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**Essays in
Ottoman and Turkish History,
1774–1923**

The Impact of the West

Roderic H. Davison

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*To my students,
who for the past fifty years have made the teaching of
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a stimulating adventure,
and
to the librarians, archivists,
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institutions—colleagues
whose help has made the search and the writing so
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Introduction

The Ottoman Empire at the start of the nineteenth century still covered a vast territory, including all of North Africa except Morocco, the whole Balkan peninsula, Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and parts of the Arabian peninsula. Its hold on much of the area was, however, tenuous. Its peoples were many; Turks numbered somewhat fewer than half. In a world increasingly dominated by European power and increasingly agitated by nationalist sentiments this multi-ethnic Ottoman state struggled to survive. In its last century and a half it experienced both successes and failures in the quest for greater viability. After suffering defeat in the First World War, however, it finally disappeared. Among its successor states was the Turkish Republic, which established itself in the Anatolian core of the old empire.

All the essays in this volume excepting the first, a broad survey of Turkish history, examine events or developments in this period of Ottoman decline and reform, and of the birth of the republic. The modern history of Europe is often taken to begin with the French Revolution of 1789. The beginning of the modern history of the Ottoman Empire is sometimes linked to a dramatic event produced by that revolution, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. But the beginning can also conveniently be put at 1774, the year of the peace treaty sealing a major defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, an event that pushed the Ottoman sultans toward more serious efforts at westernizing reforms. The essays begin with this treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. They end essentially with the treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which launched the republic on its life as an independent sovereign state. Most of them focus on political and diplomatic developments, but they also concern religious, intellectual, social, and economic aspects of the Ottoman world. Eleven of these studies, written for varying purposes, appeared originally in widely scattered publications over a span of thirty-three years, beginning in 1948. They are here collected for the first time and again made available. One new study, on the advent of the electric telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, has been included. Because each essay is designed to stand alone, there is occasional overlapping when one complements another.

Although independent, the essays are linked by a common theme. The linkage, which was not intentional when they were written, flows logically from the course that Ottoman history took in these years. Every essay deals with change, and in every case with change that came about because of the impact of the West. The essay "Foreign and Environmental Contributions to the Po-

litical Modernization of Turkey" focuses most specifically on that impact, but all reflect change that occurred directly or indirectly because of contact with the West.

For the Ottomans, the West in the modern period was essentially Europe. America was distant and uninvolved; individual Americans had some impact on Ottoman society, but it was modest. Europe meant, in general, a somewhat French-flavored western civilization shared by peoples in a number of large and small states, in many of which technology and industry were advancing rapidly. More specifically, Europe meant the great powers, the governments who dominated international affairs and referred to themselves as the Concert of Europe. From the eighteenth century until 1861 they were the Pentarchy of Europe—Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Then Italy was added as a sixth power when it became a unified kingdom, and in 1871 the unified imperial Germany replaced Prussia. Russia was a member of this western group, a full participant in European great power politics and also since the time of Peter the Great a country consciously westernizing first the military and then some other aspects of Russian life. Only after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was Russia split from her great power fellows to become "East." In the essay "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne" there appear "Easterners" among the Turks, those who in the postwar nationalist struggle looked to Russia for cooperation and aid, as opposed to the "Westerners," who preferred ties to the western European powers.

The impact of the West was felt in the Ottoman Empire in many ways. The most direct was military defeat. Most of that came at the hands of Russia. Between 1768 and 1918 there were seven Ottoman-Russian wars, in every one of which Russian forces invaded Ottoman territory. The first of these, ending in Ottoman defeat and the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, set the precedent for Ottoman defeat in all the others except the Crimean War of 1853–1856, when Britain and France aided the Ottomans. The last was the Great War of 1914–1918, which saw Russian victory in 1915–1916 reversed by Ottoman victory in 1917–1918 when the Bolshevik revolution convulsed Russia. But the Ottoman victory proved to be ephemeral, as the same two powers who had supported the Ottomans in the Crimea were, this time, the instruments of their defeat and humiliation in 1918. Their empire was on its deathbed.

The great powers also on occasion took Ottoman territory for themselves, not only by conquest but also by occupation declared "temporary" or by diplomatic convention forced on the Istanbul government. Five of the six great powers helped themselves to Ottoman provinces between 1830 and 1912. Only Germany did not, but she coveted the great central Baghdad Railway sphere in Anatolia, as the study of "The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914" makes clear. During the Great War the Allied powers further secretly and prospectively partitioned much of the Ottoman Empire for themselves, by the Constantinople agreement of 1915 and the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and

others. These furnished the background, although not as it turned out the exact model, for the devastating treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that reduced Turkey to a nubbin and spurred the nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal to new efforts. In sum, the Ottoman Empire took a severe battering at the hands of the European powers through the course of a century and a half.

Defeat and despoiling by the West were supplemented by diplomatic pressure and interference in Ottoman domestic affairs. This interference, especially by Britain and France, was at times aimed at strengthening the Ottoman state; sometimes it was not. Almost always, however, the diplomatic pressure was resented by the Sublime Porte. Often the European powers used diplomatic intervention to further the cause of one or another of the minority peoples, usually Christian, in the empire. This sort of interference was the most threatening when practiced by Russia, an immediate neighbor. Russian misuse of the articles in the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca permitting her to build and protect a church in Istanbul bothered the Ottomans on several occasions and helped to bring on the Crimean War. Russian raising of the Armenian question in 1912 for the purpose of expanding her own influence in Anatolia furnishes a prime example of diplomatic interference. It led, among other things, to a conference of all the great powers held in the Ottomans' own capital, but with no Ottoman participation.

The western impact was felt not only in war, territorial conquest, and diplomatic intervention but also in the economic dominance that Europe acquired in the Ottoman domains. European manufactures, more and more machine produced, supplanted indigenous wares in many instances. Europe's technological advantage was magnified by extraterritorial rights benefiting their merchants and goods that the powers had gained in earlier years. Among the capitulatory rights were very low Ottoman import duties. These concessions, once unilateral grants by the sultans, became enshrined in the eighteenth century in bilateral treaties between the Porte and European powers—now a matter of right rather than of gift. The low import duties were confirmed by an Ottoman-British commercial convention of 1838, along with Ottoman export duties at a higher rate, increasing thus the disadvantage under which Ottoman manufactures labored. Other western powers secured commercial conventions with the Porte on the same model. In addition, the Ottoman Empire went into debt to westerners, beginning at the time of the Crimean War. The Porte sold bonds, many of them on the European market, failed in 1876 to meet the interest payments, and thereafter came under European financial tutelage. The Council of the Public Debt, although it was an Ottoman organ, was created to represent the European creditors. From 1881 on it collected and disbursed some of the most important Ottoman revenues for the benefit of the bondholders.

Among the western influences that affected the Ottoman Empire the nationalist spirit became perhaps the most unsettling. This sentiment, burgeoning first in western Europe, spread to Ottoman minority peoples geographically,

from the western provinces to the eastern, over the period of a century. The Greeks felt it first and revolted in 1821, getting also some great power support. Other Balkan peoples followed the same course. The last revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the name of nationalism came with the Arab rising of 1916, during the Great War. Muslim peoples came generally to nationalism later than the Christian peoples, and among the later ones to feel the impact of this western force were the Turks themselves.

Military defeat, territorial loss, diplomatic interference, economic subordination, and nationalist revolt impelled the Porte to seek strengthening—through military reorganization, administrative reform, educational development, financial and economic rejuvenation, and other measures. The reform process itself naturally led to the greater impact of the West by the adaptation of western concepts, practices, and institutions, such as appear throughout these essays: new-style army drill, the equality of rights of all subjects, representative bodies of various sorts, new law codes, constitution, foreign loans, paper money, secular schools, a diplomatic corps, newspapers, and many other innovations of western origin. Mechanical objects and hardware like the printing press, the telegraph, Krupp arms, and ironclad naval vessels were even easier to import from the West and had a more immediate impact than ideas and modes of acting. But the ideas continued to flow—not only legal and political, technological and scientific, but literary and artistic also. A high point came with Ismet Paşa's insistence at the Lausanne conference on territorial and political sovereignty for Turkey, western style: secure national boundaries, no capitulations, no economic or judicial servitudes, no western interference in independent Turkey's domestic affairs. Ismet and the nationalists used the concepts of the West to combat domination by the West.

When institutions or practices adapted from the West were launched they often met with opposition from major segments of Ottoman society. The concept of an equal and secular citizenship of all Ottoman subjects did not sit well with conservative Muslims. Secular schools also could arouse protest. Not infrequently a conflict of cultures emerged, bolstered by the common Muslim bias against innovation as something inherently bad, even blasphemous. Sometimes the reform process eventuated in a dualism—two sets of institutions side by side, one derived from the example of the West, one more traditional: two sets of schools, two kinds of law. But paralleling the conflict of cultures there was also a confluence of civilizations, as some concepts and institutions borrowed from the West took root and grew over the years: the representative principle, constitution, journalism. There was, in effect, a continuity of change under the impact of the West, not always at an even pace but never arrested.

When western ideas or institutions were adapted to Ottoman use, their advocates were almost always members of the official elite. Westernization came from the top down, from individuals usually concerned with the func-

tioning of government and ultimately with the salvation of the empire. Westernizing changes did not, as might have been the case in western European countries in analagous situations of change, well up from a vigorous yeomanry or an increasingly prosperous bourgeoisie but rather trickled down from an administrative, diplomatic, and military elite. Furthermore the changes, as well as coming from the top down, frequently came from the outside in and backward. Externals sometimes preceded essentials—Mahmud II's soldiers and civil officials, for instance, were put into western-style uniforms and costumes before they were trained in new methods or had acquired a new mentality. The backward nature of some reforms is exemplified by the desire to introduce the end product before the infrastructure was complete—the establishment of a university, for example, before the nascent school system was sufficient to undergird it. But by whatever methods and in whatever order they were introduced, western concepts and western institutions, as well as western gadgets, continued to make an impact.

