The Transcendental and the Immanent as Liturgical Experience – the Greek Orthodox Case

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Abstract

The essay is a quantitative analysis of a questionnaire distributed to a sample of 775 worshipers immediately after the Sunday Liturgy in a random number of churches in Athens, Thessaloniki and Mytilini. The questions addressed to them try to grasp feelings and thoughts felt during liturgical experience and effervescence as such, as well as reflections concerning the religious and the political self. The findings suggest that the liturgy has profound effects on those who attend service often, but it is not irrelevant even to those who attend service less often. Those who attend service often and feel strongly the liturgical rite tend to identify religion, both doctrinal and vernacular (the 'little traditions'), with politics, consider themselves to be rightist and hold political beliefs revolving around antinomian egotism and authoritative paternalism. Those who attend service rarely and do not experience any effervescence, as the mirror-image of the former, tend to identify themselves as leftist and hold political beliefs revolving around revolution, defiance and the like, and reject democratic institutions. The study underlines the very close connection of church attendance to 'magical' aspects of the Orthodox religion, as well as the very strong presence of icons in the life of the believers irrespective of their frequency of liturgical attendance.

Introduction

Even though religion, as an institutional sphere, does not enjoy today the predominance it enjoyed in the past, is still considered to be one of the main sources of moral reflexivity and ethical contact, especially so in countries such as Greece whereas religion, both as an institution as well as a practice, is still considered to be a valid cannon for spiritual guidance and national and individual identity.

This is verified by various polls and surveys both national and international. For example, Pew Research Institute verifies that religion is more important in Greeks' personal lives than it is in those of many Western Europeans. For example, in a survey carried out by the institution a few years ago (Pew Research, 2018: https://pewrsr.ch/2Jhe03k), nine-in-ten Greeks (92%) believe in God – including 59% who say they believe with absolute certainty – while a median of just 15% of Western Europeans say they are certain of God's existence. And 55%

of Greek adults say religion is very important in their lives – more than double the share who say this in Ireland, Italy and Spain, and five times the share in France, Germany and the UK. Greece also is more religious than most Central and Eastern European countries by these measures. Furthermore, when asked if religion is important in our lives, Greece emerges first in Europe and first in the western world, as 80% answer "important" and "very important" and only 20% "little" or "not at all important. In fact, Greece ranks first in piety in the western world, but not in the whole world, as it is surpassed by Indonesia (100%), the Philippines (98%) and Turkey (89%).

Also, in Greece the acceptance rates of certain narratives of Christianity seem high, such as the existence of Satan (43.8%), the miracles (41.4%), the afterlife (37.4%), the Second Coming (31.8%), as well as the existence of paradise and hell (30.2%). Thus, almost 6 in 10 Greeks consider religion to be of great value to man, while more than half describe themselves as religious. In terms of religious customs, 55.8% are accustomed to making their cross when they go through church, one in four pray daily and regardless of whether they have difficulties or not (64.8%), while 16.7% state that they go to church at least once a month (Kappa Research, 2018: https://kaparesearch.com).

The Orthodox religiosity and the shaping of the Orthodox self

Yet, while the strength of religious identity and beliefs are well analyzed and recorded, there has never been a quantitative study about specific religious beliefs –either doctrinal or vernacular– of the congregation and the way these specific beliefs and practices affect the attitudes of believers vis-à-vis other aspects of social life as well as political attitudes and moral preferences. This is a vital issue of the shaping of modern Greece as modernity is much younger than the staunchly and proudly premodern Orthodox church and the former always needs to deal with the latter for institutional priority and behavioral justification.

'Orthodoxy', meaning the 'correct doctrine', is literally proud of not changing its doctrine or liturgical rites for more than a thousand years as the first communities and Fathers of the Church established the correct doctrine once and for all. Accordingly, the 'Orthodox self', as an ideal type is correspondingly equally premodern, that is, constructed around a symbolic system that ignores the symbolic openness and the temporal progressivity of modernity, and instead, is animated by medieval-type visions of transcendental 'stillness'

which, in modernity, in the midst of the modern social division of labor, takes the form of unqualified political goals and unqualified desires.

The reason and the source of this fixation is the Orthodox dogma concerning the nature of the Trinitarian God, according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. This 'Father-only' approach –for the sake of securing the primacy of the Father over the other two persons of the Holy Trinity– downplays the role of in-worldly 'salvationist' activities and situates the grace of God completely out of history, in the timeless domain of the Father, or the Godhead (Marangudakis 2001, Ramfos 2011).

Consequentially, the dogma ignores as insignificant the ordinary temporal and material world – a condition which the late medieval Palamian theology of 'divine energies' only intensified, since 'energies' is the way the transcendental enters the human psyche, establishing a gap between the self and its social identity. In this vein, salvation is achieved by re-attachment of the self to timeless visions of the holy, at the expense of rational methods of introspection and the methodical in-worldly construction of the self and of the public sphere. The out-worldly orientation of salvation turns the self to a 'boundless will', an 'ocean of emotions unescorted by reason', an 'endless expectation', without the aid of reason to turn vision of the good into practical projects.

