

Introduction

§ 1

Philosophy lacks the advantage from which the other sciences benefit, namely the ability to *presuppose* both its *objects* as immediately endorsed by representation of them and an acknowledged *method* of knowing, which would determine its starting-point and progression. It is true that philosophy initially shares its objects with religion. Both have the *truth* for their object, and more precisely the truth in the highest sense, in the sense that *God* and *God alone* is the truth. Moreover, both treat the sphere of finite things, the sphere of *nature* and the *human spirit*, their relation to each other and to God as their truth. Philosophy thus may definitely presuppose a *familiarity* with its objects – indeed it must do so – as well as an interest in them from the outset, if only because chronologically speaking consciousness produces for itself *representations* of objects prior to generating *concepts* of them. What is more, only by passing *through* the process of representing and by turning *towards* it, does *thinking* spirit progress to knowing by way of thinking [*denkendes Erkennen*] and to comprehending [*Begreifen*].

While engaged in thoughtful contemplation, however, it soon becomes apparent that such activity includes the requirement to demonstrate the *necessity* of its content, and to *prove* not only its being but, even more so, the determinations of its objects. The aforementioned familiarity with this content thus turns out to be insufficient, and to make or accept *presuppositions* or *assurances* regarding it appears illegitimate. The difficulty of making a *beginning*, however, arises at once, since a beginning is *something immediate* and as such makes a presupposition, or rather it is itself just that.

§ 2

Generally speaking, philosophy may initially be defined as the *thoughtful examination* [*denkende Betrachtung*] of things. If, however, it is correct

(as it probably is) that it is through thinking that human beings distinguish themselves from the *animals*, then everything human is human as a result of and only as a result of thinking. Now insofar as philosophy represents a peculiar way of thinking, in virtue of which thinking becomes knowing and a knowing that comprehends things [*begreifendes Erkennen*], its thinking will be *different* from the thinking at work in everything human and which, indeed, is responsible for the humanity of all that is human, even though it is identical with the latter such that *in itself* there is only *one* thinking. This distinction is tied up with the fact that the human content of consciousness which is grounded in thought does not at first *appear in the form of thought*, but rather as feeling, intuition, representation, i.e. *forms* that must be distinguished from thought *as form*.

It is an old prejudice, indeed a triviality, that human beings set themselves apart from animals through thinking. While it may seem trivial to remind ourselves of such a longstanding belief, it must definitely seem strange that there should be a need for such a reminder. And yet this can be considered necessary given the prejudice of our time which separates *feeling* and *thinking* to such an extent that they are supposedly opposed or even inimical to one another, that feeling, in particular religious feeling, is contaminated and perverted, even annihilated, by thinking, and that religion and religiosity do not have their roots and proper place essentially in thinking. In this kind of separating it is forgotten that only human beings are capable of religion and that animals no more have religion than they have law and morality.

When the said separation of religion from thought is maintained, one tends to have in mind the kind of thinking that may be called *thinking over* [*Nachdenken*], – *reflective thinking* which has *thoughts per se* for its *content* and brings them as such to consciousness. Negligence in knowing and heeding the distinction specifically formulated by philosophy in regard to thinking is responsible for generating the crudest ideas about philosophy and the recriminations against it. Since religion, law, and the ethical are properties of human beings alone, and, again, are so only because a human being is a thinking being, *thinking* has not been inactive at all in what is religious, right, and ethical – whether it be feeling and faith or representation: its activity and its products are *present* and *contained* therein. However, there is a difference between having such feelings and representations that are *determined* and *permeated* by

thought, and having *thoughts about* them. The thoughts *about* those forms of consciousness produced by *thinking* them *over* constitute the rubric under which reflection, formal reasoning [*Raisonnement*] and the like, and in the end even philosophy, are subsumed.

In this connection, the claim has been made – quite frequently under the influence of an erroneous understanding – that such *thinking over* is the condition or even the only way for us to attain a representation of and belief in the eternal and true. Thus, for instance, the *metaphysical proofs of the existence of God* (which are now somewhat *obsolete*) have been served up as evidence that – or as if – belief and conviction in the existence of God could essentially or even exclusively be caused only by familiarity with those proofs and the conviction produced by them. Assertions such as these would be equivalent to the contention that we would be incapable of eating, before we have acquired familiarity with the chemical, botanical, or zoological properties of our nutrients, and that we would have to wait to digest, until we finished the study of anatomy and physiology. If this were so, the sciences in their fields, just as philosophy in its own, would gain considerably in utility; indeed their utility would be elevated to an absolute and universal indispensability; or rather, instead of being indispensable, none of them would exist.