The study of Ottoman history has made progress since World War II, world over and especially in the United States, where before the war it was almost nonexistent. These essays reflect, in their widening of sources, an aspect of that progress. The essay that was published earliest—in 1948, although actually written in first draft in 1938—was able to draw on no materials in Turkish, although it used a few Turkish materials available in French. The later essays have used many more materials in Turkish, both published and archival, for since 1948 sources in Turkish have become much more widely available. One reason is that some libraries in the United States and in Canada have built up important collections in that language. Another is that since the war a new generation of historians has grown up in Turkey who are doing research, writing histories, and publishing documents, which then are available elsewhere. The third reason is that Turkish libraries and Ottoman archives have been made more accessible to scholars. There are of course auxiliary reasons in the postwar development of Turkish-language courses, Middle East centers, the provision of travel and research funds, and inauguration of teaching positions in Turkish history and Turkish studies more broadly.

It is interesting to recall now that half a century ago, in the summer of 1939, I started to travel to Istanbul on a fellowship to learn to read Ottoman manuscript documents and, if possible, to do research in the Başvekâlet Arşivi, as it became known, the Prime Ministry archive housing voluminous Ottoman records. At that time Turkish, whether old or new, was taught in no American university. One had to seek private instruction or be an autodidact, or combine the two. An American historian who had pursued that course most successfully, Walter L. Wright, Jr., had been on the Princeton faculty and then had moved to Istanbul to be president of Robert College. He knew the archives there, knew that a specialist from Hungary had been helping to clas-

sify materials, knew that some of the Turkish professors could do research there, and encouraged me to see if I could also. But the war that started with Hitler's invasion of Poland came while I was en route. The fellowship administrators insisted that I return to the United States. In the years that followed, the arranging of the Ottoman archives proceeded slowly. By the 1950s some western scholars were admitted to do research there. Ultimately, I was able to do so on a number of occasions.

The greater availability of Turkish sources has changed, and will continue to change, western writing on Ottoman history, including the history of the period from 1774 to 1923 in which the western impact was so marked. The Ottoman Empire of those years used commonly to be regarded as an object of the West, rather than as an actor in its own right. The "sick man of Europe" concept was often present. Further, most of what was produced was political, military, or diplomatic history in which the Ottoman viewpoint was largely forgotten. These kinds of history are immensely important and, as Ottoman records have become available, are being much more objectively pursued. They are not, however, sufficient. The western view of Ottoman history has been broadening, as it should. Institutional history of the nineteenth century has begun to come of age, and intellectual history also, including the history of literature. More recently still, Ottoman economic history of that century has found some practitioners—not just those who detail how deeply the Ottoman Empire was in debt to the West, but those who investigate crafts, industry, transportation, communication, labor, agriculture, commerce, and capital. These fields merge into social history, which in many ways is nearly unplowed, including the history of the family and of women in the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Research on such topics can sometimes be assisted by viewpoints developed in the social sciences. And as archival work brings more and more data to light, statistics will play a bigger role, as they are already beginning to do. Demographic studies are among those now profiting from data collection and statistical analysis.

Two or three other approaches to later Ottoman history can prove fruitful. One is biography. A great tradition existed in the Ottoman Empire, which carried over into the Republican period, of the biographical sketch, the *hal tercümesi*. But there is hardly as yet a single major biography in the Ottoman period, in Turkish or in any language, comparable to the two-volume life and letters of a dead Englishman, or to the life and times of a French, German, or American statesman or general or poet. No first-class biography exists even of a sultan of the late Ottoman period. Several attempts to write one for Abdülhamid II have fallen short of the mark. The history of a sultan could turn into another genre, a period history, so valuable in the study of western societies. Even the history of a decade, the complete fabric of life in a short period, could be one of the most profitable ventures for a historian. Still another area worth cultivating is local history, which exists in rudimentary form

in Turkish for a good many localities in Anatolia, and in more sophisticated form for some of the non-Turkish provinces, but this still leaves room for much investigation in the last Ottoman century. In some areas local records abound. The twin pitfalls of local patriotic piety and unsynthesized chronicle need to be avoided.

Finally, at the other extreme from local history, the Ottoman Empire as a whole needs works of synthesis. It may be that only team effort can do this well. The later Ottoman Empire, as indicated in the opening paragraph, was immense, although it was shrinking. It was made up of peoples who used about a dozen written languages, and it dealt with great powers who used five other major languages. That magnificent bibliographical tool that Andreas Tietze and Georg Hazai and their collaborators in Vienna and Budapest have given us annually since 1975, the *Turkologischer Anzeiger/Turkology Annual*, searches out and classifies books and articles in all those languages and more. Ideally, those who work in Ottoman history will use materials in all these tongues. But for any one mortal historian that seems unlikely. Cooperative effort among historians of differing language backgrounds may be one trend for the future.

These observations and hopes apply to Ottoman history in general, but they apply also to those aspects of later Ottoman history that reflect the influence of western governments and armies, western statesmen and diplomats, western ideas and institutions, western techniques and inventions. The essays that follow examine some phases of Ottoman and Turkish history where these influences played a significant part. A brief note has been added after the notes for some of the essays to call attention to a few scholarly works that supplement the essay and that have appeared since it was written.

Turks since the earliest centuries of the Christian era have been moving west. The Ottoman Empire followed this course. From its inception it had close contact with the West. At first this was the Byzantine Empire, then other states and peoples. The Ottomans pushed their way deep into Europe, nearly to Vienna. The impact in those days was probably more one of the Ottomans on the West than the reverse. There is a considerable literature on this broad topic. After the Ottomans were halted for the second time at Vienna, in 1683, the West began to have a greater impact on the Ottomans, in such ways as are outlined above. The first essay will provide some background on the Ottoman rise and ensuing decline, and then on the years 1774 to 1923 in which the other essays fit.

Note

Except for corrections of some typographical and a few factual errors, the essays are republished here as they originally appeared. The spelling of Turkish names and Turkish words is not completely standardized, as some appear in modern Turkish spelling in one place and in a conventional Anglicized spelling in another. The index will show both spellings and will contain cross-references.

The modern Turkish alphabet is phonetic. Most of its consonants are pronounced as in English, and most of its vowels as in Italian. There are a few exceptions. Turkish *c* is an English *j*, as in "jam." Turkish *ç* is an English *ch*, as in "chin," and the *ş* is an English *sh*, as in "shin." Among vowels, Turkish *ö* and *ü* are like the same vowels in German, or like the French vowels in *peu* and *tu*. Turkish has both a dotted *i*, pronounced rather like the *i* in the English "fin," and an undotted *i*, sounded like the *i* in English "fir." A Turkish *ğ*, with a soft mark over it, is practically a vowel; it can lengthen the vowel that precedes it. A circumflex also lengthens a vowel. Thus, Ali and Âli are different names. The latter is equivalent to Aali, which is how the famous Âli Paşa signed his name when writing French.

All dates in the text are in the Gregorian calendar, not in one of the calendars used in the Ottoman Empire. Some publication dates of works cited in the notes are in Hicrî years.

Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923

10. The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914

The eastern or “Armenian” provinces of Turkey, since 1945 again the object of Russian claims, have long been one of the sensitive spots occupying the attention of European statesmen. In the two years before Sarajevo the question of the future of this region took on the proportions of a diplomatic crisis. When the question arose in serious form at the end of 1912, the Turks had just lost almost all their European territories in disastrous defeat at the hands of the Balkan states. Statesmen and journalists began to wonder whether Asiatic Turkey would hold together. As early as December of 1912 rumors of the partition of Asiatic Turkey became frequent.¹ Such a partition threatened complications even more serious for the relationships of the powers than the settlement of the Balkan confusion.² Spheres of strategic, economic, and cultural interests were all involved, as well as questions of prestige and a possible test of strength, a year before it actually came, between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. What brought the crisis to the fore was a new edition of the old Armenian question, last a concern of the powers in 1897—the question of the government of the Armenian provinces by the Turks, of necessary reforms, and of possible autonomy or separation.

Both the question of reforms and the crisis threatening partition in these years have been forgotten, although at that time the European chancelleries took the whole affair very seriously. This forgetfulness is easily explained. The crisis over Armenia was sandwiched in between the more dramatic events of the Tripolitan and Balkan wars on the one hand, and the World War on the other. For a time the dispute over Liman von Sanders overshadowed it. Those who are interested especially in Armenian affairs have concentrated on the supervening massacres and deportations of 1915. Because of its importance then, and its significance now, the 1912–1914 crisis is worth reconstructing.

An edict of reforms for the Armenian *vilayets* (provinces) had been wrung from Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1895 by European pressure.³ On paper, the scheme promised to be reasonably effective, but, like many Ottoman reforms, it remained only paper. Russia, engaged in holding down her own Armenians in Transcaucasia, did not press the issue; France, Germany, and Austria, for various reasons, did not want to risk the partition of Turkey; and the attention

of the powers was soon distracted by the Cretan problem. Abdul Hamid sent out an inspector general for reforms, who did nothing.⁴ The lot of the Armenians did not improve. The recent massacres were the one topic of conversation among them, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation continued its activities, although in a more subdued manner.⁵

Wild rejoicing among Armenians, and great hopes for the future, arose with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Armenians co-operated with the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). A few steps were, in fact, made toward realizing the Armenian hopes. Their newspapers and schools could speak more freely. Less brutality accompanied tax collection. A gendarmerie reorganized by the French General Baumann and other Europeans in 1909 operated from its Trebizond headquarters to increase public order and safety in eastern Anatolia. In 1912 the Porte started to make effective a new *vilayet* law providing for greater provincial self-government.⁶ But these embryonic measures of improvement from 1908 to 1912 were far outweighed by old and new grievances. When measured against the hopes of 1908, furthermore, the situation seemed to the Armenians as black as ever.

Armenian disillusionment sprang from the massacres of 1909, the so-called “Cilician vespers” in Lesser Armenia for which the Young Turks must bear a goodly share of the responsibility.⁷ More lasting troubles came with Kurd depredations in Greater Armenia. The chief source of conflict between Kurds and Armenians was the land problem. Wandering Kurds had seized the lands of many Armenians who had been massacred, or had fled, in 1895. When some of the refugees returned after 1908, the Kurds would not restore the lands; indeed, the government was powerless to prevent further seizures of Armenian property. From 1909 on there was what the French vice-consul in Van described as real war between the two peoples.⁸

Advantage rested with the Kurds, however, for two reasons. The first was that they were armed, whereas most Armenians were not. When the Turkish government tried to disarm all troublemakers in Armenia, they were successful only among the sedentary population, which was largely Armenian; wandering Kurds were still armed. The second reason was that subordinate Turkish officials tended to favor their fellow Moslems against the Christian Armenians. The gendarmerie was handicapped since all Greater Armenia contained not a mile of railroad before 1914, and because what roads existed were poor. In 1911–1912 the situation became worse as troops were taken from eastern Anatolia to Tripoli and the Balkans. The Armenian divisions were called to the Balkan front in 1912, and the Armenian peasantry was thus left without military protection. The Young Turks, furthermore, soon turned from equality and Ottomanization to Turkification, stifling previous Armenian hopes. This policy extended even to limiting the privileges of the Armenian Patriarch Arsharouni, installed at Constantinople in 1912.⁹ In short, the constitutional regime had done little for the Armenians.