The Orthodox religiosity first strips the self of its social context and identity, and then orients the remaining, featureless, individual inwardly, to its own emotions and desires, as if they were the grace of God and the source of the good. This fixation of conscience to premodern comprehension of the self, frustrates the interaction between the reflective 'I' and the social 'me', and allows for feelings to be perceived as a valid source of moral legitimacy and accountability. Thus, as Nikos Kalapothakos' phrases it: 'we live without purpose, yet all together' (2007: 35). The Orthodox priority to re-unite the individual to God in a socially and temporally neutral way, frustrates the development of individuality, and cultivates the egotistic person, while the entrenched identity, which is exhausted in the inner circle of kith and kin, allows for the development of psychological predispositions which tolerate clientelism, and encourages anarchic individualism.

Furthermore, the Orthodox 'functional time' collapses past and future into a motionless and emotive present time. Situated in a 'timeless present time' the Orthodox self recalls the past with yearning nostalgia; as for the future, instead of being the domain of methodical affordances, it becomes the amorphous domain of desires. Certainly, this peculiar perception cannot erase two basic human needs: the satisfaction of the basic materialistic needs, and the longing of the self to be acknowledged by the significant others. The interac-

tion of these two ~~bio~~-psychological needs with a timeless present-time, distorts the way the self acts in the world. It creates a self that recycles and exchanges time for space, by becoming permanently trapped in the safety of kith and kin, of the glorious past, and of dream-like desires, rejecting at the same time the right of other perspectives to exist as valid alternatives of truth. We could not start understanding the Greek problem, Ramfos (ibid.) argues, before we comprehend the 'tyranny of present-time' which seeks the instant gratification of political visions as repetition of the glorious past. The future, seen through these lenses, is not open-ended and malleable enough to be shaped through social action, but an unknown territory full of dangers and unanticipated events, of miraculous interventions and dark conspiracies of the eternal evil. Therefore, collective representations, instead of being living symbols that turn individual desire to methodical, civil, initiative, in fact they are fantasies of egotistic self-centeredness.

Ramfos suggests that lack of trust and suspicion for strangers, even when the stranger is a neighbor or a co-worker, is a reflection of a deficient self; a self who is not placed firmly in time and space and thus not in control of temporality. The reason for this deficiency is the way Orthodox religion comprehends time and space as timeless fate. It accustoms the individual to remain trapped in habit and custom, in the bosom of his family and in constant repetition of daily routine, as if time stands still. The timeless span of fate nullifies the logic of effort and encourages the growth of a selfish self who demands from others and from the state without acknowledging corresponding obligations. In this blissful perspective of stillness future time has no place, as no place there is for prediction, planning, and method since the flow of time is meaningless, while the security of circumscribed space breeds idleness, postponement, and indifference. Circumscribed space entrenches the self in given perceptions, and emotions, instead of urging the individual to act, demand the perpetuation of present time and its conditions. Stillness of time urges the individual to find solutions in critical moments not in doing things differently, but demanding the crisis to pass without affecting his present condition – as if the crisis is the tangible 'presence' of an external threat, and that some kind of spell can eradicate it, as if by some magic spell.

In this worldview, the family represents the holy cradle of someone's stillness. The family protects and shelters 'the child' from the world as if the latter is a dangerous and treacherous place. To this purpose, the family comforts, insulates, and spoils the child for as long and as much as possible, without feeling the need to train and acclimatize it to be responsible. Giorgos Lanthimos' disturbing movie Dog Tooth (2009) reflects on this condition – in spite of the

insanity and oddness of the plot. This is a worldview that does not wither away as the child becomes an adult. Instead, the family is replaced by unions and associations who play the role of the family: not to uphold the principles of citizenry, but to protect the member from impending danger notwithstanding the crime he has committed, or the anti-deontological behavior he exhibited. This deficiency nullifies any institutional or organizational openness, and any chance to build a civil society based on abstract principles and values rather than merely on kin and kith ties.

Boundless yet ephemeral emotions, not anchored in time and space, constitute the fertile ground upon which passion is confused for meaning, and collective passions are taken to be the will of the people. Adulation of collective sentiments instead of leading to the construction of an open civil consciousness leads to a façade of comfortable togetherness which hides the fragmentation of the community to various egoistic interest groups. Anchored in its privacy, and locked in familial and guild-like professional ties, the Orthodox self rests in an enchanted time awaiting the leader-hero to save the day by providing inexpensive, indeed imagistic, solutions to demanding problems. When the hero fails to deliver, frustration turns to violence, blind and mindless, the expression of a circumscribed self that demands not freedom from the bondage of stillness, 'but to go back to sleep'.

All of the above raise questions about the Orthodox self that partially have been addressed and tentatively verified recently – that the Greek self exhibits strong reactionary and liminal features which can be referred to the Orthodox religiosity (Marangudakis with Chadjipadelis 2019). Yet, we still need to address religion not just as identity but as a living, existential situation of the believer in touch with the transcendental qualities of its faith, and how these qualities directly affect its worldview.

This is what this study intends to do asking the following questions. First, particular emotions and affections during and after the holly Liturgy that could affect the individual's worldview, sense of civility, moral standing, and political preferences.

Second, whether she/he accepts any key aspects of Orthodox "little traditions" or folk religiosity (Steward 1991), which go against the ethical and methodical mode of the "high tradition" and instead follow a more "magical/manipulatory" mode of religiosity in the Weberian framework of religious rationalism, or the "gnostic" aspects of religiosity according to Tyriakian (1996).

Third, whether the believer feels any spiritual connection to the holy icons and the saint the icon depicts, and how this affects his/her general mode of religiosity (Freedberg 1989).

