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Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of 'Bureaucratic Clientelism'?

Christos Lyrintzis

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the military regime in July 1974 was immediately followed by a reappearance of political forces, for they had to regroup hastily in order to participate in the national election of the following November. This set in motion a restructuring of the Greek party system resulting in the three-party alignment of today. Even though the dictatorship which preceded had – unlike the long-lasting Iberian dictatorships of Franco and Salazar – been in power for only seven years, its interruption of party-political development nevertheless allowed for a new departure here with the resumption of democracy in 1974.

The study of Greek political parties has remained a remarkably neglected area of research, and this is especially true of the most recent period since 1974. The reason has been partly the lack of sufficient and relevant empirical and especially survey data coupled with the overall absence of adequate research resources. In particular, the individual political parties have been reluctant to open themselves to scrutiny or even to publish significant material on their activities, social base and functioning which reflects on their internal problems and unity. Furthermore, work on the modern Greek parties has been strongly inhibited by a number of strongly-held myths, such as that they are simply 'personal parties' or alternatively that they are exclusively clientelistic. In view of such one-dimensional interpretations, any new research on this subject is bound to be revisionist.¹

This chapter therefore seeks to provide some new direction in assessing the nature of the Greek party system that has developed since the fall of the junta government in 1974. It will focus on three major questions. First, to what extent are the post-1974 political parties different from the primarily clientelistic parties that dominated postwar Greek politics up to 1967? Second, what form have new elements in the party system over the past decade taken; for example, how far have they adopted new patterns of mobilisation and of representing the various social interests? Third, to what extent is it possible to argue that the year 1974, apart from the transition to parliamentary politics, also signalled a transition from clientelistic/particularistic party politics to mass politics?

PATTERNS IN THE PRE-1967 GREEK PARTY SYSTEM

It is useful to begin with a short description of the forces which formed the postwar party system and of their major characteristics, in order to trace the background of the political parties of today and to determine the continuities and discontinuities between the pre-junta party system and that which

succeeded the junta. The complex of political parties that emerged after the occupation of Greece by the Axis forces (1941–4) and the subsequent civil war (1946–9) consisted of three major groups which may be conventionally identified as the right, the centre and the left.

The ancestry of the modern Greek right goes back to the interwar People's Party (Laiko Komma) which was at the forefront of the monarchist movement. Its policies and ideology were mainly defined in opposition to those of its main rival, the Liberal Party (Komma Fileleftheron), founded in 1910 by Greece's most prominent statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos. The Liberal Party's conflict with the People's Party over the issue of the monarchy strongly marked interwar Greek politics, and created what became known as the 'National Schism' which was the cleavage between republicans and monarchists (Venizelists and anti-Venizelists).² After its poor showing in the 1950 and 1951 elections the People's Party was gradually absorbed by the 'Greek Rally' (Hellinikos Synagermos), founded in 1951 by Field-Marshal Alexander Papagos, the victor of the civil war. The Rally's landslide victory in the 1952 parliamentary elections was to establish a long period of uninterrupted right-wing rule (1952–63). After Papagos' death in 1955, his successor, Constantine Karamanlis dissolved the Greek Rally and founded his own party, the 'National Radical Union' (Ethniki Rizopastiki Enosis-ERE). ERE was, however, not a new party but merely the old Greek Rally under a new name and with a few changes in its leading political personnel. Under Karamanlis's leadership ERE remained in power until 1963 and continued to play a central role in Greek politics until the 1967 military coup.

During the same period, the centre did not manage to remain united or to provide a credible alternative to the right. The fragmentation of the Liberal Party and other centre forces only ended in 1961, when the Centre Union (Enosis Kendrou) was formed. This brought together the various centre groups under the leadership of George Papandreou. The Centre Union won the 1963 and 1964 elections but remained in power only until 1965 when, after the King's intervention in party politics, the party split and its right-wing defected to form a new government with the parliamentary support of ERE. This so-called 'apostates' government marked the beginning of a period of governmental instability, and at the same time sparked off a process of political radicalisation which found a symbol and a leader in Andreas, son of George Papandreou, who had entered Greek politics in 1964.³ The elections scheduled for May 1967 were expected to result in a comfortable majority for the Centre Union dominated by its centre-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou. The military coup of April 1967 pre-empted such an outcome and temporarily destroyed any hope of political change.

The Greek left has traditionally been identified with the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Hellados, hereafter KKE). Unlike most of its European counterparts, the KKE did not emerge out of a split within the socialist movement. Instead, in 1920, the second congress of the Socialist and Labour Party of Greece (SEKE) – founded in 1918 – decided that the party should join the Third International, and changed the party's name to KKE, without causing any major crisis within the young and fragile Greek socialist movement. Following this decision, the party's ideology, organisation and

policies developed along the lines prescribed by the international communist movement. This gave the KKE a well-organised mass base and a highly centralised structure, while at the same time increasing the party's dependence on the 'foreign centre', which in 1931 intervened to nominate a whole new leadership of the party. The KKE, however, remained a marginal political force throughout the interwar period, and it was only during the Axis occupation that the KKE managed to revive its clandestine organisations, which then became the driving force of the resistance movement; and it developed as the major component in the 'National Liberation Front' (EAM), the most effective of the resistance organisations, which by the end of the war was in control of the major part of Greek territory. However, for a variety of reasons – among which British interests and generally foreign interference played a crucial role – EAM and the KKE eventually became involved in an armed confrontation with the forces of the right.⁴ The civil war (1946–9) resulted in the total defeat (military and political) of the left, and created a new schism between the victorious 'nationally minded' (Ethnikofrones) Greeks on the one hand and the communists and their sympathisers on the other. The KKE was proscribed and the left-wing sympathisers were systematically suppressed and harassed by the right-wing governments and their specially designed 'extra-legal' and 'para-state' mechanisms. The left then found a new source of political expression in the 'United Democratic Left' (EDA), founded in 1951 with the help of the clandestine communist organisations. This party attracted not only communists, but also the majority of left-wing, socialist-orientated groups. The electoral appeal of EDA remained limited, however, with the notable exception of the 1958 elections, when the party received 25 per cent of the vote. It could be said, therefore, that to the extent that the EDA was a front for the KKE, the latter dominated and monopolised the Greek left during this period.⁵ Occasional attempts, mainly on the part of a few intellectuals, to create a viable and independent socialist party proved stillborn.