Under these conditions, Armenian voices began to make themselves heard. There was no unanimity, however, among them. Many, haunted by fears of massacre and loss of land, seem to have favored Russian protection but at the same time to have feared a possible Russian annexation as being only a change of masters.¹⁰ The peasant mass was not very vocal. Higher classes of Ottoman Armenians wished rather for a regenerated and orderly Turkey and thought that autonomy would be possible only within Turkey and not under Russian domination. By the end of 1911, through their patriarch and delegations of the assembly of the semiautonomous Gregorian *millet*, or “nation,” these Armenians were appealing to the grand vizier for protection against Kurds and for a land settlement. New depredations in the fall of 1912 led to new protests. The Ottoman council of ministers was genuinely concerned, made promises, appointed commissions, and laid plans for redemption payments to dispossessed Armenians, but results were negligible. Beset with wars and diplomatic problems and not wishing to antagonize the Kurds, the Porte was in an extremely difficult position.¹¹

Armenian political societies, constituted outside the official *millet*, also became more vocal. Because they were organized, these societies had more influence than their mere membership warranted. Aimed at improving the lot of Armenians in both Russia and Turkey, and ultimately at liberating the Turkish Armenians, the societies had since their origin at the end of the nineteenth century collected members of all hues—socialists, anarchists, and freethinkers, among others. Their ramifications extended to America, France, Switzerland, and Austria. Of the four principal groups, the Verakazmial and the Ramkavar were the more moderate and the least influential. The Hintchak and the Dashnakzouthiun were socialist and revolutionary, though their programs were subject to change. It is difficult to estimate the hold of these societies on the mass of Armenians, though it is certain that they had many enemies as well as friends; it is difficult also to distinguish the opinions of their members in Turkey from those of members elsewhere. But the position of the Dashnakzouthiun, otherwise called the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, is fairly clear. It was easily the leading society by this time, claiming for itself in 1907 a membership of 165,000.¹²

The Dashnaks had co-operated with the Young Turks in the 1908 revolution and continued to work with them until 1913. They were socialist and revolutionary and had stores of arms, but they restricted their actions for the most part to a cultural and legal plane after the revolution. Their program was essentially one of reform within the Ottoman Empire. They did not believe that Russian occupation of Armenia would bring them more freedom, though it would bring more order. Varandian, writing as a member of the Dashnakzouthiun, asked reforms and autonomy for Turkish Armenia, saying that a complete separation of Armenia from Turkey was ethnographically and geographically impossible. By the beginning of 1913, however, relations between

the Dashnaks and the Committee of Union and Progress, representing the Young Turk group now in power, were becoming strained. On February 1, 1913, all the Dashnak members of the CUP's committee on national defense stayed away from a vital session.¹³ Dashnak members also approached foreign powers. A Russian Dashnak, Dr. Zavriev, called on the Russian ambassador in Constantinople to complain about the treatment of his fellows in Turkey, and to ask advice. The ambassador reports that he cautioned him against revolutionary activities that might provoke the Turks. Armenians, he said, must be victims in the eyes of Europe.¹⁴ On the whole, the Dashnakzouthiun seems not yet to have favored separatism or Russian occupation, but to have pursued a policy of waiting and pressure for reforms and autonomy. Its representatives co-operated with conservative Armenians in the *millet* assembly of November, 1912. It constituted, however, a potential threat to the Porte, and it could present the Armenian case abroad as well as within the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵

Public opinion the world over was soon made conscious of the Armenian problem. When the Balkan wars broke out, Armenians saw both an example of a fight for freedom and an opportunity for action. Their agitation increased. The magazine *Pro Armenia* reappeared in Paris. Armenians resident in Japan and Burma sent appeals to the Hague Court. *Armenia*, printed in the United States, carried articles directed at awakening world opinion for reform. The Armenian colony in Paris petitioned the president of France for a solution to their problems in Turkey. The British embassy in Constantinople was approached by Armenians who asked for the execution of the guarantees of reform in the Treaty of Berlin.¹⁶

Thus the ground was prepared for the resurgence of the Armenian question in diplomatic circles. But it remained for Russian action to force an early consideration of the question by the powers, who, occupied with the Balkan imbroglio, did not want to be bothered with Armenia at the moment.¹⁷ The Russian action, however, forced them to pay attention to it. It was curious that Russia, for whom in 1895 the question of Armenian reforms had been distasteful, should now be the protagonist of such reform. Mandelstam, the first dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, later explained this change of heart on purely humanitarian grounds: Russia wanted to help the Armenians to secure liberty and safety in Turkey.¹⁸ The real Russian motives are more obscure, and there was apparently a conflict on policy within Russia itself. The immediate object of the tsarist government seems to have been simply the establishment of Russian control over reform administration in Turkish Armenia, perhaps separated from Turkey as an autonomous province. Military occupation was contemplated if reform efforts should fail.¹⁹ Reasons both of internal and external policy supported such an aim.

The internal reasons were connected with the attitude of the Russian government toward its own Armenian minority in Transcaucasia. Until 1905 Russian policy had been one of ruthless repression, which reached its height in

that year with a government-provoked Armeno-Tartar war, and the confiscation of all Armenian ecclesiastical property. This resulted only in increased revolutionary activity by the Armenians against the government. After 1905 a new governor of the Caucasus, Vorontzov-Dashkov, inaugurated a conciliatory policy which gave results and put an end to the Armenian separatist drive. Peace, order, and justice were given the Armenians, as well as some nationalist rights, although at the same time Vorontzov made efforts to colonize Russians in Transcaucasia. The Armenians were still, however, a thorn in the Russian side. The Armenian deputies in the Duma lined up with the left-wing parties, the Dashnaks with the revolutionaries, and the Hintchak with the Social Democrats. The Dashnaks gave particular trouble, and as late as 1912 there was a spectacular trial of five hundred of the most important Armenians, of Dashnak sympathies, for high treason; the trial served in the end only to make the government look foolish, as all but fifty were acquitted.

Since the Armenian political societies, as well as Armenian sympathies, extended across the Russo-Turkish border, a method of conciliating the Armenians in Russia was to help their brothers in Turkey. This the tsarist government promised to do. The matter became more pressing when the Balkan wars broke out. The Russian government now feared that its own Armenians might be inspired to rise, help their brethren in Turkey, and try to form a nation; or else that the Armenians in Turkey, seeing the Turkish weakness and the Balkan example, would revolt and the conflagration would spread across the Russian border, and also to the Armenians in the Russian sphere in northern Persia. Armenian demands in Turkey were championed by the Armenians in Russia and in the Duma by the Armenian deputy Papadjanov. The Russian government made renewed promises to its own Armenians that it would help those in Turkey. Many Russian Armenians demanded annexation of Turkish Armenia to Russia. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, was emphatic that this was not possible but promised to see to reform within Turkey.²⁰

Considerations of foreign policy added to the Russian desire to pose the Armenian question once again. In 1905 Russia had been turned back in the Far East and since then had been concentrating her efforts in the Near East. She had successfully won a sphere in Persia but had been unsuccessful in attempts to open the Straits and had not gained from the Balkan wars. A question of prestige was involved, in a sense: Russia needed a foreign success to appease public opinion after her many failures.²¹ But an active policy with regard to Armenia would have further practical value. This was true especially because of the strategic position of Turkish Armenia. The mineral and agricultural resources of that section were attractive,²² but the strategic implications far overshadowed the economic. A Russian control over Turkish Armenia would safeguard the Persian sphere of influence and the Russian Transcaucasus, and would provide a basis for future expansion either South or West. In 1912-1913 the control of Armenia would be particularly useful in

settling a Turco-Persian boundary dispute, in which Russian interests were involved. Until 1911, when Turkey became involved in the Tripolitan war, Turkish forces had been encroaching on Russia's Persian sphere near Lake Ourmiah, pushing north to Diliman, Khoi, and Makou.²³ Although since 1911 the Turks had not advanced, Russia still felt the threat.

In all these considerations of strategy, Erzurum was the key point. This city, populated largely by Armenians and situated in the center of the most pronouncedly Armenian region, dominated all the roads from Russia into Turkey: the roads to Diarbekir and Harput and the Euphrates Valley, to Bitlis and the Tigris Valley, to Trebizond and Sivas, to Ankara and Constantinople, and to Alexandretta. The campaign of 1877 had shown its importance to Russia.²⁴

When Russia was occupied in the Far East, and then with her own revolution of 1905, she depended on her treaty of 1900 with Turkey to keep other powers out of Armenia. Under this agreement no railroad concessions could be given in Turkish regions adjacent to Russia without Russian consent.²⁵ By 1912 Russia had regained some of her strength, while Turkey was weakening. Still, Russian policy in 1912-1914 was not one of immediate annexation of Armenia, nor of a drive through Armenia to Alexandretta or the Straits. Military occupation of Armenia was to be considered only if Russian reform plans failed. Russia was not yet prepared for military action against Turkey, for her own Caucasus railroads were incomplete, and she could not operate effectively within Turkey. Sazonov reported to the tsar toward the end of the crisis that territorial annexation at the moment would do Russia no good. Vorontzov-Dashkov added that it might only increase Russia's troubles by increasing her Armenian minority. Ultimate annexation was probably contemplated, and was certainly in the minds of many Russians.²⁶ The *Novoye Vremya*, opposing German penetration in Anatolia, spoke openly of "our South . . . our natural frontier, the historical conclusion of our centuries-old struggle with Turkey."²⁷