Fourth, whether religiosity is correlated (positively or negatively) to some enduring features and matters of concern of the Greek public sphere and political attitudes such as familism (Pollis 1965), anarchic individualism (Hirschon 2014), collectivism (Triandis 2001, Georgas 1989), and paternalism (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984).

And fifth, whether Orthodox religiosity affects modern personhood and conceptualization of democracy (Photiadis and Johnson 1963, Canetti-Nisim 2003).

Data and Methodology

This study is a tentative effort to address such aspects of religiosity. It was contacted in three Greek cities, i.e., Athens, Thessaloniki and Mytilini last year whereas a number of interviewers approached a random sample of interviewees as they exited the church after Sunday Liturgy and while the latter were still under the influence of the collective effervescence of the Liturgy itself, asking them to fill out the questionnaire. The number of respondents was 775.

The first step of analyzing our data is to present descriptive statistics results for the characteristics for all respodents. Proceeding further with the analysis we compare groups in order to detect whether there is statistically significant difference between the groups regarding the variables of closeness during Liturgy, the Gnostic element of the little traditions, immediately after Liturgy, belief in supernatural forces, icons as symbols of in-worldly divine presence, ideological Identity, political orientations, moral Self-identification and definitions of Democracy.

To investigate the above research questions, data analysis is based on Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) and Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) in two steps (Chadjipadelis, 2015). In the first step, HCA assigns subjects into distinct groups according to their response patterns. The main output of HCA is a group or cluster membership variable, which reflects the partitioning of the subjects into groups. Furthermore, for each group, the contribution of each question (variable) to the group formation is investigated, in order to reveal a typology of behavioral patterns. To determine the number of clusters, we use the empirical criterion of the change in the ratio of between-cluster inertia to total inertia, when moving from a partition with r clusters to a partition with r–1 clusters (Papadimitriou and Florou, 1996). Analysis was conducted with the software M.A.D. [M´ethodesde l' Analyse des Donn´ees] (Karapistolis, 2010).

In the second step, the group membership variable, obtained from the first step, is jointly analyzed with the existing variables via Multiple Correspondence Analysis on the so-called Burt table (Greenacre, 2007).

Bringing the two analyses together, behavioral patterns and abstract discourses are used to construct a map visualizing the behavioral structure of the variables and the subjects.

The demographic features of people attending Liturgy and surveyed were representative of the population as a whole, as no significant demographic differences were found in any matter other that church attendance. As expected, the percentage of those in our sample that attend Liturgy often (54%) was higher than in surveys of the general population (close to 20%) since the survey was contacted in the church yard immediately after the Sunday Liturgy. Also, as expected, Liturgy attendance corresponds closely to prayer frequency with frequency of attendance being identical to frequency of praying.

Table 1: Gender

E1	Male 42%	Female 58%

Table 2: Age

E2	Below 19	19–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	Above 69
	2,8%	20,9%	15,4%	20,4%	17,0%	11,5%	12,1%

Table 3: Education (completed)

E3	Primary school	Lower High School	Full High School	Technical Education	University	MA/PhD
	6,5%	2,8%	31,0%	7,3%	42,3%	10,1%

Table 4: Marital Status

E5	Married	Single	Partnership	Divorced	Separated	Widow/er
	48,8%	36,4%	3,0%	4,9%	0,8%	6,1%

Table 5: Annual Income

E6	5.000 or less	5.000–10.000	10.000–15.000	15.000–25.000	25.000–40.000	Above 40.000
	11,7%	16,8%	27,9%	26,1%	11,3%	1,2%

Table 6: Class status

E8	Labor	Middle	High
	21,5%	76,3%	2,2%

Table 7: How often to you attend church service?

E9	Every week	Sometimes per month	Sometimes per year	Rarely	Only social religious events
	33,2%	20,9%	19,6%	17,6%	8,7%

Table 8: How often to you pray?

E18	Every day	Sometimes per week	Sometimes per year	Rarely	Never
	53,6%	20,6%	7,3%	12,8%	5,7%

Closeness during the Liturgy

We simplified the responses of the sample to only two kinds –above or below average– and came up with three groups of individuals – plus a missing fourth which did not respond to the questions (see E19 below). The first group which comprises 60% of the sample feels connected and committed to all aspects of the holy Liturgy; the second group, which is comprised of the third of the sample (33%) feels close to the main transcendental aspects of the religion (God(head), Jesus and Mary) while not so to the rest of the doctrinal constellation, while a very small third group (6.7%) feels close, or focused, on the preaching alone. In other words, the clear majority of the sample follows the Liturgy as it is supposed to do, according to the doctrinal principles of the Orthodox Church.

Yet, the relative significance of these principles, or elements, are not held in equal value. Instead, the transcendental aspects (God (head), Virgin Mary, Jesus, Liturgy, saints and angels) are highly valued, while the more "immanent" elements, the preaching and the congregation are the least valued, with the latter being the least valued of all. This verifies the hypothesis that the passivity of the Orthodox Liturgy does not cultivate communal life, but instead a simulacrum of collectivity, while, arguably, it nourishes a self-centered and self-gratifying individu-

ality, analytically close to the anthropological term "(Greek) anarchic individualism".

Table 9: E19. How close you feel to… during the Liturgy?

