplied ἐνίοις μέν.

Apol. 18 d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μέν.

Cf. Hom. Il. xi. 536, ἀφ' ἵπτείων ὁπλέων ῥαθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον, Αἱ δ' ἀπ' ἐπιστότρων, xxii. 157, παραδραμέτην, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ὅπισθε διώκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὅπισθ' ὀνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρέα ὕπτων ἄλλα δ' ἔπειρον, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεόμην μενοεικέα, πολλὰ δ' ὅπισσω Λάγχανον (i. e. πολλὰ μὲν μενοεικέα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theæt. 192 d, ἀκούω, . . . τότε δὲ αἰσθησιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω.

Phædo 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τότε δ' αὐτὸν περὶ τῆς ἔνυμφορᾶς διεξόντες—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Phileb. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common: e. g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxii. 171, [Ἄλλοτε μὲν] Ἰδης ἐν κορυφῆσι πολυπτύχου, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτεὶ κ.τ.λ., xvi. 689, Ὅστε [ὅτε μὲν] καὶ ἄλκιμον ἄνδρα φοβεῖ . . . ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ., and so xx. 52.

§ 243. d. Anastrophe of Correlative Conjunctions.

Soph. 217 e, κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον.

Gorg. 488 d, διόριστον, ταῦτὸν ἡ ἔτερόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 169 d, ἴδωμεν, ὅρθῶς ἡ οὐκ ὅρθῶς ἐδυσσχεραίνομεν. So 161 d.

Ib. 173 d, εὐδὲ ἡ κακῶς . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 132, Ζώει ὄγ' ἡ τέθνηκε.

§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὅρῶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τὶ δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom. Il. xi. 374, Ἡτοι ὁ μὲν θώρηκα Ἀγαστρόφου ἰφθίμοιο Λῖνντ' ἀπὸ

στήθεσφι παναλολον ἀσπίδα τ' ὥμων. And Theocr. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνὰ κράνας, πάντ' ἄλσεα, ib. 117, Οὐκ ἔτ' ἀνὰ δρύμως, οὐκ ἄλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, *κελεύειν εἰσιέναι*, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλένιν αὐτόν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, *κελεύοντι με τράκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι*, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυ-
ᾶσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά τον λαβεῖν ἡ ἀρχὴν ἀρξαὶ ἢ τιν' ἄλλην δύναμιν—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, *ώς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστὸς καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει*—where ἐστὶ is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, *ξύμπαντα . . . ἐροῦμεν . . . εἰναὶ τε καὶ* [supply 'are'] *δύντα.*

Phdr. 234 e, *σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἔκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόργενται.*

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νεῖλος εἴς τε τὰ ἄλλα σωτῆρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, *οὐτως ὡς καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον μὲν . . . οὐδὲν ὀρώμενον, ξυναθροι-
σθέντων δὲ . . . ὀρᾶσθαι.*

Legg. 872 a, *ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μή, βουλεύση δὲ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἐτέρω.*

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, *ἄσπερ οἱ τὰ θρέμματα θαλλὸν . . . προσείοντες ἔγοντες*—where to οἱ τὰ θρέμματα must be supplied ἔγοντες.

Phædo 114 b, *οἱ ἀν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὄστις βιῶνται*—where to διαφερόντως must be supplied βεβιωκέναι.

Theæt. 180 a, *ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι*—where to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, *παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλεί-
στους λέγοντες, περὶ πεντήκοντα*—where to οἱ . . . λέγοντες must be supplied λέγονται. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,

οῦτω μὲν τὸς τὰ πολυτελέστατα σκευάζουσι νεκρούς. Thuc. ii. 53, ῥᾶσιν γάρ ἐτόλμα τις ἀ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν—
ἐτόλμα sc. καθ' ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 c, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἵον τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 183 b, ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, ὡς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ δμυνύντι μόνῳ συγγράμη.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὐδὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, ἡ προσήκουσα . . . νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἔκει λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὐσα—i. e. οὐδὲ ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστίν, ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡ πρ. κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Xen. Mem. II. vi. 17, ὁ ταράττει σε, ὁ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις . . . ὁρᾶς κ.τ.λ. Isoer. iv. 176. p. 77, ὁ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Lysias xxx. 29. p. 186, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. [So Bekker: Zurich edd. omit ὅτι.] We have also the following variations:—Isoer. vi. 56. p. 127, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (and similarly xviii. 18. p. 375), xv. 23. p. 314, ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅταν κ.τ.λ., Lysias xix. 25. p. 154, ὁ δὲ μέγιστον τεκμήριον· Δῆμος γάρ κ.τ.λ.

§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύοντα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν—where μεθύοντα ἄνδρα stands for μεθύοντος ἄνδρὸς λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἔχομένη ἐμοῦ κλίνη—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλίνης τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 e, οὐτ' ἀν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φῖλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. Il. xvii. 51, κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὁμοῖαι.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Theæt. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἀ νῦν διήλθομεν—where πάντα stands for ‘all besides.’

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς . . . καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

Phædo 69 b, τούτου πάντα . . . πιπρασκόμενα — ‘all other things being parted with for this.’

So τί μήν; ‘what, if not what you say?’

§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, οὐδαμῶς [φιλοσόφους φήσομεν], ἀλλ' ὅμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφους—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὐ.

Theaet. 201 b, οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πείσαι μέν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὐ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δή τοι ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [So Oxon. and two more MSS.] μέν μοι, ἥξειν τήμερον—sc. ‘but I am not sure.’

Phdr. 242 c, εἰμὶ μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνν δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαντῷ μόνον ἱκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταντὶ ἔλεγεν ἄν, ή οὐ; ἔγὼ μὲν οἶμαι—sc. ‘but another might not.’ (οἶμαι μὲν ἔγὼ would have been ‘I think, but am not sure.’)

§ 250*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 e, ἔως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ, ἔάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, [έάν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ,] ὅμως ὁρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) Οὐ μέντ' ἂν . . . ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ—i. e. ‘No: for else I should certainly not have,’ &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἴθε γράψειν κ.τ.λ.: ή γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἰεν οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ δήπον ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ τις σοφίᾳ . . . ή γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφίᾳ εἴη.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴπερ representing the Protasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκουν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεῖ], ἀλλ', εἴπερ, σέ.

Rep. 497 e, οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὐκ, ὁ γαθέ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τοῦτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 e, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, δόποσα φλαῦρα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227, “Ἐπειτ’ ἀπὸ ταρρόν τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence;—εἰ δὲ representing the Protasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἔγκωμιον εἰς Ἱερωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι· εἰ δέ, ὁ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαξε.