In summary, it could be argued that a three-block party system emerged in postwar Greece. However, it was a system in which one of the participants (the left) as a result of the dominant anti-communist ideology, the authoritarianism of right-wing governments and the repressive mechanisms at the disposal of the state had no real chance of winning power. The army, being the guardian of the existing political order, was always ready to intervene in order to avert any real or imaginary threat from below. The main features of the other postwar political parties were their organisational weakness and clientelistic nature. Both the Centre Union and ERE were parties built structurally around a network of local notables; while their unity and electoral appeal depended on the personalities of their national leaders and on the effectiveness of their clientelistic relationships. In terms of policies, the differences between the non-communist Greek parties were ones of degree rather than substance. Thus, clientelism at the organisational level and anti-communism at the ideological level distinguished the nature and performance of the postwar political parties. By arguing that clientelism was the major characteristic of Greek political parties, we do not imply that clientelism is the main or only explanatory variable of political behaviour in Greece as some analysts have

asserted.⁶ Undoubtedly class cleavages, historical background and foreign dependence have also played a central role in shaping Greek politics. By emphasising the clientelistic nature of the Greek political parties, however, we intend to stress that at the organisational level it was clientelistic relations through which the non-communist parties mobilized mass support and through which they communicated with the electorate.

Thus, in order to understand how and why these features came to characterise Greek party politics, one has to take into account a number of factors, which from the creation of the independent Greek state strongly influenced if not determined Greek politics. First, the Greek political system had to operate under the shadow of foreign interference. The resulting dependence here which was both economic and political became a structural feature of Greek politics, whose effects were evident in every phase of modern Greek history.⁷ Second, the state emerged as a powerful and omnipresent entity whose mechanisms were extensively employed by the parties in power – that is, mainly right-wing parties – to consolidate their power and expand their clientelistic networks. Owing to the country's belated and limited in scope industrial development, the state played a dominant role not only in the economy but also in every aspect of social and political life.⁸ The ever-increasing involvement of the state in socio-economic and political development became even more apparent during the postwar years. By allocating huge economic resources received in foreign aid, and by playing a central role in the rapid economic development of the 1950s and 1960s, state-controlled agencies acquired a significant role in the Greek political system. The state and the parties thus became closely related and often interdependent forces, the former defining the scope of the parties' activity and the latter depending on and at the same time influencing the former by using its mechanisms to consolidate their power and attract mass support. Thus, at the risk of over-generalisation, it could be argued that Greek politics were marked by the combined effects of this dependence and the state's key role in socio-economic and political developments.

These factors are directly related to the weakness of the political institutions, the fragility and clientelistic nature of the political parties and the oscillation between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Unable therefore to become autonomous and well-organised forces, the Greek political parties tried unsuccessfully to copy foreign models and remained attached to the state mechanisms in order to maintain their electoral bases and secure their survival. These features of Greek party politics are particularly helpful in understanding the close identification of the political right with the state and the lack of identity and organisational independence that characterised almost all non-communist Greek political parties. Another aspect of this situation was the limited appeal of the communist left during the interwar years – although the KKE had attracted a large percentage of the small working class – and its difficulty in elaborating a strategy and articulating a consistent appeal during the postwar years which could rally the dissatisfied under the banner of a left-wing party. The combination of clientelism, anti-communism and the all-pervasive state resulted in the effective blurring of class cleavages mainly through the development of vertical clientelistic

networks. The middle class that regrouped in the postwar years, as a result of both the state's role as the major employer in the economy and of the country's rapid economic development and the related rural exodus, was easily drawn into the clientelistic networks of the right. Together with the farmers, the middle class provided the electoral backing that secured the parliamentary dominance of the right-wing parties during this period. In conclusion, serious antagonisms between political leaders, the clientelistic nature of the Greek political parties, the failure to integrate all social and political forces into the political system by excluding the communist and left-wing forces from every access to power and by isolating them both politically and ideologically and, last but not least, the attempts to control from above every social and political development that could lead to social and political change were the key aspects of what has been described as a system of 'guided democracy' or 'restrictive parliamentarism'.⁹

It was only in the 1960s that a process of social and political mobilisation got under way. It was motivated by the inequalities that resulted from the Greek model of economic development and the rapid and abrupt economic changes that accompanied it. For this reason, the middle and lower classes became ready to shift their allegiance towards parties that advocated policies which seemed beneficial to their interests. Since the communist left had no real chance of gaining power, the Centre Union and particularly its centre-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou became in the middle sixties the representative of these newly mobilised and radicalised forces. The centre-left emerged as the only force whose message – consistent and quite radical for the standards of that period – rallied support for 'democracy' and social and political reforms. The prospect of an electoral victory for the Centre Union and this centre-left provoked the overthrow of the parliamentary system. The 1946–67 system had failed to pass the crucial test of any democracy: it could not survive changes of power.

Within this context, several qualifications to the clientelistic nature of the Greek political parties should be made. The system of power developed by both right-wing and centre parties had not been one based simply on the influence of local notables – as was the case in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Greece – but one very similar to what has been described as 'party-directed patronage', in which the central party leadership and particularly the leader himself played a central role at the expense of the influence of local factions.¹⁰ The increasing importance of the party leadership in allocating favours and spoils, in combination with the central role played by the state apparatus in the functioning of the clientelistic system allow one to speak of 'bureaucratic clientelism' rather than merely 'party-directed patronage'.¹¹

Bureaucratic clientelism is a distinct form of clientelism and consists of systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocation of favours through it. It is characterised by an organised expansion of existing posts and departments in the public sector and the addition of new ones in an attempt to secure power and maintain a party's electoral base. When the state has always played a central role in both economic and political development, it is very likely that the parties in government turn to the state as the only means for consolidating their power, and this further weakens their

organisation and ideology. Such a political party becomes a collective patron, with the clientelistic networks based on and directed through an intricate combination of party mechanisms and the state apparatus. In a system such as this the public bureaucracy is orientated less towards the effective performance of public service than towards the provision of parasitic jobs for the political clientele of the ruling sectors, in exchange for their political support.

