innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard, by which they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For, upon the same ground, namely, of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, *that one and two are equal to three*, *that two and two are equal to four*, and a multitude of other like propositions in numbers that every body assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place among these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone and propositions made about several of them, but even natural philosophy and all the other sciences afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. *That two bodies cannot be in the same place* is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," that "white is not black," that "a square is not a circle," "that bitterness is not sweetness." [. . .] But since no proposition can be innate unless the *ideas* about which it is are innate, this will be to suppose all our *ideas* of colors, sounds, tastes, figure, etc. innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else (as we shall show afterward), belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

19. *Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims*. Nor let it be said that those more particular self-evident propositions which are assented to at first hearing as *that one and two are equal to three*, *that green is not red*, etc., are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles, since anyone, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding will certainly find that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent with which they are received at first hearing. [. . .]

21. *These maxims not being known sometimes until proposed does not prove them innate*. But we have not yet done with *assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms*. It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary, since it supposes that several who understand and know other things are ignorant of these principles until they are proposed to them, and that one may be unacquainted with these truths, until he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when by being in the understanding by a natural and original impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? [. . .]

22. I*mplicitly known before proposing signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them*, *or else signifies nothing*. If it is said, "the understanding has an *implicit knowledge* of these principles, but not an *explicit*, before this first hearing," (as they must who will say, "that they are in the understanding before they are known") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it is this, that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations as well as first principles must be received as native impressions on the mind. [. . .]

Book II. Of Ideas. Chapter I. *Of* Ideas *in General, and Their Origin*.

1. Idea *is the object of thinking*. Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about while thinking being the *ideas* that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several *ideas* such as are those expressed by the words *whiteness*, *hardness*, *sweetness*, *thinking*, *motion*, *man*, *elephant*, *army*, *drunkenness*, and others. It is in the first place then to be inquired how he comes by them. I know it is a received doctrine that men have native *ideas* and original characters stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have, at large, examined already, and I suppose what I have said in the foregoing book will

be much more easily admitted when I have shown from where the understanding may get all the *ideas* it has and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind—for which I shall appeal to everyone's own observation and experience.

2. *All* ideas *come from sensation or reflection*. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any *ideas*. How does it come to be furnished? From where does it come by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? From where does it have all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*; our knowledge is founded in all that, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about *external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking*. These two are the fountains of knowledge from which all the *ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. *The objects of sensation one source of* ideas. First, *our senses*, conversant about particular sensible objects, do *convey into the mind* several distinct *perceptions* of things, according to those various ways in which those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those *ideas* we have of *yellow*, *white*, *heat*, *cold*, *soft*, *hard*, *bitter*, *sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities—which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those *perceptions*. This great source of most of the *ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our senses and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

4. *The operations of our minds, the other source of them*. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnishes the understanding with *ideas* is the *perception of the operations of our own mind* within us, as it is employed about the *ideas* it has gotten—which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of *ideas*, which could not be had from things without. And such are *perception*, *thinking*, *doubting*, *believing*, *reasoning*, *knowing*, *willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we, being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct *ideas*, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of *ideas* every man has wholly in himself; and though it is not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other *sensation*, so I call this REFLECTION, the *ideas* it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations and the manner of them by reason of which there come to be *ideas* of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, namely, external material things as the objects of sensation and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of reflection, are to me the only origins from which all our *ideas* take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its *ideas*, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5. *All our* ideas *are of the one or the other of these*. The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any *ideas* which it does not receive from one of these two. *External objects furnish the mind with the* ideas *of sensible qualities*, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us. And the *mind furnishes the understanding with* ideas *of its own operations*.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of *ideas*, and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let anyone examine his own thoughts and thoroughly search into his understanding—and then let him tell me whether all the original *ideas* he has there are any other than of the objects of his *senses*, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his *reflection*—and however great a mass of knowledge he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see

that he *does not have any* idea *in his mind, but what one of these two have imprinted*, though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

6. *Observable in children*. He who attentively considers the state of a *child* at his first coming into the world will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of *ideas* that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. It is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them. And though the *ideas* of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way that there are few men who cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them. And if it were worthwhile, no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few even of the ordinary *ideas* until he were grown up to a man. But all who are born into the world being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of *ideas*, whether care is taken of it or not, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colors are busy at hand everywhere, when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities do not fail to solicit their proper senses and force an entrance to the mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white until he were a man, he would have no more *ideas* of scarlet or green than he who from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pineapple has of those particular relishes.