Euthyd. 285 c, *εὶ μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, εὶ δ', ὅ τι βούλεται τοῦτο ποιεῖτω.*

Legg. 688 b, *εὶ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίξων εὶ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων.*

Alc. I. 114 b, *τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας, εὶ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ· εὶ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.*

This *εὶ δὲ* does not stand for *εὶ δὲ μή*, in reference to the *βούλει* of the former clause ; but refers to a *βούλει* of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer : cf. Il. vi. 376, *Εἰ δ', ἄγε, xxii. 381, Εἰ δ', ἄγετε, ix. 46, εὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, Φευγόντων κ.τ.λ., 262, Εἰ δέ, σὺ μέν μεν ἄκουσον.*

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence ;—suppression of Apodosis.

Rep. 575 d, *οὐκονν ἐὰν μὲν ἔκόντες ὑπείκωστιν—· ἐὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 520 e, *εὶ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται—· εὶ δὲ μή, οὕ.*

More commonly the form is *ἐὰν μὲν . . . εὶ δέ*, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, *ἐὰν μέν σοι ἐθέλῃ παύεσθαι ἡ λύγξ—· εὶ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.*

Legg. 854 c, *καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι λωφᾶ τι τὸ νόσημα—· εὶ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.*

Protag. 325 d, *ἐὰν μὲν ἔκων πείθηται—· εὶ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 311 d, *ἄν μὲν ἔξικνῆται . . . —· εὶ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.*

Hip. Ma. 287 a, *ἐὰν . . . ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι—· suppose I' &c.*

Symp. 199 e, *ἀπόκριναι ὀλίγῳ πλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθης δ βούλομαι· εὶ γάρ ἐροίμην κ.τ.λ.—· suppose I were to ask, now,' &c.*

Rep. 440 d, *ἀλλ' εὶ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τοδε ἐνθυμεῖ . . . , δτι κ.τ.λ.—*

Symp. 177 b, *εὶ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι κ.τ.λ.—*

With *εὶ βούλει*, or *εὶ βούλεσθε*, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, *εὶ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—· where εὶ βούλεσθε represents εὶ βούλεσθε σκέψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὅποιος ἐστίν.*

Crat. 392 a, *εὶ δὲ βούλει περὶ τῆς ὅρνιθος.*

Theat. 196 e, *εὶ δὲ βούλει, . . . κεχρήμεθα.*

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 580, *Εἴπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' εἴ μιν ἀεικισσαίμεθ', κ.τ.λ., xxii. 487, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις πολέμοιο δαήμεναι κ.τ.λ., Od. xv. 80, Εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις.* Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after *ἐπει*,—as Il. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by *ἄν*, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phædo 98 c, *ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἄν εἴ τις . . . λέγοι.*

In this common phrase the *ān* represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e. g. here *πεπονθός ἀν εἴη τις*, but rather a vague sentence such as *τὸ πράγμα ἀν εἴη*.

Apol. 29 b, *τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἵστως διαφέρω . . . , καὶ εἰ δή τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίνη εἶναι, τούτῳ ἀν*—sc. *σοφώτερος ἀν φαίνη εἶναι*—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Politie. 308 c, *εἴ τις πράγμα ότιοῦν . . . κανεὶς εἰ τῷ φανλότατον . . . ξυνίστησιν*. Here the *κανεὶς . . . φανλότατον* is exegetic of *ότιοῦν*—‘any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.’ The *καὶ* is hyperbolically placed, and belongs to the *εἰ* clause.

Symp. 221 e, *δύναματα καὶ ρήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται, Σατύρου ἀντιναῦ βριστοῦ δοράν*—‘something [like] what a satyr’s hide would be.’ In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, *τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτέον κ.τ.λ.; Λέγε, ἔφη, ποιεῖ ἀν*;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an *implicit* Proposition.

Phædo 61 b, *Εὐήνω φράγε . . . ἀν σωφρονῆ ἐμὲ διάκειν*—‘tell him to follow me,—*which he will do if he is wise*’

Symp. 173 d, *όπόθεν . . . τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες . . . , οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε* ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἰ—‘I do not know how you came by it, but at all events it fits you; for’ &c.

Theæst. 158 a, *όκνῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω* ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, *αἰσχυνοίμην ἀν ἔγωγε τοῦτο ὄμολογεῖν* ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, *εἰμι* ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀν ἵστως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἥκουν.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phædo 100 d, *ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη*.

Legg. 834 e, *εἴτε τριετηρίδες εἴτε αὖ διὰ πέμπτων ἐτῶν εἴθ' ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως ἀν . . . διανεμηθῶσι*.

Tim. 48 c, *τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ*.

Crito 50 a, *εἴτ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ δονομάσαι τοῦτο*.

Apol. 41 b, *Ὀδυσσεά η Σίσυφον η ἄλλους μυρίους ἀν τις εἴποι*.

Phædo 70 e, οἶον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον [τυγχάνει ὅν], καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Similarly Phædo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:—

Protag. 358 a, εἴτε γάρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὅπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὡς βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτο μοι πρὸς δὲ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἀν βιῶναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησῷ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;

Apol. 20 d, οὐδοὶ δὲ τάχ' ἀν . . . μείω τινα ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἰεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἀρχοντας . . . ὑπηρέτας . . . ἐκάλεσα οὐ τι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' ἡγοῦμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . ἀλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο.

Cf. Lysias xxviii. 4-5. p. 179, οἵμαι . . . οὐδένα ἀν . . . ἐπιτρέψαι . . . , ἀλλως τε καὶ Ἐργοκλῆς ἔλεγεν. St. Mark vi. 5, καὶ οὐκ ἡδύνατο ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποιῆσαι, εἰ μὴ . . . ἐθεράπευσε.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ . . . φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι . . . ; (B) Τί δ' οἴει ἀλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατο ἥσαν;

Phædo 63 d, (A) σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστὶν βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. (B) Τί δὲ ἀλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει δ μέλλων κ.τ.λ.;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεῖ instead of οὐ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεῖ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεῖ is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ μυθολογητέον . . . , ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπαλός . . . , ἀλλὰ σκληρός. Fully and regularly this would have been οὐχ ἀπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ,— ἀλλὰ σκληρός.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μῆποτέ τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται. Fully οὐ μῆποτέ τις (πολλοῦ γε δεῖ) τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 e, εἰς ταῦτὸν βασιλέα καὶ τύραννον, ξυνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους ὅντας αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκατέρου τρόπον—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing *τὸν τρόπον* under the government of *ξυνέθεμεν*.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—i. e. σύ τε ἐξάγων, ἐγώ τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀπείπομεν δ' ἀν ἀκούοντές τε καὶ λέγοντες—i. e. ὑμεῖς τε ἀκούοντες, ἐγώ τε λέγων. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη, τῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however *μείζονα*, still more brachylogically, stands for *τὴν μὲν μείζωνα*, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.