§ 3

The *content* that fills our consciousness, of whatever kind it may be, makes up the *determinacy* of the feelings, intuitions, images, representations, of the ends, duties etc., and of the thoughts and concepts. Feeling, intuition, image, etc., are in this respect the *forms* of such content, a content which remains *one and the same*, whether it is felt, intuited, represented, willed, and whether it is *merely* felt, or felt and intuited, etc., together with an admixture of thoughts, or whether it is thought entirely *without any such admixture*. In any one of these forms, or as a mixture of several of them, the content is the *object* of consciousness. In this objectification, it so happens that the determinacies of these forms convert themselves into part of the content, such that with each of these forms a specific object seems to arise, and, what is in itself the same, can take on the look of a different content.

Given that the determinacies of feeling, intuition, desire, volition, etc., insofar as we are *conscious* of them, are usually called *representations*, it can be said quite generally that philosophy replaces

representations with *thoughts* and *categories*, but more specifically with *concepts*. Representations may generally be regarded as *metaphors* of thoughts and concepts. By merely having representations, however, we are not yet familiar with the meaning they have for thinking, i.e. we are not familiar with *their* thoughts and concepts. Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and concepts, and another to know [*wissen*] which representations, intuitions, feelings correspond to them. – One aspect of what is called *the unintelligibility* of philosophy relates to this. In part, the difficulty consists in a certain inability, which is really merely a *lack of training*, to think abstractly, i.e. to hold on to pure thoughts and to move among them. In our ordinary consciousness, thoughts are clothed in and combined with familiar sensuous and spiritual material, and when we think things over, reflect, or reason about them, we intermingle our feelings, intuitions, and representations with thoughts (in every sentence with a quite sensuous content – as for instance in ‘This leaf *is* green’ –, categories such as *being*, *singularity* are already part of the mix). But it is something else to make the unmixed thoughts themselves our object. – The other aspect of the unintelligibility of philosophy is due to the impatience of wanting to have before oneself in the form of a representation what exists in our consciousness in the form of a thought and a concept. We sometimes hear people say that they do not know [*wissen*] what they are supposed to *think* in connection with a concept they have grasped. When it comes to concepts, nothing further needs to be thought than the very concept itself. What those people mean to express, however, is the yearning for some *familiar, current representation* [of things]; when deprived of its manner of representing, consciousness feels as if it had lost the ground in which it is otherwise so firmly rooted and at home. When it finds itself transposed into the pure region of concepts, it no longer knows [*weiß*] *where* in the world it is. – As a result, those writers, preachers, speakers, etc., are regarded as the most *intelligible* who tell their readers or listeners things which they knew already by heart: things which are familiar to them and *self-evident*.

§ 4

In relation to our ordinary consciousness, philosophy would first have to explain, or even awaken, *the need* for the *manner of knowing*

[*Erkenntnisweise*] *peculiar to it*. In relation to the objects of religion, however, and *truth* generally, it would have to prove its *capacity* to know them by its own lights. In relation to the appearance of a *difference* from the *religious* representations, it would have to *justify* its own diverging determinations.

§ 5

For the purpose of reaching a preliminary agreement about the difference mentioned above and the insight connected with it, namely, that the true *content* of our consciousness is *preserved* in its translation into the form of thought and the concept, and indeed only then placed in its proper light, the reader may be reminded of an *old prejudice*, namely that in order to learn what is true in objects and events, even feelings and intuitions, opinions, representations, etc., *thinking* them *over* is required. At any rate, thinking them over has at least this effect, namely, that of transforming the feelings, representations, etc., into *thoughts*.

Due to the fact that philosophy merely lays claim to *thinking* as constituting the proper *form* of its business, and the fact that each human being by nature possesses the capacity for thinking, abstraction is made from the difference referred to in § 3, and thus there comes to pass the opposite of what was mentioned above concerning the complaint about the *unintelligibility* of philosophy. This science frequently suffers contemptuous treatment even by those who have not taken the trouble to study it but fancy themselves capable of *understanding* without further ado what philosophy is about, and of philosophizing and passing judgments on philosophy, simply on the basis of an ordinary education, and religious feelings in particular. People admit that one must study the other sciences in order to be familiar with them, and that one is entitled to pass judgment on them only by virtue of such familiarity. People admit that in order to manufacture a shoe one must have learnt and practised shoemaking, despite the fact that everyone possesses the requisite model for it in his own feet, as well as the required aptitude for the task in his own hands. Only for philosophizing are such study, learning, and effort supposed not to be a requirement. – This convenient opinion has in recent times received confirmation through the doctrine of immediate knowing [*Wissen*], or knowledge through intuition.