7. *Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different objects they converse with*. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple *ideas* from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety, and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less *reflect* on them. For though he who contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear *ideas* of them, yet, unless he turns his thoughts that way and considers them *attentively*, he will no more have clear and distinct *ideas* of all the *operations of his mind*, and all that may be observed in there, than he will have all the particular *ideas* of any landscape or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be so placed that they may come in his way every day, but yet he will have but a confused *idea* of all the parts they are made up of until he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular.

8. Ideas *of reflection later, because they need attention*. And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get *ideas* of the operations of their own minds; and some do not have any very clear or perfect *ideas* of the greatest part of them all their lives, because, though they pass there continually, yet, like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in their mind clear, distinct, lasting *ideas*, until the understanding turns inward upon itself, *reflects* on its own *operations*, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, ready to take notice of new and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without. And so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensation, [they] seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them until they come to be of riper years, and some scarcely ever at all.

9. *The soul begins to have* ideas *when it begins to perceive*. To ask *at what time a man has first any* ideas is to ask when he begins to perceive—having *ideas* and perception being the same thing. I know it is an opinion that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of *ideas* in itself constantly as long as it exists, and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body—which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's *ideas* is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For by this account soul and its *ideas* as body and its extension will begin to exist both at the same time.

10. *The soul does not always think, for this wants proofs*. But whether the soul is supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the

first rudiments of organization or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls that does not perceive itself always to contemplate *ideas;* nor can conceive it any more necessary for the *soul always to think* than for the body always to move, the perception of *ideas* being (as I conceive) to the soul what motion is to the body—not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking is supposed never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action; that perhaps is the privilege of the infinite author and preserver of things who never slumbers nor sleeps, but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think—and from there draw this infallible consequence that there is something in us that has a power to think—but whether that substance perpetually thinks or not, we can be no further assured than experience informs us. For to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question and not to prove it by reason—which is necessary to be done, if it is not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, "that the soul always thinks," is a self-evident proposition that everybody assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought at all last night or not; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute. In this way one may prove anything, and it is but supposing that all watches think while the balance beats; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt that my watch thought all last night. But he who would not deceive himself ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so. This way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.

But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could anyone make it an inference of mine that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no soul in a man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep. But I do say he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it always will be necessary, until we can think without being conscious of it.

11. *It is not always conscious of it.* I grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming is not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration, it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. If the *soul* does *think in a sleeping man* without being conscious of it, I ask, whether during such thinking it has any pleasure or pain or is capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it is possible that the soul can, while the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments and concerns, its pleasures or pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of nor partakes in, it is certain that *Socrates* asleep and *Socrates* awake is not the same person. But his soul when he sleeps and *Socrates* the man, consisting of body and soul when he is waking, are two persons, since waking *Socrates* has no knowledge of, or concern for that happiness or misery of his soul which it enjoys alone by itself while he sleeps, without perceiving anything of it, no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he does not know. For if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concern that accompanies it, it will be hard to know in what to place personal identity.

12. *If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.* "The soul, during sound sleep, thinks," say these men. *While it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions, and *it must necessarily be conscious of its*

own perceptions. But it has all this apart; the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the soul of *Castor*, while he is sleeping, retired from his body—which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life without a thinking soul to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul, nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the soul of *Castor* separated during his sleep from his body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man, e.g., *Pollux*, who is sleeping without a soul. For if *Castor's* soul can think while *Castor* is asleep, what *Castor* is never conscious of, it is no matter what place it chooses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, of which the sleeping man is never conscious, never has the least perception. I ask then, whether *Castor* and *Pollux*, thus, with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as *Castor* and *Hercules* or as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter. For if that is necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days or two moments together.

13. *Impossible to convince those who sleep without dreaming that they think*. Thus, I think, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach that the soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes busy for four hours without their knowing of it, and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

14. *That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged*. It will perhaps be said, "that the *soul* thinks even *in* the soundest *sleep*, *but the memory does not retain it*." That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy thinking, and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man who was bred a scholar and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed in his life until he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances. At least everyone's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such, as pass most of their nights without dreaming. [. . .]

19. *That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable*. To suppose the soul to think and the man not to perceive it is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man. And if one considers well these men's way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For they who tell us that the soul always thinks do never, that I remember, say that a man always thinks. Can the soul think and not the man? or a man think and not be conscious of it? This perhaps would be suspected of *jargon* in others. If they say the man always thinks but is not always conscious of it, they may as well say his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts as that anything *thinks without being conscious of it* or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it is necessary to their hypothesis, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel

it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask how do they know it. Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep and ask him what he was that moment thinking of. If he himself is conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking. May he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy, and it cannot be less than revelation that discovers to another thoughts in my mind when I can find none there myself; and they must necessarily have a penetrating sight who can certainly see that I think when I cannot perceive it myself and when I declare that I do not, and yet can see that dogs or elephants do not think when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians, it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be "a substance that always thinks," and the business is done. If such definition is of any authority, I do not know what it can serve for, but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. For no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience; and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world.