§ 262. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection; e. g. *εἰναι* subjoined to *ἐκὼν* and the like :

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure :

3. Cases of fullness of Construction : e. g.

Phædo 62 a, *τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων*—which is simply the full form of which *μόνον ἀπάντων* would have been an abbreviation; as ‘distinct from all the rest’ is more accurate than ‘distinct from all’ :

Or the use of *ωστε* with the Infinitive, following *δύναμαι* &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες ;

Ib. 34 d, ἐπιεικῆ ἀν μοι δοκῶ . . . λέγειν λέγων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τεῦτο.

Legg. 858 a, *τίνα τρόπον ἀν γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτο.*

Phædo 75 d, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.

Cf. Isæus ii. 22, οὐκ ἀν ποιησάμενος ἄλλον οἰκειότερον ἐμοῦ ποιήσαιτο ἄν· whereby we are reminded of Homer's (Od. xi. 612) Μὴ τεχνη-σάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο [“]Ος κεῖνον τελαμῶνα ἐῇ ἐγκάτθετο τέχνη.

Or, in coordinate clauses which have a common part, the expression of this in each clause, as in

Phdr. 255 d, ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν.

Rep. 553 b, πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει.

Phædo 67 d, ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

(Compare these with the real Pleonasm of Prepositions below—
§ 265.)

§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, οὐπω δῆλον οὐδὲ εἰ μεγάλη.

Ib. 389 a, οὐκοῦν 'Ομήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα.

Crito 43 b, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐδὲ ἀν αὐτὸς ἥθελον.

Euthyd. 279 a, οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν. So Phædo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν δυνατὸν λαβεῖν τέχνην.

Phædo 100 a, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.

Hip. Ma. 292 b, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ 'Ιππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτα γε ἀποκριναίμην.

Lysis 221 c, οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἀν ἦν κ.τ.λ.

Crat. 398 e, οὐδὲ εἰ τι οἷος τ' ἀν εἴην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντεῖνω.

Euthyphro 4 d, οὐτ' εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δεῖν.

Cf. Hom. Il. i. 86, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Theæt. 163 a, ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον οὐτε σὺ οὐτ' ἀν ἡμεῖς φάμεν.

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.

§ 264. *β.* Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost ¹⁵irrational.

Apol. 27 e, ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἀν ώς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανή ἔστι.

Legg. 747 d, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ώς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γεννῶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους· οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον. οἱ μέν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antiph. vi. 10. p. 142, οὕτε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ή ἢ διώκει ἐν πράγματι τοιούτῳ, πιστεῦσαι δήπου αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερόν ἔστιν ή ἀπιστῆσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. *b.* Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 a, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . ἐν μόνοις τὸ ἐναργὲς εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ή ὑμῖν.

§ 266. *c.* Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 b, καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ὁν τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἄν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνῃ ἀν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον ἀγαπόη ἀν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρεύσαντες ἀν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἀν ἀποκτείνατε.

e. Of ἔφη, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἀν ἔχοι, φάναι, δὲ Ἀγάθων.

Ib. 190 e, λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. *B.* Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. *C.* Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι.

Legg. 805 a, ἡμίσεια πόλις ἀντὶ διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phædo 58 a, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών.

Ib. 70 e, ἐκ μείζονος ὅντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται.

¹⁵ Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ή οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.

Soph. 219 b, ὅπερ ἀν μὴ πρότερον τις ὁν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγγ. So 265 b.

Cf. Lysias xxxi. 24. p. 189, τοιγάρτοι πρότερον βελτίων γενόμενος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὕστερον βουλεύειν ἀξιούτω.

Phædo 64 c, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἔνδοκῇ ἀπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ.

Ib. 76 e, ἀναγκάνον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἴναι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταῦτα δοκεῖ ἀπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom. Il. vi. 476, δότε δὴ καὶ τόνδε γενέσθαι Παιδ' ἐμόν, ὡς καὶ ἐγώ περ, ἀριπρεπέα Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα.

Ib. 99 b, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ράθυμία.

Ib. 79 e, ὅλως καὶ παντί (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγρηγορόστι μήτε εὐδουστι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμένοις. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES :—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δύο διχῆ ποιητικῆς εἴδῃς θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ θάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὅν, τὸ δὲ ὅμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

Ib. 218 e, τί δῆτα προταξίαμεθ' ἀν εὔγνωστον καὶ σμικρὸν . . . ; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theæst. 192 a, δεῖ ὁδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους.

Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος δ ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 811 c, ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν λόγον . . . , ἔδοξαν . . . μοι . . . εἰρῆσθαι.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἰπεῖν, βλέψας κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὅπόσοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαιότατον ἐπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theæst. 173 d, σπουδαὶ δέ ἔταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

Symp. 208 e, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά.

Rep. 565 d—e, ὡς ἄρα δὲ γενοσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα . . . οὐ περὶ τούτου δὲ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἀν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. c. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἔχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ δομίλια . . . θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδονσι—the words καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδονσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phædo 88 c, εἰς ἀπίστιαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθῆσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τὸν ἀκίρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα . . . , καὶ τιμᾶς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, . . . γέρα λαγχάνοντα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἄμεινον παντὶ . . . ἄρχεσθαι, μᾶλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγοὺς . . . , δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴθ' ὑμᾶς μήτε τις ἐπιθυμίᾳ . . . ποτὲ λάβοι . . . , μήτε ἐγρηγορόσι μήτε καθεύδονσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θύραν διαπονούμενοις.

Critias 116 d, νεῶς ἦν σταδίου μὲν μῆκος, εὐρος δὲ τρισὶ πλέθροις.

§ 275*. AA. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον.

Phædo 82 a, οἶ ἀν ἐκάστη ἵοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης.

Symp. 207 b, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἔτοιμά ἔστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων=τοῦ γενομένου.

Protag. 345 e, οὐχ ὃς ἀν μὴ κακὰ πονῆ ἐκάων, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι.

Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποθανουμένους, ὃς ἀν τοῦτο δρᾶ.

Conversely to the last two instances

Symp. 187 e, προσφέρειν οἷς ἀν προσφέρη, ὅπως ἀν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπάσηται.

b.

Rep. 554 a, θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ, οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see 'Attraction,' §§ 192-194, above.)

Phædo 107 b, τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστὰς ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον.

This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express *saying, seeming, or thinking.*

Crat. 384 c, ὅτι δὲ οὐ φησὶ κ.τ.λ., ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτὸν σκώπτειν.

Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν, . . . ὅτι οὐδὲν . . . δέοι κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη δὲ πρός με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πᾶς ἀν τοῦτο νοήσειε, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμήν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ . . . Ἐρωτα μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι, ἀλλ' οὐτως ἡμέληται.

