willing to be put off with illusory knowledge. And it is a call to reason to take on once again the most difficult of all its tasks—namely, that of self-cognition—and to set up a tribunal that will make reason secure in
Axii its rightful claims and will dismiss all baseless pretensions, not by fiat but in accordance with reason's eternal and immutable laws. This tribunal is none other than the *critique of pure reason* itself.

By critique of pure reason, however, I do not mean a critique of books and systems, but I mean the critique of our faculty of reason as such, in regard to all cognitions after which reason may strive *independently of all experience*. Hence I mean by it the decision as to whether a metaphysics as such is possible or impossible, and the determination of its sources as well as its range and limits—all on the basis of principles.

Now, this is the path—the only one that remained—which I have pursued, and I flatter myself to have found on it the elimination of all the errors that had thus far set reason, as used independently of experience, at variance with itself. I have certainly not evaded reason's questions, by pleading the incapacity of human reason. Rather, I have specified them exhaustively according to principles, and, upon discovering the locus of reason's disagreement with
Axiii itself, have resolved them to its full satisfaction. To be sure, my answers to these questions have not turned out to be such as a raving dogmatist's thirst for knowledge might expect. Nothing but magical powers—at which I am not adept—could satisfy that kind of thirst for knowledge. Presumably, however, this was also not the aim of our reason's natural vocation. The duty of philosophy was, rather, to remove the deception arising from misinterpretation, even at the cost of destroying the most highly extolled and cherished delusion. In that activity, I have made comprehensiveness my major aim, and I venture to say that there should not be a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or for whose solution the key has not at least been provided. In fact, pure reason is so perfect a unity that, if its principle were insufficient for the solution of even a single one of all the questions assigned to reason by its own nature, then we might just as well throw the principle away; for then we could not fully rely on its being adequate to any of the remaining questions either. [. . .]

Preface [Second Edition]

Whether someone's treatment of the cognitions Bvii pertaining to reason's business does or does not follow the secure path of a science—this we can soon judge from the result. If, after many preparations and arrangements have been made, the treatment falters as soon as it turns to its purpose; or if, in order to reach that purpose, it repeatedly has to retrace its steps and enter upon a different path; or, again, if the various collaborators cannot be brought to agree on the manner in which their common aim is to be achieved—then we may rest assured that such an endeavor is still far from having entered upon the secure path of a science, but is a mere groping about. We shall indeed be rendering a service to reason if we can possibly discover that path, even if we should have to give up as futile much that was included in the purpose which we had previously adopted without deliberation.

Logic has been following that secure path from Bviii the earliest times. This is evident from the fact that since *Aristotle* it has not needed to retrace a single step, unless perhaps removing some of its dispensable subtleties, or setting it forth in a more distinct and determinate way, were to be counted as improvements of logic, even though they pertain more to the elegance of that science than to its being secure. Another remarkable fact about logic is that thus far it also has not been able to advance a single step, and hence is to all appearances closed and completed. It is true that some of the more recent [philosophers] have meant to expand logic. Some of them have inserted into it *psychological* chapters on the different cognitive powers (the imagination, wit). Others have inserted *metaphysical* chapters on the origin of cognition, or the origin of the different kinds of certainty according to the difference in the objects (i.e., chapters on idealism, skepticism, etc.). Still others have inserted into logic *anthropological* chapters on prejudices (as well as their causes and remedies). But all these attempts to expand logic are the result of ignorance concerning the peculiar nature of this science.

We do not augment sciences, but corrupt them, if we allow their boundaries to overlap. But the boundary
Bix of logic is determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is a science that provides nothing but a comprehensive exposition and strict proof of the formal rules of all thought. (Such thought may be *a priori* or empirical, may have any origin or object whatsoever, and may encounter in our minds obstacles that are accidental or natural.)