Postwar Greek politics exhibited many characteristics of a system of bureaucratic clientelism; however, the fragile organisational structure of the ruling postwar political parties and the presence of well-known politicians heading strong local or regional factions among their ranks do not allow us to speak of a genuine system of bureaucratic clientelism. The latter requires a sufficiently well-organised political formation whose party machine organises and directs the allocation of favours through the state machine. It was after the fall of the junta when new parties emerged which, ostensibly, were better organised and less susceptible to the power of their leading members than one can identify a real trend towards bureaucratic clientelism.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PARTY SYSTEM

Before looking individually at the three main political forces which have come to dominate post-junta Greek politics, it is necessary to establish the general context of the party-political scene – one which was characterised by a certain ideological fluidity and organisational fragmentation. This is best done by describing briefly the electoral fortunes of the various parties during the 1974–81 period.

Parliamentary elections were held in November 1974 with the participation of four major political parties. The right was represented by the 'New Democracy' (Nea Demokratia – hereafter ND) founded by Karamanlis, and the political centre by a revival of the old Centre Union under a new label 'Centre Union-New Forces' (Enosisi Kendrou-Nees Dynamis, EK-ND). The traditional left took the form of an alliance of the two communist parties, which included the remnants of the old EDA. Under the label 'United Left' (Enomeni Aristera) the communist left concealed the deep divisions within its constituent parts. The fourth party that contested the 1974 elections was an entirely new one created by Andreas Papandreou. The 'Panhellenic Socialist Movement' (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima – PASOK) presented itself as a socialist party advocating radical change in Greek society. The 1974 parliamentary elections gave an easy victory to Karamanlis' ND, which received 54.3 per cent of the vote and an overwhelming majority of the seats in parliament; the centre was confined to 20.5 per cent of the vote and the communist left to 9.4 per cent; while PASOK received 13.6 per cent of the vote and 12 seats in parliament, far fewer than the party's leadership had anticipated.¹²

In November 1977, after three years in office, the New Democracy party called for elections, a year earlier than scheduled, on the grounds that the country's domestic and international problems (Greece's entry into the EEC and the renegotiation of its relations with NATO were the two main issues)

demanded a government with a fresh mandate. The elections of 20 November 1977 redressed the balance of power between the major parties. ND retained its parliamentary majority, but its share of the vote decreased by 13 per cent and its number of seats in parliament declined from 220 to 171. The main victory of the election was won by PASOK, which doubled its vote and became the second largest party in parliament. The centre represented by the

TABLE I
ELECTIONS TO THE GREEK PARLIAMENT, 1974, 1977 AND 1981

| | 1974 | 1977 | 1981 | | European Parliament 1981 |
|---|------|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------------------|
| | % | % | seats | % | % |
| National Democratic Union (EDE) | 1.0 | | | | |
| National Front ¹ | | 6.8 | | | |
| Progressive Party | | | - | 1.7 | 1.9 |
| New Democracy (ND) | 54.3 | 42.8 ² | 115 | 35.8 | 31.5 |
| Centre Union-New Forces (EK-ND) | 20.5 | | | | |
| Union of Democratic Centre (EDIK) | | 11.9 | - | 0.4 | 1.4 |
| Democratic Socialist Party (KODISO) | | | - | 0.7 | 4.1 |
| Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) | 13.6 | 25.3 | 172 | 48.0 | 40.2 |
| United Left | 9.4 | | | | |
| Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces ³ | | 2.7 | | | |
| Communist Party of Greece (Interior) ⁴ | | | - | 1.3 | 5.1 |
| Communist Party of Greece (KKE) | | 9.3 | 13 | 10.9 | 12.6 |
| Others (extreme Left/independents) | 1.2 | 1.1 | - | 0.9 | 3.9 |

Notes

1. The National Front was the successor of the National Democratic Union; in 1981 the National Front was absorbed by New Democracy.
2. The 1977 vote for New Democracy includes that for the New Liberals (1.0 per cent) who merged with New Democracy immediately after the 1977 election.
3. In 1977 the Communist Party of the Interior and four other parties formed a common 'Alliance', similar to the United Left of 1974, but without the KKE.
4. Communist Party (Interior) is the Eurocommunist party; the 1981 election was the first it fought independently.

Source: C. Lyrantzis, 'The Rise of PASOK: The Greek Election of 1981', *West European Politics*, Vol.5, No.3 (July 1982).

'Enosis Demokratikou Kendrou' (Union of Democratic Centre - EDIK) - which was the new name of the 'Enosis Kendrou-Nees Dynamis' - saw its share of the vote shrink to 12 per cent, while the traditional left slightly increased its strength. PASOK's electoral gains meant an increase in its parliamentary seats from 13 to 93. This enabled the party to present itself as a serious contender for power and as the only alternative to the ND.

Between 1977 and 1981 the centre disintegrated into several small groups. Decimated by defections, EDIK was finally left with two MPs, and with a negligible organisational infrastructure. A small number of its MPs joined ND in 1977, while in 1979 four EDIK MPs formed the 'Party of Democratic Socialism' (Komma Demokratikou Socialismou - KODISO), which was a serious attempt to salvage the centre from oblivion by creating a new party that saw itself as the representative of social democracy in Greece. At the same time, Mavros, the leader of EDIK between 1974 and 1977, created his own group which also aspired to represent the Greek centre. This situation was exploited by PASOK and ND, who both tried to attract the centre voters. Eventually it was PASOK which managed to attract the larger part of the floating centre electorate. By 1981, PASOK had established an image of itself as a party ready to win power, and was expected to emerge as the strongest party in parliament. However, the extent of its victory in October 1981 was hardly to be expected. No other parties apart from PASOK, ND and the KKE managed to win parliamentary representation, and thus the new parliament was marked by a tripartite structure. Since it was the performance of these three parties that shaped the post-junta Greek party system, the discussion will now look at their organisation, ideology and leadership in an attempt to understand their role as social and political forces.

NEW DEMOCRACY: A NEW INTEGRATIVE FORCE OF THE RIGHT?