		Not at all	Slightly	Some-what	Adequa-tely	Very much	Absolu-tely
1	To God	5,5%	7,5%	13,0%	26,9%	29,6%	16,2%
2	To Virgin Mary	6,5%	7,1%	8,7%	22,3%	30,2%	19,6%
3	To Jesus	6,1%	6,5%	8,1%	21,5%	28,9%	17,8%
4	To a saint/to angels	10,9%	9,3%	16,2%	20,6%	21,1%	12,3%
5	The rest of the congregation	21,9%	20,4%	24,3%	14,6%	8,1%	4,7%
6	To Heavens	23,3%	14,2%	18,0%	13,4%	9,7%	8,7%
7	To Hell	52,8%	12,6%	11,3%	5,5%	3,0%	1,8%
8	To the Holly Liturgy	9,1%	9,3%	12,3%	25,3%	22,1%	12,3%
9	To the pre-aching	16,0%	12,3%	19,4%	17,8%	14,6%	9,5%

Table 10: E19. How close you feel to…. during the Liturgy?

Group	425	438	441	999
Numbers	15	138	74	50 (total 224)
%	6.7%	59.4%	33.0%	18.2%
To God	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	No responses
To Virgin Mary	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Above Average
To Jesus	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Above Average
To a saint/to angels	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average
The rest of the congregation	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average
To Heavens	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average
To Hell	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average
To the Holly Liturgy	Below Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average
To the preaching	Above Average	Above Average	Above Average	Below Average

The Gnostic element of the little traditions

Two popular "Orthodox" sayings, in line with the more 'gnostic' other-worldly and vernacular element of the Orthodox doctrine of morality being a stranger to this "evil world", concerning the relationship of ethical life with achievement are tested in this part of the inquiry (Tiryakian, 1996). Together they argue that the truly religious/ethical person cannot do well in this lifetime since in-worldly achievement necessarily involves unethical contact. Indeed, a third of our sample adheres to such a worldview. Later we are examining its social effects.

Table 11: E20. With which statement do you agree:

	Not at all	Slightly	Some-what	Adequa-tely	Very much	Absolu-tely
Nobody moves ahead "carrying a cross"	19,2%	11,9%	17,8%	15,2%	9,7%	14,2%
The good person suffers in this life but is rewarded in the next one	20,8%	10,3%	16,6%	11,7%	13,6%	14,6%

Immediately after Liturgy

The questions below addressed the actual and immediate effects of attending Liturgy. Half of the respondents were "positively" affected by attendance in all relative matters, while a quarter were positively affected in a secular framework (no mentioning of God but a positive response to psychological matters) while one in five were not affected significantly.

Table 12: E21. How strong you feel after the end of the liturgy:

		Not at all	Slightly	Some-what	Ade-quately	Very much	Abso-lutely
1	The Grace of God	7,9%	7,7%	13,8%	23,9%	24,5%	14,4%
2	Courage	5,7%	7,1%	10,5%	24,5%	28,3%	16,8%
3	Forgiveness for those who hurt me	12,1%	11,3%	18,0%	20,9%	16,2%	12,3%
4	Forgiveness for my sins	13,4%	12,6%	22,3%	19,0%	14,6%	8,5%
5	Tranquility	4,3%	6,3%	12,1%	22,5%	27,1%	17,4%

Belief in supernatural forces

The Orthodox Church, due to its insistence of keeping the doctrine intact as it was formulated in the first Christian centuries, does accept the material presence of the divine and of evilness in this world (Meyendorff, 2012). Thus, it accepts the presence of "evil eye", miracles, and prophecies by living holly men and women. Yet, as it happens, worshippers develop their own idiosyncratic religiosities out of the doctrinal one, "enriching" official religiosity with more "chthonic" elements such as magic spells, and belief in fate.

The results of the survey clearly verify the strength of these "little traditions" as follows.

Table 13: E22. Do you believe in:

		Yes	No
1	Evil eye	65,6%	22,5%
2	Magic spells	32,6%	54,7%
3	Fate	53,2%	34,2%
4	Miracles	69,0%	19,8%
5	Prophecies of saints	63,4%	25,1%

Table 14: The responses to the above beliefs are clustered in five groups:

1	Believe in miracles	23,8%
2	Believe in miracles, prophecies	12,0%
3	Negative answers to all of the above	8,4%
4	Believe in the evil eye, magic spells, miracles, prophecies	17,4%
5	Positive answers to all of the above	37,8%

As we can see, only 8.4% of the sample holds negative views to all of the above. The rest of the sample accepts at least some combinations with more than a third of the sample accepting the presence and significance of all of them.

Icons as symbols of in-worldly divine presence

Close to the above little traditions and usually functioning as a "bridge" between doctrinal observance and magical use are the holy icons. Byzantine-style

icons become 'windows' to the transcendental realm due to their particular antinaturalistic, two-dimensional, artistic configuration which urges the onlooker to gaze through the icon rather than admire the painting per se. Yet, icons are not 'passive'. Instead, in the context of the Greek Orthodox theology they are alive, and so they are perceived by the faithful: they have rich 'biographical dimensions' and 'social life' that is enriched by the legend that surrounds their creation, discovery, and/or location and relocations, by the passage of time and their miracles (Hanganu, 2010). They constitute living objects that are contextualized in the life of the believers through "internal" and "external" narratives referring accordingly to "…the story that the image communicates" and the "social context that produced the image and the social relations within which the image is embedded at any moment of viewing" (Freedberg, 1989: 50). Holy icons are used outside of churches, usually at home and in the workplace as means to sanctify space and keep the worshiper in contact with the divine in routine, "profane", life, and sometimes a saint, whose figure is depicted on a special icon, carried from generation to generation, is considered to be the patron of the family.