Immediate Russian policy was rather to insure a sphere of influence in Armenia in case the Ottoman Empire should fall apart, and to keep Germany out of this sphere. The Berlin-to-Bagdad railway zone was still nebulous, but German activity among Cilician Armenians was great, and was increasing to the North in Van and Bitlis. Russia wanted to forestall Germany in gaining favor among Armenians.²⁸ Wangenheim, German ambassador to the Porte, was convinced that Russia was trying to stir up Kurds and Armenians to provoke a clash leading to military intervention.²⁹ Undoubtedly Russian agitators, some consular officials among them, gave money, arms, and advice to Kurds and Armenians. Some of the agitation may be explained by the fact that many of the individual Armenian revolutionaries in Turkey had come from Russian Transcaucasia. Sazonov, though opposed to expansion, probably countenanced "incidents" as a means of pushing through a Russian-controlled reform scheme in Turkey.³⁰

Moved by these considerations of foreign and domestic policy, Sazonov was ready to sponsor the Armenian cause. He did this, in the first instance, through the Catholicos George V, head of the Gregorian Church, of which most Armenians were members. The seat of the Catholicos was at Etchmiadzin, at the foot of Mt. Ararat, in Russia; this geographical fact made Russian control of his actions easy. But since 1905 the Gregorians had adopted loyalty toward Russia, and George V was an ardent exponent of the new spirit.³¹ There was thus no difficulty in Russo-Armenian co-operation on this basis. George V appealed formally to the tsarist government to aid his Turkish brethren. He also appointed a delegation headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha, son of the Armeno-Egyptian statesman, to present the Armenian case to Europe in such a way as to prepare opinion for reform under Russia's aegis. This move was approved by the government, as was the program of the delegation, which demanded what amounted to an autonomous Armenia, under a European commissioner appointed by the Porte, and in which Christians and Moslems should share equally all military and administrative offices, as well as enjoying protection of their own languages and cultures. This was not mere subservience to Russia by the Catholicos and Nubar. They seem to have felt that in Russia lay the chief Armenian hope, and Nubar kept in touch with Iswolski while making his representations in the Western capitals. Nubar was explicit in saying that the Armenians desired neither separation from Turkey nor Russian occupation, merely reforms. All through the year 1913, Nubar was occupied in Europe with this work.³²

Sazonov also broached the problem in two other ways. Apparently on the initiative of Giers, his ambassador in Constantinople, he warned the Turks in early December, 1912, of the danger of the Armenian situation, and hinted at intervention.³³ Sazonov also sounded out the French and English cabinets as to the possibility of making effective such reforms as were contemplated in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. He did not want to approach all the powers "because there would be disagreements, since the Balkan crisis still existed"; obviously, the Triple Alliance would seek to check Russian initiative.³⁴ But by January 2, 1913, Wangenheim knew of the Russian *démarches*.³⁵ The Armenian question was thus raised before all Europe.

In both England and France opinion was that consideration of the Armenian question should be postponed until the Balkans were peaceful. This was perhaps the reception Sazonov wished; he might then impose upon the Porte a purely Russian reform scheme, or he might even send a few Russian troops into Armenia on pretext of keeping order there. But France added that she could countenance no unilateral action by Russia which might precipitate the partition of Anatolia.³⁶ Not only would German opposition be aroused by such a Russian move but French financial and railway interests in Turkey, which were dependent on the integrity of the country, would be jeopardized.³⁷ Sir Edward Grey did not, at this point, seem to fear any untoward Russian action.³⁸

The German reaction to the news of Russia's *démarches* was almost explosive. Zimmerman, in the foreign office, at once announced that German interests demanded that she be consulted on the matter.³⁹ The Bagdad railway zone, extending across the Anatolian peninsula, was the object of his concern; it represented a heavy investment and contained many Armenians within its borders.⁴⁰ From January of 1913 onward the German diplomats, and particularly Wangenheim at Constantinople, expressed fear of a Russian partition of Anatolia. He described the Russian policy as one of deliberate provocation of incidents to provide an excuse for intervention and annexation. At times his reports grew almost fantastic, saying at one moment that the Russians were arming the Kurds to attack the Armenians and at the next that the Russians were causing Kurds and Armenians to ally in revolt. He suspected also, and the kaiser and a good part of public opinion supported him, that the Triple Entente had arranged to partition Asiatic Turkey. The 1907 treaty between Russia and England made Germans doubt that England would oppose Russia in Armenia, although by the Cyprus treaty of 1878 she was committed to do so. "The Russian bear wants Armenian honey," said the *Deutsch-Asiatische Gesellschaft*. The situation is "not at all rosy," reported Wangenheim. Grey continually assured Germany that no partition was contemplated, and that no agreement existed among the Triple Entente powers, but German fears continued. There was, in fact, no such agreement. These fears were in part well founded, however, with regard to the Russian designs.⁴¹

In a saner vein, Wangenheim outlined the proper action for Germany. He realized that the Armenian complaints were just, and advocated German cooperation with Turkey to make reform effective. In this way Russian interference would be avoided, for which the Turks would be grateful to Germany; in addition, the Armenians would see Germany as their friend. If necessary, Germany must act in concert with all the powers to achieve reform and prevent the partition of Turkey. The main object of Germany must be to prevent partition, for the Bagdad railway sphere was too large and nebulous as yet to fall to her completely. Germany must, nevertheless, insure herself against all contingencies. Therefore in a sphere four hundred kilometres wide, reaching from the Eskishehir-Adalia line to the Persian frontier, and including Van, Aleppo, and Alexandretta, Germany should put forth every effort to increase her influence by means of more consulates, German experts and merchants, and missions and schools. Such a sphere would, Wangenheim acknowledged, clash with France in Aleppo and Russia in Van, but he maintained it nevertheless. And with his conclusions Jagow, the foreign secretary, agreed. "To go away empty-handed," said the latter, "would be a second Morocco for us."⁴² The warship *Goeben* was stationed off Mersina in early May, to prevent Armenian incidents.⁴³

German opinion found staunch support in Italy and Austria. The Austrian military attaché in London suspected partition by the Triple Entente. Berchtold

déclared that neither Austria nor Italy would allow the Triple Entente to handle the reform question alone. Some in Austria suspected a Russian thrust toward Alexandretta.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, German protests against Russian action aroused in England the suspicion that Germany wanted to partition Anatolia.⁴⁵ Russian journalists now accused Germany of wanting to appropriate Anatolia entire, as compensation for having let Austria take Bosnia and Italy take Tripoli. The Russian ambassadors in Constantinople and Berlin reported new German activity among Armenians, in opposition to Russia.⁴⁶ By the end of April, 1913, suspicion was intense on all sides.

The Turks had, meanwhile, not been inactive. As soon as the initial Russian moves were known, the Turks started on the elaboration of reform plans to forestall intervention. One such was drawn up in December, 1912, for the *vilayets* of Van, Bitlis, Harput, and Diarbekir.⁴⁷ On January 10 Mahmud Shevket became grand vizier in a *coup* led by Enver, and strengthened Turkish resistance to interference, while lending a sympathetic ear to the German representations. This ministry presented in March a new reform of all *vilayet* administration, granting a considerable degree of decentralization.⁴⁸ Wangenheim wanted to support Turkey in carrying out this project.⁴⁹ It was, he observed, the most that the Turkish government could do with safety at the time. This was probably true, for the defeat in the Balkans had served only to increase Turkish nationalism and the Turks' pride in their Anatolian homeland and to breed further enmity against Christians. The CUP government was sincere in wishing reforms and order but opportunist in its methods and not too friendly to the Armenians, despite their valiant service as soldiers in the Balkans.

In April the Turks, apparently with no German prompting, hit upon a clever tactical move in a request for English officials to help carry out their new reforms in the Armenian *vilayets*. These experts would control the gendarmerie, the system of justice, agriculture and forests, public works, and the interior department work. Soon Mahmud Shevket added a request for more English officials for the South and West of Anatolia. The Turks explained this move to Wangenheim as an effort to convince England of the Turk sincerity and efficiency in reform, to show England that Turkey would not fall apart, and so to win English consent to Turkish ownership of the Aegean islands; otherwise, the Turks believed, Britain would give Greece the islands for fear that some great power might take them away from a decaying Turkey.⁵⁰ There was doubtless some truth in this explanation, especially as regards Southwest Anatolia. But the whole offer was aimed at keeping Russia and England at odds on the Armenian question.⁵¹ English officers in Armenia would be a guarantee not only of good administration but against Russian encroachment. The Turkish demand was based on the Cyprus treaty of 1878, directed against Russia.

Wangenheim was delighted with this plan, and Jagow agreed to it also. The

Germans approved partly because Shevket's plan gave Germany control of the reorganization of the Turkish army and of the educational system, and partly because they hoped to drive England and Russia farther apart. But they also saw visions of Anglo-German co-operation to protect Turkey, like another Egypt, and to prevent partition.⁵² On Wangenheim's representations to Shevket that the British officers in Southwest Anatolia might infringe on the Bagdad railway sphere, the Turkish minister changed the locations for a few but stuck to his offer. Jagow wanted Wangenheim to insist that only German officers be near that sphere, but the ambassador replied that if the Turks were forced to abandon the Cyprus treaty as a basis for requesting foreign aid, Russia would have cause for asking that she too be represented by officials.⁵³ A few French experts were contemplated for finance reform. Russia was excluded entirely. For a moment there dawned the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation to put Asiatic Turkey on its feet and guarantee its integrity.

