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**IMMIGRATION INTO GREECE, 1990-2003:**

**A Southern European Paradigm?**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

This paper is essentially an account of immigration and policy response in Greece. Is Greece a paradigm for the southern European experience? This is a difficult issue, needing serious exploration, and only a superficial answer can be provided here.

In this presentation, I shall try to give a coherent account of a largely incoherent situation, dealing with the following: what we know about migration flows into Greece; stocks of migrants; the policy responses; socio-economic effects; and finally, some comparison with the other southern European countries.

## **MIGRATION FLOWS**

There have been predominantly illegal flows of immigrants into Greece, owing to a restrictive mentality and the award of only 1-year permits to non-Greeks alongside automatic privileged access for ethnic Greeks. This has pertained throughout modern Greek history, and legal immigration flows are small and unknown – I estimate about 3.000 seasonal and temporary workers per year. Border crossing arrests are currently around 30.000 a year, and sea arrivals about 6.000; however, it is impossible to estimate the magnitude of illegal entry because of insufficient data.

Trafficking has been a serious issue, and ignored until very recently by the Greek state. The US Report of 2003 suggests that 18.000 persons were trafficked into Greece in 2002; a Greek researcher, Lazos, offers the figure of 21.700 for 1997, and claims it peaked in that year.

Asylum-seekers are currently at a high of around 9.000 for 2003, predominantly of Middle Eastern origin, but there are continuous claims of denial of registration for asylum application by authorities. Thus the potential number of asylum applicants could be very high. The current recognition rate is under 1%, having previously been around 6%.

Expulsions have been used extensively since 1991, and probably illegally. **Graphic 1** shows summary data; the principal nationality affected is Albanian [about 85-90% of total]. A 2002 re-admission treaty with Turkey has not had much effect, and no data seem to be available.

## STOCK DATA

**Table 1** gives a summary of data relevant for both legal and illegal immigrant stocks. There have been no official statistics on **legal** immigrants since 1998, and still there are none prepared while a database is being constructed. The Census of 2001 is still the only real indication of the extent of immigration: this is discussed in detail below. Applications for legalisation [White Card, Green Card etc.] also give some indications, although with the usual caveats of such programmes. Estimates of illegal immigrants are meaningless, and are used primarily for political purposes.

## A SHORT HISTORY OF GREEK IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND POLICY

Although there had been a small number of immigrants in Greece throughout the 1980s – 24-34,000 workers including EC nationals and ethnic Greeks<sup>1</sup> and perhaps another 40-50,000 foreign residents – it was not until the collapse of the communist Albanian government in 1991 that Greece experienced any significant illegal flows of migrants. Throughout the 1980s, there had also been quite a large number of Polish refugees and illegal migrants,<sup>2</sup> but these were largely ignored as a socio-political issue.

The sudden influx of Albanians in 1991 resulted in a hysterical reaction by Greek parliamentarians, the media and society generally. Rapidly, a new immigration law was approved, to replace the outdated 1929 law. The 1991 Law makes clear in its Preamble, the underlying rationale:

“Suddenly, Greece started to be flooded with aliens, who, entering, staying and working illegally, create enormous social problems for the state, while they inevitably try to solve their own problems by engaging in criminality (drugs, robberies, thefts etc).”<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the main justification for a repressive law was the allegation of criminality, with the mass media playing a central role in the development of a “dangerous immigrant” stereotype, particularly with regard to Albanians. We might also note the convenience of

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<sup>1</sup> Baldwin-Edwards M. and Fakiolas, R. (1999): ‘Greece: the contours of a fragmented policy response’, in Baldwin-Edwards M. and Arango J. (1999): *Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe*, London: Frank Cass

<sup>2</sup> Romaniszyn, K. (1996): “The invisible community: undocumented Polish workers in Athens”, *New Community* 22/2, pp 321-33

<sup>3</sup> Minutes of the Parliament, Session 10<sup>th</sup> October 1991; cited in Karydis, V. (1998): “Social and legal issues concerning migration in Greece”, mimeo, University of Thrace, Law Faculty

such an external threat, which enabled the Greek political elite to legislate for the major provisions of the Schengen Treaty<sup>4</sup> without any real public debate.

