cannot be eradicated. We shall need more perseverance in order to keep from being deterred—either from within by the difficulty of this science or from without by people's resistance to it—from thus finally bringing it to a prosperous and fruitful growth.

VII. Idea and Division of a Special Science under the Name of Critique of Pure Reason

From all of the above we arrive at the idea of a spe-
A11 cial science that may be called the *critique of pure reason*. For reason is the faculty that provides us with the *principles* of *a priori* cognition. Hence pure reason is that reason which contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely *a priori*. An *organon* of pure reason would be the sum of those principles
B25 by which all pure *a priori* cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. Comprehensive application of such an organon would furnish us with a system of pure reason. Such a system, however, is a tall order; and it remains to be seen whether indeed an expansion of our cognition is possible here at all, and in what cases it is possible. Hence a science that merely judges pure reason, its sources, and its bounds may be regarded as the *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason. Such a propaedeutic would have to be called not a *doctrine* but only a *critique* of pure reason. Its benefit, in regard to speculation, would actually only be negative. For such a critique would serve only to purify our reason, not to expand it, and would keep our reason free from errors, which is a very great gain already. I call *transcendental* all cognition that
A12 deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible *a priori*. A *system* of such concepts would be called *transcendental philosophy*. But, once again, this system of transcendental philosophy is too much for us as yet, here at the beginning. For since such a science would have to contain both analytic cognition and synthetic *a priori* cognition, in their completeness, it has too broad a range as far as our aim is concerned. For we need to carry the analysis only as far as it is indispensably necessary for gaining insight, in their entire range, into the principles of *a priori* synthesis, which is all that we are concerned with. [. . .]

[. . .] Human cognition has two stems, namely, A15/
sensibility and *the understanding*, which perhaps B29
spring from a common root, though one unknown to us. Through sensibility objects are *given* to us; B30
through the understanding they are *thought*. Now if sensibility were to contain *a priori* representations constituting the condition under which objects are given to us, it would to that extent belong to tran- A16
scendental philosophy. And since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given to us precede the conditions under which these objects are thought, the transcendental doctrine of sense would have to belong to the *first* part of the science of elements.

Transcendental Doctrine of Elements A17/B31

Part I. Transcendental Aesthetic A19/B33

§1. In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may refer to objects, still *intuition* is that by which a cognition refers to objects directly, and at which all thought aims as a means. Intuition, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but that, in turn, is possible only—for us human beings, at any rate—by the mind's being affected by the object in a certain manner. The capacity (a receptivity) to acquire representations as a result of the way in which we are affected by objects is called **sensibility**. Hence by means of sensibility objects are *given* to us, and it alone supplies us with *intuitions*. But objects are *thought* through the understanding and *concepts* arise from it. Yet all thought must, by means of certain marks, refer ultimately to intuitions, whether it does so straightforwardly (*directe*) or circuitously (*indirecte*); and hence it must, in us, refer ultimately to sensibility, because no object can be given to us in any other manner than through sensibility.

The effect of an object on our capacity for B34
representation, insofar as we are affected by the object, is *sensation*. Intuition that refers to the ob- A20
ject through sensation is called *empirical* intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*.

Whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation I call its *matter*; but whatever in an appearance brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance can be ordered in certain relations I call the *form* of appearance. Now, that in which alone sensations can be ordered and put into a certain form cannot itself be sensation again. Therefore, although the matter of all appearance is given to us only *a posteriori*, the form of all appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations *a priori* in the mind; and hence that form must be capable of being examined apart from all sensation.

All representations in which nothing is found that belongs to sensation I call *pure* (in the transcendental sense of the term). Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions generally, in which everything manifold in experience is intuited in certain relations, will be found in the mind *a priori*. This pure B35 form of sensibility will also itself be called *pure intuition*. Thus, if from the representation of a body I separate what the understanding thinks in it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and if I similarly separate from it what belongs to sensation in it, such A21 as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., I am still left with something from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which, even if there is no actual object of the senses or of sensation, has its place in the mind *a priori*, as a mere form of sensibility.

There must, therefore, be a science of all princi- B36 ples of *a priori* sensibility; I call such a science *transcendental aesthetic*. It constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, and stands in contrast to that [part of the] transcendental doctrine of elements which contains the principles of pure thought and is called transcendental logic.

A22 Hence in the transcendental aesthetic we shall, first of all, *isolate* sensibility, by separating from it everything that the understanding thinks [in connection] with it through its concepts, so that nothing other than empirical intuition will remain. Second, we shall also segregate from sensibility everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing will remain but pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply *a priori*. In the course of that inquiry it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, which are principles for *a priori* cognition: namely, space and time. We now proceed to the task of examining these.

Transcendental Aesthetic B37

Section I. Space

§2. Metaphysical Exposition of This Concept

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent objects as outside us, and represent them one and all in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. By means of inner sense the mind intuits itself or its inner state. Although inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itself as an object, yet there is a determinate form [time] under which A23 alone an intuition of its inner state is possible. Thus everything belonging to our inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time cannot be intuited outwardly, any more than space can be intuited as something within us. What, then, are space and time? Are they actual beings? Are they only determinations of things, or, for that matter, relations among them? If so, are they at least determinations or relations that would also belong to things intrinsically, i.e., even if these things were not intuited? Or are they determinations and relations that adhere B38 only to the form of intuition and hence to the subjective character of our mind, so that apart from that character these predicates cannot be ascribed to any thing at all? In order to instruct ourselves on these points, let us first of all give an exposition of the concept of space. Now, by *exposition* (*expositio*) I mean clear (even if not comprehensive) representation of what belongs to a concept; and such exposition is *metaphysical* if it contains what exhibits the concept as *given a priori*.

1. Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experiences. For the representation of space must already be presupposed in order for certain sensations to be referred to something outside me (i.e., referred to something in a location of space other than the location in which I am). And

it must similarly already be presupposed in order for me to be able to represent [the objects of] these sensations as outside and *alongside* one another, and hence to represent them not only as different but as being in different locations. Accordingly, the representation of space cannot be one that we take from the relations of outer appearance by means of experience; rather, only through the representation of space is that outer experience possible in the first place.

A24 2. Space is a necessary *a priori* representation that
B39 underlies all outer intuitions. We can never have a representation of there being no space, even though we are quite able to think of there being no objects encountered in it. Hence space must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them. Space is an *a priori* representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances.

3. Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal
A25 concept of things as such; rather, it is a pure intuition. For, first, we can represent only one space; and when we speak of many spaces, we mean by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Nor, second, can these parts precede the one all-encompassing space, as its constituents, as it were (from which it can be assembled); rather, they can be thought only as *in it*. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and hence also the universal concept of spaces as such, rests solely on limitations. It follows from this that, as far as space is concerned, an *a priori* intuition of it (i.e., one that is not empirical) underlies all concepts of space. By the same token, no geometric principles—e.g., the principle that in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third—are ever derived from universal concepts of *line* and *triangle*; rather, they are all derived from intuition, and are derived from it moreover *a priori* with apodeictic certainty.

4. We represent space as an infinite *given* mag-
B40 nitude. Now it is true that every concept must be thought as a representation that is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations (as their common characteristic) and hence the concept contains these representations *under itself*. But no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite multitude of representations *within itself*. Yet that is how we think space (for all parts of space, *ad infinitum*, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an *a priori intuition*, not a *concept*.

§3. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space

By a *transcendental exposition* I mean the explication of a concept as a principle that permits insight into the possibility of other synthetic *a priori* cognitions. Such explication requires (1) that cognitions of that sort do actually flow from the given concept, and (2) that these cognitions are possible only on the presupposition of a given way of explicating that concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet *a priori*. What, then, must the representation of space be in order for such cognition of space to be possible? Space must B41
originally be intuition. For from a mere concept one cannot obtain propositions that go beyond the concept; but we do obtain such propositions in geometry (Introduction, V). This intuition must, however, be encountered in us *a priori*, i.e., prior to any perception of an object; hence this intuition must be pure rather than empirical. For geometric propositions are one and all apodeictic, i.e., linked with the consciousness of their necessity—e.g., the proposition that space has only three dimensions. But propositions of that sort cannot be empirical judgments or judgments of experience; nor can they be inferred from such judgments.

How, then, can the mind have an outer intuition which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined *a priori*? Obviously, this can be so only insofar as this intuition resides merely in the subject, as the subject's formal character of being affected by objects and of thereby acquiring *direct representation* of them, i.e., *intuition*, and hence only as form of outer *sense* in general.

Our explication of the concept of space is, therefore, the only one that makes comprehensible the *possibility of geometry* as a [kind of] synthetic *a priori* cognition. Any way of explicating the concept that fails to make this possibility comprehensible, even

if it should otherwise seem to have some similarity to ours, can be distinguished from it most safely by these criteria.

A26/ B42

Conclusions from the Above Concepts

(a) Space represents no property whatsoever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in their relation to one another. That is, space represents no determination of such things, no determination that adheres to objects themselves and that would remain even if we abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition. For determinations, whether absolute or relative, cannot be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and hence cannot be intuited *a priori*.

(b) Space is nothing but the mere form of all appearances of outer senses; i.e., it is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now, the subject's receptivity for being affected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects. Thus we can understand how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, and hence given *a priori*; and we can understand how this form, as a pure intuition in which all objects must be determined, can contain, prior to all experience, principles for the relations among these objects.