The creation of New Democracy by Constantine Karamanlis in September 1974 represented a significant attempt to regroup and modernise the traditional right. He presented New Democracy as a new centre-right party which had nothing in common with its predecessor (ERE), for it abandoned the ERE's passionate and all-embracing anti-communism and adopted more progressive socio-economic policies. However, although the party did introduce new personnel into Greek politics (127 out of its 220 MPs ran for office for the first time in 1974), its leadership consisted exclusively of ex-ERE members.¹³ New Democracy failed essentially to project a convincing image of a modern, centre-right party, and this was directly related to its inability to formulate and articulate a coherent ideology and to create a well-structured mass organisation.

Although several attempts to develop a well-organised mass party were made, culminating in the April 1977 'pre-congress' and the 1979 congress, when a new organisational plan was accepted and a new 'administrative committee' was elected, New Democracy remained basically a party of notables which relied on MPs and their clientelistic networks for communicating with the electorate and rallying mass support. The efforts of a *small progressive and centre-orientated group to reorganise the party and to establish a mass membership* were frustrated by the entrenched power of well-

known personalities and most of the party's MPs, whose vested interests would have been endangered by the development of a more structured organisation. As a political analyst close to the party has himself acknowledged, 'the party was far less significant as a mass organisation than as a group of leaders and professional politicians'.¹⁴

Although the party's basic ideological principles were described by Karamanlis at the 1979 congress as 'radical liberalism', also making clear that it did not represent social democracy, New Democracy never elaborated on these ideas nor did it define exactly what was meant by 'radical liberalism'. New Democracy failed to put forward a clear 'neo-liberal' ideology of the kind for instance adopted by the British Conservative party under Thatcher; similarly, it hesitated to adopt whole-heartedly a moderate, centre-orientated and catch-all strategy as the Christian Democrats had done in Italy. Hence, the party oscillated between policies which aimed at the modernisation of the social and economic system (e.g. reforms in the field of education, the extension of state control over the whole of the Greek banking system) and a set of conservative policies reminiscent of the ERE period and its related anti-communist mentality (e.g. the trades unions and anti-terrorist legislation). New Democracy, therefore, came to suffer from a confusing and contradictory image, the implications of which became evident during its electoral campaigns from 1977 and eventually contributed to the party's defeat in 1981.

New Democracy capitalised and depended heavily from the beginning on its founder's charisma and immense prestige as the leader who had restored democracy to Greece. This was clearly illustrated during the 1974 electoral campaign, when the slogan 'Karamanlis or the tanks' showed how the party's leader was projected as the sole guarantor of the preservation of Greece's newly-won democratic freedom, and this accounted most of all for the party's outstanding performance in the elections of that year.¹⁵ At the same time, the party's neutrality during the December 1974 referendum on the monarchy marked the end of the close identification of the Greek right with the Crown, for the 69.2 per cent of votes registered for a republic was decisive in settling the historical question of the monarchy in Greece. For the time being, it seemed that New Democracy's political future was secured as a force integrating the right, especially as the extreme right proved to be weak (the National Democratic Union (EDE) gained only 1 per cent in 1974). This tended to suggest that traditional anti-communist hysteria had indeed declined if not disappeared, although in 1977 the National Front which replaced the EDE won nearly 7 per cent of the vote. This party attracted arch-conservatives and pro-junta supporters who viewed ND as a centre-right party which had betrayed the basic principles of the traditional right. The relative success of the extreme right account for ND's loss of 10 per cent over its 1974 showing, although it must be pointed out that a significant percentage of ND voters defected to the left and supported PASOK, which in 1977 managed to double its share of the vote and to become the official opposition in parliament.

During the period 1977-81, ND in office had to deal with a number of basic and challenging problems, and did so with only limited success. Economic

recession and rising inflation (running at over 20 per cent in 1980) were problems for which the party failed to provide satisfactory solutions. The government's ad hoc interventions in the economy caused the hostility of private capital, and this together with the world energy crisis probably accounted for the poor state of the Greek economy between 1978 and 1981. In the field of foreign affairs, where the government's policy was determined by the dictum of Karamanlis that 'Greece belongs to the West', Greece's entry into the EEC was presented as the party's major achievement, but this was bitterly contested by the opposition parties, PASOK and KKE. More controversial even was the issue of Greece's relationship with NATO and the 'Rogers agreement' providing for Greece's reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance, again sharply opposed by both PASOK and the communist left.¹⁶

The election of Karamanlis as President of the Republic in May 1980 deprived the party of its undisputed and highly popular leader, and of the only person who could guarantee the party's electoral prospects. Karamanlis' successor to the party leadership, George Rallis, elected by a narrow majority over his main rival Evangelos Averoff, lacked charisma and failed to impose his authority on the party. His election not only did little to solve the basic leadership question, it also brought to the surface significant differences of opinion within ND and illustrated the ideological confusion of the party. Rallis, representing the party's moderate centre-orientated wing was continuously challenged by his right-wing rival Averoff, who never accepted his defeat at the leadership contest as definite. Under pressure from the party's right-wing, Rallis was gradually forced to abandon appeals to the political centre, initiated by his predecessor, and to adopt an increasingly right-wing strategy. Afraid of the possible loss of votes to the extreme right, ND tried to win over the most prominent figures of the National Front into the party's ranks, and was eventually successful, but this destroyed the party's credibility as a centre-right formation, appealing to a large part of the political spectrum. Thus, it was a divided party which fought the 1981 election and one which had a markedly right-wing image. Within this context, the lack of a consistent ideology became more damaging, and it failed to present a dynamic set of policies for the future that could deflect the growing challenge from PASOK. At the same time, its organisational weaknesses now became more pernicious, since the party conspicuously failed to mobilise its supporters and to project its ideas in a manner comparable to that achieved by PASOK or the KKE.

