INTRODUCTION B 1

[SECOND EDITION][152]

I.[153] ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL COGNITION

There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For what else might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring our senses did not do so? In part these objects by themselves bring

[152][Textual differences between the Introduction in B (which has seven sections) and the one in A (which has two) are indicated in footnotes. For two extensive commentaries on Kant's Introduction, see Hans Vaihinger's *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, vol. 1, 158–496, and Norman Kemp Smith's *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* 26–78 (both works cited above, Ak. vii br. n. 5. The interpretation of Kant's Introduction provided by Vaihinger and Kemp Smith is now generally regarded as flawed. For a plausible (and more sympathetic) alternative interpretation, see Herbert James Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936 [1970]), vol. 1, 57–90.]

[153][Sections I and II in B replace the first two paragraphs (and section heading) from Section I in A. The Introduction in A starts as follows:]

INTRODUCTION [FIRST EDITION] A 1

I. The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy

Experience is, without doubt, the first product to which our understanding gives rise, by working on the raw material of sense impressions. That is precisely why experience is our first instruction, and why,

about presentations.[154] In part they set in motion our understanding's activity, by which it compares these presentations, connects or separates them, and thus processes the raw material of sense impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience. *In terms of time*, therefore, no cognition in us precedes experience, and all our cognition begins with experience.

But even though all our cognition starts **with** experience, that does not mean that all of it arises **from** experience. For it might well be that even

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as it progresses, it is so inexhaustible in new information—so much so that if the lives of all future generations are strung together, they will never be lacking in new knowledge[a] that can be gathered on that soil. Yet experience is far from being our understanding's only realm, and our understanding cannot be confined to it. Experience does indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise. And that is precisely why experience gives us no true universality; and reason, which is so eager for that [universal] kind of
A 2 cognitions, is more stimulated by experience than satisfied. Now, such universal cognitions, which are at the same time characterized by intrinsic necessity, must be independent of experience, clear and certain by themselves. Hence they are called a priori cognitions; by contrast, what is borrowed solely from experience is, as we put it, cognized only a posteriori, or empirically.

Now, it turns out—what is extremely remarkable—that even among our experiences there is an admixture of cognitions that must originate a priori, and that serve perhaps only to give coherence to our presentations of the senses. For even if we remove from our experiences everything belonging to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts, and judgments generated from these, that must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience. These concepts and judgments must have arisen in this way because through them we can—or at least we believe that we can—say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach us; and through them do assertions involve[b] true universality and strict necessity, such as merely empirical cognition cannot supply.[c]

[a][*Kenntnisse.*]

[b][*enthalten.*]

[c][The text of A continues with the first paragraph in Section III of B.]

[154][*Vorstellungen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

our experiential cognition is composite, consisting of what we receive through impressions and what our own cognitive power supplies from itself (sense impressions merely prompting it to do so). If our cognitive power does make such an addition, we may not be able to distinguish it from that basic material[155] until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it from the basic material. B2

This question, then, whether there is such a cognition that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses, is one that cannot be disposed of as soon as it comes to light,[156] but that at least still needs closer investigation. Such cognitions are called *a priori cognitions*; they are distinguished from empirical cognitions, whose sources are a posteriori, namely, in experience.

But that expression, [viz., *a priori*,] is not yet determinate enough to indicate adequately the full meaning of the question just posed. For it is customary, I suppose, to say of much cognition derived from experiential sources that we can or do partake of it a priori. We say this because we derive the cognition not directly from experience but from a universal rule, even though that rule itself was indeed borrowed by us from experience. Thus if someone has undermined the foundation of his house, we say that he could have known a priori that the house would cave in, i.e., he did not have to wait for the experience of its actually caving in. And yet he could not have known this completely a priori. For he did first have to find out through experience that bodies have weight and hence fall when their support is withdrawn.

In what follows, therefore, we shall mean by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but those that occur *absolutely* independently of all experience. They contrast with empirical cognitions, which are those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience. But we call a priori cognitions *pure* if nothing empirical whatsoever is mixed in with them. Thus, e.g., the proposition, Every change has its cause, is an a priori proposition; yet it is not pure, because change is a concept that can be obtained only from experience. B 3

[155][I.e., raw material: *Grundstoff*.]

[156][*Anschein*.]

II. We Are in Possession of Certain A Priori Cognitions, and Even Common Understanding Is Never without Them

What matters here is that we find a characteristic by which we can safely distinguish a pure cognition from empirical ones. Now, experience does indeed teach us that something is thus or thus, but not that it cannot be otherwise. **First**, then, if we find a proposition such that in thinking it we think at the same time its *necessity*, then it is an a priori judgment; and if, in addition, it is not derived from any proposition except one that itself has the validity of a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. **Second**, experience never provides its judgments with true or strict *universality*, but only (through induction) with assumed and comparative universality; hence [there] we should, properly speaking, say [merely] that as far as we have
B 4 observed until now, no exception is to be found to this or that rule. If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict universality, i.e., thought in such a way that no exception whatever is allowed as possible, then the judgment is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Hence empirical universality is only [the result of] our choosing to upgrade[157] validity from one that holds in most cases to one that holds in all, as, e.g., in the proposition, All bodies have weight. But when universality is strict and belongs to a judgment essentially, then it points to a special cognitive source for the judgment, viz., a power of a priori cognition. Hence necessity and strict universality are safe indicators of a priori cognition, and they do moreover belong together inseparably. It is nevertheless advisable to make separate use of the two criteria, even though each is infallible by itself. For, in using them, there are times when showing the empirical limitedness of a cognition is easier than showing the contingency of the judgments based on it; and there are times when showing the unlimited universality that we attribute to a judgment is more convincing[158] than is showing the judgment's necessity.