Only from the human standpoint, therefore, can we speak of space, of extended beings, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can—namely, as far as we may be affected by objects—acquire outer intuition, then the representation of space means nothing whatsoever. This A27/ B43 predicate is ascribed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., only insofar as they are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity which we call sensibility is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects are intuited as outside us; and if we abstract from these objects, then the form of that receptivity is a pure intuition that bears the name of space. We cannot make the special conditions of sensibility conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility of their appearances. Hence we can indeed say that space encompasses all things that appear to us externally, but not that it encompasses all things in themselves, intuited or not, or intuited by whatever subject. For we can make no judgment at all about the intuitions of other thinking beings, as to whether they are tied to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are valid for us universally. If the limitation on a judgment is added to the concept of the subject, then the judgment holds unconditionally. The proposition, All things are side by side in space, holds under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If I here add the condition to the concept and say, All things considered as outer appearances are side by side in space, then this rule holds universally and without limitation. Accordingly, our A28/ exposition teaches that space is *real* (i.e., objectively B44 valid) in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is *ideal* in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves, i.e., without taking into account the character of our sensibility. Hence we assert that space is *empirically real* (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is *transcendentally ideal*, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we omit [that space is] the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves.

Besides space, however, no other subjective representation that is referred to something external could be called an *a priori* objective representation. For from none of them can we derive synthetic *a priori* propositions, as we can from intuition in space (§3). Hence, strictly speaking, ideality does not apply to them, even though they agree with the representation of space inasmuch as they belong merely to the subjective character of the kind of sense involved. They may belong, e.g., to the sense of sight, of hearing, or of touch, by sensations of colors, sounds, or heat. Yet because they are mere sensations rather than intuitions, they do not allow us to cognize any object at all, let alone *a priori*.

The only aim of this comment is to prevent an B45 error: it might occur to someone to illustrate the ideality of space asserted above by means of examples such as colors or taste, etc. These are thoroughly insufficient for this, because they are rightly regarded

not as properties of things, but merely as changes in ourselves as subjects, changes that may even be different in different people. For in this case, something that originally is itself only appearance—e.g.,
A30 a rose—counts as a thing in itself in the empirical meaning of this expression, a thing in itself that in regard to color can nonetheless appear differently to every eye. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, by contrast, is a critical reminder that nothing whatsoever that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form of things, one that might belong to them as they are in themselves. Rather, what we call external objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility. The form of this sensibility is space; but its true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not cognized at all through these representations, and cannot be, since the thing in itself is never at issue in experience.

B46 ## Transcendental Aesthetic

Section II. Time

§4. Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time

1. Time is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from any experience. For simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the representation of time did not underlie them *a priori*. Only on the presupposition of this representation can we represent this and that as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively).

A31 2. Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. As regards appearances in general, we cannot annul time itself, though we can quite readily remove appearances from time. Hence time is given *a priori*. All actuality of appearances is possible only in time. Appearances, one and all, may go away; but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be annulled.

B47 3. This *a priori* necessity, moreover, is the basis for the possibility of apodeictic principles about relations of time, or for the possibility of axioms about time in general. Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but successive (just as different spaces are not successive but simultaneous). These principles cannot be obtained from experience. For experience would provide neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty; we could say only that common perception teaches us that it is so, but not that it must be so. These principles hold as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all; and they instruct us prior to experience, not through it.

4. Time is not a discursive or, as it is called, universal concept; rather, it is a pure form of sensible A32
intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time; and the kind of representation that can be given only through a single object is intuition. Moreover, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous could not be derived from a universal concept. The proposition is synthetic, and [therefore] cannot arise from concepts alone. Hence it is immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time.

5. To say that time is infinite means nothing more
than that any determinate magnitude of time is pos- B48
sible only through limitations of a single underlying time. Hence the original representation *time* must be given as unlimited. But if something is such that its parts themselves and any magnitude of an object in it can be represented determinately only through limitation, then the whole representation of it cannot be given through concepts (for they contain only partial representations), but any such representation must be based on immediate intuition.

§5. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time

I may refer for this exposition to No. 3, where, for the sake of brevity, I put among the items of the metaphysical exposition what in fact is transcendental. Let me add here that the concept of change, and with it the concept of motion (as change of place), is possible only through and in the representation of time; and that if this representation were not (inner) *a priori* intuition, no concept whatsoever could make comprehensible the possibility of a change, i.e., of a

combination, in one and the same object, of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., one and the same thing's being in a place and not being in that same place). Only in time can both of two contradictorily
B49 opposed determinations be met with in one thing: namely, *successively*. Hence our concept of time explains the possibility of all that synthetic *a priori* cognition which is set forth by the—quite fertile—general theory of motion.

§6. Conclusions from these Concepts

(a) Time is not something that is self-subsistent or that attaches to things as an objective determination, and that hence would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of our intuition of it. For if time were self-subsistent, then it would be something
A33 that without there being an actual object would yet be actual. But if, on the second alternative, time were a determination or order attaching to things themselves, then it could not precede the objects as their condition, and could not be cognized *a priori* and intuited through synthetic propositions. But this *a priori* cognition and intuition can take place quite readily if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which alone any intuition can take place in us. For in that case this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and hence represented *a priori*.

(b) Time is nothing but the form of inner sense,
B50 i.e., of the intuiting we do of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it does not belong to any shape or position, etc., but rather determines the relation of representations in our inner state. And precisely because this inner intuition provides no shape, do we try to make up for this deficiency by means of analogies. We represent temporal sequence by a line progressing *ad infinitum*, a line in which the manifold constitutes a series of only one dimension. And from the properties of that line we infer all the properties of time, except for the one difference that the parts of the line are simultaneous whereas the parts of time are always successive. This fact, moreover, that all relations of time can be expressed by means of outer intuition, shows that the representation of time is itself intuition.

(c) Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all ap- A34
pearances generally. Space, as the pure form of all outer appearances, is limited to just outer appearances as an *a priori* condition. But all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our inner state; and this inner state is subject to the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the condition of time. Therefore time is an *a priori* condition of all appearance generally: it is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and precisely thereby also, indirectly, B51
a condition of outer appearances. If I can say *a priori* that all outer appearances are in space and are determined *a priori* according to spatial relations, then the principle of inner sense allows me to say, quite universally, that all appearances generally, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and necessarily stand in relations of time.

If we take objects as they may be in themselves—i.e., if we abstract from the way in which we intuit ourselves inwardly, and in which by means of this intuition we also take into our faculty of representation all outer intuitions—then time is nothing. Time has objective validity only with regard to appearances, A35
because these are already things considered as *objects of our senses*. But time is no longer objective if we abstract from the sensibility of our intuition, and hence from the way of representing peculiar to us, and speak of *things as such*. Hence time is merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (an intuition that is always sensible—i.e., inasmuch as we are affected by objects); in itself, i.e., apart from the subject, time is nothing. Nevertheless, time is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, and hence also in regard to all things that we can encounter in experience. We cannot say that all things are in time; for in the concept of things as such we B52
abstract from all ways of intuiting them, while yet this intuition is the very condition under which time belongs in the representation of objects. If now we add the condition to the concept, and say that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in

time, then this principle has all its objective correctness and *a priori* universality.

Hence the doctrine we are asserting is that time is *empirically real*, i.e., objectively valid in regard to all objects that might ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object that is not subject to the condition of time can ever be given
A36 to us in experience. However, we dispute that time has any claim to absolute reality; i.e., we dispute any claim whereby time would attach to things absolutely, as a condition or property, without taking into account the form of our sensible intuition. Nor indeed can such properties, properties belonging to things in themselves, ever be given to us through the senses. In this, then, consists the *transcendental ideality* of time. According to this view, if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, then time is nothing and cannot be included either as subsist-
B53 ing or as inhering among objects in themselves (apart from their relation to our intuition). But this ideality of time is not to be compared, any more than is the ideality of space, with the subreptions of sensations. For in their case we presuppose that the appearance itself in which these predicates inhere has objective reality. In the case of time, such objective reality is entirely absent, except insofar as this reality is merely empirical, i.e., except insofar as we regard the object itself as merely appearance. See, on this, the above comment at the close of the preceding section.

§7. Elucidation

Against this theory, which grants that time is empirically real but disputes that it is real absolutely and transcendentally, I have heard men of insight raise one objection quite unanimously. I gather from this great unanimity that the objection must occur
A37 naturally to every reader who is not accustomed to contemplations such as these. The objection is the following. Changes are actual. (This is proved by the variation on the part of our own representations—even if one were to deny all outer appearances, along with their changes.) Now changes are possible only in time. Therefore time is something actual. There is no difficulty in replying to the objection. I concede the whole argument. Time is indeed something actual, namely, the actual form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner B54
experience; i.e., I actually have the representation of time and of my determinations in time. Hence time is to be regarded as actual, though not as an object but as the way of representing that I myself have as an object. Suppose, however, that I could intuit myself without being subject to this condition of sensibility, or that another being could so intuit me; in that case the very same determinations that we now represent as changes would provide a cognition in which the representation of time, and hence also that of change, would not occur at all. Hence time retains its empirical reality as condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality must, by the reasons adduced above, be denied to time. Time is nothing but the form of our inner intuition.[9] If we take away from time [the qualification that it is] the A38
special condition of our sensibility, then the concept of time vanishes as well; time attaches not to objects themselves, but merely to the subject intuiting them.

But what causes this objection to be raised so unanimously, and raised, moreover, by those who B55
nonetheless cannot think of any plausible objection against the doctrine that space is ideal, is the following. They had no hope of establishing apodeictically that space is real absolutely; for they are confronted by idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is incapable of strict proof. By contrast, the actuality of the object of our inner sense (the actuality of myself and of my state) is directly evident through consciousness. External objects might be a mere illusion; but the object of inner sense is, in their opinion, undeniably something actual. They failed to bear in mind, however, that both of them, though their actuality as representations is indisputable, still belong only to appearance. Appearance always has two sides. One is the side where the object is regarded in itself (without regard to the way in which it is intuited, which is precisely why its character always

9. I can indeed say: My representations follow one another. But that means only that we are conscious of them as being in a time sequence—in accordance, i.e., with the form of inner sense. Time is not, on that account, something in itself, nor is it a determination attaching to things objectively.

remains problematic). The other is the side where we take account of the form of the intuition of this object. This form must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the object appears. Yet this form belongs to the appearance of this object actually and necessarily.