20. *No* ideas *but from sensation or reflection evident, if we observe children*. I see no reason therefore to believe that the *soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with* ideas to think on; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking, in the several parts of it as well as afterwards, by compounding those *ideas* and reflecting on its own operations, [and so] it increases its stock as well as facility in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking. [. . .]

23. If it shall be demanded then *when a man begins to have any* ideas, I think the true answer is when he first has any *sensation*. For since there does not appear to be any *ideas* in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that *ideas* in the understanding are coeval with *sensation*—which is such an impression or motion made in some part of the body as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, etc.

24. *The origin of all our knowledge*. In time the mind comes to reflect on its own *operations* about the *ideas* gotten by *sensation* and in this way stores itself with a new set of *ideas*, which I call *ideas* of reflection. These are the *impressions* that are made on our *senses* by outward objects that are extrinsic to the mind and its *own operations*, proceeding from powers intrinsic and proper to itself, which, when *reflected* on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation, and *are*, as I have said, *the origin of all knowledge*. Thus the first capacity of human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it either through the *senses* by outward objects or by its own operations when it *reflects* on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything and the groundwork on which to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here. In all that great extent in which the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it does not stir one jot beyond those *ideas* which *sense* or *reflection* have offered for its contemplation.

25. *In the reception of simple* ideas *the understanding is most of all passive*. In this part the *understanding* is merely *passive*; and whether or not it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular *ideas* upon our minds whether we will or not; and

the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These *simple ideas*, when offered to the mind, *the understanding can* no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or *ideas* which the objects set before it do produce there. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions and cannot avoid the perception of those *ideas* that are annexed to them.

Chapter II. *Of Simple* Ideas.

1. *Uncompounded appearances*. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the *ideas* we have, and that is, that *some* of them are *simple*, and *some complex*.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them, yet it is plain the *ideas* they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object at the same time different *ideas*—as a man sees at once motion and color, the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax—yet the simple *ideas* thus united in the same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of *ice* being as distinct *ideas* in the mind, as the smell and whiteness of a lily or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple *ideas*, which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform appearance*, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different *ideas*.

2. *The mind can neither make nor destroy them*. These simple *ideas*, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways mentioned above, namely, *sensation* and *reflection*. When the understanding is once stored with these simple *ideas*, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex *ideas*. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple *idea* in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned. Nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, is much the same as it is in the great world of visible things—in which his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no further than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand—but it can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability everyone will find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding any simple *idea* not received in by his senses from external objects or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or *frame the* idea of a scent he had never smelt. And when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man has *ideas* of colors, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

3. This is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man; yet I think it is *not possible* for anyone *to imagine* any other *qualities* in bodies, however constituted, by which they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible, and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four senses, the qualities then, which are the objects of the fifth sense, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any *belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense* can possibly be. Whether some other creatures yet, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have this, will be a great presumption to deny. He who will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of

it which he has to do with, may be apt to think that in other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet has of the senses or understanding of a man—such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses, though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more. But either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

Chapter III. *Of* Ideas *of One Sense*.

1. *As colors, of seeing; sounds, of hearing*. The better to conceive the *ideas* we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them in reference to the different ways by which they make their approaches to our minds and make themselves perceivable by us.

First, then, there are some which come into our minds *by one sense* only.

Secondly, there are others that convey themselves into the mind *by more senses than one*.

Thirdly, others that are had from *reflection* only.

Fourthly, there are some that make themselves [a] way and are suggested to the mind *by all the ways of sensation and reflection*.

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.

First, there are *some* ideas *which have admittance only through one sense*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colors, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes; all kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears; the several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by, no other way to bring themselves into view and be perceived by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch are heat and cold and solidity. All the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough, or else more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

2. *Few simple* ideas *have names*. I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple ideas* belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many *more* of them belonging to most of the senses *than we have names for*. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these *ideas*, which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing, though the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct *ideas*. Nor are the different tastes that we receive *ideas* of by our palates much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but all the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colors and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the account of simple *ideas* I am here giving, content myself to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex *ideas*, among which, I think, I may well account solidity—which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.

Chapter IV. *Of Solidity*.

1. *We receive this* idea *from touch*. The *idea* of *solidity* we receive by our touch. And it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, until it has left it. There is no *idea* which we receive more constantly from sensation than *solidity*. Whether we move or rest, in whatever posture we are, we always feel something under us that supports us and hinders our further sinking downwards, and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that, while they