Now, it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such judgments [as we are looking for, viz.], judgments that are necessary and in the strictest sense universal, and hence are pure a priori judgments. If we want an example from the sciences, we need only look to all the propo-
B 5 sitions of mathematics; if we want one from the most ordinary use of un-

[157] [*willkürliche Steigerung.*]

[158] [*einleuchtend.*]

derstanding, then we can use the proposition that all change must have a cause. Indeed, in this latter proposition the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity in [the cause's] connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the rule[159] [governing that connection], that the concept of a cause would get lost entirely if we derived it as *Hume* did: viz., from a repeated association of what happens with what precedes, and from our resulting habit[160] of connecting presentations (hence from a merely subjective necessity). But we do not need such examples[161] in order to prove that pure a priori principles actual[ly exist] in our cognition. We could, alternatively, establish that these principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience as such, and hence establish [their existence] a priori. For where might even experience get its certainty if all the rules by which it proceeds were always in turn[162] empirical and hence contingent, so that they could hardly be considered first principles? But here we may settle for having established as a matter of fact [that there is a] pure use of our cognitive power, and to have established what its indicators are. However, we can see such an a priori origin not merely in judgments, but even in some concepts. If from your experiential concept of a *body*[163] you gradually omit everything that is empirical in a body—the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even[164] the impenetrability—there yet remains the *space* that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely vanished), and this space you cannot omit [from the concept]. B 6
Similarly, if from your empirical concept of any object whatever, corporeal[165] or incorporeal, you omit all properties that experience has taught you, you still cannot take away from the concept the property through which you think the object either as a *substance* or as *attaching* to a substance (even though this concept of substance is more determinate than that

[159][Cf. Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 121–25.]

[160][Or 'custom': *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, V, Pt. I, and cf. VII, Pt. II. Cf. also below, B 19–20, 127. Kant knew Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* only indirectly, through citations (translated into German) from James Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, of 1770.]

[161][Examples from the sciences or from ordinary understanding.]

[162][I.e., even the higher-order rules.]

[163][*Körper.*]

[164]['even' omitted in the fourth original edition (1794).]

[165][*körperlich.*]

of an object as such[166]). Hence you must, won over by the necessity with which this concept of substance forces itself upon you, admit that this concept resides a priori in your cognitive power.

III. Philosophy Needs a Science That Will Determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Range of All a Priori Cognitions[167]

Much more significant yet than all the preceding[168] is the fact that there are certain cognitions that [not only extend to but] even leave the realm of
A 3 all possible experiences. These cognitions, by means of concepts to which no corresponding object can be given in experience at all, appear to expand the range of our judgments beyond all bounds of experience.

And precisely in these latter cognitions, which go beyond the world of sense, where experience cannot provide us with any guide or correction,
B 7 reside our reason's inquiries. We regard these inquiries as far superior in importance, and their final aim as much more sublime,[169] than anything that our understanding can learn in the realm of appearances. Indeed, we would sooner dare anything, even at the risk of error, than give up such treasured inquiries [into the unavoidable problems of reason], whether on the ground that they are precarious somehow, or from disdain and indifference.[170] These unavoidable problems of reason themselves are *God, freedom, and immortality*. But the science whose final aim, involving the science's entire apparatus, is in fact directed solely at solving these problems is called *metaphysics*. Initially, the procedure of metaphysics is *dogmatic;* i.e., [metaphysics], without first examining whether reason is capable or incapable of so great an enterprise, confidently undertakes to carry it out.

[166][The concept of an object as such does not include even (the property or "determination" of) permanence. Cf. A 242–43/B 300–301.]).

[167][The text of A continues, together with that of B, just below The section number and heading were added in B.]

[168][I.e., than the fact that we have a priori cognitions as described. In A this sentence starts with 'But'; 'than all the preceding' added in B.]

[169][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 245, 264.]

[170][Remainder of paragraph added in B. For its content, cf. A 337/B 395 n. 222, A 798 = B 826, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 473.]

Now, suppose that we[171] had just left the terrain of experience. Would we immediately erect an edifice by means of what cognitions we have, though we do not know from where? Would we erect it on credit, i.e., on principles whose origin is unfamiliar to us? It does seem natural that we would not, but that we would first seek assurance through careful inquiries that the foundation had been laid. In other words, it does seem natural that we would, rather,[172] long since have raised the question as to just how our understanding could arrive at all these a priori cognitions, and what might be their range, validity, and value. And in fact nothing would be more A 4
natural, if by the term *natural*[173] we mean what properly and reasonably[174] ought to happen. If, on the other hand, we mean by this term what B 8
usually happens, then nothing is more natural and comprehensible than the fact that for a long time this inquiry had to remain unperformed. For, one part of these [a priori] cognitions, viz.,[175] the mathematical ones, possess long-standing reliability, and thereby raise favorable expectations concerning other [a priori] cognitions as well, even though these may be of a quite different nature. Moreover, once we are beyond the sphere of experience, we are assured of not being refuted[176] by experience. The appeal[177] of expanding our cognitions is so great that nothing but hitting upon a clear contradiction can stop our progress. On the other hand, we can avoid such contradiction by merely[178] being cautious in our inventions—even though they remain nonetheless inventions. Mathematics provides us with a splendid example of how much we can achieve, independently of experience, in a priori cognition. Now, it is true that mathematics deals with objects and cognitions only to the extent that they can be exhibited in intuition. But this detail is easily overlooked because that intuition can itself be given a priori and hence is rarely[179] distinguished from a mere pure concept. Cap-

[171][*man.*]

[172]['rather' added in B.]

[173][Instead of 'by the term *natural*', A has 'by this term.']

[174][*vernünftigerweise.*]

[175]['viz.' (*als*) added in B.]

[176][A has 'contradicted.']

[177][*Reiz.*]

[178]['merely' (*nur*) added in B.]