Thus, the following questions concerning the use of icons:

Table 15: E23.

		Yes	No
1	Do you have icons at home?	90,7%	8,1%
2	Do you have icons at the workplace?	61,3%	30,4%
3	Do you have a family-saint?	43,7%	45,1%

The strength of the icons is clearly verified by the responses of our sample who place icons higher than church attendance (50% vis-à-vis 90%). Even if we assume that icons are often used for clearly aesthetic reasons without any deeper meaning, the fact than more than four out of ten respondents have a 'family-' or 'patron-saint' verifies the strong presence of icons in the life of the believers, and the strong presence of cult-like worshipping.

Such a centrality of icons in the life of all believers (attendants of Liturgy or not) demand a closer examination of the feelings and thoughts of those who adhere to icon "worshipping". The answers clearly suggest the very strong significance of icon worshipping to roughly two-thirds of the sample which functions both psychologically (tranquility, emotiveness) and doctrinally (awe, presence of God, need to pray, attachment) at the same time.

Table 16: E24. When facing an icon, I feel:

		Not at all	Slightly	Some-what	Ade-quately	Very much	Absolu-tely
1	Tranquility	7,1%	10,3%	12,6%	23,3%	24,7%	14,8%
2	Awe	10,1%	9,3%	11,7%	21,3%	23,7%	16,0%
3	The presence of God	9,1%	11,3%	11,1%	21,3%	23,7%	15,2%
4	Emotiveness	12,3%	11,5%	13,0%	20,8%	20,4%	14,0%
5	Need to pray	9,7%	7,7%	9,1%	21,1%	25,9%	19,4%
6	Attachment to the holly person(s) depicted on it	13,6%	9,3%	16,0%	15,8%	21,5%	14,2%
1	More than average: all of the above				41%		
2	Absolutely: all of the above				17%		
3	Less than average: all of the above				27%		
4	More than average: praying / less than average to all the rest				15%		

Ideological Identity

As expected, the ideological identification of our sample leans toward the right side of the continuum, with only 13,4% being of leftist inclination (0–3 of the scale), 24,4% of rightist inclination (7–10 of the scale), while the rest (46,9%, 4–6 of our scale) identifying themselves as centrists. This self-classification while skewed to the right is not utterly out of touch with the identification of the general population which also identifies itself as predominantly "centrists".

Table 17: E28. Place yourself on the left-right scale

Left										Right
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1,6%	2,2 %	3,8%	5,7%	9,1%	28,7%	9,1%	10,1%	8,9%	1,4%	4,0%

Political orientations

Five different political orientations were tested: Familism (1), ethnic nationalism (2), anarchic individualism (3), collectivism (4) and authoritarianism,

which are all, theoretically speaking, related to the Orthodox religion – doctrinal as well as traditionally.

Table 18: E29

		Absolutely Agree	Agree	Disagree	Absolutely disagree
1	If I consider something to be beneficial for me and my family, I support it without considering the interests of society	12,3%	33,6%	31,0%	9,9%
2	The national culture and our traditions are undermined by the immigrants	12,1%	26,3%	32,6%	17,6%
3	The citizens have the right to react violently to laws which they consider unjust	9,9%	18,4%	38,5%	20,8%
4	The state should care more about the individual rather than the social groups	6,9%	33,0%	37,5%	8,7%
5	Today Greece needs a strong leader capable to solve the various issues	27,7%	28,9%	15,2%	16,8%

Moral Self-identification

The next set of out-of-church items that we wish to take into account and shape and define an individual is the "moral sources of the self" as they have been defined by Charles Taylor and have already being used in a previous study about the constitutive goods of the Greek public sphere. In short, following Taylor (1989: 495–6), we identify two major moral sources of modern life: naturalism and expressivism. Naturalism consists of the rational self-interpretation of the "affirmation of ordinary life", which designates those aspects of human life concerned with "production and reproduction, that is, labor, the making of the things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including marriage and the family" (Taylor, 1989: 211). Expressivism, on the other hand, stands against the one-sided rationality of naturalism since the moral source of a meaningful life lies in the deep inwardness of human feelings and emotions, and is expressed through language, gestures, and art. Here, the moral source is an inner voice,

a creative imagination of the individual or of the community which has to be articulated (Taylor, 1989: 368–90). Expressivism, in contrast to naturalism, describes the individual as embedded in a greater moral unity (God, nature, cosmos, and community). Certainly, this unity is not certain and stable as it was in premodern societies; rather, the individual is called upon to establish such a unity through his creative imagination (Taylor, 1989: 375) and, in effect, through this authenticity to bridge the gap between the mundane world of naturalism and the transcendental. Expressivist forms might have had their origins in high culture, but processes of social equalization and cultural osmosis have brought them down to earth and penetrated everyday life (Taylor, 1989: 66).

The items are as follows: (1) Entertainment, (2) Career, (3) Jesus, (4) Intimacy, (5) meditation, (6) money, (7) competition, (8) voluntarism, (9) happiness, (10) family, (11) political resistance, (12) nationalism.