In conclusion, it can be argued that ND had two alternative model courses to follow: either to become a modern mass party and independent of clientelistic networks, with a well-structured organisation serving as the channel for elaborating a convincing ideology and programme; or to rely on the personal influence and clientelistic networks of its leading members and to adopt policy positions in a more ad hoc fashion. The available evidence suggests that Karamanlis opted for the first alternative, but failed to implement it successfully. The fact that the party was in power from its creation, together with the vested interests of its leading personnel, impelled the ND to follow the second model, even though some efforts were made to develop a mass organisation. Thus, ND as all previous conservative parties relied heavily on the resources of the state machine and used these for party

purposes. Although the party played a crucial and important role in launching and consolidating parliamentary democracy in Greece from 1974, it failed to function as an effective and well-institutionalised political and social force. Its weaknesses in this latter respect might have been contained, but ND's eventual lack of substantial policy success in office especially over the country's mounting economic and social problems, together with the retirement from the leadership of its charismatic figure Karamanlis (on whom the ND had depended so much for its public appeal), meant that its intrinsic defects as a political party undermined its impact. Thus, ND can hardly be viewed as a new integrative force of the right, despite the considerable efforts made by its founder and a small group within the party towards that direction. The election of Averoff to the party's leadership did little to restore the internal unity of the party and the recurrent discussions about a new leadership and the need to renew the party's ideology and policies showed a deep division between a conservative and a progressive, centre-orientated wing within ND. It seems that the party is going to need considerable time in order to bridge the differences between its constituent parts to become a coherent and homogeneous political formation successfully integrating all those forces opposed to the left. Whether New Democracy in opposition will remain a united political force, even possibly reforming itself, or will split into a right-wing party or a centre-orientated one is a question with important consequences for the future of the new Greek party system.

THE RISE OF PASOK

As noted earlier, a short period before the 1967 coup, the Centre Union's centre-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou emerged as a radical force representing newly mobilised classes. The dictatorship did not destroy the centre-left as a political force, for most of its leading members, together with new political activists, joined the 'Panhellenic Liberation Movement' (PAK), one of the major resistance organisations, created by Papandreou in May 1968. During his absence abroad for the period of the dictatorship, Papandreou dissociated himself and PAK from the Centre Union and chose not to take the leadership of that party after the death of his father in 1968. He concentrated his efforts instead on making PAK an effective political force with a radical programme for change, and which could become the basis for a new political party.

On his return to democratic Greece in August 1974, Papandreou refused to join a refounded Centre Union. Instead, he founded PASOK as a new political party which distinguished itself from both the old centre and the traditional communist left. Thus, the opportunity provided by the interruption of the military regime was taken to establish a viable and independent socialist party in Greece.

The new party drew together the PAK group, members of other resistance organisations and cadres that had emerged during the struggle against the military regime, as well as assorted independent figures from both the traditional left and the old centre and centre-left. It was the PAK group, however, that played the dominant role in creating PASOK in September

1974. Ex-PAK members occupied many of the key positions in PASOK's executive organs – numerically the PAK group was the largest in the central committee during 1974-5. Also, PAK's ideas and policies characterised the so-called 'Third of September Declaration', which became the basic ideological and political text of PASOK.¹⁷

It is clear that PASOK's historic roots relate to the Centre Union and particularly the 'centre-left' but this does not mean, however, that there is a simple continuity between the Centre Union and PASOK. PASOK itself has claimed that it has integrated three different currents in Greek politics: the first current goes back to the war-time resistance EAM movement and those organisations associated with it; the second current refers to the Centre Union and its centre-left faction; and the third one includes the forces that emerged during the resistance against the junta. The analysis of the background of PASOK's leading political personnel, however, suggests that this claim is only partly true. For example, the party's central committee and parliamentary personnel include only a small number of members who had participated in the EAM.¹⁸ The overwhelming majority of PASOK's leading members emerged from the centre-left and the resistance organisations during the dictatorship, while a considerable number of other such members were new figures in Greek politics. Although PASOK's links with the EAM movement are really very weak, it would be misleading on the other hand to view PASOK simply as the continuation of the Centre Union. It seems more arguable to treat the party as essentially a new force in Greek politics, which both achieved an extensive renewal of political personnel and brought new ideas and practices to the Greek party-political arena.

There is ample evidence to show that the party introduced a large number of new personnel into Greek politics. It is significant that out of 170 MPs elected in 1981, only 14 had been elected before 1967 on Centre Union lists and 6 had been elected in 1974 on the EK-ND list. The remaining 150 MPs were all elected for the first time on PASOK's lists. Among these 150 new MPs only 12 had been parliamentary candidates for parties other than PASOK; the remaining 138 entered Greek parliamentary politics for the first time through PASOK. In contrast, New Democracy's parliamentary group in 1977 included 68 MPs who had previously run as ERE or 'Greek Rally' candidates in the postwar period, and 10 who had run for the Centre Union. Almost all members of PASOK's 1977 central committee had not held any significant position in any of the pre-junta political parties, and in this sense they were newcomers in Greek party politics. It could be said, therefore, that to the extent that PASOK relied strongly on new leadership personnel it can be viewed as a new force in Greek politics.

PASOK also introduced several novel ideas and policies. The party's ideology was based on the concepts of national independence, popular sovereignty and social liberation. With these as its main objectives, PASOK advocated Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the EEC, the removal of the US military bases in Greece, the socialisation of the means of production (to be distinguished from nationalisation), self-management and decentralisation. These basic policies were complemented by a set of social and institutional changes aiming at the establishment of a welfare state and the democratisation

of the state machine. Altogether, PASOK presented itself as a radical socialist party advocating a road to socialism different from both the communist and social democratic model. PASOK emphasised its Third World orientation and its nature as a 'liberation movement'. This in combination with the ill-defined manner in which the party presented its policies led many observers to argue that, in fact, PASOK was a populist party and so different from the mainstream western European socialist parties.¹⁹ PASOK's 'green socialism' (green was the official colour of the party in contrast to the red of the communist left and the blue of ND) by stressing the idea of national independence appealed to all social strata concerned about the problems and implications of foreign interference. By advocating a 'Greek road to socialism' and identifying the enemy as the 'foreign factor' (imperialism and multinational capital) and those few 'privileged' associated with it, PASOK was able to mobilise large sections of the population. It was an achievement that the communist left had failed to realise in the postwar years, mainly because of the impact of the civil war, but also because of its orientation towards foreign models and the recurrent crises within its ranks over strategy and tactics. In a society in which it was anathema to be a communist, and where anti-communism had for decades dominated the ideological sphere, PASOK by presenting itself as an independent socialist party created a force that was progressive and belonged to the left without bearing the stigma of communism.