[179][*kaum.*]

A 5 tivated[180] by such a proof of reason's might, our urge to expand [our cognitions] sees no boundaries. When the light dove parts the air in free flight and feels the air's resistance, it might come to think that it would do much
B 9 better still in space devoid of air. In the same way *Plato* left the world of sense because it sets such narrow limits to[181] our understanding; on the wings of the ideas,[182] he ventured beyond that world and into the empty space of pure understanding. He did not notice that with all his efforts he made no headway. He failed to make headway because he had no resting point against which—as a foothold, as it were—he might brace himself and apply his forces in order to set the understanding in motion. But [Plato is no exception]: it is human reason's usual fate, in speculation, to finish its edifice as soon as possible, and not to inquire until afterwards whether a good foundation has in fact been laid for it. Then all sorts of rationalizations[183] are hunted up in order to reassure us that the edifice is sturdy, or, preferably, even to reject altogether[184] so late and risky an examination of it. But what keeps us, while we are building, free from all anxiety and suspicion, and flatters us with a seeming thoroughness, is the following. A large part—perhaps the largest—of our reason's business consists in dissecting what concepts of objects we already have. This [procedure] supplies us with a multitude of cognitions. And although these cognitions are nothing more
A 6 than clarifications or elucidations of what has already been thought in our concepts (although thought as yet in a confused way), they are yet rated equal to new insights at least in form, even though in matter or content
B 10 they do not expand the concepts we have but only spell them out. Now since this procedure yields actual a priori cognition that progresses in a safe and useful way, reason uses this pretense, though without itself noticing this, to lay claim surreptitiously[185] to assertions of a quite different kind. In these assertions, reason adds to given concepts others quite foreign to them, doing so moreover[186] a priori. Yet how reason arrived at these con-

[180][A has 'encouraged.']

[181][A has 'puts such manifold obstacles in the way of.']

[182][*Ideen.*]

[183][*Beschönigungen.*]

[184]['even,' along with 'preferably' and 'altogether' (*auch . . . lieber gar*), added in B.]

[185][*erschleichen.*]

[186]['moreover' (*und zwar*) added in B. The addition helps to remove an ambiguity in the German text of A: it helps to separate 'a priori' from *Begriffen* (concepts) and thus keeps the expression from seeming to modify that noun.]

cepts is not known; indeed, such a[187] question is not even thought of. Hence I shall deal at the very outset with the distinction between these two kinds of cognition.

IV.[188] On the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

In all judgments in which we think the relation of a subject to the predicate (I here consider affirmative judgments only, because the application to negative judgments is easy afterwards[189]), this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B, though connected with concept A, lies quite[190] outside it.[191] In the first case I call the judgment *analytic*; in the second, *synthetic*.[192] Hence (affirmative) analytic judgments are A 7
those in which the predicate's connection with the subject is thought by [thinking] identity, whereas those judgments in which this connection is thought without [thinking] identity are to be called synthetic. Analytic judg- B 11
ments could also be called *elucidatory*.[193] For they do not through the predicate add anything to the concept of the subject; rather, they only dissect the concept, breaking it up into its component concepts which had already been thought in it (although thought confusedly). Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, could also be called *expansive*.[194] For they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in that concept at all and could not have been extracted from it by any dissection. For

[187][Instead of 'such a,' A has 'this.']

[188][This number absent in A, where the heading is that of the second subsection of Section I.]

[189]['afterwards' added in B.]

[190][*ganz*, presumably intended for emphasis only, and not for a contrast between complete and partial exclusion.]

[191][Cf. J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145–47.]

[192][Emphasis in both terms added in B.]

[193][Emphasis added in B.]

[194][*Erweiterungsurteile;* emphasis added in B. I prefer to translate *erweiternd* as 'expansive' rather than as 'ampliative.' My reason is that the corresponding verb, *erweitern*, is rendered better as 'expand' than as 'amplify,' because the latter term might (to contemporary readers) suggest increase in *force*.]

example, if I say: All bodies are extended—then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go beyond[195] the concept that I link with the word body in order to find that extension is connected with it. All I need to do in order to find this predicate in the concept is to dissect the concept, i.e., become conscious[196] of the manifold[197] that I always think in it. Hence the judgment is analytic. By contrast, if I say: All bodies are heavy[198]—then the predicate is something quite different from what I think in the mere concept of a body as such. Hence adding such a predicate yields a synthetic judgment.[199]

[200]*Experiential* [201] *judgments, as such, are one and all synthetic.*[202] For to base an analytic judgment on experience would be absurd, because in

[195][A has 'outside.']

[196][*bewußt* in A, *mir bewußt* in B. The latter conforms better to German grammar, but adds nothing to the meaning.]

[197][Of component concepts.]

[198][In the technical sense of 'heavy,' as meaning no more than 'having weight'; cf. B 2, B 4. 'All bodies have weight' lacks the copula 'are' and hence would, in the present context, create a misleading contrast to 'All bodies are extended.']

[199][Cf. Lewis White Beck, "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic?" in *Kant-Studien*, 47 (1955), 168–81; reprinted in Beck's *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 74–91. Cf. also Moltke S. Gram, *Kant, Ontology, and the A Priori* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 43–82.]

[200][This paragraph in B replaces the following two in A:]

A 8 Now, this shows clearly: (1) that analytic judgments do not at all expand our cognition, but spell out and make understandable to myself the concept that I already have; (2) that in synthetic judgments, where the predicate does not lie within the concept of the subject, I must have besides this concept something else (X) on which the understanding relies in order to cognize nonetheless that the predicate belongs to that concept.