§ 6

On the other hand, it is just as important that philosophy come to understand that its content [*Inhalt*] is none other than the basic content [*Gehalt*] that has originally been produced and reproduces itself in the sphere of the living spirit, a content turned into a *world*, namely the outer and inner world of consciousness, or that its content is *actuality* [*die Wirklichkeit*]. We call the immediate consciousness of this content *experience*. Any sensible consideration of the world discriminates between what in the broad realm of outer and inner existence [*Dasein*] is merely *appearance*, transitory, and insignificant, and what truly merits the name '*actuality*'. Since philosophy differs only in form from the other ways of becoming conscious of this content that is one and the same, its agreement with actuality and experience is a necessity. Indeed, this agreement may be regarded as at least an external measure of the truth of a philosophy, just as it is to be viewed as the highest goal of the philosophical science to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself with the reason that *exists*, or with actuality, through the knowledge of this agreement.

In the Preface to my *Philosophy of Right*, p. XIX, the following statement can be found:

*What is rational, is actual,
And what is actual, is rational.*

These simple sentences have seemed striking to some and have been received with hostility even by those who would not want to be regarded as lacking in philosophy, let alone religion. It will be unnecessary to turn to religion for support for these sentences, since its doctrines of the divine governance of the world express the above propositions only too clearly. With regard to their philosophical meaning, however, we may presuppose that the reader is sufficiently educated to know [*wissen*] not only that God is actual – that he is what is most actual, indeed that he alone is what is truly actual –, but also, insofar as the merely formal difference is concerned, that existence [*Dasein*] in general is partly *appearance* and only partly actuality. In ordinary life, we may accidentally call every idea, error, evil, and the like, *actual*, as well as every concrete existence [*Existenz*], crippled and transitory though it may be. But even for someone possessing an ordinary sensitivity, a contingent concrete existence [*Existenz*] will not be deemed to deserve the emphatic designation of being actual; a contingent concrete existence has no

greater value than something that is *possible* and which may just as well *not exist* as exist. But when I spoke of actuality, it should have been evident in what sense I am using this expression, since I treated actuality in my more extensive Logic, too. There I directly distinguished it not only from what is contingent (which, after all, exists as well), but also and more specifically and precisely from existence [*Dasein*], concrete existence [*Existenz*], and other determinations. – The notion of the *actuality of the rational* seems immediately to come up against two objections: one, that ideas and ideals are nothing more than chimeras and philosophy a system of such phantasms, and the other that, conversely, ideas and ideals are much too exquisite to be actual, or again too impotent to acquire for themselves the status of something actual. But the severance of actuality from the idea is popular particularly with that kind of understanding which takes the dreams of its abstractions for something true, and which insists pretentiously on the ‘*ought*’ which it likes to prescribe especially in the sphere of politics – as if the world had been waiting for this to learn how it *ought* to be, but is not. Were it as it ought to be, what would the precociousness of such ‘ought’ come to? When its ‘ought’ is directed against trivial, superficial and transitory objects, arrangements, situations, and so forth (that is to say, what may perhaps be of relative importance to certain circles for a period of time), then this understanding may indeed be right to find many things that are not in accord with universal and correct standards. Who would not have enough good sense to see much around him that is indeed not as it should be? But this cleverness is in the wrong when it fancies itself to have the interest of the philosophical science at heart with such objects and their ‘ought’. Philosophical science deals solely with the idea which is not so impotent as to demand that it merely ought to be actual without being so and, hence, it deals with an actuality of which those objects, arrangements, situations, etc., are only the superficial exterior.

§ 7

Insofar as the *thinking over* of things in general contains the principle of philosophy (including the sense of a philosophy’s starting-point), and after it has newly blossomed in its *independence* in recent times (i.e. after the Lutheran reformation), the name of *philosophy* has been given to all those

kinds of knowledge [*Wissen*] that occupy themselves with the knowledge of fixed measures and what is *universal* [*das Allgemeine*] in the sea of empirical particulars, and with what is *necessary*, such as the *laws* governing the seemingly chaotic and infinite mass of contingent things. For, contrary to the philosophical beginnings among the Greeks, this renewed thinking has not held on to what is abstract only, but from the very start has thrown itself equally upon the seemingly immense material of the world of appearance. It has thus derived its *content* from its *own* intuition and perception of the outer and inner world, from its immediate rapport with nature and its immediate rapport with the spirit and the human heart.