That logic has been so successful in following the secure path of a science is an advantage that it owes entirely to its limitations. They entitle it, even obligate it, to abstract from all objects of cognition and their differences; hence in logic the understanding deals with nothing more than itself and its form. Reason naturally had to find it far more difficult to enter upon the secure path of science when dealing not just with itself, but also with objects. By the same token, logic is a propaedeutic and forms, as it were, only the vestibule of the sciences; and when knowledge is at issue, while for the judging of such knowledge we do indeed presuppose a logic, yet for its acquisition we must look to what are called sciences properly and objectively.

Now insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized *a priori*. Moreover, reason's cognition can be referred to the
Bx object of that cognition in two ways: either in order merely to *determine* the object and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere), or in order to *make it actual* as well. The first is reason's *theoretical*, the second its *practical cognition*. In both cases the pure part, i.e., the part in which reason determines its object entirely *a priori*, must be set forth all by itself beforehand, no matter how much or how little it may contain. We must not mix with this part what comes from other sources. For we follow bad economic procedure if we blindly spend what comes in and are afterwards unable, when the procedure falters, to distinguish which part of the income can support the expenditure and which must be cut from it.

Two [sciences involving] theoretical cognitions by reason are to determine their *objects a priori*: they are *mathematics* and *physics*. In mathematics this determination is to be entirely pure; in physics it is to be at least partly pure, but to some extent also in accordance with sources of cognition other than reason.

Mathematics has been following the secure path of a science since the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends; it did so already among that admirable people, the Greeks. But we must not Bxi
think that it was as easy for mathematics to hit upon that royal road—or, rather, to build it on its own—as it was for logic, where reason deals only with itself. Rather, I believe that for a long time (above all, it was still so among the Egyptians) mathematics did no more than grope about, and that its transformation into a science was due to a *revolution* brought about by the fortunate idea that occurred to one man during an experiment. From that time onward, the route that mathematics had to take could no longer be missed, and the secure path of a science had been entered upon and traced out for all time and to an infinite distance. This revolution in the way of thinking was much more important than the discovery of the passage around the celebrated Cape. Its history, and that of the fortunate man who brought this revolution about, is lost to us. But *Diogenes Laërtius* always names the reputed discoverers of even the minutest elements of geometrical demonstration, elements that in ordinary people's judgment do not even stand in need of proof; and Diogenes hands down to us a story concerning the change that was brought about by the first indication of this new path's discovery. This story shows that the memory of this change must have seemed exceedingly important to mathematicians, and thus became indelible. When the *isosceles triangle* was first demonstrated, something dawned on the man who did so. (He may have been Bxii
called *Thales*, or by some other name.) He found that what he needed to do was not to investigate what he saw in the figure, nor—for that matter—to investigate the mere concept of that figure, and to let that inform him, as it were, of the figure's properties. He found, rather, that he must bring out (by constructing the figure) the properties that the figure had by virtue of what he himself was, according to concepts, thinking into it *a priori* and exhibiting. And he found that in order for him to know anything *a priori* and with certainty about the figure, he must attribute to

this thing nothing but what follows necessarily from what he has himself put into it in accordance with his concept.

Natural science took much longer to hit upon the high road of science. For only about a century and a half have passed since the ingenious *Bacon*, Baron Verulam, made the proposal that partly prompted this road's discovery, and partly—insofar as some were already on the trail of this discovery—invigorated it further. This discovery, too, can be explained only by a sudden revolution in people's way of thinking. I shall here take natural science into consideration only insofar as it is founded on *empirical* principles.