Table 19: The responses clustered as follows:

1	Jesus, Intimacy, Voluntarism, Family	24,9%
2	Jesus, Happiness, Family	17,6%
3	Career, Competition, Entertainment	17,2%
4	Jesus, Family, Nationalism	13,7%
5	Career, Meditation, Family	9,4%
6	Meditation, Competition	7,6%
7	Entertainment, Career, Intimacy, Money	7,4%
8	Entertainment, Intimacy, Meditation, Political resistance	2,2%

Three out of the eight clusters of Taylor's "moral sources of the self" include the presence of Jesus; yet, the "traditional" rightist motto God-country-family is the least prevalent of them three, and fourth in overall popularity. Interestingly enough, the most prominent of all is a rather late-modern understanding of the religious self which combines "family" with "intimacy" and "voluntarism", while the second most important is a rather "materialist" or traditional understanding of family life. The rest of the constellations strongly demonstrate various combinations of "career" and "competition", with political antinomianism being the least popular of all.

Conceptualization of Democracy

Last in our inquiry is a search for the meaning of "Democracy". Since the Orthodox religion has been identified with anti-liberal anti-individualist notions of political representation, we asked our sample to choose three out of twelve potential definitions of or inspirations for Democracy: (1) People's power, (2) Classical Athenian democracy, (3) Direct democracy, (4) e-coverment, (5) Parliament, (6) Anti-systemic violence, (7) Municipal democracy, (8) Voluntarism, (9) Corruption, (10) the anti-junta 1973 Polytechnic Uprising in Athens, (11) Revolution, and (12) the church congregation.

Table 20: The responses clustered as follows:

1	People's Power, Ancient Athens, Parliament, Voluntarism, Church	31,5%
2	e-government	14,2%
3	Direct democracy	11,6%
4	People's Power, Municipality, Polytechnic Uprising, Revolution	13,3%
5	Parliament, Municipality, Church	10,9%
6	People's power, Polytechnic	10,7%
7	Direct democracy, Anti-systemic Violence, Corruption, Polytechnic, Revolution	5,4%
8	Parliament, Corruption	2,4%

In these clusters, the church congregation appears twice, once amongst a combination of traditional (Ancient Athens, Parliament), mainstream (People's Power) and late-modern, individualistic (Voluntarism) aspects of Democracy, and then in a combination which also includes Parliament and Municipality. As such, the sample supports Democracy in its most substantial form, that is as an anti-elite institution inspired by the ancient prototype but activated by individual action (1), as well as a function of the community for the community (2).

Modelling the overall patterns

If we aggregate the various responses of the sample the following four Models emerge.

Table 21: Model 1: Education, Income, Gender, Marital Status, During/After Liturgy, Little Traditions, Icons

1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6
		Middle/Upper Class	Labor Class		
	MA/PhD	University	High School	Lower High School	
	30–39	40–49	50–59	>60	<29
			Married/Divorced	Widow	Single
		{10.000–15.000} {>40.000}	5.000–10.000		<5.000
		Male	Female		
E19. During Liturgy: "Not at All" to all items	During Liturgy: More than average: 1,2,3 / Less than average: 5,6,9		During Liturgy: More than average: 1,2,3 / Less than average: 5,6,9	During Liturgy: All items: Absolutely	During Liturgy: Somewhat: 1,2,3 / Not at all: 4,5,6,8,9
E21. End of Liturgy: "Not at All" to all items	End of Liturgy: More than average to Tranquility, Courage/ Less than average to Forgiveness			End of Liturgy: "Absolutely" to all items	End of Liturgy: Slightly to all items
E22. You believe in: "Not at all" to all items	You believe in: Yes to Miracles and Icons	You believe in: Yes to Evil eye, Magic spells, Prophecies and Icons	You believe in: Yes to all		You believe in: Yes to miracles and icons
E23. Icons: "Not at All" to all items	Icons: More than average to Praying. Less than average to Awe, Emotiveness			Icons: "Absolutely" to all items	Icons: Less than average to all

There are two groups of constellations which are of particular interest in Model 1: first, the group that either totally rejects (1.1) or almost rejects (1.6) Liturgy, little traditions and icons. The full rejection of the Liturgy and everything

related to it, combined with the rejection of the little traditions and of the icons and their various meanings seems to be either an "arbitrary" decision irrespective of demographic identity (column 1.1), or an attitude of the single young individuals of low-income (1.6).

The rest of the identified demographic groups (1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5) which combine gender, age, marital and educational groups seem to accept various aspects of the Liturgy and its effects, as well as various combinations of the little traditions and of the icons. In other words, the same Orthodox religiosity is accepted across the demographic spectrum of the sample. And in all cases, Liturgy serves to strengthen the spiritual but not the social aspect of worshipping (see E19, E21).

Table 22: Model 2: Attend Liturgy, Gnostic worldview, Praying, Little traditions, Icons

3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
E9	Attend Liturgy Often		Attend Liturgy Rarely	
E20a	"Carrying the cross" -Strongly Agree		"Carrying the cross" – Strongly Disagree	"Carrying the cross" – Somewhat/Adequately Agree
E20b	"Vindication of the sufferer" – Strongly Agree		"Vindication of the sufferer" – Strongly Disagree	"Vindication of the sufferer": Slightly agree/ disagree
E18 Never praying	Praying often		Praying sometimes	
E19 During Liturgy close to: Not at All to all items	During Liturgy close to: above average 1,2,3 / below average 5,6,9	During Liturgy close to: Absolutely to 1,2,3, and Very Much to 5,6,9	During Liturgy close to: Slightly to 1,2,3 / Not at All to 4,5,6,8,9	During Liturgy close to: Very Much to 1,2,3 / Slightly or Not At All to 5,6,9
E21 End of Liturgy: Not at All to all items	End of Liturgy: Above average to all items	End of Liturgy: Absolutely to all items	End of Liturgy: Slightly to all items	End of Liturgy: Absolutely Tranquility Courage / Not forgiveness
E22 Do you believe in: Not at All to all items E23 No icons	Do you believe in: Evil eye, Magic spells, Miracles, Prophecy. Icons at home		Do you believe in: Miracles. Icons at home	Do you believe in: Miracles. Icons at home