Against this background, it was not surprising that PASOK did not commit itself to seeking the support of a specific social class. Instead, the party claimed to represent in general 'under-privileged' Greeks, the latter being defined as a broad social bloc encompassing 'farmers, workers, employees, craftsmen and artisans, the youth and all the people who are subject to odious exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign'.²⁰ Thus, PASOK aimed to appeal to its followers not as a class but as the people or 'the nation'. By appealing to the 'under-privileged' in this all-embracing way, PASOK adopted a 'catch-all' strategy and so strengthened its position for uniting under its banner all those who for one reason or another opposed New Democracy.

PASOK's most important innovation, however, was its establishment of a well-structured mass organisation. In a relatively short time PASOK managed to build a mass organisation, so that by 1977 the party could claim a membership of 27,000 members, while by 1980 the total membership exceeded 60,000. This membership was organised in local and departmental units which were supposed to function in a manner very similar to that of PASOK's western European counterparts. According to the party's statutes, the national congress is the most powerful party organ, with the central committee acting as the leading unit of the party between congresses. The president and the executive bureau occupy a special position within the party hierarchy, with responsibility for formulating the party's programme, implementing party policies and supervising and co-ordinating organisational matters.

Despite its impressive development in this respect, PASOK did not function internally as envisaged in the party's statutes. The party failed to implement democratic procedures within its ranks, and the personality and

charisma of Papandreou influenced powerfully its development and nature. A special bond developed between the president and the party structures: Papandreou's charismatic authority and appeal to the masses maintained the party during its initial period of internal crises, and later it was his influence that brought about the reconstruction of the party organisation and the subsequent steady growth of the party. It was he who articulated and presented the party's ideology and served as its dominant spokesman. As a result of this situation, the mass membership was never involved in the decision-making process because the president and the eight-member executive bureau controlled party activity. The primacy of Papandreou's role has been officially acknowledged by PASOK's leading members who have described his presence within the party as 'a crucial parameter of the existence and operation of PASOK, determining it as a unified, organised movement and as a unitary political entity'.²¹ However, although the party has lacked institutionalised democratic processes – and, notably, a national congress has not yet been held – its organisation cannot be dismissed as merely playing a passive role, as shown by its central importance in PASOK's election campaigns.

Despite its shortcomings, PASOK's organisation was nevertheless a major novelty for a non-communist Greek political party. From its foundation, PASOK appeared determined not to rely on clientelism as a means for communicating with the electorate and rallying mass support. The available evidence suggests that its leading personnel, and particularly its parliamentary group, did not adopt or develop clientelistic practices. Their rise was, with few exceptions, due to the general advance and appeal of the party and to their role in the party organisation. This phenomenon, it must be emphasised, constituted a considerable departure from previous practice in Greek party politics, and in the contemporary context sharply contrasted with the political practices of New Democracy.

It could be said, therefore, that in combining a radical ideology with charismatic leadership and organisational activism, PASOK appeared not only as a novel force in Greek politics, but also as a hybrid type of political party, articulating populist elements (of the kind familiar to students of Latin American populist parties) and mass-organisational socialist elements (of the kind exhibited by west European socialist parties). The presence of a dominant and charismatic leadership together with its relatively vague Third World orientated ideology have reinforced this populist image of PASOK. However, as the 1981 elections approached with the prospects of victory increasing, PASOK began to abandon much of its Third World-style ideas in an attempt to present a moderate image and to strengthen its appeal to voters of the centre. For instance, although its 1981 electoral manifesto reiterated PASOK's commitment to withdraw Greece from NATO and remove the US military bases, it was recognised that a transitional period was necessary, that 'PASOK would never allow the capability of the armed forces to be undermined' and that withdrawal from NATO was part of PASOK's long-term objective towards the abolition of the two military blocks. As far as Greece's position in the EEC was concerned, PASOK repeated its pledge to seek a referendum on the issue, but it also made clear that in the meanwhile it

would participate in the Community's structures in order to mitigate the negative effects of Greece's participation in the EEC. Similarly, references to socialisation and self-management were minimized throughout the 1981 campaign, and the manifesto made no reference to a 'socialist constitution' as had the 1977 one. The word 'socialism' was rarely used by Papandreou in his public speeches; instead, the slogan 'Allaghi' (Change) came to dominate PASOK's message.

PASOK did indeed succeed in attracting moderate centre voters in 1981, thus confirming its gradual displacement of the old centre as the main alternative to the right; and it also challenged successfully the communist KKE's previous monopoly over the Greek left. In a period marked by ideological fluidity, PASOK had emerged as a convincing and appealing force, but it would be a stark and misleading oversimplification to say that the party was elected with a mandate to bring about a socialist transformation of Greek society. This was the vision of a relatively small group of party militants, but for the majority of the party's voters in 1981 PASOK's pledge to establish a welfare system, reform the civil and penal law, democratise and modernise the state machinery and to reorganise and rationalise the economy was enough to convince undecided voters to support the party. The slogan 'Change' captured the imagination of the electorate and gave PASOK a remarkable electoral victory.

Nevertheless, beneath PASOK's broad appeal lay a potential instability within its electorate, for it is difficult to say that the party has – at least yet – established itself as a socially integrative force despite its widespread organisational presence. Although it is very difficult to draw any major conclusions about PASOK's social base, the 1981 electoral results suggest that the party's catch-all tactics paid off in terms of electoral gains and that it attracted voters from different socio-economic backgrounds. PASOK's remarkably broad appeal to all sections of the electorate is illustrated by the distribution of its vote in urban and rural areas. The difference between the degree of its support in urban and rural areas was smaller in PASOK's case than in that of any other party in Greece. This was already evident in 1977, but in 1981 there was virtually no difference between PASOK's percentage of the vote in urban and rural areas. It could be pointed out, in contrast, that ND was more successful in rural than in urban areas, thus following the pattern of electoral performance set by all postwar right-wing parties in Greece. New Democracy, however, attracted a larger percentage of the women's and older people's vote. Specifically, ND received 36 per cent of the women's vote and 33 per cent of the men's vote, while PASOK received 48.8 per cent of the men's vote but 47 per cent of the women's.²² The available information suggests that PASOK's programme of change did not appeal to any one specific class or group within a class. It appears that PASOK had succeeded in persuading the electorate that it was a party for all 'the people' and it was elected as such by all sections of the population. In this sense it can be argued that PASOK's electorate was a mirror image of Greek society: the relatively moderate image projected by PASOK between 1980 and 1981 certainly contributed to this achievement.