Time and space are, accordingly, two sources of
A39 cognition. From these sources we can draw *a priori* different synthetic cognitions—as is shown above all by the splendid example that pure mathematics pro-
B56 vides in regard to our cognitions of space and its relations. For time and space, taken together, are pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make synthetic propositions possible *a priori*. But precisely thereby (i.e., by being merely conditions of sensibility), these *a priori* sources of cognition determine their own limits; namely, they determine that they apply to objects merely insofar as these are regarded as appearances, but do not exhibit things in themselves. Appearances are the sole realm where these *a priori* sources of cognition are valid; if we go outside that realm, there is no further objective use that can be made of them. This [limited] reality of space and time leaves the reliability of experiential cognition otherwise untouched; for we have equal certainty in that cognition, whether these forms necessarily attach to things in themselves or only to our intuition of these things. Those, on the other hand, who assert that space and time—whether they assume these as subsistent or as only inherent—are real absolutely must be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For suppose they decide to assume space and time as subsistent (thus taking what is usually the side of the mathematical investigators of nature): then they must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsistent nonentities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything actual) only in or-
A40 der to encompass everything actual. Or suppose they assume space and time as only inherent (thus taking the side to which some metaphysical natural scientists belong). Here space and time count for them as relations of appearances (occurring concurrently
B57 or sequentially)—relations abstracted from experience but, as thus separated, represented confusedly. If they take this second side, then they must dispute that the mathematical *a priori* doctrines are valid for actual things (e.g., things in space), or at least that they are apodeictically certain. For *a posteriori* there is no such certainty at all. According to this second opinion, the *a priori* concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination, and their source must actually be sought in experience: the relations are abstracted from experience; and the imagination has made from them something that, while containing what is universal in these relations, yet cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has connected with them. Those who assume space and time as [real absolutely and] subsistent do gain this much: they make the realm of appearances free for mathematical assertions. On the other hand, these very conditions create great confusion for them when the understanding wants to go beyond the realm of appearances. Those, on the other hand, who assume space and time as [real absolutely but as] only inherent gain on this latter point. I.e. they do not find the representations of space and time getting in their way when they want to judge objects not as appearances but merely as they relate to the understanding. But they can neither indicate a basis for the possibility of mathematical *a priori* cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid *a priori* intuition), nor bring the propositions of experience into necessary A41
agreement with those *a priori* mathematical asser-
tions. Our theory of the true character of these two B58
original forms of sensibility provides the remedy for both [sets of] difficulties.

Finally, transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, i.e., space and time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility presuppose something empirical. This holds even for the concept of motion, which unites the two components. For [the concept of] motion presupposes the perception of something movable. But in space, considered in itself, there is nothing movable; therefore the movable must be something that we find in space only through experience, and hence must be an empirical datum. Similarly, transcendental aesthetic cannot include among its *a priori* data the concept of alteration. For time itself does not alter; rather, what alters is something

that is in time. Therefore the concept of alteration requires the perception of some existent and of the succession of its determinations; hence it requires experience. [. . .]

A50/ B74

Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

Part II. Transcendental Logic Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic

I. On Logic As Such

Our cognition arises from two basic sources of the mind. The first is [our ability] to receive representations (and is our receptivity for impressions); the second is our ability to cognize an object through these representations (and is the spontaneity of concepts). Through receptivity an object is *given* to us; through spontaneity an object is *thought* in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts, therefore, constitute the elements of all our cognition. Hence neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them in some way or other, nor intuition without concepts can yield cognition. Both intuition and concepts are either pure or empirical. They are *empirical* if they contain sensation (sensation presupposes the actual presence of the object); they are *pure* if no sensation is mixed in with the representation. Sensation may be called the matter of sensible cognition. A51/ B75 Hence pure intuition contains only the form under which something is intuited, and a pure concept contains solely the form of the thought of an object as such. Only pure intuitions or concepts are possible *a priori*; empirical ones are possible only *a posteriori*.

Let us give the name *sensibility* to our mind's *receptivity* [i.e., to its ability], to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some manner. The *understanding*, by contrast, is our faculty for producing representations ourselves, i.e., our *spontaneity* of cognition. Our *intuition*, by our very nature, can never be other than *sensible* intuition; i.e., it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The *understanding*, by contrast, is our ability to *think* the object of sensible intuition. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it is just as necessary that we make our concepts sensible (i.e., that we add the object to them in intuition) as it is necessary that we make our intuitions comprehensible (i.e., that we bring them under concepts). Moreover, these faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot intuit anything, and the B76 senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition arise. This fact, however, must not lead us to confuse their respective contributions; it provides us, rather, with a strong reason for carefully A52 separating and distinguishing sensibility and the understanding from each other. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility as such, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding as such, i.e., logic. [. . .]

Transcendental Analytic B89

Transcendental analytic consists in the dissection of our entire *a priori* cognition into the elements of the understanding's pure cognition. The following points are what matters in this dissection: (1) The concepts must be pure rather than empirical. (2) They must belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and the understanding. (3) They must be elementary concepts, and must be distinguished carefully from concepts that are either derivative or composed of such elementary concepts. (4) Our table of these concepts must be complete, and the concepts must occupy fully the whole realm of the pure understanding. Now, the completeness of this science cannot be assumed reliably by gauging an aggregate of concepts that was brought about merely through trials. Hence this completeness is possible only by means of an *idea of the whole* of the understanding's *a priori* cognition, and through the division, determined by that idea, of the concepts amounting to that cognition; A65 and hence this completeness is possible only through the *coherence* of these concepts *in a system*. The pure understanding differentiates itself fully not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility. B90

Therefore it is a unity that is self-subsistent, sufficient to itself, and that cannot be augmented by supplementing it with any extrinsic additions. Hence the sum of the pure understanding's cognition will constitute a system that can be encompassed and determined by an idea. The system's completeness and structure can at the same time serve as a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of whatever components of cognition fit into the system. This entire part of the Transcendental Logic consists, however, of two *books*; one of these contains the *concepts*, the other the *principles*, of the pure understanding.

Book I. Analytic of Concepts

By *analytic of concepts* I do not mean the analysis of concepts, i.e., the usual procedure in philosophical inquiries of dissecting already available concepts in terms of their content and bringing them to distinctness; rather, I mean the until now rarely attempted
A66 *dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself*. The purpose of this dissection is to explore the possibility of *a priori* concepts, by locating them solely in the understanding, as their birthplace, and by
B91 analyzing the understanding's pure use as such. For this exploration is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy generally. Hence we shall trace the pure concepts all the way to their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where these concepts lie prepared until finally, on the occasion of experience, they are developed and are exhibited by that same understanding in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them.

Chapter I. On the Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding

When we bring into play a cognitive faculty, then, depending on the various ways in which we may be prompted to do so, different concepts come to the fore that allow us to recognize this faculty. These concepts can be collected in a more or less comprehensive manner, once the concepts have been observed fairly long or with significant mental acuity. But by this—as it were, mechanical—procedure we can never reliably determine at what point that inquiry will be completed. Moreover, if concepts are A67
discovered only on given occasions, then they reveal themselves in no order or systematic unity; instead B92
they are ultimately only paired according to similarities, and arranged in series according to the quantity of their content, from the simple concepts on to the more composite. The way in which these series are brought about, despite being methodical in a certain manner, is anything but systematic.

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, but also the obligation, of locating its concepts according to a principle. For these concepts arise, pure and unmixed, from the understanding, which is an absolute unity; and hence these concepts themselves must cohere with each other according to one concept or idea. Such coherence, however, provides us with a rule by which we can determine *a priori* the proper place for each pure concept of the understanding, and the completeness of all of them taken together—whereas otherwise all of this would be subject to one's own discretion or to chance.

Transcendental Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding

Section I. On the Understanding's Logical Use As Such The understanding was explicated merely negatively above, namely, as a nonsensible cognitive faculty. And since independently A68
of sensibility we cannot partake of any intuition, B93
it follows that the understanding is not a faculty of intuition. Apart from intuition, however, there is only one way of cognizing, namely, through concepts. Hence the cognition of any understanding, or at least of the human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive. All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected; concepts, on the other hand, rest on functions. By *function* I mean the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one common representation. Hence concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, whereas sensible intuitions are based on the receptivity for impressions. Now the only use that the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by

means of them. But in such judging, a concept is never referred immediately to an object, because the only kind of representation that deals with its object immediately is intuition. Instead the concept is referred immediately to some other representation of the object (whether that representation be an intuition or itself already a concept). Judgment, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, namely, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds for many [representations], and, among them, comprises also a given representation that is referred immediately to the object. E.g., in the judgment, *All bodies are divisible*, the concept of the divisible refers to various other concepts; but, among these, A69/ it is here referred specifically to the concept of B94 body, and the concept of body is referred in turn to certain appearances that we encounter. Hence these objects are represented mediately through the concept of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations. For instead of cognizing the object by means of an immediate representation, we do so by means of a higher representation comprising both this mediate representation and several other representations; and we thereby draw many possible cognitions together into one. Now since all acts of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the *understanding* as such can be represented as a *faculty of judgment*. For, according to what we said above, the understanding is a faculty of thought. But thought is cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some representation of an as yet undetermined object. Thus the concept of body signifies something—e.g., metal—that can be cognized through that concept. Hence it is a concept only because there are contained under it other representations by means of which it can refer to objects. Therefore the concept of body is the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g., the judgment that every metal is a body. Therefore we can find all of the functions of the understanding if we can exhibit completely the functions of unity in judgments. This, however, can be accomplished quite readily, as the following section will show.

Section II. A70/ B95

§9. On the Understanding's Logical Function in Judgments If we abstract from all content of a judgment as such and pay attention only to the mere form of the understanding in it, then we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four headings, each containing under it three moments. They can be represented conveniently in the following table.

	1	
	Quantity of Judgments	
	Universal	
	Particular	
	Singular	
2		**3**
Quality		*Relation*
Affirmative		Categorical
Negative		Hypothetical
Infinite		Disjunctive
	4	
	Modality	
	Problematic	
	Assertoric	
	Apodeictic	

[. . .]