Liturgy attendance and praying are strongly correlated (3.2 and 3.4) and affect the strength of feelings and thoughts during and after Liturgy with a clear distinction between the triplet God(head), Mary and Jesus on the one hand and other items on the other with the first group eliciting stronger emotions and attention than the rest. They are also directly correlated with the gnostic conceptualization of the world as a place of sin and the otherworldly vindication of the true believer. Also, strong attendance and frequent praying strongly correlate with all of the little traditions.

Of the rest three constellations, one (3.1) rejects all aspects of religiosity without reference to attendance or praying, one is strongly focused on the triplet God(head), Mary and Jesus and intense after-the-Liturgy feelings without any other special characteristic (3.3), while the last has mild feelings toward the gnostic aspect of Orthodoxy, feels strongly for the above mentioned triplet during Liturgy and is psychologically rewarded by the Liturgy without extending it to its "absolution" social components of forgiveness. As in Model 1, the worshiper focuses on the divine presence during the Liturgy rather than the social aspects of participating in a congregation of co-worshippers (see E19).

Last, all various religiosity aspects of this group of constellations have in common the presence of icons in the everyday life of the believers.

Table 23: Model 3: Political orientations, Ideologies, Liturgical emotiveness, Icons, Morality, and Democracy

MODEL 3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
E28 Left-Right Scale			CENTER/DON'T KNOW-NA	LEFT	RIGHT
E19 Feel close during Liturgy	Not at All: all items	Below Average: all items	Below Average: all items	Below Average: all items	Above Average: all items
E21 Feel after Liturgy	Courage: ENOUGH The rest of the items: NOT AT ALL	All items: ENOUGH { Courage: N.A.}	Grace of God, Courage, Tranquility: ENOUGH the rest of the items: SOMEWHAT	All items: NOT AT ALL	All items: ABSOLUTELY
E22 Believe in	NO to all items	YES to all items	YES to Miracles/ Prophesies/Icons	NO to all items	NO to Fate YES to the rest of the items

MODEL 3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
E23/24 Possess Icons Facing an Icon	NO to all	YES Icons Average to all	YES Icons Average to all	YES Icons Below Average: all ITEMS	All items: ABSOLU-TELY
E29 Political orienta-tions 1. family interest 2. Immigrants as threat 3. violence by citizens 4. Individual abo-ve collectivity 5. Strong leader		DISAGREE to Strong Leader AGREE to all other items	DON'T KNOW to Strong Leader & Family-interest DISAGREE/ STRONGLY DISAGREE to all other		STRONLGY AGREE: All items
E30 Moral self-identifi-cation 1 entertainment 2 career 3 Jesus 4 Intimacy 5 Self-awareness 6 money 7 competition 8 Voluntarism 9 happiness 10 family 11 Political strife 12 nationalism		{3,9, 10}	{3, 4} /{5, 7}/ {2, 7}/ {2, 9, 10}	{1, 4, 5, 7, 11}/ {1, 2, 4, 6}/ {1, 2, 4, 7}	{3, 8, 10}/ {3, 10, 12}
E31 Democracy 1 Popular power 2 Classical demo-cracy 3 Direct demo-cracy 4 Electronic de-mocracy 5 Parliament 6 Anti-system 7 Municipal politi-cal processes 8 Voluntarism 9 corruption 10 Polytechnic uprising 11 revolution 12 Church			{3}/ {5, 7, 12} / {1, 10}/ {4}	{3, 6, 9, 10, 11}/ {5, 9}/ {1, 7, 10, 11}	{1, 2, 5, 8, 12}

In this constellation the three basic ideological orientations Left (E28.0-E28.3), Center (E28.4-E28.6), and Right (E.28.7E28.10) are seen in full alignment with the Orthodox religiosity, that is, liturgical effervescence (E19, E21), adherence to little traditions (E22), possession and emotive responses to icons (E22, E23), strong anti-collectivism, anti-immigration, antinomian, familial and paternalistic feelings and orientation (E29) – the more emersed someone is to Orthodox religiosity, the more he/she identifies his/herself with the political right. And this correlation extends to matters of moral identification, whereas "Jesus" and "family" appear in both rightist sets (E30: {3,8,10} and {3,10,12}) and definition of democracy (E31: {1,2,5,8,12}). Reversely, the more distant someone is to the liturgical ritual and the cultural dispositions of Orthodoxy the more distant is from the rightist disposition. Interestingly enough, someone who identifies his/herself as leftist is not completely cut off from the Orthodox religiosity but adheres to some rites (above all possession of icons) and keeps a light relationship with the liturgical rites. We should also note that attachment to the Orthodox religiosity is not correlated with frequency of attendance.

The model crystalizes, in its most vivid manifestation, the intermingling of religious and secular-political worldviews of our sample – and especially so the rightist and the leftist orientation thereof. Starting with the leftist worldview, and taking into account the very distance from matters religious (E18, E9), 'holding the cross' (E20.1) could be nothing but an allegory for socialism, i.e., the envisioning of the political struggle as an in-worldly moral crusade to save the world. Yet, as the crusade always fails (especially so in Greece after the disastrous SYRIZA governance 2015–2019), the 'afterlife' (E20.2) (whatever that means for the respondent – most probably, the historical account) becomes the domain of justification.