The 1991 Law made little realistic provision for legal immigration routes in Greece, and was clearly intended for repressive measures to be enacted. In particular, it created a new power of an “administrative deportation” or expulsion without legal process, whereby the police simply deported all immigrants found without the appropriate permits of legal stay in Greece. This mechanism was used extensively throughout the 1990s, with massive numbers of expulsions [see **Graphic 1**]. No other EU country has been able to deport any significant number of illegal immigrants, or rejected asylum-seekers, in such a fashion; recently, there has been some disquiet from the relatively new Ombudsman’s Office on the legality of such treatment of immigrants.

By the mid 1990s, despite the large number of expulsions [over 1 million by 1995], it was becoming clear that very large numbers of [illegal] immigrants were here to stay in Greece, regardless of government policy. Reluctantly, the Greek state began to prepare its first legalisation programme, which resulted in 1998 in a temporary “White Card” being awarded supposedly for 6 months, to be followed, by means of another legalisation procedure, by a “Green Card” of duration 1-3 years. The White Card received 372,000 applicants by 31 May 1998, yet by December 1998 only 38,000 had been awarded. The subsequent Green Card process, which was a more rigorous procedure anyway, had its deadline for applications extended three times, from 7/98 originally, to finally 4/99. The extensions were given because of the unrealistic demands made on both immigrants and on the state itself [to provide medical examinations, judicial information, etc]. Out of 228,000 applicants, by Feb 2000, a total of only 107,000 cards had been awarded, and most of those for only one year’s duration.

#### *The Green Card legalisation of 1998*

Despite the continuous delays in applications being submitted, the procedure for awarding a Card was so bureaucratic [even requiring personal appearance before a tribunal] that the rate of processing was abysmally slow. Furthermore, more than 75% of cards were awarded for only one year and could not easily be renewed. The original application data have been collated and analysed, but the actual information provided by applicants was not sufficiently controlled and cross-checked. Thus, the information provided on employment status, work

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<sup>4</sup> Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1997): ‘The emerging European Immigration Regime : Some Reflections on Implications for Southern Europe’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35/4, pp 497-519

previously undertaken and work desired was acquired through only one question, and was open to multiple interpretations. Furthermore, as in the White Card applications, some 50% of applicants did not answer that question. Thus, the only valuable data concern nationalities and locations of residence within Greece. These are shown in **Graphics 2 and 3**.

The report (Cavounidi and Hadjaki) from which Graphics 2 and 3 are taken, presents data concerning citizenship, gender and geographical distribution of aliens by region and prefecture. According to the data, the majority of migrants came from neighbouring Balkan countries: Albanian migrants were 65% of the migrant population, while Bulgarian migrants represented 6,76% and Romanian migrants 4,55%. Other migrants came from Pakistan (2,92%), Ukraine (2,64%), Poland (2,32%); the location of some 40% of migrants was in Attika [basically, Greater Athens].

Although ultimately over 90% of applications were approved, most were issued late, for one year only, and the overall renewal acceptance rate was only 54%. At no time did the issuing authority, OAED [a branch of the Ministry of Labour] issue any statistics on the number of valid permits: it merely provided irregular press briefings on the cumulative total awarded since 1998. Using all available data, I have constructed a time-series model of awards, expiries and renewals of permits 1998-2001. This model shows convincingly that until late 2000, there were under 100,000 valid permits, and at no point did the number exceed 170,000 – the latter in April 2001.

### *The 2001 Census*

The 10-yearly Census was conducted in February 2001, but unlike the 1991 Census (which had little or no participation of illegal immigrants), it was managed by the Statistical Service with the explicit objective of assuring all immigrants, regardless of their legal status, that it was in their interest to be recorded. Advertising campaigns and public assurances of the confidentiality of the data, along with some collaborations with immigrant NGOs, resulted in a successful collection of data – the first, and to date only, serious record of immigrants in Greece.

**Table 2** summarizes the principal nationalities, showing some 800,000 in total, out of which about 650,000 are from non-EU or non-First World countries. As had been revealed in the Green Card applications, about 60% of immigrants in Greece are from Albania – around 450,000 persons. The second significant nationality is Bulgarian, at around 5%, followed by

Georgia and Romania. Two nationalities are over 70% female – Ukraine and Philippines – and several are almost exclusively male – Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

Other important data have recently emerged from the Census, and will be dealt with under Labour Market issues, below.