Section III. B102

§10. On the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories General logic, as we have said several times already, abstracts from all content of cognition. It expects representations to be given to it from somewhere else—no matter where—in order then to transform these representations into concepts in the first place. This it does analytically. Transcendental logic, by contrast, has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility, offered to it by transcendental aes- A77 thetic, in order to provide it with a material for the pure concepts of the understanding. Without this material, transcendental logic would have no content, and hence would be completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition. But they belong nonetheless to the conditions of our mind's receptivity under which alone

the mind can receive representations of objects, and which, by the same token, must always affect the concept of these objects. Yet the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold, in order to be turned into a cognition, must first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain manner. This act I call synthesis.

B103 By *synthesis*, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various representations with one another and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition. Such synthesis is *pure* if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is the manifold in space and time). Before any analysis of our representations can take place, these representations must first be given, and hence in terms of *content* no concepts can originate analytically. Rather, synthesis of a manifold (whether this manifold is given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to a cognition. Although this cognition may still be crude and
A78 confused at first and hence may require analysis, yet synthesis is what in fact gathers the elements for cognition and unites them into a certain content. Hence if we want to make a judgment about the first origin of our cognition, then we must first direct our attention to synthesis.

Synthesis as such, as we shall see below, is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely. Bringing this synthesis *to concepts*, on the other hand, is a function belonging to the understanding; and it is through this function that the understanding first provides us with cognition in the proper meaning of the term.

B104 Now *pure synthesis*, *conceived of generally*, yields the pure concept of the understanding. By pure synthesis I mean the synthesis that rests on the basis of synthetic *a priori* unity. E.g., our act of counting (as is more noticeable primarily with larger numbers) is a *synthesis according to concepts*, because it is performed according to a common basis of unity (such as the decimal system). Hence under this concept the unity of the manifold's synthesis becomes necessary.

Bringing various representations *under* a concept (a task general logic deals with) is done analytically. But bringing not representations but the *pure synthesis* of representations *to* concepts is what transcendental logic teaches. The first [thing] that we must be given *a priori* in order to cognize any object is A79
the *manifold* of pure intuition. The second [thing] is the *synthesis* of this manifold by the imagination. But this synthesis does not yet yield cognition. The third [thing we need] in order to cognize an object that we encounter is the concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity. And these concepts rest on the understanding.

The same function that gives unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the B105
mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*. This unity—speaking generally—is called the pure concept of the understanding. Hence the same understanding—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of a judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings into its representations a transcendental content, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such; and because of this, these representations are called pure concepts of the understanding which apply to objects *a priori*—something that general logic cannot accomplish.

Thus there arise precisely as many pure concepts of the understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as in the preceding table there were logical functions involved in all possible judgments. For these functions of the understanding are completely exhaustive and survey its powers en- A80
tirely. Following Aristotle, we shall call these functions *categories*. For our aim is fundamentally the same as his, even though it greatly deviates from his in its execution.

Table of Categories B106

1

Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality

2	3
Of Quality	Of Relation
Reality	of *Inherence* and Subsistence (*substantia et accidens*)
Negation	of *Causality* and Dependence (Cause and Effect)
Limitation	of *Community* (Interaction between Agent and Patient)

4

Of Modality

Possibility—Impossibility

Existence—Nonexistence

Necessity—Contingency

This, then, is the list of all the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains *a priori*. Indeed, it is a pure understanding only because of these concepts; for through them alone can it understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object of intuition. This division of the categories has been generated systematically from
A81 a common principle, namely, our faculty of judgment (which is equivalent to our faculty of thought).
B107 It has not been generated rhapsodically, by locating pure concepts haphazardly, where we can never be certain that the enumeration of the concepts is complete. For we then infer the division only by induction, forgetting that in this way we never gain insight into why precisely these concepts, rather than others, reside in the pure understanding. Locating these basic concepts was a project worthy of an acute man like Aristotle. But having no principle, he snatched them up as he came upon them. He hunted up ten of them at first, and called them *categories* (predicaments). He later believed that he had discovered five more categories, and added them under the name of postpredicaments. But his table remained deficient even then. Moreover, we also find in it some modes of pure sensibility (*quando*, *ubi*, *situs*, as well as *prius*, *simul*), as well as an empirical mode (*motus*), none of which belong at all in this register of the primary concepts of the understanding. Again, derivative concepts (*actio*, *passio*) are also included among the original concepts, while some of the original concepts are missing entirely.

Hence for the sake of the latter, we must note also that the categories, as the true *primary concepts* of the pure understanding, have also their equally pure derivative concepts. In a complete system of transcendental philosophy these *derivative concepts* can by no means be omitted. In a merely critical essay, A82
however, I can settle for merely mentioning them.

Let me call these pure but derivative concepts of B108
the understanding the *predicables* of the pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). Once we have the original and primitive concepts, we can easily add the derivative and subsidiary ones and thus depict completely the genealogical tree of the pure understanding. Since I am here concerned with the completeness not of the system but only of the principles for a system, I am reserving that complementary work for another enterprise. We can, however, come close to achieving that aim of completing the tree if we pick up a textbook on ontology and subordinate the predicables to the categories: e.g., to the category of causality, the predicables of force, action, undergoing; to the category of community, the predicables of presence, resistance; to the predicaments of modality, the predicables of arising, passing away, change; and so on. When the categories are combined either with the modes of pure sensibility or with one another, they yield a great multitude of derivative *a priori* concepts. Mentioning these concepts and, if possible, listing them completely would be a useful and not disagreeable endeavor, but one that we can dispense with here.

In this treatise I deliberately refrain from offering definitions of these categories, even though I may A83
possess them. I shall hereafter dissect these concepts only to a degree adequate for the doctrine of method B109
that I here produce. Whereas definitions of the categories could rightly be demanded of me in a system of pure reason, here they would only make us lose sight of the main point of the inquiry. For they would give rise to doubts and charges that we may readily relegate to another activity without in any way detracting from our essential aim. Still, from what little I have mentioned about this, we can see distinctly that a complete lexicon with all the requisite explications not only is possible but could easily be brought

about. The compartments are now at hand. They only need to be filled in; and a systematic [transcendental] topic, such as the present one, will make it difficult to miss the place where each concept properly belongs, and at the same time will make it easy to notice any place that is still empty. [. . .]

A84/B116

Chapter II. On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

Section I.

§13. On the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction As Such When legal educators talk about rights and claims, they distinguish in a legal action the question regarding what is legal (*quid iuris*) from the question concerning fact (*quid facti*), and they demand proof of both. The first proof, which is to establish the right, or for that matter the legal entitlement, they call the *deduction*. We employ a multitude of empirical concepts without being challenged by anyone. And we consider ourselves justified, even
B117 without having offered a deduction, to assign to these empirical concepts a meaning and imagined signification, because we always have experience available to us to prove their objective reality. But there are also concepts that we usurp, as, e.g., *fortune*, *fate*. And although these concepts run loose, with our almost universal forbearance, yet they are sometimes confronted by the question [of their legality], *quid iuris*. This question then leaves us in considerable
A85 perplexity regarding the deduction of these concepts; for neither from experience nor from reason can we adduce any distinct legal basis from which the right to use them emerges distinctly.

But there are, among the various concepts making up the highly mixed fabric of human cognition, some that are determined for pure *a priori* use as well (i.e., for a use that is completely independent of all experience); and their right to be so used always requires a deduction. For proofs based on experience are insufficient to establish the legitimacy of using them in that way; yet we do need to know how these concepts can refer to objects even though they do not take these objects from any experience. Hence when I explain in what way concepts can refer to objects *a priori*, I call that explanation the *transcendental deduction* of these concepts. And I distinguish transcendental deduction from *empirical* deduction, which indicates in what way a concept has been acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns not the concept's legitimacy but only the fact whereby we came to possess it.

We already have, at this point, two types of con- B118
cepts that, while being wholly different in kind, do yet agree inasmuch as both of them refer to objects completely *a priori*: namely, on the one hand, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility; and, on the other hand, the categories as concepts of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of these two types of concepts would be a futile job. For what is distinctive in their nature is precisely the fact that they refer to their objects A86
without having borrowed anything from experience in order to represent these objects. Hence if a deduction of these concepts is needed, then it must always be transcendental.

But even for these concepts, as for all cognition, we can locate in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, then at least the occasioning causes of their production. Thus the impressions of the senses first prompt [us] to open up the whole cognitive faculty in regard to them, and to bring about experience. Experience contains two quite heterogeneous elements: namely, a *matter* for cognition, taken from the senses; and a certain *form* for ordering this matter, taken from the inner source of pure intuition and thought. It is on the occasion of the impressions of the senses that pure intuition and thought are first brought into operation and produce concepts. Such exploration of our cognitive faculty's first endeavors to ascend from singular perceptions to universal B119
concepts is doubtless highly beneficial, and we are indebted to the illustrious *Locke* for first opening up the path to it. Yet such exploration can never yield a *deduction* of the pure *a priori* concepts, which does not lie on that path at all. For in view of these concepts' later use, which is to be wholly independent of experience, they must be able to display a birth A87
certificate quite different from that of descent from

experiences. The attempted physiological derivation concerns a *quaestio facti*, and therefore cannot properly be called a deduction at all. Hence I shall call it the explanation of our *possession* of a pure cognition. Clearly, then, the only possible deduction of this pure cognition is a transcendental and by no means an empirical one, and empirical deductions regarding the pure *a priori* concepts are nothing but futile attempts—attempts that only those can engage in who have not comprehended the quite peculiar nature of these cognitions.