For the rightist the situation is reversed – and, indeed, revealing. For the part of our sample that defines itself as 'rightist' follows the vernacular Orthodox conceptualization of good and evil as it was first recorded by Campbell (1964) concerning the public sphere of the mountainous tribe of the Sarakatsans, as a Fallen immoral world up for grabs, whereas the individual accepts immorality as a necessary evil and does not hesitate to become a sinner himself (women remain at home and far from sin) for the sake of success – only to ask for forgiveness during Lent, in a perpetual circle of sin-and-forgiveness. In this vein, the strong follower of the Orthodox rite 'experiences' the religious symbols as described at the beginning of the article and projects them on the self and the public sphere as doctrines: Christian ethics are a hindrance to earthly success (E20.1) (and, we add, need to be broken when necessary) but a true *believer* is, at the end of the day rewarded (E20.2) in this life – exactly as Campbell's

Sarakatsans believed. In other words, while the leftist projects his/her ideology onto religion, the rightist projects his/her religion onto ideology and declares by default that he/she is a rightist ideologue.

Table 24: Model 4: Gnostic worldview, Ideology, Political orientation, Church attendance, Morality and Democracy

MODEL 4	4.1	4.2	4.3
E20.1 Nobody moves ahead "holding a cross"	AGREE/DIS-AGREE	STRONLGY AGREE	STRONLGY DISAGREE
E20.2 The good person suffers in this life but is rewarded in the afterlife	AGREE/DIS-AGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
E28	Center	Right	Left
E18		Pray OFTEN	Pray RARELY/ NEVER
E9		Church OFTEN	Church RARELY
E30 Moral self-identification 1 entertainment 2 career 3 Jesus 4 Intimacy 5 Self-awareness 6 money 7 competition 8 Voluntarism 9 happiness 10 family 11 Political strife 12 nationalism	{2, 7} {2, 9, 10}	{3, 4, 8} {3, 10, 12} {3, 9, 10}	{1, 4, 5, 7, 11} {5, 7} {1, 2, 4, 6} {1, 2, 4, 7}
E31 Democracy 1 Popular power 2 Classical democracy 3 Direct democracy 4 Electronic democracy 5 Parliament 6 Anti-system 7 Municipal political processes 8 Voluntarism 9 Corruption 10 Polytechnic uprising 11 revolution 12 church	{3} {1, 10}	{5, 7, 12} {1, 2, 5, 8, 12}	{3, 6, 9, 10, 11} {5, 9} {4} {1, 7, 10, 11}

Yet, both of these groups are united in that their ideologies are in reality projections of fantasies –not 'imagined' institutional projects; they both ignore

as insignificant the ordinary temporal and material world and they situated Weberian 'salvation', that is ways to bridge the gap between the immanent and the transcendental domains outside history, in an atemporal 'boundless will', indeed in an 'ocean of emotions unescorted by reason' (the rightists), or an 'endless expectation' (the leftists). This is clearly seen in the constitutive goods and especially so the ways they choose to depict Democracy.

Accordingly, for the rightists 'Jesus' appears in all three combinations of constitutive goods together with family, intimacy, nationalism, happiness and voluntarism (probably meaning church philanthropy), while 'Church' appears in both sets of Democracy – in combination either with established institutions (items 5,7,12), or with a populist mixture thereof (1,2,5, 8, 12). As for the leftists, they choose a multitude of gratifying and individualistic constitutive goods (not chosen by the rightists) and a much greater variety of definitions of democracy which tend to reject constitutional democracy.

Surprisingly, those who choose a centrist identification, show a poverty of both constitutive goods and of definitions of democracy.

Conclusions

The study examined the impact of Greek Orthodox religiosity in shaping the views of our church-going sample in matters that form the modern Greek public sphere, and in particular definitions of democracy, preferences of constitutive goods and political preferences. In a sense we tested a certain cultural institutional factor amongst those which, according to Shmuel Eisenstadt and his theory of multiple modernities, shape particular notions and institutionalizations of modernity (Eisenstadt 2000).

The study suggests that the Greek Orthodox religion strongly shapes the public sphere, both directly and indirectly, not just as an external identity or as the institutional power of the Church of Greece (which is substantial), but through the states of consciousness it cultivates during the Liturgy. This effect is more prominent and direct on those who declare a rightist ideological orientation and incorporate in full the ideal-type of the Orthodox self: egoist and paternalist.[1] In addition to this, the findings indicate that the same social group projects democracy as a church congregation: a flock-like passive sum of self-confined individuals. The study also suggests, though only tentatively, that the Orthodox religion as practical religiosity also affects the mode of political conceptualization of the opposite side –those who are self-identified as

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1   For a full description of the Orthodox ideal-type self, see Marangudakis with Chadjipadelis 2019, Chapter 4, 109–152)

anti-clericalist leftists– in the sense that the latter define democracy via their imagistic (not 'imagined') projections and desires (revolution, the Polytechnic Uprising, corruption) while utterly rejecting both democratic institutional arenas and voluntarism.

As a final note, we would like to hypothesize that the strong anti-vaccination attitude exhibited today as we speak by the religious right is strongly positively correlated to the worshipers' devotion to icons and observance of the little traditions. This is a matter of further research.

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