### *The 2001 Immigration Law*

By the late 1990s, it was increasingly being recognised by the state that Greece needed an actual immigration policy, rather than the exclusionary provisions of the 1991 Law. After a long drafting process, a bill which supposedly remedied those defects was presented to Parliament. In fact, the draft law provided no realistic mode of legal entry to Greece, and replicated – albeit in slightly different ways – all of the defects of the 1991 Law.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, it had – in its original draft – no provisions for legalisation: apparently, the Greek state believed that the 1998 Green Card process was a great success and required no repetition or amendment.

Immediately the draft law was made public, there was a political outcry about no provision for legalisation, and the Minister was forced to make a last-minute amendment to create Green Card II. This time, the Card was again only for 6 months, and had to be replaced with both a work permit and a residence permit under the new rules of the 2001 Law. Even this draft law was heavily criticised by human rights groups and academics<sup>6</sup>, although several improvements were made during its progress through committees. In particular, immigrants were no longer tied to a specific employer – as had been the case with the 1991 Law. However, the final version had no measures to deal with the extensive trafficking and forced prostitution of women and children which had escalated out of control during the 1990s; it had no realistic mechanism for labour recruitment; and did little other than transfer the competence for 1-year residence permits to local authorities, whilst also requiring work permits of immigrants.

Some 368,000 immigrants applied to OAED for Green Card II, but only 220,000 fulfilled the bureaucratic requirements.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, immigrants were required to submit their applications to local government offices: these had been totally unprepared for such an

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<sup>5</sup> see Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2001), 'An analytic commentary on the Greek Immigration Law', 2000, MMO, Working Paper 1, February (on the web at <http://www.hri.org/docs/MMO-WP1final.pdf>)

<sup>6</sup> Skordas, A. (2002), 'The New Immigration Law in Greece: Modernization on the Wrong Track', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 4, pp 23–48; also, Sitaropoulos, N. (2001), 'The new Greek Immigration Law: A step forward?', *Immigration, Asylum & Nationality Law*, 15/4, pp 228-234

<sup>7</sup> *Athens News*, 28 Nov 2003

event, and the situation was even more chaotic than had been the earlier legalisations. The only available official data are an announcement by the Ministry of the Interior informing that 351.110 migrants applied for residence and work permits, of whom half were located in the Athens Metropolitan Area. The Interior Minister, Kostas Skandalidis, announced in February 2003<sup>8</sup> that by June some 450,000 new residence permits would have been issued along with another 200,000 by the end of the year. However, the Ministry continues to be unable to provide data, as their information collection database is still under construction. Various press reports<sup>9</sup> claim that only 35,000 residence permits have been issued for all of Greece, and in Attica only 37,000 out of 180,000 immigrants have actually applied to renew their permits with the deadline expiring on June 30, 2003. By November 2003, the extended deadline for all permit applications had expired. The expulsion of "illegal immigrants" resumed, although less visibly; the Deputy Interior Minister claims that 330,000 permits have now been issued.<sup>10</sup>

The Ministry of Labour, and the various prefectures responsible for work permits, are also unable to provide data. Again, we are dependent upon press reports stating that only 30% of potential applicants have applied to renew their work permits: the actual numbers of applications and the numbers of permits given are not available. Throughout 2003, and continuing into 2004, the prefectures have been demanding, variously, 150, 300 and now 180 days of social insurance for renewal of work permits. (300 days represents a year's full-time employment with statutory holidays and a 6-day week.) The requirement, originating from Ministry of Labour circulars, has no basis in law and has been condemned by the Ombudsman.

On November 20<sup>th</sup> 2003, the Parliament approved six amendments to the immigration law, of which the most important are the following:

- Immigrants applying for their second renewal of a 1-year permit [ie after 3 years] will be given a 2 year permit;
- Work permits will no longer be confined to prefectures, but will be valid throughout Greece;
- Job status [employee/self-employed] can be changed;
- Applicants prevented by state inadequacy from even submitting their applications by the deadline, can now apply.

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<sup>8</sup> *Athens News*, 6 June 2003

<sup>9</sup> *Ta Nea*, 12 June 2003; *Athens News*, 20 June 2003

<sup>10</sup> *Athens News*, 28 Nov 2003

## **SOCIO ECONOMIC EFFECTS**

### *The Labour Market*

Despite three legalisations and work permit procedures for the existing residence permit system, there are still no official data on the situation of immigrants in the labour market. Nor does the Ministry of Labour have any plans to collect such data, or to commission research. In addition, the large informal economy [generally estimated at around 30%] is a significant issue which complicates the picture further.