Yet even if it be granted that the only possible kind of deduction of pure *a priori* cognition is one along the transcendental path, that still does not show that this deduction is inescapably necessary. We did earlier trace the concepts of space and time
B120 to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and we explained and determined their *a priori* objective validity. Yet geometry, using nothing but *a priori* cognitions, follows its course securely without needing to ask philosophy for a certificate of the pure and legitimate descent of geometry's basic concept of space. However, the use of the concept of space in this science does apply only to the external world of sense. Space is the pure form of the intuition of that world. In that world, therefore, all geometric cognition is directly evident, because it is based
A88 on *a priori* intuition; and, through cognition itself, objects are (as regards their form) given *a priori* in intuition. With the *pure concepts of the understanding*, however, begins the inescapable requirement to seek a transcendental deduction—not only of these concepts themselves, but also of space. For these concepts speak of objects through predicates of pure *a priori* thought, not through predicates of intuition and sensibility; hence they refer to objects universally, i.e., apart from all conditions of sensibility. They are, then, concepts that are not based on experience; and in *a priori* intuition, too, they cannot display any object on which they might, prior to all experience, base their synthesis. Hence these concepts not only arouse suspicion concerning the objective validity
B121 and limits of their use, but they also make ambiguous the *concept of space*; for they tend to use it even beyond the conditions of sensible intuition—and this indeed is the reason why a transcendental deduction of this concept was needed above. I must therefore convince the reader, before he has taken a single step in the realm of pure reason, that such a deduction is inescapably necessary. For otherwise he proceeds blindly, and after manifold wanderings must yet return to the ignorance from which he started. But the reader must also distinctly see in advance the inevitable difficulty of providing such a deduction. For otherwise he might complain of obscurity when in fact the matter itself is deeply shrouded, or might be too quickly discouraged during the removal of obstacles. For we either must entirely abandon all claims A89
to pure rational insights into the realm that we care about most, namely, the realm beyond the bounds of all possible experience, or else must bring this critical inquiry to completion.

We had little trouble above in making comprehensible how the concepts of space and time, despite being *a priori* cognitions, must yet refer necessarily to objects, and how they make possible, independently of any experience, a synthetic cognition of objects. For only by means of such pure forms of sensibility can an object appear to us, i.e., can it be an object of empirical intuition. Hence space and time are pure B122
intuitions containing *a priori* the condition for the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in space and time has objective validity.

The categories of the understanding, however, do not at all represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Therefore objects can indeed appear to us without having to refer necessarily to functions of the understanding, and hence without the understanding's containing *a priori* the conditions of these objects. Thus we find here a difficulty that we did not encounter in the realm of sensibility: namely, how *subjective conditions of thought* could have *objective validity*, i.e., how they could yield conditions for the possibility of all cognition of A90
objects. For appearances can indeed be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. Let me take, e.g., the concept of cause, which signifies a special kind of synthesis where upon [the occurrence of] something, A, something quite different, B, is posited according to a rule. Why appearances should

contain anything like that is not evident *a priori*. (For experience cannot be adduced as proof, since we must be able to establish this concept's objective validity *a priori*.) Hence there is doubt *a priori* whether perhaps such a concept might not even be empty and encounter no object at all among appearances. For
B123 while it is evident that objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility lying *a priori* in the mind, since otherwise they would not be objects for us, it is not so easy to see the inference whereby they must in addition conform to the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought. For, I suppose, appearances might possibly be of such a character that the understanding would not find them to conform at all to the conditions of its unity. Everything might then be so confused that, e.g., the sequence of appearances would offer us nothing providing us with a rule of synthesis and thus corresponding to the concept
A91 of cause and effect, so that this concept would then be quite empty, null, and without signification. But appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition; for intuition in no way requires the functions of thought.

Suppose that we planned to extricate ourselves from these troublesome inquiries by saying that examples of such regularity among appearances are offered to us incessantly by experience, and that these examples give us sufficient prompting to isolate the concept of cause from them and thus to verify at the same time the objective validity of such a concept. In that case we would be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause cannot arise in that way at all;
B124 rather, it either must have its basis completely *a priori* in the understanding, or must be given up entirely as a mere chimera. For this concept definitely requires that something, A, be of such a kind that something else, B, follows from it *necessarily* and according to an *absolutely universal rule*. Although appearances do provide us with cases from which we can obtain a rule whereby something usually happens, they can never provide us with a rule whereby the result is *necessary*. This is, moreover, the reason why the synthesis of cause and effect is imbued with a dignity that cannot at all be expressed empirically: namely, that the effect is not merely added to the cause, but is posited *through* the cause and results *from* it. And the strict universality of the rule is indeed no property A92 whatsoever of empirical rules; empirical rules can, through induction, acquire none but comparative universality, i.e., extensive usability. But if we treated the pure concepts of the understanding as merely empirical products, then our use of them would change entirely.

§14. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Only two cases are possible where synthetic representations and their objects can concur, can necessarily refer to each other, and can—as it were—meet each other: namely, either if the object makes the representation possible or if the B125 representation alone makes the object possible. If the object makes the representation possible, then the reference is only empirical and the representation is never possible *a priori*. This is what happens in the case of appearances, as regards what pertains to sensation in them. But suppose that the representation alone makes the object possible. In that case, while representation in itself does not produce its object *as regards existence* (for the causality that representation has by means of the will is not at issue here at all), yet representation is *a priori* determinative in regard to the object if *cognizing* something *as an object* is possible only through it. Now there are two conditions under which alone there can be cognition of an object. The first condition is *intuition*; through it the object is given, though only as appearance. The A93 second condition is the *concept*; through it an object is thought that corresponds to this intuition. Now it is evident from the above that the first condition, namely, the condition under which alone objects can be intuited, does indeed, as far as their form is concerned, underlie objects *a priori* in the mind. Hence all appearances necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given. Now the question arises whether *a priori* concepts too do not precede [objects], as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, yet thought as an object at all. For in that case all B126

empirical cognition of objects necessarily conforms to such concepts, because nothing is possible *as object of experience* unless these concepts are presupposed. But all experience, besides containing the senses' intuition through which something is given, does also contain a *concept* of an object that is given in intuition, or that appears. Accordingly, concepts of objects as such presumably underlie all experiential cognition as its *a priori* conditions. Hence presumably the objective validity of the categories, as *a priori* concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thought in it is concerned). For in that case the categories refer to objects of experience necessarily and *a priori*, because only by means of them can any experiential object whatsoever be thought at all.

A94 Hence the transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts has a principle to which the entire investigation must be directed: namely, the principle that these concepts must be cognized as *a priori* conditions for the possibility of experience (whether the possibility of the intuition found in it, or the possibility of the thought). If concepts serve as the objective basis for the possibility of experience, then—precisely because of this—they are necessary. But to unfold the experience in which these concepts are found is not to deduce them (but is only to illustrate them);
B127 for otherwise they would, after all, be only contingent. Without that original reference of these concepts to possible experience wherein all objects of cognition occur, their reference to any object whatsoever would be quite incomprehensible.

The illustrious **Locke**, not having engaged in this contemplation, and encountering pure concepts of the understanding in experience, also derived them from experience. Yet he proceeded so *inconsistently* that he dared to try using these concepts for cognitions that go far beyond any limits of experience. **David Hume** recognized that in order for us to be able to do this, the origin of these concepts must be *a priori*. But he was quite unable to explain how it is possible that concepts that are not intrinsically combined in the understanding should nonetheless have to be thought by it as necessarily combined in the object. Nor did it occur to him that perhaps the understanding itself might, through these concepts, be the author of the experience wherein we encounter the understanding's objects. Thus, in his plight, he derived these concepts from experience (namely, from *habit*, a subjective necessity that arises in experience through repeated association and that ultimately is falsely regarded as objective). But he proceeded quite consistently after that, for he declared that we cannot use these concepts and the principles that they occasion in order to go beyond the limits of experience. Yet B128
the *empirical* derivation of these concepts which occurred to both cannot be reconciled with the scientific *a priori* cognitions that we actually have, namely, our *a priori* cognitions of *pure mathematics* and *universal natural science*, and hence this empirical derivation is refuted by that fact.

Of these two illustrious men, Locke left the door wide open for *fanaticism;* for once reason has gained possession of such rights, it can no longer be kept within limits by indefinite exhortations to moderation. Hume, believing that he had uncovered so universal a delusion—regarded as reason—of our cognitive faculty, surrendered entirely to *skepticism*. We are now about to try to find out whether we cannot provide for human reason safe passage between these two cliffs, assign to it determinate bounds, and yet keep open for it the entire realm of its appropriate activity.

The only thing that I still want to do before we start is to *explain the categories*: they are concepts of an object in general whereby the object's intuition is regarded as *determined* in terms of one of the *logical functions* in judging. Thus the function of the *categorical* judgment—e.g., All bodies are divisible—is that of the relation of subject to predicate. But the understanding's merely logical use left un- B129
determined to which of the two concepts we want to give the function of the subject, and to which the function of the predicate. For we can also say, Something divisible is a body. If, on the other hand, I bring the concept of a body under the category of substance, then through this category is determined the fact that the body's empirical intuition in experience must be considered always as subject only,

never as mere predicate. And similarly in all the remaining categories.

Section II. Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding [Second Edition]

§15. On the Possibility of a Combination As Such The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity; and the form of this intuition can lie *a priori* in our faculty of representation without being anything but the way in which the subject is affected. But a manifold's *combination (coniunctio)* as such can never come to us through the senses; nor,
B130 therefore, can it already be part of what is contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For this combination is an act of spontaneity by the faculty of representation; and this faculty must be called the understanding, in order to be distinguished from sensibility. Hence all combination is an act of the understanding—whether or not we become conscious of such combination; whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of the manifold of various concepts; and whether, in the case of intuition, it is a combination of sensible or of nonsensible intuition. I would assign to this act of the understanding the general name *synthesis*, in order to point out at the same time: that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without ourselves' having combined it beforehand; and that, among all representations, *combination* is the only one that cannot be given through objects, but—being an act of the subject's self-activity—can be performed only by the subject himself. We readily become aware here that this act of synthesis must originally be a single act and must hold equally for all combination; and that resolution or *analysis*, which seems to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not beforehand combined anything, there it also cannot resolve anything, because only *through the understanding* could the faculty of representation have been given something as combined.