The British viewed the proposal with favor but at once wanted to inform Russia, for fear of awakening Russian suspicion if English officers should appear without explanation on the Russian frontier. Russia was so informed, and at the same time Grey promised the Turks that some officials would be sent, although not all that had been requested.⁵⁴ At once the Russian protest came, and in strong language. It boiled down to this: that Russia could not play second fiddle in the question of Armenian reform because of her paramount interest in the region next to her frontier, and because the promises made to her own Armenians demanded that Russia herself take the lead in Armenian reform.⁵⁵ Sazonov was also under pressure from his military men, who did not want foreign military experts on their frontier and who hated above all the Anglo-Indian officers who would doubtless be appointed.⁵⁶ In the face of this firm stand, England was not prepared to risk the loss of Russian friendship. Arguments on the part of England and France that if the Turks met refusal in England they would turn to Germany had no effect on Sazonov; he considered that Russian threats at the Porte would be sufficient to prevent such a move and said he would use force if necessary.⁵⁷ Slowly Grey backed down, and in July, 1913, agreed to postpone sending any officers until a conference of the powers should have considered the question of reform.⁵⁸

The month of June, 1913, was spent in preparations for the proposed conference. Sazonov wanted to revive the 1895 Triple and to allow the Triple Alliance no initiative concerning Armenia.⁵⁹ But neither France nor England wanted to make this a test case of the strength of the two combinations.⁶⁰ Effective reform, they saw, could come only from a united front. Grey was obdurate on this point and insisted that, in return for his concession on the question of officers, all six powers should take part.⁶¹ Germany still hoped for Anglo-German co-operation but was worried by English complaisance toward Russia.⁶² Ample justification for the German worry was the English deference to Russia on two more points: the Triple Entente should talk over reform plans

before all six powers met, and the conference of ambassadors should meet not in London but in Constantinople, where the pressure of the Armenians and Russians would be greatest.⁶³

Upon hearing on June 4 that Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, proposed to bring the Armenian question before the London Conference, then sitting on Balkan affairs, Grey hurried the Russians into sending out the call for a conference at Constantinople.⁶⁴ Thus Grey was able to give Russia credit for the initiative in the reform movement, but at the same time he made certain that henceforth all six powers would be included in discussions. From this time on Grey was a self-constituted mediator between the Russian and Turkish-German viewpoints, seeking to preserve Turkey and keep the friendship of both sides.

The Germans and their allies accepted the Russian invitation on condition that Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity be upheld and that a Turk take part in the discussion. At once Sazonov objected, successfully, that the Armenians would have no confidence in the reform if a Turk participated, and that the proceedings would be dragged out without end. It was obvious that Russian diplomacy was fighting every inch of the way to have a free hand in Armenia. Nor would Sazonov allow the discussion of a Turkish scheme. Grey and Pichon were becoming more annoyed at the Russian demands on their friendship, which would bring German and Turkish enmity and jeopardize the success of railroad negotiations then being conducted with Djavid Bey. The French had growing interests in an Armenian network and encountered Russian opposition on that score also. Sazonov also rejected the French proposal of a high commissioner *ad hoc* to keep Armenia quiet while discussions were taking place. A British proposal to lend the Turks six temporary gendarmerie officers met the same fate. The *entente préalable* between the French, English, and Russian ambassadors did not in the end carry much weight, for Pichon and Grey insisted that the plan to be discussed be presented as Russia's only, not as a concerted proposal by the Triple Entente.⁶⁵

André Mandelstam, dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, was the author of this plan. It provided in essence for the creation of one province out of the six Armenian *vilayets*, under a governor general to be approved by the powers, and a mixed advisory council of Europeans, Turks, and Armenians.⁶⁶ Wangenheim at once characterized the scheme as a violation of Turkish sovereignty and the signal for the partition of Anatolia.⁶⁷ To him, such an autonomous province next to the frontier of Russia was tantamount to Russian annexation. The Russians actually intended neither annexation nor partition, although some elements within Russia desired this. Admittedly, the Mandelstam scheme tended to create Armenian autonomy.⁶⁸ But the German ambassador in St. Petersburg saw correctly that Russia had too many internal troubles to expand territorially, and that this was not Sazonov's policy.⁶⁹ And Giers pointed out that Russia was in no way prepared for the partition of Tur-

key; Armenian reform at most was the preparation of a Russian sphere in anticipation of such an eventuality.⁷⁰ Jagow and Grey both came to recognize the sincerity of Sazonov's protestations that he contemplated no territorial expansion, but they insisted also that the Mandelstam plan led inevitably to it.⁷¹ Sazonov countered with the assertion that if the Mandelstam plan were not adopted, the Armenians would revolt, Russian military intervention would be forced, and partition would then ensue.⁷²

Here was the fundamental quarrel: Russia asserted that, without her plan, partition would result; Germany asserted that partition would result directly from the plan itself.⁷³ England, supported to some extent by France, agreed with Germany that the Mandelstam plan looked too much like the beginning of partition to be allowed; the cure was worse than the disease. England feared particularly the bad effects on her Indian Moslems of the partition of Moslem Turkey.⁷⁴ Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador, who, as dean of the diplomatic corps in Constantinople, was to preside over the conference, at first would not even consider the plan. This was natural, inasmuch as Austria was not ready for a partition of Anatolia and had only the vaguest of claims near Adalia. Wangenheim, fearing that a rejection of the Russian plan without any consideration would cause an Armenian uprising, finally changed Pallavicini's mind sufficiently so that the conference could be held.⁷⁵

This was the situation in the first week of July, 1913, before the conference. At this point the Turks, as might have been expected from their own practice, but perhaps also on German initiative, issued a new reform scheme of their own, providing for European officials but differing radically from the Mandelstam plan in that all control was to be in the hands of the Porte. Armenia was, in addition, split into two inspectorates.⁷⁶ Germany and England, although recognizing the need for some degree of European supervision if any reforms were to be effectively carried out, wanted to make this plan the basis of discussion in order to take control of the proceedings away from Russia.⁷⁷ This they were unable to do.

Under these conditions the conference of ambassadors met in the Austrian summer embassy at Yeniköy on the Bosphorus. A deadlock was expected, and a deadlock ensued.⁷⁸ Russia, fairly well supported by France, and partially supported by England, advanced her plan as the only way to prevent an Armenian rising and subsequent intervention and partition. The Triple Alliance, pleading the Turk case as well as its own, stood united against it.⁷⁹ Germany was the more determined to oppose it because the plan contemplated the inclusion of part of what Wangenheim regarded as the Bagdad railway sphere. Thus it was that Germany bore the onus of stopping the Russian plan, and in effect pulled the English chestnuts out of the fire.⁸⁰ Had the Mandelstam plan been forced on the Porte and had it brought the partition which was feared, English problems in the Mediterranean region would have been complicated, and English prestige among the Indian Moslems would have suffered.

The Yeniköy conference had failed to provide any solution to the Armenian question. Toward the end of July, when the futile sessions were just over, a new scare was thrown into diplomatic circles. Russian troops were reported concentrating on the Turkish border, near Mount Ararat.⁸¹ It appeared that Russia, worsted in the Adrianople question, was on the verge of occupying a few cities in Armenia as a means of forcing the Turks to give up the disputed stronghold. The German ambassador in St. Petersburg suspected such a move, and Said Halim, the grand vizier, remarked to Pallavicini that this would not force the Turks out of Adrianople.⁸² Had the Russian occupation occurred, the Armenian question would have been settled, and partition of Turkey would presumably have resulted. French remonstrances, which were immediate and strong, served to thwart the move; the French had at no time wanted to partition Anatolia, and were now in the process of concluding with the Bagdad railway interests an agreement which would have come to nothing if the Russian army had marched.⁸³ The extreme tension was soon over, but the powers were now spurred on to settle the Armenian problem.⁸⁴

Further incentive to find a speedy solution was furnished the powers by the growing Armenian unrest, which increased particularly after it became known that England would send no officers, and that the conference of ambassadors had reached no agreement. Conditions were as bad as ever. The Kurds were evidently preparing a rising and receiving some encouragement from unofficial Russian *agents provocateurs*.⁸⁵ Armenians were murdered near Bitlis at the rate of twenty-seven a month. "Depression among the Armenians is great," wrote a missionary on the spot. "All who are able are trying to get away. Fifty are on the point of leaving Bitlis. Those left behind are being driven to desperation; they incline either to appeal to the Russian consul for protection or flee to the mountains."⁸⁶ Although still divided in counsel, more and more Armenians tended to look to Russia as the only protector, if also a despotic one.⁸⁷ Their disgust with the concert of powers was evident. "Lots of words make no *pilaf*," they complained. The editor of the Armenian paper *Avedaper* wrote: "We have been deceived quite long enough. The *Times*, the *Temps*, the *Novoye Vremya*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* have nothing new to say, more especially as our wound is not of those that are healed of ink." He told his people that Russia might extend her Persian sphere into Turkish Armenia.⁸⁸ The Turks poured oil on the flames when the *Tasvir-i Efkiar*, official CUP organ, chose this moment to label as a traitor the Armenian who was urging reform in the Western capitals, Boghos Nubar.⁸⁹

Although a failure, the conference had at least clarified the situation. Out of it, as well as out of the Armenian unrest, came desires for compromise. The British had early said the obvious, which needed saying: that the Russian plan was of no use because it led only to disagreement, that any effective action had to be united, and any effective reform had to be accepted voluntarily by

the Porte. The French, at the end of the conference, sought a basis to conciliate the Turk and Russian plans.⁹⁰ The Italians, starting to delimit a sphere in Adalia and to negotiate a railway concession with Turkey, wanted peace and quiet.⁹¹ The Austrians were even less prepared for an explosion or partition of Turkey.⁹²

The chief antagonists, finally, were of a similar mind. Sazonov, convinced that the Russian plan could be imposed neither by Russia nor by the Triple Entente, was irritated but realistic. "Why this name of Triple Entente if six powers have to agree?" he expostulated and approached Berlin with suggestions for a new agreement.⁹³ If he could not get the autonomous Armenia that Russian foreign policy would have liked, it was still important to appease the Russians with reforms and to stop the danger of a revolt in Turkey. The Germans astutely reasoned that to join with Russia was to prevent any individual Russian action. This policy would tone down the Russian plan and restore Germany's prestige among the Armenians. If Russia would not compromise at all, Germany could back the Porte's plan of reform, and Russia would have to join in the move if she were to gain any credit among her own Armenians.⁹⁴

There is no need to follow in detail the negotiations which occupied the autumn of 1913.⁹⁵ Giers and Wangenheim were given, in effect, a mandate by the six governments to come to an agreement which might be acceptable to the Porte. Neither ambassador conceded more than a bare minimum at each step, and neither attributed to the other any motives but those of basest self-interest. The conversations were aided by more amicable relations between the foreign offices at Berlin and St. Petersburg. For a time the French were worried that this apparently friendly co-operation meant a weakening of the Franco-Russian alliance, and Bompard was set to inquiring in Constantinople as to what was really going on.⁹⁶ There was, in reality, no ground for the French suspicions. In the middle of September, Giers and Wangenheim produced a plan which accepted the Turkish proposal of two inspectorates for Armenia, the inspectors to be recommended by the powers and to have rather extensive control over administration.⁹⁷ This plan was approved by the other powers, and the two ambassadors set out to talk the Porte into acceptance. Here they suffered a setback.