Ib. 184 b, ἔστι . . . νόμος, ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀλλη μία μόνη δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.

Apol. 19 e, τούτων ἔκαστος οἵος τε ἔστιν ἵὸν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προΐκα ξυνεῖναι φέ αν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι κ.τ.λ.

Theæt. 190 d, αἱ μᾶιαι δύνανται τὰς ὠδῖνας μαλθακωτέρας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐάν νέον δέν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσι.

§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, *κελεύεις γάρ δή με, τῆς αὐτῆς ὅδοῦ ἐχθροπού γεγονίας πολλοῖς, ἵστως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττοσιν ἔτεροι προσφιλοῦντες . . . μεθ' ὧν διακελεύει με κ.τ.λ.*

Crito 44 b, *χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μήποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω κ.τ.λ.*

Gorg. 457 b, *ἐάν δέ, οἷμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενύμενός τις κάτα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ.*

Rep. 530 b, *ἄτοπον . . . ἡγήσεται, τὸν νομίζοντα . . . καὶ ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

Critias 114 e, *ἡ νῆσος αὐτὴ παρείχετο . . . τὸ νῦν ὄνομαξόμενον μόνον, τότε δὲ πλέον ὀνόματος ἦν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ὀρυττόμενον ὄρειχαλκον.*

§ 279. d. Construction begun with *ὅτι*, after Verbs of *knowing* or *saying*, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, *αἰσθάνομαι σον ἐκάστοτε . . . ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἀν φῇ σοῦ τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἀν φῇ ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν.*

Legg. 892 d, *εἰπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατ' ἐμαυτόν.*

Crito 50 b, *ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκει γάρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις;*

Protag. 356 a, *εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει.*

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with *οἶδα*, and with *λέγω* or *εἰπον*, *ὅτι* becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, *οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἀν διενεγκεῖν.*

Apol. 37 b, *Ἔντι οὖθ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.*

Symp. 175 d, *καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἀν ἔχοι κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 189 a, *εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ' ἐπαύσατο.*

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c-d, *σὲ . . . οἷμαι . . . ἐγνωκέναι ὡς . . . ἡ μὲν ἔτέρα διακονικὴ ἔστιν, ἢ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. 391 c-d, *μηδ' ἐῶμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεὺς . . . ὁρμησεν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγάς, μηδέ τιν' ἄλλον . . . ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἀν κ.τ.λ.*

Charm. 164 d, *δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι . . . ἀντὶ τοῦ χαῖρε, ὡς τούτον μὲν οὐκ ὄρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προστρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλους.*

Laches 198 b, *ἡγούμεθα . . . δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.· δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.· δέος γάρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*

§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, *εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παιδεία ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ εἶν αἴγριοι.*

Phædo 95 c-d, *οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τέ ἔστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.* ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον κ.τ.λ. *καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη . . . ζῷη κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 96 b, *ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἔστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.*

Phdr. 241 b, *δὸς δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., ἡγνοηκώς . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι . . . χαρίζεσθαι . . . , εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαῖον εἶη κ.τ.λ.*

Hip. Ma. 301 d, *δόξαν εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ὡς ἔκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴς ἔστι, τοῦτο δέ, δὲ ἔκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐκ ἄρα εἴημεν ἀμφότεροι.*

Gorg. 512 a, *λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μέν τις . . . , τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἔστι καὶ τοῦτον διησειεν.*

Phileb. 41 d, *[εἴρηται] ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἡττον ἀμφω δέχεσθον, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.*

Charm. 156 d-e, *Ζάμολξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὅτι . . . οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη κ.τ.λ.*

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these passages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the principal account to be given of this change of construction: it may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in

Tim. 18 c, *ἐτίθεμεν, μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεὶς . . . γνώσοιτο, νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες κ.τ.λ.*

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, *ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν . . . ἄρ’, ἐπειδὰν κ.τ.λ., ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.* This passage exemplifies b. also (where it

is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical *ώς τινες ἔλεγον*, which usurps here the influence properly due to *πότερον*.

§ 285. e. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive *Oratio Obliqua*, changing into Infinitive.

Phædo 111 c, *τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν φῷ ήμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . ἔλαττον ἔχειν.*

Politic. 293 e, *λεκτέον μεμημένας . . ., ἃς μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχύνα μεμιμῆσθαι.*

Cf. Hom. Il. xviii. 535, *Ἐν δ' Ἔρις ἐν δὲ Κυδοιμὸς ὄμιλεον, ἐν δ' ὀλοὴ Κήρ,* *Ἄλλον ζωὸν ἔχουσα νεούτατον, ἄλλον ἄουτον,* *Ἄλλον τεθνεῶτα κατὰ μόθον ἔλκε ποδοῖν, Od. vii. 125, ὅμφακες εἰσὶν* *"Ανθος ἀφιεῖσαι, ἔτεραι δ' ὑποπερκάζουσιν.*

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Theæt. 201 b, *οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες . . ., τούτους δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.*, where *τούτους* refers to *τινες*.

Phædo 70 e, *ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸν γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;*—*αὐτὸν* refers to *τι*.

Lysis 219 d, *ὅτιν τις τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται . . ., ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτο*;

Phædo 105 b, *φῷ ἀν τι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται*;—sc. *τὸ σῶμα*.

Symp. 204 b, *ὅν δὲ σὺ φήθης* *"Ἐρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες.*

§ 287. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS AND CLAUSES.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Prepositions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.

The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato's own time. Socrates in the *Protagoras* (343 e), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says *ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἀσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως*.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτ' ἀν γίγνηται ρήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Ib. 860 d, ἀκούσιως δὲ ἔκουσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—where the two clauses οὐκ ἔχει λόγον and ἀκούσιως ἔκουσιον πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἔστι.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, δ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἀλλά, φάντα, ὁ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπὲ ὁ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. Similarly 26 e, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ἵνα . . . τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλήν—έὰν εἴπω οὐτωσί—ἀναδήσω—ἅρα καταγελάσεσθέ μον ὡς μεθύοντος;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—“That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well ! and if I shall say that,—what then ? will you make fun of me ?” In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counter-changes them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajectio as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἴπεις βλέψας;

Symp. 191 d, ἔστιν . . . δ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο δ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας.

Politic. 309 a, ὑπὸ κακῆς βίᾳ φύσεως ἀπωθούμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παῦσαι τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον.

Cf. Andoc. i. 30. p. 5, *τούτων οὖν ἐμοὶ τῶν λόγων ἡ τῶν ἔργων τί προσήκει*; Hdt. ii. 134, *ἔτεσι γὰρ κάρτα πολλοῖσι ὕστερον τούτων τῶν βασιλήων τῶν τὰς πυραμίδας ταύτας ἥν λιπομένων Ἱοδῶπις*.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, *τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες* —where *αὐτοῦ* belongs to *τὸ μέν*.