In empirical judgments, or in judgments of experience,[a] it is not difficult at all to find this X. For here this X is the complete experience of the object that I think by means of a concept A, the concept amounting only to part of the experience. For although in the concept of a body as such I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness,[b] yet the concept designates the complete experience [of a body] by means of part of it; hence I can add to this part, as belonging to it, further parts of the same experience. I can begin by cognizing the concept of a body analytically through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all

its case I can formulate my judgment without going outside my concept, and hence do not need for it any testimony of experience. Thus the [analytic] proposition that bodies are extended is one that holds[203] a priori and is not an experiential judgment. For before I turn to experience, I already B 12
have in the concept [of body] all the conditions required for my judgment. I have only to extract from it, in accordance with the principle of contradiction, the predicate [of extension]; in doing so, I can at the same time become conscious of the judgment's necessity, of which experience would not even inform me. On the other hand, though in the concept of a body as such I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness,[204] yet the concept designates an object of experience by means of part of this experience; hence I can [synthetically] add to this part further parts, of the same experience, in addition to those that belonged to the concept of a body as such. I can begin by cognizing the concept of a body *analytically* through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all of which are thought in this concept. But then I expand my cognition: by looking back to the experience from which I have abstracted this concept of body, I also find heaviness to be always connected with the above characteristics; and so I add it, as a predicate, to that concept *synthetically*. Hence

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of which are thought in this concept. But then I expand my cognition: by looking back to the experience from which I have abstracted this concept of body, I also find heaviness to be always connected with the above characteristics. Hence experience is the X that lies outside the concept A and makes possible the synthesis of the predicate B of heaviness with the concept A.

[a][See br. n. 201, just below.]

[b][In the technical sense of 'heaviness,' as meaning no more than 'weight.' See just above, br. n. 198.]

[201][*Erfahrungs-* ('of experience,' literally). The German noun has no corresponding adjective. In translating Kant, the proper English adjective corresponding to 'experience' is 'experiential,' which in Kant is not synonymous with 'empirical.' Whereas experience is indeed empirical (insofar as it includes sensation), *perception* (which includes sensation) is empirical (viz., empirical intuition) without as yet being experience. In order for perception to become experience, it must be given the synthetic unity provided by the understanding's categories. See A 183/B 226 (cf. B vii, 12, 161) and the *Prolegomena*, Ak IV, 297–98.]

[202][The beginning of this paragraph, through 'inform me,' is taken almost verbatim from the *Prolegomena*: see Ak. IV, 268.]

[203][*feststehen*]

[204][See br. n. 200b, just above.]

experience is what makes possible the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness with the concept of body. For although neither of the two concepts is contained in the other, yet they belong to each other, though only contingently, as parts of a whole; that whole is experience, which is itself a synthetic combination[205] of intuitions.

A 9 B 13 In synthetic judgments that are a priori, however, this remedy[206] is entirely lacking. If I am to go beyond[207] the concept A in order to cognize another concept B as combined with it, I rely on something that makes the synthesis possible: what is that something, considering that here I do not have the advantage of looking around for it in the realm of experience? Take the proposition: Everything that happens has its cause.—In the concept of something that happens I do indeed think an existence preceded by a time, etc., and from this one can obtain analytic judgments. But the concept of a cause lies quite outside that earlier concept and[208] indicates something different from what happens; hence[209] it is not part of what is contained[210] in this latter presentation. In speaking generally of what happens, how can I say about it something quite different from it, and cognize as belonging to it—indeed, belonging to it necessarily[211]—the concept of cause, even though this concept is not contained in the concept of what happens? What is here the unknown = X on which[212] the understanding relies when it believes that it discovers, outside the concept A,[213] a predicate B that is foreign to concept A but that the understanding considers nonetheless to be connected with that concept?[214] This unknown cannot be experience. For in adding the presentation of cause to the presentation of what happens, the above principle does so not only with greater universality than experience can provide, but also with the necessity's being ex-

[205][On (linking) or combination (*Verbindung*), assembly (*Zusammensetzung*), and connection (*Verknüpfung*), see below, B 201 n. 30.]

[206][I.e., experience.]

[207][A has 'outside.']

[208]['lies entirely outside that concept and' added in B.]

[209][Instead of 'hence,' A has 'and.']

[210][*ist . . . gar nicht mit enthalten.*]

[211][This insertion added in B.]

[212][Instead of 'unknown = X,' A has 'the X.']

[213][Literally, 'concept of A' (in this case).]

[214]['that the understanding considers' added in B.]

pressed; hence it does so entirely a priori and on the basis of mere concepts. Now, on such synthetic, i.e., expansive, principles depends[215] the whole final aim of our speculative a priori cognition. For, analytic principles are indeed exceedingly important and needed, but only for attaining that distinctness in concepts which is required for a secure and extensive synthesis that, as such, will actually be a new acquisition[216] [of cognition].[217] A 10 B 14

V.[218] All Theoretical Sciences of Reason Contain Synthetic A Priori Judgments as Principles[219]

1. *Mathematical judgments are one and all synthetic.* Although this proposition[220] is incontestably certain and has very important consequences, it

[215][More literally, 'rests': *beruht.*]

[216][A has 'addition' (*Anbau*, as for a building).]

[217][A adds, but B omits, the following paragraph:]

> Hence a certain mystery lies concealed here.[a] Only by solving it can we make our progress in the boundless realm of understanding's pure cognition secure and reliable. Thus, with the requisite universality, we must uncover the basis on which synthetic a priori judgments are possible; we must gain insight into the conditions that make each kind of a priori judgments possible; and we must [properly] define[b] this entire cognition (which constitutes a type of its own), not merely mark it by drawing a cursory circumference around it: we must define it completely—in a system, and in a manner adequate for any use—in terms of its original sources, its divisions, its range and bounds. So much, for now, as regards what is peculiar about synthetic [a priori] judgments.
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> [a]If so much as raising this question had occurred to any of the ancients, this question by itself would have created mighty resistance, up to our own time, against all systems of pure reason. It would thus have saved [philosophers] all those vain attempts that they undertook blindly, without knowing what they were in fact dealing with.
> [b][*bestimmen.*]

[218][Sections V and VI added in B. The text of A continues together with that of B in B's Section VII.]

[219][*Prinzipien.*]

[220][*Satz.*]

seems thus far to have escaped the notice of those who have analyzed[221] human reason; indeed, it seems to be directly opposed to all their conjectures. For they found that all the inferences made by mathematicians proceed (as the nature of all apodeictic certainty requires) according to the principle[222] of contradiction; and thus they came to be persuaded that the principle of contradiction is also the basis on which we cognize the principles[223] [of mathematics]. In this they were mistaken. For though we can indeed gain insight into a synthetic proposition according to the principle of contradiction, we can never do so [by considering] that proposition by itself, but can do so only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which it can be deduced.