But the concept of combination carries with
B131 it, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the manifold's unity. Combination is representation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold. Hence the representation of this unity cannot arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it makes possible the concept of combination in the first place. This unity, which thus precedes *a priori* all concepts of combination, is by no means the category of unity mentioned earlier (in §10). For all categories are based on logical functions occurring in judgments; but in these functions combination, and hence unity of given concepts, is already thought. Hence a category already presupposes combination. We must therefore search for this unity (which is qualitative unity; see §12) still higher up, namely, in what itself contains the basis for the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence contains the basis for the possibility of the understanding, even as used logically.

§16. On the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception The *I think* must be *capable* of accompany- B132
ing all my representations. For otherwise something would be represented to me that could not be thought at all—which is equivalent to saying that the representation would be either impossible or at least nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is called *intuition*. Hence everything manifold in intuition has a necessary reference to the *I think* in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation [i.e., the *I think*] is an act of spontaneity; i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it *pure apperception*, in order to distinguish it from *empirical* apperception. Or, again, I call it *original apperception*; for it is the self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation *I think* that must be capable of accompanying all other representations and is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call the *unity* of this apperception the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that *a priori* cognition can be obtained from it. For the manifold representations given in a certain intuition would not one and all be *my* representations, if they did not one and all belong to one self-consciousness. I.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious

of them as being mine), they surely must conform necessarily to the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness, since otherwise they would not thoroughly belong to me. And from this original combination much can be inferred.

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This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesi . For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is essentially scattered and without any reference to the subject's identity. Hence this reference comes about not through my merely accompanying each representation with consciousness, but through my *adding* one representation to another and being conscious of their synthesis. Hence only because I can combine a manifold of given representations *in one consciousness*, is it possible for me to represent the *identity itself of the consciousness in these representations*. I.e., the *analytic* unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some *synthetic* unity of apperception. The thought that these representations given in intuition belong one and all to me is, accordingly, tantamount to the thought that I unite them, or at least can unite them, in one self-consciousness. And although that thought itself is not yet the consciousness of the *synthesis* of the representations, it still presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. I.e., only because I can comprise the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all *my* representations. For otherwise I would have a self as many-colored and varied as I have representations that I am conscious of. Hence synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given *a priori*, is the basis of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all *my* determinate thought. But combination does not lie in the objects, and can by no means be borrowed from them by perception and thus be taken up only then into the understanding. It is, rather, solely something performed by the understanding; and the understanding itself is nothing more than the faculty of combining *a priori* and of bringing the manifold of given intuitions under the unity of apperception—the principle of this unity being the supreme principle in all of human cognition.

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Now, it is true that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself merely an identical and hence an analytic proposition. Yet it does declare as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, a synthesis without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the I, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from this representation, can a manifold be given, and only through *combination* can it be thought in one consciousness. An understanding wherein through self- consciousness alone everything manifold would at the same time be given would be an understanding that *intuits*. Our understanding can only *think*, and must seek intuition in the senses. I am, then, conscious of the self as identical, as regards the manifold of the representations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all *my* representations that make up *one* representation. That, however, is tantamount to saying that I am conscious of a necessary *a priori* synthesis of them. This synthesis is called the original synthetic unity of apperception. All representations given to me are subject to this unity; but they must also be brought under it through a synthesis.

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§17. The Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception Is the Supreme Principle for All Use of the Understanding The supreme principle for the possibility of all intuition in reference to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that everything manifold in intuition is subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle for the possibility of all intuition in reference to the understanding is that everything manifold in intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.[10] All manifold representations of intuition are subject to the first principle insofar as they are given

10. Space and time, and all their parts, are *intuitions*; hence they, with the manifold that they contain, are singular representations. (See the Transcendental Aesthetic). Hence space

to us. They are subject to the second principle in-
B137 sofar as they must be capable of being *combined* in one consciousness. For without that combination, nothing can be thought or cognized through such representations, because the given representations do not have in common the act of apperception, *I think*, and thus would not be collated in one self-consciousness.

Understanding—speaking generally—is the faculty of *cognitions*. Cognitions consist in determinate reference of given representations to an object. And an *object* is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is *united*. But all unification of representations requires that there be unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the reference of representations to an object consists solely in this unity of consciousness, and hence so does their objective validity and consequently their becoming cognitions. On this unity, consequently, rests the very possibility of the understanding.

Hence the principle of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception is the primary pure cognition of the understanding, on which the entire remaining use of the understanding is based; and this cognition is at the same time entirely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition. Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, i.e., space, is as yet no cognition at all; it provides only the manifold of *a priori* intuition for a possible cognition. Rather, in order to cognize
B138 something or other—e.g., a line—in space, I must *draw* it; and hence I must bring about synthetically a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and so that an object (a determinate space) is thereby first cognized. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition. Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognize an object, but every intuition must be subject to it *in order to become an object for me*. For otherwise, and without that synthesis, the manifold would *not* unite in one consciousness.

Although this last proposition makes the synthetic unity [of consciousness] a condition of all thought, it is—as I have said—itself analytic. For it says no more than that all *my* representations in some given intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I can ascribe them—as my representations—to the identical self, and hence under which alone I can unite them, as combined synthetically in one apperception, through the universal expression *I think*.

However, this principle is not one for every possible understanding as such, but is a principle only for that [kind of] understanding through whose pure apperception, in the representation *I think*, no manifold whatsoever is yet given. An understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold B139
of intuition would at the same time be given—i.e., an understanding through whose representation the objects of this representation would at the same time exist— would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold that the human understanding, which merely thinks but does not intuit, does need. But still, this principle is unavoidably the first principle for the human understanding. And thus our understanding cannot even frame the slightest concept of a different possible understanding—whether of an understanding that itself would intuit; or of an understanding that would indeed have lying at its basis a sensible intuition, yet one of a different kind from that in space and time.

§18. What Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness Is

The *transcendental unity* of apperception is the unity whereby everything manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. Hence this unity is called *objective*, and must be distinguished from the *subjective* unity of consciousness, which is a *determination of inner sense* whereby that manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is given empirically. Whether I can be conscious *empirically* of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive

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and time are not mere concepts, through which the very same consciousness is encountered as contained in many representations. They are, rather, [representations through which] many representations are encountered as contained in one representation and in the consciousness thereof, and hence [they are representations] encountered as composite; and consequently the unity of this consciousness is encountered as *synthetic*, but yet as original. This *singularity* of [intuition] is important in its application. (See §25.)

B140 depends on circumstances or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness, through the association of representations, itself concerns an appearance and is entirely contingent. However, the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition as such containing a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness. It is subject to that unity solely through the necessary reference of the manifold of intuition to the one *I think*, and hence through the understanding's pure synthesis that lies *a priori* at the basis of the empirical synthesis. Only the original unity of consciousness is valid objectively. The empirical unity of apperception, which we are not examining here and which moreover is only derived from the original unity under given conditions *in concreto*, has only subjective validity. One person will link the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with some other thing; and the unity of consciousness in what is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessary and universally valid.

§19. The Logical Form of All Judgments Consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts Contained in Them I have never been satisfied with the explication that logicians give of
B141 a judgment as such. A judgment, they say, is the representation of a relation between two concepts. Now, I shall not here quarrel with them about one respect in which this explication is defective (although this oversight has given rise to many troublesome consequences for logic): namely, that it fits at most *categorical* judgments only, but not hypothetical and disjunctive ones (since these contain a relation not of concepts but of further judgments). I shall point out only that this explication of a judgment leaves undetermined what this *relation* consists in.

But suppose that I inquire more precisely into the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and that I distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation in terms of laws of the reproductive imagination (a relation that has only subjective validity). I then find that a judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to
B142 the objective unity of apperception. This is what the little relational word *is* in judgments intends, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective one. For this word indicates the relation of the representations to original apperception and its *necessary unity*. The relation to this necessary unity is there even if the judgment itself is empirical and hence contingent—e.g., Bodies are heavy. By this I do not mean that these representations belong *necessarily to one another* in the empirical intuition. Rather, I mean that they belong to one another *by virtue of the necessary unity* of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions; i.e., they belong to one another according to principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as these representations can become cognition—all of these principles being derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only through this does this relation become a *judgment*, i.e., a relation that is *valid objectively* and can be distinguished adequately from a relation of the same representations that would have only subjective validity—e.g., a relation according to laws of association. According to these laws, all I could say is: If I support a body, then I feel a pressure of heaviness. I could not say: It, the body, is heavy—which amounts to saying that these two representations are not together merely in perception (no matter how often repeated), but are combined in the object, i.e., combined independently of what the subject's state is.

§20. All Sensible Intuitions Are Subject to the Categories, Which Are Conditions under Which Alone Their Manifold Can Come Together in One Consciousness B143 The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception; for solely through this unity is the *unity* of intuition possible. (§17.) But the act of the understanding whereby the manifold of given representations (whether intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception as such is the logical function of judgments. (§19.) Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is *determined* in regard to one of the logical functions of judging, inasmuch as through this function it is brought to one consciousness as such. The *categories*, however,

are indeed nothing but precisely these functions of judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them. (§13.) Hence, the manifold in a given intuition is also necessarily subject to the categories.

B144 §21. Comment Through the synthesis of the understanding, a manifold contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the *necessary* unity of self-consciousness, and this representing is done by means of the category.[11] Hence the category indicates that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition is just as subject to a pure *a priori* self-consciousness, as empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensible intuition that likewise takes place *a priori*. Hence in the above proposition I have made the beginning of a *deduction* of the pure concepts of the understanding. Since the categories are *independent of sensibility* and arise in the understanding alone, I must still abstract, in this deduction, from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to take account solely of the unity that the understanding contributes to the intuition by means of the category. Afterwards (§ 26) I shall show, from the way in which
B145 the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that the intuition's unity is none other than the unity that (by §20, above) the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition as such; and that hence by my explaining the category's *a priori* validity regarding all objects of our senses, the deduction's aim will first be fully attained.