Something dawned on all investigators of nature when *Galileo* let balls, of a weight chosen by himself, roll down his inclined plane; or when *Torricelli* made the air carry a weight that he had judged beforehand to be equal to the weight of a water column known to
Bxiii him; or when, in more recent times, *Stahl* converted metals into calx and that in turn into metal, by withdrawing something from the metals and then restoring it to them.[3] What all these investigators of nature comprehended was that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own plan; and that reason must not allow nature by itself to keep it in leading strings, as it were, but reason must—using principles that underlie its judgments—proceed according to constant laws and compel nature to answer reason's own questions. For otherwise our observations, made without following any plan outlined in advance, are contingent, i.e., they have no coherence at all in terms of a necessary law—even though such a law is what reason seeks and requires. When approaching nature, reason must hold in one hand its principles, in terms of which alone concordant appearances can count as laws, and in the other hand the experiment that it has devised in terms of those principles. Thus reason must indeed approach nature in order to be instructed by it; yet it must do so not in the capacity of a pupil who lets the teacher tell him whatever the teacher wants, but in the capacity of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer the questions that he puts to them. Thus Bxiv even physics owes that very advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to this idea: the idea that we must, in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature, seek in nature (not attribute to it fictitiously) whatever reason must learn from nature and would know nothing of on its own. This is what put natural science, for the very first time, on the secure path of a science, after it had for so many centuries been nothing more than a mere groping about.

Metaphysics is a speculative cognition by reason that is wholly isolated and rises entirely above being instructed by experience. It is cognition through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, cognition through the application of concepts to intuition), so that here reason is to be its own pupil. But although metaphysics is older than all the other sciences, and would endure even if all the others were to be engulfed utterly in the abyss of an all-annihilating barbarism, fate thus far has not favored it to the point of enabling it to enter upon the secure path of a science. For in metaphysics reason continually falters, even when the laws into which it seeks to gain (as it pretends) *a priori* insight are those that are confirmed by the commonest experience. Countless times, in metaphysics, we have to retrace our steps, because we find that our path does not lead us where we want Bxv to go. As regards agreement in the assertions made by its devotees, metaphysics is very far indeed from such agreement. It is, rather, a combat arena which seems to be destined quite specifically for practicing one's powers in mock combat, and in which not one fighter has ever been able to gain even the smallest territory and to base upon his victory a lasting possession. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the procedure of metaphysics has thus far been a mere groping about, and—worst of all—a groping about among mere concepts.

Why is it, then, that in metaphysics we have thus far been unable to find the secure path of science? Might this path be impossible here? Why, then, has nature inflicted on reason, as one of reason's most important concerns, the restless endeavor to discover that path? What is more: how little cause do we have to place confidence in our reason, when in one of the

3. I am not here following with precision the course of the history of the experimental method; indeed, the first beginnings of that history are not well known.

most important matters where we desire knowledge reason not only forsakes us, but puts us off with mere pretenses and in the end betrays us! Or if we have only missed the path thus far, what indication do we have that if we renew our search, we may hope to be more fortunate than others have been before us?

I would think that the examples of mathematBxvi ics and natural science, which have become what they now are by a revolution accomplished all at once, are sufficiently remarkable to [suggest that we should] reflect on the essential component in that revolution, namely, the transformation of the way of thinking that became so advantageous for them; and as far as is permitted by the fact that they, as rational cognitions, are analogous to metaphysics, we should imitate them with regard to that transformation, at least by way of an experiment. Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them *a priori*, by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded, have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition.— This assumption already agrees better with the demanded possibility of an *a priori* cognition of objects—i.e., a cognition that is to ascertain something about them before they are given to us. The situation here is the same as was that of *Copernicus* when he first thought of explaining the motions of celestial bodies. Having found it difficult to make progress there when he assumed that the entire host of stars revolved around the spectator, he tried to find out whether he might not be more successful if he had the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest.