The Turks naturally wanted to institute their own reform plan and had been going through all manner of contortions to avoid foreign control. In July they had approached Sweden and Belgium for officers, but these nations circumspectly submitted the proposals to the approval of some of the great powers, and Giers and Wangenheim objected.⁹⁸ In the fall of 1913 several factors combined to stiffen the resistance of the Turkish government, now really a dictatorship of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal: they saw the failure of the powers to agree, they were encouraged by their triumph in retaining Adrianople, and

they were assured by French financiers that Russia would never use force in Armenia.⁹⁹

Said Halim appeared at first to be agreeable to the new scheme, but he deferred to the CUP, which made plain its opposition. "They want to make little Lebanons everywhere," complained Said.¹⁰⁰ Reform and order were desired by the CUP, and the *Sabah* and *Ikdam* prodded the government to action, but foreign control the Turks would not have.¹⁰¹ They reverted in October to the old measure of asking for British officials, and in particular for Sir Robert Crawford, whose work in reorganizing the customs house had been excellent. The British government naturally snuffed out these Turkish hopes.¹⁰² Another logical move was made in the direction of direct Turk-Armenian conciliation. This effort was difficult at best because of the divisions among the Armenians and was rendered nugatory by the inability of either side to make any real concessions; the Turks were proud and nationalist, the Armenians too suspicious to trust to mere bilateral agreements.¹⁰³ In the end the Turks were unable to solve their problem for themselves but succeeded in thwarting the Giers-Wangenheim plan, which could not be forced on the Porte because the powers were split on so many issues, particularly on the question of the Aegean islands.¹⁰⁴

Negotiations continued on a new line which the Turks themselves, playing for time, suggested—the creation of counselors, to be attached to inspectors in Armenia and to be named by the powers. Some progress was made in this direction by the beginning of December, 1913, and Wangenheim and Giers were slightly more hopeful.¹⁰⁵ Djemal, however, voiced absolute opposition to any foreign control, although he would welcome foreign experts under Turk direction.¹⁰⁶ The Turks seem to have feared at this point that Russia and Germany might be planning a partition of Anatolia.¹⁰⁷

In the midst of this slow process of bargaining, the Liman von Sanders affair burst on the diplomatic world, threatening to bring the corollary of a forceful solution to the Armenian problem. Sazonov contemplated the occupation of Bayazid and Erzurum as a means of forcing Turkey to give up this appointment which, in Russian eyes, meant German control of the Straits.¹⁰⁸ It is questionable whether Sazonov would actually have done this. Giers advised only concentrating troops on the Caucasus frontier, and informing the Armenians that this was not to be regarded as support of Armenian revolt.¹⁰⁹ Both before and after the crucial last two weeks of 1913, Sazonov showed clearly that Russia was not prepared for military or naval action, and that her communications in the Caucasus were not sufficient to allow of any mobility.¹¹⁰ German and French evidence supports this point.¹¹¹ And Sazonov later declared that he would not have carried out the threat, because it would have meant European war.¹¹² The episode served, nevertheless, to dim for a moment the chances of a peaceful solution to the Armenian question. Its end result, how-

ever, aided such a solution. It was apparent that Germany had made no great concession on the Liman appointment, and so to keep their advantage the Germans strongly counselled Said Halim to give in to Russia on several points in the Armenian affair.¹¹³

On Christmas day it appeared to Wangenheim that the Armenian matter was settled. Said Halim had agreed to ask the powers to recommend inspectors. The kaiser sent congratulations to his ambassador, and Sazonov asked Iswolski to let Boghos Nubar know of the happy outcome. A formula was agreed upon which saved the Turk prestige, and gave the powers some influence over the administration of reforms.¹¹⁴ Then came another halt, all the more exasperating because a solution was so near.

The cause of the new trouble is hard to determine. The Turks and the Germans claimed that Sazonov suddenly demanded concessions on some fresh points: parity of Moslems and Christians in the Armenian assemblies and military service for Armenians in their own *vilayets* were the chief of these.¹¹⁵ He had, in fact, suddenly become more demanding.¹¹⁶ It is probable that Sazonov was seeking revenge for the Liman appointment, and for the rise of the militarist Germanophile, Enver, to be minister of war. The Turkish Armenians seem also to have pressed Sazonov for greater advantages.¹¹⁷ The Turks, for their part, wanted to squeeze the last piastre out of the year-long bargaining.¹¹⁸ The Russian consul at Erzurum raised the cry of imminent massacre. This report the French and British consuls declared exaggerated, and the German consul said that nothing but a pistol match by a sport club was going on.¹¹⁹

These conditions offer at least a partial explanation of Sazonov's sudden obduracy. In view of his attitude hitherto, it is improbable that he should have wanted to perform such a quick *volte-face* as to jeopardize the results of months of negotiation; chauvinist and Armenophile elements beyond his control must bear a part of the blame. In his memoirs Sazonov states that he regarded the details as of no significance compared to European control of Armenian reform, but now he was arguing over details, not over the control.¹²⁰ Gulkevitch, the Russian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople who completed the negotiations after Giers left, urged Sazonov to close the deal.¹²¹ The other powers also pressed him to let some of the minor points go.¹²² France had up to this point refused a loan to Turkey, in order to exert pressure for the acceptance of the Russian demands. Now it appeared that a loan might come from the United States through Morgenthau and Chester, thereby destroying the pressure and the French deal at the same time.¹²³ These considerations led Sazonov to yield, after he had won a few more concessions in the haggling with Turkey which, in the best oriental fashion, was drawn out until the first week in February.¹²⁴ On February 8, 1914, Russia and Turkey signed an accord on Armenian reform which stipulated that the powers should recommend verbally to the Porte two inspectors general, who should have a rather exten-

sive control.¹²⁵ “The act of February 8 marks, without any doubt,” wrote Gulkevitch, “the dawn of a new and happier era in the history of the Armenian people!”¹²⁶

Not all factions accepted the agreement in good grace. The reality of foreign intervention rankled in the Young Turk breast.¹²⁷ Many Armenians regarded the plan as too weak to offer a real guarantee of reform, pointing out that the inspectors general, although European, were Turkish appointees.¹²⁸ Nor did unrest in Armenia subside because of the conclusion of the agreement.¹²⁹ The diplomatic crisis was, however, over. Two months of negotiation were required to find inspectors who should be agreeable to the Turks, the Armenians, and the six powers. Russia, aided by France, was able to control to some extent the choice of these officials. When the Dutch East Indies administrator, Westenek, and the Norwegian major, Hoff, were finally chosen, Iswolski was able to write that “they understand the necessity of supporting Russia.”¹³⁰ But from these negotiations no new crisis resulted.

Various interpretations were placed on the accord of February 8. Germans saw in it a victory over Russia.¹³¹ To the Russian mind it meant a victory over Turkey and Germany—the agreement was a bilateral Russo-Turk affair, and Germany had, said the Russians, lost caste in the eyes of both Turks and Armenians by sabotaging the Mandelstam plan in an effort to gain Turk gratitude and then by urging weak reforms on the Porte to win Armenian thanks.¹³² The French view was the sanest: Turkey and the Triple Alliance had obliged Russia to accept some fundamentals of the Turkish plan, but from Russia had come the initiative and motive power that had made possible any action at all.¹³³

In point of fact, there were no losers. Turkey had a reform plan with a minimum of foreign control which might be expected to keep the Armenians quiet for a time, and she was saved from immediate partition. The Armenians had gained something which promised to be more than mere paper. Russia had not gained all the control over Armenia which she regarded as her right and necessity, but she gained some, and gained also some reforms with which to appease her own Armenians and minimize the danger of a revolt in Turkey; she had succeeded, moreover, in thwarting a purely Anglo-German reform of Anatolia, with Anglo-Indian officers in control of Armenia. Germany had not won all the influence in Anatolia that she wanted, but had averted what she regarded as a threat to the Bagdad railway sphere. France, England, Austria, and Italy had also gained by avoiding an explosion or partition of the Ottoman Empire.

This, in reality, was the chief benefit to all the powers. None wanted partition at that moment, and none wanted war at that moment over the Armenian question. Pallavicini, dean of the ambassadors in Constantinople, spoke for all as well as for Austria when he said that the time for partition was not yet ripe and that a period of consolidation of interests in Turkey was in everyone's

interest.¹³⁴ The various foreign offices echoed this opinion frequently. Both Giers and Wangenheim, however, were convinced that the nation represented by the other wanted to control Turkey and appropriate large parts of Anatolia; each was certain, too, that it was his duty to exclude the other entirely from Anatolia. Their attitudes were at times almost fanatic.¹³⁵ But each, in fighting the other, helped to prevent the partition for which no one was ready and for which everyone was preparing feverishly against the time when it should be inevitable. Hence they clashed violently over the Armenian question. The threatened partition did not occur over this issue simply because no one wanted to take the final step.

Notes

1. *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12710 and note (hereinafter cited as *Grosse Politik*); Auguste Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour* (Paris, 1917–22), IV, 347.

2. *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12588.

3. For the 1895–97 diplomacy and background of the Armenian question see William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1935), I, chaps. v, vii, x; for a convenient summary and collection of reform documents since 1878 see Marcel Léart, *La question arménienne à la lumière des documents* (Paris, 1913).

4. Sir Telford Waugh, *Turkey Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (London, 1930), p. 51.

5. Frédéric Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1917), pp. 149–57.

6. Noel and Harold Buxton, *Travel and Politics in Armenia* (New York, 1914), pp. 108–10; Léon Lamouche, “La réorganisation de la gendarmerie ottomane,” *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XXXI (Apr. 16, 1911), 470–82; *Asie française*, XII (1912), 199–200, 346–47.

7. André Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1917), pp. 203–206.

8. Michel Pavlovitch, “La Russie et les arméniens,” *Revue politique internationale*, I (May, 1914), 474–75; Mandelstam, p. 30; S. Zarzecki, “La question kurdo-arménienne,” *Revue de Paris*, XXI (Apr. 15, 1914), 888; *Asie française*, XII (September, 1912), 391, notes a typical incident.