Theæt. 166 d, *τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὸν μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε*—where *μου* belongs to *τὸν λόγον*.

Gorg. 469 d, *καν τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δέιν*—where *αὐτῶν* belongs to *τινα*.

Phædo 60 b, *ώς ἄτοπον . . . ἔσικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο*—where *τι* would normally have found its place beside *ἄτοπον*.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent *τις*.

Theæt. 188 a, *ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἡ ἐν τι οἴδεν ἡ μὴ οἴδεν*.

Crito 53 b, *ἔαν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἐλθῆς*.

§ 290*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, *ῳσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν*.

Ib. 28 d, *οὐδὲν ἀν τις ἔαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡ ὑπὸ ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ*.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

Οὔτω.

Legg. 747 b, *ἐν οὐδὲν οὔτω δύναμιν ἔχει παίδειον μάθημα μεγάλην*—where *οὔτω* belongs to *μεγάλην*.

Theæt. 169 c, *οὔτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε*—where *οὔτω* belongs to *δεινός*.

§ 292. Ἰσως.

Legg. 640 e, *τάχ' ἀν ὀρθῶς Ἰσως μέμφοιτο*.

Symp. 194 c, *τάχ' ἀν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτοὺς εἰ τι Ἰσως οἴοιο κ.τ.λ.* That this is a trajectio of *ἴσως* we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination *τάχ' ἀν Ἰσως*, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of *εἰ Ἰσως*.

§ 293. Ἐτι.

Symp. 187 b, *οὐ γὰρ δήπον ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὁξέος καὶ βαρέος ἀρμονία ἀν εἴη*—where *ἔτι* is constructed with *οὐκ ἀν εἴη*.

Crat. 399 a, κινδυνεύσω ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέουντος γενέσθαι—
ἔτι with *σοφώτερος*.

Tim. 53 d, τὰς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἀνωθεν θεὸς οἶδε.

§ 294. *Μέντοι* intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα;

Apol. 35 c, μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, . . .

ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀστεβέλας φεύγοντα. The phrase *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* is rent asunder to admit the words *μέντοι νὴ Δία*, which could have found no other convenient place. It is because *ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ* had become a fixed phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the sense into doubt. In the disengaged *μέντοι νὴ Δία* another familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll. Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a) is to be recognised.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, Τίς ἦν ἐν ᾧ ματτόμεθα μέντοι τᾶλφιτα;

§ 295. *Γε* intrusive.

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ φαῖη γ' ἀν τις οἰοί τ' εἰσὶν ὑμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι. It might seem at first sight improbable that this *γε* should not belong to the clause within which it stands. But we have ground for recognising a trajectio here 1. in the sense, which is not helped by *γε* with *φαῖη*. 2. in the familiarity of the sequence *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε*, coll. Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the consideration that *φαῖη ἀν* is not consciously to the speaker a separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c, *τίνες φῆσθαι οἱ λόγοι*; Euthyphro 15 a, *τι δ' οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή*; Symp. 216 d, *πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει . . . σωφροσύνης*; and to the instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetical Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the *ἀν* preceding the *φαῖη*, as in Phædo 87 a, *τι οὖν, ἀν φαῖη δ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς*; but *ἀν* could not commence the clause if it were consciously regarded as distinct.

Gorg. 492 e, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ *βίος*.

§ 296. *"Αν*, anticipated Hyperbolically with *οἴμαι* and the like.

Apol. 32 e, ἀρ' οὖν ἀν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι;

Phædo 64 b, *οἴμαι γὰρ ἀν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . δοκεῖν*.

Soph. 223 a, *τὸ προσῆκον ὄνομ' ἀν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν*.

Soph. 224 d, οἶμαί σε, καν εἴ τις . . . προῦτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ. where ἄν belongs to καλεῖν.

Euthyd. 294 b, οὐκ ἄν οἴει ὁμολογῆσαι ἡμᾶς;

Phdr. 234 e, οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν;

Tim. 26 b, οὐκ ἄν οἴδα εἰ δυναίμην.

Cf. Isaeus viii. 20. p. 71, μὴ οἴεσθ' ἄν, εἰ κ.τ.λ., μήτ' ἄν τὸν πατέρα . . . εἰσενεγκεῖν. Thuc. iv. 28, οὐκ ἄν οἰόμενος αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι, vi. 11, Σικελιῶται δ' ἄν μοι δοκοῦστι, . . . καὶ ἔτι ἄν ἡσσον δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, viii. 103, οὐκ ἄν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλον.

§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 711 e, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ξυμπάστης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.

Soph. 265 a, καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν.

Phædo 83 e, οὐχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκα φασι.

Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, ὅν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα ἐπεβουλεύθην.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, οὐτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγάς.

Ib. 395 b, ἔτι τούτων εἰς σμικρότερα.

Ib. 397 b, δλίγον πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν.

Symp. 195 e, ἔξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἔξῆς πάσαις.

Theæt. 205 e, δλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.

Phædo 70 e, οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων.

Ib. 110 e, πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.

Apol. 40 a, πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς.

Phdr. 245 d, μηδὲ ἔξ ἐνός. So Politic. 310 e.

Gorg. 449 e, ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Legg. 876 b, ὅ τι περὶ σμικρότατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὡς ἐσ ἐλάχιστον χωρίον, iii. 46, ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ, ibid. ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον, i. 23, ἔστι παρ' οἷς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλειόνι αἰτίᾳ, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἐπ' δλίγων ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ . . . καθ' ἔτερα, and so 59, μηδὲ καθ' ἔτερα, and on the same principle vii. 72, ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἔτι λοιπάς.

§ 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis: e. g.

Phdr. 230 e, ἐν ἡρέμα προσάντει.

Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ.

Legg. 797 d, ἐν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὐ.

Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὐτῷς δλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isaeus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνυ δλίγῳ χρόνῳ).

Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς.

Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προάγειν.

Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πόλιν.

Ib. 832 c, σὺν ἀεὶ τινι βίᾳ.

Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταῦτα.

Phileb. 35 e, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.

Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὐτὸγυρίου.

Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὐτὸν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by interposition of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 e, καὶ ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ κ.τ.λ., τὰ δὲ αἰσχρὰ φέγοι τὸν ὁρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ—where ὁρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων is continued in τὰ αἰσχρὰ φέγοι.

Symp. 173 e, ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἀλλως ποιήσῃς ἀλλὰ διῆγησαι.

Ib. 179 c, ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν . . . ὥστε . . . εὐαριθμήτοις δή τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Αἴδου ἀνέναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσταν—the ὥστε being continued at τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσταν.

Theæt. 145 d, ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἀλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὅμως appertains to σμικρόν τι ἀπορῶ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ πεφίλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς. ὁν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προύθυμηθην γενέσθαι—where the construction of ὁν is continued at παντὶ τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀν φαίη, ἐκάστην . . . ἀννφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἀν εἴη, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀν φαίη is suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἀν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τί κωλύει, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι . . . , ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;

Legg. 822 c, ἀρ' οὐκ οἰόμεθα γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὁρθόν, ἐκεῖ γιγνόμενον ἦν ἀν τότε, νῦν ἐνταυθοῖ καὶ ἐν τούτοισι γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μέντ' ἀν σὲ ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σε—where, in meaning, οὐ μέντ' ἀν goes with ἐφοίτων, the ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ being explanatory.

Protag. 335 e, *τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαι*.

Phdr. 244 d, *ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει*.

Legg. 648 e, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοι πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι*.

Gorg. 512 a, *λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.*—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.

Thuc. vi. 68, *ἔξ οὐς κρατεῖν δεῖ η μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποχωρεῖν*. Xen. Hell.

VII. iii. 7, *ἱμεῖς τὸν περὶ Ἀρχίαν . . . οὐ ψῆφον ἀνεμείνατε ἀλλ’ ἐτιμωρήσασθε*. Isoctr. viii. 85. p. 176, *τοσοῦτον δὲ διήνεγκαν ἀνοίᾳ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἄλλους αἱ συμφοραὶ συστέλλονται . . . , ἐκείνοι δ’ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τούτων ἐπαιδεύθησαν*, xii. 118. p. 257, *αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰτίαι . . . , διὰ μακροτέρων μὲν αὐτὰς δηλθον, αὗται δ’ οὐν ἡσαν*. Dem. de Cor. 289. p. 322, *ἀρετῆς καὶ δείματος, οὐκ ἐνάσσων Ψυχάς, ἀλλ’ Ἀτδην κοινὸν ἔθεντο βραβῆ*. Soph. Ant. 21, *τάφου . . . , Τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δ’ ἀτιμάσας ἔχει*.

Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, *ἥν γε οὐ τὸν προῦχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ.*, ii. 91, *περὶ ήν η Ἀττικὴ ναῦς φθύσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα*. Hom. Il. x. 307, *Οστις τε τλαίη, οἱ τ’ αὐτῷ κύδος ἄροιτο, Νηῶν ωκυπόρων σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν*. Aesch. Pr. V. 331, *Πάντων μετασχῶν καὶ τετολμηκὼς ἐμοί*. Soph. Ant. 537, *Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας*, 1279, *τὰ δὲ ἐν δόμοις Ἔοικας ἥκειν καὶ τάχ’ ὄψεσθαι κακά*, El. 1154, *ἥς σὺ πολλάκις Φῆμας λάθρα προῦπεμπεις ὡς φανούμενος Τιμωρός*, O. T. 717, *Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νιν ἄρθρα κείνος ἐνζένξας ποδοῖν*. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, *τὸν δὲ γέροντα . . . κλάζον τε περίσσαν τ’ [Alii κλάζοντε], Epigr. xix. 1, Ἀρχιλοχὸν καὶ στᾶθι καὶ εἴσιδε*.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i. e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, *οὐδὴ ἐφίέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς . . . τυγχάνουσιν*—where *ἐφίέμενοι* is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theæst. 142 c, *δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ*.

Ib. 173 b, *πότερον βούλει διελθόντες η ἔσσαντες . . . τρεπώμεθα*;

Phædo 63 c, *ὅτι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς [ἐλπίζω] ἥξειν . . . διῆσχυρισάμην ἀν*. The virtual Primary Predicate is *δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς*.

Ib. 63 d, *σκεψώμεθα τί ἔστιν ὁ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν*. The virtual Primary Predicate is *βούλεσθαι*, not *δοκεῖ*.

Ib. 65 b, *ἡ . . . καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι . . . ὅρῶμεν*. The

Primary Intention, with which *ἡ* connects itself, is in the *όρωμεν* clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι . . . κείσεται. The ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι connects itself with the *κείσεται* clause.

Ib. 88 b, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence *θάνατον . . . θαρρεῖν* the virtual Primary Predicate is *θάνατον θαρροῦντι*—in other words, it would normally be *θάνατον θαρρεῖν*, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως δ αὐτὸς καλεῖται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at *ἔχων*. *

Soph. 224 d, οἷμαί σε, καν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος . . . προῦτάξετο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δή.

Apol. 31 b, τοῦτο γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The *οὐχ οἷοί τε* connects itself with *παρασχ.* μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἄδηλον δν ὅπότε τις ἐπελθών, καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἄμα ὅντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται. Hdt. ii. 134, οὐδὲ ὁν οὐδὲ εἰδότες μοι φάνονται λέγειν, ix. 105, τοῦτον δὲ κατέλαβε ὑστερον τούτων ἀποθανόντα κείσθαι. Hom. Od. iv. 739, Εἰ δή πού τινα κένος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ὑφίνας Ἐξελθὼν λαοῖσιν δδύρεται. Aesch. Ag. 479, τις ὁδε παιδινὸς . . . παραγγέλμασιν νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν, ἀλλαγὴ λόγου καμεῖν; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being *πυρωθέντα*), 740, παρ' αὐτὰ δ' ἐλθεῖν ἐς Ἰλίου πόλιν λέγοιμ' ἀν φρόνημα τηνέμον γαλάνας ('there came what I should call a spirit' &c.—virtual Predicate not *ἐλθεῖν* but *φρόνημα ν. γ.*), 796, οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὅμματα φωτὸς τὰ δοκοῦντ' εὑφρονος ἐκ διανοίας ὑδαρεῖ σαινειν φιλότητι (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on *δοκοῦντα* the virtual Predicate is *εὑφρονος*, not *σαινειν*—'which with seeming-kindly heart fawn' &c.). Soph. Aj. 798, τήνδε δ' ἔξοδον Ὁλεθρίαν Αἴαντος ἐλπίζει φέρειν—'he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here *ὁλεθρίαν* is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.

Rep. 438 c, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις [ἐπιστήμη ἔστι] ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός.

Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας.

Rep. 597 d, *ὅντως κλίνης ποιητής ὅντως οὕσης· ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις.*

Symp. 186 a, *οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . πρὸς τοὺς καλούς· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.*

Ib. 196 b, *οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται, οὐθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ, οὐτε θεόν.*

Theor. 173 d, *νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα, οὐτε δρῶσιν οὐτ' ἀκούοντι.*

Symp. 218 a, *δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὅντας δηθείη, τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν γάρ δηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.*

Soph. 231 a, *καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.*

Gorg. 474 c, *καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀἰσχρόν.*

Phædo 102 c, *σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας . . . , τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.*

Ib. 69 b, *τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα.*

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (A) *πότερον . . . πείθει, ἢ οὐ;* (B) *Οὐ δῆτα [sc. οὐ πείθει], ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.*

Ib. 496 d, (A) *πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὅμολογεῖς κ.τ.λ.;* (B) *Ομολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.*

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) *ἄλλο τι . . . ποιήσεις;* *ὅν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινεῖ;* (B) *Οὐκ ἀνθαυμάσαιμι· εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὔτω δόξειε.*

Ib. 428 d, (A) *τίς, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;* (B) *Αὔτη, ἡ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχοντιν.*

Soph. 267 a, (A) *Μιμητικὸν δὴ . . . ἀπονειμάρεθα· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν κ.τ.λ.* (B) *Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.*

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170-197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170-4, corresponding to 187-190, and the remainder to the remainder. And *Æsch. Ag.* 622, 623, and ib. 1202-5, KA. *Μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει· Προτοῦ μὲν αἰδὼς ἦν ἐμοὶ λέγειν τάδε. ΧΟ. Μῶν καὶ θεός περ ἴμέρῳ πεπληγμένος;* *Ἄβρυντεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εὐ πράσσων πλέον.*

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.

Rep. 341 b, (A) οὐτε γάρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὐτε κ.τ.λ. (B) Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι.

Phædo 79 b, (A) τι δὲ ἡ ψυχή; δρατόν, ἡ ἀειδές; (B) Οὐχ ὁπ' ἀνθρώπων γε.

Hip. Ma. 293 e, (A) τὸ πρέπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὁ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἔκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλά, . . . ἡ δὲ εἴναι ποιεῖ, ἡ οὐδέτερα τούτων; (B) Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (sc. δ—φαίνεσθαι).

Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἡ ἀποκρίνον. (B) Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὢ Σώκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 e, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ δτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι. The emphasis is on ἐμαυτοῦ, and the ὑμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκλήσθαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε—‘I your master, as well as the others.’

Ib. 185 c, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἡ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἡ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιπεπτωκύιν—‘from some cause, most probably repletion.’

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα—‘the class as well as the mere name.’

Euthyphro 3 d, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι—‘for whatever cause, most probably for envy.’

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμένω καὶ οὗτοι—‘I as well as they.’

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron: where (in other words) the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence of facts.

Theæt. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phædo 80 c, συμπεσὸν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἴματια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος.

Symp. 190 e, τὰς . . . ρυτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τά στήθη διηρθρού.

Symp. 209 c, *τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ*.

Tim. 73 e, *γῆν ἐφύρασε καὶ ἔδευσε*.

Apol. 32 b, *ἡναυτιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην*.

Cf. Hdt. viii. 114, *ὅ δὲ γελάσας τε καὶ κατασχὼν πολλὸν χρόνον . . . εἰπε.*

§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.

Phædo 80 e, *ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.* — *οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα κ.τ.λ.* ;

Rep. 402 a, *ώσπερ ἄρα γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἵκανῶς εἴχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.* — *οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 581 e, *τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ποιώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν . . . τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 587 a, *πλείστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου καὶ τάξεως* ;

Ib. 590 a, *ἡ δὲ αὐθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδες . . . αὐξηται* ;

Legg. 830 d, *καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεὶς . . . μὴ φαίνηται τισι γελοῖα, οὐκ ἄρα νομοθετήσει* ;

Protag. 351 c, *ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά* ;

Ibid. d, *ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα* ;

Meno 78 c, *ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ.* ;

Ib. 88 d, *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . εἶναι, ἀρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.* ;

Symp. 216 d, *καὶ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἴδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σειληγώδες* ; [The Zurich editors give *τοῦτο. οὐ σ.* ;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.

Soph. 233 c, *δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἄπαντα, φαμέν* ;

Hip. Ma. 301 c, *ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὸν ὑπό σου ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.* ;

Gorg. 496 c, *τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι* ;

Phileb. 44 d, *οἶμαι τοιώνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὅτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.* ;

Politic. 265 e, δ πολιτικὸς ἄρ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ.; Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται, ὃ πρὸς Διός, ἡ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἡ σφῶν αὐτῶν;

Apol. 37 b, πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν κ.τ.λ., τί δείσας; [So Hermann punctuates.]

Crito 53 c, ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὃ Σώκρατες;

Ibid. e, ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων,—τί ποιῶν; [The Zurich editors give δουλεύων]

Cf. Lysias xiii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγόρατος τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ φυγάδας ἐντεῦθεν ἐποίησε,—τίς ἀν αὐτός;

§ 311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.

Phileb. 16 c, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοὶ, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη.

Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῶν νῦν ὁν γεγονέαι.

Ib. 46 c, δόπταν . . . τις τάνατίᾳ ἀμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρητας καὶ θερμανόμενος ἐνίστε ψύχηται.

Phædo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν; πώποτέ τι . . . εἰδες; [So Oxon. But the edd. give ἥδη οὖν πώποτέ τι εἰδες;]

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περιῶν δὲ Φίλιππος Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ Τριβαλλούς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly ἀν commences a parenthetical clause.

Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἀν φαίη δὲ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς; (See, above, § 295.)

Cf. Dem. Olynth. A. 14. p. 13, τί οὖν, ἀν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις; [So one Paris MS. τις ἀν Zurich editors.]

§ 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

A. Metonymy.

Rep. 497 d, ὃν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε — ‘of those [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that’ &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνήσταν ἄλεις ἔπαινον ἔχοντες—equivalent to ἐνήν ἔπαινος ἄλεσι διδόμενος. A strange instance.

Ib. 205 b, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν λόντι ὁτιοῦν αἰτία—that is, ἡ τοῦ λέναι ὁτιοῦν αἰτία.

Theæt. 167 c, ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.

Theæt. 190 e, *αἰσχυνοίμην ἀν* ὑπὲρ *ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ὅμολογειν*—
‘I should be ashamed at our being compelled’ &c.

Apol. 33 c, *χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις εἶναι σοφοῖς*.

Phædo 88 d, *δ λόγος ὀσπερ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥηθεῖς*—‘the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.’

Ib. 68 a, *τούτον ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς*—‘be rid of the company of this.’

Charm. 173 b, *ἐκ τούτων οὔτως ἐχόντων*. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 e, *καλὸν ἔστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γιγνόμενα*—‘let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely or decently performed.’

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

‘*Υποπτεύειν* for ‘to expect.’

Theæt. 164 a, *καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἴκανῶς γε συννοῶ*.

‘*Αμήχανος* of number.

Phdr. 229 d, *καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τερατολόγων τινῶν φυσέων*.