Bxvii Now, we can try something similar in metaphysics, with regard to our *intuition* of objects. If our intuition had to conform to the character of its objects, then I do not see how we could know anything *a priori* about that character. But I can quite readily conceive of this possibility if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the character of our faculty of intuition. However, if these intuitions are to become cognitions, I cannot remain with them but must refer them, as representations,[4] to something or other as their object, and must determine this object by means of them. [Since for this determination I require concepts, I must make one of two assumptions.] I can assume that the *concepts* by means of which I bring about this determination likewise conform to the object; and in that case I am again in the same perplexity as to how I can know anything *a priori* about that object. Or else I assume that the objects, or—what amounts to the same—the *experience* in which alone they (as objects that are given to us) can be cognized, conform to those concepts. On this latter assumption, I immediately see an easier way out. For experience is itself a way of cognizing for which I need the understanding. But the understanding has its rule, a rule that I must presuppose within me even before objects are given to me, and hence must presuppose *a priori;* and that rule is ex- Bxviii pressed in *a priori* concepts. Hence all objects of experience must necessarily conform to these concepts and agree with them. Afterwards, however, we must also consider objects insofar as they can merely be thought, though thought necessarily, but cannot at all be given in experience (at least not in the way in which reason thinks them). Our attempts to think these objects (for they must surely be thinkable) will

4. [The German term for representations is "Vorstellungen." Werner Pluhar originally translated "Vorstellung" as "presentation," consistent with the following line of reasoning: "The traditional rendering of *Vorstellung* (similarly for the verb) as 'representation' suggests that Kant's theory of perception (etc.) is representational, which, however, it is not (despite the fact that Kant sometimes adds the Latin *repraesentatio*). For one thing, *vorstellen*, in the Kantian use of the term that is relevant here, is not something that *Vorstellungen* do; it is something that *we* do. Moreover, *vorstellen* as so used never means anything like 'represent' in the sense of 'stand for.' Even an empirical intuition, e.g., does not stand for an object of experience (let alone a thing in itself), but rather enters into the experience which that object of experience is . . . Presentations . . . are such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata" p. 22 of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Whatever the merits of these arguments, given that this volume is a student anthology, we have decided to translate "Vorstellung" as the traditional "representation" for the sake of consistency and continuity with the other texts in this anthology.]

afterwards provide us with a splendid touchstone of what we are adopting as the changed method in our way of thinking, namely, that all we cognize *a priori* about things is what we ourselves put into them.

This experiment is as successful as was desired. It promises that metaphysics will be on the secure path of a science in its first part, namely, the part where
Bxix it deals with those *a priori* concepts for which corresponding objects adequate to these concepts can be given in experience. For on this changed way of thinking we can quite readily explain how *a priori* cognition is possible; what is more, we can provide satisfactory proofs for the laws that lie *a priori* at the basis of nature considered as the sum of objects of experience. Neither of these accomplishments was possible on the kind of procedure used thus far. On the other hand, this deduction—provided in the first part of metaphysics—of our faculty of *a priori* cognition produces a disturbing result that seems highly detrimental to the whole purpose of metaphysics as dealt with in the second part: namely, that with this faculty to cognize *a priori* we shall never be able to
Bxx go beyond the limits of possible experience, even though doing so is precisely the most essential concern of this science. Yet this very [situation permits] the experiment that will countercheck the truth of the result that we obtained from the first assessment of our *a priori* rational cognition: namely, that our rational cognition applies only to appearances, and leaves the thing in itself uncognized by us, even though actual per se. For what necessarily impels us to go beyond the limits of experience and of all appearances is the *unconditioned* that reason demands in things in themselves; reason— necessarily and quite rightfully—demands this unconditioned for everything conditioned, thus demanding that the series of conditions be completed by means of that unconditioned. Suppose, now, we find that if we assume that our experiential cognition conforms to objects as things in themselves the unconditioned *cannot be thought at all without contradiction*, yet that *the contradiction vanishes* if we assume that our representation of things, as these are given to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but that these objects are, rather, appearances that conform to our way of representing. Suppose that we find, consequently, that the unconditioned is not to be met with in things insofar as we are acquainted with them (i.e., insofar as they are given to us), but is to be met with in them [only] insofar as we are not acquainted with them, namely, insofar as they are things in themselves. If this is what we find, it will show that what we assumed initially only by way of an experiment Bxxi
does in fact have a foundation.[5] Now, once we have denied that speculative reason can make any progress in that realm of the suprasensible, we still have an option available to us. We can try to discover whether perhaps in reason's practical cognition data can be found that would allow us to determine reason's transcendent concept of the unconditioned. Perhaps in this way our *a priori* cognition, though one that is possible only from a practical point of view, would still allow us to get beyond the limits of all possible experience, as is the wish of metaphysics. Moreover, when we follow this kind of procedure, still speculative reason has at least provided us with room for such an extension [of our cognition], even if it had to leave that room empty. And hence there is as yet nothing to keep us from filling in that room, if we can, with practical *data* of reason; indeed, reason Bxxii
summons us to do so.[6]