The principle of *experience* contains the infinitely important determination that human beings must themselves be *involved* when taking up a given content and holding it to be true, more precisely that they must find such content to be united and in unison with *the certainty of themselves*. They must be involved in it, whether through their external senses only or with their deeper spirit and the essential consciousness of their respective self. – This is the same principle that in our time has been called faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation coming from outside and in particular from one's *own* inner being. We designate those sciences that have been called *philosophies* as *empirical* sciences due to their taking their point of departure from experience. But what in essence they aim at and produce are *laws*, *general propositions*, a *theory*, i.e. the *thoughts* of what there is. Thus *Newton's* physics has been called a philosophy of nature, while *Hugo Grotius*, for instance, by cataloguing the historical interactions of peoples among themselves, and by relying on ordinary reasoning, has developed general principles, a theory that could be called a philosophy of international law. – Even today the name of *philosophy* retains this general connotation among the English, and Newton continues to enjoy the fame of being the greatest philosopher. Down to the very pricing tables used by 'instruments-makers', those instruments that are not specifically classified under the columns of the magnetic or electric gadgets, such as the thermometers, barometers, etc., are called *philosophical instruments*; though, frankly, only *thinking* rather than some combination of wood, iron, etc.¹⁰ should properly be called an

¹⁰ The journal edited by Thomson, too, has the title 'Annals of *Philosophy*, or Magazine of *Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture, and the Arts*'. From this, everybody may form their own idea of the nature of the materials that are here called *philosophical*. – Among the

instrument of philosophy. In particular, the science of political economics, which has emerged in recent times, is also called philosophy, something we usually call rational state economy, or perhaps *intellectual* state economy.¹¹

§ 8

As satisfactory as this [empirical] knowledge may initially be in its sphere, there is, *in the first place*, yet another domain of *objects* that are not contained therein, namely freedom, spirit, and God. The reason why they cannot be found in that sphere is not that they are supposedly not a part of experience; they are not experienced by way of the senses, it is true, but whatever is present in consciousness is being experienced – this is even a tautological sentence. Rather, they are not found in that sphere, because in terms of their *content* these objects immediately present themselves as infinite.

There is an old saying customarily attributed to *Aristotle* (and falsely, because it allegedly expresses the standpoint of his philosophy), namely that *nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*; – there is nothing in the understanding that has not been in sensation, in experience. It must be considered a misunderstanding, if speculative philosophy were to refuse to accept this proposition. It would, however, just as much have to assert the opposite, namely that *nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu* and assert it in the quite general sense that *nous*, or, in its deeper determination, *spirit*, is the

advertisements of newly published books I recently found the following in an English newspaper: ‘The Art of Preserving the Hair, on *Philosophical Principles*, neatly printed in post 8., price 7 sh.’ – Chemical or physiological procedures, etc., are what is presumably meant by *philosophical* principles of preserving one’s hair.

¹¹ The expression ‘philosophical principles’ is often used by English statesmen when they refer to general principles of national economics, even in public speeches. During the 1825 session of Parliament (on 2 February) *Brougham*, while delivering the address in reply to the King’s Speech, expressed himself as follows, speaking of ‘the philosophical principles of free trade that are worthy of a statesman – for no doubt they are philosophical – on the acceptance of which His Majesty has congratulated parliament today’. – It was not only this member of the opposition, however, who used such words. At the Annual Dinner of the London General Shipowners’ Society (which took place during the same month), presided over by the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, with the junior minister Canning and the Paymaster General of the Army, Sir Charles Long at his side, *Canning*, responding to a toast drunk to him, answered thus: ‘There has recently begun a period in which the ministers enjoyed the power to apply the right maxims to the administration of this country based on a *profound philosophy*.’ – In whatever way English philosophy may differ from German philosophy, it is always a pleasure to see the name of philosophy still honoured by English members of His Majesty’s government, even while this name is elsewhere used merely as a nickname and as an insult or to refer to something hateful.

cause of the world, and more specifically (see § 2 above) in the sense that the feelings concerning what is right, ethical, or religious are feelings and, consequently, that they are the experience of a content that has its roots and its seat in thinking alone.

§ 9

Second, however, subjective reason demands further satisfaction *in terms of form*. This form is the *necessity* in general (cf. § 1). Regarding the scientific manner mentioned above [§ 7], the *universal* that it contains (such as the genus, etc.) is on the one hand left indeterminate for itself and is not intrinsically connected to the particular [*das Besondere*]. Instead, both are external and contingent in relation to each other, as are likewise the combined particularities vis-à-vis each other in their reciprocal relationship. On the other hand, the starting-points are throughout *immediacies*, *accidental findings*, *presuppositions*. In neither respect is justice being done to the form of necessity. The process of thinking over that is directed towards satisfying this need is genuinely philosophical thinking, *speculative thinking*. This process of thinking things over is both the *same* as and *different* from the former process of thinking them over and, as such, it possesses in addition to the shared forms of thinking *its own peculiar forms*, of which the *concept* is the general form.

To that extent, the relationship of the speculative to the other sciences is merely this, namely that the former does not simply set aside the empirical content of the latter, but instead acknowledges and uses it; that it likewise acknowledges and utilizes as its own content the universal produced by these sciences, such as their laws, genera, etc.; and furthermore that it introduces into those categories others as well and validates them. In this respect, the difference between them concerns solely the said modification of the categories. Speculative logic contains the former logic and metaphysics, preserves the same forms of thought, the same laws and objects, but at the same time in doing so it develops them further and transforms them with the help of additional categories.

The *concept* in its speculative sense must be distinguished from what is customarily called a 'concept'. It is only with reference to the latter one-sided sense of the term that it has been asserted again and again a thousand times and been made a prejudice that the infinite cannot be grasped by means of concepts.

§ 10

The thinking operative in the philosophical manner of knowing needs to be understood in its necessity. Equally, its capacity to produce knowledge of the absolute objects needs to be justified. Such understanding, however, is itself a case of philosophical knowledge that can accordingly fall *within* philosophy alone. A *preliminary* explication would thus have to be an unphilosophical one and could not be more than a web of presuppositions, assurances, and formal reasoning, a web, that is, of casual assertions against which the opposite could be maintained with equal right.

It is one of the main viewpoints of the *Critical* philosophy that, prior to setting about to acquire knowledge of God, the essence of things, etc., the *faculty of knowing* itself would have to be examined first in order to see whether it is capable of achieving this; that one must first come to know the *instrument*, before one undertakes the work that is to be produced by means of it. For should the instrument be insufficient, all the effort would then have been expended in vain. – This thought has seemed so *plausible* that it has elicited the greatest admiration and acclaim and drawn knowing away from its interest in the *objects* and work on them and drawn it back to itself, i.e. to the formal aspect. If, however, we do not delude ourselves with words, it is easy to see that other tools may very well be examined and evaluated in ways other than undertaking the actual work for which they are determined. But the examination of knowing cannot take place other than *by way of knowing*. With this so-called instrument, examining it means nothing other than acquiring knowledge of it. But to want to know *before* one knows is as incoherent as the Scholastic's wise resolution to learn to *swim*, *before he ventured into the water*.

Reinhold,¹² who recognized the confusion that prevails in beginning in this way, proposed as a remedy that one make a preliminary start with a *hypothetical* and *problematic* kind of philosophizing and continue in this vein – Heaven knows how [*man weiß nicht wie*] – until somehow at some point along the line it would emerge that in this way one had arrived at the *primordial truth*. Looked at more closely, this would come down to the usual procedure, namely analysis of an empirical foundation or a provisional assumption that has been put into a definition.

¹² Moldenhauer–Michel: Karl Leonhard Reinhold, *Beiträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Hamburg, 1801.

Unmistakably, it is right to declare the usual manner of working with presuppositions and provisional assumptions a hypothetical and problematic procedure. Still, while right, this observation does not alter the character of such a procedure, but instead immediately articulates the insufficiency of it.

§ 11

What philosophy aspires to may be further specified in the following way. In feeling and intuiting, the spirit has sensory things for objects; it has images in imagining, purposes when it wills, and so forth. But, *in opposition*, or merely in *contradistinction to those forms* of its existence and its objects, it also seeks to satisfy its loftiest inwardness, namely *thinking*, and to secure thinking as its object. In this way, spirit comes *to itself* in the deepest sense of the word, for its principle, its unalloyed selfhood, is thinking. But while going about its business it so happens that thinking becomes entangled in contradictions. It loses itself in the fixed non-identity of its thoughts and in the process does not attain itself but instead remains caught up in its opposite. The higher aspiration of thinking goes against this result produced by thinking satisfied with merely understanding [*verständiges Denken*] and is grounded in the fact that thinking does not let go of itself, that even in this conscious loss of being at home with itself [*Beisichsein*], it remains true to itself, ‘*so that it may overcome*’, and in thinking bring about the resolution of its own contradictions.

The realization that the dialectic makes up the very nature of thinking and that as understanding it is bound to land in the negative of itself, i.e. in contradiction, constitutes a cardinal aspect of logic. Despairing over its inability to achieve *by its own lights* the resolution of the contradiction into which it has placed itself, thinking returns to the resolutions and appeasements that have become part of the spirit in its other modes and forms. In the course of this return, however, thinking did not need to fall into the *misology* – a phenomenon Plato had already witnessed – of acting polemically against itself as happens when the so-called *immediate knowing* is declared to be the *exclusive* form in which we may become conscious of the truth.

§ 12

The *origin* of philosophy, emerging from the aspiration mentioned above, takes its *point of departure* from *experience*, i.e. from the immediate

consciousness engaged in formal reasoning [*räsonnierendes Bewußtsein*]. Aroused by this stimulus, thinking essentially reacts by *elevating* itself above the natural, sensory, and formally reasoning consciousness and into its own unmixed element. In this way, it at first takes up a self-distancing, *negative relationship* towards that point of departure. It thus finds satisfaction, for the time being, within itself, i.e. in the idea of the *universal* essence of these appearances, an idea that may be more or less abstract (such as the absolute, God). Conversely, the empirical sciences provide the stimulus to conquer *the form* in which the wealth of their content presents itself as something merely immediate and ad hoc, a multiplicity of items placed *side by side* one another and thus generally *contingent*, and to elevate this content to necessity. This stimulus tears thinking away from that universality and the implicitly [*an sich*] assured satisfaction and impels it to *the development [of the form and content] from out of itself*. Such development consists on the one hand merely in taking up the content and its given determinations and at the same time bestowing upon them, on the other hand, the shape of a content that emerges purely in accordance with the necessity of the subject matter itself, i.e. a shape that emerges freely in the sense of original thinking.

The relationship of *immediacy* and *mediation within consciousness* will have to be discussed explicitly and in detail below. At this point, it suffices to point out that, although both moments *appear* to be distinct, *neither of them* may be absent and they form an *inseparable* combination. – Thus, the knowledge [*Wissen*] of God, like that of anything *supersensory*, essentially contains an *elevation* above sensory feeling or intuiting. It accordingly entails a *negative* stance towards its initial object and therein a *mediation* as well. For mediation means to make a beginning and then to have proceeded to a second item, such that this second item is the way it is only insofar as one has arrived at it by starting with something that is an other over against it. This does not mean, however, that the knowledge [*Wissen*] of God is for all that any less independent vis-à-vis that empirical side; to the contrary, it achieves its independence essentially by means of this negation and elevation. If mediation is made a condition and is emphasized in this one-sided fashion, then one can say (although it does not say much) that philosophy owes its initial origin to experience (the *a posteriori*) – for thinking is indeed essentially the negation of something immediately on hand – just as eating is indebted to food, since without the latter

one would not be able to eat. Note, however, that in this connection eating is represented as ungrateful, for it consumes that to which it owes its being. Taken in this sense, thinking is no less ungrateful.

However, the *immediacy* that belongs properly to thinking and that is reflected into itself and thus mediated in itself (i.e. the *a priori*) is *universality*, its being-at-home-with-itself [*Beisichsein*] in general. In this universality, it finds satisfaction within itself, and in this respect the indifference against *particularization*, and hence against its development, is innate. Religion also possesses this same intensive kind of satisfaction and bliss, whether it be more or less developed or uneducated, whether it has advanced to scientific consciousness or been kept alive in the heart and a naïve sort of faith. When thinking remains at a standstill with the universality of ideas, as is unavoidable in the case of the first philosophies (think of *being* in the Eleatic school, *becoming* in Heraclitus, etc.), then it is rightfully accused of *formalism*. Even in the case of a more developed philosophy it can happen that only abstract propositions or determinations are taken up (such as, for instance, that everything is one in the absolute, that there is an identity of the subjective and the objective), and are merely repeated when we come to the particulars. As far as the first abstract universality of thinking is concerned, it makes very good and sound sense to say that philosophy owes its *development* to experience. On the one hand, the empirical sciences do not stand still with the perception of the details of the appearances; instead, by thinking, they have readied this material for philosophy by discovering its universal determinations, genera, and laws. In this way, they prepare this particularized content so that it can be taken up into philosophy. On the other hand, they thus make it necessary for thinking to proceed to these concrete determinations by itself. The process of taking up this content, in which thinking sublates its mere givenness and the immediacy that still clings to it, is at the same time a process of thinking *developing* out of itself. Insofar as philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it bestows upon their contents the most essential shape of the *freedom* of thought (i.e. the shape of the *a priori*) and, instead of relying on the testimony of their findings and the experienced fact, provides their contents with the *corroboration of being necessary*, such that the fact becomes the depiction and the replication of the original and completely independent activity of thinking.

§ 13

The origin and development of philosophy as a *history of this science* is portrayed in the peculiar shape of an *external history*. This shape bestows upon the developmental stages of the idea the form of *contingent* succession and mere *diversity* of the principles and their elaborations in philosophies of them. The architect of this work of millennia, however, is the one living spirit whose thinking nature it is to become conscious of *what it is*, and, in having thus become an object, to be at the same time already elevated above it and to be in itself a higher stage. In part, the *history of philosophy* presents only one philosophy at different stages of its unfolding throughout the various philosophies that make their appearance. In part, it also shows that the specific *principles* each one of which formed the basis of a given system are merely *branches* of one and the same whole. The latest philosophy, chronologically speaking, is the result of all those that precede it and must therefore contain the principles of all of them. This is why, if it is philosophy at all, it is the most developed, richest and most concrete philosophy.

When dealing with what seem to be so many *diverse* philosophies one must distinguish the *universal* and the *particular* according to their proper determinations. If the universal is taken in its formal aspect and set *alongside* the particular, then it, too, becomes something particular. Such a procedure would strike us automatically as inappropriate and inept in the case of objects of everyday life, such as when someone were to ask for fruit and then rejected cherries, pears, and grapes simply because they are cherries, pears, and grapes, but *not* fruit. When it comes to philosophy, however, we allow ourselves to justify its rejection on the grounds that philosophies are so diverse and that each one of them is only *one* philosophy, not *the* philosophy; as if cherries were not fruit as well. It also happens that a philosophy whose principle is the universal is placed alongside one whose principle is particular, or even alongside doctrines that assert that there is no philosophy at all, in the sense that both are *merely different* aspects of philosophy, just as if light and darkness were to be called two *different* kinds of light.

§ 14

The same development of thinking that is portrayed in the history of philosophy is also portrayed in philosophy itself, only freed from its historical

externality, *purely in the element of thinking*. Free and genuine thought is *concrete* in itself, and as such it is an *idea*, and in its full universality *the idea*, or *the absolute*. The science of the latter is essentially a *system*, since the true insofar as it is *concrete* exists only through unfolding itself in itself, collecting and holding itself together in a unity, i.e. as a *totality*. Only by discerning and determining its distinctions can it be the necessity of them and the freedom of the whole.

A philosophizing *without a system* can be nothing scientific. Apart from the fact that such philosophizing expresses by itself more of a subjective outlook, it is also random in terms of its content. A particular content is justified solely as a moment of the whole. When separated from it, it represents an unjustified presupposition or a subjective certainty. Many philosophical writings limit themselves to expressing in this way merely *attitudes* [*Gesinnungen*] or *opinions*. – By a *system* one wrongly understands a philosophy built on a narrowly circumscribed *principle* distinct from other such principles; contrary to this, however, it is a principle of any genuine philosophy that it contain all particular principles within itself.

§ 15

Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle coming to closure within itself, but in each of its parts the philosophical idea exists in a particular determinacy or element. The individual circle, simply because it is in itself a totality, also breaks through the boundary of its element and founds a further sphere. The whole thus presents itself as a circle of circles each of which is a necessary moment, so that the system of its distinctive elements makes up the idea in its entirety, which appears equally in each one of them.

§ 16

As an *encyclopedia*, this science will not be presented in a detailed development of its particular divisions [*Besonderung*]. It has to be limited instead to the starting-points and the fundamental concepts of the particular sciences.

How much of the particular parts is required to constitute a particular science is indeterminate insofar as a part is not merely a singular moment, but must itself represent a totality in order to be

something true. Thus, the whole of philosophy constitutes truly *one* science, but it may also be viewed as a whole made up of several particular sciences. – A philosophical encyclopedia distinguishes itself from other, ordinary encyclopedias in that the latter are meant to be an *aggregate* of sciences that have been included in an ad hoc and empirical fashion. Some of these merely bear the name of a science but are in reality a mere collection of data. Because sciences of this kind have been taken up extraneously, the unity into which they are brought together in such an aggregate is itself likewise *extraneous*, i.e. – *an arrangement*. For this reason, such an arrangement must remain a provisional *attempt* and will always display unsuitable sides, especially since its materials are themselves of a contingent nature. – So in addition to the fact that a philosophical encyclopedia excludes (1) mere *aggregates* of data (as philology, for instance, seems at first glance to be), it likewise and *a fortiori* excludes (2) those based on mere caprice (such as, for instance, heraldry); sciences of the latter sort are positive *through and through*. (3) Other sciences are called *positive* as well. They, however, have a rational basis and starting-point. This part of them belongs to philosophy, whereas their *positive side* remains peculiar to them. The positive element of the sciences comes in several forms. First, what is in itself a rational starting-point passes over into something contingent due to the fact that they have to trace the universal back down to *empirical singularity* and *actuality*. In this field of the changeable and the accidental it is not the *concept* but only reasons [*Gründe*] that can be appealed to. Jurisprudence, for instance, or the system of direct and indirect taxation, require definitive, exact decisions which lie outside the *determinateness in-and-for-itself of the concept*. They therefore admit of a wide margin of discretion that may lead to one result for one reason and a different result for another, but is not capable of a final certain determination. Similarly, when pursued down to its individual details, the idea of *nature* fades away into contingencies. Thus the *history of nature*, *geography*, *medicine*, etc., end up with determinations of concrete existence and with species and genera that are determined by external coincidence and playfulness rather than by reason. *History* belongs here as well, insofar as its essence is the idea, while its appearance unfolds in contingency and in a field of arbitrariness. Second, sciences such as these are also *positive*, insofar as they do not acknowledge that their determinations are *finite*. Nor do they point

up where these determinations, together with their entire sphere, make the transition into a higher sphere. Instead, they assume those determinations to be *unqualifiedly valid*. Connected with this finitude of the *form* (the earlier point concerned the finitude of the *material*) is the finitude of the *epistemological ground*, which draws partly on formal reasoning, partly on feeling, belief, the authority of others, in general the authority of inner or outer intuition. Philosophies that want to base themselves on anthropology, facts of consciousness, inner intuition or outer experience belong in this group as well. To add one more thing, it may also be the case that only the *form of the scientific presentation* is empirical, but a meaningful intuition has ordered what is otherwise mere appearance in a way that it accords with the inner sequence of the concept. It is characteristic of such an empirical presentation that, due to the opposition and manifoldness of the juxtaposed phenomena, the extraneous and contingent circumstances of their conditions sublate themselves, so that the universal then comes before the mind. – In this way, a sensible [*sinnige*] experimental physics, or history, etc., will present the rational science of nature and of human affairs in an external image that mirrors the concept.

§ 17

As far as the *beginning* that philosophy has to make is concerned, in general it seems to start like the other sciences with a subjective presupposition, namely a particular object, such as space, number, etc., except that here *thinking* would have to be made the object of thinking. And yet, it is thinking's free act of placing itself at that standpoint where it is for itself and thus *generates* and *provides its own object for itself*. Furthermore, this standpoint, which thus appears to be an *immediate* one, must transform itself into a *result* within the science itself, and indeed into its final result in which the science recaptures its beginning and returns to itself. In this way, philosophy shows itself to be a sphere that circles back into itself and has no beginning in the sense that other sciences do. Hence, its beginning has a relationship merely to the subject who resolves to philosophize, but not to the science as such. Or, which comes to the same thing, the concept of the science and hence its first concept – which because it is the first contains the separation whereby thinking is the object for a seemingly external, philosophizing subject – must be grasped by the science itself. This is even its sole purpose, activity, and goal, namely to attain the

concept of its concept, returning to itself and attaining satisfaction in the process.

§ 18

Just as it is not possible to give someone a preliminary, general representation of philosophy, since only the science *as a whole* presents the idea, so also its *division into parts* can be comprehended only on the basis of this, the idea. Like the idea, the division that must be derived from it is something anticipated. The idea, however, proves to be the thinking that is utterly identical with itself. At the same time, it is the activity of opposing itself to itself in order to be for itself and solely by itself in this other. So the science falls into three parts:

- I. Logic, i.e. the science of the idea in and for itself,
- II. Philosophy of nature as the science of the idea in its otherness,
- III. Philosophy of spirit as the idea returning back to itself from its otherness.

In § 15 above, mention was made of the fact that the differences between the particular philosophical sciences are merely determinations of the idea itself and that it is the latter alone that presents itself in these several elements. What is recognized in nature is not something other than the idea. It is just that in nature the idea is in the form of *externalization*, just as in spirit the very same idea exists *as being-for-itself* and *as coming to be in and for itself*. A determination such as this in which the idea appears is at the same time a *fluid* moment. Thus, the individual science is just as much this: to know its content as a *positively existing* [*seiend*] object, as well as knowing therein immediately of its transition to a higher sphere. The *representation* of the *division into parts* is thus incorrect insofar as it sets the particular parts or sciences alongside one another, as if they were merely static components with substantive distinctions, similar to *species*.