It must not be forgotten, however, that PASOK'S victory in 1981 owed

much to the personality of Papandreou, who dominated its campaign and monopolised all its public rallies and demonstrations; and that, accordingly, his eventual disappearance from political life must be a major factor of uncertainty in PASOK's future. In this particular sense, PASOK invited comparison with the traditionally personalistic nature of Greek parties. Furthermore, as the party in power, PASOK or at least groups in it may seek to consolidate their positions by developing new clientelistic practices. As the party organisation may possibly prove ineffective in maintaining mass support, and in addition as PASOK may see good reasons in wanting to purge the state machine of its numerically dominant right-wing cadres as a necessary precondition for implementing its policies, a process of clientelisation by the political left cannot be discounted. Moreover, a failure to fulfil the policy expectations aroused in the 1981 campaign would be likely to strengthen this temptation. Whether PASOK follows a clientelisation process (of which there are already some signs) similar to that previously adopted by the political right in power, or whether alternatively it will attempt to institutionalise and expand its own organisational roots as a party, or even combine both methods for the sake of maintaining its newly acquired power position is a fundamental question, the answer to which must be crucial in determining how far the Greek party system since 1974 has permanently taken a new departure.

THE COMMUNIST LEFT: A PRISONER OF ITS IDEOLOGICAL GHETTO

The dictatorship brought to the surface the problems of internal division that has characterised the communist left throughout the postwar years. The then EDA's strategy and policies had already been a cause of disagreement between the section of the leadership of the KKE which remained outside Greece in eastern Europe and the leading party members – both communists and non-communists – who had stayed inside Greece. The 'pure and hard' line adopted by the communist leadership abroad and the concomitant disagreements and divisions were among the factors which accounted for the generally limited appeal of the EDA. The differences over serious political issues re-emerged in a more acute form during the military dictatorship, when the whole leadership of the communist left found itself abroad, and this led to a definite split in 1968. The dissident members formed an interior bureau of the KKE which, after the fall of the junta, became the KKE Interior party and held its first congress in 1975. Attitudes towards the Soviet model of socialism, the question of loyalty to and dependence on Moscow and the opening to Eurocommunist ideas were the main lines of difference between the two branches of the Greek communist left.²³

Despite the differences, however, the KKE and the KKE Interior joined forces for the elections in 1974 and formed the United Left (EA). The United Left was a precarious alliance formed purely for the election. After its poor showing in the 1974 elections (9.4 per cent of the vote), the alliance split into its constituent parts and relations between the two KKEs were characterised by vitriolic attacks and mutual hatred. The KKE opposed the New Democracy government on fundamentalist grounds, regarding it as an instrument of western imperialism. In contrast, the KKE Interior had adopted a strategy of

unity of action of all democratic forces, from the communist left to the democratic right, aiming at consolidating democracy in Greece and thus in its view facilitating the road to socialism. At the same time, the KKE, apart from predictably denouncing the KKE Interior as revisionist and opportunistic, was also in conflict and competition with PASOK.

This antagonism between the three parties that claimed to represent the Greek left sprang out of their desire for hegemony over the left. The 1977 elections proved determinant in that while the KKE won 9.3 per cent of the vote the rival KKE Interior received only 2.7 per cent so consolidating the dominance of the KKE over the communist left. This dominance, however, was only a qualified success in view of the rise of PASOK in 1977. As already shown, the 1981 election corroborated what was already known in 1977, namely PASOK's ability to offer a radical message while frequently outflanking the KKE by accusing it of aligning itself with Soviet positions. Even so, the KKE still won 10.9 per cent of the vote against the odds. Although the party still attracts a large section of the working-class vote (the KKE's electoral strongholds are the predominantly industrial areas in Athens, Pireaus, Salonica, Larissa and Volos), it failed to achieve any significant advances among the rural and middle-class strata. Thus, the limited mass of communist voters remained loyal to the KKE, but for reasons of internal division and adherence to traditional and 'foreign' ideas the communist left had failed to break out of its ideological ghetto.

THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM AFTER 1974: NEW ELEMENTS AND OLD PRACTICES

In the period after 1974 the Greek party system operated under various different conditions compared with the party system prior to the period of the military junta. First, anti-communism ceased to be such a dominant feature of Greek political life, and the communist parties were free to compete as legalised forces. Second, the historically divisive question of the monarchy was swiftly taken off the agenda of Greek politics by the referendum late in 1974, related as this was to the King's controversial behaviour shortly before and during the military dictatorship. Third, PASOK's rise in popular support and eventually to power demonstrated the impact of a new type of political force.

In spite of these important differences, one can also identify limitations to change and even several similarities and thus continuity between the pre 1967 and post 1974 party systems. First, the political right as represented by New Democracy failed essentially to become a modern mass party similar to most of its western European counterparts. In particular, it relied heavily on traditional practices of 'bureaucratic clientelism', and it became plagued by strong internal division over its very identity. Second, PASOK notwithstanding its establishment of a mass organisation and enunciation of a radical programme has failed to institutionalise itself as a political party in the full sense, and thus there still exists considerable ambiguity and confusion over the party's nature and future. PASOK projected itself as a force for social and economic change and capitalised on the failures and weaknesses of New Democracy very effectively, but it has all the same evidenced a certain

ideological inconsistency. In other words, PASOK has been both an expression as well as a beneficiary of the ideological fluidity which has characterised the Greek party system in this period. Furthermore, the strongly personalistic nature of its public appeal through the figure of Papandreou and the possibility that it might itself adopt clientelistic practices in power additionally suggest the picture of a party still in search of its political identity. Certainly, PASOK cannot continue forever to use the strategy which enabled it to emerge as the champion of all those sections of the electorate that were dissatisfied with the policies of ND. Thus, systematic efforts may be made to institutionalise charisma and to reinforce the role of the mass organisation and/or to embark on a process that may eventually lead to some form of 'bureaucratic clientelism'. The first alternative, however, may offer a greater chance to PASOK to develop as a stable and effective force, successfully integrating the social and political forces of the Greek left.