From one point, however, I could not abstract in the above proof: namely, from the fact that the manifold for the intuition must be given still prior to the understanding's synthesis, and independently of it; but how it is given remains undetermined here. For if I were to think of an understanding that itself intuited (as, e.g., a divine understanding that did not represent given objects but through whose representation the objects would at the same time be given or produced), then in regard to such cognition the categories would have no signification whatever. The categories are only rules for an understanding whose entire faculty consists in thought, i.e., in the act of bringing to the unity of apperception the synthesis of the manifold that has been given to it from elsewhere in intuition. Hence such an understanding by itself cognizes nothing whatsoever, but only combines and orders the material for cognition, i.e., the intuition, which must be given to it by the object. But why our understanding has this peculiarity, that it brings about unity of apperceptB146 tion *a priori* only by means of the categories, and only by just this kind and number of them—for this no further reason can be given, just as no reason can be given as to why we have just these and no other functions in judging, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition.

§22. A Category Cannot Be Used for Cognizing Things Except When It Is Applied to Objects of Experience *Thinking* an object and *cognizing* an object are, then, not the same. For cognition involves two components: first, the concept (the category), through which an object as such is thought; and second, the intuition, through which the object is given. For if no intuition corresponding to the concept could be given at all, then in terms of its form the concept would indeed be a thought; but it would be a thought without any object, and no cognition at all of anything whatsoever would be possible by means of it. For as far as I would know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. Now, all intuition that is possible for us is sensible (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Hence for us, thinking an object as such by means of a pure concept of the understanding can become cognition only insofar as this concept is referred to B147 objects of the senses. Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of what, through sensation, is immediately represented as actual in space and time. By determining pure intuition we can (in mathematics) acquire *a priori*

11. The basis of the proof for this rests on the represented *unity of intuition*, through which an *object* is given. This unity always implies a synthesis of the manifold given for an intuition and already contains this manifold given's reference to the unity of apperception.

cognition of objects as appearances, but only in terms of their form; that, however, still leaves unestablished whether there can be things that must be intuited in this form. Consequently all mathematical concepts are, by themselves, no cognitions—except insofar as one presupposes that there are things that can be exhibited to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition. But *things in space and time* are given only insofar as they are perceptions (i.e., representations accompanied by sensation), and hence are given only through empirical representation. Consequently the pure concepts of the understanding, even when they are (as in mathematics) applied to *a priori* intuitions, provide cognition only insofar as these intuitions—and hence, by means of them, also the concepts of the understanding—can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories also do not supply us, by means of intuition, with any cognition of things, except through their possible application to *empirical* intuition. I.e., the categories serve only
B148 for the possibility of *empirical cognition*. Such cognition, however, is called *experience*. Consequently the categories cannot be used for cognizing things except insofar as these things are taken as objects of possible experience.

§23 The above proposition is of the greatest importance. For it determines the bounds for the use of the pure concepts of the understanding in regard to objects just as much as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the bounds for the use of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time, as conditions for the possibility as to how objects can be given to us, hold no further than for objects of the senses, and hence hold for objects of experience only. Beyond these bounds, space and time represent nothing whatsoever; for they are only in the senses and have no actuality apart from them. The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation and extend to objects of intuition as such, whether this intuition is similar to ours or not, as long as it is sensible rather than intellectual. But this further extension of the concepts beyond *our* sensible intuition is of no benefit to us whatsoever. For they are then empty concepts of objects, i.e., concepts through which we cannot judge at all whether or not these objects are so much as possible. I.e., the pure concepts of the understanding are then mere forms of thought, without objective reality; for we then have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of apperception—which is all that those concepts contain—could be applied B149
so that the concepts could determine an object. Solely *our* sensible and empirical intuition can provide them with meaning and significance.

Hence if we suppose an object of a *nonsensible* intuition as given, then we can indeed represent it through all the predicates that are already contained in the presupposition *that the object has as a property nothing belonging to sensible intuition*: hence we can represent that it is not extended or in space, that its duration is not a time, that no change (i.e., succession of determinations in time) is to be found in it, etc. But yet I have no proper cognition if I merely indicate what the intuition of the object *is not*, without being able to say what the intuition does contain. For I have not then represented the possibility of there being an object for my pure concept of the understanding, since I was unable to give an intuition corresponding to the concept, but was able only to say that our intuition does not hold for it. However, the foremost point here is that not even one single category could be applied to such a something. E.g., one could not apply to it the concept of a substance, i.e., the concept of something that can exist as subject but never as mere predicate. For I do not know at all, concerning this concept, whether there can be anything whatever corresponding to this conceptual determination [of substance], unless empirical intuition gives me the instance for applying it. But more about this below.

§24 On Applying the Categories to Objects of the B150
Senses As Such The pure concepts of the understanding refer, through the mere understanding, to objects of intuition as such—i.e., we leave undetermined whether this intuition is ours or some other, although it must be sensible intuition. But the concepts are, precisely because of this, mere *forms of thought*, through which as yet no determinate object is cognized. We saw that the synthesis or combination of the manifold in them referred merely

to the unity of apperception, and was thereby the basis for the possibility of *a priori* cognition insofar as such cognition rests on the understanding; and hence this synthesis was not just transcendental but was also purely intellectual only. But because there lies at the basis in us *a priori* a certain form of sensible intuition, a form that is based on the receptivity of our capacity to represent (i.e., based on our sensibility), the understanding (as spontaneity) can, by means of the manifold of given representations, determine inner sense in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception; and thus it can think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of *a priori sensible intuition*—this unity being the condition to which all objects of our (i.e., human) intuition must necessarily be subject. And thereby the categories, as themselves mere forms of thought,
B151 acquire objective reality. I.e., they acquire application to objects that can be given to us in intuition. But they apply to these objects only as appearances; for only of appearances are we capable of having *a priori* intuition.

This *synthesis* of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, may be called *figurative* synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*). This serves to distinguish it from the synthesis that would be thought, in the mere category, in regard to the manifold of an intuition as such; this latter synthesis is called combination of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*). Both these syntheses are *transcendental*, not just because they themselves proceed *a priori*, but because they are also the basis for the possibility of other *a priori* cognition.

However, when the figurative synthesis concerns merely the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., merely this transcendental unity thought in the categories, then it must be called the *transcendental synthesis of imagination*, to distinguish it from the merely intellectual combination. **Imagination** is the faculty of representing an object in intuition even *without the object's being present*. Now, all our intuition is sensible; and hence the imagination, because of the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of the understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility*. Yet the synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spon- B152
taneity, which is determinative, rather than merely determinable, as is sense; hence this synthesis can *a priori* determine sense in terms of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception. To this extent, therefore, the imagination is a faculty of determining sensibility *a priori;* and its synthesis of intuitions *in accordance with the categories* must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination*. This synthesis is an action of the understanding upon sensibility, and is the understanding's first application (and at the same time the basis of all its other applications) to the objects of intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, this synthesis is distinct from the intellectual synthesis, which proceeds without any imagination but merely through the understanding. Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also call it the *productive* imagination, thereby distinguishing it from the *reproductive* imagination. The synthesis of the reproductive imagination is subject solely to empirical laws, namely, to the laws of association. Therefore this synthesis contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of *a priori* cognition, and hence belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology. [. . .]

§25 By contrast, in the transcendental synthesis of B157
the manifold of representations as such, and hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am not conscious of myself as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but am conscious only that I am. This *representation* is a *thought*, not an *intuition*. Now *cognition* of ourselves requires not only the act of thought that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, but requires in addition a definite kind of intuition whereby this manifold is given. Hence although my own existence is not ap-
pearance (still less mere illusion), determination of B158
my existence can occur only in conformity with the form of inner sense and according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition. Accordingly I have no *cognition* of myself as I am but merely cognition of how I appear to myself. Hence consciousness of oneself is far from being a cognition of oneself, regardless of all the

categories, which make up the thought of an *object as such* through the combination of the manifold in one apperception. We saw that in order for me to cognize an object different from myself, I not only require the thinking (which I have in the category) of an object as such, but do also require an intuition whereby I determine that universal concept. In the same way, in order to cognize myself, too, I not only require the consciousness of myself or the fact that I think myself, but require also an intuition of the manifold in me whereby I determine this thought.
B159 And I exist as an intelligence. This intelligence is conscious solely of its faculty of combination. But as regards the manifold that it is to combine, this intelligence is subjected to a limiting condition (which it calls inner sense). As subjected to this condition, it can make that combination intuitable only in terms of time relations, which lie wholly outside the concepts of the understanding, properly so called. And hence this intelligence can still cognize itself only as, in regard to an intuition (one that cannot be intellectual and given by the understanding itself), it merely appears to itself; it cannot cognize itself as it would if its *intuition* were intellectual.

§26 Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Use in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding In the *metaphysical deduction* we established the *a priori* origin of the categories as such through their complete concurrence with the universal logical functions of thought. But in the *transcendental deduction* we exhibited the possibility of them as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition as such (§§20, 21). We must now explain how it is possible, through *categories*, to cognize *a priori* whatever objects *our senses may encounter*—to so cognize them as regards not the form of their intuition, but the laws of their combination—and hence,
B160 as it were, to prescribe laws to nature, and even to make nature possible. For without this suitability of the categories, one would fail to see how everything that our senses may encounter would have to be subject to the laws that arise *a priori* from the understanding alone.

First of all, let me point out that by *synthesis of apprehension* I mean that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), becomes possible.