We must note, first of all, that mathematical propositions, properly so called, are always a priori judgments rather than empirical ones; for they carry with them necessity, which we could never glean from experience.
B 15 But if anyone refuses to grant that all such propositions are a priori—all right: then I restrict my assertion[224] to *pure mathematics*, in the very concept of which is implied that it contains not empirical but only pure a priori cognition.

It is true that one might at first think that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytic one that follows, by the principle of contradiction, from the concept of a sum of seven and five. Yet if we look more closely, we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the union of the two numbers into one; but in [thinking] that union we are not thinking in any way at all what that single number is that unites the two. In thinking merely that union of seven and five, I have by no means already thought the concept of twelve; and no matter how long I dissect my concept of such a possible sum, still I shall never find in it that twelve. We must go beyond these concepts and avail ourselves of the intuition corresponding to one of the two: e.g., our five fingers, or (as *Segner* does in his

[221] [*Zergliederer*:]

[222] [*Satz*.]

[223] [*Grundsätze* On my use of 'principle' to translate both *Prinzip* and *Grundsatz*, see above, A vii br. n. 7. Although *Satz* is usually translatable as 'proposition,' in *Satz des Widerspruchs* it, too, comes out as 'principle.' Yet no distortion results in Kant's meaning. On the other hand, such distortion would result if *Grundsatz* were, here or throughout, rendered in some other way, which would create an illusory contrast with *Prinzip*.]

[224] [*Satz*.]

Arithmetic[225]) five dots. In this way we must gradually add, to the concept of seven, the units of the five given in intuition. For I start by taking the number 7. Then, for the concept of the 5, I avail myself of the fingers of my hand as intuition. Thus, in that image of mine, I gradually add to the number 7 the units that I previously gathered together in order to make up B 16
the number 5. In this way I see the number 12 arise. That 5 *were to be added* to 7, this I had indeed already thought in the concept of a sum = 7+5, but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. Arithmetic propositions are therefore always synthetic. We become aware of this all the more distinctly if we take larger numbers. For then it is very evident that, no matter how much we twist and turn our concepts, we can never find the [number of the] sum by merely dissecting our concepts, i.e., without availing ourselves of intuition.

Just as little are any principles of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of *straight* contains nothing about magnitude, but contains only a quality. Therefore the concept of shortest is entirely added to the concept of a straight line and cannot be extracted from it by any dissection. Hence we must here avail ourselves of intuition; only by means of it is the synthesis possible.

It is true that a few propositions presupposed by geometricians are actually analytic and based on the principle of contradiction. But, like identical propositions, they serve not as principles but only [as links in] the B 17
chain of method. Examples are a = a; the whole is equal to itself; or (a+b)>a, i.e., the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles, although they hold according to mere concepts, are admitted in mathematics only because they can be exhibited in intuition. [As for mathematics generally,] what commonly leads us to believe that the predicate of its apodeictic judgments is contained in our very concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytic, is merely the ambiguity with which we express ourselves. For we say that we *are to*[226] add in thought a certain predicate to a given concept, and this necessity adheres indeed to the very concepts. But here the question is not what we *are to* add in thought to the given con-

[225][Johann Andreas von Segner (1704–1777), German physicist and mathematician at Jena, Göttingen, and Halle. He is the author of several significant works, and introduced the concept of the surface tension of liquids. The work mentioned here, as translated from the Latin, is his *Anfangsgründe der Arithmetik* (*Elements of Arithmetic*). See the second edition (Halle/Saale: Renger, 1773), pp. 27, 79].

[226][*sollen.*]

cept, but what we *actually* think[227] in the concept, even if only obscurely; and there we find that, although the predicate does indeed adhere necessarily to such[228] concepts, yet it does so not as something thought in the concept itself, but by means of an intuition that must be added to the concept.

2. *Natural science (physica)*[229] *contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles.* Let me cite as examples just a few propositions: e.g., the proposition that in all changes in the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; or the proposition that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal to each other. Both propositions
B 18 are clearly not only necessary, and hence of a priori origin, but also synthetic. For in the concept of matter I do not think permanence, but think merely the matter's being present in space insofar as[230] it occupies space. Hence I do actually go beyond the concept of matter, in order to add to it a priori in thought something that I have not thought *in it*. Hence the proposition is thought not analytically but synthetically and yet a priori,[231] and the same[232] occurs in the remaining propositions of the pure part of natural science.

3. *Metaphysics* is to *contain synthetic a priori cognitions*. This holds even if metaphysics is viewed as a science that thus far has merely been attempted, but that because of the nature of human reason is nonetheless indispensable. Metaphysics is not at all concerned merely to dissect concepts of things that we frame a priori, and thereby to elucidate them analytically. Rather, in metaphysics we want to expand our a priori cognition. In order to do this, we must use principles which go beyond the given concept and which add to it something that was not contained in it; and, by means of such synthetic a priori judgments, we must presumably go so far beyond such concepts that even experience[233] can no longer follow us; as in the proposition: The world must have a first beginning—and others like

[227][Deleting the emphasis in 'in thought' and 'think' (*denken* both times).]

[228][*jenen.*]

[229][Physics.]

[230][*durch.*]

[231][An alternative reading is: 'Hence the proposition is not analytic but synthetic, and yet is thought a priori, . . .' The reading I have adopted seems to go better with 'in' in the last clause.]

[232][*so.*]

[233][Actual *or possible* experience.]

that. And hence metaphysics consists, at least *in terms of its purpose*, of nothing but synthetic a priori propositions.

VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON B 19

Much is gained already when we can bring a multitude of inquiries under the formula of a single problem. For we thereby facilitate not only our own business by defining it precisely, but also—for anyone else who wants to examine it—the judgment as to whether or not we have carried out our project adequately. Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in this question:

How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?[234]

That metaphysics has thus far remained in such a shaky state of uncertainty and contradictions is attributable to a sole cause: the fact that this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* judgments, has not previously occurred to anyone.[235] Whether metaphysics stands or falls depends on the solution of this problem, or on an adequate proof that the possibility which metaphysics demands to see ex-

[234][(In the original this sentence, unlike the next two similar ones below, is not set off as a separate paragraph.) The question could also be translated thus: 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?' I.e., 'a priori' can be construed either as an adverb modifying 'possible' or as an adjective modifying 'judgments.' Kant himself seems to have construed it one way in some contexts, the other way in other contexts.]

[235][The problem, roughly, is this: In the case of *analytic* judgments (judgments whose truth depends solely on the meanings of their terms, i.e., on the content of the concepts involved) it is easy to see how such judgments can (by which Kant means 'can legitimately') be made a priori (independently of experience). But the truth of *synthetic* (nonanalytic) judgments depends on *more* than their meaning (conceptual content). An example is the judgment (see B 17) that in all changes in the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unchanged. This judgment is clearly not analytic, but asserts something (not merely conceptual) about the world (and hence about any possible experience that we may have of it). How then can we make such judgments a priori? Kant's answer lies in his "Copernican revolution" (B xvi–xviii). We can make synthetic judgments a priori insofar as objects of experience (which are the same thing as object-experiences) must conform a priori to what we contribute to experience (and hence to them), instead of experience's conforming a priori to totally independent objects (things in themselves) by means of some preestablished harmony. By the same token, as Kant will show in the Transcendental Dialectic (A 293–704/B 349–732), synthetic a priori judgments that *go beyond* all possible experience (make assertions about things in themselves) cannot be justified (legitimated) theoretically at all (though they may still be justifiable *morally-practically*).]

plained[236] does not exist[237] at all. *David Hume*[238] at least[239] came closer to this problem than any other philosopher. Yet he did not think of it nearly determinately enough and in its universality, but merely remained with the synthetic proposition about the connection of an effect with its causes (*prin-*
B 20 *cipium causalitatis*).[240] He believed he had discovered that such a proposition is quite impossible a priori.[241] Thus, according to his conclusions, everything that we call metaphysics would amount to no more than the delusion of a supposed rational insight into what in fact is merely borrowed from experience and has, through habit, acquired a seeming necessity. This assertion, which destroys all pure philosophy, would never have entered Hume's mind if he had envisaged our problem in its universality. For he would then have seen that by his argument there could be no pure mathematics either, since it certainly does contain synthetic a priori propositions; and from such an assertion his good sense[242] would surely have saved him.

In solving the above problem we solve at the same time another one, concerning the possibility of the pure use of reason in establishing and carrying out all sciences that contain theoretical a priori cognition of objects; i.e., we also answer these questions:

How is pure mathematics possible?

How is pure natural science possible?

Since these sciences are actually given [as existent], it is surely proper for us to ask **how** they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved
B 21 by their being actual.[243] As regards *metaphysics*, however, there are grounds on which everyone must doubt its possibility: its progress thus far has been

[236][I.e., how synthetic judgments are possible a priori.]

[237][*stattfinden.*]

[238][Cf., for this passage, B 5 above and B 127 below.]

[239][*noch.*]

[240][Principle of causality.]

[241][Or: 'that such an a priori proposition is quite impossible.']

[242][*Verstand.*]

[243]This actuality may still be doubted by some in the case of pure natural science. Yet we need only examine the propositions that are to be found at the beginning of physics proper (empirical physics), such as those about the permanence of the[a] quantity of matter, about inertia, about the equality of action and reaction, etc., in order to soon be convinced that these propositions themselves amount to a *physica pura* (or *physica rationalis*).[b] Such a physics, as a science in its own right, surely

poor; and thus far not a single metaphysics has been put forth of which we can say, as far as the essential purpose of metaphysics is concerned, that it is actually at hand.[244]

Yet in a certain sense this *kind of cognition* must likewise be regarded as given; and although metaphysics is not actual as a science, yet it is actual as a natural predisposition[245] (i.e., as a *metaphysica naturalis*[246]). For human reason, impelled by its own need rather than moved by the mere vanity of gaining a lot of knowledge, proceeds irresistibly to such questions as cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and any principles taken from such use. And thus all human beings, once their reason has expanded to [the point where it can] speculate, actually have always had in them, and always will have in them, some metaphysics. Now concerning it, too, there is this question:

How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?[247] B22

i.e., how, from the nature of universal human reason, do the questions arise that pure reason poses to itself and is impelled, by its own need, to answer as best it can?

Thus far, however, all attempts to answer these natural questions—e.g., whether the world has a beginning or has been there from eternity, etc.—have met with unavoidable contradictions. Hence we cannot settle for our mere natural predisposition for metaphysics, i.e., our pure power of reason[248] itself, even though some metaphysics or other (whichever it might be) always arises from it. Rather, it must be possible, by means of this predisposition,[249] to attain certainty either concerning our knowledge or lack of knowledge of the objects [of metaphysics], i.e., either concerning a decision about the objects that its questions deal with, or certainty concern-

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deserves to be put forth separately and in its whole range, whether this range be narrow or broad.[c]

[a][*derselben.*]

[b][Pure, or rational, physics.]

[c][This Kant did in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Ak. IV, 465–565.]

[244][*vorhanden.*]

[245][*Naturanlage.*]

[246][Natural metaphysics.]

[247][In the original, this question is embedded in the paragraph.]

[248][*Vernunftvermögen.*]

[249][I.e., our power of reason.]

ing the ability[250] or inability of reason to make judgments about these objects. In other words, it must be possible to expand our pure reason in a reliable way, or to set for it limits that are determinate and safe. This last question, which flows from the general problem above,[251] may rightly be stated thus:

How is metaphysics as science possible?[252]

Ultimately, therefore, critique of pure reason leads necessarily to science; the dogmatic use of pure reason without critique, on the other hand,
B 23 to baseless assertions that can always be opposed by others that seem equally plausible,[253] and hence to *skepticism*.