In late 2003, two important sources of data on migrants and employment became available. These are the processed datasets from the 2001 Census – which had many questions on the occupations of immigrants – and statistics from the state social insurance foundation, IKA, which is the principal insurer of employed persons. Looking first at the age distribution of immigrants [Graphic 4], there is a predominance of working age males, peaking at 30-34 and constituting some 20% more than women throughout the age range 20-40. Over the age of 50, the genders are equally balanced; this alone suggests the predominance of labour migration, focused upon young males. Graphic 5 shows self-declared length of stay in Greece, by nationality and gender. Amongst Albanians, some 40% claimed to have been in Greece for more than 5 years; other nationalities typically had fewer with this duration, apart from Filipina.

General occupations were covered in the Census, and these data yield new information. Taking first, female occupations, Graphic 6 shows the absolute levels of work by nationality in different sectors. Albanian women predominate, with the principal occupation in the "Other" category – presumably housework and cleaning. Albanian women also have a significant presence in agriculture and tourism, along with a smaller role in industry. The other nationalities present include Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Filipina. Looking at Graphic 7, we can see in more detail a breakdown of each female nationality's employment. Filipina are almost exclusively in category 10 ["Other"], which we assume to be housekeeping. In fact, this is the major category for all immigrant women. Romanian are the most diversified, with a presence in tourism, agriculture and industry; Bulgarians and Albanians show a similar but less pronounced pattern. Russians and Georgians also seem to be more involved with industrial employment, category 4.



Male occupations show a very different pattern, of course. **Graphic 8** shows the usual predominance of Albanian workers, primarily in construction [about 70,000] but also in agriculture, industry and tourism. Looking in more detail at the other nationalities in **Graphic 9**, very different patterns are visible. Some nationalities have a great presence in industry [Bangladeshi and Pakistani]; Polish are heavily specialised in construction, as are Georgians; agriculture is predominant for Bulgarians and Indians [the latter known specifically to be flower cultivation]. Only one nationality, Cypriot, has no significant presence in agriculture, industry or construction.

Additional data are helpful in confirming or questioning the accuracy of the Census data. **Graphic 10** shows nominal<sup>11</sup> membership of the social insurance agency, IKA in 2002. The immigrant membership is 14%, of which roughly half are Albanians. Russians seem to be over-represented in the IKA data, which probably reflects their privileged position in both society and economy as [ethnic Greeks]; otherwise, the ratios look roughly similar to labour market participation. **Graphic 11** gives more detail of non-construction employment, showing high presence of Russian and Bulgarian women – probably employment as live-in housekeepers. Turning to construction specifically in **Graphic 12**, we can see the importance of Albanian male workers in the construction industry. They constitute some 27% of total construction workers, and about 75% of immigrant construction workers.

Detailed analysis of the number of social insurance contributions, for Greeks and immigrants, shows that even Greeks are unable to satisfy the requirements which are demanded of immigrants for work permits. **Graphic 13** shows relative contribution levels for Greeks and immigrants in all sectors other than construction; **Graphic 14** shows the same for construction, where 0.0% of Greeks possess 300 stamps, and only 14% possess 180 stamps. The obvious effect of government policy has been to make all foreign construction workers illegal, and to deny legality to most other workers too. The cost of buying additional stamps is prohibitive, especially when the immigrants have to pay both employer and employee contributions. The possibility of so doing, was only recently created by an amendment to law in late 2003.

In summary, male immigrants are predominantly employed in poorly-regulated, dangerous and heavy manual jobs and females in housekeeping jobs. The Labour Force Survey data, as

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<sup>11</sup> defined as, "contributions for at least one day of 2002". The nominal immigrant membership totalled 327,391 for 2002.

well as data from the Census and IKA, suggest that construction is the principal activity for men, followed by factory work in manufacturing. However, these data seem to under-represent the extent of seasonal agricultural work, which is very extensive in Greece (65% of all farms employ such labour, according to a recent study by Kassimis). Female immigrants are concentrated in housekeeping work, but are also employed in the services sector – which again is seasonal. Albanian migrants are present across almost all of Greece, and seem to find work in almost all sectors. The rigid segmentation of the Greek labour market means that immigrants are rarely competing with Greeks, and when this occasionally happens, it is with the marginal sectors of Greek society, such as Roma. Essentially, the Greek population is discouraged from labour market participation because of the very limited number of good jobs, which tend to be given out through patronage and networks. Thus, there is great demand for seasonal work, badly paid temporary work, and dirty heavy duty factory work. Immigrants fill these roles, as there is little interest from the Greek population. Without immigrant workers, entire sections of the Greek economy would no longer be viable – especially in the agricultural sector<sup>12</sup>.