We have *a priori*, in the representations of space and time, *forms* of both outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these forms the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because that synthesis itself can take place only according to this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* (containing a manifold), and hence are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold in them (see B161
the Transcendental Aesthetic).[12] Therefore even the *unity of the synthesis* of the manifold outside or within us, and hence also a *combination* to which everything that is to be represented determinately in space or time must conform, is already given *a priori* as a condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension*—given along with (not in) these intuitions. This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than the unity of the combination, conforming to the categories but applied to our *sensible intuition*, of the manifold of a given *intuition as such* in an original consciousness. Consequently all synthesis, the synthesis through which even perception becomes possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and hence hold *a priori* also for all objects of experience.

12. Space, represented as *object* (as we are actually required to represent it in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition; namely, it also contains *combination* of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into an *intuitive* representation—so that the *form of intuition* gives us merely a manifold, but *formal intuition* gives us unity of representation. In the Transcendental Aesthetic I had merely included this unity with sensibility, wanting only to point out that it precedes any concept. But in fact this unity presupposes a synthesis; this synthesis does not belong to the senses, but through it do all concepts of space and time first become possible. For through this unity (inasmuch as the understanding determines sensibility) space or time are first *given* as intuitions, and hence the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (see §24).

B162 Hence, e.g., when I turn the empirical intuition of a house into a perception by apprehending the intuition's manifold, then in this apprehension I presuppose the *necessary unity* of space and of outer sensible intuition as such; and I draw, as it were, the house's shape in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. But this same unity, if I abstract from the form of space, resides in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition as such, i.e., the category of *magnitude*. Hence the synthesis of apprehension, i.e., perception, must conform throughout to that category.[13]

When (to take a different example) I perceive the freezing of water, then I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity) as states that stand to each other in B163 a relation of time. But in time, which I presuppose for the appearance as an inner *intuition*, I necessarily represent a synthetic unity of the manifold; without this unity, that relation could not be given *determinately* (as regards time sequence) in an intuition. However, this synthetic unity, as an *a priori* condition under which I combine the manifold of an *intuition as such*, is—if I abstract from the constant form of *my* inner intuition, i.e., from time—the category of *cause*; through this category, when I apply it to my sensibility, *everything that happens is, in terms of its relation, determined* by me *in time as such*. Therefore apprehension in such an event, and hence the event itself, is subject—as regards possible perception—to the concept of the *relation of effects and causes*; and thus it is in all other cases.

Categories are concepts that prescribe laws *a priori* to appearances, and hence to nature regarded as the sum of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*). And now this question arises: Since the categories are not derived from nature and do not conform to it as their model (for then they would be merely empirical), how are we to comprehend the fact that nature must conform to the categories, i.e., how can the categories determine *a priori* the combination of nature's manifold without gleaning that combination from nature? Here now is the solution of this puzzle.

How it is that the laws of appearances in nature B164 must agree with the understanding and its *a priori* form, i.e., with the understanding's faculty of combining the manifold as such, is not any stranger than how it is that appearances themselves must agree with the form of *a priori* sensible intuition. For just as appearances exist not in themselves but only relatively to the subject in whom the appearances inhere insofar as the subject has senses, so the laws exist not in the appearances but only relatively to that same being insofar as that being has understanding. Things in themselves would have their law-governedness necessarily, even apart from an understanding that cognizes them. But appearances are only representations of things that exist uncognized as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere appearances, however, they are subject to no law of connection whatsoever except the one prescribed by the connecting faculty. Now what connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination; and imagination depends on the understanding as regards the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and on sensibility as regards the manifoldness of apprehension. Now all possible perception depends on this synthesis of apprehension; but it itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on transcendental synthesis and hence on the categories. Therefore all possible perceptions, and hence also anything whatsoever that can reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of na- B165 ture, must in regard to their combination be subject to the categories. Nature (regarded merely as nature in general) depends (as *natura formaliter spectata*) on the categories as the original basis of its necessary law-governedness. But even the pure faculty of the understanding does not suffice for prescribing *a priori* to appearances, through mere categories, more laws than those underlying a *nature in general* considered as the law-governedness of appearances in space and time. Particular laws, because they

13. In this way we prove that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must conform necessarily to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained wholly *a priori* in the category. The spontaneity that brings combination into the manifold of intuition is one and the same in the two cases: in apprehension it does so under the name of power of imagination; in apperception it does so under the name of the understanding.

concern appearances that are determined empirically, are *not completely derivable* from those laws, although the particular laws are one and all subject to the categories. Experience must be added in order for us to become acquainted with particular laws *at all*; but the *a priori* laws alone give us information about experience as such and about what can be cognized as an object of that experience.

§27 Result of This Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding We cannot *think* an object except through categories; we cannot *cognize* an object thought by us except through intuitions corresponding to those concepts. Now all our intuitions
B166 are sensible, and this [sensible] cognition is empirical insofar as its object is given. Empirical cognition, however, is experience. C*onsequently no cognition is possible for us* a priori *except solely of objects of possible experience*.[14]

But this cognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not therefore all taken from experience. Rather, as far as pure intuitions as well as pure concepts of the understanding are concerned, they are elements of cognition that are found in us *a priori*. Now, there are only two ways in which one can conceive of a *necessary* agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts
B167 make experience possible. The first alternative is not what happens as regards the categories (nor as regards pure sensible intuition). For they are *a priori* concepts and hence are independent of experience. (To assert that their origin is empirical would be to assert a kind of *generatio aequivoca*.) There remains, consequently, only the second alternative (a system of *epigenesis*, as it were, of pure reason): namely, that the categories contain the grounds, on the part of the understanding, of the possibility of all experience as such. But as to how the categories make experience possible, and as to what principles of the possibility of experience they provide us with when applied to appearances, more information will be given in the following chapter on the transcendental use of our faculty of judgment.

Someone might want to propose, in addition to the two sole ways mentioned above, a middle course between them: namely, that the categories are neither *self-thought a priori* first principles of our cognition, nor again are drawn from experience, but are subjective predispositions for thinking that are implanted in us simultaneously with our existence; and that they were so arranged by our originator that their use harmonizes exactly with the laws of nature governing the course of experience (this theory would be a kind of *preformation system* of pure reason). If such a middle course were proposed, the following would decide against it (apart from the fact that with B168
such a hypothesis one can see no end to how far the presupposition of predetermined predispositions to future judgments might be carried): namely, that the categories would in that case lack the *necessity* which belongs essentially to the concept of them. For, the concept of cause, e.g., which asserts the necessity of a result under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, to link certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I could then not say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e., connected with it necessarily), but could say only that I am so equipped that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. And this is just what the skeptic most longs for. For then all our insight, achieved through the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but sheer illusion; and there would also be no lack of people who would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) in themselves. At the very least one could not quarrel with anyone

14. In order to keep my readers from being troubled prematurely by the worrisome detrimental consequences of this proposition, let me just remind them that in our *thinking* the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unbounded realm. Intuition is required only for *cognizing* what we think, i.e., only for determining the object. Thus if intuition is lacking, the thought of the object can otherwise still have its true and useful consequences for the subject's *use of reason*. But because the use of reason is not always directed to the determination of the object and hence to cognition, but is sometimes directed also to the determination of the subject and his volition, it cannot yet be set forth here.

about something that rests merely on the way in which his [self as] subject is organized.

Brief Sketch of This Deduction This deduction is the exhibition of the pure concepts of the understanding (and, with them, of all theoretical *a priori* cognition) as principles of the possibility of experi-
B169 ence; the exhibition of these principles, however, as the *determination* of appearances in space and time *as such*; and the exhibition, finally, of this determination as arising from the *original* synthetic unity of apperception, this unity being the form of the understanding as referred to space and time, the original forms of sensibility. [. . .]

Book II. Analytic Of Principles

A136/ B175 [. . .] [T]his *transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment* will comprise two chapters. The *first* chapter deals with the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be used, i.e., with the schematism of the pure understanding. The *second* chapter deals with the synthetic judgments that under these conditions emanate *a priori* from pure concepts of the understanding and that lie *a priori* at the basis of all other cognitions; i.e., it deals with the principles of the pure understanding.

Chapter I On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

A137/ B176

Whenever an object is subsumed under a concept, the representation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept; i.e., the concept must contain what is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. For this is precisely what we mean by the expression that an object is contained *under* a concept. Thus the empirical concept of a *plate* is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a *circle*, inasmuch as the roundness thought in the concept of the plate can be intuited in the circle.

However, pure concepts of the understanding are quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally) and can never be encountered in any intuition. How, then, can an intuition be *subsumed* under a category, and hence how can a category be *applied* to appearances—since surely no one will say that a category (e.g., causality) can also be intuited through senses and is contained A138/ B177 in appearances? Now this question, natural and important as it is, is in fact the cause that necessitates a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment. The doctrine is needed, namely, in order to show how it is possible for *pure concepts of the understanding* to be applied to appearances as such. In all the other sciences no such need arises. For there the concepts through which the object is thought in a universal way are not so distinct and heterogeneous from the concepts representing the object *in concreto*, as it is given. And hence there is no need there to provide a special exposition concerning the application of the first kind of concept to the second kind.

Now clearly there must be some third thing that must be homogeneous with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other hand, and that thus makes possible the application of the category to the appearance. This mediating representation must be pure (i.e., without anything empirical), and yet must be both *intellectual*, on the one hand, and *sensible*, on the other hand. Such a representation is the *transcendental schema*.

A concept of the understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold as such. Time, as the formal condition for the manifold of inner sense and hence for the connection of all representations, contains an *a priori* manifold in pure intuition. Now, a transcendental time determination is homogeneous with the *category* (in which its unity consists) insofar as time determination is *universal* and rests on A139/ B178 an *a priori* rule. But it is homogeneous with *appearance*, on the other hand, insofar as every empirical representation of the manifold contains *time*. Hence it will be possible for the category to be applied to appearances by means of the transcendental time determination, which, as the schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of appearances under the category.

In view of what has been shown in the deduction of the categories, I hope that no one will have doubts in deciding this question: whether these pure concepts of the understanding have a merely empirical use [only] or also a transcendental one; i.e., whether,