For these various reasons, it could be argued that the major non-communist Greek parties have failed to institutionalise those mechanisms and procedures that would link them to their electorates, elaborate and articulate their programmes and hence guarantee their effectiveness and longevity as social and political forces. Party politics since the fall of the military junta has continued to be very dependent on the personalities and policies of party leaders; and, moreover, the familiar interplay between the state machine and party figures in the form of clientelism has not ceased to exist. These different aspects therefore favour the view that the extent and nature of the new elements introduced in the post 1974 party system in Greece have not constituted a profound change.

In summary, it can be argued that the post-1974 Greek party system is characterised by a combination of new elements and old practices. With the exception of the extreme right, the post 1974 political parties played a positive role in securing the smooth transition to parliamentary democracy and in creating a relatively stable party system. The creation and development of PASOK, its organisation and ideology and its eventual rise to power provided the major novelty, but this was due first and foremost to a process characterised by charismatic leadership, populist ideology and tactics and organisational activism. A process such as this could not effectively integrate the masses into party politics, and it could not ultimately develop the means to cope successfully with clientelism and with the problems related to the role and nature of the Greek state machine. On the other hand, the fact that the political right has failed to renew itself and thus grow out of the old clientelistic practices reinforces the image of a party system struggling between renewal and traditional practices. Finally, the communist left, although the only political force with a well-established and institutionalised mass membership, did not manage to integrate new elements. Given this context, the electoral victory of PASOK in 1981 and its performance while in office can be viewed as a possible historical turning-point in Greek party politics. The persistence of the personalistic and clientelistic elements depend to a considerable extent on the policies and practices of this party in power.

NOTES

1. See G. Mavrogordatos and E. Nicolacopoulos, 'Report on Greece', presented to symposium of the ECPR standing group on Southern European Politics, on Parties and Party Systems in Southern European Countries, Barcelona, November 1982.
2. The most thorough and in depth analysis of interwar politics and society in Greece is G. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, University of California Press, 1983. For an historical account of the social and political developments in Greece since the formation of the Greek state (in English) see J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, *Modern Greece* (London, 1969); also R. Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (London, 1980).
3. Andreas Papandreou had been a professor of economics in the United States. He returned to Greece in 1963 and joined the Centre Union; in 1964 he was elected MP in the department of Achaia and became minister in his father's government. With a group of personal friends and party militants he organised the centre-left (Kendroaristera), and became the leader and representative of the party's left-wing.
4. The literature on the resistance and the civil war in Greece is marked by conflicting interpretations. The most recent work on this subject (in English) is a collective volume edited by J. Iatrides, entitled *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, (University Press of New England, 1981).
5. On the relationship between KKE and EDA and on the various debates and arguments within the KKE during the 1960s see V. Kapetanyiannis, 'The Making of Greek Eurocommunism', in *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1979). Also, M. Papayiannakis, 'The Crisis in the Greek Left', in H. Penniman (ed.), *Greece at the Polls. The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, pp.130-59.
6. See K. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
7. On the role of foreign influence in Greek politics see, N. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (London, 1978). Also, T. Coulombis, J. Petropoulos and H. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics* (New York, 1976).
8. On the role of the state in Greek society see N. Mouzelis, 'Capitalism and the Development of the Greek State', in R. Scase (ed.), *The State in Western Europe*, (London, 1981). It must be pointed out that the special role and nature of the Greek state is not a postwar phenomenon, but one that has characterised Greek politics since the creation of an independent Greek state.
9. See G. Katephores, *He Nomothesia Varvaron* [The Barbarians' Legislation] (Athens, 1975). Also, N. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*, op. cit., pp.115-33. On the repressive nature of the postwar Greek state, see N. Alivizatos, 'The Emergency Regime and Civil Liberties', in J. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940s*, op. cit., pp.220-8.
10. The term 'party-directed patronage' is used here in the sense developed by A. Weingrod; see A. Weingrod, 'Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties', in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.X (July 1968), pp.376-400. On the nature and role of clientelism in Greece, see N. Mouzelis, 'Class and Clientelistic Politics: the Case of Greece', in *Sociological Review*, (August 1978).
11. The term 'bureaucratic clientelism' has often been employed by both oligarchic and populist regimes in Latin America; see A.E. Van Niekerk, *Populism and Political Development in Latin America*, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974). Also H. Jaguaribe, *Political Development* (London, 1973), pp.475-80.
12. On the post-junta political parties and elections, see H. Penniman (ed.), *Greece at the Polls*, op. cit. This work covers the parties' role and performance between 1974 and 1977.
13. J. Loulis, 'New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism', in H. Penniman (ed.), *Greece at the Polls*, op. cit., pp.49-83. See also, *Nea Demokratia: Ideologikes Arches ke Katastakiko* [New Democracy: Ideological Principles and Statutes], a publication of the New Democracy Party, Athens, 1979.
14. Loulis, op. cit., p.72.
15. On the 1974 elections and Karamanlis' performance during the period 1974-5, see R. Clogg, 'Karamanlis, Cautious Success', in *Government and Opposition* (Summer 1975).
16. The Rogers agreement was negotiated by the Rallis government in 1981; PASOK committed itself to a new vote in the next parliament in order to achieve its annulment.

17. The 'Third of September Declaration' includes the basic ideological principles of PASOK, its major political objectives and the main policies in order to achieve these objectives; it is significant that this text cannot be changed even by a party congress.
18. Most of the information about PASOK presented in this article is based on research conducted in Greece between 1980 and 1981 for the preparation of the author's Ph.D. thesis.
19. On the debate over the socialist or populist nature of PASOK, see N. Mouzelis, 'The Greek Elections of 1977', in *New Left Review*, No. 109, pp.59-74.
20. A. Papandreou, article for *Athinaiki*, Athens daily newspaper, 29 October 1975.
21. Report of the executive secretariat to the First Panhellenic Conference, published in *Exormisi*, PASOK's official weekly newspaper, 15 September 1977.
22. See *Epikendra*, a political periodical published by the Research Centre of New Democracy, Athens (Sept.-Oct. 1981).
23. See Papayiannakis, 'The Crisis in the Greek Left', op. cit., pp.149-59.