Small family businesses also appear to require cheap and/or illegal immigrant labour. There has been almost no research undertaken on this, although there is some indicative evidence in the Labour Inspectors' reports. For such employers, not only are there the onerous demands of social security and taxation, but additionally those of employing immigrants. Thus government policy has given a structural encouragement to the informal economy as well as to illegal migration, whilst failing to provide any real incentives to SMEs for development and growth based on better state support infrastructure as well as capital improvement and the modernisation of production methods.

### *Immigrant Integration, Citizenship and the Future?*

Greece has coped quite well with a large and rapid influx of immigrants – for a variety of reasons. The first is a simple economic reality, that the segmented labour market protects most Greek employment, relegating immigrants almost exclusively to dirtier, heavier and less well-paid work. The second is less obvious, and more contentious: that the predominant culture of immigrants in Greece is close enough not to hit racial discord. The Balkan immigrants, despite their recent confinement within the Communist bloc, have been able to fit in culturally; nevertheless, they remain second class citizens in Greek eyes. The third reason is also not so obvious, except maybe to immigrants themselves: that the continuous

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<sup>12</sup> Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2002): 'Southern European Labour Markets and Immigration: a structural and functional analysis', in *Employment 2002*: IAPAD, Panteion University [in Greek] and in English as MMO Working Paper 5, available at: [http://www.uehr.panteion.gr/site/pdf/MMO\\_WP5.pdf](http://www.uehr.panteion.gr/site/pdf/MMO_WP5.pdf)

instability and insecurity of semi-legal, illegal and temporary [6-month and 1-year permits] legal statuses, has allowed the Greek population to fool itself that immigration is a temporary phenomenon, that the guestworkers will soon “go home”. The lack of public records on the duration of stay of migrants has also assisted this mythology. Recently, it has started to be seriously questioned within Greek society: there is now a reluctant acceptance that at least 50% of the immigrants will probably settle and remain in Greece.

Thus, the issue of immigrant integration remains an open question at this time.

Naturalization is both costly [€1500] and demanding; it is not seen as a “natural” process, part of longer term integration. **Table 3** shows some unpublished data on naturalization: given an immigrant population of 800,000 in the Census, and perhaps 500.000 for over 10 years, these figures are proportionately very low. Much of this is caused by the ineligibility of illegal immigrants; some of it is deliberate policy, with Greece’s recent history of “nation-building”.

In many Greek state schools, immigrant children form as much as 40% of the population: still, there is no intercultural education, or Immigrant Minority Language Instruction. This situation only increases the permanence of immigrant family migration, where the children learn only Greek and cannot return to the country of their parents. Recent incidents with immigrant children carrying the Greek flag for their school [as students with the highest marks] show simultaneously how far some local communities have come, and conversely [where parents and other schoolchildren opposed the flag-bearing by a foreigner] how problematic other local communities in North Greece are.

## **GREECE AND SOUTHERN EUROPE**

Is Greece a paradigm for southern Europe? First, we can identify some common features with other southern European countries:

- Large informal economies [20-30%]
- Low participation rates [except Portugal]
- Large agricultural sectors and other labour-intensive economic sectors
- Demographic shift to elderly populations, without state welfare care

These all tend to favour the illegal and semi-legal employment of immigrants, as seasonal farm labour, housekeepers, construction workers...

There are some major differences, in the case of Greece:

- Greece's immigrants are predominantly (over 50%) from one country – Albania, and these mostly with low educational levels. Not true in rest of southern Europe.
- Greece's immigrants, who almost all arrived in last 15 years, amount to 7% of population: cf with 3-4% in P, Es, I.
- Most immigrants arrived illegally in Greece; in others, the majority (70%) are overstayers
- The Greek conception of ethnicity creates serious problems for acceptance of immigrants into society, especially at the formal level of naturalisation.