‘*Δαιμόνιος*.

Critias 117 b, *κάλλος ὑψος τε δαιμόνιον ἔχοντα*.

§ 314. Θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. ‘Strange,’ ‘eccentric.’

Symp. 182 e, *θαυμαστὰ ἔργα*. So 213 d, *θαυμαστὰ ἔργαζεται*.

β. ‘Incomparable,’ ‘capital;’—only the intention of *superlativeness* being retained.

Apol. 41 b, *θαυμαστὴν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι*.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—‘decided,’ ‘emphatic,’ ‘positive.’

Symp. 182 d, *ἡ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἔρῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή*—
‘most positive is the encouragement given by all.’

Tim. 29 d, *τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου*—‘most decidedly approved.’

Euthyd. 283 c, *θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζοιμεν*—‘were particularly anxious.’

Phædo 74 b, (A) *φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν*; (B) *Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε*. *θαυμαστῶς* qualifies *φῶμεν* not *εἶναι*—‘say Yes most positively.’

Ib. 92 a, *θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην*—‘was most decidedly convinced.’

§ 315. *Υπερφυῶς, καλῶς, σφόδρα*, are also in the same way used to express *decided* assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 c, (A) ὁμολογοῦμεν *ταῦτα*; . . . (B) Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ—‘I agree most decidedly.’

Phædo 76 e, ὑπερφυῶς δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἀρ' οὐ *ταῦτα* ἐγγιγνόμενα *ταῦτα* . . . μονσικὴν *ξύμπασταν* *τελεώτατα* *ξυνεστήσατο*; (B) Κάλλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of *καλῶς λέγειν* for ‘to say truly,’ e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἀτελῆ δ' ὅντες δήπον *παντάπασιν* ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ *σφόδρα* γε. So 39 e.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπὲ . . . εἰ ὠρισάμην *ζρωτα* ἀρχόμενος *τοῦ λόγου*. (B) Νὴ Δῖ’ ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς *σφόδρα*—‘most decidedly you did.’

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phædo 62 b, δ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διιδεῖν, ‘cumbersome,’ i. e. ‘perplexing.’

Euthyd. 275 d, τὸ μειράκιον, ἄτε μεγάλου ὅντος *τοῦ ἐρωτήματος*, ἡρυθρίασέ τε καὶ ἀπορήσας *ζβλεψεν* εἰς ἐμέ. So Hip. Ma. 287 a.

§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, δλίγον καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ’ ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθησαν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγρηγορόστι μήτε εῦδουσι κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονοῦμένοις—the supposition of the alternative εῦδουσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolical. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δεῖ . . . μήτ’ ἄκοντα μήθ’ ἔκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, ἵτ’ ἵτ’ ὀπάοντες Οἴ τ’ ὅντες οἱ τ’ ἀπόντες.

§ 318. D. Formulæ expressive of Contempt.

a. Οὐτος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα *ταῦτα λέγουσιν*.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὖτοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρῦνιν *ταῦτα τὰς δυσκολοκάμπτους* [καμπάς].

§ 319. b. *Ποῖος*;

Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἀλλ' ἵσως ἴματίων [τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῦν ἔχειν φῆς]
.... (B) Ποίων ἴματίων ;—‘Clothes, forsooth !’

Charm. 174 b, (A) ἀρά γε ἦ [οἶδε] τὸ πεττευτικόν ; (B) Ποῖον
πεττευτικόν ;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.

Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 98 c, ἀέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον.

Symp. 218 a, Φαΐδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξιμάχους.

Rep. 387 b, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας.

Cf. Æsch. Ag. 1439, Χρυστίδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἰλίῳ. It is frequent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclez. 1069, ὁ Πᾶνες, ὁ Κορύβαντες, Ach. 270, καὶ Δαμάχων ἀπαλλαγεῖς, Ran. 963, Κύκνους ποιῶν καὶ Μέμνονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γόνον ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελπέμεν γυναικῶν τε Καδμειᾶν ἔμολον, sc. Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.

§ 321. d. Periphrasis.

Legg. 953 e, θρέμματα Νεῖλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the Particle of Comparison omitted.

(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x–xi, where he characterises it as *πρὸ δημάτων ποιεῖν*.)

Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἔγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαιδαλος.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπτιὸν δ' ὑποδείσαντες τάχ' ἀν ἔξαιφνης εἰ σὺ φανεῖται σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι, Æsch. P. V. 856, οἱ δ' ἐπτοημένοι φρένας Κίρκοι πελειῶν οὐ μακρὰν λελειμμένοι Ἡξουσι, Ag. 394, ἐπεὶ διώκει παῖς ποτανὸν δρυν, Eurip. Bacch. 1114, Πρώτη δὲ μῆτηρ ἡρξεν ἱερία φόνου.

§ 323. F. Play upon Words.

Rep. 621 b, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀν σώσειεν.

Symp. 185 c, Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου,—διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἵσα λέγειν οὐτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί.

Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν.

Ib. 174 b, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί—in allusion to Agathon.

Apol. 25 c, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ Μέλητε, . . . σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν.

Theaet. 194 c, κέαρ, δὲ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὄμοιότητα.

Phædo 80 d, εἰς . . . τόπον . . . ἀειδῆ, εἰς Αἴδους ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Ib. 89 b, ἐάνπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἀλλῷ λόγῳ ξυνωδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας.

Legg. 802 e, δεινὸν γάρ ὅλη γε ἀρμονίᾳ ἀπάδειν ή ῥυθμῷ ἀρρυθμεῖν.

Ib. 803 d, ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὕτ’ οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὕτ’ οὖν παιδεῖα.

Cf. Hom. Il. xiii. 773, νῦν τοι σῶς αἰπὺς ὅλεθρος.

§ 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of *δείνωσις*.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον.

Ib. 111 d, συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχῆ καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν.

Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Tim. 87 d, ὃν οὐδὲν σκοπούμεν, οὐδὲν ἐννοοῦμεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἔξελέγχοντα.

Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. ἔάν τίς τι κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 e, τίς οὖν ἡ διάστασις; ήδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἐνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 e.

Gorg. 453 c, *τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.*

Ib. 458 a, *ἔγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἀν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 487 b, *καὶ ἐμοὶ εἴ εῦνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἔγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.*

Meno 97 e, *πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς.*

Legg. 701 c, *τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 780 a, *τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*

Tim. 31 a, *πότερον οὖν ὁρθῶς ἔνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὁρθότερον; ἔνα, εἴπερ κ.τ.λ.*

Critias 111 a, *πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτο πιστόν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείφανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὁρθῶς ἀν λέγοιτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.*

Symp. 206 e, *πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*

[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]

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
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
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
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
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