This science, moreover, cannot be overly, forbiddingly voluminous. For it deals not with objects of reason, which are infinitely diverse, but merely with [reason] itself. [Here reason] deals with problems that issue entirely from its own womb; they are posed to it not by the nature of things distinct from it, but by its own nature. And thus, once it has become completely acquainted with its own ability regarding the objects that it may encounter in experience, reason must find it easy to determine, completely and safely, the range and the bounds of its use [when] attempted beyond all bounds of experience.

Hence all attempts that have been made thus far to bring a metaphysics about *dogmatically* can and must be regarded as if they had never occurred. For whatever is analytic in one metaphysics or another, i.e., is mere dissection of the concepts residing a priori in our reason, is only a prearrangement for metaphysics proper, and is not yet its purpose at all. That purpose is to expand our a priori cognition synthetically, and for this purpose the dissection of reason's a priori concepts is useless. For it shows merely what is contained in these concepts; it does not show how we arrive at such concepts a priori, so that we could then also determine the valid
B 24 use of such concepts in regard to the objects of all cognition generally. Nor do we need much self-denial to give up all these claims;[254] for every meta-

[250][*Vermögen.*]

[251][The problem as to how (in general) synthetic judgments are possible a priori: B 19.]

[252][In the original, this question forms the end of the preceding paragraph.]

[253][*ebenso scheinbare.* The basic meaning of *scheinbar* is 'seeming.' Sometimes this term is taken negatively, as meaning 'illusory'; but at other times Kant takes it positively, as meaning 'plausible.' For this latter meaning, cf. A 502/B 530, A 703/B 731, A 784 = B 812; also A 46/B 63, A 289/B 345, A 399.]

[254][Of dogmatic metaphysics.]

physics put forth thus far has long since been deprived of its reputation by the fact that it gave rise to undeniable, and in the dogmatic procedure indeed unavoidable, contradictions of reason with itself. A different treatment, completely opposite to the one used thus far, must be given to metaphysics—a science, indispensable to human reason, whose every new shoot[255] can indeed be lopped off but whose root cannot be eradicated.[256] We shall need more perseverance in order to keep from being deterred—either from within by the difficulty of this science or from without by people's resistance to it—from thus finally bringing it to a prosperous and fruitful growth.

VII. IDEA AND DIVISION OF A SPECIAL SCIENCE UNDER THE NAME OF CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON[257]

From all of the above we arrive at the idea of a special science[258] that may be called the *critique of pure reason.*[259] For[260] reason is the power that A 11
provides us with the *principles*[261] of a priori cognition. Hence[262] pure reason is that reason which contains the principles for cognizing something

[255][*hervorgeschossenen Stamm.*]

[256][Although 'root' and 'eradicate' have the same origin, *radix*, and 'eradicate a root' may sound odd to an etymologically attuned ear, all of that applies to the respective German terms, *Wurzel* and *ausrotten*. Indeed, all four terms come from the same root!]

[257][The text of A continues, together with that of B, just below. The section number and heading were added in B.]

[258][Instead of the remainder of the sentence as given here from B, A has 'that may serve as [a] critique of pure reason.']

[259][A adds, but B omits, the following two sentences:]

> Now, any cognition is called *pure* if it is not mixed with anything extraneous. Above all,[a] however, a cognition is called absolutely pure if no experience or sensation whatsoever is mixed into it, so that the cognition is possible completely a priori.
>
> [a][*besonders.*]

[260][A has 'Now.']

[261][Emphasis added in B.]

[262][The inference relies on the two sentences from A that Kant just omitted in B, regarding them as understood.]

absolutely a priori. An *organon*[263] of pure reason would be the sum of those
B 25 principles by which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. Comprehensive application of such an organon would furnish us with a system of pure reason. Such a system, however, is a tall order; and it remains to be seen whether indeed an expansion of our cognition is possible here at all,[264] and in what cases it is possible. Hence a science that merely judges pure reason, its sources, and its bounds may be regarded as the *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason. Such a propaedeutic would have to be called not a *doctrine* but only a *critique* of pure reason.[265] Its benefit, in regard to speculation,[266] would actually only be negative. For such a critique would serve only to purify our reason, not to expand it, and would keep our reason free from errors, which is a very great gain already. I call *transcendental* all cognition that deals not so much with
A 12 objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori.[267] A *system* of such concepts[268] would be called *transcendental philosophy*. But, once again, this [system of] transcendental philosophy is too much for us as yet, here at the beginning.[269] For since such a science would have to contain both analytic cognition and synthetic a priori cognition, in their completeness, it has too broad a range as far as our aim is concerned. For we need[270] to carry the analysis only as far as it is indispensably necessary[271] for gaining insight, in their entire range, into the principles of a priori synthesis, which is all
B 26 that we are concerned with. What we are now dealing with is [not such a science, but only] this inquiry, which properly speaking can be called only a transcendental critique, not a doctrine. For its aim is not to expand the cognitions themselves, but only to correct them; and it is to serve as the touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori cognitions. Ac-

[263][Emphasis added in B.]

[264][A has 'whether indeed such an expansion of our cognition is possible at all.']

[265][Emphasis in 'propaedeutic,' 'doctrine,' and 'critique' added in B.]

[266]['in regard to speculation' added in B.]

[267][A has 'as rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.']

[268][I.e., a system of a priori concepts of objects in general; see the preceding note. Emphasis in 'system' and 'transcendental philosophy' added in B.]

[269]['as yet' added in B; 'once again' refers back to the point made earlier in this paragraph, that a system of pure reason is a tall order.]

[270][*dürfen.*]

[271][Instead of 'necessary' (*notwendig*), A has 'needed' (*nötig*)]

cordingly, such a critique is a preparation: if possible, for an organon of those [cognitions]; or, should the [attempt to produce an] organon be unsuccessful, at least for a canon of them. Such a canon would, at any rate, some day allow us to exhibit, analytically as well as synthetically, the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether that system were to consist in expanding the cognition of pure reason or merely in setting boundaries for it. That such a system is possible—and, indeed, that it cannot be overly wide-ranging, so that we may hope to complete it entirely—can be gathered even in advance from the following: What here constitutes the object[272] is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding that makes judgments about the nature of things, and A 13
even this understanding, again, only in regard to its a priori cognition. Moreover, the understanding's supply of a priori cognition cannot be hidden from us, because, after all, we need not search for it outside the understanding; and we may indeed suppose[273] that supply to be small enough in order for us to record[274] it completely, judge it for its value or lack of value, and make a correct assessment of it.[275] [But my readers must not B 27
expect to find in this critique more than the mentioned preparation.] Still less must they expect here a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but should expect the critique of our power of pure reason itself.[276] Only if we use that critique as our basis do we have a reliable touchstone for assessing the philosophical content of old and new works in this field. Without such critique, unqualified historians and judges[277] pass judgment on[278] other people's baseless assertions by means of their own, which are just as baseless.[279]

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science for which[280] the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan *architectonically*, i.e., from

[272][Of our inquiry.]

[273][*allem Vermuten nach.*]

[274][*aufnehmen*, as in an inventory.]

[275][Remainder of the paragraph added in B.]

[276][Cf. A xii.]

[277][*Richter.*]

[278][*beurteilen*]

[279][In A, what follows forms the second section of the introduction and is headed thus: **II. The Division of Transcendental Philosophy**.]

[280][A has 'is, at this point [*hier*], only the idea for which.']

principles, with full guarantee of the completeness and reliability of all the components that make up this edifice. Transcendental philosophy is the system of all principles of pure reason.[281] That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy is due solely to this: in order for this critique to be a complete system, it would have to include a comprehensive analysis of the whole of human a priori cognition. Now, it is indeed true that our critique must also put before us a complete enumeration of all the root concepts[282] that make up that pure cognition. Yet the critique refrains, and properly so, from providing either the comprehensive analysis of these concepts themselves, or the complete review of the con-
A 14 cepts derived from them. [There are two reasons for this.] First, this dis-
B 28 section of concepts would not serve our purpose; for it lacks that precariousness which we find in synthesis, [the precariousness] on account of which the whole critique is in fact there. Second, taking on the responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation (a responsibility from which we could, after all, have been exempted in view of our aim)[283] would go against the unity of our plan. On the other hand, this completeness in the dissection of the a priori concepts yet[284] to be supplied, as well as in the derivation [of other concepts] from them, can easily be added later: provided that first of all these [concepts] are there, as comprehensive principles of synthesis, and nothing is lacking[285] as regards this essential aim.[286]

Accordingly, the critique of pure reason [in a way] includes everything that makes up transcendental philosophy; it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy. But the critique is not yet that science itself, because it carries the analysis [of a priori concepts] only as far as is required for making a complete judgment about synthetic a priori cognition.

The foremost goal in dividing such a science is this: no concepts whatever containing anything empirical must enter into this science; or, differently put, the goal is that the a priori cognition in it be completely pure.[287]

[281][This sentence added in B.]

[282][*Stammbegriffe*.]

[283][Parentheses added.]

[284][*künftig*.]

[285][A has 'lacking in them [*ihnen*].']

[286][Of supplying these concepts, as such principles.]

[287][For the distinction between 'a priori' and 'pure,' see B 3.]

Hence, although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality[288] are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy. For they do of necessity also bring [empirical concepts] into the formulation of the system of pure morality:[289] viz., the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, etc., all of which are of empirical origin. Although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality do not lay these empirical concepts themselves at the basis of their precepts, they must still bring in such pleasure and displeasure, desires and inclinations, etc. in [formulating] the concept of duty: viz., as an obstacle to be overcome, or as a stimulus that is not to be turned into a motive.[290] Hence transcendental philosophy[291] is a philosophy of merely speculative pure reason. For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives,[292] refers to feelings, and these belong to the empirical sources of cognition. A 15 B 29

If, then, the division of the science being set forth here is to be performed in terms of the general viewpoint[293] of a system as such, then this science must contain in the first place a *doctrine of elements*, and in the second a *doctrine of method*, of pure reason.[294] Each of these two main parts would be subdivided; but the bases on which that subdivision would be made cannot yet be set forth here. Only this much seems to be needed here by way of introduction or advance notice: Human cognition has two stems, viz., *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring from a common root, though one unknown to us. Through sensibility objects are *given* to us; through understanding they are *thought*.[295] Now if sensibility were to contain a priori presentations[296] constituting the condition[297] un- B 30

[288][*Moralität* here, *Sittlichkeit* just below.]

[289][Whereupon the system is *no longer* pure, though it is still a priori.]

[290][Instead of 'For . . . turned into a motive,' A has 'For the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, of the power of choice [*Willkür*], etc., all of which are of empirical origin, would there [*dabei*] have to be presupposed.']

[291][*Philosophie* here, *Weltweisheit* just below.]

[292][Instead of 'incentives' (*Triebfedern*), A has 'motives' (*Bewegungsgründe*, more commonly called *Beweggründe*.]

[293][*Gesichtspunkt*.]

[294][In A, 'doctrine of elements' and 'doctrine of method' are doubly emphasized (by bold print).]

[295][Emphasis in 'given' and 'thought' added in B.]

[296][*Vorstellungen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[297][A has 'conditions.']

der which objects are given to us, it would to that extent belong to tran-
A 16 scendental philosophy. And since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given to us precede the conditions under which these objects are thought, the transcendental doctrine of sense[298] would have to belong to the *first*[299] part of the science of elements.

[298][I.e., in effect, of sensibility: *Sinnenlehre.*]

[299][Emphasis added in B.]