5. This experiment of pure reason is very similar to that done in *chemistry*, which is called sometimes the experiment of *reduction*, but generally the *synthetic procedure*. The *analysis* of the *metaphysician* has divided pure *a priori* cognition into two very heterogeneous elements, namely, that of things as appearances and then of things in themselves. The [metaphysician's] *dialectic* recombines the two so as to yield *agreement* with reason's necessary idea of the *unconditioned*, and finds that this agreement can never be obtained except through that distinction, which is therefore the true one.

6. In the same way, the central laws governing the motions of the celestial bodies provided with established certainty what *Copernicus* had initially assumed only as a hypothesis, and at the same time provided proof of the invisible force (*Newtonian* attraction) that links together the world edifice. That force would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not dared, in a manner that conflicted with the senses but yet was true, to seek the observed motions not in the celestial objects but in the spectator. The transformation in the way of thinking which I set forth in the *Critique* is analogous to the Copernican hypothesis. Here in the preface I likewise put it

The task, then, of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in the described attempt to transform the procedure previously followed in metaphysics, by subjecting metaphysics to a complete revolution, thus following the example set by the geometricians and investigators of nature. The critique is a treatise on the method [of the science
Bxxiii of metaphysics], not a system of the science itself. Yet it does set down the entire outline of metaphysics, including the limits of this science as well as its entire internal structure. [. . .]

Bxxv [. . .] Now in the analytic part of the critique I shall prove that space and time are only forms of our sensible intuition and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as appearances, and that, furthermore, we have no concepts of the understand-
Bxxvi ing, and hence also no elements whatsoever for the cognition of things, except insofar as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts. That will prove, consequently, that we cannot have cognition of any object as thing in itself, but can have cognition only insofar as the object is one of sensible intuition, i.e., an appearance. And from this it does indeed follow that any possible speculative cognition of reason is restricted to mere objects of *experience*. On the other hand, it must be noted carefully that this [conclusion] is always subject to this reservation: that we
Bxxvii must be able at least to *think*, even if not *cognize*, the same objects also as things in themselves.[7] For otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, namely, that there is appearance without anything that appears.

Now let us suppose that the distinction, necessitated by our critique, between objects of experience and these same objects as things in themselves, had not been made at all. In that case the principle of causality, and hence nature's mechanism in its determination, would definitely have to hold for all things in general as efficient causes. Hence I could not, without manifest contradiction, say of the same being, for example the human soul, that its will is free and yet is subject to natural necessity, i.e., not free. For I would be taking the soul *in the same sense* in the two propositions, namely, as a thing in general (thing in itself); nor, without prior critique, could I help taking it so. Suppose, on the other hand, that the *Critique* is not in error when it teaches us to take the object in *two different senses*, namely, as appearance and as thing in itself; and that the deduction of the *Critique's* concepts of the understanding is correct, so that the principle of causality applies to things only in the first sense, namely, insofar as they are objects of experience, but that these same objects are not subject to that principle when taken in the second sense. On these suppositions, no contradiction arises Bxxviii when we think the same will in both these ways: in its appearance (i.e., in its visible acts), as conforming necessarily to natural law and as to that extent *not free*; yet on the other hand, *qua* belonging to a thing in itself, as not subject to that law, and hence as *free*. Now as regards my soul when considered from this second standpoint, I cannot *cognize* it through any [use of] speculative reason (let alone through empirical observation); nor, therefore, can I cognize freedom in this way as the property of a being to which I attribute effects in the world of sense. For otherwise I would have to cognize such a being as determined with regard to its existence and yet as not determined in time (which is impossible, because I cannot base such a concept on any intuition). Nevertheless, I can still *think* freedom. I.e., at least my representation of freedom contains no contradiction,

forth only as a hypothesis, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved, not hypothetically but apodeictically, from the character of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding. Here I put it forth as a hypothesis in order merely to draw attention to the first attempts at such a transformation; and such attempts are always hypothetical.