9. Buxton and Buxton, p. 28; *Near East*, V (July 11, 1913), 280; Max Schlagentweit, *Verkehrswege und Verkehrsprojekte in Vorderasien* (Berlin, 1906), pp. 32–34; American Board of Congregational Missions, *Report for 1910* (Boston, 1911), p. 119; *Echos d'Orient*, XV (November, 1912), 543; Macler, pp. 157–68.

10. Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 476.

11. A. Vialatte et M. Caudel, *La vie politique dans les deux mondes* (Paris, 1908 ff.), VI, 377; *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia v Epokhu Imperializma* [International Relations in the Period of Imperialism], 2d series, III, Pt. 2 (Moscow, 1940), nos. 648, 715 and n. 2, 819.

12. Fédération Arménienne Révolutionnaire, *Rapport présenté au Bureau Socialiste Internationale* (Stuttgart, 1907), pp. 22–23.

13. *Near East*, IV (Feb. 7, 1913), 379.

14. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 209; Russia, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, *Sbornik Diplomaticeskikh Dokumentov: Reformy v Armenii, 26 Noiabria 1912 goda-10 Maia 1914 goda* [Collection of Diplomatic Documents: Reforms in Armenia, Nov. 26, 1912–May 10, 1914] (Petrograd, 1915), no. 7. This is the official Russian Orange Book on the Armenian crisis, hereinafter cited as *Orange Book*. A popular condensed edition also exists, *Budushchee Ustroistvo Armenii* [Future Organization of Armenia] (Petrograd, 1915). These are the only Russian collections covering the Armenian question of 1912–14. Thus far the great collections now being published leave a gap here. The second series of *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia* so far goes only to October 17, 1912, and the third series begins with January 1/14, 1914. The gap can be filled to some extent from the collections published by Adamov, Marchand, Siebert, and Stieve, which will be cited below, but much is still missing. The *Orange Book* was edited to suit Russia's wartime politics in 1915, as is evident from the omissions and alterations of its no. 148 (Jan. 27/Feb. 9, 1914) as compared with the full text in *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, 3d series, I (Moscow, 1931), no. 210 (German translation in *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, 1st series, I [Berlin, 1931], no. 210; hereinafter cited as *Internationalen Beziehungen*). The *Orange Book* must be used with caution.

15. The foregoing two paragraphs are based on the following: Charles Vellay, "La question arménienne," *Revue de Paris*, III (June 1, 1913), 664; *Armenia*, VI (July, 1913), 368; *Near East*, V (July 11, 1913), 280; Kapriel S. Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted* (Boston, 1934), pp. 9–37; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 479; Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Blackest Page of Modern History* (New York, 1916), p. 71; Fédération Arménienne Révolutionnaire, *Rapport, passim*; Frédéric Macler, "Les arméniens en Turquie," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, XXIV (September, 1913), 168–69; Federal Writers' Project of WPA of Massachusetts, *The Armenians in Massachusetts* (Boston, 1937), pp. 46–52; M. Vartan Malcom, *The Armenians in America* (Boston, 1919), pp. 118–24; Leon Z. Surmelian, *I Ask You, Ladies and Gentlemen* (New York, 1945), pp. 53–65; René Pinon, *Le rapport secret du Dr. Johannes Lepsius . . . sur les massacres d'Arménie* (Paris, 1918), pp. 190–200; *Orange Book*, no. 11. Much of this literature is controversial. For later Turkish charges of Armenian revolutionary activity up to 1914, and documentary support, part of it certainly true, see: *Aspirations et agissements des comités arméniens* (Constantinople, 1917), pp. 7–118; *Les turcs et les revendications arméniennes* (Paris, 1919), pp. 17–18, 25–29; also Mahmud Moukhtar, *La Turquie, l'Allemagne, et l'Europe* (Paris, 1924), pp. 94–95.

16. Mikael Varandian, *L'Arménie et la question arménienne* (Laval, 1917), p. 76; *Moslem World*, IV (January, 1914), 85; Vellay, in *Rev. de Paris*, III, 671; *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567, enclosure (hereinafter cited as *British Documents*).

17. *Ibid.*, no. 475.

18. André Mandelstam, *Das armenische Problem im Lichte des Völker- und Menschenrechts* (Berlin, 1931), pp. 109–13.

19. *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3d series, VIII, no. 144 (hereinafter cited as *Documents diplomatiques*); Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 207; *Orange Book*, no. 1.

20. For a tirade against Russian policy before 1905 see E. Aknouni, *Les plaies du Caucase* (Geneva, 1905); also Varandian, pp. 65 ff. For Vorontzov's policy see Maxime Kovalevsky, "La Russie et les arméniens," *Rev. pol. internat.*, I (April, 1914), 348–52; B. A. Bor'ian, *Armenia, Mezhdunarodnaia Diplomatia i SSSR* (Moscow, 1928–29), I, 337–44; Buxton and Buxton, pp. 22–24, 52–68. Also Otto Hoetzsch, *Russland* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 493–95; Serge Sazonov, *Fateful Years* (New York, 1928), pp. 138 ff.; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 465; Ivan Loris Melikov, *La révolution russe et les nouvelles républiques transcaucasiennes* (Paris, 1920), pp. 84–86; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 492, 493, 494; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 619; Friedrich Stieve, ed., *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis* (Berlin, 1924), III, 165–66; *Orange Book*, no. 2; René Pinon, *La suppression des arméniens* (Paris, 1916), p. 7.

21. *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12734.

22. William Eleroy Curtis, *Around the Black Sea* (New York, 1911), pp. 66–69.

23. *Asie française*, XII (May, 1912), 178–79. This controversy was settled only in November, 1913, by a commission, Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 71; C. H. D. Ryder, "The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Boundary in 1913–14," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, LXVI (July-December, 1925), 227–42.

24. On Armenia as a strategic problem see Schlagentweit, p. 36; E. von Hoffmeister, *Durch Armenien* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 119; Paul Rohrbach, *Die russische Weltmacht in Mittel- und Westasien* (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 154–75; Max Friedrichsen, *Die Grenzmarken des Europäischen Russlands* (Hamburg, 1915), pp. 145 ff.; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 464, 478; K. T. Kairallah, "La question arménienne," *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XXXV (Jan. 16, 1913), 68–71; M. Phillips Price, "The Problem of Asiatic Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, CV (February, 1914), 218; E. J. Dillon, "Russia's Solution of the Armenian Problem," *ibid.*, CV (January, 1914), 126–28.

25. *Asie française*, XII (August, 1912), 347; René Marchand, ed., *Un livre noir* (Paris, 1923?), II, 363–72.

26. *Orange Book*, no. 1; Marchand, *loc. cit.*; A. Gervais, "La renaissance de l'Orient," *Nouvelle Revue*, 2d series, X (Nov. 1, 1913), 12–13; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12734, and XXXVIII, no. 15284; Viallate et Caudel, VI, 392, 404. Bor'ian, I, 277–78, writes as if immediate annexation were the Russian aim. This is exaggerated. Felix Valyi, *Political and Spiritual Revolutions in Islam* (London, 1925), misconstrues *Orange Book* no. 1 to say Giers hoped for Russian military occupation shortly.

27. Trans. in *Literary Digest*, XLVII (Aug. 16, 1913), 240.

28. Alexandre Iswolsky, *Au service de la Russie* (Paris, 1937), I, 41. The American Congregational Board Report for 1913 states, p. 69, that German missionary activity had increased in Adana, Marash, Harput, Urfa, and Van. For Wangenheim's definition of the German sphere, see *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15312, wherein

Diarbekir and Van are included. See also Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey* (Norman, Okla., 1931), *passim*.

29. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15287.

30. Walter Guinness, "Impressions of Armenia and Kurdistan," *National Review*, LXII (January, 1914), 800; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 477; Valyi, pp. 198–201; Zarzecki, in *Rev. de Paris*, XXI, 893; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. I, no. 12731; Mandelstam, *Armenische Problem*, pp. 113–17.

31. Etienne Taris, "L'état actuel des problèmes ethnographiques du Caucase," *Asie française*, XII (October, 1912), 427–32.

32. *Orange Book*, nos. 12, 14; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 211; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 472; *Echos d'Orient*, XVI (March, 1913), 174; Bor'ian, I, 281; program printed in Buxton and Buxton, pp. 270–71; Marchand, II, 47; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15286. See Nubar's notes, reprinted in Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie*, pp. 287–99; also in Ludovic de Contenson, *Les réformes en Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1913), pp. 112–19.

33. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15282 n.; *Orange Book*, nos. 1, 2, 3. Giers was worried lest Russia lose the initiative in this question through Armenian appeals to all the powers.

34. *Orange Book*, no. 5; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 208–209.

35. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15282.

36. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, no. 475. Here it is stated that Sazonov spoke of the Armenian question as premature at this time. There can be no doubt that Sazonov meant to raise the question but was trying to reserve for Russia initiative and freedom of action. See also Marchand, II, 13.

37. For these interests, see Howard, pp. 48–50; for an expression by these interests, Contenson, "La question arménienne en Turquie d'Asie," *Asie française*, XIII (January, 1913), 8–16. France was negotiating for the rights to a railroad network in Armenia: Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, Neue Folge, LIV (Munich, 1915), 633.

38. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, no. 476.

39. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15283.

40. Howard, pp. 48–50; Edward M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923), pp. 1–142. See also Hugo Grothe, *Die Asiatische Türkei und die Deutschen Interessen* (Halle, 1913), treating the Armenian problem as central.

41. On the German fears of Russian and Triple Entente action see *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15282, 15284, 15285, 15288, 15294, 15308; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Mar. 16, 1913, quoted in *Asie française*, XIII (March, 1913), 135; Ernst Jäckh, "Vorderasien nach dem Balkankrieg," *Asiatisches Jahrbuch*, 1913, pp. 13–24. Dr. Jäckh thinks that Russia, thwarted by Britain in a drive to the Persian Gulf, is now trying to drive through the Bagdad railway sphere to Alexandria. Also *British Documents*, IX, Pt. 2, nos. 542, 546, 555, 561, 1018, 1026, and X, Pt. I, no. 476; Br. von Siebert, ed., *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel* (Berlin, 1928), III, nos. 837,

840. Also Adolf Grabowsky, "Die armenische Frage," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, VII (1914), 699–715.

42. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15287, 15299, 15312, 15317. According to Pomiankowski, the Austrian military attaché in Constantinople, Wangenheim at first wanted a reorganization of Turkey by the Triple Alliance. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* (Vienna, 1922), III, 40.

43. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15302.

44. Conrad von Hötzendorf, III, 64; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. I, no. 12730; Feldmarschalleutnant Otto von Gerstner, "Das klein-asiatische Problem," *Österreichische Rundschau*, XXXIV (Mar. 15, 1913), 409–15.

45. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 477, 478.

46. *Literary Digest*, XLVI (Mar. 15, 1913), 464, quoting the *Novoye Vremya*; *Orange Book*, nos. 13, 16.

47. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 210; *Orange Book*, nos. 4, 6, 8 and annex.

48. *Orange Book*, no. 15; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 51, 211.

49. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15295.

50. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 479, 487; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15303, 15305.

51. *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, VI, no. 7417; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 3.

52. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15301, 15311, 15312, 15439, wherein the Kaiser notes marginally about English and German aid to Turkey: "No go! either or!" Also Jäckh, in *Asiatisches Jahrb.*, 1913, pp. 19–20; *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, no. 533.

53. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15303–15311.

54. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 479–83, 485, 489, 491, 502.

55. *Ibid.*, nos. 484, 486, 492–494; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, nos. 568, 581, 619; Stieve, III, 165–67.

56. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 494, 541; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 581, and VII, no. 293.

57. *Ibid.*, VI, nos. 599, 618, 619; *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 492, 493.

58. *Ibid.*, no. 544; Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, LIV, 1458–59, 2170, and LV, 855–56, 1676. It is significant that the *Orange Book* does not take up the Anglo-Russian dispute over the British officers.

59. *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 486, 488; *Orange Book*, nos. 23, 31.

60. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 618.

61. *Ibid.*, no. 641; *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 494–96.

62. *Ibid.*, no. 499; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15314; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 30.

63. *Ibid.*, VII, no. 55; Stieve, III, 172; *British Documents*, X, Pt. I, nos. 492, 498.

64. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 32, 45; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 501; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15320, 15321, 15325–15329; *Orange Book*, no. 32.
65. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 86, 105, 119, 120, 121, 131, 140, 171, 186, 191, 222, 227; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15317, 15331, 15335, 15338, 15342, 15343; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 505–12, 516, 518–26, 528, 530, 531, 536; Stieve III, pp. 175, 180–81, 184; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 216–17; Marchand II, 114–15; *Orange Book*, nos. 35, 37, 38, 40, 43–45, 49, 51.
66. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 218–24; *Orange Book*, no. 50 annex.
67. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15337, 15347.
68. *Asie française*, XIII (June, 1913), 251; Pokrowski, *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210.
69. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15339, 15378.
70. Stieve, III, nos. 929, 951.
71. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15359; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 546, 554.
72. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15349.
73. *Orange Book*, nos. 57, 58.
74. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 331, 345; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 532, 535, 542.
75. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15340.
76. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 224–25; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 533, 538; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 298; *Orange Book*, nos. 42, 46, 54, and pp. 183–89.
77. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 534, 539, 540, 546; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 289; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15359.
78. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 225–34, on the conference, and *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567; *Orange Book*, pp. 190–272, gives the *procès-verbaux*.
79. Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (London, 1922), p. 271, says that Turkey viewed the Mandelstam plan as establishing a Russian protectorate.
80. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15344, 15361.
81. *London Daily Telegraph*, July 26, 1913, cited in *Armenia*, VII (September, 1913), 54–55.
82. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15366; *Aussenpolitik*, VI, nos. 8019, 8020; Stieve III, nos. 970–72. See also Giers's account of Dr. Lepsius' warnings to the Armenians on this point: *Orange Book*, no. 61. For the Adrianople question see Ernst C. Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 400–406.
83. Marchand, II, 112, 114; Robert de Caix, "Les chemins de fer d'Asie Mineure," *Asie française*, XIII (August, 1913), 333–36.
84. The Russian threat is interpreted by Stieve (in *Iswolsky and the World War*, tr. by E. W. Dickes [London, 1926], p. 156) as a thrust at the Straits after failure to reach

- them through the Balkans. This statement is echoed by Erich Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, tr. by A. E. Adams (Oxford, 1933), p. 455. Stieve thinks the Armenian question was raised for the purpose of getting to the Straits after the Balkan League collapsed, whereas actually it was raised six months before the Balkan League broke up. Pourtalès (*Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15339) saw that the ultimate objective of the Straits could not be gained for some years. Baron M. de Taube, *La politique russe d'avant-guerre* (Paris, 1928), pp. 305–307, shows that the Imperial Council recognized in July, 1913, that neither the Russian army nor the navy was ready for action.
85. Guinness, in *Nat'l Rev.*, LXII, 789–801; Buxton and Buxton, pp. 32–51; Staatsrat von Hahn, "Das sterbende Armenien," *Asien*, XII (August, 1913), 186; *Near East*, V (May 16, 1913), 31.
86. *Missionary Herald*, CIX (August, 1913), 345.
87. Diana Apar, "Russian Occupation of Armenia," *Armenia*, VII (August, 1913), 8–9.
88. Quoted in *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 5, 1913), 10.
89. *Near East*, V (July 4, 1913), 239.
90. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 547, 555; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 515.
91. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 152, 157; *Asie française*, XIII (August, 1913), 357–58.
92. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15376.
93. *Ibid.*, no. 15373; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 99; *Orange Book*, no. 59.
94. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15361, n., 15369, 15375; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567. Boghos Nubar declares that he personally persuaded the Wilhelmstrasse to co-operate further in the reform question: Boghos Nubar, *Note sur la question arménienne* (Paris, mimeographed 1916), pp. 8–10.
95. The negotiations may be followed in *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15369–15400; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 568–72; Marchand, II, 362; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 135, 171, 296; *Orange Book*, nos. 62, 63, 65–69, 73–79.
96. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 176, 179; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15394, 15395.
97. *Ibid.*, nos. 15386–15392; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 191, 208, 240; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 234–36; *Orange Book*, no. 78.
98. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15356; *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8183; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 564–66.
99. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15399; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 118.
100. *Ibid.*, no. 296; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15399. For Turkish counter-proposals, see *Orange Book*, nos. 86, 88, 91, 92.

101. *Le Temps*, Nov. 26, 1913, interview with Djavid Bey, cited *Asie française*, XIII (November, 1913), 485; *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26 and Aug. 16, 1913), 123, 240; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 581, 586 n.
102. *Ibid.*, nos. 569–79; Djemal, p. 272.
103. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15381; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 567, 586; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 124; Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie*, pp. 306–11; Djemal, p. 275; *Near East*, VI (Jan. 2, 1914), 283; *Asien*, XIII (November, 1913), 43; *Asie française*, XIII (November, 1913), 461–65.
104. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 586 n.
105. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 235–36; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 576–86; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 473, 514; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15401–15409.
106. *Ibid.*, no. 15406.
107. *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 9068.
108. E. Adamov, ed., *Die europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges* (Dresden, 1930), I, 81; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 440.
109. Siebert, III, no. 1002.
110. Marchand, II, 363–72; M. Pokrowski, *Drei Konferenzen* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 65–66. Professor Fay seems to interpret a sentence here which says that “in the event of a struggle for Constantinople a clash on the Turkish frontier must be regarded as unavoidable” as meaning that Armenia was to be used as a road to the Straits. Sidney B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1928), I, 541.
111. Freiherr von der Goltz, “Die militärische Lage der Türkei nach dem Balkankriege,” *Asiatisches Jahrbuch*, 1913, p. 7; Maurice Larcher, *La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1926), pp. 374–79.
112. Sazonov, p. 136.
113. R. J. Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders, IV,” *Slavonic Review*, VII (June, 1928), 104; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15411. Mutius, the German embassy counsellor, gives himself credit for persuading Talaat to agree to the plan: Gerhard von Mutius, “Die Türkei 1911–14,” *Preussische Jahrbücher* vol. 236:3 (June, 1934), p. 213.
114. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15412, 15413; Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, III, no. 1195; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 587; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 674, 688; *Orange Book*, nos. 112–15.
115. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15414–15418.
116. *Orange Book*, nos. 106, 109, 110, 116–19, 121, 122.
117. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 49.
118. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 25; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 588, 589; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 35.
119. *Ibid.*, I, no. 17; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 78, 107; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15421; *Orange Book*, nos. 111, 128.

120. Sazonov, p. 145.
121. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 190.
122. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 225, 240.
123. Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, IV, nos. 1234, 1247, 1252.
124. The last stages may be followed in *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15422–15424; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 588–90; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, nos. 9, 35, 49, 63, 120, 123, 135, 163, 186, 190, 205; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 56, 91, 96, 108, 202, 233; *Orange Book*, nos. 125–46.
125. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 362; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 591; *Orange Book*, no. 147.
126. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210.
127. Djemal, p. 276, says that one of the Turkish aims in 1914 was to get rid of the Russian-imposed reform.
128. Diana A. Apcar, *The Case of the Armenians*, a pamphlet of June 8, 1914.
129. *Missionary Herald*, CX (April, 1914), 180; *Asien*, XIII (May, 1914), 134.
130. Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, IV, no. 1326. On the negotiations for inspectors see *ibid.*, nos. 1281, 1292, 1293, 1301; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15426, 15428–15434; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 592–95; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 156; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, nos. 71, 177, 324, 333, 437.
131. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15425.
132. Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, IV, no. 1261; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 70–71.
133. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 362.
134. *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8772. Mandelstam is hopelessly wrong when he says that intervention by the powers was entirely dissociated from national policy toward Turkey, and motivated only by humanitarianism. “La protection des minorités,” *Recueil des Cours*, 1923, of the Académie du Droit International, p. 379.
135. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15361, 15368, 15372; *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8772.
- Added Note:* The question of how many Armenians lived in the so-called Armenian provinces of eastern Anatolia has been the subject of much recent investigation. Richard Hovanissian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley, 1967), briefly considers the problem. The most detailed work has been done by Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York, 1983). See also Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wis., 1985). It is evident that the Armenians were a majority in none of the provinces. Joseph Heller has examined the diplomacy of these years from the viewpoint of British policy, using documents from the Public Record Office, in “Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912–1914: A Study in Realpolitik,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 16 (1980): 3–26.