However, there has been significant convergence of immigration policy in last 3 years across southern Europe. We can identify only three policy options open to governments in dealing with illegal immigrant workers [NB: this is the nexus of labour market and immigration, not illegal immigration *per se*]. These options are:

- **Toleration**
- **Legalisation**
- **Expulsion**

Previously, Greece relied on toleration and expulsion; the other southern countries, on toleration and legalisation. Since 2000, there has been a new convergence onto a policy mix of legalisation and expulsion. **Graphic 15** shows the common features. The common pattern of short-term permits, along with onerous demands for renewals and poor policing of employment practices means that southern Europe will be beset by illegal immigrants, illegal workers and illegal migration for a long time to come. However, Greece makes no attempt to minimise illegal migration through the formal recruitment of workers [cf. recent change in Spanish law, enabling migration for jobsearch], and seems intent on delaying any implementation of the incipient EU permanent residence permits. In the European Union, it is Greece which will continue to have massive numbers of illegal immigrants on its territory, apparently as a deliberate policy choice.

**Table 1: STOCK DATA on illegal/legal immigrants in Greece**

1998	<b>372.000</b> applications for 6 month White Card
2000	<b>228.000</b> applications for 1-3 year Green Card
2001	<b>800.000</b> Census, without Greek nationality
2001	<b>650.000</b> Census, without Greek <b>ethnicity</b> , EU or 1 <sup>st</sup> World nationality [estimate]
2001	<b>413.000</b> Census, self-declared workers [240.000 Albanians]
2001	<b>368.000</b> applications for 6 month Green Card II [220.000 accepted applications]
2002	<b>328.000</b> registrations of non-Greeks with principal social insurance agency (IKA)
2002	<b>351.000</b> applications for work+residence permits
2003	<b>???</b> no data from Ministry of Interior

**TABLE 2****REAL FOREIGN POPULATION, AS RECORDED IN THE 2001 CENSUS, GREECE: SIGNIFICANT NATIONALITIES**

<i>Nationals of:</i>	<b>M + F</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>% fem.</b>
Albania	443,550	55.6	182,048	41
Bulgaria	37,230	4.7	22,172	60
Georgia	23,159	2.9	13,179	57
Romania	23,066	2.9	9,890	43
USA	22,507	2.8	11,494	51
Cyprus	19,084	2.4	10,053	53
Russian Fedn.	18,219	2.3	11,318	62
UK	15,308	1.9	8,858	58
Germany	15,303	1.9	8,778	57
Ukraine	14,149	1.8	10,516	74
Poland	13,378	1.7	7,238	54
Pakistan	11,192	1.4	489	4
Australia	9,677	1.2	5,097	53
Turkey	8,297	1.0	3,959	48
Italy	7,953	1.0	3,991	50
Egypt	7,846	1.0	1,759	22
Armenia	7,808	1.0	4,160	53
India	7,409	0.9	533	7
Iraq	7,188	0.9	2,126	30
Canada	6,909	0.9	3,572	52
Philippines	6,861	0.9	4,919	72
France	6,513	0.8	3,780	58
Moldavia	5,898	0.7	4,099	69
Syria	5,638	0.7	1,174	21
Bangladesh	4,927	0.6	169	3
Former Yug.	4,051	0.5	2,104	52
Others	43,971	5.5	23,209	53
<b>TOTAL IMMIGRANTS</b>	<b>797,091</b>		<b>360,684</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>TOTAL POPULATION</b>	<b>10,964,020</b>		<b>5,532,204</b>	
Immigrants as percentage of population	7.3		6.5	

SOURCE: Elaboration of data from the National Statistical Service of Greece

**Table 3**

## NATURALIZATION DATA

*Lambros Baltiotis-Tassos Kostopoulos*

(According to an oral presentation by a high officer at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, May 2003). The remarks have been added by us. We remind that these numbers are not including the possessions of Greek citizenship according to the definition [*kathorismos* or *dipistosi*] procedure (see the text) and of course are not including the Greeks from the Soviet Union following the special procedures and legislation concerning them.

Year	<i>homogeneis</i>	<i>allogeneis</i>	Total	Remarks
1980	172	168	340	<sup>A</sup>
1981	959	186	1145	
1982	4996	336	5332	<sup>B</sup>
1983	2776	470	3246	
1984	1444	367	1811	
1985	1483	126	1609	<sup>C</sup>
1986	807	397	1204	
1987	1937	279	2216	<sup>D</sup>
1988	1313	258	1571	<sup>E</sup>
1989	845	372	1217	<sup>F</sup>
1990	691	399	1090	<sup>G</sup>
1991	688	198	886	<sup>H</sup>
1992	857	347	1204	
1993	1273	531	1804	<sup>I</sup>
1994	99	225	324	<sup>J</sup>
1995	2744	973	3717	
1996	995	409	1404	
1997	1250	1064	2314	
1998	655	1824	2479	
1999	599	1366	1965	
2000	464	543	1007	<sup>K</sup>
2001	690	1084	1774	
2002	445	1696	2141	

<sup>A</sup> Probably the numbers for the whole decade (1970s) are similar.

<sup>B</sup> First year of the PASOK administration. The *homogeneis* figure is related mostly with "Greeks of Northern Epirus". Other groups like "Greeks from Istanbul" etc are also included this and the years to come.

<sup>C</sup> Parliamentary elections. PASOK wins the elections.

<sup>D</sup> "Greeks from Northern Epirus" and others again.

<sup>E</sup> "Greeks from Northern Epirus" and others again.

<sup>F</sup> Two years of political instability and repeating elections.

<sup>G</sup> Nea Demokratia is winning the elections.


<sup>H</sup> The first massive influx of immigrants.

<sup>I</sup> PASOK is winning the elections.

<sup>J</sup> "Greeks" for different countries. A more open policy towards non Greeks to consecrate. The elections ahead must not excluded for the reasons led to this new policy.

<sup>K</sup> The debate between parties on naturalization has been started..


**Graphic 1: EXPULSIONS [without legal process] from Greece, 1991-2001**




SOURCE: Greek Ministry of Public Order



## Graphic 2 Green Card applicants, 1998, by country of origin




## Graphic A3 Green Card applicants, 1998, by prefecture of residence



SOURCE: Cavounidi, J. and Hatzaki, L. (2000) "Alien applications for Residence and Work Permits", National Institute of Labour, Second revised edition, available in Greek only at [http://www.eie.org.gr/Greek/contents\\_keimena\\_ergasias2.htm](http://www.eie.org.gr/Greek/contents_keimena_ergasias2.htm) (12/05/2002)


Graphic 4

Age distribution of immigrants in Greece, 2001, by sex



SOURCE: Census 2001

**GRAPHIC 5: Immigrant labour force in Greece, 2001, principal nationalities, by gender and duration of stay**




Note: self-declared data

SOURCE: Census, 2001


GRAPHIC 6

Female occupations, Greece - absolutes



SOURCE: Census, 2001


GRAPHIC 7: Female immigrant occupations in Greece, percentages



SOURCE: Census 2001

# GRAPHIC 8


## Male immigrant occupations, Greece, 2001 - absolutes



SOURCE: Census, 2001

GRAPHIC 9


Male occupations, Greece, by category



SOURCE: Census, 2001

GRAPHIC 10

Nominal membership of IKA, 2002, by nationality




SOURCE: IKA Statistics



# GRAPHIC 11


## Non-construction insurance with IKA, 2002, principal nationalities, by gender



SOURCE: IKA statistics


GRAPHIC 12

Nominal insurance with IKA, 2002 [construction only]




SOURCE: IKA statistics

## Social Insurance contributions (IKA) 2002 [all sectors other than construction]



Graphic 14

### Social Insurance contributions (IKA) 2002 [construction only]



## GRAPHIC 15

### Characteristics of the new Southern European immigration policies

- Pre-entry authorisation in foreign consulate with guaranteed job (under quota set by the Labour Ministry)
- Short permits (1 or 2 years)
- Continuous employment needed to renew permits
- Reduction or removal of many legal rights (e.g. in Spain, new law requires judges to expel immigrants charged, not convicted, with a crime carrying a prison sentence; also in Spain, expulsion of immigrants with permit applications; in Italy, expulsion of applicants for legalisation if their applications were not accepted)
- Aggressive police and other measures to detect illegal immigrants (in Spain, use of airline data on unused return tickets; Spanish deal with IOM to involve NGOs in reporting illegal migrants), along with attempts to expel more migrants
- More secure borders, new technology, more helicopters, personnel and training. Also coastguard patrols (Es, P, I and UK) – failed and expensive. Costs very high, e.g. Greece spent €600m in 2002 on border measures.
- More re-admission agreements with sending countries, and very recent attempts to make sending countries construct an *emigration policy*, preventing departures.