7. In order for me to *cognize* an object I must be able to prove its [real] possibility (either from its actuality as attested by experience, or *a priori* by means of reason). But I can *think* whatever I want to, even if I am unable to commit myself to there being, in the sum of all [logical] possibilities, an object corresponding to the concept. All that is required in order for me to think something is that I do not contradict myself, i.e., that my concept be a [logically] possible thought. But I require something further in order to attribute objective reality to a concept (i.e., real possibility, as distinguished from the merely logical possibility just mentioned). However—and this is my point—this something further need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition, but may also lie in practical ones.

if we make our critical distinction between the two ways of representing (sensible and intellectual), and restrict accordingly the pure concepts of the understanding and hence also the principles that flow from them. Now let us suppose that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will; for morality adduces *a priori*, as *data* of reason, original practical principles residing
Bxxix in reason, and these principles would be absolutely impossible without the presupposition of freedom. But then suppose that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be thought at all. In that case the moral presupposition would have to yield to the other [supposition]. For this other [supposition]'s opposite involves a manifest contradiction (whereas the opposite of freedom and morality involves no contradiction, unless freedom has already been presupposed). Hence *freedom*, and with it morality, would have to give way to the *mechanism of nature*. But in fact the situation is different. All I need for morality is that freedom does not contradict itself and hence can at least be thought; I do not need to have any further insight into it. In other words, all I need is that freedom [in my act] puts no obstacle whatsoever in the way of the natural mechanism [that governs] the same act (when taken in a different reference). Thus the doctrine of morality maintains its own place, and so does natural science. But this would not have happened if critique had not instructed us beforehand about our unavoidable ignorance regarding things in themselves, restricting to mere appearances what we can *cognize* theoretically. This same exposition of the positive benefit found in critical principles of pure reason can be produced again in regard to the concept of *God* and of the *simple nature* of our *soul*;
Bxxx but for the sake of brevity I shall omit it. Thus I cannot even *assume God*, *freedom*, and *immortality*, [as I must] for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason, if I do not at the same time *deprive* speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order to reach God, freedom, and immortality, speculative reason must use principles that in fact extend merely to objects of possible experience; and when these principles are nonetheless applied to something that cannot be an object of experience, they actually do always transform it into an appearance, and thus they declare all *practical extension* of reason to be impossible. I therefore had to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*. And the true source of all the lack of faith which conflicts with morality—and which is always highly dogmatic—is dogmatism in metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice according to which we can make progress in metaphysics without a critique of pure reason. [. . .]

Introduction

IV. On the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

In all judgments in which we think the relation of a A6/
subject to the predicate (I here consider affirmative B10
judgments only, because the application to negative judgments afterwards is easy), this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B, though connected with concept A, lies quite outside it. In the first case I call the judg- A7
ment *analytic*; in the second, *synthetic*. Hence (affirmative) analytic judgments are those in which the predicate's connection with the subject is thought by identity, whereas those judgments in which this connection is not thought with identity are to be B11
called synthetic. Analytic judgments could also be called *explicative*. For they do not add anything to the concept of the subject through the predicate; rather, they only dissect the concept, breaking it up into its component concepts which had already been thought in it (although thought confusedly). Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, could also be called *expansive*. For they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in that concept at all and could not have been extracted from it by any dissection. For example, if I say: All bodies are extended—then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go beyond the concept that I link with the word body in order to find that extension is connected with it. All I need to do in order to find this predicate in the concept is to dissect the concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold